can nigeria achieve unity in diversity?

Case Study on the Management of Identity

Can Nigeria Achieve Unity in Diversity?

December 2010

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Case Study Prepared for

The Office of the Special Adviser of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

The Fund for Peace Conflict Early Warning and Assessment

Report Written by

Dr. Pauline H. Baker

Nate Haken

Will Ferroggiaro

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Foreword & Contents

This report—Can Nigeria Achieve

Unity in Diversity?—is the first in a series of

papers examining how different countries

manage ethnic, racial, religious, or other

identities in order to prevent conflict leading

to mass atrocities and genocide. The paper

examines Nigeria’s political institutions, legal

structures, and policy initiatives to address

the issues arising from its complex society.

Several measures were adopted to encourage

broad political inclusion and reduce the

potential for conflict. First, Nigeria has

created additional states from its original

four regionally-based states in order to

decentralize power to avoid secessionist

movements and respond to demands for

statehood from minorities. Second, a

constitutional provision was established

requiring “the federal character” to be

reflected through state representation at the

center through the “federal character”

principle, which requires the national cabinet

to include at least one minister from each of

the 36 states. At the local level, the

constitution provided for a preference for

“indigenes” (by custom, this refers to those

whose ancestors were original inhabitants of

the community) over “non-indigenes” (those

who migrated, or whose ancestors migrated,

to the area). These designations affect the

allocation of land, jobs, education, and

political appointments. Third, an informal

“power shifting” practice (sometimes

referred to as the “zoning” or “rotational”

rule) was adopted for the presidential

nomination process of the dominant political

party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). It

requires presidential nominees to rotate

between Southerners and Northerners at

least once every two terms (or eight years).

Fourth, the electoral system was amended to

discourage ethnic voting and secessionist

tendencies. It requires, in addition to the

popular vote, that a presidential candidate

has to receive one-quarter of the votes cast

in two-thirds of the states plus the federal

capital to be declared a winner. On the

surface, this provision appears to establish a

government based on a broad mandate; in

practice, it encourages political parties to

pressure local agents to record winning votes

in their areas at any cost. This requirement

has had the effect of incentivizing fraud in

elections, undermining political legitimacy,

and generating public cynicism about

elections generally. Finally, the positive

effects that might have emerged from these

efforts to foster political inclusion were

undermined by a steady trend toward

political centralization that emerged during

approximately three decades of military rule.

In sum, the Nigerian experience shows the

weakness of stressing form over function in

managing diversity. Nigeria’s challenges in

integrating ethnic, regional and religious

identities into a framework based on national

unity remain. Indeed, Nigeria could fragment

again, and particular groups could again

become targets of mass atrocities.

This paper and subsequent papers are

produced by The Fund for Peace working with

the cooperation of the United Nations Office

of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-

General on the Prevention of Genocide

(OSAPG) in order to assist the Special Adviser

in his early warning and prevention efforts.

The mandate of the Special Adviser is to

make recommendations to the Secretary-

General and through him, the United Nations

Security Council, to prevent genocide, and to

inform and educate opinion leaders and

policy makers on how to recognize and

prevent potential genocides. In support of

Introduction 5

Background 6

Application of the Genocide Framework 9

Inter-Group Relations 9

Capacity of the State 14

Presence of Illegal Arms and Armed Elements 16

Motivation of Leading Actors 16

Circumstances that Facilitate Genocide 17

Genocidal Acts 18

Evidence of Intent to Destroy 18

Triggering Factors 19

Conclusion and Recommendations 20

Endnotes 22

Appendix: UN Genocide Analysis Framework 24

About The Fund for Peace 27


Unity in Nigeria

Overview

the Office, the FfP is producing this series of

objective case studies that identify the

factors for identity conflict as well as

government actions that either exacerbate or

mitigate identity-related conflict. The

primary goal of the papers is to identify best

practices in how countries addressed identity

and fostered inclusion so as to avoid such

conflict.

The concept and modalities for the series of

papers, as well as the countries to be

examined, were jointly agreed between FfP

and OSAPG. The papers employ the OSAPG

Analysis Framework as a central lens on the

issues. Drafts of the papers are peer

reviewed by an independent expert reviewer

chosen by FfP, a senior UN official, and

OSAPG. The Fund for Peace finalizes the

papers for dissemination within the UN

system and to a broader public audience. This

initiative has been generously supported by

Humanity United, while the series of

dialogues on the papers is supported by The

Stanley Foundation.

The principal author of this paper is Dr.

Pauline H. Baker, President Emeritus of The

Fund for Peace. Senior Associates Will

Ferroggiaro and Nate Haken contributed

drafting, editing, and research, and FfP Intern

Shane Hensinger assisted in production of

the report. It was reviewed by John Campbell

(U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria 2004-2007); a

senior UN Department of Political Affairs

official; and the Special Adviser and his staff.

However, the views contained herein are

solely those of The Fund for Peace.


Overview

1. Nigeria was widely expected to be

a “showcase of democracy” and a “giant of

Africa” at the time of independence in 1960.

It had an agricultural economy, an educated

middle class, a large number of professionals

(judges, lawyers, civil servants, and

entrepreneurs), a free press, and a

parliamentary system based on a federal

constitution that was peacefully negotiated

with Britain, its former colonial ruler. It was

widely believed that when Nigeria celebrated

its fiftieth anniversary in 2010, it would have

a diversified economy, a robust democracy,

and a leading role in international diplomacy.

2. Boasting an estimated population of 158

million, Nigeria’s cultural diversity is a major

feature that has been one of the country’s

proudest characteristics.1 The most

heterogeneous country in Sub-Saharan Africa,

it contains at least 250 ethno-linguistic

groups, approximately half of whom are

Muslim, 40% Christian, and the remainder

adhering to traditional beliefs, although there

is often a blending of religious practices. The

country is more than twice the size of

California, with a variety of topographical

zones stretching from the arid southern rim

of the Sahara Desert in the north to the dense

tropical mangrove swamps of the Gulf of

Guinea in the south. Since independence, the

population has become increasingly young

(forty-two percent are under the age of

fourteen), urban (forty-eight percent live in

cities and towns), and unequal (billionaires

proliferate while 70% of the country is

classified as poor, with 35% living in

absolute poverty).2 The average life

expectancy is only forty-seven years and

average school retention is eight years.

The Harvard School of Public Health stated in

a recent study that “Nigeria stands ready to

collect a substantial demographic dividend if

it continues with recent positive economic

growth, improves health standards, and

harnesses a growing workforce.” However, it

warned that because of the “lost decade” of

the 1990s, when per capital GDP fell below

1980 levels, if Nigeria fails to take the

necessary steps soon, its prospects will be

bleak and could be catastrophic …

Demographic factors are steadily elevating

Nigeria’s risk of conflict.”3

3. Nigeria contains more historic pre-colonial

kingdoms than any other country in Africa,

some dating back to the fifth century. Its sixty

years of British colonial rule saw frequent

administrative reclassifications to unify the

ethnic and religious mosaic into a single

state. Post-independence leaders continued

to experiment with various methods of

political inclusion, many of which were highly

creative. Yet decades of military rule,

enormous oil profits, and a one party

dominant political system fostered political

centralization that strained national unity and

fostered unaccountability. While Nigeria has

exerted an influential voice in diplomatic

circles, its internal weaknesses have

prevented it from fulfilling its early promise.

Nigeria remains highly fragile, having

experienced a brutal civil war, military coups,

an armed insurgency, communal atrocities,

religious conflict, and the rise of

fundamentalist sects. The country is largely

governed by ex-generals and business

tycoons who operate as political “godfathers”

making back-room deals to wield power and

accumulate personal wealth. State

institutions remain weak, inter-group

relations are tense, the economy is suffering

from “the resource curse,” and national unity

is far from assured.


Unity in Nigeria

Introduction

4. While there were ethnic tensions

within the federation dating back to colonial

rule, the first appearance of violent ethnic-

based conflict in the country occurred in

1966, when a military coup d’état was

mounted following a rigged election in the

then Western Region. A group of mostly Igbo

army officers overthrew the northern Hausa

Fulani-dominated government, ostensibly to

eliminate political corruption. The murder

and mutilation of top government and

Muslim leaders was seen as an Igbo plot to

install an anti-northern government in power.

Following a pro-north counter-coup six

months later, fighting broke out nationwide

with pogroms targeting Igbos. Most were

driven back to their area of origin in the then

Eastern Region. A Middle Belt Christian

general, Yakubu Gowan, was selected as a

compromise candidate to run the military

government following the coup, but it was

too late to contain the forces of

fragmentation. In 1967, rebel Igbo leaders

declared the independence of the breakaway

state of Biafra (comprising the entire former

Eastern Region), a territory that was

populated not only by Igbos, but by

minorities who historically feared Igbo

domination—Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Calabari,

Rivers and others in the oil-rich Niger Delta.

One million people were estimated to have

died in the ensuing Nigerian Civil War (1967-

1970).

5. When the Nigerian military overran the

Biafran territory in 1970, there were

widespread fears of genocidal revenge

against the Igbos. Instead, the federal

government declared a “no victors, no

vanqui shed” pol i c y to p romote

reconciliation. Rebel leaders who had fled

the country were invited back; they were

neither put on trial nor punished. Forty years

after the end of the Biafran War,4 many

believe that there is still a bias against Igbos

occupying high offices. Yet Goodluck

Jonathan appointed an Igbo as Chief of Army

Staff, a key post, in September 2010 as part

of a general military shake-up, an action

applauded by Igbo civil groups. Whether an

Igbo could be nominated for president by a

major party remains an open question.

Windfall profits that the country received just

at the end of the civil war from the dramatic

rise in oil prices allowed the government to

soothe lingering ethnic grievances at the end

of the civil war. The distribution of oil money

and the policy of reconciliation eased the

reunion, and Nigeria turned its attention

toward becoming one of the wealthiest

countries in Africa, as the country’s economy

transitioned to one based largely on the

extractive industry.

6. While Nigeria rebounded quickly from the

civil war and there was no policy of

recrimination, the war and the subsequent

restructuring of the economy set the stage

for another source of unrest that erupted in

the 1980s—an armed insurgency by ethnic

minorities in the oil-producing Niger Delta

region, the minority areas of the former

breakaway Biafran region. Both the Biafran

War and the Niger Delta rebellion have

shaped the way Nigeria managed political

diversity. Several measures were adopted to

encourage broad political inclusion, of which

four are especially notable. It is important to

understand these efforts in order to grasp the

context in which inter-group relations exist

within the country.

7. First, there was a proliferation of states. In

the beginning, this was done to divide the

political opposition, but after the civil war it

was intended to decentralize power to avoid

more secessionist movements and respond to

demands for statehood from minorities. Out

of the original three regions at

independence, Nigeria was re-divided into

four “regions” in 1963, then into 12 “states”

in 1967, 19 in 1977, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991,

and 36 in 1996. The proliferation of states

led to a proliferation of bureaucracies and

patronage. It also prompted a new process of

disbursing federal revenue, particularly after

the civil war, when allocations began to be

distributed directly from the central

government to state governors who, in turn,

reallocated sums to local government

chairmen. This was the beginning of a new

revenue-allocation process which created

more opportunities for corruption as well as a

new class of power brokers—state governors

who continue to wield extensive influence.

Revenue distribution focused on which

persons received funds in the hierarchy of

power rather than which authorities, such as

the state legislatures or treasuries. Political

competition for holding office, even at the

local level, then intensified dramatically

because the winners had direct access to

revenue from oil allocations.

8. Second, a constitutional provision was

established requiring state representation to

be reflected at the center through the

“federal character” principle, which requires

the national cabinet to include at least one

minister from each of the 36 states. At the

local level, the constitution provided for a

preference for “indigenes” (by custom, this

refers to those whose ancestors were original

inhabitants of the community) over “non-

indigenes” (those who migrated, or whose

ancestors migrated, to the area). The

designation affects the allocation of land,

jobs, education, and political appointments.

However, the definition of “indigene” versus

“non-indigene” is unclear in the constitution.

The principle has had the negative effect of

establishing two classes of citizens, with


Unity in Nigeria

Background

different rights in different areas of the

country. This has led to inter-group clashes,

particularly in mixed communities in the

North, including cities with substantial

clusters of Nigerians who migrate to towns

for economic opportunity. They are often

regarded as “foreigners” by the locals, even if

their families have lived there for

generations.

9. Third, an informal “power shifting” practice

(sometimes referred to as the “zoning” or

“rotational” rule) was adopted for the

presidential nomination process of the

dominant political party, the Peoples

Democratic Party (PDP). Unwritten and

untested in court, this principle has become

accepted as standard practice by most

political parties. It requires presidential

nominees to rotate between Christian

Southerners and Muslim Northerners at least

once every two terms (or eight years). Over

time, it has created constitutional crises, as

happened with the death of President Umaru

Yar’Adua, a Muslim northerner, in June 2010,

before the expiration of his first term. His

death meant that there was an automatic

power shift from the North to the South. This

set off an intense controversy over whether

Yar’Adua’s successor, Vice President

Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from the South-

South region, was entitled to run for political

office in the 2011 election under the zoning

rule. Leaders from the North claimed he could

not, as Yar’Adua had not served his full

term.5 Others, especially from the South-

South, argued that Jonathan should be

allowed to run for office, and that the power-

shifting rule should be dropped.

10. Fourth, the electoral system was

amended to discourage ethnic voting and

secessionist tendencies. It requires, in

addition to the popular vote, that a

presidential candidate has to receive one-

quarter of the votes cast in each of two-thirds

of the states plus the federal capital to be

declared a winner. On the surface, this

provision appears to establish a government

based on a broad mandate; in practice, it

encourages political parties to pressure local

agents to record winning votes in their areas

at any cost, including rigging, to meet the

necessary electoral quotas. This requirement

has had the effect of incentivizing fraud in

elections, undermining the political

legitimacy of several presidencies, and

generating public cynicism about elections

generally.

11. At the time they were adopted, these four

measures to broaden political representation

were thought to be the political glue that

would bring diverse elements of the country

together. However, they had unintended

consequences that often produced the

opposite effect. Institutionalizing ethno-

religious identity as the centerpiece of

political representation downgraded merit

and performance as qualifications for office

and reinforced political competition along

ethno-religious lines. In addition, ambiguities

about the rights of indigenes and non-

indigenes eroded the concept of citizenship

with equal rights under the law throughout

the country.

12. The power-shifting or zoning principle

caused other political difficulties, in

particular, tensions regarding presidential

succession. The debate over the nomination

process following Yar’Adua’s death

threatened key policy initiatives, including

the amnesty and cease fire for the Niger

Delta. It also deepened splits within the

ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and

sharpened the north-south/Muslim-Christian

rivalries.

13. Moreover, these measures intensified the

gap between minorities, on the one hand,

which represent roughly 40% of the

population, and the big three ethnic groups—

the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo—

on the other hand, which together represent

60% of the population. Historically, the big

three have had more access to government

jobs, contracts, education, and political

patronage. Minority grievances have been

expressed in many ways in different parts of

the country. In the Niger Delta, they exploded

in the 1990s into an armed insurgency in the

core oil-producing states in the southeast

part of the country. In the Middle Belt and

mixed cities in the north with many

minorities, communal clashes have been

common for decades, breaking out most

frequently when land and water became

scarce. The conflict in the Niger Delta with

several minorities did not involve religious

disputes (its population is predominantly

Christian); the causes of friction there were

rooted in grievances from environmental

degradation and competition for resources.6

14. Finally, the positive effects that might

have emerged from these efforts to foster

political inclusion were undermined by a

steady trend toward political centralization

that emerged during approximately three

decades of military rule. From 1970 to 1999,

power and wealth was concentrated in the

hands of unaccountable military elites and

their business associates, even as steps were

being taken to devolve formal power to the

states. When civilian rule returned in 1999,

there was little change in this trend, as the

system benefited civilian politicians as well

as generals. Since most government revenue

came from oil profits rather than taxes, and

since the PDP had become the dominant

political party, the ruling elites had ample


Background

resources for using patronage to maintain

control. Opposition parties were represented

in the national assembly and at the state

level. In this respect, the creation of more

states and the distribution of revenue

allowed state governors to become

formidable political actors in their own right.

Nonetheless, even if they belonged to

opposition parties, they, too, assimilated into

the political system that is widely known in

Nigeria as being based on political

“godfathers” or informal power brokers,

consisting of former office-holders, ex-

generals, business leaders, state governors,

powerful local government chairmen, and

current federal officials, who use patronage

and oil revenues for self-aggrandizement and

political survival.

15. As a result, the cultivation of democratic

institutions, the elimination of poverty, and

the building of critical infrastructure have all

been neglected. With that neglect, federalism

weakened, corruption soared, economic

development stalled, the integrity of state

institutions eroded, inequality worsened, and

the North/South rivalry intensified. As the

quality and capacity of governance declined,

many groups felt marginalized and alienated,

as the state failed to provide basic services,

including security and justice. The erosion of

the judicial system, in particular, prompted

twelve northern states, or one-third of the

country, to adopt Sharia law in 2000, to

achieve some form of dispute resolution and

to instill a moral code that secular courts

lacked. While the Islamic code had been

practiced in civil cases in Nigeria for

centuries, this was the first time it was

applied to criminal violations, with harsh

punishments from the Islamic code that are

offensive to human rights advocates. In 2002,

Islamic law was also adopted in a southern

state, Oyo, for civil law cases only, such as

marriage, divorce, and land issues.

16. Though formally exempting Christians,

Sharia law created fear among Christians

living in states that adopted it. Violent riots

erupted, particular in northern cities with

Christian populations. Nigeria’s Islamic elites

have traditionally been moderate, so the

more radical versions of Sharia law are also a

threat to the Muslim establishment,

particularly the emirs and imams who have

managed Islamic practices in the past.

However, Islamic radicalism appears to be

attractive in areas with poor governance and

low economic development, such as the

impoverished North, where agricultural and

manufacturing sectors have withered as the

country’s oil industry prospered.

17. In this atmosphere, inter-group friction

has grown. Some estimates put the number

of civilians who have died from inter-

communal violence since 1999 as high as

13,000 (thirteen thousand), a figure which

others have challenged as being too low.

There is no authoritative figure, and while

commissions have been established, there

has been no official investigation.7 Most

perpetrators have gone unpunished,

especially those who incited communal

violence in the Northern and Middle Belt

regions. Rebels in the Niger Delta have also

widened their range of operations, with the

Ijaws in the forefront of armed resistance.

Some militants accepted the Yar’Adua

amnesty offer made in June 2009, but hold-

outs have resumed scattered attacks due to

disappointment over unfulfilled promises of

training and employment, the lack of a

political process that addresses the root

issues behind the rebellion, and the absence

of a robust reintegration program. Most of

the amnesty program is based simply on “buy

-outs” of individuals, a practice that is not

sustainable. Once payments to the ex-

militants stop, they could go back to

militancy or crime due to economic

desperation. Criminality in the Niger Delta

has increased, including armed robbery,

k idnapping for ransom, poli t ica l

assassinations, and violence against

journalists.

18. In sum, although the resolution of the

Nigerian civil war succeeded in preserving

the territorial integrity of the country, it did

not resolve the fundamental problem of

integrating ethnic, regional and religious

identities into a framework based on national

unity. Nigeria could fragment again, and

particular groups could again become targets

of mass atrocities.

19. The Nigerian experience shows the

weakness of stressing form over function in

managing diversity. There were political

motives behind some of the measures

adopted to institutionalize diversity, but

there was also a sincere desire to avert break

-away movements that could split the

country apart. Because these measures were

not well thought-out or implemented,

however, they had unintended consequences

that undermined national unity and created

or deepened group grievances. As Nigeria

enters a new political era, it is an open

question whether sufficient reforms will be

made to reverse these trends. Communal

groups cannot be adequately protected until

there is good governance, the rule of law,

equal citizenship rights, fiscal transparency,

equitable economic development, and an end

to impunity for violators of human rights—all

of which will require committed leadership

backed by an inter-ethnic and inter-religious

elite coalition dedicated to achieving these

goals.


Background

20. Violence among identity groups

has occurred several times in different

locations over the course of fifty years of

Nigerian independence. Historically, targeted

acts of genocide on a large scale were

committed only once—in the period

preceding the outbreak of the Biafran War

when the more prosperous, educated and

Christian Igbo people were blamed for the

first military coup d’état that overthrew the

central government, then dominated by the

Muslim northern region. Pogroms were

launched against Igbos shortly afterward,

driving them back to their homeland in the

East. Thousands were killed. However, the

Biafran War (1967-1970) itself was not a

genocidal war, despite a perception fueled by

press accounts of alleged deliberate

starvation. Nor was it primarily a war over

control of oil, which was not being produced

in large quantities at the time. Rather, it was a

war to repress secession, or, as the

government described it—to “Keep Nigeria

One.” The reality was summed up by John de

St. Jorre, an independent journalist:

First, there was no ‘genocide’, massacres or

gratuitous killings; in the history of warfare

there can rarely have been such a

bloodless end and such a merciful

aftermath. Secondly, the expectations (and

some of the reports) of mass starvation

were not fulfilled…But there was mass

hunger and there were concentrations of

starving, sick and exhausted people,

usually refugees caught a long way from

home, some of whom died because aid was

too slow in reaching them. There is no

accurate figure for this category and

probably never will be, though it ran into

thousands, possibly even hundreds of

thousands.…Apart from the patchy

handling of the relief situation the most

outstanding feature of the end of the war

was the remarkable atmosphere of

reconciliation…It was marvelous to see

officers and men who had been facing

each other over the barrel of a gun for two

and a half years embrace and weep tears of

joy.8

21. Since the end of the war, Igbos have been

divided into seven states, two of which are

inhabited largely by other minority groups.

Fostering state identities and creating more

local governments would make it harder for

groups to secede, it was thought. Igbos

reported that they faced discrimination in the

immediate post-war period, particularly by

being purged from the upper ranks of the

military, but they gradually prospered in

private enterprise, thrived in the informal

economy, and acquired high positions in the

political parties and government, including

eventually the armed forces. Nonetheless,

some Igbos continue to express feelings of

psychological and economic marginalization,

even though they remain one of the largest

and most influential groups in the country.

While they are not usually the primary

targets, Igbos have been victimized by riots in

the North aimed generally at Southerners. In

July 2007, the former Biafran leader, General

Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, renewed his call

for secession of Igbo states. This call has not

been widely supported. Indeed, some Igbos

argue that, having shed their blood, they

have earned the right to be part of Nigeria. An

intra-ethnic debate such as this is not an

uncommon legacy of civil war, but it shows

that Igbos have not fully reconciled their dual

role in the country’s history—a group

responsible for the break-up of the country

and a targeted victim of ethnic cleansing. In

seeming contradiction to this revived call for

secession, Ojukwu and others have also

called for Igbos to have “their turn” at the

Nigerian presidency.

22. Another crisis in Nigeria’s attempts to

deal with identity occurred with the Yoruba

people, who became the central focus of

concern when the country’s freest and fairest

election was annulled depriving them of

power in 1993 by the then president, Major-

General Ibrahim Babamasi Babangida, known

as IBB. The Yoruba form the majority

population in six states in the southwest, and

they represent substantial proportions of the

population in three additional states.9 Their

moment appeared to have arrived when

Nigerians went to the polls on June 12, 1993

to end military rule and select a civilian

government. Early results showed that

Moshood Abiola, a wealthy and popular

Muslim Yoruba businessman, was winning a

landslide victory. However, Babangida, a

Nupe from Niger State, abruptly annulled the

election before results were released, setting

off massive demonstrations that paralyzed

several Nigerian cities and led to threats of

Yoruba secession. Due to riots, strikes, and

protests from a strong Yoruba-led

prodemocracy movement, Babangida was

forced to step down and turn over power to

an interim government. That government

lasted only three months before Defense

Minister Gen. Sani Abacha, a Muslim from

Kano State, led a coup d’état in November.

Abacha dissolved all civilian institutions,

including the national legislature and state

governments. His regime was the most

authoritarian military government in Nigeria’s

history and it was responsible for many

human rights violations, including executing

activists from the Niger Delta, arresting

political opponents, and intimidating the

press. The Abacha government jailed Abiola

for sedition in 1994. In a bizarre twist,


Unity in Nigeria

Application of the Genocide Framework

Inter-Group Relations

Abacha died suddenly of an apparent heart

attack in June 1998, and within a month, so

did Abiola.10 He collapsed during a meeting

with high-level U.S. officials who were trying

to arrange a diplomatic solution to the

political impasse. The Yoruba were outraged

that not only had the election been stolen

from them and their leader imprisoned, but

now, as he was going to be released, it was

rumored that he had been poisoned to

prevent his installation in office.11 This crisis

brought Nigeria closer to a break-up than at

any other time since the end of the civil war.

23. In the 1999 election that followed the

death of Abiola, a Yoruba was voted into

office—retired Major-General Olusegun

Obasanjo, partly in deference to the

aggrieved feelings of marginalization by the

Yoruba population. A Christian, Obasanjo was

a former head of state who had also been

imprisoned by Abacha. As the military leader

in charge of the incursion that ended the

Biafra war, his disciplined forces had been

credited with avoiding a genocidal aftermath.

Although it was a flawed election, the 1999

poll was widely seen by Nigerians as a means

to send the soldiers back to their barracks

and return the country to civilian rule. That

blood, they have earned the right to be part

of Nigeria. An intra-ethnic debate such as this

is not an uncommon legacy of civil war, but it

shows that Igbos have not fully reconciled

their dual role in the country’s history—a

group responsible for the break-up of the

country and a targeted victim of ethnic

cleansing. In seeming contradiction to this

revived call for secession, Ojukwu and others

have also called for Igbos to have “their turn”

at the Nigerian presidency.

22. Another crisis in Nigeria’s attempts to

deal with identity occurred with the Yoruba

people, who became the central focus of

concern when the country’s freest and fairest

election was annulled depriving them of

power in 1993 by the then president, Major-

General Ibrahim Babamasi Babangida, known

as IBB. The Yoruba form the majority

population in six states in the southwest, and

they represent substantial proportions of the

population in three additional states.9 Their

moment appeared to have arrived when

Nigerians went to the polls on June 12, 1993

to end military rule and select a civilian

government. Early results showed that

Moshood Abiola, a wealthy and popular

Muslim Yoruba businessman, was winning a

landslide victory. However, Babangida, a

Nupe from Niger State, abruptly annulled the

election before results were released, setting

off massive demonstrations that paralyzed

several Nigerian cities and led to threats of

Yoruba secession. Due to riots, strikes, and

protests from a strong Yoruba-led

prodemocracy movement, Babangida was

forced to step down and turn over power to

an interim government. That government

lasted only three months before Defense

Minister Gen. Sani Abacha, a Muslim from

Kano State, led a coup d’état in November.

Abacha dissolved all civilian institutions,

including the national legislature and state

governments. His regime was the most

authoritarian military government in Nigeria’s

history and it was responsible for many

human rights violations, including executing

activists from the Niger Delta, arresting

political opponents, and intimidating the

press. The Abacha government jailed Abiola

for sedition in 1994. In a bizarre twist,

Abacha died suddenly of an apparent heart

attack in June 1998, and within a month, so

did Abiola.10 He collapsed during a meeting

with high-level U.S. officials who were trying

to arrange a diplomatic solution to the

political impasse. The Yoruba were outraged

that not only had the election been stolen

from them and their leader imprisoned, but

now, as he was going to be released, it was

rumored that he had been poisoned to

prevent his installation in office.11 This crisis

brought Nigeria closer to a break-up than at

any other time since the end of the civil war.

23. In the 1999 election that followed the

death of Abiola, a Yoruba was voted into

office—retired Major-General Olusegun

Obasanjo, partly in deference to the

aggrieved feelings of marginalization by the

Yoruba population. A Christian, Obasanjo was

a former head of state who had also been

imprisoned by Abacha. As the military leader

in charge of the incursion that ended the

Biafra war, his disciplined forces had been

credited with avoiding a genocidal aftermath.

Although it was a flawed election, the 1999

poll was widely seen by Nigerians as a means

to send the soldiers back to their barracks

and return the country to civilian rule. That

Obasanjo was a Yoruba helped ease the

transition. Northern political “godfathers”

reluctantly acquiesced to Obasanjo as a way

to get beyond the crisis and preserve the

union. In addition, the PDP adopted the

principle of power-shifting in order to assure

the Yorubas that they and other groups could

get more than one chance at the political

helm. Obasanjo benefited most from this new

principle. He won a second term in 2003

(although that election was also regarded as

rigged), and he tried, but ultimately failed, to

change the constitution to run for a third

term in 2007.

24. When thwarted in his quest for a third

term by a legislative vote prompted by a

massive outcry from the public, Obasanjo, as

party leader, hand-picked his successor,



Umaru Yar’Adua, a little-known Muslim

governor from Katsina State. Thus, power

passed power back to the North per the

zoning principle. When Yar’Adua died in

2010 before he could complete his first full

term in office, Vice President Goodluck

Jonathan, a Christian Southerner, succeeded

him. This not only shifted power back again

to the South, it opened up the contest for the

presidency in 2011. In August 2010, the PDP,

after considerable controversy, decided to

waive the zoning principle which would have

prevented the PDP nomination of Jonathan,

but it also reaffirmed the principle, creating

confusion. After much speculation and just

four months before the election, Goodluck

Jonathan announced that he would run for

the presidency in January 2011.

25. In addition to deaths from the civil war

and the disturbances surrounding the 1993

election controversy, tens of thousands of

other people have been killed in sectarian

violence over the years. However, no single

group stands out as being at risk of genocide.

Rather, identity-based violence—some

thought to be planned, some spontaneous—

often erupts from local causes, such as access

to jobs, land, education, economic

opportunity, damage to the environment, and

control of local government. These disputes

can easily spiral into identity-related

conflicts that have wider national

significance, instigated by leaders who want

to advance their own agendas. There have

also been rebellions by fundamentalist

Muslim sects, such as the Maitatsine riots in

the 1980s and Boko Haram unrest in the

2000s, both of which triggered massive

responses from the federal government.

Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Benue, and Taraba

states have all had bloody clashes in the

1990s and the 2000s, often involving

religious disputes between Christians and

Muslims, intra-religious rivalry among Muslim

sects, or competition over resources.

26. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999,

inter-group conflict has been concentrated in

the Middle Belt states, an area sometimes

called a “mini-Nigeria” because it is the most

heterogeneous part of the country. Plateau

State and the area around its regional capital,

Jos, have some 50-100 ethnic groups, none of

which are dominant. Until the last ten years,

these groups lived in peace.12 Formerly the

center of the tin-mining industry, its main

economic activities today are cattle-raising

by Hausa Fulani nomads and agriculture by

local residents or “indigenes.” As agriculture

has expanded, both land and access to water

for cattle have been in limited supply,

inducing friction between the two

communities.13 Droughts, population growth,

and expanded settlement have sharpened

the differences between Muslims and

Christians. In 2001, 1,000 persons were killed

and mosques and churches burned in inter-

group riots that were sparked when a non-

indigenous Muslim received a local

government job that indigenous Christians

believed belong to them. In 2004, more than

500 people were murdered in cycles of

religious revenge. In 2008, disputes over

local council polls erupted in violence with

900 killed, and another 300 were later killed

in a dispute over a plot of land. In January

2010, an estimated 500 Muslims were killed

over land-use disputes between Muslim

Hausa-Fulani herders and Christian farmers

from local ethnic groups. Two months later,

there was a retaliatory attack by Muslims for

the Christian attack in January, resulting in

another 500 dead. Sporadic killings

continued months later. Whereas most of the

states in the North are Muslim, Plateau State

is an exception in that it is largely Christian,

never having been conquered by the 19th

century Muslim Sokoto caliphate.

27. Another source of friction is the vague

definition of an “indigene.”14 By custom, the

term refers to people whose ancestors

originally inhabited the area. Preference for

indigenes, or “sons of the soil,” is common

throughout the country. In effect, it has

created two classes of citizens: preferred-

status indigenes and secondary-status non-

indigenes, even if the latter may have resided

in, owned property, or used land in the area

for generations. Preference for indigenes is a

widely-accepted discriminatory practice that

has been institutionalized in the law. A

constitutional remedy eliminating

preferences would help reduce the tension,

but it would not suffice unless the cultural

practice of discrimination based on area of

origin was outlawed altogether.

28. Besides the North, another area of unrest

is the Niger Delta which formally consists of

nine states in the south-eastern part of the

country, where the jugular vein of the

economy, the oil industry, is located.15 Over

40 ethnic groups speaking some 250 dialects

live in this area, including Efik, Ibibio, Annang,

Oron, Ogoni, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Igbo, Urhobo,

Yoruba, and Kalabari. Commercial oil

production has existed in Nigeria since the

1950s, but the industry did not take off until

the 1970s, when international prices soared

and major reserves of the highly desirable

“sweet c rude” were di scovered.

Environmental degradation has increased in

the producing areas of the Niger Delta since

that time. The government has neglected to

compensate the local population or protect

the environment from leakages, gas flaring,

and other abuses that have polluted the air,



soil and water, damaging arable land and

fishing stocks. A report in The New York

Times comparing the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill in

the U.S. to the Nigerian experience, estimated

that an average of 11 million gallons of oil

(more than the Exxon Valdez) a year has

spilled into the Niger Delta for the past 50

years.16

29. Antagonism had been building in the area

for years, but the tipping point in the Niger

Delta came in November 1995, when the

Abacha military government executed nine

ethnic Ogoni activists, including Ken Saro-

Wiwa, a popular spokesperson for the Ogoni

people, creating an international outcry. From

that time onward, the region has been a

hotbed of ethnic violence, with attacks

concentrated on multinational oi l

installations and government targets.

However, the rebellion is not unified in its


Percent Incidence of Poverty versus Self-Assessment by Nigerian Region and State

Zones State Incidence of Poverty

Self-Assessment: Very Poor

North Central Benue 55.33 26.15

Kogi 88.55 28.63

Kwara 85.22 32.57

Nassarawa 61.59 19.23

Niger 63.90 18.10

Plateau 60.37 19.42

Average 69.16 24.02

North East Adamawa 71.73 26.97

Bauchi 86.29 27.01

Borno 53.63 36.86

Gombe 77.01 12.25

Taraba 62.15 29.71

Yobe 83.25 26.29

Average 72.34 26.52

North West Jigawa 95.07 13.87

Kaduna 50.24 11.87

Kano 61.29 18.40

Katsina 71.06 5.60

Kebbi 89.65 12.53

Sokoto 76.81 17.89

Zamfara 80.93 18.52

Average 75.01 14.10

Zones State Incidence of Poverty

Self-Assessment: Very Poor

South East Abia 22.27 34.45

Anambra 20.11 16.19

Ebonyi 43.33 36.74

Enugu 31.12 17.24

Imo 27.39 25.42

Average 29.21 26.16

South South Akwa Ibom 34.82 16.86

Bayelsa 19.98 61.48

C/River 41.61 21.70

Delta 45.35 25.13

Edo 33.09 34.51

Rivers 29.09 14.93

Average 33.99 29.10

South West Ekiti 42.27 35.57

Lagos 63.58 16.84

Ogun 31.73 18.55

Ondo 42.14 34.12

Osun 32.35 20.45

Oyo 24.08 12.51

Average 39.36 23.01

These statistics are broken down according to the six economic zones of the country, with the

zonal averages in bold. Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, Social

Statistics in Nigeria, 2005, available at http://www.nigeriastat.gov.ng/, accessed April 8, 2010.


goals. Some militants have kidnapped

civilians for ransom, and there have been

infighting as well. In 1997, for example, the

Urhobo, Itsekiri, and Ijaw fought over the

relocation of a local government

headquarters, a move that would determine

the distribution of oil revenues among the

three groups. The offer of a ceasefire and

amnesty by the late president Yar’Adua

divided the militants deeply as well.

30. Leading the insurgency are the Ijaws, the

fourth largest ethnic group in the country and

the largest in the Niger Delta, spread over six

states,17 but—unlike the Igbos, Yoruba, and

Hausa-Fulani—they do not constitute the

majority in any one of them. Anti-government

protests over the environment originated

with the Ogoni, but the Ijaws have effectively

been in the forefront in armed protest which

succeeded, at its height in 2009, in reducing

oil production by as much as 25%. The Ijaws

also use the language of ethnic nationalism

to mobilize many of the diverse peoples of

the region around the cause of greater justice

for the peoples of the Niger Delta.

31. According to government reports,

President Yar’Adua’s amnesty program

reportedly had lured about 20,000 fighters

into the rehabilitation program,18 but some

recalcitrant remnants of MEND (Movement

for the Emancipation of the People of the

Niger Delta) did not respond positively and

threatened to resume the insurgency. Lack of

development in the region drives much of the

popular support enjoyed by the militants,

even though they are divided by internal

splits, have corrupt leaders, and indulge in

criminal acts, including kidnapping, bombings

and “bunkering”—the illegal theft of oil.19

Since petroleum represents 95% of the

country’s export earnings and 80% of

government revenues, resolving the

insurrection in the Niger Delta is vital to the

country’s economic survival. Even a small

group of hold-outs could wreak havoc on the

industry.

32. Another source of communal conflict in

Nigeria is the wider tension between the

North and South. This is based both on

historical and cultural differences as well as

on a growing disparity between rich and

poor, which have led to perceptions of group-

based inequality generally. For example,

rebels in the Niger Delta believe that a

greater share of the oil money will resolve

their development problems. They argue that

this will ensure that they will not be

politically repressed or economically

marginalized. However, Nigeria’s oil-

producing states already receive huge

revenue allocations, but due to corruption

and the system of revenue distribution, the

funds have not reached the grass-roots level.

This is not likely to change simply by

throwing more money at the problem.

Moreover, contrary to widespread

impression, overall poverty rates are actually

more severe in the North than in the South.

When the average of number of people living

above the poverty line in each region is

divided by the average Gross Domestic

Product of that region, the South-South,

where the Ijaw live, has the smallest

proportion of impoverished inhabitants, as

seen in the chart on page opposite. The issue

is not the total number of people living in

poverty, but rather the poverty rate relative

to the amount of revenue being generated by

the region. This may explain why more

people in the South-South tend to assess

themselves as “very poor” compared to other

Nigerians, despite the fact that the

percentage of poor people (i.e., those living

below the poverty line) in the North is much

higher.

33. In real terms, the North is worse off than

most other parts of the country. De-

industrialization has hit many cities hard in

the region, especially Kano and Kaduna,

which have faced high unemployment, the

emergence of fundamentalist sects, and

growing frustration among youth. The

adoption of Sharia law in the 12 northern

states has also sharpened Northern identity.

Historically, even though there have been

cultural differences, religion has not been a

cause for violence in the country. Since the

1990s, tensions have flared over resources,

revenue allocation, and local government

control. As a result, inter-communal violence

between Muslims and Christians has

worsened. Religious tolerance is weakening

not only because of resource issues, but also

because of cultural sensitivities, such as

disputes over Muslim prayer in public places,

the ability of Christian women to ride

motorbikes in Muslim areas, and the holding

of beauty contests. For example, in 2002, the

Miss World beauty contest had to be moved

from Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, to London

following violent attacks by Muslim youths

who were angered by what they believed

were inflammatory, anti-Islam news

commentaries surrounding the pageant.20



34. The National Assembly of Nigeria

is moderately strong, and has demonstrated

independence of the executive, notably by

denying former President Olusegun

Obasanjo’s bid to change the constitution to

allow him to run for a third term in 2007. The

Parliamentary Powers’ Index places Nigeria at

about the 50th percentile globally with a

score of 0.47.21 Thus, there is a significant

degree of potential legislative independence

when the issue is sufficiently salient to

generate a popular outcry. The legislature is

backed by a 1999 constitution that could

legally protect citizens from being victims of

genocide should warning signs be recognized

and acted upon, though it is uncertain

whether the security apparatus could act

quickly in that capacity.

35. The political party system is less

developed, as it has drifted from a multiparty

system at the time of independence toward a

one party-dominant system since the return

to civilian rule in 1999. The PDP has won

every presidential election since then. It

dominates both houses of the national

legislature, and controls three-quarters of the

state governorships. In the aftermath of the

transition to power of President Goodluck

Jonathan in 2010, however, and the resulting

controversy over power-shifting, party in-

fighting broke out. The PDP leadership

suspended 19 prominent dissident members

for criticizing the lack of transparency in

selecting candidates for political office.

Power struggles centered on the role of the

Southern president, who is resented by

Northerners who feel his succession violates

the zoning principle. Reformers are calling

for revamping the system, maintaining that

the state governors have become too

powerful and are overtaking the party

machinery in the nomination process. Each

state governor has his own patronage system,

his own party machinery, and very often his

own militia or team of mercenaries who can

be mobilized during elections to manipulate

polling outcomes. If the PDP splits, two

outcomes are possible: more open

competition in a two party or multiparty

system, or further fragmentation, such that

no clear majority is possible to attain.

36. Other state institutions are weak, given

the history of military rule and the dominant

role of “godfathers.” The constitution

provides for an independent judiciary, but

the once proud justice system is a shadow of

its former self, susceptible to political

pressure and corruption, except for justices

on the Supreme Court who have

demonstrated some independence.

According to the World Bank’s World

Governance Indicators, Nigeria is the weakest

of the world’s 20 most populous countries

concerning the Rule of Law. According to the

Bank’s evaluation, people do not “have

confidence in and abide by the rules of

society, in particular the quality of contract

enforcement, the police, and the courts, as

well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”

The erosion of the system of justice was a

major factor in driving the adoption of Sharia

law in the North, as well as permitting

impunity whenever violence breaks out.

37. The security forces also present

challenges. The military has good capacity

regarding peacekeeping missions, having

served with distinction after some

unfortunate initial assignments in West

Africa. No one has produced an authoritative

study on ethnic representation in the armed

forces. Prior to Obasanjo’s presidential terms,

the military’s officer ranks were primarily

staffed by Northerners, with the rank and file

soldiers recruited predominantly from the

Middle Belt states. Obasanjo diversified the

upper ranks, but the rank and file is still

thought to be primarily from the Middle Belt.

In September 2010, President Goodluck

Jonathan replaced the top brass of the

security establishment, appointing new

service chiefs, a new Director of the State

Security Services (SSS), and a new acting

Inspector General of Police. Military and

police leadership shake-ups are common

with new administrations. This new shake-up

involves people from several regions of the

country. The military is used by the

government to impose domestic order and it

exercises its firepower freely, often

indiscriminately, killing many non-

combatants. The security forces are often

accused of abuse and political favoritism.

After the 2010 violence in Jos, for example,

Christians alleged bias on the part of the

military against them, and called for Major-

General Saleh Maina, the commanding officer

in Jos, to be held accountable for alleged

abuses by security forces that were sent in to

quell the Jos disturbances. In the past, the

security forces had been accused of taking

the side of Christians in similar clashes. The

then Chief of the Army Staff, Lt-General

Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau, denied these

allegations. One issue that has not been

seriously debated is the structure of the

police force, a national institution.22 Local

populations often feel that national police do

not know the culture, speak the language, or

are familiar with the terrain of the areas over

which they have jurisdiction. The federal

government, however, is reluctant to have

locally-controlled and locally-recruited

police for fear that they may support break-

away movements or become more ethnically-

oriented, rather than nationally oriented in

their loyalties. However, initiatives to


Capacity of the State to Prevent Genocide


decentralize power in order to strengthen

security might consider establishing local

police, with civilian review boards to oversee

disputes concerning abusive behavior,

resource allocation, and policies concerning

training, promotions, and codes of conduct.

That might also be a way of building public

confidence in the police.

38. A serious problem in the security forces is

impunity and lack of accountability. This

issue is especially severe among the police,

who are underpaid, undertrained,

overstretched, and not held accountable for

undisciplined behavior, such as extra-judicial

killings. They have been accused of routinely

torturing and killing suspects, particularly

those who cannot afford to bribe them.

Human Rights Watch stated in its 2008 report

on Nigeria that some 10,000 Nigerians have

been shot and killed by the Nigerian national

police force since 2000 during the course of

police operations. Amnesty International

accused the police of killing at will and

conducting their own executions.

39. In the Niger Delta, vulnerable groups lack

institutional protections against extensive

criminality, as well as political unrest. The

Ijaws, who represent the majority of

organized militants in the Niger Delta, could

be the most likely targets of extra-judicial

killings or excessive use of force by the

military. Should the Niger Delta conflict not

be settled, the potential exists for an

escalation along ethnic lines, especially if the

amnesty program collapses.

40. While the security forces have been

accused of exercising a heavy hand when

operating in the Niger Delta, they are

frequently absent when conflict initially

breaks out; especially in the communal

conflicts that erupt in the North. When rioting

occurs and an emergency erupts, police and

military set up roadblocks, establish curfews,

and bring order. When the violence subsides,

they typically withdraw, leaving the drivers

of conflict and often the perpetrators of

violence untouched. Shamaki Gad Peter, the

Director of the Nigerian League for Human

Rights, has argued that those responsible for

violence in the North typically go free. “Most

of those arrested are usually minors who

cannot be legally subjected to such criminal

prosecutions. Many of the suspects arrested

say they have sponsors, but at the end of the

day, the sponsors are neither prosecuted nor

their names disclosed to the public.”23

According to legal experts and human rights

groups, “perpetrators of mass killings in

Nigeria have largely gone unpunished over

the past decade.”24 Investigations by Human

Rights Watch into inter-communal violence

that has killed more than 13,000 people in

the North since 1999 showed that

commissions are often set up and

recommendations made, but no effective

action taken.25 In addition, the military,

including the Joint Task Force, the special

unit created to combat the rebellion in the

Niger Delta, and the Nigerian Navy, have been

implicated in oil bunkering, a highly lucrative

criminal activity. However, there have been

no investigations into such allegations.

41. The media is very active, independent,

and outspoken, providing probably the best

voice internally against the perpetration of

organized violence and an end to impunity.

There are over 100 national and local

publications, many of which are privately-

owned and critical of the government, as well

as hundreds of broadcast outlets licensed by

the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission.

However, Freedom House has asserted that

there have been cases in which security

agencies used arbitrary detention and

extrajudicial measures to muffle political

activism and restrict press coverage.

Journalists have also been kidnapped and

intimidated. Such thuggery is a constant

threat to media freedom and casts a

menacing shadow over the ability of

journalists to pursue independent

investigations or expose wrong-doing in high

circles.

42. Along with the relative media freedom,

the non-governmental sector—including

national human rights organizations,

democracy activists, trade unions, and

women’s organizations—are permitted to

function freely. The non-governmental

community has had fewer restrictions on

their activities since the advent of civilian

rule. Civil society has played a significant role

in monitoring elections, organizing group

interests, and being a watchdog of

democracy. With the support of foreign

assistance programs, some organizations are

training to provide a conflict early-warning

system and monitor violence in areas of high

tension, such as the Niger Delta, or in

advance of elections. As witnesses to

outbreaks of violence, they could play a role

in preventing genocide or mass atrocities by

sounding the alarm, activating an

international response, insisting on

accountability, and working to end impunity.

However, the nongovernmental sector is

weakened by a lack of resources, and many

are not institutionally sustainable without

international support. In addition, the bulk of

civil society activity occurs in the South.

There is far less such activity in the North.



43. Small arms proliferation is a

major problem in West Africa, and Nigeria is a

major importer of arms due to the high

demand during elections and communal

conflicts. Shamaki Gad Peter, the League for

Human Rights Director, has noted that in the

inter-communal violence in the northern

conflict zones, “the accused are poor people

who struggle to feed themselves, but [yet

they] have access to AK-47 rifles which sell at

around US $2,000 [on] the black market.

Where do these poor people get these guns?

They must have sponsors.”26 One group that

has managed to smuggle small arms into the

country that presents a threat is Boko Haram

(whose name in Hausa means “Western

Education is Forbidden”), a radical Islamic

sect that launched an uprising in the

northeastern state of Borno last year. The

revolt was brutally repressed by the military

and police in an assault mounted in July 2009

that left 800 dead. The sect’s leader was

captured and died (or was killed) in police

custody. More killings have occurred since

then in Bornu’s capital, Maiduguri, the

headquarters of Boko Haram, in incidents

committed both by the security forces and

unknown motorcycle drive-by assassins. Boko

Haram is known locally as Nigeria’s “Taliban,”

because it stands for the same strict religious

principles and practices. However, no direct

links have been discovered between Boko

Haram and any Islamic organizations in Asia

or the Middle East. One year after the

crackdown on the group, they successfully

staged a jail break in September 2010, in

which more than 721 inmates, including

members of the sect, were freed from a

prison in the northern town of Bauchi,

showing that the sect was still capable of

inflicting serious attacks.27 Just a month

before the jailbreak, security services

reported that they had intercepted a large

arms cache being smuggled into the country

from Chad.28 Intercommunal violence based

on resource competition in the North could

be exploited by extremist groups, such as

Boko Haram, who want to set up an Islamic

community that applies fundamentalist

Islamic laws and practices in the country’s

Muslim areas.

44. In the Niger Delta, militant coalitions and

groups, such as the Joint Revolutionary

Council, an umbrella organization which

includes the Movement for the Emancipation

of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Reformed

Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force

(NDPVF), and the Martyrs' Brigade, are heavily

armed. Their purchases are usually funded

through oil theft and protection money paid

by oil companies.29 These groups often have

an ethnic basis to their mobilization,

especially among the Ijaw.30 Militants

frequently have linkages to elected officials,

such as the alliance between then Ijaw Youth

Council (IYC) leader, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari,

and an Igbo governor of Rivers State, Peter

Odili. Asari apparently intimidated Odili’s

political opposition in exchange for access to

oil bunkering routes. When the two of them

had a falling out, Odili supported another

Ijaw militant, Ateke Tom, against his former

ally.31 Odili is no longer governor.

45. Relationships between sponsors or

political “godfathers” and militant groups

occur throughout Nigeria. The “godfathers”

provide access to arms, financing, and

recruits, depending on the political pressures

at the time, and this facilitates politicians

having a ready militia at their disposal, often

during elections. Typically, security forces

turn a blind eye to the activities of these

factions. When conflict between groups

escalates to a level of mass violence, the

military typically is sent in to quell the

disturbances.


Presence of Illegal Arms and Armed Elements

46. There is no evidence of any

strategic campaigns, official or otherwise, to

eliminate in whole or part any particular

group in Nigeria. However, there is distrust

and stereotyping among groups, especially

when resources become scarce, elections are

looming, or there is a change in leadership.

There is not yet any “hate speech” as such,

but polarizing language of indigene versus

non-indigene (or “settler”) is often used to

drive a wedge between communities and

justify acts of violence. Such practices are

also common during election campaigns

when ethno-religious divisions are exploited

to win votes, control economic resources,

acquire land, or receive favoritism in

contracts, licensing, and jobs. While

exclusionary practices have been given

prominent attention in the North, it is a

national phenomenon that has affected other

states, including:

• Modakeke (settlers) and Ife (indigenes) in

Osun State

Motivation of Leading Actors


• Sabon Gari (or migrant) settlements and

the local Hausa indigenes in Kano State

• Sabo Gari settlements and the local Yoruba

population in Oyo State

• Hausa (settlers) and the Kataf (indigenes)

in Kaduna State

• Urhobo (settlers) and the Itsekiri

(indigenes) in Delta State

• Urhobo (settlers) and the Tiv (indigenes) in

Taraba state

• Jukun-Chamba (settlers) and the Kuteb

(indigenes) in Taraba state

• Hausa (settlers) and the Yoruba (indigenes)

in Ogun state

Politicians and security forces play groups

against each other, in much the way that Odili

split the Ijaw opposition by playing Ateke

Tom against Mujahid Dokubo-Asari.

47. In recent years, however, new actors are

becoming involved in perpetrating violence.

Churches and mosques have financed and

rallied mobs to commit acts of violence in the

defense of their religion or community, or in

response to a perceived offense, such as

disrespecting the Prophet Mohammed or

desecrating holy sites or sacred ground.

Politicians have appealed to communal

nationalism and religious identities to win

votes, and corrupt officials have looked the

other way when violence has occurred. While

there appears to be no planning or intention

for genocide to occur, there are also no

effective mechanisms on the ground to

prevent or stop spontaneous or planned local

violence against groups to settle old scores

and get revenge for past atrocities. When and

if such violence occurs, Nigeria’s vulnerability

is that it may fulfill Edmund Burke’s warning

that the only thing that is necessary for evil

to triumph is for good men to do nothing.


48. The uncertainties and instability

that prevailed in the period leading up to the

Nigerian Civil War are by no means as intense

in 2010 as they were in 1966-1967, when the

country began to fragment. However, there

are new circumstances that could facilitate

genocide or mass atrocities as the country

transitions into a new administration. Four

scenarios of widespread identity-based

violence in the future are plausible. The first

scenario would be a resurgence of unrest that

spirals out of control in the Niger Delta. A

tenuous ceasefire is being resisted by the

Joint Revolutionary Council, a recently

formed group which has claimed

responsibility for an attack on a Royal Dutch

Shell facility since the amnesty offer of June

2009, and many militants who have accepted

the amnesty have complained of false or

unfulfilled promises of jobs and training. If

the ceasefire and amnesty should break

down, or if the payments by the government

to militants end and full-scale armed

resistance resumes, a security crackdown by

the government could occur under a newly

elec ted adminis t ration . In these

circumstances, the Ijaw people, who

constitute the heart of the militancy, would

likely be most affected.

49. A second scenario would be expanded

identity-based violence breaking out from

intercommunal fighting in the mixed

communities in the North between indigenes

and non-indigenes. This could result in

several possible outcomes: a North-South

split, a religious war between Christians and

Muslims, or an intra-Islamic struggle that pits

Nigeria’s moderate Islamic establishment of

respected emirs32 and other Islamic

associations against extremist groups and

Islamic sects which have begun to infiltrate

Nigeria, such as the Boko Haram.

50. Third, electoral campaigns could spark a

serious identity-based conflict. In 2007, all

the principal presidential contenders were

Muslims from the North and there are

substantial pressures to ensure that the North

again recaptures the presidency in 2011. If

President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian

Southerner, is nominated by a major party,

his opponent is almost certainly going to be a

Muslim Northerner. This will be the first time

that the Muslim/Christian rivalry will be

played directly out at the national level. If the

election is perceived to have been rigged,

violence could erupt on a massive scale with

demonstrations breaking out in Nigerian

cities across the country, instilling fears of

religious retribution and rage.

51. The fourth scenario would be another

violent change of government at the top.

There are a number of permissive

circumstances that would facilitate such an

event: a history of military coup d’états; the

prominent role that ex-generals continue to

play in politics; the enormous wealth

accumulated by former leaders who deploy

their own militias for political purposes; a

history of assassinations against political

Circumstances that Facilitate Genocide


opponents, many of which have not been

prosecuted; accumulated group grievances

from political turmoil and economic

mismanagement; a huge number of

unemployed youth; and deep public

dissatisfaction with the direction in which the

country is going. If violence were used to

forcefully change the government or remove

a leader, it could plunge Nigeria into another

round of retributive violence against the

group perceived to be behind the action,

reminiscent of the country’s first coup d’état

in 1966, which set off pogroms against the

Igbos and a civil war. This time around,

Nigeria may not have the wherewithal to

survive another round of ethnic fighting and

civil conflict. State institutions, such as the

civil service and the judiciary, which had held

the country together in the past, have eroded

considerably.

52. Each of these scenarios carries different

risks for different groups, and in many cases,

several groups may be at risk simultaneously.

Ijaws would be the likely group to suffer most

in the Niger Delta, but would not be the only

community in danger. Christians appear to be

most vulnerable in the North because they

are the minority, but Muslims have also been

victims of planned attacks by Christians and

would likely be again, if they lived or worked

in the South under times of major distress. In

the event of a forceful overthrow of the

government, any identity group perceived to

be behind an assassination or a coup d’état

could be the target of revenge attacks by

angry mobs.


53. As noted earlier, the most

extreme conditions of genocidal acts in

Nigeria’s history took place during the

pogroms against the Igbos in 1966-67. Since

then, there have been periodic ethno-

religious outbreaks of violence in the Middle

Belt and in other parts of the country. The

security forces have been alleged to be

complicit in the violence in some cases, but

there has been no evidence of any systematic

national policy to target any identity group in

particular. In the Niger Delta, militants and

criminal gangs have perpetrated killings and

abductions for ransom. In most cases where

militants have been involved, the kidnap

victims have been released unharmed. There

is no pattern of particular ethnic groups

being singled out as kidnap victims or for

targeted killings. When such abuses do occur,

it is usually a product of factionalized elites

settling old scores or criminal activity against

foreigners working in the oil industry in order

to collect ransom. Amnesty International

reported that in the May 2009 military

offensive in the Niger Delta, civilians were

sometimes caught in the crossfire with

militants.33 Although civilian killings may not

be genocidal in intent, the military and police

have not taken adequate precautions to

protect non-combatants. Further, the security

forces often downplay the casualties, either

denying that civilians were killed or

dismissing the deaths as part of the

unintended consequences of their

operations. Rarely have they been brought to

account for such abuses.

Genocidal Acts

54. Thus far, there has been no

evidence of the systematic use of

inflammatory or dangerous speech that

belittles, denigrates or demeans against any

single group. Nor is there evidence of any

intent at the national level to destroy in

whole or in part any particular group.

However, at the local level, identity-based

communal conflict has been recurrent. Riots

in the Middle Belt and elsewhere have

revealed some evidence of deliberate attacks

against particular groups, with Christians

targeting Muslims and vice versa. Attacks are

not only focused on civilians, including

women and children, some of whom have

been mutilated, but have also targeted

churches and mosques, and peoples’ homes

and property. Muslims and Christians have

both engaged in retaliatory attacks.

Commissions appointed to investigate the

causes of such attacks have sometimes

reinforced the very conditions that spawned

these attacks in the first place. For example,

the Commission headed by Justice J. Aribiton

Evidence of Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part….


Fiberesima that was established to delve into

the causes of the 1994 riots in Jos concluded

that there was evidence of intended

destruction of one group by another, but

reaffirmed the discriminatory distinction

between indigenes and non-indigenes by

declaring that the “indigenes”—Berom,

Anaguta and Jarawa ethnic groups—were

rightfully claiming their status, while Hausa

and Fulani ethnic groups were declared

“settlers.” The Commission recommended

the prosecution of Hausa/Fulani leaders

accused of fomenting violence. Such

conclusions can be seen by local groups as

grounds for justifiable preemptive violence

against any group that does not qualify as

“indigene.”


55. In 1967, the conditions that gave

rise to the pogroms against the Igbos were

deeply embedded in the social and political

contradictions that existed between the more

developed Southerners, who dominated the

economy, and the less developed

Northerners, who controlled the political

system. The immediate triggering factors

were an Igbo-led military coup and a counter-

coup by Northerners. That same economic/

political power split exists to the present

time. The triggering factors that have ignited

violence in the past could likewise spark

violence in the future: another coup d’état,

political assassinations, a rigged election,

communal conflict, or a revived insurgency.

Other types of triggers could be contested

local elections; land disputes; religious

rivalry; competition for jobs; and decisions on

the location of public infrastructure, such as

markets, hospitals, or schools, which may be

seen to favor one group over another. With

the rise of religious identities, fighting may

also break out over control of mosques, the

impact of Sharia law on non-Muslims, or

perceived offenses to religious codes

concerning provocative dress, media

statements or other public behavior. A

number of everyday occurrences have

served, and could serve in the future, as

flashpoints for communal conflict, especially

if they involve indigene vs. settler rights.

Another key triggering factor is the holding of

elections. The Nigerian Independent Electoral

Commission announced National Assembly

elections for January 15, the Presidential

election for January 22, and State Assembly

and Governors elections on January 29. The

date is in flux as INEC, the election

commission, is requesting more time to put

together a new voter registry, order

computers, and overcome other logistical

problems. Whenever it takes place, the

month-long exercise could open up

opportunities around the country for ethno-

religious conflict at many levels.

56. The “godfather” syndrome has also

intensified ethnic loyalties and heightened

identity affiliations to the detriment of

national unity. “Godfathers” have been

known to resort to violence to win elections,

change regimes, eliminate political

opponents, and take revenge for perceived

injustices. In addition, policies undertaken at

the national level can be misinterpreted to

favor one group over another. For example,

President Goodluck Jonathan’s goal to

resolve the rebellion in the Niger Delta is

vulnerable to Northerners and others seeing

it as favoritism toward his home region or his

own Ijaw ethnic group. If that perception

occurred, it would set back efforts to stabilize

the region. Entrenched corruption also makes

conflict and violence more likely, as the

stakes have become so high. Billions are

being made by people who are fortunate

enough to have the right connections,

exercise the right authority, issue the right

contracts, and disperse the right patronage.

57. The premature death of the president

would also be a potential triggering factor for

violence, as it would exacerbate the contest

for power at all levels—local, state, and

national—although it is not clear how this

would be played out. Leaders’ deaths have

created political crisis before, as was

apparent with the demise of Abacha, Abiola,

and Yar’Adua.

Triggering Factors


Unity in Nigeria

Conclusion and Recommendations

58. Nigeria has pioneered some

creative mechanisms to deal with ethnic and

cultural diversity. Many of them might be

appropriate in other heterogeneous societies

in which there is an agreed upon political

system, the rule of law, a sense of national

identity, and leaders’ commitment to equity

and justice. However, absent these

conditions, such measures have the potential

to backfire. While political considerations

certainly played a role in Nigeria, most of

these measures were designed to balance

political and economic interests among the

three major ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa,

and Igbo), provide more political inclusion to

minority groups, and avert secessions after a

brutal civil war. Some of these mechanisms

are informal, such as the political party power

-shifting or zoning practice that requires the

political rotation of the presidency between

Northern and Southern candidates. Others,

such as ensuring the “federal character” of

the government by requiring cabinet

representation of each of the 36 states, and

in local governments, are constitutionally

required. In practice, however, these

innovative mechanisms have not been

sufficient to foster political inclusion or

national unity and several have had the

opposite impact.

59. Efforts to manage diversity have been

undermined by several factors. First,

decentralization, including the federal

system itself, has been nullified by a steady

trend toward the centralization of power

through military rule and a one-party

dominant political system, and the

centralization of wealth through the federal

dispersal of lucrative oil revenues to favored

party politicians, state governors and local

government elites. Second, corrosive

influences from endemic corruption, tight

patronage networks, and rigged elections

contributed to the de-legitimization of these

measures. Many believed they were simply

devices to “divide and rule.” Third, there has

been an erosion of the integrity and

professionalism of core national institutions,

including the police, military, justice system,

civil service, and political leadership. Nigeria

held together during a 2 ½ year civil war—an

important feat that should not be

underestimated—as the national entity has

retained intact, but Nigeria may not be as

fortunate the second time around.

60. Nigeria has a reputation of “muddling

through” its crises. But 50 years on,

institutions have atrophied, corruption has

soared, economic disparities have increased,

political competition has intensified, and new

pressures such as population growth and

scarcity of resources, have created new fault

lines. Promoting inclusiveness, without

ensuring its genuine functionality, cannot

build national unity. Should the “giant of

Africa” continue to fail to manage its rich

cultural diversity with justice, transparency

and sensitivity, the consequences could

result in genocidal violence that would be

felt across the continent and beyond.

61. Nigeria teeters between two possible

outcomes: either a break-through scenario in

which the new administration that comes to

power after the 2011 elections is regarded as

legitimate and effective and begins tackling

the country’s most critical problems, or a

break-down scenario in which the new

administration is not regarded as legitimate

or effective, possibly leading to mass

violence, a coup d’état, or disintegration.34

How the 2011 election is conducted will

shape which of these scenarios comes to

pass. The outcome might not be immediately

evident. Nigeria is reaching a pivotal point

and the fallout from the election could erupt

right away or seep into the body politic to

emerge months later.

62. What is to be done to tip the balance in

favor of the more optimistic scenario? First

and foremost, Nigeria needs to conduct

reasonably free and fair elections. The past

three elections have become progressively

worse and it is not clear how many more

rigged elections the population will tolerate.

Though the timing and sequence of elections

continue to be debated, the most

troublesome issues are going to be logistical

problems, such as the creation of a new

registry of voters, training election workers

for 120 precincts, setting up enumeration

systems, printing ballots, and completing all

the other various administrative tasks that

are required for a free and fair process. The

international community should do all it can

to lessen these problems by providing voter

education and guidance on what is necessary

for the elections to be viewed as credible.

63. Second, Nigeria also needs to review the

mechanisms of political inclusion to see if

they are fulfilling their purpose. Identity-

based quota systems, while useful for

affirmative action to close socio-economic

gaps in the short-term, need sunset

provisions for constant review or they

eventually create friction. Fixed systems of

representation run up against demographic

and democratic problems over time,

becoming sources of grievance when growing

communities have inadequate

representation. Moreover, Nigeria’s quotas—

in the form of the zoning principle, the

federal character principle, and, most of all,

indigene privileges—violate democratic

standards and create artificial barriers to free


competition, economic opportunity, and

merit-based political appointments. Most of

all, such quotas, however well-intentioned,

emphasize religion, ethnicity, and ancestry,

fixed criteria that create a hierarchy of

political privilege with at least two distinct

classes: one based on preferential treatment

of “indigenes”, the other based on

discriminatory treatment of non-indigenes or

“foreigners.” Nigeria needs to move away

from such distinctions and build unity in

diversity, based on a common definition of

citizenship in which all Nigerians have equal

rights anywhere in the country, including the

right to own property, compete for jobs, and

move freely, regardless of personal identity.

64. Third, Nigeria needs to strengthen state

institutions, particularly the police, military,

the system of justice, and the civil service.

Vast training must be done to raise the level

of performance, salaries must be paid on time

and in full, and a code of conduct must be

enforced under penalty of prosecution to

curtail patronage and corruption. Nigeria can

use its own ample resources to provide for

this kind of state-building.

65. Fourth, there needs to be an emphasis on

development. Special attention needs to be

given to the Middle Belt and Niger Delta

regions, where inter-communal conflict and

an armed insurgency have left these regions

poorer and more conflicted than ever. In both

cases, there must be development that is

visible to the people. Inequality is a major

source of conflict in Nigeria, and the gap

between rich and poor must be narrowed.

66. Last but not least, security must be

emphasized. Murders, assassinations,

kidnappings, rebellions, riots,

demonstrations, oil bunkering, arms

smuggling, cults, religious sects, multiple

militias and thuggery are becoming common

features of Nigerian life, not only as criminal

behavior, but as practices shaping the

conduct of political discourse, the fierceness

of electoral competition, and the quality of

governance.35 Overcoming an anarchic

undercurrent of violence, unrestricted by

effective police work or judicial prosecution,

will be a major challenge as Nigeria confronts

struggles between North and South,

Christians and Muslims, and communal

disputes based on resource scarcity,

environmental devastation, and economic

inequality, any one of which could spiral into

mass violence and atrocities.

67. Whatever the outcome of the 2011

election, Nigeria needs to address the

fundamental issue of how its diverse

population can live together if it is to avoid

backsliding into another civil war. A new

administration could turn the country around.

To do so, however, it must take on the big

issues and be steadfast in its commitment to

fulfilling the promise that Nigeria has had

ever since independence. It could be a

“showcase of democracy,” but has not yet

reached that goal. Genocide on a national

scale is not likely, unless the country breaks

up. What is more likely to erupt on a wider

scale if the steps recommended here are not

taken, are localized incidents of “genocidal

acts” that appear from time to time, under

stressful circumstances where the state is

either unwilling or unable to act.


Conclusion and Recommendations


1. Population figures are estimates, as a reliable census has not been

conducted in Nigeria for decades because it is highly controversial.

Population figures determine the distribution of funds, and the political

representation of various ethnic and religious groups. The 158 million

estimate comes from a study conducted by the Harvard School of Public

Health sponsored by the British Council, entitled “Nigeria: The Next

Generation Report” (2010). Currently, the eighth most populous country,

Nigeria is projected by the study to have an additional 63 million people,

making it the fifth most populous country in the world after India, China,

the U.S., and Pakistan, by 2030.

2. “Rural Poverty in Nigeria: Rural Poverty Portal Nigeria”, Global Action on

Aging, February 28, 2008, available at http://www.globalaging.org/

ruralaging/world/2008/nigeria.htm, accessed September 21, 2010. The

2010 UNESCO report on poverty painted a more dire picture: a poverty

level in which 92% of Nigerians live on less than $2 day, and 71% live on

less than $1 a day. See “UNESCO on Poverty in Nigeria,” Daily Champion,

January 27, 2010, available at http://allafr ica.com

stories/201001280540.html, accessed September 21, 2010.

3. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

4. The official name of the war is the Nigerian Civil War. Colloquially, it

frequently referred to as the Biafran War.

5. However, party pressure was splitting the North. The forum of 19 Northern

Governors met to take a common position on the issue of the zoning

formula of the Peoples Democratic Party leading up to the 2011 elections.

Reports indicated that they were sharply divided. Those who were

themselves in office for only one term were said to be leaning toward

suspending the zoning rule and backing Jonathan in order to favor their

own re-election. However, Northern youth groups were organizing to

protest abandoning the zoning rule. See “2011: Northern Governors Under

Pressure to Dump Zoning: Northern Youths Converge, Insisting on Zoning,”

African Examiner Online, July 26, 2010, available at http://

www.africanexaminer.com/north_zoning, accessed September 21, 2010.

6. In a revealing survey, ethnicity and religious affiliation were the two

highest-ranking identities for most Nigerians as opposed to state, national,

ECOWAS, and African identities. Northerners were more inclined to identify

by religious affiliation, while Southerners were more inclined to identify by

ethnicity. Nationwide, identity preferences by rank order were: religion,

ethnicity, state of origin, and national allegiance. See Kevin H. Ellsworth,

“Reimagined Communities—Democracy and Ethnic Violence: The Social

Reconstruction of Nigerian Identities and Communal Relations,” paper

presented at the conference of the American Political Science Association,

September 3, 1999. The so-called Middle Belt is the most diverse region of

the country in terms of ethnicity and religion, and it has historically

supplied a large proportion of recruits for the Nigerian armed forces.

Stretching East to West through the central part of the country around the

confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers, it consists of seven states: Niger,

Kwara (inhabited mostly by Yoruba), Kogi, Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa, and

Taraba.

7. Legal experts and human rights groups documented the lack of

investigations into mass atrocities as a pattern in Nigeria. See “Nigeria:

Investigations of Mass Killings in Nigeria,” IRIN News, April 13, 2010,

available at http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=88797 , accessed

September 21, 2010.

8. John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (Hodder and Stoughton: London,

1972), pp. 404-407.

9. The predominantly Yoruba states are Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and

Oyo. Yoruba also make up large portions of the populations in Edo, Kwara,

and Kogi states. The Yoruba population is about half Muslim and half

Christian, with traditional beliefs integrated with both.

10. The press speculated for months about Abacha’s mysterious death. He was

buried the next day in accordance with Muslim tradition but without an

autopsy. Rumors were rife that he was poisoned by military opponents.

Abiola's cause of death was also reported to be heart failure, which

occurred just as his release from four years of detention was being

considered by Abacha’s military successor.

11. Two autopsies, including one ordered by his family, showed that Abiola had

not been poisoned.

12. Indeed, with its cool climate, Plateau State proclaimed itself the “Home of

Peace and Tourism”.

13. Cattlemen had traditionally migrated to villages and traded cattle for

agricultural goods and access to pasturage, acquiring, in their view,

traditional rights to the land.

14. Section 147 (3) of the 1999 Constitution states that “the President shall

appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of

such State” without defining who an indigene of a state is or how a Nigerian

can become one. Some commentators have said that an indigene may

prove his origins by getting a letter of identification from a traditional ruler

or councilor, or a state could issue a certificate of indigene verification (not

citizenship), but there are no established procedures for such verification

and no section of the constitution resolves the contradiction between the

rights of indigenes in the states and the rights of citizens nationally.

15. The terms used to describe this turbulent region are somewhat confusing.

The core states of the oil-producing Niger Delta, which consists of nine

states, are Delta, Bayelsa (President Goodluck Jonathan’s home state), and

Rivers States. In 2000, six more states were added: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross

River, Edo, Imo, and Ondo, as part of an attempt to identify six economic

zones nationally for planning purposes, as shown in Figure 1. The Niger

Delta and South-South zone, however, are not co-terminous, even though

these terms are often used interchangeably. The South-South consists of

only six states: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers

States.

16. The Exxon Valdez spilled an estimated 10.8 million gallons in Alaska in

1989. See Adam Nossiter, “Far from Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old”,

The New York Times, June 17, 2010, p. A1.

17. The Ijaws are concentrated in Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa

Ibom States.

18. Some observers believe that many criminal elements and unemployed

persons are “turning themselves in” under the amnesty, and that the

number of returnees is inflated.

19. The bunkering problem is thought by many observers to be criminal

behavior that involves more than the militants. Elements of the national

government, particularly the armed forces and politicians, are widely

References

Endnotes


believed to be collaborating with the rebels, although there has been no

official investigation or report proving such linkages.

20. In 2002, the Miss World beauty contest had to be moved from Abuja,

Nigeria’s capital, to London following violent attacks by Muslim youths. The

riots were sparked by a fashion writer for a local newspaper who had

commented that the Prophet Mohammed might have married one of the

contestants in the beauty contest had he lived to see the pageant, a remark

that offended some Muslims who thought the contest was an indecent

spectacle. Youths attached the newspaper’s office in Kaduna, where two

years earlier, 2,000 had been killed in religious riots. The fighting, which

spread to Abuja, resulted in over 200 killed, hundreds more injured, and

thousands displaced.

21. M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, The Handbook of National

Legislatures: A Global Survey (New York: Cambridge University Press,

2009).

22. There is only one national police force. States and localities do not have

their own police.

23. “Nigeria: Bringing perpetrators of mass violence to book - or not”, IRIN

News, April 13, 2010, available at http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx?

ReportId=88794, accessed July 21, 2010.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Adam Nossiter, “Prison Raid in Nigeria Releases Hundreds; Many Freed

Inmates Tied to Islamic Sect,” The New York Times, September 9, 2010, A6.

28. “Assault Rifles, Ammunition Intercepted in Nigeria,” The Associated Press,

August 18, 2010, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100818/

ap_on_re_af/af_nigeria_violence, accessed September 21, 2010. Police

reported that they seized 52 Kalashnikov rifles, more than 1,700 rounds of

ammunition, and $32,000 hidden underneath vegetables and dried fish in

two cars.

29. "Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta", Africa Briefing N°60, Crisis

Group, April 30, 2009, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/

africa/west-africa/nigeria/B060-nigeria-seizing-the-moment-in-the-

nigerdelta.aspx, accessed September 21, 2010.

30. Statement of Joint Revolutionary Council, undated, available at http://

www.ijawland.com/JOINT%20REVOLUTIONARY%20COUNCIL.pdf, accessed

July 21, 2010.

31. Ibid; also, "Nigeria's MEND: Odili, Asari, and the NDPVF", STRATFOR Global

Intelligence, March 18, 2009, available at http://www.stratfor.com/

analysis/20090313_nigerias_mend_odili_asari_and_ndpvf, accessed July

21, 2010.

32. Nigeria’s emirate system consists of 12 traditional Muslim leaders, many of

whom are accomplished individuals who have had experience in business,

government, the justice system or the military, and, by virtue of their

traditional roles, have acquired considerable social status in their local

areas as Islamic monarchs. The Sultan of Sokoto is the spiritual leader of all

Nigerian Muslims. One of the most powerful and richest Muslim leaders is

the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, who escaped an assassination attempt

by a 19-year-old Muslim on July 9th, 2010. (see Auwalu Umar and Lawan

Danjuma Adamu, "Confusion at Juma'at prayer: Emir of Kano Escapes

Assassination - 19-year-old assailant says, 'I was sent'", Sunday Trust, July

11, 2010, available at http://www.sunday.dailytrust.com/index.php?

option=com_content&view=article&id=4191:confusion-at-jummaatprayer-

emir-of-kano-escapes-assassination-19-year-old-assailant-says-i-was-

sent&catid=57:cover&Itemid=126, accessed September 21, 2010.)

Established in the 1880s when Islam swept down from Sokoto during the

jihad led by Usman dan Fodio, the emirs stopped providing social services

to their people when Nigeria became independent. They have no formal

power over secular institutions, such as the police, military or state courts,

but they receive 5% of all funds given to local governments plus gifts from

their constituents. Their powers stem from their religious authority to

select imams in the main mosques, oversee the Sharia court system, and

intervene in the resolution of local disputes, such as land or water.

Politicians seek alliances with the emirs for legitimacy and access to their

considerable resources and status. Emirs have publicly denounced Osama

bin Laden and strongly oppose Islamic fundamentalism, whose followers

tend to view emirs as part of the corrupt political establishment that does

not sufficiently enforce Islamic law. On the other hand, democracy

advocates deem the emirs as an unelected aristocracy whose influence

should be curtailed. Nonetheless, emirs continue to exert influence in the

North.

33. "We fear that hundreds of bystanders, including women and children, have

been killed and injured, and thousands of people remain trapped in the

area – unable to return to their homes having fled the fighting.” Quoted in

Xan Rice, “Niger Delta army offensive killing civilians, says Amnesty", The

Guardian, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2009/may/21/hundreds-killed-niger-delta, accessed July 21, 2010.

34. Some outside observers have warned of the possibility of the worst case

scenario. See John Campbell, “SNAPSHOT: Nigeria on the Brink; What

Happens If the 2011 Elections Fail?”, Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2010,

available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/66707, accessed

September 21, 2010.

35. For example, as electioneering heated up in September, within a single day

it was reported that unidentified assassins murdered a member of the Kano

State Security Service and four members of his family, the Head of the

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s Forensic Unit who was a key

witness in ongoing cases of corruption was killed by unknown gunmen in

Kaduna, and the campaign manager for one of the leading presidential

candidates alleged that telephone threats had been made to kidnap his son

and take his life by unknown persons. See “SSS operative, wife, three

children killed in Kano,” African Examiner Online, September 15, 2010,

http://www.africanexaminer.com/sss_killed, accessed September 21, 2010;

“Gunmen kill head of EFCC’s forensic unit,” African Examiner Online,

September 15, 2010, available at http://www.africanexaminer.com/

efcc_forensic, accessed September 21, 2010; “Dokpesi fights back at

Jonathan’s camp, alleges threat to his life, children, business interests,”

African Examiner Online, undated, available at http://

www.africanexaminer.com/dokpesi_threat2011, accessed September 21,

2010.

Endnotes

Unity in Nigeria

Appendix: Genocide Analysis Framework

Legal definition of genocide

Genocide is defined in Article 2 of the

Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)

as "any of the following acts committed with

intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a

national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as

such: killing members of the group; causing

serious bodily or mental harm to members of

the group; deliberately inflicting on the

group conditions of life calculated to bring

about its physical destruction in whole or in

part1; imposing measures intended to

prevent births within the group; [and]

forcibly transferring children of the group to

another group."

Elements of the framework

The Analysis Framework comprises eight

categories of factors that the OSAPG uses to

determine whether there may be a risk of

genocide in a given situation. The eight

categories of factors are not ranked, and the

absence of information relating to one or

more categories does not necessarily indicate

the absence of a risk of genocide; what is

significant is the cumulative effect of the

factors. Where these factors are effectively

addressed, no longer exist or are no longer

relevant, the risk of genocide is assumed to

decrease.


Office of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide

Framework Factors and Explanation The issues to be analyzed here include:

1. Inter-group relations, including record of discrimination and/or other human rights violations committed against a Group

• Relations between and among groups in terms of tensions, power and economic relations, including perceptions about the targeted group;

• Existing and past conflicts over land, power, security and expressions of group identity, such as language, religion and culture;

• Past and present patterns of discrimination against members of any group which could include:

• Serious discriminatory practices, for instance, the compulsory identification of members of a particular group, imposition of taxes/fines, permission required for social activities such as marriage, compulsory birth-control, the systematic exclusion of groups from positions of power, employment in State institutions and/or key professions2

• Significant disparities in socio-economic indicators showing a pattern of deliberate exclusion from economic resources and social and political life.

• Overt justification for such discriminatory practices;

• History of genocide or related serious and massive human rights violations against a particular group; denial by the perpetrators;

• References to past human rights violations committed against a possible perpetrator group as a justification for genocidal acts against the targeted group in the future.

2. Circumstances that affect the capacity to prevent Genocide

Structures that exist to protect the population and deter genocide include effective legislative protection; independ-ent judiciary and effective national human rights institutions, presence of international actors such as UN operations capable of protecting vulnerable groups, neutral security forces and independent media. Issues to be analyzed here include:

• Existing structures;

• The effectiveness of those structures;

• Whether vulnerable groups have genuine access to the protection afforded by the structures;

• Patterns of impunity and lack of accountability for past crimes committed against the targeted groups;

• Other options for obtaining protection against genocide, e.g. presence of peacekeepers in a position to defend the group, or seeking asylum in other countries.

3. Presence of illegal arms and armed Elements

• Whether there exists a capacity to perpetrate genocide - especially, but not exclusively, by killing;

• How armed groups are formed, who arms them and what links they have to state authorities, if any;

• In cases of armed rebellions or uprising, whether a state has justified targeting groups from which armed actors have drawn their membership.

4. Motivation of leading actors in the State/region; acts which serve to encourage divisions between national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups

• Underlying political, economic, military or other motivation to target a group and to separate it from the rest of the population;

• The use of exclusionary ideology and the construction of identities in terms of “us” and “them” to accentuate differences;

• Depiction of a targeted group as dangerous, disloyal, a security or economic threat or as unworthy or inferior so as to justify action against the group;

• Propaganda campaigns and fabrications about the targeted group used to justify acts against a targeted group by use of dominant, controlled media or “mirror politics”3;

• Any relevant role, whether active or passive, of actors outside the country (e.g., other Governments, armed groups based in neighboring countries, refugee groups or diasporas) and respective political or economic motivations.

5. Circumstances that facilitate perpetration of genocide (dynamic factors)

Any development of events, whether gradual or sudden, that suggest a trajectory towards the perpetration of genocidal violence, or the existence of a longer term plan or policy to commit genocide. Examples:

• Sudden or gradual strengthening of the military or security apparatus; creation of or increased support to militia groups (e.g., sudden increases in arms flow) in the absence of discernible legitimate threats;

• Attempts to reduce or eradicate diversity within the security apparatus;

• Preparation of local population to use them to perpetrate acts;

• Introduction of legislation derogating the rights of a targeted group;

• Imposition of emergency or extraordinary security laws and facilities that erode civil rights and liberties;

• Sudden increase in inflammatory rhetoric or hate propaganda, especially by leaders, that sets a tone of impunity, even if it does not amount to incitement to genocidal violence in itself;

• Permissive environment created by ongoing armed conflict that could facilitate access to weapons and commission of genocide.

6. Genocidal acts • Acts that could be obvious “elements” of the crime of genocide as defined in Article 6 of the Rome Statute,4 such as killings, abduction and disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence; ‘ethnic cleansing’ or pogroms;5

• Less obvious methods of destruction, such as the deliberate deprivation of resources needed for the group’s physical survival and which are available to the rest of the population, such as clean water, food and medical services;6

• Creation of circumstances that could lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion;

• Programs intended to prevent procreation, including involuntary sterilization, forced abortion, prohibition of marriage and long-term separation of men and women;

• Forcible transfer of children, imposed by direct force or through fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or other methods of coercion;

• Death threats or ill treatment that causes disfigurement or injury; forced or coerced use of drugs or other treatment that damages health.


Appendix: UN Genocide Analysis Framework

7. Evidence of intent “to destroy in whole or in part …”7

• Statements amounting to hate speech 8 by those involved in a genocidal campaign;

• In a large-scale armed conflict, widespread and systematic nature of acts; intensity and scale of acts and invariabil-ity of killing methods used against the same protected group; types of weapons employed (in particular weapons prohibited under international law) and the extent of bodily injury caused;

• In a non-conflict situation, widespread and/or systematic discriminatory and targeted practices culminating in gross violations of human rights of protected groups, such as extrajudicial killings, torture and displacement;

• The specific means used to achieve “ethnic cleansing” which may underscore that the perpetration of the acts is designed to reach the foundations of the group or what is considered as such by the perpetrator group;

• The nature of the atrocities, e.g., dismemberment of those already killed that reveal a level of dehumanization of the group or euphoria at having total control over another human being, or the systematic rape of women which may be intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child or to cause humiliation and terror in order to fragment the group;

• The destruction of or attacks on cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group that may be designed to annihilate the historic presence of the group or groups;

• Targeted elimination of community leaders and/or men and/or women of a particular age group (the ‘future generation’ or a military-age group);

• Other practices designed to complete the exclusion of targeted group from social/political life.

8. Triggering factors • Future events or circumstances seemingly unrelated to genocide that might aggravate conditions or spark deterioration in the situation, pointing to the likely onset of a genocidal episode. These ‘triggers’ might include:

• Upcoming elections (and associated activities such as voter registration or campaigning; revision of delimitation of electoral boundaries; a call for early elections or the postponement or cancellation of elections; disbanding of election commissions; imposition of new quotas/standards for political party or candidate eligibility);

• Change of Government outside of an electoral or constitutionally sanctioned process;

• Instances where the military is deployed internally to act against civilians;

• Commencement of armed hostilities;

• Natural disasters that may stress state capacity and strengthen active opposition groups;

• Increases in opposition capacity, which may be perceived as a threat and prompt preemptive action, or rapidly declining opposition capacity which may invite rapid action to eliminate problem groups.9


1. It might be necessary to determine if all or only a part of the group at risk

within a specific geographical location is being targeted. The aim of the

Genocide Convention is to prevent the intentional destruction of entire human

groups, and the part targeted must be significant enough (substantial) to have

an impact on the group as a whole. The substantiality requirement both

captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions

(numbers) and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the

destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group

(emblematic).

2. This could include security, law enforcement or oversight apparatus, such as

police, army and judiciary.

3. “Mirror politics” is a common strategy to create divisions by fabricating events

whereby a person accuses others of what he or she does or wants to do.

4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

5. Efforts should be made to gather information on a sufficient number of

incidents to determine whether the abuses were substantial, systematic and

widespread over a period of time.

6. Deprivation of the means to sustain life can be imposed through confiscation

of harvests, blockade of foodstuffs, detention in camps, forcible relocation or

expulsion to inhospitable environments.

7. Genocidal intent can develop gradually, e.g., in the course of conflict and not

necessarily before, and genocide may be used as a “tool” or “strategy” to

achieve military goals in an operation whose primary objective may be

unrelated to the targeted group. Evidence of “intent to destroy” can be

inferred from a set of existing facts which would suggest that what is

unfolding or ongoing may be genocide. From a preventive perspective, there

could be other indications of a plan or policy or an attempt to destroy a

protected group before the occurrence of full-blown genocide.

8. The hate speech has to denigrate characteristics of a specific ethnic/racial/

religious/national group.

9. Critical moments can also represent moments of opportunity to improve a

situation and to lessen the risk of genocide.

Appendix: UN Genocide Analysis Framework

About

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Conflict Early Warning and Assessment

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Sustainable Development, Sustainable Security

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