canadian aid for education in conflict affected states

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Background paper prepared for the

Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010

Reaching the marginalized

Canadian Aid for Education in Conflict Affected

States

Karen Mundy

2009

This paper was commissioned by the Education for All Global Monitoring Report as

background information to assist in drafting the 2010 report. It has not been edited by the

team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should

not be attributed to the EFA Global Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be

cited with the following reference: Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring

Report 2010, Reaching the marginalized For further information, please contact

[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Canadian Aid for Education in Conflict Affected StatesBackground paper,

Education for Al l Global Moni tor ing Report, UNESCO, 2010

Karen Mundy, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto1

August 30th

, 2009

1. Introduction

For the last half decade, Canada has identified education in emergencies, conflict and post-conflict situations as one of its four priority areas in the education sector (CIDA SDS, 2007e:23-24). Disbursements for this purpose have risen dramatically in recent years, driven in part bythe emergence of Afghanistan as the largest ever country recipient of Canadian bilateral aid.

While the increasing concentration of Canadian aid to a small number of conflict affected stateshas raised questions about the impact of security and trade agendas on ODA allocations, the

more surprising feature of Canadian aid to education in conflict-affected states may be the sheerdiversity of approaches being taken at the country level. Such diversity suggests a significantopportunity for experimentation and learning. It also raises questions about the factors drivinggeographic and sectoral choices, and how such choices are being integrated into a broader aidagenda.

This paper looks at the experience of Canadas aid to education in conflict-affected states since2000. A first section lays out the goals and priorities for Canadas development cooperation,including its aid to education. It provides a brief overview of the main factors that haveinfluenced the countrys strategic direction and levels of total ODA in recent years. A secondsection looks more closely at the policies and policy actors that shape Canadian educational

ODA in conflict-affected states. A third section reviews CIDAs education sector portfolio inconflict-affected states, using short examples from three countries to illustrate the diversity ofCanadas approach to education sector programming in conflict-affected states. The paperconcludes with an analysis of Canadas overall performance, and assesses the prospects for, andappropriateness of, further increasing or improving Canadian aid to education in states affectedby conflict.

2. Canadian ODA and Education: Shifts in Priorities and Performance

Over the past decade, dramatic shifts in the policies, priorities and performance of CanadianODA program have reshaped Canadas education sector assistance. There are four key stories

here.1. Since 2000, Canada has rapidly increased the overall volume of its aid.2. Canada has signed on to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and has moved its

thematic and sectoral focus in their direction.3. Canadian ODA has been reshaped by a new focus on aid effectiveness.

1 Correspondence to [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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4. In tension with these three shifts, since 2004/5, Canadian ODA has become increasinglyintegrated with new strategic foreign policy goals, and is now shaped significantly byCanadas security and trade agendas.

To outline these policy shifts, this section draws on DAC statistics, Government of Canada and

CIDA policy documents, the small secondary literature on Canadian ODA, and interviews withinCIDA.2

Canadas commitment to the Millennium Development Declaration, its later commitments at theMonterrey Conference on Financing for Development, and its hosting of the 2002 G8 meetings,have led successive Canadian governments to sharply increase the volume of Canadian ODA. In2001, the government committed to doubling international assistance by 2010, through annual8% increases to its International Assistance Envelope (IAE).3 In 2002 at the G8 meetings inKananaskis, Canada committed to doubling its aid to Africa from its 2003/4 levels. Thesepledges have been maintained through all recent budgets. As a result, Canadas aid program hasrapidly recovered from the massive cuts made to it during the 1990s: DAC figures suggest that

the increases to Canadian aid have resulted in more than $2 billion of new ODA since 2000.However, Canadas official development assistance is stalled at about 0.3% of our gross nationalincome (or about $ 4.4 billion for 2008/9), and unlike EU governments, Canada has set notimeline for increasing its ODA to meet the 0.7% Pearson target. Furthermore, minus debt relief,humanitarian relief and assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, less than 1/3 of the newly committedamounts have been made available for longer-term development programs (CCIC 2008).

One important part of the reform of Canadian ODA after 2000 has been an effort to focus in amore concentrated way on social development, including education. Early in the decade, Canadamade an effort to establish sector specific policies for its work in social development (see forexample its Action Plans on Basic Education, Child Protection, Gender, CIDA 2001, 2002).These policies fed an overarching document entitled CIDAs Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy which outlines four areas of targeted support: equitable economic growth; socialdevelopment; environmental management; and democratic governance and human rights (CIDA2001b, 2004b, 2007e). Considerable growth in flows of ODA funding for social sectorprogramming has followed these policies, including new investments in basic health, democraticgovernance, and basic education (see Table C, D, E, F in Appendix 1; Mundy & Bhanji 2005;Smillie 2007). Today, according to a UNESCO GMR analysis, more than 70% of CanadasODA to education is focused on basic education.4 Canadas ODA disbursements for basiceducation have grown from $ 81 million in 2002 to $ 188 million in 2007, or at rate of 15.1% peryear over the same period (UNESCO, 2009; Table 1 below).

Canada has also moved rapidly to reform its aid program in the direction of Paris DeclarationPrinciples. The Agencys Policy Paper on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness (CIDA 2002) set out

2 A total of 19 interviews or email exchanges were conducted for this research (15 with CIDA staff and 4 with CSOrepresentatives see Table H in Appendix 1). Documentary data was collected not only from CIDA (which administers about of all ODA) but also from other ODA implementing agencies, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade and Defense.3 The International Assistance Envelope (IAE) contains both ODA and non-ODA assistance. A little over 70% of ODA ischanneled through CIDA, which is the focus of this paper.4 http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/GMR/pdf/gmr2009/GMRAid2009_Canada.pdf
http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/GMR/pdf/gmr2009/GMRAid2009_Canada.pdfhttp://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/GMR/pdf/gmr2009/GMRAid2009_Canada.pdf


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as goals: greater policy coherence, the untying of Canadian aid, greater geographic and sectoralconcentration, harmonization with other donors, a greater focus on poverty reduction, and the useof results based management (RBM). Progess has been made on most of these goals. Canadasuse of sector-wide or program-based aid in the education sector has been particularly significant,and the Agency has prepared policy papers, research and guidelines to support the use of SWAps

in education and other sectors (CIDA 2003a&b; CIDA RPP 2007b; Mundy et al. 2008). Canadahas also made steady progress in untying its aid since 2000, and in 2008 announced that it woulduntie all its food aid by 2009, and all other forms of aid by 2012/13.5 In regards toharmonization, Canada strongly supports multilateral initiatives to improve aid effectiveness,including the OECD-DACs Aid Effectiveness initiative (where it took the leading on civilsociety and aid effectiveness); the good humanitarian donorship initiative (for humanitarian aid);and the DAC initiative on state fragility. It has also contributed to several new global initiativesin health and education (such as the Fast Track Initiative), and is a middle-ranked donor tomultilateral humanitarian appeals (CCIC March 2009).

Table 1. Canadian Aid to Basic Education (disbursements)

Source: UNESCO, GMR

Policy coherence, however, has remained more elusive. A great deal of flux in policy followedthe 2004 and 2006 elections of minority governments in Canada, leading the DAC to note thatCIDA had been: particularly affected by changing political circumstances and leadership,which have brought frequent policy pronouncements rather than stable and cleardirections...Canada does not have a clear statement promoting policy coherence for development,which hinders CIDAs leadership on development issues in government discussions andnegotiations (DAC 2007: 11, 13). As an example of recent policy pronouncements, in March2009 CIDAs Minister for International Cooperation indicated that she hopes to make foodsecurity, children and youth, and economic growth the new key thematic foci during her

leadership. CIDA has also criticized by the DAC for failing to develop a strong capacity forresearch, analysis and evaluation (OECD-DAC 2007; see also Smillie 2004; Goldfarb and Tapp2006).

5The most recent DAC data (2007/8) reports Canadian ODA as 74.6% untied, still a relatively low level compared to many other

OECD/DAC donors (DAC/OECD Annual Report, Statistical Annex: Table 23: e). The new untying policy promises to radicallyalter Canadas future humanitarian assistance efforts, which have to date been comprised of more than 40% food aid (themajority tied). NB: Technical cooperation is still a large component of Canadian aid, representing a form of tying which is

prevalent in the education sector.


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Perhaps the most extensive change to CIDAs policies and priorities over the past decade hascome in the geographic allocation of ODA. Historically, Canadian aid has been among the mostgeographically diffuse of all OECD donors (OECD-DAC 2002). Following the publication ofCIDAs aid effectiveness strategy in 2002, the Canadian government began to seek a formula for

concentrating bilateral (government to government) aid in a smaller number of recipientcountries (CIDA 2002; Government of Canada June 2005). The period between 2000 and 2006saw a renewed concentration on Africa, and a higher degree of geographic concentration on leastdeveloped countries (see OECD-DAC 2007a).

After 2005, motivations for the geographical concentration of Canadian aid began to shift. In2005, the government announced, in its International Policy Statement (IPS), a strategy of betterintegrating the 3Ds of Canadian foreign policy: diplomacy, defence and development. Attentionto integrating Canadas international policies unfolded alongside a strong push from Canadasmain trading and diplomatic partner, the United States, for Canadian intervention and leadershipin Afghanistan and in Haiti (Noble 2008; Tomlin et al., 2008). It also occurred alongside a

national effort to bolster and retool the capacities of the Canadian Forces and Canadas defencepolicies, building from Canadas long-standing image of itself as a key player in internationalpeacekeeping (Middlemiss and Stairs 2008). A first articulation of a new National SecurityPolicy (2004) encouraged a 3 D approach that framed development assistance as an element ofCanadas counter-terrorism initiatives (DAC 2007, p. 40). Many subsequent governmentstatements and parliamentary reports echoed the idea that aid should be used to bolster Canadasinternational security agenda (GOC 2008; OECD-DAC 2007a; Aning 2007; Simpson &Tomlinson 2006). In particular, Afghanistans emergence as the single largest recipient ofCanadian ODA appears to have been shaped by this new security agenda (Maloney 2006, 2008;GOC 2008). Critics argue that Canadas foreign policies have tilted too far towards militaryintervention, noting that Canada has pushed for a redefinition of ODA to include more supportfor security system reform (DFAIT 2006; CCIC May 2006)6, and has a surprisingly high defenceto development ratio.7

In addition to the aid effectiveness and security agendas, both reputational and trade interestshave shaped recent shifts in the geographic allocation of Canadas foreign aid. In 2007, thegovernment announced that it would focus a larger share of its aid to the Americas, with apriority to the Caribbean a shift that has been framed as part of an effort to integrate aid moreclosely with Canadas security and trade agendas in the American hemisphere (CIDA 2008a;GOC 2009). The government is also keenly interested in leverage, announcing in March 2007the goal of placing Canada among the five largest donors in core countries of interest, in orderto improve how we work (CIDA 2007b). The fact that bilateral aid flows are growing at theexpense of multilateral flows (See Table C, Appendix 1); and that an increasing portion of whatCanada commits to its International Assistance Envelope is now not countable as ODA, and is

6 According to DFAIT, Canada will continue to argue for a definition of ODA which includes more security relatedexpenditures, recognizing that efforts to address global instability must link near-term peace and stability imperatives with longerterm development and economic growth goals (DFAIT Feb 2006)7 Project Ploughshares leader Ernie Regehr, 5 Sept 2008, on his Disarming Conflict blog:www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/howcanadasnotes that in 2004 Canadas defence to development ratio was 3.8:1 putting Canadaroughly in the middle of the OECD rankings. In 2006 this had climbed to 4:1. This ratio will decline in 2011 when Canada plansto end its military mission in Afghanistan.
http://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/howcanadashttp://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/howcanadashttp://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/howcanadas


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programmed outside of CIDA, further heightens fears that Canada is moving to embed aid moredeeply in a geo-strategic foreign policy agenda. Newly created posts in the Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) of a Deputy Minister, Afghanistan and DeputyMinister, Americas reinforce this reading of Canadas foreign policy direction.

In an announcement in February of 2009, the government published a new list of 20 countries ofconcentration, in which it plans to concentrate 80% of its bilateral (government to government)aid (GOC 2009; Barthiame 2009a&b; Halliday 2009; Tomlinson 2008). 8 The new list reducesthe number of African countries of concentration, and signals an attempt to focus more on LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, where Canada has a trade-focused foreign policy agenda. Countrieson this list that can be categorized as conflict-affected (using the GMR list, the list developed bySave the Children and the Canadian governments own definitions)9 are highlighted below.

Africa:Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Senegaland Sudan.Americas: Bolivia, Caribbean Region, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, Peru.Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh,Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, and West Bank / Gaza.

Other: UkraineA vocal and active civil society sector supports a Canadian ODA program focused on povertyreduction, successfully advocating for the passage of a legislated poverty reduction mandate forCanadian ODA, Bill C-293.10 There is considerable evidence, however, that the geographicallocation of Canadas aid program in recent years has strongly influenced by its new Americasand security agendas, with serious implications for its overall prioritization of poverty reduction(Brown 2008; Smillie 2009).

3. Policies and Policy Actors Shaping Canadas Education ODA inConflict-affected States

Canada does not have a single, comprehensive policy framework for its education initiatives inconflict-affected states. As we shall document below, a broad governmental policy shifttowards increased engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states was first formalized in 2005,alongside plans for improving the integration of defence, development and diplomacy into awhole of government (WOG) approach to foreign policy. In 2006, funding for fragile statesappeared as a specific line item for Canadas bilateral ODA; and in 2007 CIDA adopted the goalof improved stability and protection for children in emergency settings as one of four mainobjectives for its education sector programming (CIDA, 2007e, p. 24). However, CIDA hascontinued to operate in its traditional fashion: through three distinctive programming channels(bilateral, multilateral and partnership the latter two responsive to externally generate

proposals), and with a heavy bias towards country-led (rather than central policy-driven)

8 In Canada the term bilateral aid is used to refer to funds spend through its bilateral aid window, not the entire ODA program thus this decision does not affect multilateral or partnership windows of Canadian ODA. Bilateral aid represents about $ 1.6 ofCanadas total ODA program. The previous 2005 list of countries of concentration in the IPS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali Mozambique Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia; Bolivia, Guyana, Hondurasand Nicaragua; Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam; Ukraine (Pistor 2007).9 An explanation of these lists is offered below; see also Table A, Appendix 1.10 Bill C-293 states that all ODA must: 1) focus on poverty reduction; 2) be consistent with international human rights standards;and 3) take into account the perspective of the poor. It was signed into law in March 2008. (House of Commons Canada 2008).


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programming. A variety of corporate and governmental policy initiatives touch on dimensions ofCIDAs approach to education in fragile and conflict-affected states, but because of theautonomy of operational divisions, none can be said to have driven its overall direction. The goalin this section is therefore to map out the key policies, policy actors and policy channels thatshape Canadian aid to education in situations of conflict.

3.1 Canadas Whole of Government (WOG) Approach to Conflic t and Fragili ty

Most analysts describe Canadas intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s as a turning point inCanadas international relations with conflict-affected states. Between 1995 and 2000, Canadahad embraced human security as acentral doctrine in its foreign policies,and some of this momentum hadfiltered into our ODA program and ourdefence policies. 11 Canadas Kosovoexperience, however, highlighted the

need for active combat forces to protectcivilian populations. It alsodemonstrated the valuable role thatlonger term ODA in sectors such ashealth and education could play in thereturn to stability (see Box 1; CIDAn/d.). A new effort to link up military,diplomacy and development that beganin Kosovo, were later reinforced byinternational security concerns after9/11.

Following the 2005 International PolicyStatement, the government began toinstitutionalize a whole-of-governmentapproach to foreign policy, givingspecial emphasis to fragile states (GOC2005). The government created a new Peace, Security and Crisis Pool within CanadasInternational Assistance Envelope, with funding split about 80-20 between DFAIT and CIDA.12

A Global Peace and Security Fund, and a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)were also established under DFAIT to manage whole-of-government coordination across thefields of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building; Peacekeeping and Peace Operations;Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response: and Mine Action and Small Arms. After 2006,Canadas new Conservative minority government maintained these policy directions.

11 Canada played leadership roles in the creation of the International Criminal Court and the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-

personnel landmines. It helped pioneer the idea of responsibility to protect (Tomlin et. al. 2007).12 The International Assistance Envelope (IEA) has since been restructured on a departmental basis. It is important to rememberthat the IEA includes funds for ODA and non-ODA eligible expenditures. A little less than of the IAE funds are channeledthrough CIDA; the rest is channeled to DFAIT, both for peace and security initiatives, and for contributions to internationalfinancial institutions; a small amount is given to the International Development Research Council.

Box 1 Ten Thousand Agents of Change :CIDAsEducation Sector Development Project in theBalkans (2001-2007)

Beginning in 2001, CIDA funded two Canadian

partner organizations to enhance learner-centredpedagogies and a culture of peace within Kosovosnational educational system. The project trained corepersonnel in the Ministry and teacher educators,supported in-service training, and assisted in policy andcurricular development. It ultimately reached over12,000 teachers and 320,000 students, and wasreplicated in Serbia and Montenegro.

The projects success can be traced to severalfactors. Canadas early conviction that education waswhere young citizens learn about democracy led it to bethe first mover in the sector, and to set its sights onsystem wide reform. The project worked throughKosovo partners to influence the education system at

multiple levels. Furthermore, CIDAs provision offlexible and consistent support, and the selection ofhighly skilled implementers with a history of successfulresults based management created conditions forsuccess. (E.T. J ackson 2006)


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CIDA, DFAIT and the Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF)13 remainthe main partners in Canadas WOG approaches to fragility.14 Each has separate responsibilities,but some overlap occurs, at times with implications for the education sector.

DFAIT is responsible for coordinating whole of government responses in fragile states and

for early warning analysis and policy recommendations in situations of fragility,emergencies, crisis and conflict. DFAIT has long had overall responsibility for developingand coordinating Canadas humanitarian assistance policies and activities. While CIDA isprimarily responsible for the delivery of ODA in these contexts, DFAIT also programs ODAfunds in the areas of security sector reform, governance reform, mine action andderegistration/demobilization. DFAIT programming rarely touches on education provisiondirectly, though it may indirectly do so through its diplomatic discussions about governanceand demobilization.

DND/CF leads all security missions, and does not program ODA. However, in a limitednumber of cases DND/CF supports the delivery of Canadian humanitarian assistance (by

providing transport, security, and infrastructure), and has become quite committed tointegrating development and humanitarian assistance into counter-insurgency andpeacekeeping efforts (Tomlin et. al, 2008; Roberts undated).15 This has led to greater overlapof departmental activities in specific contexts, such as Afghanistan. In the education sector,for example, Canadian forces might deliver school supplies (though this is discouraged inAfghanistan), build school walls, and provide security and intelligence to support ODAproject implementation.

Since the election of Canadas minority Conservative government, several policies intended toguide Canadas WOG approach in fragile and conflict affected states have been stalled, thoughconsiderable effort has gone into defining a decision-making framework for WOG. Key policies

such as the promised interdepartmental strategy for failed and fragile states, and WOG policieson humanitarian action and civilian military cooperation have not been formally adopted (GOC2008b, 2008c; DFAIT 2006). Canada does not publish a whole of government list of itspriority fragile states. ODA funding priorities, however, have typically aligned with countriesselected as focal points for the governments Peace and Security Crisis Pool, and its GlobalPeace and Security Fund. Five fragile states were initially named as focal points for the GPSF:Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Sudan (with Uganda, Lebanon, Iraq, andthe Democratic Republic of Congo appearing on the list in several subsequent years). 16

13 In Canada the Department of National Defence (DND) is a separate legal entity headed by a deputy minister, as is the

Canadian Forces, which is headed by the Chief of Defence Staff, who is a soldier.14 Other federal departments are also involved in Canadian whole of government fragility efforts, both in planning andimplementation of ODA. These include: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (increasingly involved in delivering ODA supportfor security and justice systems); the Minister of State, Democratic Reform (will lead planned Democracy Agency); HealthCanada (on disease control, monitoring etc); Citizenship and Immigration (responsible for refugees to Canada); Public Safety andEmergency Preparedness Canada (security systems reform)15 DND/CF and the Canadian defense establishment view ODA as a strategic tool in operations whose primary focus is Canadasnational security agenda. The defense establishment is often highly critical of CIDAs reliance on multilateral channels and itsdispersed efforts (see for example, Roberts n/d; Maloney September 2008; Middlemiss and Stairs 2008)16 The list is updated annually through a process of consultation with the Prime Ministers Office (PMO), the Cabinet ForeignAffairs and National Security Committee, DFAIT, CIDA, and DND.


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Processes for interdepartmental coordination at the country level appears to vary considerably,with well-staffed Task Forces and substantial integration of departmental field staff in somecases, and more ad hoc, irregular interdepartmental meetings in others. Canada has receivedinternational praise for our use of whole of government approaches in conflict-affectedcontexts first in Afghanistan, and more recently in Haiti (OECD-DAC 2007a). However,

Parliamentary reports and external analyses have raised many questions about the efficacy ofsuch coordination.17

How has the WOG approach affected Canadian education ODA in conflict-affected states? Atthe level of geographic allocation, whole of government approaches have clearly brought anew emphasis on security and trade into CIDA programming. However, the whole ofgovernment experiment has also increased the likelihood that Canada will offer sustainedbilateral aid (as opposed to short term emergency assistance) in a few priority conflict affectedcountries. As shall be shown below, CIDA has been able to argue for the inclusion of educationas a pillar in many of Canadas priority WOG initiatives. Canadas experience in the Kosovoeducation development program illustrates this process, suggesting that when peace-building is a

primary WOG goal, whole-of-government planning can sometimes support novel, integratededucation efforts that follow logically from earlier defence and diplomacy-led stabilization andpeace-keeping interventions.

3.2 CIDA Polic ies for Fragile and Confli ct-Affected States

CIDAs main policy framework can be found in its Sustainable Development Strategy 2007-2009 (CIDA 2007). This document gives as the leading strategic outcome for the agencyIncreased achievement of development goals consistent with Canadian foreign policyobjectives, and highlights agency goals in four areas: 1) economic development; 2) socialdevelopment; 3) environment and natural resource management; and 4) progress in democraticgovernance and human rights. Gender equality is a heavily emphasized crosscutting theme, withgender equality in education identified as a priority. Pro-poor health and basic educationprogramming are the central activities addressed under its social development goal. As noted inthe introduction, the SDS 2007-2009 (in distinction from earlier SDS, CIDA 2001b and 2004b)commits the government to using its education sector ODA to improve stability and protectchildren in emergency and conflict-affected contexts (p. 24).

CIDAs work in fragile and conflict-affected states is also guided by its Annual Report onPrograms and Priorities (RPP), which is prepared for Canadas Treasury Board as part of thegovernments budget estimates and performance management review process. CIDAs 2007,2008 and 2009 RPPs announced a special funding line for programming in fragile states,naming as priorities (in various years): Afghanistan, Haiti, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan and Gaza/WestBank (CIDA 2007b, 2008a).18 At over $600 million annually, fragile states are budgeted toreceive roughly 2/3 the amount committed to bilateral aid in CIDA countries of

17 Interdepartmental tensions were found to have undermined Canadas efforts to support democracy and good governance byone Senate committee; and to have undermined Canadas Afghanistan mission (GOC July 2007; Smillie 2007, GOC January2008, Derosiers and Lagasse 2008). Some have noted the inadequacy of funding provided to DFAIT for its coordination role inCanadas WOG (Wijeyaratne 2008).18The list has varied by year and is intended to be representative of Canadas efforts, rather than a comprehensive. The 2009 RPPalso includes Iraq in this list, though I could find no evidence of plans to increase CIDAs programs in this country.


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concentration.19 As noted in Box 3 below, both the RPP and the Sustainable DevelopmentStrategy feed into CIDAs results based management framework.

In 2005 CIDA began to develop what is now its Internal Guide to Effective DevelopmentCooperation in Fragile States, a document that was originally intended as a whole ofgovernment policy, but did not receive interdepartmental endorsement.20 In its current format,the Guide offers a statement of the principals that CIDA staff should follow when programmingin fragile and conflict affected contexts, focusing their attention on the need for local ownership,

donor alignment, multi-stakeholder partnerships, attention to human security and the protectionof human rights, the need for stakeholder dialogue and partnerships, and the need to emphasizeprevention, supported by monitoring and analysis. The document adopts a broad definition offragility (naming no specific countries). No guide to geographic allocations is provided, but weare told that the Canadian government first identifies where its values, interests andinternational responsibilities coincide. Three programming pillars are highlighted: democraticgovernance (particularly democratic governance, human rights protections and rule of law);security and stability; and livelihoods. Human rights, gender equality and child protection appearas crosscutting considerations.21 Of particular relevance for education sector programming, the

19 The current RPP does not indicate whether conflict affected states recently moved to CIDAs countries of concentration listwill be funded via the fragile state or countries of concentration line items. The fragile state line item was budgeted for CDN$611million in 2008/9 ($ 968 million to other countries of concentration) CDN $ 625,521, (as against $985,814) in 2009/10. It isnot clear whether funding for fragile states under Canadas multilateral, humanitarian assistance or civil society partnershipfunding windows is included in the fragility budget line.20 The document was first drafted in 2005, and went through both interdepartmental and public consultation. However itremained stalled in other departments and was never approved as a whole-of-government policy statement. By default, it wasapproved for internal use in CIDA in 2007.21 These key lessons from past CIDA programming are also presented: use flexible approaches; ensure expectations are realistic,short term and manageable but complemented by a long term vision; intensify donor coordination; stick with it; and strengthenanalytical capacities.

Box 2. Results Based Management for CIDA Programming in Fragile StatesPerformance or results based management (RBM) is a required of all federal governmental

departments in Canada. CIDAs performance results framework is derived both from its Sustainable

Development Strategy and from the goals and objectives announced in its annual RPPs.CIDA sees RBM as a particularly useful programming tool in conflict-affected and fragile

states. In 2006, CIDA Vice President Stephen Wallace elaborated this view in testimony to a SenateReview of Canadas relations with Haiti, noting for effective aid in difficult contexts, you need a clear,transparent, sophisticated, accountable results structure. CIDAs Internal Guide on Fragile Statesalso states that ..in fragile states, because the stakes are high, donors out to be held to the highestand most stringent standards of effective practice and results (quoted in GOC 2006a). CIDAs recentRPPs have also used access to basic services (health and education) as key results indicators forCanadas work in fragile states and crises.

The use of RBM has been most fully realized in Canadas Afghanistan program, whichpublishes quarterly performance reports on a small number of countable benchmarks (such asnumbers of schools constructed).

Other units in CIDA have also experimented with RBM. CIDAs Child Protection Unit, for

example, developed and piloted a model for incorporating child participation results into an RBMframework (CIDA 2003b). CIDAs new Tip Sheets on Education in Emergencies, Conflict, Post-conflict and Fragile States also include sample results indicators (CIDA 2009a).

One of the current challenges facing CIDAs RBM framework is how to align it to the Agencysnew legislated focus on poverty reduction. In previous years emphasis has been on aligning the RBMto broader government goals, including its international security goals.


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document stresses the importance of establishing non-discriminatory minimum standards ofservice delivery, especially for health and education (2008c, p. 15).

CIDAs thematic policies on gender and child protection also identify a role for increasededucation sector programming in conflict-affected contexts, emphasizing (respectively) safe,

secure and equal education for girls; and the role that education can play in providing both safespaces for children and opportunities for peace-building and child and youth participation inconflict affected contexts (CIDA 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007). In addition, CIDA has endorsed theDACs Principals for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007), thePrinciples and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship (2003), the Paris Declaration on AidEffectiveness (OECD-DAC 2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD-DAC 2008,paragraph 21) as guiding documents for its fragile states programming.

Two principal units within CIDAs Strategic Policy and Performance Branch shape theAgencys overall approach to CAFS, though they have not to date been directly engaged on theeducation file. The three-person Peace, Conflict and State Resilience unit within the Policy

Development Division has three main functions: (1) To ensure and promotes CIDAs alignmentwith the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States andSituations, and to represent Canada at the newly created International Network on Conflict andFragility (INCAF) at the OECD. (2) To work across federal departments top ensure that thedevelopment and poverty reduction goals associated with Canadian engagement in fragile statesare advanced; and (3) To work with specific country programs to assist and support programplanning and strategy and its coherence with the activities of other donors and the multilateralsystem. For example, in support of a process being led by the DFAIT/START it is currentlycontributing knowledge and experience related to legal reform to the preparation of a whole ofgovernment strategy on security system reform. From 2005-08, this unit managed a financialcontribution to a novel approach to fragility monitoring, through the lonstanding CarletonUniversity based research project: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)22. Whileinitially conceived as a decision support tool for programming choices in CAFS, it has not beenformally adopted within Agency strategy and planning processes.

The other potentially important unit is CIDAs recently reorganized Democratic Governance andHuman Rights Division, which focuses on issues related to democratization, governance andhuman rights (including anti-corruption, childrens rights, goverance and human rights).However, apart from the work of Child Rights and Protection unit, CIDAs governanceinitiatives have shown a surprising neglect of education as a factor in governance and democracypromotion (Welsh and Woods 2007). CIDAs International Humanitarian Assistance Directoratealso contributes to programming and policy development in fragile states, but is described inmore detail in Section 3.4 (below).

22 http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/. The CIFP approach identifies the inaccessibility or unavailability of basic education to thevast majority of the population as a catalyzing factor in its fragility analysis model.
http://www.carleton.ca/cifphttp://www.carleton.ca/cifphttp://www.carleton.ca/cifp


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3.3 CIDA Education Sector Polic ies for Fragile and Conflic t-affected States

CIDAs Education Unit in its Strategic Policy and Performance Branch has recently drafted aworking paper and set of Tip Sheets that draw heavily on the INEE Minimum Standards forEducation in Emergencies as a guide for Canadas education sector programming in conflict

affected and fragile states. The draft Working Paper on Education in Emergencies, Conflict,Post-Conflict and Fragile States (CIDA 2009b) describes global challenges and offersillustrations of CIDAs activities to date. It stands out for its view of education as an essentialcomponent of efforts to protect children and ensure their human rights. The paper concludes thatCIDA needs to take greater leadership on flexible funding mechanisms; donor coordination;support education system governance; and on the issues of gender, child protection, peacebuilding and prevention. Accompanying Tip Sheets providing guidance on such programmingissues as donor coordination and alignment, teachers and teacher management, gender equality,and inclusion.

CIDAs Education Unit also leads Agency participation in international donor coordination and

minimum standards initiatives for education sector work in conflict-affected and fragile states.CIDA was an early funder of the INEE, and helped in both the production and dissemination ofits Minimum Standards. CIDA has continued to provide core funding to the INEE; it hassponsored two INEE international roundtables. It sits on the INEE Working Group on Educationin Fragility and on its Gender Task Team. CIDA supports Minimum Standards training bothwithin the Agency and for Canadian NGOs (INEE undated). All CIDA education projectproposals are now encouraged to make reference to these minimum standards anddemonstrate how they will achieve progress toward meeting them (CIDA 2009a: 12).Canada contributes to other multilateral donor coordination efforts that focus on conflict affectedstates: it was Chair of the FTIs Fragile States Task Team, works with the United Nations GirlsEducation Initiative, and has contributed to the establishment of a recently announced multi-donor transition fund for education in conflict affected and fragile states.

The Education Unit has a limited ability to effect decisions made by operational branches in theAgency, but plays an important role in circulating international norms and standards. It regularlysponsors seminars and opportunities for information exchange and dialogue on education inCAFS. However, it has not (to date) directly sponsored empirical research on educationprogramming in CAFS, nor does it play a direct role in evaluation of Canadas education sectorefforts in CAFS.

3.4 Programming Channels as Policy Actors in CIDA

CIDAs education sector activities in conflict-affected states are channeled through three mainoperational windows, each employing its own staff of analysts and project managers.

Geographic (country-country) programs (commonly referred to as bilateral programs inCIDA). CIDA has four large, regionally organized bilateral program branches, that sit withina geographic programs branch. Bilateral country programs are typically organized aroundthree or four sectoral development priorities (with health, basic education, democraticgovernance, and more recently security sector reform figuring prominently. CIDAs bilateral


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programs pride themselves on being country-team driven, leading to considerable variation inprogramming approach. While bilateral programs increasingly incorporate sector or program-based approaches, reliance on civil society organizations to implement projects is still quitecommon, multi-donor trust funds are also used for bilateral programs in conflict-affectedstates.

CIDAs Partnership Program Branch is a distinctive funding window for projects andprograms proposed by Canadian civil society partners (including NGOs, educationalinstitutions, membership based and professional organizations, unions, and regionaldevelopment councils). Individual initiatives funded under this window are typically smallerthan in bilateral programs and are often multi-sectoral. For this reason CSO partnershipefforts in education are sometimes not captured in OECD-DAC and CIDAs internal data. Asignificant number of CIDAs partners operate in conflict-affected states and humanitarianemergencies. Their initiatives are notable for their emphasis on child rights and childparticipation, and the use of education as a tool in peace building. CIDAs CanadianPartnership Program Branch also funds civil society research and policy dialogue related to

CAFs (Baranyi and Powell 2005; SCE 2006, 2007, 2008; CGCE 2008; Mundy 2008).

Multilateral programs. Canada provides regular funding to many UN organizations involvedin conflict-affected states. In addition CIDA has an International Humanitarian AssistanceDirectorate (IHA Directorate), which works in close partnership with DFAIT to delivertimely and effective humanitarian aid. The IHA Directorate responds to requests frommultilateral partners and Canadian NGOs (funding them at about an 80-20% ratio). Canada isa mid-level donor of humanitarian aid, with a positive performance in terms ofresponsiveness (OECD- DAC 2007a; CCIC 2009c).23 CIDAs IHA Directorate is involved inthe development of such initiatives as the UN cluster approach, the Sphere Project and theconsolidated appeal process; and has piloted a new calibration tool for humanitarian

intervention (CIDA 2009d).

24

While this unit recognizes that education in emergencies playsa protective role, education does not received special attention because the Canada programis based on needs identified by its partners (not pre-determined sectors). Because Canadarelies on these partners to make the case for sectoral intervention, it has lost an opportunity toplay a leadership role what is an under-funded sector (Turrent and Oketch 2009). The IHADirectorate does not monitor the prioritization of education in Canadas humanitarian aidprogram.

Each of CIDAs operational channels has a different way of working and plans its programmingstrategies somewhat independently, leading to initiatives that are sometimes only looselyintegrated and linked up at the country level. Furthermore, a disconnect between policies

developed at the corporate level and programming decisions within CIDAs operational units haslong characterized CIDA (Woods 2007). These features of the Canadian aid program naturallycontribute to a diversity of approaches at the country level and to questions about the adequacy

23 A recent analysis of Canadas humanitarian aid concludes Canadian IHA is somewhat more influenced by political factors; lesstargeted to need; and less responsive to under-funded and orphaned appeals than the DAC average. (CCIC March 2009, draft).24 For a description of the Humanitarian Needs Index (HNI) see presentation by CIDA (2009),Analysis of Humanitarian Needs.Retrieved 10 May 2009 from www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/documents/cida_analysis_humanitarian_needs.ppt
http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/documents/cida_analysis_humanitarian_needs.ppthttp://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/documents/cida_analysis_humanitarian_needs.ppt


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of integration across programming channels, especially during transitions between humanitariancrises, stabilization and reconstruction.

The vast majority of Canadian aid to education is channeled through CIDAs bilateralprogramming branches, as can be seen in Table 2 below. (NB: the prioritization of education in

multilateral and partnership disbursements is likely under-reported, as these are often not codedto sector.)

TABLE 2: CIDA Disbursements By Branch, 2007/2008 ($Cdn millions)Total Aid % Total Aid to

all BranchesTotal Education

Aid% Education inBranch Total

Geographic/Bilateral 1525.19 53% 234.11 15%

Partnership 252.97 9% 36.19 14%

Multilateral 1094.08 38% 44.34 4%

Source: Derived from Table G, Appendix 1, based on data from CIDAs Information System, 2009-03-19

4. Canadian Education ODA to Conflict-Affected States

The following section provides an overview and analysis of CIDAs education sector activities inconflicted-affected states. It begins with a section on methodology and data sources, and thenturns to sections on aid volume, geographic allocation, and programming content, before movingto three brief country case studies.

4.1 Methodology and Sources of Data

As a starting point for this analysis, we developed a composite list of 32 conflict-affected or

fragile states, drawing from the lists developed by the GMR team (conflict-affected leastdeveloped states); the list of countries used by Save the Children for its Last In Line report (Save2007, 2008); and the list of conflict affected countries announced as focal points by the Canadiangovernment and CIDA (see Table A in Appendix 1).25 This list is not perfect: it includes, forexample, Senegal, and country that CIDA does not treat as fragile or conflict-affected; WestBank/Gaza (which appears on neither the Save nor the GMR conflict affected state lists, butwhich is a CIDA fragile state priority); and Haiti (a CIDA priority not on the GMR list).26

The list of 32 countries was used to examine broad trends in the volume and geographicallocation of Canadian ODA for education in conflict affected states. OECD-DAC statisticaldata27 from the years 2005/6 through 2007/8 was used to chart the average annual ODA to

education going to each of the 32 countries. Each countrys share of total Canadian educationsector ODA, as well as its share of all CAF-focused education sector ODA was calculated. We

25 This included the list of focal countries for Canadas Global Peace and Security Fund, and the countries names in CIDAsReport on Plans and Priorities for 2007, 2008, and 2009.26 The GMR team should note in particular that the inclusion of Senegal on their list, and exclusion of Haiti, will dramaticallyaffect the picture of Canadian aid to education in conflict.27 Some limitations arise from our reliance on DAC data: first, it tends to under-represent Canadas performance in education,

because it does not disaggregate multilateral flows and requires donors to code multi-sectoral projects to only one theme. Second,it is only available to the end of fiscal 2007/2008. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain internal data from CIDA.


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also developed a list of the top 10 conflict-affected recipients of Canadian ODA. Additional dataon the volume of Canadian ODA was drawn from Save the Children (2009), reproduced inAppendix 1, Table B.

In a subsequent step, we created a list of all education sector investments in each of the 32

countries on our CAFS list in order to explore the content of Canadian programming. A list ofcurrent projects and related project information was generated from CIDAs online projectbrowser, supplemented by information from CIDAs Education Directorate (full list is found inTable G, Appendix 1). To be included on the list a project had to be operational within the lasttwo years, and have 30% or more of its total allocated to education (except in the case of multi-million dollar multi-donor trust funds). We used the full list for our analysis, but provide only thelist for the top 10 CAF recipients in Appendix 1.

To provide further information about the character of Canadian ODA in conflict-affectedcountries, we finally looked in more detail at CIDA programming in three countries: Colombia,Afghanistan, and Sudan. These case countries were chosen from a list of the top 10 CAF

recipients of Canadian education ODA, and were selected to reflect the diversity of approachestaken in the Canadian aid to education in CAFS. Each case utilized the project list describedabove, in combination with CIDAs country program websites, program evaluations, the CIDAproject browser, and secondary literatures. CIDA provided a detailed break down of itsgeographic program and partnership program disbursements for 2007/2008 for each of the casecountries. Interviews with one or more country program staff were conducted (See Table H,Appendix 1).

4.2 Trends in Aid Volume and Channels

Canadas education aid to conflict-affected states has grown quite rapidly, especially after 2006,when Canada began to provide educational aid in Afghanistan. According to Save the Childrensanalysis,28between 2004-06 and 2005-07 Canadas commitments for education in conflict-affected and fragile states jumped from US $59 million to US $87.9 million, or from about 18%to 23% of Canadas total education ODA. ODA commitments for basic education in conflict-affected states more than doubled in the same period, jumping to US $43.9 million in 2007.However, when looking within countries, Save finds that only 7.1% of sector allocated CanadianODA goes to education in conflict-affected states, while 35.8% is used for education in otherlow-income countries for the 2005-2007 period.

The amount of Canadian humanitarian aid that is channeled to education is unknown. Savesanalysis (based on the OECD-DAC data) finds that Canada provides a very small share ofhumanitarian aid targeted to basic education (less than 2% in 2006-2008). As noted earlier,however, this low figure may be due to the fact that most humanitarian assistance is not coded tosector. However, as a reflection of efforts, we found that neither CIDAs IHA Directorate norDFAITs START group monitors or advocates for the prioritization of education withinCanadas humanitarian assistance program. This is a somewhat surprising finding given the factthat Canada formally prioritizes education in conflict affected states in its Sustainable

28 Save the Children provided this data by personal communication to the author. The data tables appear in Appendix 1, Table Bof this study, and will be published in the 2009 Last in Line Report.


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Development Strategy (CIDA 2007), and uses access to basic services as a results measure for itsprogramming in fragile states.29

One important feature of Canadian aid that is missed in the Save analysis is the extreme variationin prioritization of education across CAFS. Disbursement data provided by CIDA for sectoral

allocations in five highest profile CAF bilateral country programs is presented below. As can beseen, the percentage of bilateral (country-to-country) aid to education ranges from less than 5%in Haiti, to highs of close to 30% in Colombia (Table 3 below)

ODA disbursements channeled through CIDAs Partnership funding window can also varysignificantly, as seen in Table 4 below. While Partnership Branch funding for education issmaller than the bilateral funding, education seems to be a more consistent priority in theseresponsive programs (with the exception of Sudan).

Table 3. CIDA Bilateral (Country to Country) Program Disbursements Allocated toSectors of Focus in Selected States, 2007/2008 (Cdn $ million)30

Afghanistan Colombia Hait i Pakistan Sudan

$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %

Democratic governance 97.68 36.06% 2.72 36.40% 14.71 15.66% 11.93 29.86% 8.78 23.5

Improving health 11.38 4.20% 0.05 0.70% 25.15 26.76% 9.66 24.18% 7.57 20.3

Private sector development 65.36 24.12% 1.05 14.12% 32.94 35.05% 4.24 10.62% 3.17 8.5

Strengthening basic education 33.09 12.22% 2.16 28.98% 4.67 4.97% 8.18 20.48% 3.22 8.6

Environment 0.01 0.01% 0.25 3.37% 1.05 1.12% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.0

Emergency assistance 20.05 7.40% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 4.24 10.60% 6.53 17.5

Peace and security 24.98 9.22% 0.93 12.43% 0.27 0.29% 0.00 0.00% 7.82 20.9

Other** 18.36 6.78% 0.30 4.00% 15.18 16.15% 1.70 4.26% 0.19 0.5

Total 270.92 100% 7.47 100.00% 93.97 100.00% 39.96 100.00% 37.27 100.0Source: Prepared by CIDAs Statistical Analysis and Reporting Division, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Agency

Information System, 2009-05-07

29 Canada is not far off the global average here: globally, education receives less than 2% of the annual total to mostconsolidated appeals and receives only 42% of required amounts (as compared to 66% for other sectors) (Turrent and Oketch2009; Save the Children 2009).30 Data provided to the author by CIDAs Statistical Analysis team, April 2009. Country Program disbursements include CanadaFund for Local Initiatives. Other includes all programs not part of CIDA's main sector of focus: e.g.Higher education, Secondaryand Post-secondary education, Housing and welfare, Multisector, Commodity aid,


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Table 4. CIDA Partnership Disbursements by Sectors of FocusAfghanistan Colombia Hait i Pakistan Sudan

$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %

Democratic governance 0.12 17.3% 0.38 26.6% 1.13 20.7% 0.13 18.2% 0.15 36.0%

Improving health 0.05 6.7% 0.20 14.3% 1.06 19.4% 0.14 19.4% 0.04 10.4%

Private sector development 0.15 21.8% 0.47 33.3% 1.27 23.1% 0.20 28.1% 0.13 29.2%

Strengthening basic education 0.17 24.0% 0.26 18.5% 1.26 23.1% 0.16 22.7% 0.02 5.2%

Environment 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.14 2.5% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.4%

Emergency assistance 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0%

Peace and security 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.06 1.1% 0.00 0.0% 0.03 7.8%

Other 0.21 30.2% 0.10 7.2% 0.55 10.0% 0.08 11.6% 0.05 11.0%

Total 0.69 100% 1.41 100.0% 5.47 100.0% 0.71 100.0% 0.43 100.0%

Source: Prepared by CIDAs Statistical Analysis and Reporting Division, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, AgencyInformation System, 2009-05-07

4.3. Geographic Allocation of Canadian Education ODA to CAFS

While the past five years have seen significant improvement in the volume of Canadian fundingfor education in CAFS, most of this has been focused in a small number of countries. As can beseen in Table 5 below, based on OECD-DAC data, more than 75% of all our education aid toconflict-affected states between 2005/6-2007/8 was concentrated in three countries:Afghanistan, Pakistan and Haiti. Allocations to Afghanistan dwarf all other education sectorprograms in CAFs. Several other CAFS receive smaller but still significant amounts ofCanadian ODA for education (e.g., Columbia, Sierra Leone). Short-term investments were alsomade in Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Iraq mid-decade, but a review of current CIDA projectssuggests that these are now concluding. Our table suggests that 14 of the conflict-affectedcountries on our composite CAFS list receive no Canadian ODA whatsoever in the 2005-2008

period.One of the outstanding questions raised by Save the Children and the GMR team is whether thegrowth of Canadas education aid to CAFS has resulted in a decrease of Canadian educationODA to other low-income countries. Certainly the recent SAVE analysis (based on its list of 28fragile countries) suggests that this is the case. Their data show that Canadian education ODA toLICs not on the SAVE CAFS list has fallen by more than half, from US $169.4 million in 2006to US $ 88 million in 2007; while basic education ODA in non-CAF LICs has dropped from65% to 60% of total commitments. We were unable to compare these findings to CIDAsinternal disbursement data, which is not available on a country-by-country basis. However,CIDA did provide us with disbursement data by Geographic (bilateral) Programs Branch for

2007/2008 (see Table G, Appendix 1). This data shows a slight drop in totalbilateraldisbursements to Africa Branch (from a high of $583 million in 2006/2007, to $ 539 million in2007/8). In contrast, after four years trailing Africa Branch, CIDAs Asia Branch disbursementsgrew to Cdn $ 597 million in 2007. Thus at the level of total aid, there appears to be a shift fromAfrica to Asia, probably caused by the expansion of disbursements to Afghanistan.

So far, education spending in Africa has been protected, reaching $111 million in Africa or 21%of all Africa branch disbursements in 07/08. Asian Branch funding for education has remained


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significantly lower than that in Africa branch, at $72 million, or 12% of total bilateraldisbursements. The question now is whether commitments to African CAFS can be sustained orimproved, given Canadas stated objectives of focusing on fewer countries, and concentrating inparticular on Afghanistan and on the Americas.

One feature of Canadian aid that is worth re-emphasizing is the fact that sectoral priorities at thecountry-level vary significantly. Canadas aid program to Ethiopia, for example, does notprioritize education, even though it is among the top 10 recipients of Canadian aid. CanadianODA to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda similarly has no education focus. Onthe other hand, some small ODA recipients have strong allocations to basic education (as thecase for example in Colombia and to a lesser degree, Sierra Leone). As might be expected froman operationally driven aid program, the prioritization of sectoral aid appears to be highlyidiosyncratic.


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Table 5. Geographic Allocations of Canadian Aid to Education to CAFS(Based on DAC Commitment data/ US$ millions)

Conflict-AffectedCountries

&Fragile States(SCF +GMR)

* SCF list only* GOC fragile

Policy Status Canadian Aid to Education2005/6-2007/8

CIDAcountry of

focus20052009

Rank ofCanada's

ODAamongDAC2005/6-2007/8

Averageannual

ODA toEducation(Constant2006 USDmillion)

Share oftotal

Cdn EdODA (%)

Share oftotal Ed

ODA forall SCFCAFS(%)

Share ofEd ODA

forGMRList (%)

Primaryage

childrenout ofschool

Afghanistan 2005+2009* 2 40.26 14.96 63.81 63.44 2,082,000Angola 11 0 0 0 0 800,000Burundi 14 0 0 0 0 480,000Cambodia 11 0 0 0 0 23,000*Central AfrnR.

11 0 0 0 -- 287,000

Chad 11 0 0 0 0 594,000

*Colombia 2009* 9 0.75 0.28 1.19 -- 479,000Congo, Rep. 7 0 0 0 0 376,000*Cote d'Ivoire 13 0 0 0 -- 1,223,000Dem. Rep.Congo

9 0 0 0 0 5,026,000

Eritrea 23 0 0 0 0 308,000Ethiopia 2005 +2009 5 0.17 0.06 0.27 0.27 2,666,000*Guinea 9 0 0 0 -- 501,000Guinea-Bissau 17 0 0 -- 0 114,000*Haiti 2009* 2 8.48 3.15 13.44 -- 704,000*Iraq 9 0.04 0.02 0.06 -- 552,000Liberia 14 0 0 0 0 171,000Myanmar 19 0 0 0 0 487,000

Nepal 10 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.14 702,000*Nigeria 14 0 0 0 -- 6,584,000Pakistan 2005 +2009 5 6.51 2.42 10.32 10.26 6,303,000Rwanda 2005 10 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.05 373,000Senegal 2009 9 14.05 5.22 -- 22.14 513,000Sierra Leone 12 0.64 0.24 1.01 1.01 277,000Somalia 10 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 1,231,000Sri Lanka 2005 8 4.29 1.59 6.80 -- 47,000*Sudan 2009* 6 0.57 0.21 0.90 0.90 2,695,000Tajikistan 9 0 0 -- 0 19,000Timor-Leste 14 0 0 0 -- 3,000Uganda 14 1.1 0.41 1.74 1.73 1,151,000*W.Bank/Gaza

2009 10 4.15 1.54 -- -- 94,000

Zimbabwe 10 0.12 0.05 0.19 -- 429,000Notes: Column 1. Combines the lists of conflict-affected states used by Save the Children (2006, 2008) with the GMR list of low-incomecountries affected by conflict. Column 3 is based on OECD-DAC commitments data, and ranks Canadas total ODA to each country againstother OECD donors. Columns 4 and 5 draw on OECD-DAC commitment data to show average annual commitments to education (05/6-07/08)and the percentage of total Canadian ODA committed to education for each country (respectively). The amount of total education aid averaged$269.11 million annually. Columns 6 shows what percentage of Canadas total education aid to conflict affected states each country receives,using the SCF list, and also the SCF method for calculating total ODA to Education (total aid to education = aid to education plus 20 % ofGeneral Budget Support). Average annual education aid 2005-2007 was $63.1 million. Column 7 does the same using the GMR List. Averageannual education aid 2005-2007 was $63.46 million. Column 8 uses data provided by the UIS 2005 with the exception of Guinea-Bissau,Senegal, Tajikistan and the West Bank and Gaza, found in UNESCO's 2009 GMR, Table 5, pp. 300-307. 1Figures are for 1999.


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4.4 The Composi tion and Content of Canadas Education ODA to CAFS

Significantly different approaches to education sector programming are also evident in content ofCanadian initiatives at the country level. For this section we explored key trends in thecomposition of aid to education by looking at level, channel and focus of programming in all 32

countries on our CAFS list, and then in more detail at a few of the top CAF recipients ofCanadian aid to education.

Several general trends can be seen in the overall portfolio of education sector projects. First, forthe vast majority of countries on our list of 32, Canadaprovides little or no bilateral branch funding foreducation, though it may indirectly support educationthrough its funding for multilateral organizations andhumanitarian assistance. Education sectorprogramming in these countries is typically fundedthrough Canadas Partnership Program, a unique

window that supports small-scale projects proposed byCanadian CSOs. Our review of the portfolio of smallNGO-led education projects currently funded byCIDA suggests that they emphasize education as a toolfor peace-building to a degree often not found in largerscale bilateral projects.31 They also engage morefrequently with such issues as adult literacy, earlychildhood education and child participation, and use arights based and child-centred frame for their activities. Accounts from CIDA staff and NGOrepresentatives suggest that these efforts can often be innovative. At their best, such successfulCSO initiatives can help to introduce new approaches to programming to CIDA, and sometimesreceive support from bilateral branch programs to go to scale (as in Colombia, see below). Fromthe CSO perspective, however, the value of these initiatives is not only their potential for scalingup. Projects that build ongoing relationships between Canadian and Southern partners, or createsustainable capacity in Southern organizations can be highly successful even when they do notattract larger funding.

For a second, much smaller group of conflict-affected countries, Canada has provided (or plansto provide) significant levels of bilateral aid, and is prioritizing education within its aid program.Afghanistan, Haiti, West-Bank Gaza, Sudan, Colombia and Pakistan all fall into this category.In many of these countries, Canada disburses its ODA through a combination of two mainprogramming approaches: multi-donor trust funds that provide support to the national ministryof education and a national education sector program; and regionally focused initiatives that aimto directly deliver educational services (usually implemented by Canadian CSOs or UNICEF).As examples of this regional focus, CIDA is concentrating on Arbonite and Grande Ansedepartments in Haiti; Kandahar in Afghanistan; and Nario and Antiquoia in Colombia. Inaddition, small-scale responsive initiatives funded through Partnership Branch programmingexist in most bilaterally programmed countries, though their degree of integration with Canadas

31 See for example projects listed for Uganda, Sierra Leone and Colombia in Appendix 1, Table G). The main Canadian NGOsprogramming in conflict-affected states are: Save the Children Canada, Plan Canada, Aga Khan Foundation, War Child Canada,

Box 3: Innovation & CSOsIn Sierra Leone, a country in which

Canada has no significant assistanceprogram and no long term projectsplanned* Canada funds an innovativeinitiative in peace education that bringstogether adults, children andcommunity leaders, led by Canadian

NGO Peaceful School International.Canada also supports a multi-countryproject led by War Child Canada toprovide support for the educationalreintegration of child-soldiers in SierraLeone.* http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/sierraleone-e
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/sierraleone-ehttp://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/sierraleone-e


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bilateral programming is often limited. In priority conflict-affected states, Canada balances theuse of CSOs and multilaterals for short rundelivery with programs that develop nationalcapacity through a harmonized, pooled fundingapproach.

The content and character of Canadas educationsector programming in these priority countriesvaries substantially. As mentioned in section 4.2above, the degree to which education is prioritizedranges from 5% to 30% in five high profile CAFrecipients of Canadian ODA. This variationsometimes reflects difficulties encountered withinthe country: for example, governmental capacity insouthern Sudan and Haiti appears to have delayededucation sector disbursements. The type of

educational intervention can also varysignificantly. As an example, in West Bank/Gazaprogramming includes some funding for highereducation scholarships and early childhoodeducation, and is heavily focused on providing safespaces for learning and institutional support forUNRWA. But Canada provides no direct support to the government for education through thePalestinian Authority. Haiti receives significant funding for post-secondary education. Incontrast, Canadian programming in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan is highly concentrated onbasic education (see Table 6 below).

Table 6. CIDA Bilateral Country Program* Disbursements to Education by Level$ Cdn

millions Afghanistan Colombia Hait i Pakistan Sudan

$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %Education,levelunspec 24.46 73.04% 0.65 25.09% 1.70 29.94% 2.30 27.04% 0.20 5.87%

Basic ED. 8.63 25.78% 1.51 58.09% 2.93 51.55% 5.96 69.97% 3.13 94.13%Secondaryeducation 0.20 0.58% 0.44 16.82% 0.20 3.52% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00%Post-secondaryeducation 0.20 0.60% 0.00 0.00% 0.85 14.98% 0.25 2.99% 0.00 0.00%

Total

Education 33.49 100% 2.60 100.00% 5.68 100.00% 8.52 100.00% 3.33 100.00%* Canada Fund for Local Initiatives is included in this total.Source: Prepared by CIDAs Statistical Analysis and Reporting Division, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Agency

Information System, 2009-05-07

Box 4: Lessons from Canadian Aid toEducation in Haiti

In 2004, CIDA reviewed itsdevelopment cooperation program in Haiti

as part of the OECD-DAC fragile statesinitiative. The study showed that frustrationwith Haitis Aristide government ledCanada to invest almost entirely in NGO-provided basic educational services. Theresult was the creation of a parallel servicedelivery system that eroded the legitimacy,capacity and will of the government todeliver key services. CIDA also fundedmany small education projects, neglectingthe need to create a critical mass of activitycapable of acting as a driver of long-termchange.

Lessons from the Haiti experiencehave informed CIDAs current dual trackapproach to funding both government ledand regionally focused, NGO-deliveredprogramming in fragile states. (CIDA2004a


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One area that receives significant attention across CIDAs education sector programming inCAFS is gender. Every CAF country receiving bilateral education ODA includes initiatives tosupport girls access to basic education (see for example projects in Pakistan, Afghanistan, TableG, Appendix 1), and initiatives for female adult literacy are not uncommon. A gender focus isalso emphasized when Canada participates in multi-donor trust funds. Another unique area of

programming that is presently seeing significant growth is vocational education and skillstraining: the recently announced Skills for Employment Initiative, a technical and vocationalprogram to be delivered by Canadian community colleges, has new projects in Afghanistan,Haiti and Colombia.32

In contrast CIDAs bilateral education programs in CAFS rarely appear to include peace buildingas a specific goal. Lessons learned from CIDAs highly successful Kosovo experience about thevalue of democracy-enhancing curricula and pedagogy are not strongly reflected in CIDAscurrent bilateral initiatives, perhaps with the exception of its Colombia programming.33

4.5 Country Examples: Sudan, Colombia and Afghanistan

AfghanistanAfghanistan is often viewed as a model for Canadas whole of government approach becauseof the tight integration of development activities with initiatives from defence and foreign affairs.Canadas aid program to the country has a long history, but it was not until after 2005 that ourbilateral program in Afghanistan emerged as one of the largest in Canadian history.34 In2007/2008, Afghanistan received more than Cdn $270 million in bilateral aid, of which a littleover 12% (or about $33 million) went to fund programs in basic education.

The evolution of Canadian aid to Afghanistan has been highly scrutinized. In common with otherOECD donors, Canada did not develop a comprehensive strategy for its development aid in theimmediate period after 2001 and thus may have missed a key opportunity to use social sectorto support to build the legitimacy of the new government (Banerjee 2008a, 2008b; Gilmore andMosazai 2007). Much of its early aid was delivered through multilateral channels, or throughloosely linked, NGO implemented initiatives. It was only after Canada accepted responsibilityfor the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) in 2005 that it began to develop alonger-term framework, focusing more carefully on key sectors (security sector reform,livelihoods and basic services, building a stronger national government). Following the report ofa specially appointed advisory panel (GOC 2008a), the Canadian government moved to enhancethe integration of its development, defence and diplomacy efforts, and to further focus its aidprogram, geographically (to support its military mission in Kandahar), and sectorally. Thegovernment also announced that it would end its military mission in Afghanistan in 2011.

Education has come to play a significant role in Canadas WOG framework for Afghanistan.Initial education sector investments began in late 2006, and focused on womens economic

32 http://www.cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-3691851-JSU33 The evaluation of the Kosovo program argues that other programs in conflict-affected states could emphasize peacebuildingand child-centred pedagogy. However, it acknowledges that a system wide reform like that attempted in Kosovo is most likely tosucceed where conditions of stability and security are already in place something not true in Canadas priority CAFS,Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan and Colombia.34 Afghanistan receives roughly three times the Canadian aid of any other country.
http://www.cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-3691851-JSUhttp://www.cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-3691851-JSU


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livelihoods and getting girls back in school as for example in the BRAC-led communityschools project and a UNICEF led literacyprogram (see Table G, Appendix 1). In2007/2008, CIDA became a lead donor tothe World Bank managed Education

Quality Improvement Project (a multi-donor trust fund), and continued to extendits funding for NGO- and UNICEFimplemented projects in vocationaleducation for women and girls basiceducation.

Three major shifts in Canadasprogramming approach occurred towardsthe end of 2007. Thefirstwas towards agreater concentration of its total education

sector funding within Kandahar followingthe redeployment of the Canadian forces tothe PRT from Kabul. In 2007, Canadaannounced that 50% of all its fundingwould be directed towards this province,and subsequently earmarked a portion of itsEQUIP funding for Kandahar.35 At thesame time, Canada announced a signatureproject in education, aimed at theconstruction or rehabilitation of 50 schoolsin Kandahar by 2011, using earmarkedfunds from its contribution to the EQUIP. To support these projects and to ensure theirintegration with provincial and national plans, CIDA has engaged a full time Canadian and onelocally engaged staff that is responsible for education and other social sector files.

The secondshift has been towards greater focus on building capacity at the national level. CIDAhas worked with the Ministry of Education to establish the Education Development Board, abody that brings together CSOs, donor organizations and the Ministry to provide guidance onsuch issues as research, monitoring and evaluation in the sector and to improve overallcoordination in the sector. Canada is currently co-chairing this body with the Ministry ofEducation and is the convenor for the Education Partners Coordination Group for donors andCSOs. As examples of Canadas work in this context, it has been a key advocate for theinclusion of perimeter walls for schools; and it has also worked with government in thedevelopment of an educational envoys program, which works with local leaders in some of theleast secure areas for their endorsement and support of local schools.

The thirdshift has been in relation to its direct service delivery projects. Though Canada hascontinued to fund smaller NGO and Unicef-led projects in Kandahar and the North (in part tooffset disbursement problems with EQUIP), it has shifted its approach to these projects, and

35 Smaller NGO-implemented projects in the North have also received funding.

Box 5. Civil -Military Cooperation in AfghanistanKandahar offers a unique window into

emerging experimentation with civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) in the delivery of Canadas education sector

aid. In 2006, leadership within the Canadian Forces(CF) was among the first to argue that a strongeducational focus was needed to support the Kandaharmission, and the provision of books and suppliesdirectly to schools was among the early activities of themilitary in the field.

However, as CIDA became more directlyengaged in the education sector and developed itsteam of education sector specialists for Afghanistan,clearer guidelines on civil-military interaction in theeducation sector were negotiated to protect childrenand to ensure that the Ministry of Education (and notCanada) is seen as delivering educational services.

The WOG appoach to Afghainstan provides anopportunity for integrated training across departments.CIDA now provides a pre-departure orientation to CFpersonnel. At the same time, CIDA continues to relyheavily on the Canadian Forces to provide securityescorts, to assess and plan for infrastructure needs (asfor instance in the construction of school perimeterwalls), and to provide intelligence about local securityand implementation. The Canadian Forces leadership,along with CIDA and DFAIT representatives, participatein an advisory committee that oversees the use of localproject funds.


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increasingly seeks to ensure that they are aligned with Ministry plans and the overall goal of asingle public system of education.

In summary, Canada has adopted a three pronged strategy in Afghanistan: strong support for thenational education strategy, through funds channeled via a multi-donor program and direct

engagement in national policy dialogue; a focused, carefully monitored, and well financedregional effort; and a smaller set of NGO-led projects to get services in place. A well-staffedteam of education sector specialists monitors and supports these investments, ensuring that theyare linked-up to the national sector plan for education. The same team supports the Ministryscapacity at national and local levels, and encourages co-operative forms of policy dialogue.

Several questions may be raised about the Canadian approach to education in Afghanistan: boththe ultimate sustainability and costs-benefit ratio of concentrating resources in Kandahar (asopposed to other regions), and the wisdom of blurring of civil-military responsibilities in theKandahar PRT, are unclear (CCIC 2009a, 2009b; Simpson and Tomlinson 2006: 3).Nonetheless, Canadas large, diversified portfolio, with its emphasis on alignment with national

plans, capacity support to local and national ministry of education staff, and the scaling up ofnongovernmental service provision into a nationally controlled system, provides importantlessons for other efforts to support education in CAFS.

Colombia

Canada considers Colombia a fragile state and has identified it as a priority country ofconcentration both for its aid to fragile states, and for its Global Peace and Security Fund since2006. Canadian foreign policy interest in Colombia has developed rapidly in recent years as partof a governmental push to expand its bilateral free trade agreements with countries in theAmericas.36 Expanded interest in Colombia has created a space for a novel approach toeducation sector programming, focused on childrens rights and protection.

Colombia was one of the first countries identified early in the past decade as a test site forCIDAs Action Plan on Child Protection (2001), the first CIDA policy to explicitly adopt ahuman rights approach. Between 2002 and 2006, CIDAs Bilateral Program in Colombia fundedtwo of the Agencys five childrens and youth participation pilot projects, and rapidly increasedbilateral funding for NGO and Unicef-implemented projects directed at the protection of childrenand youth. By 2006/2007, child rights and protection projects accounted for about half ofCIDAs operational bilateral programming (CIDA 2007a, 2007c). Canadas Ambassador toColombia, (who had been a strong advocate of the human security efforts developed in DFAIT inthe late 1990s), encouraged complementary programming on focused on reintegration ofdemobilized youth combatants from the paramilitary and leftist military groups, and peace-building, reconciliation and human rights from DFAITs START-GPSF program and its GlynBerry Program Fund (Barthiame 2008).

36 See: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspx; and CCIC 2009.
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspxhttp://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-andin/can-colombia-colombie.aspx


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In 2007, CIDA made a bid to place child rights and protection at the centre of Canadasexpanded aid program to Colombia, and received whole of government support to do so. 37 AsCIDAs programming strategy makes clear, Canada has chosen to use child rights and educationas a non-threatening entry point for its larger agenda of improving governance and democracy inColombia (CIDA 2007c). Drawing on lessons from its first phase of project based child rights

programming, CIDA prepared a new strategic framework for child rights and protection inColombia that called for a greater focus on improving governmental capacity to deliver(culturally) relevant, quality education, based on principals of child rights and child participation;for a more integrated, regionally focused programmatic approach concentrated in the conflict-affected region of Nario; and for an approach that extended from early childhood education toyouth engagement.

Canadas recent announcement of a technical vocations skills program in Colombia appears todepart from this child protection approach to education, reflecting the recent prioritization ofskills and training by CIDAs current Minister.

In contrast to other education interventions in priority CAFS, Canada has decided to forgofunding a government-led sector program in Colombia, choosing instead to focus on buildingboth regional governmental and civil society capacity for child rights advocacy and education,mainly using international nongovernmental implementing agencies. Regional efforts areintended to create scalable models for change at the national level, while avoiding directengagement with government. This programming approach contrasts to other efforts focusedprimarily on short term gaps in service delivery: here the goal is not primarily access toschooling, but the expansion of a network of child-rights supporters and advocates in schools,local government and community. This focus, along with the attention paid to such issues ascultural relevance, peace education and rights based pedagogies make CIDAs bilateralColombia programming unique (CIDA 2007).

Sudan

Canadas aid, defence and diplomatic initiatives in Sudan are concentrated in two areas: Darfur,and South Sudan. In Darfur, Canadian aid has focused on the provision of humanitarianassistance via both multilateral and Canadian NGO partners. DFAIT has supported the peacenegotiation process in Darfur, and Canada has also provided funding, equipment, and a smallnumber of technical advisors from the CF to the UNAMID mission in Darfur. In SouthernSudan, Canada has provided humanitarian assistance to support returnees and the reintegration ofdisplaced populations, and early recovery support to help implement the Comprehensive PeaceAgreement (delivered through World Bank multi-donor trust funds, UN Agencies and CanadianNGOs). Canada has also deploys a small number of CF personnel and police officers in southernSudan. An important innovation in South Sudan is the creation a Joint Donor Office (based inJuba) with Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, an initiativethat is intended to both enhance aid harmonization and provide a lower-cost approach to theoversight of each countrys ODA investments.

37 Some commentators believe that the aid program has been expanded to legitimate and offset criticism related to the free tradeagreement. See CCIC 2009; Berthiume 2008.


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While basic education is not a thematic priority for Canadian programming in Darfur and SouthSudan, it nonetheless receives a significant share of total assistance (over 8% in 2007/8). It isnot possible to deduce from CIDA data the extent to which educational needs are beingprioritized in the humanitarian programs Canada supports in Darfur. These programs have beendeeply affected by recent curtailing of NGO activities in the region. Canada is responding

through diplomatic channels and supports the efforts of the ICC.In South Sudan, Canada supports the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and has identifiedgovernance, re-integration of returnees, and mine clearance as priorities for its bilateral aid.Nonetheless, CIDA staff closely monitor MDTF support for basic education (which accounts forabout 6% of total MDTF budget) and actively pursues policy dialogue with government toencourage timely implementation of school construction planned in the MDTF. Howevercumbersome procurement processes and debates with government about school design havedramatically delayed school construction. CIDA has also used its bilateral aid channel to fundeducational initiatives implemented by Save the Children and Plan Canada. Canada has thus farnot supported a Dutch proposal to concentrate MDTF education resources regionally, in southern

Kardofan. In contrast to Afghanistan, its education sector activities are not concentrated in thesame geographical areas that are the focal points for its governance, reintegration and securitysector support programs.

5. Summary and Conclus ions

Canada is at the forefront of efforts to provide aid to education in conflict-affected states:contexts where there is limited legitimate government authority and capacity, and wherechildrens basic right to education is most dramatically at risk. Canada is one of the fewcountries to have formally prioritized support for education in conflict-affected states within itsaid policies. Canada has also rapidly increased its education aid to CAFS since 2006, and hasfocused its activities on basic education.

Canadas aid to education in conflict affected situations, however, is concentrated in a very fewcountries, with Afghanistan the largest single CAF recipient of Canadian education ODA.Recent policies suggest that a shift of funding away from Africa is underway, and that futuredisbursements will concentrate more heavily in the Americas and in countries linked

canadian aid for education in conflict affected states

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