canadian environmental assessment agency agence … · 2013-07-29 · bursey and jenna mclean over...
TRANSCRIPT
NEW PROSPERITY GOLD COPPER MINE PROJECT
FEDERAL REVIEW PANEL
CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY
AGENCE CANADIENNE D'ÉVALUATION ENVIRONMENTALE
HEARING HELD AT
CARIBOO MEMORIAL RECREATION COMPLEX
GIBRALTAR ROOM,
525 Proctor Street
Williams Lake, British Columbia
Saturday, July 27, 2013
Volume 6
FEDERAL REVIEW PANEL
Bill Ross
Ron Smyth
George Kupfer
International Reporting Inc.
41-5450 Canotek Road,
Ottawa, Ontario
K1J 9G2
www.irri.net
1-800-899-0006
(ii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIERES
PAGE
Opening remarks by Panel Chair 3
Presentation by Dr. John Kwong 7
Presentation by Mr. Morin 85
Presentation by Mr. Watterson 138
Presentation by Bill Lloyd 196
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Williams Lake, British Columbia
--- Upon commencing at 9:14 a.m.
--- Opening ceremonies
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Good
morning, everyone. First, thank you to the
Tsilhqot'in drummers for the opening ceremony.
Welcome to the third day of the topic-specific
session of the public hearing regarding Taseko's
application -- sorry -- proposed New Prosperity
gold-copper mine.
My name is Bill Ross. On my
left is Ron Smyth; on my right is George Kupfer.
Our legal counsels are David
Bursey and Jenna McLean over there. Secretariat
staff, identified by name tags, will be able to
assist you with any logistical or process-related
questions that you might have.
I would like to recap a few
housekeeping items again this morning.
As a reminder, please use the
south entrance on Seventh Avenue to the Gibraltar
room as the main access to the hearing. All other
doors -- I guess it's called this door -- are for
emergencies and access to the washrooms only. We
need to keep all doorways clear to comply with
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fire code regulations.
In the event of an emergency
the lights above me -- we've moved so I'm not sure
exactly where those lights are and I hope I never
see them -- in the event of an emergency the
lights above will flash or I will make an
announcement. In the event of a fire, please
vacate the building in a calm manner.
In the event of a medical
emergency, let Secretariat and Complex staff know
immediately. First aid supplies and attendants
are available in the Complex.
Purpose of the hearing. I
would like to reiterate the overall purpose of the
topic-specific sessions is to provide an
opportunity for experts who possess specialized
knowledge or expertise to present to the Panel the
results of their review of the potential effects
of the proposed project. The sessions are also
designed to allow an opportunity to assess the
technical aspects of the project.
The sessions, in addition, are
designed to provide opportunities for Taseko to
explain the project and respond to concerns and
questions raised by others.
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I would like to stress that
anyone may attend the topic-specific hearing
sessions and observe the proceedings.
Given the purpose of the
sessions, only those presenting a technical review
of the project and who have registered in advance
as an interested party may present or ask
questions at these sessions.
Today is a continuation of our
discussions on geology hydro geology which will
also focus on acid rock drainage and metal
leaching today.
The agenda with a list of
presenters is available to be picked up at the
entrance of the hearing room.
Briefly, the presenters we've
today are Dr. Kwong, on behalf of Natural Resource
Canada, Dr. Kevin Morin, and Dan Watterson on
behalf of the Tsilhqot'in National Government, and
Bill Lloyd on behalf of the Cariboo-Chilcotin
Conservation Society. The agenda may change
depending on the length of time it takes for
questioning. We ask participants show some
flexibility when they can present.
With respect to scheduling, we
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plan to sit until approximately noon with a break
this morning, an hour for lunch. We will resume
at one and continue until approximately 5, with
breaks as necessary in the afternoon.
Here is to good news. The
hearing will not go on tomorrow.
We will resume on Monday at
nine a.m. for the aquatic environment
topic-specific session.
I now ask that you turn off the
ringer on your cell phone or pager, and remember
that filming and photography are not allowed
without my prior approval.
Quickly, any questions about
the procedures? I haven't had any so far, so we
don't expect any today.
The first presenter this
morning is Natural Resource Canada, and Ms.
Coulson?
MS. COULSON: If I could, Mr.
Chairman. I would like to introduce NRCan's team
for those who were not in attendance for Dr.
Desbarats presentation on hydro geology yesterday.
My name is Jessica Coulson,
C-O-U-L-S-O-N. I'm a team leader at the
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environmental assessment division. To my left is
Dr. John Kwong, senior environmental scientist
from minerals and metals sector. To my right, Mr.
Rob Johnstone, also from -- deputy director also
from the minerals and metals sector, and Dr. Kwong
is here this morning to provide NRCan's views on
the topic of acid rock drainage and metal
leaching.
DR. KWONG: Thank you, Jessica.
PRESENTATION BY DR. JOHN KWONG:
Good morning, Mr. Chairman,
elders, chiefs, ladies and gentlemen.
My name is John Kwong. First
name John, J-O-H-N; last name Kwong, K-W-O-N-G.
This morning I'm tasked with
presenting an NRCan's view on the New Prosperity
EIS with respect to acid rock drainage and metal
leaching.
For the rest of the
presentation I will refer to metal leaching and
acid rock drainage as ML and ARD.
To put NRCan's assessment into
context, I will start with a brief review of the
current practices of ARD/ML prediction and the
limitations, as well as a susceptibility of
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porphyry copper deposits to produce ARD. Then I
will present a summary of NRCan's assessment of
the previous Prosperity EIS, followed by an
evaluation of the New Prosperity EIS on the same
topic before closing with a few conclusions and
recommendations.
Acid rock drainage, generally
characterized by low pH, elevated sulphate and
metal contents is the product of a natural
weathering of a sulphide-bearing rocks. The
released metals can originate from the oxidizing
sulfides or enhanced leaching of the associated
minerals when acidic conditions materialize.
Sulphide oxidation can occur
under all conditions, including low temperatures
-- say like -- provided as long as water and
oxygen with available to advance the process.
Environmental impact of ARD/ML
depends on its extent of occurrence, the degree of
neutralization, dilution and attenuation in the
receiving environment.
The challenge of any mining
project involving sulphide-bearing rocks is to
ensure that the disturbance and enhanced exposure
of various geological materials in the mining
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process will not lead to the production of a
ARD/ML that exceeds the capacity of a nature to
mitigate is detrimental effects.
This has led to the development
in a past two to three decades of a very static
and kinetic test methodologies for ARD/ML
characterization and prediction to inform devising
proper mind waste schemes to ensure minimum
environmental risks and impacts.
Acid base accounting, ABA, was
the earliest static test developed and still
remains as the most popular screening tool to
determine the ARD characteristics of a test
sample. The two key parameters involved in the
ABA analysis are acid generating potential, AP,
and neutralization potential, NP.
AP is determined based on the
total sulphur content of the test sample and NP is
measured by chemical titration.
Two criteria derived to
differentiate potentially acid generating or PAG
material from non-acid generating -- i.e., non-PAG
material -- are net acid generating potential,
NNP, and the acid neutralization ratio, NPR.
Any sample with an NNP greater
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than 20 kilograms per ton of calcium carbonate
equivalent is classified as non-PAG. Samples with
NPR less than one are considered as PAG material.
Those with NPR bigger than
three or four are considered as non-PAG. Anything
in between -- and those samples with values in
between with considered as having uncertain ARD
potential. This samples require further kinetic
testing to determine the geochemical behaviour.
In reality, few geologic
materials will NPR greater than 2 are certainly
observed to produce ARD in the field.
The limitations of ABA analysis
includes the following:
First, reaction kinetics are
not always considered. In other words, there no
information in the analysis to tell us when a PAG
sample will start to produce acid when exposed to
the weathering elements.
Second. Although sulphide
speciation are always incorporated into the
evaluation, the metal-to-sulfur ratio are
invariably ignored. List over-estimation of the
AP value.
Third. Carbonate
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neutralization potential are often measured, but
the effects of iron and the manganese components
are not always so. This would lead to an
over-estimation of the carbonate neutralization
potential.
Lastly, the possibility of a
metal leaching in the absence of acid drainage are
seldom considered.
Kinetic testing such as a
humidity cell and column leaching is used to
further characterize materials which, based on ABA
analysis, have uncertain ARD potential. The
testing is also often used to estimate the
sulphide oxidation and carbonate depletion rates
which are essential predicting the onset of ARD.
The leachate chemistry could
potentially be interpreted to reflect the effluent
composition and utilized to estimate the chemical
loading to the receiving environment.
The challenges associated with
kinetic testing are:
First, the test samples and the
test conditions in the lab are not the same as
that -- those occurring into the field.
Second, the data interpretation
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is not always straightforward. The kinetic
testing are often terminated when so-called steady
state is reached. However, steady state does not
mean that the same reaction of the same rate will
go on forever.
Furthermore, there's always a
temptation to interpret the water chemistry that
would lead to knowledge of the relevant
solution-mineral interactions involved.
Besides the ABA and humidity
cell testing, other supplementary tests often
conducted include shake flask extraction to
measure readily soluble constituents using
standard protocols, and a fast net acid generation
of NAG tests involving the application of the
strong oxidizing agent, such as hydrogen peroxide
to rapid oxidize the sulphide minerals in the
sample to assess if a test sample is able to
neutralize the potential acidity.
Samples at the end of the NAG
test that use -- pH 7, is considered as a non-acid
generating, and if a pH less than 7 is reached
then the test samples is considered as acid
generating.
Overall, in spite of all the
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continual improvement in ARD prediction
methodology, the inherent limitations in every
method means that that is always some degree of-
uncertainty regarding the prediction results,
although more detailed investigation generally
help to reduce the uncertainty. Therefore,
regular monitoring during mining and post closure
remain essential to validate the mine pre-mine
predictions on the potential occurrence and impact
of ARD and metal leaching.
Now, let's briefly look at the
susceptibility of a metal mines to develop ARD.
In 1993, based on the deposit
geology and mineralogy as well as the observed
occurrence of ARD in various mines, I ranked the
common ore departments occurring in the Canadian
Cordillera according to their proneness to
development ARD.
To the best of my knowledge,
the ranking has not been contradicted by any newer
work to date.
As shown in this slide, massive
sulphide deposits, such as those exploited at the
Sullivan mine, Myra Falls, Britannia readily
develop ARD upon mining while skarn deposits such
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as those occurring at Craigmont and Nickel Plate
are least prone to develop ARD.
Calc-alkaline phosphate
porphyry copper deposits, such as Gibraltar and
Island Copper is ranked medium. Amount of these
deposits, while porphyry Cu-Au deposits such as
Afton mine and Copper Mountain rank much lower.
New Prosperity deposit probably
lies between these two.
Calc-alkaline suite deposits
are generally associated with acidic intrusives
and undergone and have more intensive alteration
in predicting neutralization potential of a
(inaudible) bearing minerals that, thus, lead to
higher potential of acid generation.
In contrast, alkaline suite
deposits are typically more gold-rich and are
hosted by basic rocks and, therefore, lower acid
generation potential.
However, depending on the
degree of evolution of the intrusive body and this
emplacement depth, some porphyry copper-gold
deposits may be enriched to varied extent with
potentially deleterious elements such as arsenic,
antimony, mercury and selenium.
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Furthermore, no two ore
deposits even belong to the same float (ph) or
type are identical to each other.
Due care must be taken when to
extrapolate observations made in deposit to
another.
Now is the time to be saying
NRCan's assessment of the previous Prosperity EIS.
The main concerns with the --
identified in the previous EIS we take it to
determination of time to onset of ARD. And the
extrapolation of laboratory testing result to the
field might lead to uncertainties in water quality
predictions. The consideration for metal leaching
under neutral pH and low oxygen conditions was
lacking in the previous EIS.
Comparison of the prospective
performance of the tailings storage facility at
the project site with the exiting TSF at Gibraltar
may not be appropriate. This is for the past EIS.
Lastly, the assumption that
with time the tailings storage facility might be
able to support fish operation was premature.
By working iteratively towards
a resolution of potential issues of concern,
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particularly through working coordinated by the
B.C. Department Of Energy and Mines and Resources,
NRCan was satisfied that there were no significant
flaws in the ARD/ML assessment as described by the
Proponent.
However, there are two
outstanding issues. One related to
metal/metalloid mobilization under near-neutral
and oxygen-poor conditions, and the potential
occurrence of elevated levels of selenium in some
drainage.
To address the potential metal
leaching under near-neutral pH and varied redoc
conditions, NRCan recommended the Proponent to
either provide evidence prior to commencement of
mining that underwater disposal of mine waste
would not lead to significant metal leaching under
any conditions; or, commit to close monitoring of
the pertinent elements in all mine-derived waters
during operation and post-closure.
If necessary, mine effluents
should be treated to appropriate level prior to
discharge to the receiving environment.
To address this selenium issue,
NRCan recommended to Proponent to either conduct
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an appropriate geochemical study to identify the
sources of selenium and develop suitable
management plans to handle this suspect materials;
or, utilize an appropriate effluent treatment if
selenium levels become a concern during operation
or post-closure.
As for the New Prosperity EIS,
the key observations made by NRCan include the
following: There is little change in the
Proponent's approach to assess ARD/ML potential
and impacts, and the presentation on determination
of a carbonate neutralization potential and
prediction of ARD on set are unclear.
The Proponent appears to opt
for monitoring and effluent treatment when
required instead of conducting more research to
address outstanding issues on metal leaching under
neutral pH conditions and the selenium release.
However, overall, the
Proponent's ARD/ML assessment are compatible with
current common practices.
NRCan does not perceive
significant environmental impacts to derive from
ARD for the proposed project provided -- I
emphasize -- provided the Proponent is diligent in
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carrying out all necessary monitoring and adopting
appropriate adaptive measures to prevent, mitigate
or treat -- and/or treat -- any contaminate
release.
NRCan would recommend timely
reporting and analysis of monitoring results to
identify deteriorating trends be imposed on the
Proponent either by the Panel or -- as a
requirement to advance the proposed project.
This concludes my presentation.
I hope that the presentation, that information
provided are useful for the Panel and all
stakeholders concerned to determine whether ARD
and metal leaching are unsurmountable obstacles to
advance the proposed project. Thank you for your
attention.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Dr. Kwong. I guess the first group of interested
parties who are invited to pose any questions are
either government departments. Are there any
other government departments who wish to pose
questions?
Seeing none, I'll move onto
First Nations interested parties. Mr. LaPlante?
MR. LAPLANTE: Thank you,
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Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kwong.
My question has to do with
better understanding you're -- these
recommendations and conclusions -- sorry, the
previous slide about the neutral pH metal leaching
and the recommendations around that.
I guess I'm still confused
about the consequences I guess of the options that
were presented to the Proponent. So one option
was prior to commencement, the other was careful
monitoring and a commitment to treatment.
I guess my question is: Is it
possible that, given the uncertainty around the
metal leaching concentrations, that
post-construction may be discovered that the
treatment that would be required would be perhaps
technically feasible but economically unfeasible.
Is that a possibility?
MS. COULSON: Perhaps could you
just repeat your key question for Dr. Kwong.
MR. LAPLANTE: I realize it may
be straying out of his area of expertise, but I
think it may be key for the Panel to understand
that this -- the recommendation that the Proponent
-- it's basically saying, go ahead but carefully
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monitor this.
But my question is: Is that
too late once it's discovered that there is
neutral pH metal leaching issue and that they have
refused to do that work up until this time? They
have had lots of time, I might add, but the point
is, is that once that is discovered it may be
economically unfeasible to conduct the treatment
that would be committed to, but we don't know what
the -- I guess the degree of the issue we don't
know -- there is uncertainty around just how bad
it might be.
So my question is, maybe you
can speak more to the technical feasibility. But
I'm curious, I want to take it a step further and
talk with the economic feasibility.
DR. KWONG: I think I can only
address the technical aspects of it. I am not
qualified enough to comment on the costs involved
because I do not know.
Technically, and often
practically, it's possible to air (unintelligible)
technology to treat any contaminants released
under neutral pH condition, and that the prior
technology would vary according to -- depending on
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the site conditions.
Some treatment methods may be
more causative than others, but how it would
affect the overall cost for the entire project,
that I cannot address.
MR. LAPLANTE: Thank you, Dr.
Kwong. Two follow-up questions.
One is a point of
clarification. You mentioned that it's possible
to treat it, but just to clarify -- and I know
there is uncertainty -- this is though water that
you can naturally capture?
DR. KWONG: Yes. And that is
why the monitoring is important. By proper -- if
one do the monitoring properly, properly, one
should be able to determine the evolving trend of
the water chemistry.
For example, if under certain
conditions or, say, if reducing environment,
reducing condition, start to develop in certain
portion or in a certain age, and not all the
available (unintelligible) -- let's take arsenic
or antimony, for example. Not all the arsenic and
antimony in the sediment would be released
immediately. What chemical reactions in nature,
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takes a certain time to proceed.
Or if the release of the
arsenic and antimony is (unintelligible) --
interaction, then it would depend on the change
involved in chemistry to enhance the speed of the
release.
So it is really important to
monitor and detect and look for pre-warning signs
about the potential release of the letters,
elements, and then you immediately use adaptive
measures to deal with the issue, and there are
available technology to prevent further metal
leaching or treated.
And once the metal release is
confirm, then the proper protocol would be to
collect the (unintelligible), the drainage, and
then treat them before the release to the actual
environment, so to be sort of the common practice.
MR. LAPLANTE: Okay. Thank
you.
I'm still perplexed, however.
I don't see there is a fundamental step of you
have to capture what you can treat. And given
what we've heard yesterday and the unknowns about
the ability to understand where all this is going,
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I'm really concerned that that monitoring program
may not even be able to detect where everything is
leaching.
I'm wondering, as an example
under the PAG waste rock, that is a potential exit
source for other environments, right.
But I'll move on. I'm just
concerned. I feel like there's a lot of rungs of
the ladder.
MR. BURSEY: Mr. LaPlante, is
there a question?
MR. LAPLANTE: My next question
is about the cumulative combinations of these
metals. I would like to know if the Proponent
adequately addressed kind of the effects of the
accommodations of metal leaching, whether or not
acid -- whether or not it's acid drainage.
DR. KWONG: To answer your
question, I think that you have to specify whether
you are considering sort of a -- a moving drainage
or sort of a confined water body. For example,
are you talking about tailings pond or whatever?
MR. LAPLANTE: I'm talking
about the system. We have a giant bore stockpile.
We have a waste rock dump. There are a lot of
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sources here so I think -- you can't look at it as
just one issue. It's all around the site and
downstream obviously.
DR. KWONG: And that is why
lots of the waste rock would be generated in a
mining project. The proper procedure to follow at
which the Proponent has done, is to categorize
those waste rocks according to the ARD and ML
potential. If your waste rock has already logged
ARD/ML potential, then the leachate you can get
from even precipitation, (unintelligible) the
waste rock pile.
What would be its chemistry, if
the chemistry is not detrimental to the receiving
environment then we don't have any concern.
However, if the waste rock are potentially acid
generating then that is a completely different
situation.
However, the Proponent proposed
to dispose all the potentially -- the packed rocks
under water, under water cover in the tailings
environment. That reduces the risk or the
probability of ARD and metal leaching. And that
is acceptable. That management method is
considered as appropriate to both NRCan and at
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BCMEM.
MR. LAPLANTE: Thank you. And
to be clear, my understanding is that -- and I'll
let our experts maybe speak to it more, but there
were -- there was the contemplation by Ministry of
Mines that there may be multiple types of
treatment required to deal with the multiple metal
species that could be leeched.
So is my understanding correct
that it may -- the technically feasible may have
to include more than one type of water treatment
in order to remove the metals?
DR. KWONG: That is true.
MR. LAPLANTE: And that -- I
take it a step further. That may have to happen
at multiple sites at the possible mine given that
there's multiple sources. Is that also true?
I'll give you an example to
clarify. Like, if the waste rock dump and the ore
stockpile were found to be leaching metal at
neutral conditions at an unacceptable level, that
may require water treatment prior to the discharge
of that water into Fish Lake, and then there may
also be one required at the tailings impoundment.
There also may be one required at Big Onion Lake.
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I'm trying to draw a picture
there may be more than one site where water would
have to be collected, if it can be collected.
DR. KWONG: There are two
possibilities. Yes, an option is that you set up
different treatment facilities. Response of the
mine. Or if you -- you can collect all the
drainage from different points on locations at the
mine and collect them to a single facility and use
various technology in that particular facility to
treat various contaminants.
MR. LAPLANTE: If you can
capture it.
My final question: Is there
expertise at NRCan to assess the economic
feasibility of potential requirement for
treatment?
DR. KWONG: I think that
question I will leave....
MR. JOHNSTONE: Mr. Chairman,
Rob Johnstone with the minerals metals sector.
The easiest way of responding
to that is that we wouldn't have the expertise to
comment on certainly various treatment options and
in the entirety of the project economics.
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MR. LAPLANTE: Okay. Thank
you.
I guess that leads me, Mr.
Chairman, I think there is a really key piece
missing here. We don't have -- my understanding
is it's the Ministry of Mines that has that
expertise. Where were they here? How can we
finish this discussion when we can't get that
answer about that economics feasibility. So I'll
leave it.
I know you don't have that
answer, but I want to express our concern that we
can't fully understand the risks here given we
don't have the right expertise available to
yourselves.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS:
Mr. LaPlante, the Ministry Of Energy And Mines of
British Columbia has indicated it is at the other
end of an Ethernet connection, and if you have a
question for the Ministry of Energy And Mines, if
you could provide it to our Secretariat, we will
send an e-mail and the Ministry Of Energy and
Mines has committed to respond as quickly as it
could.
MR. LAPLANTE: We'll certainly
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take that into consideration. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
Mr. Pearse?
MR. PEARSE: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Tony Pearse with TNG. I have a couple
of follow-up questions for Dr. Kwong, if I may.
Dr. Kwong, could you please go
to your recommendations number one side. You've
given two alternatives for your first
recommendation, and I want to explore the first
one.
If the Proponent were to
undertake that recommendation, how would it go
about doing that? What would they actually --
prior to mining, how would they provide evidence
of underwater disposal of mine waste that would
lead or not lead to significant metal leaching?
DR. KWONG: One possibility is
that you conduct a different kind of -- instead a
column leaching, you can use lisimiter (pH),
creating. For example, you put typical tailings
under a water cover and then monitor both the
tailings pond water and the flux of metals or any
contaminants to the overlying water, and then --
that experiment may take longer than column
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leaching or (unintelligible) testing.
Based on the results that you
get and you try to figure out based on the
mineralogy and the geochemical of your solids and
the water chemistry, and then you try to
investigate what type of chemical reactions would
lead to the release of the elements of a concern,
and then depending on the nature of the element
there are different ways to deal with the effects.
For example, if it is simply
fluxing form the underlying tailings or submerge
waste rock, one effective method is that if at the
tailings water interface you have the
specification of iron oxide, particularly if that
is a microfilm, a biofilm developing at the water
base, the interface, that can effectively suppress
the effects of same to the overlying water.
But that does not prevent the
downstream porphyry -- I mean, the downward
perforation of the pour water as part of the
groundwater system, then it will be dependent on
the composition of the pour water and the rate of
-- perforation rate of as transport of the pour
water further down to determine whether you need
pump and treat to deal with the....
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MR. PEARSE: Thank you. So if
I understand what you said correctly, you are
saying these are essentially lab scale tests that
you can do?
DR. KWONG: Yes. And then in
your operation you follow-up with actual
monitoring to see if what you learn from the lab
testing can apply or can inform you to develop a
adaptive measure or not.
MR. PEARSE: I think if I
understood you correctly, you earlier indicated
that the work done by the Proponent in terms of
trying to assess neutral metal leaching was
deficient or not adequate, but you were not happy
with that work. Is that correct?
DR. KWONG: Nothing has been
done. As far as the previous EIS is concerned,
not much work or none -- no work has been done
with respect to metal leaching on under neutral
conditions.
The major concern, the major
focus has been addressed to ARD, in other words,
metal leaching under acidic condition,
(unintelligible) of acidic environment rather than
in neutral environment.
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MR. PEARSE: So these kind of
tests that you are talking about for the metal
leaching, are these tests -- I would assume
because they are lab scale tests that something
would typically be done at the same time ARD work
is done for a new mine at the assessment stage.
Is that a fair statement? Wouldn't you typically
look at this?
DR. KWONG: No, that is not
really typically done. Only forward-looking
operation would consider that.
MR. PEARSE: Sorry, only a
forward looking --?
DR. KWONG: Yeah, a forward
looking operator. In other words, some -- in
general, depending on the philosophy of an
individual, mining operations, some people are
more proactive than others. I mean, some
operation are more proactive than the others.
MR. PEARSE: I would love to go
down that road, Mr. Chairman, but I won't.
I do want to ask you, Dr.
Kwong, what would be the significance then --
let's say the company went and ahead and did this
work in the lab and found they had serious neutral
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metal leaching problems.
How significant, how big, how
serious could those problems be for the --
DR. KWONG: Without the results
I cannot predict really how serious it would be.
For example, if arsenic and antimony is a concern,
okay, if you are the release -- they are water
quality criteria, okay.
If the release is below the
acceptable water quality criteria in decades that
is not a concern, is not a serious problem. But
on the other hand, if the release invariably or
very often exceed the current water quality
criteria then something has to be done and -- so
without the (unintelligible) I cannot predict how
serious the problem would be.
MR. PEARSE: So why wouldn't we
just have the company go ahead and mine it and if
the water monitor -- go to option two here --
monitor the water and then it sounds like they can
deal with the problems as they come up. Why would
you have them -- what's the purpose of your first
bullet recommendation to do some of this work in
advance? How does that help?
DR. KWONG: I think that that
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is a respect to the cause. If you have to -- when
you -- if you do your work in the beginning, you
know how to prepare for the treatment, it may
eventually reduce the overall cause of the mining
project. But if you wait until the problem arises
it may, in the end, cost you more than if you have
done the preliminary work in the beginning. That
is why -- that is the difference.
MR. PEARSE: I'll leave it at
that. I did have one other question. We heard
from Dr. Desbarats yesterday the probability that
the PAG rock in the tailings impoundment may be
subject to weather fluctuations and water level
fluctuations annually, seasonally, whatever over
time. And I would like you to explore that with
me a little bit. What would be the implications
to the ultimate water quality in the impoundment
if we had these kinds of fluctuating draw downs of
water, exposure to air and so on with respect to
the ARD issue?
DR. KWONG: Based on the data I
presented, made available in the two EIS in the
previous Prosperity EIS and the current New
Prosperity EIS, the data suggests that the
tailings are not potential -- the butt of the
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tailings are not potentially acid generating.
However, waste rocks to be co-disposed in the
tailings impoundment are potentially acid
generating.
The effect would be dependent
on the change in the water level whether the PAG
rocks are exposed or not. If the fluctuation only
exposed the tailings, I do not expect there would
be serious consequences. However, if the water
level drops to such a level that it would expose
the PEG waste rock, then the impact on the water
quality would be significantly higher. And in
that case, treatment or whatever maybe to be the
involved.
MR. PEARSE: Okay. Let me just
sort of elaborate a little on that.
So during mining, I understand
at this time PAG rock will be in the order of one
to two metres above the level of the water as the
operations are coming up. Then at the end of
mining the water level is brought up to cover the
PAG rock. Right?
So you've got some exposure
during mining, two-metre layer of rock to the
atmosphere, the rain and snow falling on that. So
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you've got some contribution of ARD possibly
there.
But then in the long term with
these seasonal fluctuations, which would be quite
dramatic, and if, in fact, you've got a porous
conduit to the substrate and then leakage under
the PAG and leakage is much greater rates, you've
got the potential here for significant
fluctuations in the water table in the long term
post closure.
So have you considered those
contributions into your assessment of what the
impoundment water quality might look like?
DR. KWONG: That lends to the
importance of the prediction of onset of ARD. We
know that waste rock are to posted (pH) in the
tailings impoundment but not immediately
submerged. So we had to determine whether doing
that exposure period acid rock drainage has
already occurred or not.
If it has already started then
any ore oxidation process has been accumulated in
the portion of the environment where waste rock,
then it would have a significant effect on the
water chemistry, including the poor water
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chemistry in the underlying tailings.
On the other hand, if ARD has
not been, has not materialized before the submerge
of the waste rock in decades then the consequence
would -- are not expected to be significant.
MR. PEARSE: Thank you, Dr.
Kwong.
Do you have any examples of
where this co-disposal, PAG and waste rock, has
been done and where we have actually monitoring
results or success studies that look at how
effective this has been?
DR. KWONG: The disposal of
waste rock and tailings is a relatively new
concept. I am a few -- I'm not aware of any
monitoring data available at this stage. But I
think that a couple mines are considering using
the same approach. But I cannot recall off my
head what are those mines.
MR. PEARSE: That's my
understanding too. I think it's fair to say it's
kind of a novel technology that's --
DR. KWONG: Right.
MR. PEARSE: Correct?
DR. KWONG: Yes.
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MR. PEARSE: Thank you. I
think that's it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
think Mr. LaPlante has got a follow-up.
MR. BURSEY: Sorry, Dr. Kwong,
your last answer, I don't know if it was recorded.
You said "yes" in response to the last -- sorry,
right here to your left. I'm not sure your last
response was recorded. It was a yes, right?
MS. COULSON: Could I just
interject? Could Mr. Pearse just repeat the very
specific question that he asked so Dr. Kwong is --
DR. KWONG: Yes. I think my
response was I said yes. It was relatively new
technology.
MR. BURSEY: It's difficult
sometimes because --
DR. KWONG: Unproven.
MR. BURSEY: You're turning to
look to him and you are turning away from the
microphones.
DR. KWONG: I see.
MR. PEARSE: Would you like me
to rephrase the question, Dr. Kwong, or do you
just want to repeat your answer?
MS. COULSON: I just want you
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to repeat the question, please.
MR. PEARSE: I said that it was
my understanding with what he said and it would be
fair to say that it's novel and unproven
technology, correct?
DR. KWONG: Yes. It's a novel
technology. Well, from that perspective, it is
unproven.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr.
LaPlante?
MR. LAPLANTE: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I have two follow-up questions based on
discussion.
The first one is: I'm curious
Dr. Kwong, are you aware of -- you had a list of
mine sites, and I'm not trying to get like a
detailed answer of what's happening where, but
would it be a fair statement to say that it's
common that at various mine sites around British
Columbia that there are water quality exemptions
as a result of metal leaching at neutral
conditions to specific metals at particular sites
depending on the chemistry there?
DR. KWONG: Would you repeat
your question? I think I missed one portion. I
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want to make sure that I catch all that.
MR. LAPLANTE: Certainly. My
question is: Is this a fair statement-- so is my
understanding correct -- is that it's fairly
common, and I don't know I'm not a geochemist, I
don't know how common, but that there are numerous
mine sites around British Columbia where there are
water quality exemptions as a result of metal
leaching at neutral conditions, and particular
metals, depending on the chemistry at a particular
mine site.
DR. KWONG: In my experience,
the answer is no. It is not really, really
common, it rarely occurs. As a matter of fact, if
you look at sort of a compliance to MMDR, most of
the Canadian mines, the compliance level in the
recent years from 2004 to 2011 (unintelligible) in
excess of 92 to 99 percent. So in other words, it
is rarely that the predictions of poor water
quality, the chances of predictions were wrong are
lot less than....
MR. LAPLANTE: Does that apply
also to the B.C. water quality guidelines? Maybe
you don't work with them. But in my experience,
I've seen exemptions being granted to companies --
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B.C. water quality guidelines.
DR. KWON: That I cannot
comment on. I'm not too familiar with this.
MR. LAPLANTE: My follow-up
question -- and this gets to the implications due
to this unknown about the amount of metal
leaching. Is that -- I guess this is a special
case. We have a receiving environment that needs
to stay perfect, more or less, right, and I guess
would it be -- is it fair to then -- I'm
questioning is it -- the fact that this is an
unknown, that we don't know the answer about the
amount of metal leaching at neutral, mean that it
may not just be an economic feasibility question
but that the project design may not be technically
feasible if it were discovered down the road that
the waste rock and ore stockpiles and other mine
infrastructure were indeed leaching metals that
could enter Fish Lake?
And would that not be an
environmental assessment question and not a
permitting or down-the-road monitoring question?
DR. KWONG: As I mentioned in
one of my slides, that environmental impact of ARD
and metal leaching, less (unintelligible) metal
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leaching, dependent on the extent of the
occurrence as well as the capacity of a nature to
mitigate the metal release.
So the testing of
(unintelligible) testing to just inform us what
could happen so that we can adjust our opinion
accordingly.
Eventually, it would dependent
on the rate of release of the (unintelligible) of
elements of a concern that would decide whether --
has -- (unintelligible) or irreversible impacts
would materialize.
But in, generally speaking,
nature (unintelligible) actions process occur in
nature progress slowly. You have lots of bonding
size to detect and decide to deal with it. The
only exception would be extreme (unintelligible),
no one can predict and that is sort of the reason
one has to consider.
MR. LAPLANTE: I guess my --
like, my question is around the technical
feasibility of what we see before us. Not what
might get done in the future and so like what if
there needed to be a full liner under the tailings
impoundment? What if there needed to be a full
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liner under the waste rock dump, under the ore
stockpile? Aren't these things we need to know
now?
DR. KWONG: I think your
question would address -- is more related to the
hydro geology sort of aspect of the whole thing,
which I'm not really comfortable.
MR. LAPLANTE: That's very
fair, and thank you for your answers, and I would
say they are combined perhaps, that these two
issues are very much related.
I have one final question. It
has to do with the lab kinetic tests. And I want
to confirm your -- you understand as well.
My understanding is that in the
last review there was certain of those tests that
showed acid generation that occurred immediately
and there was others that had not reached acid
generation. But that since the last Panel review
that they have showed early onset of acid
generation. Is that understanding correct?
DR. KWONG: (No response).
MR. LAPLANTE: And it requires
that you are familiar with some of the
submissions, I believe, that have been made like
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in the last -- as part of this EIS. I'm not sure
if you had seen that work, but I think that's a
really important issue we need to clarify.
DR. KWONG: Yes. That kind of
information just sort of change affect the onset,
the estimation of on set of ARD.
MR. LAPLANTE: And my question
is: Have we seen that happen? Were those kinetic
tests -- those were lab tests that were running
for multiple years. In the last review they
didn't show early onset of acid generation. It's
my understanding that they have since showed early
on set of acid generation.
DR. KWONG: It all depends on
what you mean by "early onset". If you're -- say
if the original prediction of onset is, say, 50
years and now that continuing -- (unintelligible)
you collect it in the case that it is 30 instead
of 50, then you have 30 years, you know, to
prepare or deal with it.
MR. LAPLANTE: But I think this
is a couple of years, and I believe the prediction
was a thousand years from companies. So we're
talking from a thousand to maybe 5. Would that
not be called early?
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CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr.
LaPlante, I think you are going to present this
shortly, so....
MR. LAPLANTE: I'll leave it,
but I would like to understand if NRCan has
concerns around this. This concerns us and I
would hope it's concerning NRCan as well.
My last -- where I was going
with that is: Would that not affect the also the
economic feasibility of all this water treatment
if you needed to treat water earlier as opposed to
later in the mine life?
DR. KWONG: It would affect the
economics. But on other hand, as I said before,
I'm not in a position to comment on that because
it's outside of my area of expertise.
MR. LAPLANTE: Okay. Thank
you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr. Pearse?
MR. PEARSE: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. We have a little bit of a tag team
going, we'll try not to prolong it. I did want to
pursue this one point with Dr. Kwong.
I think earlier you said that
the -- I'm back to the fluctuating water in the
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impoundment and layer of waste rock that's exposed
during operations, which I assume is a fairly
significant volume given the size of the facility.
You were talking about how the
onset of ARD is critical to what the water quality
impacts would be. How -- so I want to ask -- and
you also told us that you had issues with the
calculations used by the company in determining
what the onset would be. Is that correct?
DR. KWONG: That particular
problem raised with the Proponent, you saying the
term sulphide oxidation rate versus acid
generation rate interchangeably. But from a
scientific perspective, the two terms means
different things.
Sulphide oxidation. The rate
of sulphide oxidation does not depend on the
abundance of sulphide (unintelligible). But on
the other hand, given the same oxidation rate, the
more sulphide you have then the more acid will had
been generated and, therefore, the acid generation
rate will be higher.
So the complications or the
problems I have with the presentation in the EIS
is derived from the enter -- mixed use of the two
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terms which complicated the prediction.
MR. PEARSE: So if I understand
you right, what we're concerned with here is the
acid generation part, not necessarily the sulphide
oxidation rate. Did I get that -- from an
environmental perspective?
DR. KWONG: From environmental
perspective, ARD is derived from sulfur oxidation
but the amount of -- well, from a scientific point
of view, the sulphide oxidation rate is totally
dependent on the composition of that mineral,
regardless of how many -- how much of that mineral
is present, is oxidation rate is dictated by
temperature, the composition, the water chemistry.
On the other hand, the amount
of acid generated is dependent on available amount
of the sulphide present.
So if this sulphide is
undergoing oxidation the more of this material is
there, the more acid will had been generated. You
cannot really use the two term to mean
interchangeably.
MR. PEARSE: I think I've got
it. You mentioned temperature was normally part
of the determination. Can you tell us whether the
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Proponent used temperature to calculate or
determine the results of its humidity cells? Was
temperature something they looked at?
DR. KWONG: It is sort of a
common -- because as I said, you do all your
kinetic testing under lab conditions. The room
temperature typically, well, say (unintelligible).
But on the other hand in the
few, depending on where your mine is located, say
in northern Canada, eight months out of the full
year is frozen and, therefore, lower -- generally
speaking, the rate of a chemical reactions is
reduced by 10 times for every -- so 20 degrees
decrease in temperature and, therefore, the
reaction rate would be much slower under low
temperature conditions than low temperature,
therefore, is common practice to -- in order to
apply the lab results to the few to predict
effects in the field, you have a so-called
temperature adjustment factor.
MR. PEARSE: And they did that,
did they?
DR. KWONG: They did that.
MR. PEARSE: Thank you. Can
you tell me how of the humidity cells were acidic
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from basically the start of the test?
DR. KWONG: I cannot recall,
then not really that many.
MR. PEARSE: Not really that
many. There were some?
DR. KWONG: I think that the
Proponent may be help me out in giving the right
answer.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Taseko,
could you help us with this?
MR. JONES: Actually we
couldn't right at this moment. Our geochemical
guy is just not here who can answer that question
like that. He will be here on Monday.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you
very much.
MR. PEARSE: We'll get that
answer on Monday, Mr. Chairman.
This probably will have the
same answer. Do you know how many humidity cells
are acidic today? Have you looked at the humidity
cell data from the early 2009 and seen what's
happened with those for those cells that are
continuing?
DR. KWONG: My evaluation of
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the ARD and metal leaching data, I took and sort
of overall (unintelligible) because -- if those
humidities specifically address certain types of
rocks, and let's put it this way.
You try your best to look at as
many samples as possible. But are these samples
really representative of what is actually
happening in the field? We don't know.
MR. PEARSE: We don't know.
DR. KWONG: Therefore, you have
to interpret the data from what you can from the
data to understand what could happen in reality.
That is my focus.
I do not need to be specific
attention. Say, if you say that two hour of 10
humid cell (unintelligible) acidic conditions,
then my question is, oh, what are the composition
of these two columns? Are they referring to
specific (unintelligible)? In that case then I
would look at focus on this particular rock types,
then I would not really -- and then the remaining
case, I would not be -- would receive less
attention from me because they are not going to
pose significant problems.
I would expect that the
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Proponent would be doing the same thing. The data
is going to inform you what to happen for various
rock types and, therefore, if -- say, in the final
open pit (unintelligible) -- this rock type would
potentially cause more problem than you would have
to determine, well, maybe this rock type will
ultimately have a bigger control of impact on the
(unintelligible) chemistry than the others. So
that is the kind of information I....
MR. PEARSE: Okay. I just -- I
think I got you but just let me clarify.
When you look at these cells
and you look at the information, you're not
actually looking to see how representative of all
the rock types they are. You are just taking
what's been presented in the cells and working
with that. Assuming that, they are
representative; is that correct?
DR. KWONG: No, that is not
correct. No. I would be looking at whether they
have include enough of the rock types in the
assessment. So then I have an overall picture of
what would be the final outcome over all of the
proposed project.
If -- even if you done 50 humid
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cell tests but on the same rock type and yet in
that deposit you got 12 different rock types, to
me that's not acceptable. Even though you have
done (unintelligible) enough.
Even though you have done it
lots of humid cell testing, but it does not give
me the information to cover all different rock
types in the deposit.
MR. PEARSE: Just to clarify.
This is a fairly large deposit, purported to be
one of Canada's largest, if it goes ahead. And
lot of rock types. And so are you telling us that
the humidity cells, the kinetics tests that are
run are sufficiently representative of the full
depth of the deposit in the rock types or did you
have any issues there?
DR. KWONG: At the stage of the
(unintelligible) -- we considered -- work done is
acceptable.
On the other hand, that's why
we emphasis repeatedly that continual monitoring
is important to evaluate the predictions at this
stage and adopt adaptive measures and also keep on
updating the water quality prediction as if the
mine is allowed to advance, then this kind of a
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measure and continual updating of a water quality
prediction is -- should be a requirement.
MR. PEARSE: One final
question, just back to the early onset question
again.
If I were to tell you -- and
I'm not going to tell you. But if I were to tell
you that, in fact, there were humidity cells that
were acidic, more or less, from the start of the
test and more have gone acidic on the way, would
that concern you more about the issue of the PAG
rock being exposed in the TSF, if we do have very
early onset ARD, we have a more significant issue
here to deal with.
DR. KWONG: That will be
dependent on the amount of that material. For
example, if you have this particular rock type
immediately generating acid rock drainage and then
you put it in the tailings impoundment, what is
relative proportion to the other material exposed
in the same impoundment and what other
neutralizing potential or excess neutralizing
capacity of the rest of the material? Would that
excess neutralization capacity be able to
accommodate the acid generated? So that is all
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balance in the equation.
So if that is not enough, then
you may have to think of an alternative method to
deal with this potential acid generating rock.
MR. PEARSE: And we do have
significant volumes of PAG being put in the
tailings well before water gets up to it and then
all through -- I don't know what year the water
actually gets up to the base of the PAG. Taseko
can tell us. But then through mine life you've
got -- you know, multiply the number of hectares
times two metres, you've got a significant volume
of waste rock exposed --
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr. Pearse?
There is a question coming very quickly?
MR. PEARSE: Yes. I'm asking
Dr. Kwong to consider the significance of the
sizable volumes of rock that will be exposed to
air during the first few years of mining and then
subsequently that top two-metre layer, through
mining -- these are not insignificant amounts.
I'm really trying to get him to
tell us about whether -- what he thinks about that
in terms of water quality impacts. That's my last
question. Thank you.
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I was hoping for an answer.
MS. COULSON: Again, Jessica
Coulson. Would you mind repeating the question?
It was just a lengthy sentence.
MR. BURSEY: It's helpful if
there's a lot of premises and compound questions,
it's difficult for the witness to answer. So if
you simplify it, it's easier.
MR. PEARSE: In your
assessment, Dr. Kwong, of the implications of acid
rock drainage for the pond water in the
impoundment area, did you consider the significant
volumes of waste rock that would be exposed in the
early few years, virtually all of the PAG my
understanding is, will be exposed during the early
years until the water level actually comes up at
some point during mining and then for the rest of
mining there's at least a two-metre thick layer
multiplied by 30 hectares -- I don't know what
we're talking about, Mr. Chairman -- but a
significant area there.
So there's a significant volume
of PAG exposed to the atmosphere during mining.
So I just wondered if you had considered that in
your assessment of what the impoundment water
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quality might look like from ARD or neutral metal
leaching. Thank you.
DR. KWONG: My understanding is
that -- or based on the data made available in the
two EIS, that those PHE ARD -- the onset to ARD
for most of them would not materialize before they
would be submerged under the water cover before
the onset of ARD. And without the detail
composition of -- the composition of the so-called
perspective ARD, I cannot really -- I have no data
to sort of emerge what could be the water
chemistry -- except for the chemistry would be
like.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
Any other First Nations interested parties?
MS. COULSON: Mr. Chairman, a
quick observation.
I noted that several of the
last questions were kind of going into the
territory of water quality. And I just wanted to
remind parties that my colleagues at Environment
Canada would be presenting in that area on Monday.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
I should have done that, but I appreciate that you
did.
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Are there any interested party
groups who wish to question Natural Resources
Canada? Are there any interested party
individuals who wish to question Natural Resources
Canada?
Sir, please introduce yourself
for the court reporter and ask your question.
MR. YOUNG: Good morning. I
appreciate being here. My name is Gary Young, and
I live in the area. I'm retired and I don't have
an interest one way or the other with the proposed
mine.
I'm looking at something that
is a recommendation from NRC. It says, "The
Proponent should commit to close monitoring."
There are no conditions applied
to that. We don't know who is going to monitor
it. Is it going to be self-monitoring. Who would
pay for it? How would we get the results? Would
the results be available to the public? Et
cetera, et cetera.
It's a very open, open
statement and a word that has no conditions
attached to it. And I think that that is a very
important matter to address if the eventuality is
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that the Proponent is self-monitoring.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
I think the recommendation was to the Panel to
consider.
As I recall, the next
questioning would come from Taseko. I think I
might be -- Mr. Gustafson, if you could give me a
estimate as who how long, we'll either have a
break before or after.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Mr. Chairman, I
don't know that we're going to be very long at
this time. We had anticipated that issues
touching on water quality and the aquatic
environment would be dealt with on Monday and our
expert will be here and able to brief us on that.
We do appreciate and understand
that Dr. Kwong has agreed to remain to answer
those questions. We may or may not have any
detailed questions and I will undertake to advise
just as quickly as possible if we don't and can
release Dr. Kwong so that he can get on with his,
I'm sure, busy schedule.
I do have a couple of questions
right now that --
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Why don't we
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just go ahead then.
MR. GUSTAFSON: It will just
take a couple minutes I think.
Dr. Kwong, in one of your
slides -- and I believe it was number nine or 10
-- you had a ranking of -- I think that's the one
of various companies. You said that New
Prosperity ranges between these two, and I didn't
catch which two.
DR. KWONG: Okay. New
Prosperity has been classified as alkyl-alkaline
porphyry deposits. However, it share some
characteristics as copper-gold deposits.
So I ranked it. If I were to
rank the New Prosperity deposit I would rank it
between three and six. Six are alkaline porphyry
(unintelligible) deposits, such as in Copper
Mountain, then Gibraltar as a alkyl-alkaline
offering, which I read it as three in my table on
the slide.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
That helps. And Mr. Pearse, in asking a question
of you -- I heard him to say that Dr. Desbarats'
evidence indicated that there were circumstances
in which the PAG would be not submerged.
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If I heard the question that
way, perhaps you had you heard it the same way as
well. That distinctly was not Dr. Desbarats'
evidence yesterday. And I just want to give you
the opportunity to comment based on your
understanding that the PAG will always be
submerged based on Dr. Desbarats' evidence.
DR. KWONG: That's my
understanding too.
MR. GUSTAFSON: What are the
implications of the PAG being continually
submerged?
DR. KWONG: If the PAG ws
continuous submerged then the impact on the water
quality in the pond in the TSF will be minimum.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
Just one parting comment.
Mr. LaPlante implied that there
was perhaps some evidence that -- and I don't know
where he was attributing this to, whether it's the
company or somebody else -- that the possibility
of onset of ARD had been found to have been
reduced from a thousand years to two years, and
that was I guess a preface to his question.
And, Mr. Chairman, I just want
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to put on the record that we'll be interested to
have Mr. LaPlante establish the foundation for
that question at some point in these proceedings.
Those are my questions.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Gustafson.
Just before the Panel poses
questions, I think we'll -- I'm sorry? Go right
ahead.
MR. JONES: Thank you.
I just have what I believe are
two short questions. It relates to the question
that Mr. Pearse had I think about co-disposal of
tailings and PAG rock.
I believe your comment was that
it's a relatively new methodology or technology.
I just wanted to clarify whether you were talking
about co-disposal of tailings and PAG or whether
you were being more specific in terms of sub
aqueous disposal of PAG?
DR. KWONG: Well, the concept
of co-disposal of a waste rock and tailings at the
current stage is more or less always sort of --
the majority of the proposal will be under water
cover. Okay? But on rare occasions it would be
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-- they are variations in the approach.
For example, New Prosperity
would propose the waste rock to be submerged in
tailings impoundment, but not sort of a following
mixed with the tailings, but other schemes
involved the co-disposal actually dispose the
tailings to fuel up the pour space between the
waste rock. So they are variations of them.
MR. JONES: So I do have a
follow-up question because that's what I thought
we might be getting confused about, was this
methodology of mixing the co-disposal as a
distinct method from sub-aqueous PAG disposal.
And my follow-up question to
that was going to be in terms of -- is it not
common practice now, kind of state-of-the-art
practice in terms of taking a proactive approach
to the prevention of ARD metal leaching to dispose
of potentially acid generating material,
sub-aqueously. Is that not the best method
currently available to us?
DR. KWONG: Not necessarily,
because whether you can opine (ph) that technology
or not would be dependent on, for example, is your
tailings impoundment large enough to accommodate
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both of the waste rock and tailings. If you have
only a limited amount of space you co-disposal is
not an option. So that is no really something
standard option.
MR. JONES: Sorry, I'm still
trying to get this.
Assuming that you have this
space and water available to maintain water cover
over your PAG material, is that the best method
available to us to have them take a proactive
approach to the potential release of ARD metal
leaching?
DR. KWONG: Proactive
(unintelligible) yes. But then, as I said, it
would depend on the composition of your waste rock
as well. Okay. If arsenic release is a major
issue, frankly speaking, I think that some
(unintelligible) disposal would be preferable to
sub-aqueous disposal, because arsenic under
oxidizing conditions -- well, common oxidation
product will be an arsenic which is less toxic and
arsenic (unintelligible), which can be released
under (unintelligible) conditions under water
cover.
So dependent on your -- the
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composition of waste as well.
MR. JONES: Thank you. One
last question. It relates to -- again, it was
related to Mr. Pearse's question about the two
options that NRCan kind of proposed to Taseko in
terms of demonstrating the effectiveness of
sub-aqueous PAG disposal (unintelligible) or
monitoring.
And I understood your answer to
be more: It might be in the Proponent's best
interest to do that, to do the test work to give
you an early indication of whether you may have an
issue that you could address earlier and you are
going to save money if you can do that.
It was more an opinion. Would
it be appropriate for the Proponent -- or a
Proponent, an operation, to start that work sooner
rather than later but to be able to that I know
work into the early part of operations and
achieving the same thing? I guess that's my
question.
DR. KWONG: Yeah, that is
acceptable. That is why NRCan is committed to
options. The sooner you do it, it is to your
advantage.
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But on the other hand, since it
is unproven whether that would be a
(unintelligible) or not, we cannot really force
the operator to do it right away because I do not
really know the final outcome, right.
So the purpose of doing that is
to confirm your prediction and to confirm that it
would not be an issue, so that is to your
advantage.
MR. JONES: I understand. No
more questions.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Jones.
MS. COULSON: Excuse me, Mr.
Chairman, we just wanted to clarify one point
regarding Dr. Desbarats' presentation yesterday.
We just wanted -- on the issue
of whether the PAG would be exposed or not. Dr.
Desbarats just wanted to highlight the fact that
for one of NRCan's single simulations, based on
NRCan's conductivity estimates and Taseko's
average climate data, NRCan found that the PAG
waste would remain submerged. And Dr. Desbarats
is here should that require additional
clarification for the record.
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CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you
for that.
I think it's about time for our
break, so we'll take a 15-minute break, we'll come
back, and the Panel will pose some questions. You
that.
--- Recessed at 10:50 a.m.
--- Resumed at 11:10 a.m.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: The first
item that I would like to deal with is to seek --
Ms. Coulson, to seek from NRCan clarification of
what exactly Dr. Desbarats said yesterday about
exposing various components of the tailings
storage facility. So if we could have that, that
would be very helpful to the Panel.
DR. DESBARATS: Alexander
Desbarats. Natural Resources Canada.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the
opportunity to clarify the results of my
modelling, which I presented yesterday.
Late in the modelling exercise
I investigated a variant of my groundwater flow
model in which I replaced the constant head
boundary at the top of the model with a recharge
boundary condition. And a recharge boundary
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condition is -- to remind people who may not have
been there yesterday -- is a type of boundary
condition which more realistically mimics the
input of rainfall and snow melt into the tailings
storage facility.
Now, for that variant of the
model I considered NRCan's base case estimates of
hydraulic conductivity, and Taseko's average
climatic data. And that climatic data includes
rainfall and snow melt, runoff from upslope areas,
run off from tailings beach areas and evaporation
from the pond.
Now, I ran one single
realization or simulation under those conditions,
and what I observed with my model was that areas
on the periphery of the impoundment adjacent to
the embankments beneath the tailings beach -- and
this material drains, the tailings material drains
to variable depths -- however, I clearly showed in
a cross-section or a slice to the impoundment that
the potentially acidic generating waste rock
remained submerged.
However, I would like to state
that this model was very preliminary and
exploratory in nature. A much more thorough
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investigation would require consideration of a
full range of climatic conditions.
That conclude what I had to
say.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you
very much for that clarification, Dr. Desbarats.
Next, do my colleagues have
some questions for Natural Resources Canada?
George?
MR. KUPFER: Dr. Kwong, leaving
aside the question of what costs might be involved
and whether those costs were acceptable to Taseko
or to anyone else, would you please confirm for me
that what you said was that technology does exist
to address ARD and metal leaching issues that
could arise from this project. It does exist?
DR. KWONG: Yes, it does. When
there's options, depending on what are the
elements of concern and treatment maybe perpetual.
For example, red dot deposit, you may have to
treat the water forever. But economics of the --
such that perpetual treatment cause is worth it,
according to the mine plan.
MR. KUPFER: Is it possible
that there could be a type of material that could
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not be treated as far as you know?
DR. KWONG: As far as I know,
no.
MR. KUPFER: Thank you very
much for that.
MR. SMYTH: Thank you, Dr.
Kwong for your presentation. On one of your
slides you noted selenium release. Do we know in
which metals the selenium is bound up in?
DR. KWONG: We do not know.
That is why we recommended the Proponent to do
more detail work to identify the source.
The reason why I pose the
question is in the shake flask as a results done
reported in the PV EIS two of the tests, the
leachate in the (unintelligible) test. They got
elevated concentrations of selenium.
And then according to the B.C.
Department of Mines' assessment for the current
EIS, they also anticipated sub-drainage may have
selenium elevation in excess of the B.C.
environmental guideline.
MR. SMYTH: My understanding is
selenium is bound up most commonly in sulphide
minerals.
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DR. KWONG: Yes. With respect
to ore deposit perspective, selenium is usually
associated either with coal mines, particularly
sulphide rich coal mines, and the second one is
most commonly observed is with massive sulphide
deposits, which are also sulphide leachate (ph)
because chemical properties of selenium is quite
close to sulfur.
MR. SMYTH: So the pyrite is
going to go into the tailings and if there is
selenium -- that the pyrite will end up in the
tailings.
Does selenium release require
acid rock drainage conditions?
DR. KWONG: Pardon me?
MR. SMYTH: To release selenium
from a sulphide mineral, does it require acid rock
drainage conditions for selenium to be released?
DR. KWONG: No. But it doesn't
require the oxidizing environment and
Environmental Canada in the presentation on Monday
will probably identify that further.
MR. SMYTH: Then going to Dr.
Desbarats' point that some of the tails might
indeed be dry, and they would be exposed to the
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air, those then would be a potential source for
selenium release; is that correct?
DR. KWONG: If the selenium is
associated with the sulphide. But on the other
hand -- well, some of the (unintelligible)
deposits, selenium can occur as an individual
mineral by itself.
MR. SMYTH: Right. Okay.
DR. KWONG: And then selenium,
if it occurs is an element of selenium is not
mobile. But if it occurs as a
(unintelligible)....
MR. SMYTH: Tricky stuff.
I would like to discuss the
pit. The pit walls will be exposed for upwards of
40 years before the pit floods. So you didn't
mention anything about potential for -- maybe I
missed it -- the potential for acid rock drainage
developing in the pit walls.
DR. KWONG: In the period EIS,
the Prosperity EIS, NRCan did raise that issue.
We commented water quality of the pit is
(unintelligible)....
MR. SMYTH: How come you didn't
bring that forward this time?
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DR. KWONG: Oh, because it is
not part of the -- take issue -- additional
information provided in the 2000 to the New
Prosperity EIS. That's not specifically, with no
additional information provided on the pit
chemistry. So we basically said -- NRCan consider
that that the previous comment still apply to the
current EIS.
MR. SMYTH: Therefore, for my
Panel colleagues and others, we would have to read
the previous submission.
DR. KWONG: The previous
submission from NRCan. Those submissions still
apply. That is why in my presentation I give a
brief summary of what we presented in the previous
EIS.
MS. COULSON: Just to
elaborate. In our final written submission,
there's a pretty fulsome summary of what we
provided in the first round review as well.
MR. SMYTH: So it's in the
written submission, your current written
submission. All right. So let's discuss it, if
it's in your current written submission.
So can you tell us when acid
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rock generation may generate in the pit walls and
how that might be mitigated?
DR. KWONG: To answer the
question, I think that we have to have a better
understanding of what is the -- eventually the
exposed rock, the pit wall is like because as the
proposed mining procedure -- the pit is keep on
expanding as time process, so what eventually is
exposed we do not really know. We don't have
sufficient information to predict when acid rock
drainage will occur. Starting to (unintelligible)
possibility. All depends on what would be the
eventual water chemistry like.
If it is -- comes to extent
that it cannot -- if dilution by natural
precipitation, it is not of good enough quality to
be discharged to the natural environment, then
perpetual treatment will be an option as one of
the mitigation option.
MR. SMYTH: I understand the
uncertainties about the pit. So let's move to
some real life examples of closed minds in B.C.
with abandoned pits.
Are you aware of any -- perhaps
Island Copper or others -- that pit walls are
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currently generating acid?
DR. KWONG: Well, lately I've
been working more in northern Canada than in B.C.,
so let me cite an example. Faro Mines. You've
got three open pits in Faro, and then all of the
acid drainage has to be collected and then treated
either within the pit itself or pumped to a
treatment plant and treated before discharged to
the specific environment.
MR. SMYTH: I'm trying to
conceptualize. You've got a 40-degree or
45-degree odd on slope, pretty steep slope. It's
probably sloughing off. Does all the water get
treated, all the water in the pit get treated, or
do you just take a layer of the surface water or
are you trying to capture it on the sides of the
pit?
DR. KWONG: As far as Faro mine
is concerned, the current -- the current treatment
method is you actually add lime or -- to the pit
directly, to neutralize the drainage and
specifically some metals, and also expiration of
trying to use microbial mediation, trying to
reduce some of that sulphide -- some of the
dissolve (ph) metals into sulphide.
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MR. SMYTH: In the Faro -- this
may not be Faro -- are those waters then being
released to rivers and streams or are there other
lakes or are they just captured.
DR. KWONG: It is captured
within the pit. But for the tailings impoundment
the water has to be treated before it discharge to
the receiving streams.
MR. SMYTH: But the plan for
this pit is it fills and then it discharges down
the Lower Fish Creek and into the Taseko River?
DR. KWONG: Right.
MR. SMYTH: So then a treatment
plant would be required.
DR. KWONG: A treatment plant
would be required if the water quality turn out to
be of such poor quality it has to be treated prior
to discharged.
MR. SMYTH: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I can't
resist. Let me pursue that point just a little
bit longer.
Even at closure when the pit is
full there will be still some exposed areas. Is
it likely that they would generate sufficient acid
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to cause a water quality problem in the Pit Lake?
DR. KWONG: Yes, depending on
the extent of oxidation and how much sulfides are
oxidized at a rate of sulphur (ph) oxidation.
For example, if you have the
sulphide extend back to about say a meter, let's
say that. But the surface layer -- the exposed
layer would oxidize first, then you have
precipitation of (unintelligible) hydroxide, then
the sulfides behind the outer later -- slower
because you need the oxygen in the water to go in
there to -- and, hence, the oxidation further.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: That's
helpful. Thank you.
My real question, which is
quite different, relates at a very high level to
what one ought to do in 2013 to avoid ARD. And I
understand that the most common practice is
sub-aqueous disposal. Not necessarily co-disposal
with tailings, but sub-aqueous disposal.
I guess my question, simply
put, is: Is that the best or are there
alternatives, not necessarily that might apply
here, but I'm just trying to get the big picture
first. Let me stop there. Is that best and what
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alternatives are there?
DR. KWONG: According to the
research done under the mine -- Mine Environment
(unintelligible) plan, the MEMCO plan -- it has
been proven that sub-aqueous disposal is one of
the most effective methods to be when ARD.
However, as I mentioned before,
it would be all dependent on the composition of
your waste rock. If they are elements involved
that are mobile or would be mobilized under
reducing condition, then sub-aqueous disposal is
not the best technology to be when ARD.
In that case, the Proponent has
to consider what is more important, whether ARD
would cause -- ultimately have more serious impact
or that particular element of concern.
Let's put it this way. For
example, uranium mines, okay. They don't really
have a serious acid rock drainage problem but they
do have an arsenic problem, and, therefore, they
have to use various methods to prevent the
leaching of arsenic from the mine waste and the
transport of arsenic through the groundwater
system into the streams.
So every mine is specific so we
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have to take -- site specific decisions to decide
what is the most effective way for treatment, or
prevention.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: And for New
Prosperity, I infer that you don't think there are
enough of these other concerns to dissuade you
from the sub-aqueous disposal solution?
DR. KWONG: Correct.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I think I
used a double negative. I think it was clear.
There are a number of sources
of acid generating materials. I list a few for
discussion purposes. The non-PAG waste area, the
ore storage area, the soil storage area and the
tailings storage facility where PAG rock is
disposed.
Let me deal first with the
non-PAG storage. I know conceptually that one
separates PAG generating rock and disposes of it
sub-aqueously in the tailings pond, tailings
storage facility, and non-PAG generating rock
which goes to a different pile.
I have in mind that there's a
little person who runs up and tests the rock and
determines whether it's PAG rock or not, and says,
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okay, this rock goes in that truck and that truck
goes there.
Is the best way of doing this
literal testing, which is conceptually sound but
may not be operationally sound. Is it a
knowledgeable geologist who looks and says that's
the kind of rock that is non-PAG and so it goes
into that truck or -- how is that separation done
and -- you know where I'm going, it's how
successful can the separation be?
DR. KWONG: That will be
dependent on the experience of the person who are
charged with differentiating PAG from non-PAG
rocks.
For an experienced person, it
is possible, okay. I have a friend who is a
geologist in a mine in Sudbury. When I first
proposed the idea of just using mineralogy to
assess the (unintelligible) potential, he tried
that that out at his mine site. He said isn't
easy.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Sorry. It
is easy?
DR. KWONG: Yeah. And but he
said experience geology. No.
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And then for myself when I was
doing some field work in the Yukon I actually --
well, having no sort of a method of entertainment,
so I bet with my colleague, we go to a stream and
I said, oh, the pitch is within (unintelligible),
-- and then he posed another number. That end up
I'm 70 percent correct and he was 30 percent.
So it all depends on the
experience and (unintelligible) -- I remember
that, I first visit to Escape Creek Mine (ph). I
made a comment that, oh, this river (ph) is acid
generating. Then I got in a letter complaining --
a letter from the company complaining that I made
a judgment without -- without supporting data, and
then half a year -- no, three years later, I met
the same guy at a conference. He sort of
apologized to me. He said after $300,000 of a
testing we proved that you are correct.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: So I won't
bet against you then.
Surely another issue that must
complicate the separation is the nature of the
rock itself because sometimes, as I understand it,
PAG acid generating rocks and non-acid generating
rocks are mixed up, and that means it's very hard
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to separate.
In any case, let me focus more
specifically on the New Prosperity site.
In your professional opinion
against which I won't bet, what percentage of PAG
rocks are likely to show up in the non-PAG rock
pile.
DR. KWONG: That I do not know.
As I said, that were dependent to person in charge
of a (unintelligible). There's likelihood that is
a possibility and, as a matter of fact, I think
that that is always an exception. You cannot
really hundred percent correct. Effect would be
dependent on how much of this PAG rock is being
disposed (ph) together with the non-PAG rocks. If
that amount is small then it would not cause too
much impact, and the reverse.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Let me then
move onto --
DR. KWONG: Something more, and
other thing. Some mining companies are doing --
they are routinely doing I guess to do a ABA
testing that's not -- well, routine --
(unintelligible) not going to take too much time
selectively collect samples every day and do those
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analysis on-site. And even a pH measurement would
help too.
So you can operate --
incorporate some of these measures to confirm sort
of their (unintelligible).
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
That helps.
Let me move onto your
suggestion of monitoring. If I look at the
non-PAG rock pile or the ore storage pile, is the
monitoring that you are talking about measuring
things in the seeps from those piles? Is that
what you would talk about, or are there other
kinds of monitoring that you had in mind?
DR. KWONG: The minimum would
be the monitoring of the seepage, and that is most
informative. If some element of the chemistry
start to change, then you know something is going
on within the pile (ph). The pile rise to
particular chemistry of the seepage. And once you
detect something is happening, then additional
actions may be taken. For example, you may have
to drill into the rock pile, select some samples
and see what is happening.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
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Selenium. If determined there were some selenium
issues in one part of the mine or another, do I
understand that water treatment would be the
response to that? What would one do about finding
unacceptably large levels of selenium?
DR. KWONG: I feel I would
defer that question to -- refer to Environment
Canada because they would address the issue.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: That's fine.
DR. KWONG: Because I know a
little bit about the chemistry of the selenium but
not an expert in the subject, and Environment
Canada has a much better qualified person to
address that question than me.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I think
that's all of my questions.
Do my colleagues have more?
MR. KUPFER: Just a comment.
It may not be obvious to everyone in the audience.
I want to ask a sample question to Dr. Kwong.
I'm sure you've reviewed, or
have you reviewed the British Columbia mines'
ministry's letter to us on the 19th, which
includes some comments that relate to the
discussion today? Just as a factual basis.
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DR. KWONG: I agree with most
of that assessment.
MR. KUPFER: Thank you. And I
want to comment for the sake of the audience that
there are some comments in that very extensive
letter that pertain to these subjects. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I believe we
are now finished with our questions for you.
Thank you very much for your helpful contributions
to the review.
DR. KWONG: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: The next
presenters will be Dr. Kevin Morin and Dan
Watterson on behalf of the Tsilhqot'in National
Government.
Gentlemen, whenever you are
ready.
MR. MORIN: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. It's Tony Pearse, I'm a technical
adviser to the TNG and we have two presenters on
this Panel. My job really will just be to
introduce them.
Dr. Kevin Morin will be talking
first and he estimates he'll be about 45 minutes -
just issues of timing here for your consideration
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-- then I expect Dan Watterson will be an hour.
What I had proposed do was
introduce and let Dr. Morin proceed with his
presentation, allow for questions and then
introduce Dan Watterson and he can go ahead, and
there may be an appropriate time for a break in
there depending on how close to lunch.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I'm thinking
we'll break after Dr. Morin's presentation and our
normal expectation is 45 minutes for the TNG
presentation. So I would appreciate it if your
two colleagues could make some efforts to be more
expeditious. But anyway, go ahead.
MR. PEARSE: Thank you
Mr. Chairman. Kevin Morin, who is going talk
about the geochemical aspects that lead into the
water quality issues, has more than 30 years of
experience fields of water contamination,
contaminate migration, hydro geology --
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr. Pearse,
we have his CV. Perhaps we could attempt to
expeditious right now.
MR. PEARSE: Okay. I just
wanted to give a introduction so the audience is
familiar.
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He specializes in the design
and implementation of lab studies and mine
drainage related issues. He's author of over 100
publications and a registered professional geo
scientist in British Columbia, and the licensed
hydro geologist in the United States. We can
proceed with Dr. Morin.
PRESENTATION BY MR. MORIN:
MR. MORIN: Thank you for the
introduction, and good morning.
I would like to start off by
explaining exactly what I looked at during my
review. If we think of a simplistic environmental
assessment starting with a source of
contamination, and that contamination then
entering a pathway such as groundwater and surface
water, then flowing into a receptor like a like or
a stream it results and effects are environmental
impacts.
So, what I looked at were the
sources of water contamination at the proposed New
Prosperity project. Others, as we heard
yesterday, looked at some of the pathways such as
groundwater, and you'll hear about surface water
next week.
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And Mr. Watterson will be
talking about one of the groundwater pathways
after me.
I did not look at the
receptors, that comes next week under aquatic
environment. So when I talk about contaminant
sources I'm talking about the mine site components
like the waste rock, tailings, pit walls, or mine
roads, overburden, building foundations; basically
anything disturbance at the mine site becomes a
geochemical source term for water contamination.
And as you've heard already
some people in British Columbia called it ML/ARD,
but it involves a lot more than metal leaching.
There's non-metals. It can involved temperature
and other dissolved oxygen. Sometimes we just
call it geochemical source terms. That's what I
looked at, sources of contamination at the
proposed project.
On this diagram, this diagram
taken from the EIS, you can see some of the
geochemical sources of water contamination at the
proposed project. Most of them are labelled.
There's open pit, non-PAG stockpile. There's the
mine roads. There's also the ore stockpile
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footprint. It doesn't have rock in it, but it
will have rock, PAG rock, for at least a decade
and notice how close these are to Fish Lake.
One thing that's not labelled
is that brown blob in this diagram above Fish
Lake. Some of the run off drains down into Fish
Lake.
That's actually on the legend
end of the maps it's called a soil stockpile.
That's part of what my presentation is going to be
talking about. If I zoom out on this diagram to
the next one, not only there's one soil stockpile,
there's actually 5. I notice that two on the
right-hand side are out near close to Wasp Lake.
So imagine if those are
geochemical source terms of least contamination
the water will drain into Wasp Lake and damage
Beece Creek. And, so, my central major concerns
on the project are four; the first one,
geochemical source term predictions and water
quality, the second one ARD, the third, proposed
soil stockpiles, and the fourth, requirement for
water treatment.
So what I will do is briefly go
over each of these four and then conclude and put
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this all together into a summary.
So starting with the source
term predictions. It's important to note that in
the EIS the predictions for drainage from to a
number of these mine site components would violate
water quality guidelines and/or would be toxic to
aquatic life. So there's no doubt drainage from a
number of these components can kill aquatic life.
This includes the non-PAG stockpile, the ore
stockpile and the TSF pond.
So if I were to water down or
boil down my major issues on the geochemical
source terms the first one is, there's some things
that are not predicted. For example, water
temperature is not incorporated into predictions.
I'm not a biologist, but I understand that changes
in water temperature can affect aquatic life and
fish. And I'm sure you'll be hearing more about
this next week. In some cases pH was not
predicted and pH is an important water quality
parameter.
Number three, there are no
source term predictions for a nitrogen compound
called nitrite. When a mine is operating at full
scale it's blasting rock and when the explosives
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go off, most of that goes up into the air as
nitrogen gas but some of the explosive is left
over.
And when the rains come down,
coming out of the tailings, coming out of the
waste rock, coming out of the pit walls, will be
nitrogen compounds and the three compounds that
are often considered are nitrite, ammonia and this
nitrate. This is strange that there's no nitrate
predictions because the model used in the EIS was
Ferguson and Leesk(ph), 1988, which came from
Environment Canada.
This model has three
predictions that come out of it, one for nitrate,
one for ammonia and one for nitrite. So why
nitrate is not in the EIS I cannot explain, but I
know that that model provides it. And nitrate can
actually be more toxic to aquatic life at a lower
concentration than nitrate ammonia.
Without reasonable predictions
for nitrate, as well as nitrate ammonia which is
not predicted in some source terms, the full
impact of the New Prosperity project on water
quality has not been properly determined.
Fourth concern, the water in
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the TSF pond would be recirculated through the
mill around and around year after year. Now, as
this water passes through the mill, the mill adds
more contamination to the water such as sulphate,
metals, non-metals. This is like filling a
bathtub with the water previously drained from the
tub, bathing in it, draining it and re-filling the
tub to bath gain.
As a result, the tailings pond
does not start each year at some base line
condition, but instead igneous concentrations of
some of the parameters should increase through
time. You'll see them climbing year after year as
the year as the mill recirculates the water. This
is not predicted in the EIS.
Therefore, the full impact of
the New Prosperity project on water quality has
not been properly determined.
To understand again, to go back
to the source and pathway and receptor point,
here's an example of what happens when you
underestimate the concentrations and the tailings
pond.
Recirculation -- and this is
just picking on one, I'll come back to why the TSF
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pond is under-predicted. But recirculation of the
tailings pond was not properly considered,
therefore the concentrations in the tailings pond
were predicted to be too low for most years of
operation.
Because those tailings pond
concentrations are too low the seepage
concentrations they are predicting are too low.
Because the seepage concentrations are too low the
effects on the nearby creeks and down into Fish
Lake are underestimated and too low.
So this is that daisy chain
effect of source terms, pathways and receptors.
Getting it wrong in the source terms means that
everything below it is wrong.
Now I'm going to switch topics
to ARD which was already discussed for a while
this morning. The first sub-issue I'm going to
talk about ARD is something I called "scaling up"
or "upscaling".
We know that neutral drainage
is going to be a problem in New Prosperity, but we
also know that New Prosperity can, and has,
released acid rock drainage.
Now, what the New Prosperity
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project did was take the results of one kilogram
laboratory tests which were tested under
relatively steady conditions and scaled them up to
hundreds and millions of tons under variable
on-site conditions.
I ask you to think about that
scaling factor. One kilogram is used to predict
what a hundred million tons is going to do.
That's a scaling factor of a hundred billion. How
comfortable would you be taking something small
and scaling it up a hundred billion times? Do you
think that would be reliable? Would you be
concerned about the uncertainty?
Well, as Mr. Kuipers with talk
about next week, he will explain how often that
scaling up leads to under-predictions of source
terms. Concentrations are predicted to be too low
when the full scale mines are finally start to go
operate. Not surprising.
One thing that would help us at
this early stage before the EIS to help with the
scaling is to run some intermediate scale on-site
tests. This is under variable site conditions.
For example, these tests might contain one ton, a
hundred tons. Some might even go up to a thousand
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tons, and test them under on-site conditions.
Therefore, we take the one kilogram small sample,
scale it up to that intermediate one and say how
well did we do? Are we close? And we can
continue onto the full scale.
That intermediate on-site work
never been done for the New Prosperity project but
it was pointed out years ago how important it was
and it still hasn't been done.
So, again, we're hoping that a
scaling up of a hundred billion times is accurate.
Therefore, ARD predictions for
full sale mine site components in New Prosperity
are not reliable and underestimate ARD potential
as explained in the next slides.
This has also lead to AR
predictions in the EIS that contradict the actual
test work in the EIS.
The next sub-topic about ARD is
the criteria used to separate what is called PAG
and non-PAG rock which is kind of misleading
terms. But I'll use that since that is what is in
the EIS.
The initial predictions for ARD
and the old Prosperity had equations that said
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this rock will release ARD. This rock will not.
And that failed to predict what the test work
actually showed.
As a result of the discrepancy
the new EIS provides what's I call an "adjusted
criteria", but the term actually used for it are
preliminary, clarification, criteria, and the EIS
also says this preliminary adjusted criteria is
conservative, over-estimates the PAG tonnage and
allows for uncertainties.
If mining at New Prosperity
were ever to proceed I can tell you that the
wording in the EIS, that is "primarily
clarification", means the company is not happy
with that clarification, thinks that it's too
strict and will try to go back to the old one that
was proven to be wrong. So it was really
important for me, and to emphasize to the Panel,
that this criteria is absolutely critical to make
sure there is no acid releasing rock outside the
TSF.
I think not a preliminary
criteria that can be changed later during
permitting, but a final criterion should be
presented in the EIS.
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I understand some things might
happen during mining, maybe it could be adjusted
then, but by going into an EIS it contains a
preliminary clarification that means if the EIS is
approved the company can change back to the old
one when it wants to.
I believe there was some
discussion earlier this morning about the lag
time, how long it takes something to turn acid if
it's going to release ARD. We know this doesn't
always happen immediately, there's some lag time,
from the construction until the onset of ARD.
The problem was some of the
humidity cells started off acidic. Two of them
started off acidic. Two more turned acidic within
a few years. Now even if those are worse case
examples, we know some of the material can release
ARD almost immediately, one of those was basalt,
so the basalt can release it immediately. Other
rocks release within a few years.
Now, this lag time is
calculated in this EIS by equations that were
developed. Based on these equations the two
laboratory tests that started acidic should not
have become acidic for 2,000 years.
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Now, as I mentioned, this
preliminary clarification was adjusted to make it
fit the data better that still says the two tests
that started acidic would not be acidic for 1,000
years.
Details of that are in my
written presentation, written submission.
So there is a discrepancy
between what these equations say and what the test
work said, important to pay attention to that.
Under information response
seven Natural Resources Canada asked for
clarification and details of these liquidations.
After reviewing the company's response NRCan said
it had a problem with the lag equations. And I
believe Dr. Kwong said this morning he was still
uncertain on the details. And I agree with him.
Therefore, due to this inappropriate lag time
equation in the EIS the source terms and the
aqueous concentrations from the TSF and the over
stockpile PAG, which will have this material in
it, could be even further estimated than presented
above when I was talking about the source terms.
Geochemical loadings and
concentrations from some mine site components are
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expected to be higher than predicted, sooner than
predictions. Lag time predictions in the EIS for
ARD are confusing to the government and me, and
notably contradict the test work in the EIS. I
expected lag times will be much shorter than
predicted and more consistent with what the test
working is actually showing.
Now I'm going to switch over to
the soil stockpile. Maps from the EIS show
there's a soil stock file upstream of Fish Lake.
And there seem to be others along the TSF and two
out near Wasp Lake in the pristine Beece Creek
watershed. To me, that kind of disturbance
automatically makes them a geochemical source term
for ML/ARD prediction and assessment of water
contamination.
However, with these soil
stockpiles there is no testing, geochemical
testing, of the soil in those geochemical sections
in the EIS. So if you don't test the soil you
really can't make predictions for what's going to
come out of these little stockpiles above Fish
Lake and out near Wasp Lake.
Surficial run off. This is the
water running over the top. From the soil
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stockpile reports to Fish Lake and the TSF
assumed, and this is what the EIS assumed, it's
background run off concentrations, which means
that these soil stockpiles are basically invisible
to source term valuation. They're not going to be
have any effect on water quality. Although this
will be mined, this material will be picked up and
dumped with trucks and pushed around.
Some soil run off would also
enter Wasp Lake and/or Beece Creek. In addition
to the surface run off over these soil stockpiles,
there obviously will be some seepage. We were
talking about groundwater yesterday quite a bit.
However, the seepage from these stockpiles is not
mentioned anywhere in the EIS.
However, other sections of the
EIS outside of the geochemical and ML/ARD section
say that there will be an overburden stockpile,
which leaves me to suspect that at least on of the
soil stockpiles will contain overburden.
Other sections of the EIS link
the handling effects of soils and overburden
together. In other words they almost seem to say
soil and overburden are synonymous or somehow
connected together. In contradiction there's
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documents that say no, 100 percent of overburden
will go into the non-PAG stockpile and the main
TSF embankment.
Now, ML/ARD sections do
actually discuss what overburden is and they have
tested it and it's geochemically reactive and it
will can contaminate water and includes both PAG
and non-PAG material. In fact, some of what they
call overburden is actually rock, some of the
basalt that's been discussed in the last few days.
And one humidity cell containing this basalt was
acidic from the start. Maybe the soil is the
same. Maybe soil is overburden or some of it.
I'm not sure. I'm just know these soil stockpiles
can be source terms.
So, as a result, a major
geochemical source term called the soil stockpile
on the legends could contaminate Fish Lake and
Wasp Lake and Beece Creed through surface run off
and groundwater. This has not been properly
assessed in the impact assessment.
Stockpile soil and/or
overburden or what's actually going to be in these
can release toxic levels of metals and other
elements through drainage waters. So a proper
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assessment is required at the EIS stage, as done
for the other mine site components. We need this
for the soil stockpiles. Therefore, the full
impact of the New Prosperity project and water
quality cannot be determined with the information
the Panel currently has before it.
The last topic I'm going to
talk a bit about is requirement for water
treatment. For some mining projects treatment of
contaminated water is proposed. Treated(muffled)
concentrations from such plants do not
automatically meet water guidelines. They usually
don't. That's because treatment is not 100
percent effective.
As a result, environmental
impacts can still arise from the treated water
effluent and this justifies my view that treatment
plant discharge is another geochemical source term
at the site. Because New Prosperity has proposed
treatment of contaminated water therefore, my
review concludes that treatment plant as part of
geochemical source terms.
Interestingly, this isn't the
first time water treatment has come up for
Prosperity. This was a big issue back three years
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ago for the previous Panel. And the Federal and
Provincial agencies have stated that water
treatment would be necessary at New Prosperity as
an integral part of the mine plant. It's not an
option. I provided a number of quotations from
government agencies in my written submission to
show how emphatic they are.
However, the company continues
to say water treatment is just a water management
option. In one water treatment document annual
operating costs range from $4.3 to $14 million
dollars a year for a process called reverse
osmosis, a lot of people call it RO. The total
cost for the first 100 years of treatment using
this RO were estimated by the company at a half a
billion dollars to $1.5 billion.
The company estimated the net
present value of these scenarios at only $11 to
$20 million dollars because this treatment they
were talking about in the first document was
delayed for decades. It wouldn't have to start
for 20 to 40 years until after closure. However,
if treatment had to start earlier during
operation, the net present value would be much
higher.
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As the provincial government
pointed out, treatment costs would not be covered
by it's financial security because that is held
back in case of default. So the NPV, the net
present value, represents a cost in addition to
government security. And to clarify a little more
on that, I'm not sure why the provincial
government had to say to the company that bond
we're getting from you doesn't go to the treatment
plant. We're going to sit on that forever.
You've got to pay for something differently. So
something is going on, but I'm not on the inside
to figure out why the province had to clarify that
for the company.
A second water treatment
document explained the case studies of the
proposed water treatment plant, that full scale
treatment with a three circuit system has been
successful elsewhere. For example, this report,
the second one, states that membrane filtration,
which is similar to reverse osmosis, plus sulphide
precipitation was reportedly used successfully at
the Minto mine in the Yukon starting in 2010.
That sounds like good evidence that this plant
will work.
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However, other sources actually
reported problems with that treatment plant,
rather than success. For example, the mining
company itself wrote to the Yukon Water Board
saying no water treatment was undertaken in 2011
due to the inability of the site's water treatment
plant to meet updated effluent discharge criteria.
So that's not evidence that such a plant works
well.
As another example, this report
pointed out that a mine site in South Dakota, a
system similar to what is being proposed, that is
RO, reverse osmosis, was used to polish selenium
after treatment by iron reduction and
precipitation. Unless you go to those documents
and check it you won't know that most of the
selenium was removed by the iron reduction which
is not proposed in New Prosperity, and very a
little of it was removed by reverse osmosis, which
is proposed by New Prosperity. That's not
evidence they can remove all the selenium with the
full scale treatment plant.
Thus, there is no full scale
confirmation these proposed treatment circuits
will work successfully, individually or combined,
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or that they would be economical.
Statements in the New
Prosperity documents as to their success were
contradicted by other sources examining full sale
outcomes.
Proof of the full scale
effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed
treatment circuits rests with the company and
needs to be obtained in advance for the EIS stage.
The water quality of Fish Lake depends on the
continuous, reliable full scale success if the
project were to proceed.
The resulting effects on down
gradient water quality and cost for treatment were
expected by government agencies to be integrated
into the EIS and mine plan, however, this is not
done. So, therefore, there remain substantial
uncertainty around which locations would be
treated, when treatment would have to start, how
long treatment would be needed, whether full sale
treatment would be successful, and whether the
cost of the treatment would render the project
economically unfeasible or a burden to the TNG and
taxpayers.
Therefore the full impact of
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the New Prosperity project and water quality, with
or without water treatment has not been properly
assessed in the EIS. For water treatment the
downstream environment in Fish Lake would depend
directly on the treatment plant.
This type of treatment plant
remains unproven on a full operating scale fraught
with uncertainty, prone to periodic upsets and
failures and very expensive to the point of
possibly being economically unviable and a future
burden for others.
So, to conclude, I'm going to
pull my observations together into two topics; the
first topic is water quality and water
contamination.
It is critical to have a
realistic and reasonably accurate understanding of
the New Prosperity project source terms and their
potential implications for site water quality,
especially in the long term. To do this, the
Panel should have reasonably reliable predictions
of aqueous concentrations within the TSF and other
mine site components. These predictions in turn
effect predicted concentrations down the stream.
With this the information, if it's reliable and
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accurate, then we can check the proposed
mitigation measures, make sure they were properly
evaluated. Such information is not before the
Panel.
The New Prosperity EIS provides
unreasonably low predictions of the project's
effect on water quality, water contamination and
aqueous concentrations and seepage from the TSF
and other mine site components, as well as in
creeks Fish Lake and other lakes.
Now, focusing just on the TSF.
Some of the major reasons for these low prediction
in the TSF include, year after year recirculation
of the TSF pond to the mill would raise
concentrations higher than predicted ongoing
through time. Predictions are missing for water
quality primers like temperature, nitrate, in some
cases pH. A reasonable potential exists for rapid
ARD development in some PAG rock. Run off from
the soil stockpile is unreasonably assumed to have
background concentrations, when it likely contains
reactive overburden and/or soil.
Source terms for groundwater
seepage, also from the soil stockpile are not
given. With water treatment disposal of the water
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treatment waste, some of which are soluble, will
lead to higher than predicted concentration when
they're thrown in the TSF.
For Fish Lake in particular the
reasons for unrealistically low predictions of
water quality include concentrations and water
escaping the TSF as has been under-estimated.
Again, the soil stockpile, run off from the soil
stockpile is soon to have background
concentrations. Again, source terms for
groundwater seepage from the soil stockpile into
Fish Lake are not given.
Predictions are missing for
parameters like temperature and nitrate again, and
reasonable potential exists for rapid ARD
development in parts of the ore stockpile that
partially drains into Fish Lake.
Now I'm going to switch to
water treatment and just summarize my observations
on that.
The full impact of water
treatment on the New Prosperity project has not
been assessed in the EIS. The Federal and
provincial governments were expecting a meaningful
assessment, both environmental and economic. This
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is because water treatment was seen as, and still
is considered a requirement if this proceeds.
Instead, there is substantial ambiguity in the EIS
around where it would be treated, how long, when
it would have to start, how much it would cost.
In terms of technical
feasibility, the proposed treatment systems have
not been shown to be successful at lowering
aqueous concentrations of some contaminants at
safe levels in full scale operating treatment
plants at mine sites.
The Panel should have
reasonable information confirming the proposed
treatment can sufficiently reduce contaminates on
a full operating scale at stated costs. The Panel
does not have this information. The Panel should
have reasonable estimates of annual and cumulative
costs for water treatment that may have to begin
soon after mining starts. This is a critical
issue for project acceptability because the cost
of water treatment may cause the company to
default on it's environmental commitments.
Based on existing information
for the New Prosperity project full scale water
treatment could cost more than $4 to $14 million a
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year and more than a half a billion to $1.5
billion for the first hundred years. The Panel
does not have reasonable estimates integrated with
the mine plan.
As pointed out by the province
of British Columbia, the cost for treatment must
be secured independently by the company.
Government bonds and security for New Prosperity
cannot be used for treatment unless the company
defaults on its environmental responsibilities,
and thus the Crown, TNG and taxpayers approve that
liability. In other words, the company would have
to assume any costs of water treatment independent
of any closure security held by the Crown. And
perhaps a simpler way to say this is it's double
payment. The government is saying you're going to
pay us to water treatment in case you can't do it,
but you're also going to pay for the water
treatment at the same time. It's double billing
which doubles the cost of this.
Usually I'm quite wordy in my
submissions, but I tried really hard to create a
one-page graphical summary of most of my concerns
and I was amazed I was able to do it. It's a bit
crowded on there but that contains concerns most
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of my concerns.
And to finish off there is a
few points I would like to clarify and talk about.
The first, there was some discussion about Dr.
Kwong's rating of different sites and their
susceptibility to ARD.
He was mentioning that New
Prosperity would probably be between 3 and 6 in
his categories. He gave two examples of mines
that hit each of the categories 3, 4 and 5. It
turns out that one in each of those categories of
the two have ARD concerns even though there's 3, 4
and 5.
So even though say a category 5
mine in his classification might have a low
susceptibly to ARD 50 per cent of his examples of
ARD concerns.
And I think he would be willing
to admit that, yes, this doesn't say whether there
will or will not be ARD. This is simply a general
scale to let you know in advance before test work
whether could be a lot of ARD at that site, but
it's not 100 percent accurate.
Another point I want to touch
on is a nearby example of a tailings storage
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facility contaminating nearby ground water and a
lake. We heard Thursday night from Mr. Smyth that
there are a number examples that don't contaminate
ground water and a lake, and he mentioned Mount
Polley, and he is wrong on that one.
The last few annual reports
from the Ministry of Mines shows that some of the
monitored wells just outside the TSF and Mount
Polley have skyrocketed in their concentrations of
sulphate and copper. And, also, concentrations
are going up in a nearby lake very sharply. I've
seen, over 30 years, a lot of increasing
concentrations. I have not seen anything
skyrocket like it did at Mount Polley in one of
the monitor wells. So it was coming out fast and
coming out strong.
A final point, implications of
delaying environmental and economic issues to
eventual permitting. This was discussed here
before the Panel, and it's discussed elsewhere,
where you rank ideas which one should be addressed
at the EIS stage and which ones left for
permitting.
And I wanted to tell you a true
story that happened at Mount Milligan about this
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permitting delay. Mount Milligan is talked about
as a recent mine in B.C. There was EIS review.
There were a number of metals that were found to
be above water quality guidelines. They were
predicted to be too high, and they recorded
mitigation.
So the decision was what
mitigation? Water treatment plant? Cover it?
The decision was made to leave it to permitting.
So then the Ministry of the Environment then said
okay, it's left us to. So they said to the
company what mitigation are you going to do. The
company said, we predicted wrong during the EIS
stage. We were too high. We now are predicting
lower concentrations. There's no water quality
issues at all. Now, one would think that MOE
would go back to various stakeholders and say is
this okay. They didn't. They unilaterally
decided, good. Here's your permit if there's no
water quality problem.
So the two implication of
delaying something to permitting is one, you are
turning it fully over to the province which as
already approved the Old Prosperity project, and
to the company to figure out together. The second
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implications is one outcome is they will dismiss
the issue. They will revise it so it's no longer
a concern. Please keep that in mind when you
delay something to permitting. And that's it.
Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you
Dr. Morin. It's now 12:15 so I think we're going
to break for lunch and we'll start questioning
after lunch, about one hour from now. So 1:15.
--- Recessed at 12:15 p.m.
--- Resumed at 1:15 p.m.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Good
afternoon. It's now time to resume.
Just before we do, I would like
to make an announcement that has some bearing from
what the panel has done. The panel has heard a
great deal in the hearing about closure security
deposits.
This morning to panel wrote to
the B.C. Ministry of Energy and Mines seeking
clarification on a number of aspects of what it
does, what its practices are for new mines
regarding security.
We thought that might be
helpful not only for the panel but also for other
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participants in the process. To go right -- and
again I use the term -- to the horse's mouth --
and let's be clear which end we're talking
about -- to the authority to seek some guidance.
That is post on the registry at CEAR no. 763.
Mr. Gustafson, would you like
to say something.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I just wanted to mention that
we had heard many of the same questions ourselves
and do plan to put something on the record as part
of your closing.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: It was very
clear to us throughout the hearing that that would
be helpful from the authority.
It's my understanding that you
propose at this time to pause and to take
questions on Dr. Morin's presentation. Is that
the plan?
MR. PEARSE: Tony Pearse.
That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Pearse. In that case, the order is Government
of Canada, interested parties, do we have any
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questions for Dr. Morin?
I'm sorry, you are not with the
Government of Canada.
PUBLIC SPEAKER: Sorry.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: First
Government of Canada. We'll get to other
interested parties later.
Not seeing any, I would move
onto, logically, any other First Nation interested
parties. Not seeing any, I would move onto group
interested parties, interested parties that are
groups. Ma'am?
MS. NOBEL: Jenny Nobel, Fish
Lake Alliance.
Just as a member of the public
with little to no experience in these matters,
there's been a lot of talk about waste treatment
and reverse osmosis and so on. If I'm
understanding that right, reverse osmosis is
supposed to trap contaminates before the water
goes away?
MR. MORIN: Yes. Reverse
osmosis is sort of a membrane filter, and they
push the water through it and the water goes
through but the contaminates, the chemicals stay
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outside and so the water is purified as it passes
through the filters.
MR. NOBEL: My question is:
What happens to the stuff that remains in the
filter?
MR. MORIN: They all those
contaminants, the waste product, and they have to
get rid of it. At this point they are proposing
to put it into the TSF. And when it goes into the
TSR it can redissolve there and raise the
concentrations there.
MS. NOBEL: Thank you for that.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you.
Any other group interested parties? Any
individual interested parties. Taseko?
MR. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
Again, with our position with respect to Dr.
Kwong, we will have questions for Dr. Morin once
our expert arrives.
Just to put on the record, this
is consistent with the understanding of how the
hearing was to be structured with acid rock
drainage metal leaching as being part of the
aquatic phase of the inquiry in the Panel's letter
of June 27th.
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At this time I do have a couple
of points of clarification coming from a layman's
perspective.
Dr. Morin, I wanted to talk a
moment about your comments on scaling.
As I heard you speak, I got the
impression that you said that the soils'
characterization done by Taseko was based on, or
limited to, the testing of one kilogram sample and
then skilled up I forget how many billions times.
Is that your understanding of what the company has
done for soil characterization?
MR. MORIN: Excuse me. No,
that is incorrect. I could find no soil
characterization on the geochemical side in the
ML/ARD section. In other words, I was interested
-- say when rain comes down onto a soil stockpile,
whether arsenic would come out, or cadmium, or
copper or something like that. So I looked for
soils in the ML/ARD section and could find no soil
testing at all.
MR. GUSTAFSON: I'm still
trying to understand what you meant to infer when
you said that the characterization or that the
testing was limited to a single one-kilogram soil
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sample and then scaled up. So, again, was it your
intention to imply that that was the limit of the
testing that the company had done?
MR. MORIN: My comment about
scaling up came from the humidity cells, which are
run in a laboratory, and humidity cells contain
about a one-kilogram of sample and they are put
into an enclosed container and air is passed
through them, and once a week they are opened up
and water is poured over them. Water is drained
off and analyzed, and based on that there is a
certain rate that comes out of it. How fast
copper is being released, or how fast arsenic is
being released from that particular one-kilogram
sample. Based on that rate, that is then upscaled
to the full scale waste rock dump.
So, for example, waste rock
dump is one million tons -- sorry, one hundred
millions tons. When that is being predicted from
a one-kilogram sample they have to take the rate
at one kilogram and scale it up one hundred
billion times to make a prediction for one hundred
million tons of waste rock, and that also applies
to overburden too.
MR. GUSTAFSON: That comment
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then relates to that one particular test and
doesn't mean to suggest that that's the limit of
what the company has done in terms of its soil
characterization and testing.
MR. MORIN: Well, again, there
was no soils characterization that I could find on
the geochemical side. So as far as I know, the
company hasn't done anything from that.
But as far as other tests,
there are things called acid base accounts, which
Dr. Kwong talked about, which uses I believe --
I'm not sure how much you use, but about a hundred
grams of sample. There is also what are called
shake flacks (ph), where some sample of rock is
put into a jar and shaken up. That's usually
about a hundred grams.
So I'm aware of other test work
being done. But as far as I know, these humidity
cells and I think a few columns are about the
largest that have been done. So, again, we're
dealing with billions -- a scaling factor of
billions of times up to the waste rock dumps.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Dr. Morin, I
guess it's my general understanding that in fact
there are soils characterization guidelines that
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apply for a project like this that call for a
whole range of soils characterization testing. Is
that correct?
MR. MORIN: I believe there
are. Like, for example grain size
compressability. There may have also been some
analysis done. But, again, I'm not interested in
what the analysis of the soil is. I'm looking for
predictions of source terms. When you take the
soil samples, if some have been collected, tested,
if you take that I want to know what will be
coming out of the soil stockpiles. And the EIS
says what will be coming out of those soil
stockpiles, is background concentrations. In
other words, the soil will have no effect at all
on water quality. That's all I can find.
MR. GUSTAFSON: We'll clarify
that, I think, in our closing.
One other area of
clarification, if I may. You referenced the
figure of a thousand years in relation to acid
rock drainage, and I wonder if you can just
clarify, please, from my understanding, what the
significance of the thousand-year figure is.
MR. MORIN: The thousand year
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figure came from the lag time equations that are
in the EIS, and I'll step back a bit and explain
it.
There were two humidity cells
that started off acidic right from the beginning.
Now that means they would be releasing ARD
immediately. However, when you do the acid base
accounts on them -- which is what the lag
equations use -- when you look at the acid base
accounts, those should have never, ever, at any
point in time, released acidic drainage.
So what happened is in the EIS
there was -- for the New Prosperity the criteria,
the preliminary criteria were updated, they were
adjusted to match the test work. So now the new
criteria, in fact, do say that these things will
turn acidic at some point in time.
When you use the equations in
the EIS that says it will turn acidic after a
thousand years, does that explain?
MR. GUSTAFSON: It helps. I
just want to clarify. Did you mean to suggest
that at one point the company's position had been,
or in something that had filed, that acid rock
drainage would not commence for a thousand years?
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MR. MORIN: No. Specifically
those two simples. I was trying to explain the
known (ph) limitations of an equation.
With an equation you have to
put numbers in and you get numbers out. So the
numbers I put in were for these specific humidity
cells already acidic. And what came out told me
they were not supposed to be acidic for at least a
thousand years.
Now, there might be other
numbers and they are probably brought with other
characteristics, you plug into that equation and
get different numbers. But the thousand years
applies to these two cells that were already
acidic when they started.
MR. GUSTAFSON: So if I
understood your answer correctly, the company has
never taken the position that acid rock drainage
would not start for a thousand years.
MR. MORIN: My understanding
the company said this situation tells us certain
things, and I don't recall anybody saying an
average value is put into the equation and here is
the average value that came out, all that is
presented by these equations.
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Then there's a few statements
in the EIS that says it could be centuries or
decades or something like that. Again, even
though the equations are given they are not used
quantitatively in the EIS to come up with
predictions.
So I don't think the company
ever said that ARD would never appear for a
thousand years. My point is that the equation is
wrong because it says these acidic cells should
not be doing that for a thousand years.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Dr.
Morin.
Mr. Chairman, I think I'll let
the expert talk about validity of the equation.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Gustafson. Anything else, Taseko, at this
time? I'm assuming that's a no. Sorry. Thank
you, Mr. Jones.
Either of my colleagues.
George?
MR. KUPFER: You've indicated
in your presentation a number of things that you
would have liked to have seen, or that you
expected to be in any application for this kind of
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project to deal with this subject.
I wonder in terms of your list
of deficiencies, as you indicated them, what, in
your mind, is the most crucial and missing pieces
of information that would satisfy you or anyone
else as to the nature of the acid deposition in
the metal leaching.
Is there a priority? Which is
the most important thing is what I'm asking, in
your mind?
MR. MORIN: I think the easiest
way to answer this question -- I'm going to go to
one of my last slides here, my one-page graphical
summary.
Notice all the arrows pointing
into the TSF. Any one of those alone could cause
concentrations to be higher than predicted in the
TSF.
If two apply then the
concentrations are going to be even higher. So
your question is, would I rank those one higher
than the other on what's important. And no, I
think they are all important. There's also a
number of other issues that I thought I wouldn't
burden the Panel with. And the last Panel I
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actually submitted an 80-page written submission
with a lot of these details.
I thought I would pick out the
most important ones at this time. But there are
other ones that tie into this that show the
concentrations will be even higher. So short
answer is: I'm not sure I would put a priority on
these. All these are important.
MR. KUPFER: I have to admit, I
don't recall that 80-page submission, I'm going to
have to go back and look. Thank you.
MR. MORIN: To be clear, that
was from the 2010 Panel.
MR. KUPFER: I know, we've read
the material and somehow it skipped me.
MR. MORIN: Most of that, those
points still apply. I've only picked out the
major ones.
MR. KUPFER: Thank you.
MR. SMYTH: Thank you for your
presentation.
I've read your resume and I
understand that you've been involved in ARD
studies at a number of porphyry copper mines in
B.C. over the year.
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In this work, did any of the
reason project -- say those from the last 10 years
or -- so meet your standards for an ARD predictive
study?
MR. MORIN: I think I will
first make a point clarification. I just don't
look at ARD. Maybe the best way to explain it is:
For example in limestone. Limestone can contain
materials like cadmium and zinc and copper. So
even a limestone quarry can release toxic levels
of some metals, like cadmium and zinc.
I tend to see it as more
holistically than that. So I look at mine site
drainage chemistry. ARD is one aspect of it. But
really it could be alcamin (ph) drainage, like in
some diamond mines, could be mutual (ph) drainage.
I'm thinking the best way to
answer that is: In a few days Mr. Kuipers will
actually present to you what the standard is. In
other words, when these predictions are -- he did
a compilation of predictions and he went and
looked at the mine site after they were operating
compared them.
MR. SMYTH: I know you've
looked at porphyrias mine proposals in B.C. Did
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any of them get it right?
MR. MORIN: There's a very
encompassing question, right or wrong. Okay, I
would say no, and this is why I say no.
For example, with Kamis South
(ph) that was predicted to have ARD but they were
going to control that like pushing rock into the
pit and flooding it, which they did so they didn't
have ARD. And they were not predicted to have any
metal leaching.
But about two years ago they
were out in a nearby creek sampling and selenium
had gone sky high, well over toxic levels, and
they had to scramble to find out where this
selenium was coming from and what they could do to
control it.
So their chemist did a great
job of controlling ARD, but this unexpected
selenium leaching popped up on them in one creek.
So when you have a big mine site, there's lots of
creeks, lots of mine site components, and water
quality guidelines that have dozens of parameters,
the chance of a mine site ever meeting all those
everywhere is very slim.
MR. SMYTH: So there's lots of
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unknowns.
MR. MORIN: Lots of potentials
for problems to come up.
MR. SMYTH: And, therefore, a
rigorous adaptive management plan is the only way
to mine. If you didn't have that, we wouldn't
mine any more, would we?
MR. MORIN: I'm thinking back
to what a number of mine managers said to me. If
we knew the site was going to be like this, we
would have never mined it in the first place.
So I agree, adaptive management
would be important, but thee's also things to do
up front to identify what the problems could be or
where to look for those problems. For example,
how quickly could the problems arise. If they
might come up within one year then work has to be
ready to go right away.
If it's like a 30-year problem,
then there's time to adapt for it, to watch for
it. So there's a balance in there, I agree.
MR. SMYTH: I heard you say
that and I took note of it.
My colleague's question to you
was: What's the biggest gap then? You show this
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and you tell us that they are all gaps. They are
all important. I suppose that's a fair answer,
but is there any one that would keep you awake at
night?
MR. MORIN: No, there isn't
one. But my point was by showing this, none of
these are difficult to do. For example,
recirculation of the tailings pond through the
mill. That's easy to calculate. It just goes
around and around.
There was no nitrate
predictions. Well, it What comes out of the
model. Just put nitrate in with the other
parameters. There was no source terms for soil
stockpile. So these aren't big difficult things
to do.
MR. SMYTH: Okay. That's
helpful. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Ron has lead
nicely into my first question, so I will first
quote you as saying, that's easy to calculate.
What's your best guess as to
the concentration of stuff in the tailings pond
after a bunch of recirculation?
MR. MORIN: I don't think that
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would be difficult to figure out. One could go to
various tailings impoundments and see what
concentrations are in those.
But the concentrations that are
in the EIS are so low that it's obvious from any
one of these factors that it's going to be higher.
If I had some time -- well, in fact, if I was
working on the project I would have predicted
that. In fact, I'm working on a project now and I
am predicting that.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: But you
could calculate it and you have a bunch of
professional experience at what you have seen in
other places. So can you give me a
shoot-from-the-hip kind of an answer, because
we're going to write a report pretty soon and some
guidance would be helpful. You may not feel
comfortable doing it, and that's okay too. But I
think this is an important request.
MR. MORIN: I'm thinking of how
to give you a simple answer because it depends on
the elements. So I'm going pick one here.
For the TSF pond, the copper is
predicted to be 55 micrograms per litre, which is
.055 milligrams per litre. I expect it to be
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closer to one. So, we could go down through the
list.
Sulfate is predicted 1,000 with
all the recirculation, the treatment plant waste.
I expect to be around 2,000.
Selenium is given at 14
micrograms per litre. I would expect it to be
closer to 50, maybe a hundred.
So I could go through each of
these elements and give you a rough idea of what
I'd expect it to be. But, again, there's a way of
calculating it based on the test work that was
done for New Prosperity. Again, it was called the
Goldsem model. But it wasn't done or, if it was
done, it was not done properly. Does that help?
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Sorry, I
should have said thank you, that helps a good
deal. I was looking at my next question.
MR. SMYTH: While Bill is
thinking, would an option then be not to
recirculate the water? Could the water just be
left in the TSF and extract more water from all
these aquifers and put fresher water into the
mill?
MR. MORIN: That is exactly
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what used to be done a long time ago. The problem
is when it comes out of the mill it's already got
contaminates in it. So they learned decades ago
not to release it, but put it into the pond.
Then they realized as they got
larger mines that the mills need so much
incredible amount of water that you would be
sucking up so much fresh water and contaminating
it, it was better just to take the contaminated
water and keep sending it through the mill and
having the contaminates increase.
I don't know the exact number
that this mill needs, but if we check the numbers
I think you would be amazed at how much water this
mill will use in one day. So to take it out of
the aquifers or out of the Taseko River, would be
way too much water to manager. Then when it came
out of the mill it probably would still have to be
treated for something.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I found the
arrow that connected my two thoughts that fit into
a question here.
You talked earlier about the
scaling up problem of going from a kilogram to a
hundred billion tons of stuff. What's expected
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professional practice at new mines in B.C. today
in terms of the humidity cell, one-kilogram
sample, and then presumably some larger sample and
then some larger sample and even eventually you
get satisfied and you could scale up meaningfully.
What do other good mining companies do when they
propose new mines in B.C. these days?
MR. MORIN: A very loaded
question by defining what a "good mining company"
is.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: What's the
standard professional practice is what I'm looking
for.
MR. MORIN: I'm just trying to
think of some statistics to give you. Let me
start with my practice.
I would never take a humidity
cell and scale it up without the intermediate
on-site kinetic test. Never, ever. And I have
never done that.
Most other people in our
practice do that -- they do intermediate kinetic
tests. Diavik, for example, is a good one that
just started some of that a year ago. I think
there are about 50,000 tons.
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However, the B.C. government --
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Diavik has
been operating for 13 years.
MR. MORIN: Yes, they just
started doing some kinetic tests because they are
planning on doing something else. I don't know --
I'm not familiar with the site but they are
running these kinetic tests to find out something.
Something about closure maybe, I don't know.
But in other words, some of
these sites do run them, others don't.
The B.C. government does not
have a set policy. They would like to see them,
but they were not required.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Okay.
Soil stockpile. Same question
as before. It's just going to be one of those, I
want your opinion. Same question as before.
Soil stockpile. Geochemical
source term. Have you got a guesstimate as to --
I guess in part it's similar to the question
George posed. You got a guesstimate as to whether
it's likely to be an acid source term or whether
it's going to have other things coming from it or
what? Give me your professional judgment.
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MR. MORIN: Okay. The problem
with my professional judgment lies in the
definition of what the company calls "soils".
Because some people -- or some other companies
consider soils to include overburden, like sands
and gravels. Other companies think soils are just
the organic part.
So if we start with just the
organic, the black part as organic carbon, then
yes, it will be acidic because most natural soils
are acidic, but not ARD. It's from the organic
acids in the soil.
But if it includes overburden,
we know from the test work in the previous EIS for
old Prosperity, which the new one refers to, that
the overburden -- some of it is net acid
generating and can release ARD, and the part that
is not can release elevated metals into water and
other elements.
So I know that the overburden
can cause an impact. How much of the overburden
is going to be in the soil stockpiles I don't
know. The soil stockpiles can release other
problems like dissolved organic carbon which could
run down into Fish Lake and the other lakes, eat
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up the dissolved oxygen in the lake.
Again, I'm not a biologist.
I'm using (muffled). And without dissolved oxygen
things die in these lakes. So I can envision
things that could come off the soil stockpile that
would cause very serious effects in the lakes.
But because I don't know exactly what this company
is considering soil and what's going into those
piles I'm kind of wavering on what I think is
going to come out of them. Does that help?
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Yes, it
does. That's fine. I'll let you off the hook
this time.
MR. KUPFER: While Bill is
looking, would you please finish that sentence
again. The B.C. government has no set policy on
-- I'm sorry, I couldn't get that word.
MR. MORIN: Oh, on the on-site
kinetic test, whether you have to --
MR. KUPFER: Thank you.
On-site kinetic test.
MR. MORIN: The Federal
government has released a prediction manual that
said you should run these, but this manual is not
requirements, it's not a legal document that says
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mining companies have to follow this.
B.C. has also done that. They
released guidelines and expectations manuals, but
no where do they say: You must do this.
MR. KUPFER: Thank you very
much.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I think I'm
done here. Ron, anything else? George?
Okay, in that case, we're
finished. Thank you very much for your
presentation, answer, statement. That's been
helpful.
I should have asked this just
before. Dr. Morin, will you be around on Monday
when questions come forward or?
MR. MORIN: No, I'm sorry, I
will not be. I'm going back tomorrow but I will
be available for a phone call.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Okay.
That's good. Thank you. Mr. Watterson, I
believe. Go ahead.
MR. PEARSE: Mr. Chairman, Tony
Pearse. If I can briefly introduce Mr. Watterson?
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Emphasis on
"briefly".
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MR. PEARSE: Yes. Everybody, I
think, has been introducing their experts so I
would like to that I can that liberty, if I can.
Mr. Watterson is a principal
hydro geologist with Watterson Geoscience. He's
got 28 years of geoscience environmental and water
resource experience. He's registered in British
Columbia and Alberta as a professional
geoscientist and Washington state as a licenced
geologist and hydro geologist. And he's worked in
British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Yukon,
Western United States, Africa and Mexico.
PRESENTATION BY MR. WATTERSON:
MR. WATTERSON: Thank you for
the opportunity to speak.
I was contracted by the TNG to
provide a comprehensive review of the EIS and the
supporting documents with respect to the 2012 CEAA
guidelines that were presented with respect --
they were published in response to the 2009 EIS,
and also with respect to the 2012 B.C. Ministry of
Environment baseline water quality guidance which
addresses the kind of studies that should be
conducted when doing baseline studies for proposed
mines and also just with respect to my
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professional experience in the use -- in these
matters.
And the objective was to
evaluate the project with respect to the data and
the assessment and certainties, and the potential
environmental risks from the project especially to
Fish Lake.
And by doing so, I developed
kind of a big picture understanding of the project
area hydro geology and interactions of the
proposed mine with that hydro geology.
So this is an almost
criminally-abbreviated list of the EIS guidelines
that are requested in the 2012 CEAA document.
They are in my paper for reference. If we want to
talk about them, I have them at the end of my
presentation.
But the point of the guidance
which are -- the point of the guidelines which are
quite comprehensive was to complete a
comprehensive assessment and presentation of the
project area hydro geology to identify the effects
of mining in a TSF seepage in particular on local
and downgradient groundwater quality and quantity
and to provide a numerical model which uses the
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site data and which incorporates all major site
features and finally to identify and describe all
necessary monitoring and mitigation features.
So that's kind of -- in a
really broad sense, that was the criteria through
which I reviewed the EIS. So it was a very big
area; big review. And so because of that -- and
I've only kind of hit the high points in my
presentation in the interests of not keeping
everybody here till next week -- but so the key
risk in the project, of course, is we've had a
number of very learned people talk about very sort
of specific aspects of hydro geology, whether it's
the faults from Dr. Desbarats, whether it's
discussions of the overall till characterization
by Dr. Smith, Dr. Morin and others talking about
the acid rock drainage.
My review is bigger in scope
than that. So the key risks are of course the
potential for solute to leak from the TSF and then
figure out where it's going to go. The next one,
of course, is NRCan has rightfully pointed out in
numerous information requests is the understanding
between Pit Lake -- the pit and Fish Lake
interactions, and then as Kevin has pointed out,
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there is potential groundwater quality impacts
from ores and waste rock and soil stockpiles. And
this was specifically pointed out in the EIS
guidelines, potential groundwater qualities
resulting from the open pit operations.
So those are the main sources
of risk from the project.
And what I found from my review
was four main categories of inadequacies I guess
is the best word. Inadequate baseline
characterization. There's oversimplified hydro
geology used for the modelling and effects and
then the -- effects analysis and then the
modelling itself was inadequate along with it's
sensitivity analyses and inadequate mitigation
planning. There are some others but these are the
main ones. So if we're going to look at starting
with some of the inadequate baseline
characterization, we've seen this figure before.
This figure shows the Fish
Lake, TSF, the area in red is the proposed PAG
stockpile area. So these little dots are test
pits. And so one of the things that seemed odd to
me when I first looked at this is for the PAG --
proposed PAG storage area, the most sensitive area
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on the whole project, they have six test pits; six
test pits for an area that's about four square
kilometres in size. And they say -- and that's
their characterization.
The scale of this is deceiving.
This is four square kilometres, the size of a
small town. Each of these test pits is about as
big as the table in size. And so that's what they
have used to characterize and base all their
analyses on for how PAG is going to behave in this
area is on data from six test pits. If you notice
off to the south, there's a huge area which has no
test pits at all.
This is a figure out of one of
the documents, Knight Peisold TSF Design Report.
It's turned around the other way. This brown area
is Fish Lake. This is a map of till, the
underlying material for the TSF over the area.
This is the north embankment, south embankment,
west embankment. This shows kind of the data
points that are used to generate this map. So if
you compare where they show where a till is in
this thickness with this figure here showing where
the test pits are, there's quite a big disconnect
between where they actually have data sources --
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sources of data -- and where they are showing
where a till exists.
This is a figure that shows the
wells that were used in the -- to do the hydro
geology analysis. Now there is an error in my
report because I misinterpreted this figure when I
wrote it. My report says that there are no
drilling bore holes within the footprint of the
TSF. That is incorrect. These red dots right
here are some wells. But it doesn't change the
point -- they really don't change the point of my
-- of this slide in my report in that here's a 12
square kilometre area which they are going to be
storing 400, almost 500 cubic millimeters of
tailings and there's not a single bore whole
inside the bulk of the area to tell what's
underneath. Not one.
So all these questions that
have been talked about, especially from Dr.
Desbarats' report the other day where he had to
extrapolate the geology between -- from the sides
of the TSF down towards the centre, is because
there -- they actually don't have any data there.
So we don't know what the conditions are like.
Dr. Smith -- you may recall
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from a couple days ago, Dr. Smith stated that in
his opinion for an area this size they would have
-- require 50 to 60 bore holes in order to do a
proper characterization job. And, again, we have
half a dozen on one end.
This cross section shows
another problem with the characterization effort
in that there is a significant distance between
data points. This is one cross section here,
basically east/west through the proposed TSF,
here's the top of the TSF win (ph) build line.
This is 600 metres from their scale right there.
So their hydro geology extrapolates from points
more than a kilometre apart and in an area that
has complex geology and hydro geology as you've
heard.
Also another part of this, you
can't really tell on this figure, but on all these
contacts between upper units and lower units,
there are question marks. And question marks in
geology terminations means this is our best guess;
we don't know; inferred.
They have units that they just
end. This is a glacial -- what's called a glacial
fluvial unit -- sands, gravels -- that's in this
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hole. They didn't drill deep enough and down here
to find it but there's no knowledge of where this
goes. There's just ends. There's no explanation
of what happens to this, nor for how groundwater
is going to behave when it's run- -- passing
through this.
Some of the other missing data
that's part of a normal hydro geologic
characterization and is also mentioned in the
guidance is there is no data for sediments beneath
Fish Lake. The lake bottom sediments and
characteristics are based solely on inference and
from indirect methods. Scroll back up to this
picture here. You can see there is -- we know
there is a few test pits down here, there's a
couple there, and there is some test pits on this
end and there is one bore hole in the middle on an
island.
All of the rest of this is
unknown, but a huge amount of the Taseko's
modelling and effects analysis is based upon the
presumption that this till actually extends
beneath the lake. But there is essentially no
data to show that.
Another thing, there are no
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data for any kind of fluvial sediments that extend
along the Fish Creek Valley and along the Taseko
River. They don't find any maps of surficial
sediments or basalt.
The seeps and strings (ph) that
lie along the Taseko River have not been mapped or
characterized. Groundwater and surface water
interactions especially along the Fish Creek are
not assessed, and there is an incomplete
understanding of how groundwater flows in the
upper bedrock. For example, in discussions that
we had yesterday about flow above the gypsum line.
There is really no data about that.
And there is -- and what this
all boils down to, is they really haven't
characterized the potential groundwater flow
pathways to any of the overburden or the basalt or
the bedrock. They -- as Dr. Desbarats mentioned
yesterday, they have just sort of all combined
them into one unit, and I'll talk about that some
more. But as we've seen, it's not all one unit.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr.
Watterson --
MR. WATTERSON: Yes?
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I think the
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purpose of this session is to deal with the
potential effects of the project rather than with
the sufficiency of the EIS. So when you get to
the potential effects that you talk about,
emphasizing those would be really helpful to the
Panel. Telling us that something is not
sufficient is, you know --
MR. WATTERSON: Okay, well, let
me just -- thank you for that comment. What I'm
saying -- the point of all this is that what the
Proponent has said about the professional -- about
the potential effects is based on incomplete
science.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: We hope that
you will enlighten us as to how we can do a better
job based on your input. Thank you very much.
MR. WATTERSON: Okay.
Okay. So another problem with
the EIS, again which leads to their effects
predictions being off, is they did not use
available data. For example, there is a lot of
back and forth in the IRs about using the 1994
aquifer test data and they decided that they
didn't want to use it.
And it was -- unfortunately, it
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was the only aquifer test for the entire project.
There is data from the geologic committee --
geology and drilling data from many logs were not
used and other available data were not used such
as information about the faults and the
gypsum-lined bedrock.
This slide shows on the top
left, you may recall from the IRs the aquifer test
data in question where they say because of the
irregularities in the water levels, this data are
suspect and therefore we can't use it.
On the bottom left is a
basically a textbook computer-generated model of a
typical drawdown and recovery curve. You can see
the water level drops down quickly and continues
to decline. The pump is shut off and the water
level comes back up to static.
Over here are water levels from
the three observation wells that were used during
these pump tests. As you can see, the water
levels decline nicely. The pump is shut off and
the water levels return.
In a hydro geologic analysis
there is no difference between doing a test --
testing the data from the pumping well or testing
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the data from the observation wells. And so by
not using this data, they were missing an avenue.
This table shows the results of
the tests, and I know it's hard to read. From the
observation well, there's two tests. On the top
and the drawdown test, the first two -- the first
two -- the first two show the drawdown data, the
sections. Below this are the recovery data
analyzed very well -- various wells -- various
ways.
What's important to know this
in the permeability column is how similar these
numbers are. They are almost unique over two
different tests and multiple wells.
One of the key features of
doing a proper job of analyzing hydro geologic
data is its consistency and its reliability and
repeatability. This shows that the test data from
the observation wells is perfectly good and
perfectly reliable. You couldn't ask for better
data than this.
Another source of data that
they didn't use as has been talked about, this is
an older figure that shows the faults. It shows
the faults that go through the proposed mine area
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better than some of the newer figures. The key
issue in this is there is a significant
discrepancy between the fault data used in the
Knight Piesold geotechnical analysis and the Bruce
geotechnical analysis.
The Knight Piesold data as part
of their open pit modelling, their report says:
"We expect significant groundwater flow
from the two faults that extend through
this proposed open pit, and, therefore,
we have a lot of dewatering plans that
we need to make."
The Bruce geotechnical report
says, we don't see any reason for including
groundwater flow through the defaults, so we're
going to just not include that in our analysis.
So I'm not sure how those two
different 180-degree viewpoints can be reconciled.
So the next thing was the
oversimplified hydro geology used for the
modelling and effects analysis. And again as
described in detail between the various IRs and in
the hydro geology report, Bruce Geotechnical used
the packer and slug tests instead of available
aquifer test data.
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Unfortunately, using the packer
and slug tests alone, they have significant
limitations when they are doing hydro geologic
characterization. They can't be used to predict
groundwater flow over large distances over long
times. They can't be used to understand the
interconnections between different units. They
can't be used to show aquifer barriers or recharge
boundaries, and they don't provide unit
storativity characteristics, which is one of the
key factors to understanding aquifer and
groundwater behavior.
They took the highly complex
hydro geology and hydro geology of the area and
lumped them into 4 units for Bruce Geotechnical
and -- or 5 units for Knight Piesold.
So for all of the models, all
the overburden which often included basalt was
combined into one unit called till. There's a lot
of different ways of classifying this material.
Some figures show 5 units. Other figures show 10
units. It's very confusing about what exactly
they are talking about.
However, what you find when you
look at the data around the TSF -- and this is
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what Dr. Desbarats looked at -- is that the
average hydraulic conductivity for those materials
is about one times 10 to the eighth -- 10 to the
minus 4 centimetres a second, and the range
between 3 to 55 metres.
The conductivity used in the
model for the upper 100 metres of overburden
basalt is 1 or 5 depending upon Bruce Geotechnical
or Knight Piesold, times 10 to the minus 6
centimetres a second, which is two orders of
magnitude lower. That's a big difference.
This is just a quick table to
show these are the wells around the TSF; the
conductivity as measured by their testing; the
depth interval and the rocks. And, I don't know,
you probably maybe can tell on your handout in
here these are all very consistent numbers with a
mean of 1.8 times 10 to the minus 4.
And so what that means is that
between the mean of these data for test around the
TSF and the conductivity of the aquifer test are
very similar. They are consistent.
This is a couple of slides
really quick that shows some of the old wells that
show these high conductivities. These is a scale
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of 10 to the minus 3, 10 to the mines 4, 10 to the
minus 5 and these lines here show the intervals
over which the test is conducted. And these are
just a couple of wells in the TSF vicinity.
So you can see there's a
significant thickness here that was tested that
show a high conductivity and over here there is
another one. This is just a typical example of
the data that was available.
So they took the complex hydro
geology in this area and they lumped it down in
this case to three units and, again, showing --
this slide shows the significant distance between
the units, the extrapolation.
This slide shows that there's
possible groundwater flow pathways that are just
left unresolved. The question marks in all these
that show that we don't really know what's going
on between them. Again, the point of this part of
the presentation is they took very complex hydro
geology and lumped it down into really an
oversimplified conceptual model.
Here's another cross section
east/west. Here's the proposed -- top of the
proposed tailings facility. Here are some bore
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holes. You can -- to scale this is quite a long
distance.
This is the Taseko River Valley
down here. The springs are down there, and you
can see not only the question marks, not only the
extrapolated geology stratigraphy, but -- in this
particular cross section there's seven units. I'm
not sure what that -- how these relate to the
three or four that they used. Here's the fault
that was talked about, runs right through this
well, right there, between where the TSF is and
the seeps and springs. And, again, the point of
this is there is lot of data available that they
did not use.
You've seen this. This is
the -- that's Dr. Desbarats showed the other day.
This is the log for the well that was tested.
There is sand and gravel aquifers, there's
fractured basalt aquifers, there is an artesian
aquifer way down here at the bottom. This is the
reality of the stratigraphy in the Fish Lake and
TSF area. Not this. Not that. Or that.
This is just not right. This
is another old cross section through three wells
between -- four wells between Fish Lake, here's
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the open pit. And these look pretty good to me.
You could make some pretty good projections of
where sand and gravel and groundwater flow
pathways are. I don't know why this wasn't done
before.
Now moving on to the inadequate
modelling and sensitivity analysis. As I just
demonstrated, the modelling is based on the
oversimplified hydro stratigraphic units, and the
non-conservative estimates of conductivity.
One of the consequences of not
having enough data to adequately characterize the
site conditions is they used a model called
MODFLOW to model their -- to model the groundwater
flow and seepage effects. MODFLOW is the standard
method for doing this. However, there are some
significant limitations with MODFLOW that should
have been acknowledged and discussed in their
report. The biggest one is that MODFLOW is
designed for what's called porous medium, meaning
it's meant to sand and gravel, not fractured
bedrock.
So everybody uses MODFLOW
because that's the only tool really available, but
what's missing in the report is that there's no
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discussion of -- there's no recognition of the
limitations of the model and then how the data
they have and the scenario they set up fit within
how the model works.
That is commonly and standard
done as you say, Okay this is the best I got.
Here's where it fits, here's what we're life site
(ph) fits and here's where it doesn't fit and here
is how I'm compensating for that.
The other big problem with
MODFLOW is it -- when it does its solute
predictions, it only provides average flows.
Meaning there's no way for the model to predict
flow through a preferential flow pathway. So if
you have a big fracture, MODFLOW can't pick that
up or predict flow through it.
So another problem with the
model is their use of the sensitivity analysis.
Their sensitivity analysis was based on 5 times
their mean value, half an hour of magnitude and
they used 10 times one hour of magnitude to store
activity.
And so as Dr. Desbarats
discussed yesterday, that is not based on the
observed data. The observed data has a much wider
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range and if you use the actual data, you
become -- come up with much greater predictions of
seepage flow.
It's also -- there are better
ways to develop adequate sensitivity ranges. One
way is to identify the standard deviation of the
mean, and say that's your high and low range, high
and low ends, and then pick a number in between
that you think is reasonable and justify it. Say
this is what we think is best. But your range,
your -- should be one or two standard deviations
around the mean.
This picture shows a lot of the
data that was used and as you can see, the data --
the bulk of the data ranges from around here, out
layer, to down around here. So that's one, two,
three orders of magnitude with the data pretty
evenly distributed through there.
I'm not sure how they developed
their means and how they developed their -- the
justification for only using a half an order of
magnitude for their sensitivity range. But this
is what the data shows, that there's actually a
lot of data from a lot of different areas over at
least a three order of magnitude range.
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So when you take their data and
use it in their model, this model shows the
potential seepage flow at a hundred years with no
seepage capture wells.
So as you can see that it --
it's kind of hard to see. This line right here is
the main embankment. Here's Fish Lake. After a
hundred years using their estimates of
conductivity and no seepage capture wells, they
estimate the solute is going to be basically at
the south end of the Fish Lake and down to Big
Onion Lake.
Now, you have to remember --
and this is the same problem that Dr. Desbarats
discussed the other day -- they used very low
estimates of conductivity as it was pointed out in
a really over simplistic way: The higher the K,
the higher the flow. If you use the actual data
that's from the wells that I showed on the slide,
right around the TSF, this flow is going to be
greater.
This picture shows the proposed
plume, contaminate plume with seepage capture
wells at a hundred years using their 5 times the
average -- the mean conductivity data.
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Using their limited sensitivity
range this shows at a hundred years a significant
flow of water down to the Taseko River -- excuse
me. A flow of solute down to the Taseko River. I
can leave it to your imagination to picture what
this flow would look like using the higher
estimates of K, developed by myself or Dr.
Desbarats.
Their model also predicts
potentially significant increases and decreases to
surface flows and groundwaters around the area.
For example, some of the predictions show base
flow to Wasp Lake increasing 20 percent during
some times and decreasing 20 percent and there's
quite a few numbers in the report. It's actually
fairly difficult to sort out exactly what it all
is.
But none of the effects that
are discussed. And I presume the biologist would
have something to say if water level in --
groundwater flow to Wasp Lake or Big Onion Lake
increased or decreased by a significant percent
every year.
The effects of the TSF solute
that I showed in my pictures are -- on groundwater
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quality are not discussed, at least as far as I
could find in the report. The NRCan model shows
that the seepage volumes and concentrations and
travel times are likely to be significantly
greater than predicted by the Taseko model.
And finally, and, you know,
quite importantly there is no analysis of seepage
volume, quality and flow pathways past a hundred
years. If this is what it looks like at a hundred
years, what's going to happen at 150 years or 200
years?
So the numerical model does not
accurately portray current conditions nor does it
portray current effects. They have not completed
adequate sensitivity analysis that considers the
natural variations and overburden and bedrock.
As Dr. Desbarats demonstrated
the effects based on more realistic modelling will
be substantially greater. And it's already stated
in the report but it's worth emphasizing it again
that effective seepage control will be mandatory
to prevent contamination of Fish Lake and other
downgrading receptors.
So the last thing is that they
have not -- this is, again, required in the CEAA
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guidelines. They've requested adequate mitigation
planning, and so in the EIS there's no
identification assessment of worst-case scenarios,
no assessment of cumulative visual impacts, no
data caps for limitations analysis, and no
contingency plans.
The seepage control measures
are conceptual only. This figure shows 10 wells
along the main embankment but those wells are
conceptual only. There's no effort put into
actually aligning those wells' locations or
designs with actual geology or hydro geology.
And, in fact, the report says they are for bedrock
only. They don't include the concept of flow
through the sand and gravel or basalt at all.
There's no information on the
seepage collective sums designs provided at all.
Is it going to collect surface seepage or
groundwater seepage? If it's groundwater seepage
and based on their model, the top a hundred metres
is till. I'm not sure how that is supposed to
work.
And then as we have had
numerous discussions, the estimates of seepage
volume and quality are based on inadequate hydro
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geology and modelling.
There's also this figure also
shows they don't have any seepage capture wells
below the west embankment or the south embankment.
So to answer your question,
Mr. Chairman, the point of the presentation was --
is to compare their hydro geology characterization
with their predictions of the potential effects on
Fish Lake and remaining environment. And, again,
my topic is focused on -- because it's a big
elephant in the room -- the seepage from the TSF
and they haven't been able to characterize all the
groundwater flow pathways from the TSF to
surrounding receptors. Because they haven't
studied the overburden in any detail, there
really, really is no knowledge about induced
groundwater flow and dewatering the Pit Lake.
Fish Lake. They can't really talk about the
potential pit wall instabilities and its effects
on Fish Lake.
They have developed really
inaccurate estimates of seepage volume and quality
from the TSF. They don't have any understanding
of possible solute flow pathways through all the
various mechanisms that it might lead to TSF or
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any of the other potential sources of
contamination.
And so what all those result in
is the potential for significant environmental
degradation downgradient of these sources.
There are some other issues
that relate to them actually being able to have a
good understanding of site conditions is the
embankment damns will require permanent dewatering
to maintain their stability.
Okay. They will need to be
permanently dewatered. So what happens 50 years
from now if those dewatering systems fail? Is
there -- we saw their extrapolations of till
thickness for beneath the TSF. Is there
sufficient till actually in the area to line the
TSF if they need it?
I know that they have done mass
balances for the amount of till available to build
the damns, but there's nothing in there available
to see if there's enough to line the TSF if they
need to.
And as Dr. Desbarats discussed
the other day, the impact of seepage to deep
groundwater is unknown. And this hydro geologic
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evaluation doesn't concern any -- doesn't include
any aspects of all this that need to be considered
into perpetuity.
And that concludes my
presentation.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Watterson.
First, any questions for Mr.
Watterson from the Government of Canada?
Second, any questions from
other First Nations?
Third, any questions from
group interested parties?
Fourth, any questions from
individual interested parties?
Fifth, Taseko?
MR. JONES: Thanks, Mr.
Chairman. Actually, we have a number of
questions, so I'll turn it over to Mr. Crozier.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr.
Jones.
Mr. Crozier?
MR. CROZIER: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Watterson, I would like to
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start out by asking what you meant by your
comment, "an almost criminally abbreviated hydro
geological assessment." And who that was --
MR. WATTERSON: No, no, no.
That's going to be corrected. It was not a
criminally-abbreviated hydro geologic assessment.
It was a criminally-abbreviated list of the CEAA
guidance requirements for this hydro geologic
assessment.
MR. CROZIER: Thank you.
MR. WATTERSON: Yeah. Yeah.
No, I wasn't saying the assessment was criminal.
I'm just saying -- I can show you. Here are the
CEAA guidelines for this.
MR. CROZIER: I'm aware of
them. Thank you.
MR. WATTERSON: Okay. There's
a lot. So that's what I was referring to.
MR. CROZIER: Sure. In the
presentations yesterday, I believe I heard Dr.
Smith say that for projects at this stage of
design, 15 to 60 monitoring wells would be the
appropriate number of wells to use for an
assessment of this type. And at the higher end of
that, the 60 wells he suggested was something that
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you would see appropriate for a terrain that had
karst in it. Not 50 to 60.
MR. WATTERSON: Then I stand --
I thought he said 50. He may have said 15. Sorry
about that.
MR. CROZIER: Okay. Given that
Dr. Smith reviewed our work and discussed the
framework under which we did our work and found it
to be standard practice and found that it gave a
reasonable assessment of where the seepage from
the tailings storage facility may end up, how
would you explain your commentary?
MR. WATTERSON: Well, without
saying anything negative about Dr. Smith, I think
that it can be answered in the very first part of
Dr. Smith's report where he said that he took the
hydro geology data as is. His review did not
include any review of the hydro geology data.
He just took the report as it
stood and based all his findings from
recommendations from there. My report starts from
the square one, the baseline hydro geology data.
So that explains why my conclusions are so
different than his.
MR. CROZIER: So that explains
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why your comments about the data and the baseline,
and we'll certainly get into that in detail, sir.
However, I'm wondering about your comments about
inadequate sensitivity analyses and studies, given
that that was also found to be reasonable in Dr.
Smith's eyes.
MR. WATTERSON: I can't speak
for why he thought that was reasonable. When I --
in this kind of work I've done before and also in
my research that I made to make sure that my
statement was correct, I found no mechanism or no
supported rationale for taking a much narrower
range in the sensitivity analyses that actually
exist in the data. Especially when the data said
as shown in the figure, are as uniformly
distributed as that particular data set.
So that's my professional
opinion, is that you do your most conservative,
which is the highest conductivity values, and you
model with the least conservative which is the
lowest conductivity values and then you find a
number in the middle that you think is most
supported by data and other factors that you think
is reasonable.
And there's -- you can either
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-- on the small data set on a small project you
can do that intuitively or using professional
judgment. On a large data set, you use more
advanced statistics.
Like I said before, taking the
mean and one or two standard deviations on each
side of the mean is your most conservative and
least conservative values. I think that's the
best way to go.
MR. CROZIER: Okay. We'll come
back to that, I think.
Perhaps you could pull up one
of your earlier figures where you were showing the
cross section across the valley.
MR. WATTERSON: That one?
MR. CROZIER: That's correct.
MR. WATTERSON: Sure.
MR. CROZIER: Or any of those
similar holes.
MR. WATTERSON: We have that
one. We got that one. Is that one better?
MR. CROZIER: They will both
serve the purpose. So there's a number of bore
holes used there, and you made the comment that
some inferences are made with question marks on
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the lines.
Were you aware that there were
geophysical surveys done along those lines to
connect those bore holes?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, sir.
MR. CROZIER: And so that
wouldn't form a reasonable basis for extending the
interpretations along those sections?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, where the
geophysical lines exist. I don't have -- it's
hard to see but here, these red lines show where
the geophysical lines go. There's one that goes
along the base of the main embankment with a
couple of cross pieces. There's one right there.
There's one right there. There's one along the
south embankment and one here. There are no
geophysical lines in this big area right there,
and that's what I'm referring to.
MR. CROZIER: I see, but there
seems to be a reasonable number of seismic lines
run along the embankment.
MR. WATTERSON: Right. Well --
great. That's here. That's four kilometers away
from here.
MR. CROZIER: Yesterday Dr.
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Smith was discussing where you might potentially
lose hydrodynamic containment as the locations
where he would prefer to see investigations.
In short, I believe he stated
he'd prefer to see his bore holes under the
embankments where you are proposing to cut off and
curtail seepage in those locations. How do you
explain that compared to your concerns here.
MR. WATTERSON: Well, I'm
not -- I can't comment to Dr. Smith's rationale
for why he said that. But to me, the issue is you
have a several square kilometre area without any
data, either test pit data or drilling data, and
the presumption of the hydro geology and the model
is that that till is uniform and consistent and
even there. And there's no evidence to show that.
Now, I'm not saying it's not
there. Maybe somebody has walked the site and
said, Yeah, there's till here. That certainly
didn't make it into this report.
MR. CROZIER: It wasn't
discussed in the report. However, in other
portions of the EIS, there were certainly aerial
photographic interpretations done to extend the
mapping of various surface soils, if not, indeed,
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more recent ones than the 2009 assessment.
Could you back up on your
slides a little bit? I think you show a number of
other locations within the basin that were used
there.
MR. WATTERSON: These are my
three pictures that I have that --
MR. CROZIER: No, no, sir.
Just stop there. The one with the red box. The
next one. Certainly that shows test pit and bore
hole locations. I think if you look at the
isopach map that's presented on the next slide,
you'll understand that that is just bore hole
locations --
MR. WATTERSON: No, no. You're
right. You are absolutely right. This is not
showing all the test pits but when I gave my -- I
first introduced this, I showed if you compare
this area right here with that area right there,
there are no test pits.
MR. CROZIER: I don't think
that's what I heard you say.
MR. WATTERSON: Then I
apologize.
MR. CROZIER: Thank you for
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clarifying that.
MR. WATTERSON: I was comparing
this map that shows where a till is and it's
thickness with this map that shows the data
sources.
MR. CROZIER: I guess I'm
curious as to what approaches you would use to
interpolate between data points and test pits that
you have when you're investigating areas like
this; how would you go about doing that? Because
it's a common and frequent problem encountered in
the industry for any mining project where
you're -- the bulk of your data come from the
investigation of open pits along the embankment
lines that are proposed under the plant sites and
then at certain more critical locations where
you're concerned about potential loss of
hydrodynamic containment.
That was the approach that was
followed here for the investigation of this
project and certainly there are reasonable
geological principles -- surface mapping, air flow
interpretation and others -- that are used to
extend the understanding or extrapolate from those
data.
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Are you unfamiliar with those
types of methodologies?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, I am.
MR. CROZIER: You are
unfamiliar with --
MR. WATTERSON: No, sir. I am
familiar with them, yes. I understand how the
process works. However, again, the -- there's two
aspects to my question. The first response is
again the scale, the sale of this. This is
two-and-a-half, three kilometers. That's a long
way with no data. That's a big area with no data.
And if I were put in the position of saying, Okay,
I have to say something conclusive about this
area, I would have said, well gets go out and do
some field truthing.
It would have been -- if you
had like a data point here and data point there
and data point there and a data point there and a
data point there, they may be a half kilometre
apart which is still a huge distance in a glacial
environment you would be able to say something
about, Yeah we have some confidence in this. But
there is no data.
And again, in taking that to
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its most relevant to this discussion is that you
have six test pits for the entire PAG and no
drilling at all. How can you say what's going to
happen below the PAG area when you don't have any
data?
MR. CROZIER: We have data. We
also have air photo interpretations and soil maps
and bedrock maps and those were used to do the
extrapolation. Certainly when the air photo
interpretation was done in the 2009 environmental
impact statement, there was ground truthing done
to confirm the results of the photo
interpretation.
MR. WATTERSON: You can say
what basalt characteristics are beneath this area?
You can tell me what the basalt characteristics
are underneath that area?
MR. CROZIER: Beneath that
particular area, sir, we have no data. However,
we have an abundance of test data in the
basalts --
MR. WATTERSON: That's true --
MR. CROZIER: -- showing what
the range of hydraulic conductivity is.
MR. WATTERSON: This is the
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important area.
MR. CROZIER: That's the bottom
of a valley where groundwater discharges into a
stream bed, and the flow of that water is along
the access of the valley towards Fish Lake. By
understanding the way that geologic materials are
deposited in sediment (muffled) fashion and by
understanding the way the basalts tend to -- or
volcanic faults flow downgradient, you can
understand the disposition of materials and
layerings conceptually.
And then the purpose of
constructing a model would be to extend your
understanding conceptually, and test that against
the measured hydraulic head that you have in the
area. That would be the approach that would seem
reasonable to me.
MR. WATTERSON: Okay. Then
why does your model not account for this? This is
what's real. This is all lumped as till in your
unit with a conductivity two orders of magnitude
less than what it really is.
MR. CROZIER: Let's come to
that one in a moment. Let's go to the pumping
test data first. Could you go back to the test
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curve?
MR. WATTERSON: Sure.
MR. CROZIER: We'll come back
to the packer testing data that we used in a
moment.
So in the upper left corner of
the presentation is the pumping test drawdown
curve in the pumping well. Over at the right is
the drawdown curves observed in observation wells.
Down below at the bottom is a nice
computer-generated response curve, that's great.
I would like to speak for a minute about the
concerns that BGC has with the pumping test.
They were primarily focused on
the fluctuations observed in the water level in
the pumping well. That calls into question the
confidence level that we have in the pumping rate.
There are evidence of a non-steady pumping rate.
So while you may have smooth
drawdown curves observed in your monitoring wells,
you still don't have confidence in your pumping
rate.
I would like to understand how
you might be able to calculate an estimate of
hydraulic conductivity in storage without having
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confidence in the pumping rate.
Are there solutions out there
to your knowledge that you can use that don't
involve the use of pumping rate?
MR. WATTERSON: No, there are
not. However, a reasonable approach would have
calculated conductivities from this data using a
range, say, 50 to 80, and that would have given
you a range of Ks that would match what whatever
variations in pumping rate were going on here, you
could have said, well, it's not very good but
based on these nice, smooth responses, these
fluctuations certainly did not make it to these
wells, therefore I can estimate Q -- I mean K
using a reasonable range of Qs and that would be
pretty good. Not perfect, but pretty good. I
wouldn't have tossed this data.
MR. CROZIER: We didn't toss
it. We just indicated that we didn't want to use
the estimates provided by Knight Piesold for
hydraulic conductivity in storage.
Did you read our site
information request response where we in fact do
what you suggested where we looked at a different
range of probable or possible pumping rates and
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did exactly that calculation?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, I did.
Again at the end of it we decided not to use it.
MR. CROZIER: At the end of it
we found that the ranges that we felt were most
likely lay in the same range of hydraulic
conductivity estimates from packer testing, albeit
at smaller scales in the area, and that was our
decision. We didn't discard this.
MR. WATTERSON: Okay.
MR. CROZIER: I'm just curious
if you considered looking at a drawdown versus the
ratio of T over T prime plot.
MR. WATTERSON: No, I did no
independent hydro geology analysis of this at all.
If the raw data were available, I'm not sure that
they are, then that's something that could be done
but I did not do that.
MR. CROZIER: So if the raw
data were available, you would be comfortable
doing that?
MR. WATTERSON: I would be
comfortable doing it. I'm not quite sure why I
would.
MR. CROZIER: Okay. So if the
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raw data weren't available for you to go back and
look at the pumping test data if you had concerns
with the pumping rate, would you be comfortable
relying on that data?
MR. WATTERSON: I don't
understand your question.
MR. CROZIER: Well, the
concern -- the fundamental concern that we have
with this data set is that there is no detailed
record of the pumping rate. The only pumping rate
that we have is provided at the bottom of that
figure where it says "Constant pumping rate Q = 80
gallons per minute." That's it. There's no data
to support that.
MR. WATTERSON: Okay.
MR. CROZIER: There's no data
to explain fluctuations in those evident in the
pumping well. Which are, for the Panel's benefit,
approximately 25 percent of the drawdown.
In ours discussions with NRCan,
we reviewed this pumping test curve and we also
presented data from similar projects and similar
sites where we did have control of the pumping
rate and what tends to happen in those situations
is when you see fluctuations like that, it's
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typically caused by a variation in pumping rate.
So if you've got a fluctuation
of 10 or 15 percent in your water level column,
you probably have a comparable fluctuation in your
pumping rate.
The other thing that we
discussed in that review of our data was that for
the hydraulic conductivity that's backed out in
this analysis which is 10 to the minus 4
centimetres per second -- or to more fairly
compare it to the work that we presented, 10 to
the minus 6 metres per second -- to obtain a
40-metre drawdown on a well of that size in
minutes would be unexpected. Typically what you
see for hydraulic conductivity is the order of 10
to the minus 6 is draw downs in wells like that of
3 or 4 metres -- not 40, not 60. We can --
MR. WATTERSON: I guess we can
talk hydro geology all day long. I would like to
remind the Panel that that isn't -- I think my
opinion is that there is good data here that could
be used and for whatever reason, Taseko chose not
to use it.
The problem is as shown by Dr.
Desbarats and this data, there's lots of other
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independent data that come to the same result.
MR. CROZIER: Let's go for a
moment to the plot that's just a little further on
or maybe it's further back that shows all of our
packer testing data.
MR. WATTERSON: I don't have
that.
MR. CROZIER: It's actually in
there. Keep going. Keep going. That one.
What's shown on this plot is
all of the packer testing data and slug test data
that we obtained from the site. Could you comment
for me on what I heard Dr. Smith say yesterday, is
that packer testing results in basalt and
fractured rock typically vary across three or four
orders of magnitude.
MR. WATTERSON: Well, that is
correct. I'm not sure the word is "typically" but
I think a better word is they "can."
MR. CROZIER: I believe I heard
Dr. Smith say yesterday that if the range of that
variation was two or three orders of magnitude,
that he would be concerned. He would say, Wait a
minute. Something funny is going on -- or
something's up. I can't recall the exact words.
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MR. WATTERSON: I remember he
said that. Before I go way further out on this
limb, what is your question? We have the data.
He said what he thinks. What's your question?
MR. CROZIER: My question is:
Would you consider the range of variation in
hydraulic conductivity up there to be
representative of our fractured rock median:
MR. WATTERSON: Absolutely.
MR. CROZIER: What would drive
that variation in your mind?
MR. WATTERSON: There's a
number of things that determine the conductivity
values of fractured bedrock. There's the size of
the fracture, it's in-filling, it's orientation,
if it's a sharp fracture or all busted up, how far
it extends, if it's just a local fracture or goes
quite a difference away. There's many things that
can affect that number.
MR. CROZIER: Okay. And the
reason there's many things that can affect that
number is because it's a point scale measurement
essentially.
MR. WATTERSON: No. The reason
there's many things that can affect that number is
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the nature of the fracture itself.
MR. CROZIER: Did you
understand what I said by point scale measurement?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, I did.
MR. CROZIER: For the Panel's
benefit, when you are testing a shorter interval
or a longer interval of a bore hole, you are only
testing a meter, maybe two, around that interval
that's being tested. So that's a point scale
compared to a larger pumping test scale.
Upscaling point scale
measurements to the larger scale is a common issue
facing the industry. Would you agree with that
statement when we're dealing with fractured rock?
MR. WATTERSON: Is a common
issue. You mean like problem or --
MR. CROZIER: How to upscale
it. How to go above it.
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, I would
agree with that.
MR. CROZIER: You indicated
earlier you didn't understand how we had
approached the parameters that we came to.
MR. WATTERSON: I don't. What
I meant was I don't understand how you -- the
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rationale for why you chose only a half an order
of magnitude for your sensitivity analysis when
the data clearly show a nice distribution of at
least three, maybe four.
I mean, there's no pattern,
there's no -- other than this gradually decreasing
conductivities with death, this looks pretty much
like it could draw a line right here and a line
right there and say that's your realistic range.
What I don't understand is how you selected only a
half an order of magnitude to do your sensitivity
analysis.
MR. CROZIER: You indicated
perhaps we should take the standard deviation of
the mean.
MR. WATTERSON: Around the
mean -- that depending on the sensitivity and the
hydro geology, some do two standard deviations
which would probably give you all the way out here
and all the way down there. But certainly the
standard deviation around the mean.
MR. CROZIER: So we calculated
a geometric mean, that was our approach.
MR. WATTERSON: Right. And
then I would say your -- and that's the point.
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The upper range of your sensitivity, the least
conservative would be the bottom end of the range,
the bottom standard deviation, and the most
conservative would be the high end, one standard
deviation on this side. That's what I would
expect.
MR. CROZIER: That's one
methodology, sir.
MR. WATTERSON: Yes.
MR. CROZIER: There are others.
The methodology we then used was to take that
geometric mean for the materials that we had in
our model, which incidentally were 5 units, not 4.
MR. WATTERSON: Sorry.
MR. CROZIER: And adjust them
until we were able to match the hydraulic head
measurements that we had for the system.
MR. WATTERSON: Okay. Yes. I
may be old-fashioned, but I'm a firm believer in
using real data rather than trying to take a
amalgamation of data and using mathematics to fit
something else.
As Dr. Desbarats demonstrated
using these conductivities which are the real
characteristics of the rock around the TSF, he
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measured certain flows. It's not extrapolated to
the wider scale model. It's not based on heads
anywhere else. I think you should have run your
model using real numbers.
MR. CROZIER: I would like to
jump in there just for a second and state I
believe Dr. Desbarats calculated an arithmetic
mean and a harmonic mean at the geometric mean and
used those values to estimate his parameters.
So he did a similar approach to
us whereby he calculated a mean of the data set
and applied it in his modelling. I fail to see --
or could you perhaps explain to me how we are not
doing the same approach; how we are not working
with the real data if you accept that approach by
Dr. Desbarats.
MR. WATTERSON: My issue with
the work that you did was -- is -- boils around
taking the data and calibrating it to head values
around the project area and then adjusting the
conductivity so your result the models fit the
head data and by doing so lowering your
conductivity by two orders of magnitude below what
they really are.
Your model is fine for a
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project area model. That's not a problem. The
problem is and the problem that Dr. Desbarats had
is when you tyke that model and shrink it down to
the level of size of the TSF and use the volumes
that are around the TSF, your model significantly
under predicts the flows.
MR. CROZIER: Certainly you
have provided an interesting range of some of the
data around the tailings storage facility that are
available on that table. It's not all of the
data.
But let's back up for a second
because I think you just told me that you didn't
agree with the approach of taking a data set,
developing a conceptual model, and putting that
model into a numerical representation and then
calibrating it to observed heads. I think what I
heard you say there was that you don't agree with
the industry-standard practice for model
calibration. How would you address that?
MR. WATTERSON: No. You're
leaving out the second part of the statement. I
said I don't agree with that approach when it
results in a number that is significantly lower
than the real numbers. These are the rocks that
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the seepage will be passing through. That's what
I disagree with.
MR. CROZIER: That's one subset
of the data. That's your hand-picked look at the
data around the tailing storage facility.
MR. WATTERSON: That's off of
these.
MR. CROZIER: That's correct.
That's where the data in our plot that you had up
earlier came from as well. That shows the real
distribution of data, it's not a subset.
MR. WATTERSON: No. This is
the subset around the TSF. It's not all of the
data. It's not --
MR. CROZIER: Thank you. It's
not all of the data.
MR. WATTERSON: No. It's not
all of the data. This is around the TSF. These
are the rocks that the seepage will flow through.
MR. CROZIER: It's not even
all of the test results.
MR. WATTERSON: It was on your
logs. It was on the data I have. These wells
right here.
MR. CROZIER: You don't have
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the 2009 data on there?
MR. WATTERSON: This is what is
in your 2012 report and it says very specifically,
"The wells and bore holes based on Figure 3-1 are
what was used in this analysis." This is the
figure. Very specifically. They got the report,
and we can find that quote.
MR. CROZIER: The data that
were used included on our part the data from the
2011 --
MR. WATTERSON: Well, then I --
sorry.
MR. CROZIER: You missed that?
MR. WATTERSON: It didn't say
that in the report. It's very specific - the
wells on this figure -- and in fact -- and in fact
there is a whole lack of wells and data points
that you didn't use. Shall I list them: 92-20,
92-21, 92-22. There's a lot that you didn't use.
So my point is -- again, and that's part of my
discussion that there was a lot of data that were
available that weren't used for whatever reason.
MR. CROZIER: You're referring
to the bedrock logs that we didn't include in the
report?
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MR. WATTERSON: I don't know.
It doesn't say. It says, we don't include these.
We're not using these wells.
MR. CROZIER: No, it said we're
not using those wells. It said that we didn't
have the logs for them and --
MR. WATTERSON: That's another
set. That's a whole other set. I could read
those off also.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: I'm thinking
that the merit for the Panel of continuing this
discussion diminishing, so if we could get to a
quick conclusion that would be helpful. I'm not
sure exactly how best to encourage it, but I'm
hoping this will do the job.
MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I
think we have so many concerns with what's been
presented that we could go on for quite a while,
and perhaps that's not of any added value to the
Panel. So maybe our best approach should be, in
the interest of time, to just deal with this in
closing.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Perhaps this
might be an opportune for a short break that will
allow us to consolidate our remaining questions
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and we can come back and hopefully wrap it up
efficiently.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: So be it.
15 minutes.
--- Recessed at 3:00 p.m.
--- Resumed at 3:15 p.m.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Ladies and
gentlemen, I think we're about ready to proceed.
Taseko, can you help us to
proceed now?
MR. JONES: I think one last
question.
MR. CROZIER: I believe I heard
you say that you were concerned that there was a
lack of a following the effects assessment that
was conducted.
MR. WATTERSON: That is
correct. I found no significant discussion of
effects in the hydro geology report and there was
no reference to effects in the hydro geology
report where I could find it in another part of
the document.
MR. CROZIER: I see. Were you
aware that the results of the hydro geological
modelling were carried into, for example, the
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water balance model and the water quality, effects
prediction model?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, but --
yes, I figured that out after looking for it, but
I could not find any clear statement that says the
groundwater -- the effects from groundwater
seepage on Big Onion Lake will be this.
MR. CROZIER: But you did find
an effects assessment about what was going on in
Fish Lake in terms of water quality?
MR. WATTERSON: Yes and no.
Again, I could not find any clear, clear
discussion that linked the results in the impacts
analysis with the water quality in Fish Lake.
Now, I have -- since I wrote
this, I have found that there are some data tables
that show that and -- but with respect to the
bigger picture, which is the meeting the
objectives of the 2012 -- yeah, CEAA guidance, I
found no clear discussion of there's going to be
this much groundwater seepage, it's going to go
here and have these effects.
MR. CROZIER: Thank you, I
think we'll just leave it there for now and come
back to some of these things at closing.
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CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Nothing else
from Taseko? Thank you.
From the Panel point of view,
I'll ask if my colleagues any questions at this
time?
MR. KUPFER: Thank you. Very
enlighten exchange and discussion.
MR. SMYTH: I have no
questions.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: The first
observation I would make is that I guess by the
end of the discussion about bore holes, we had
been saturated, but the discussion about them was
really quite helpful, and, as were the other
questions, exchange.
I have only one question, and
it relates earlier to your comment about seepage
flows in areas where there were faults. And you
indicated that -- I'm not entirely sure I followed
you. You indicated that the existence of faults
didn't seem to be used to predict the flows or
something like that. So could you help me a
little bit with that? And I've got a follow-up.
MR. WATTERSON: Yes, I can.
There's a couple parts. The first part is there's
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a fairly significant disconnect between the
conceptual behavior of groundwater flow and faults
in the area between the Knight Piesold analysis
and the open pit and Bruce geological analysis for
the larger project area, hydro geology.
The Knight Piesold analysis
very clearly states that there are faults that are
going to intersect the open pit, and we'll have to
take active dewatering measures in order to
prevent that water in-flow from affecting the pit
stability and all those geochemical things.
So their position is initially
discussed in the very beginning of the reports
back through the nineties and continued up to the
present day, is that faults in the area are water
bearing and they product significant enough flows
that it has to be managed.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: My question
is: In your opinion, what take home message
should we take about those flows?
MR. WATTERSON: Well, my first,
my first was that between that concept that the
faults are water bearing and then the Bruce
geotechnical says no the faults are not water
bearing and they have no effect on groundwater
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flow is that -- the first take home message this
is a major disconnect which significantly
undermines the credibility of the analysis of the
area for getting groundwater flows pathways,
bottom line.
So now if we take that with the
-- with that paper and the discussion by Dr.
Eberhardt about how significant the flows are, the
potential for faults for groundwater flow
pathways, that I think just emphasizes that, that
the flows could be a significant flow pathway, but
we don't know because they haven't looked.
Again, if you look at the
figure it's right there in the cross section going
right through the well, right beneath -- and west
tailings wall. I don't know if it is a
significant flow pathway or not, but the tailings
are going to be right (ph) gradient of the
springs. So that's the take home message.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: All right.
Thank you, Mr. Watterson, Mr. Pearse. We'll move
along now. Thank you very much.
MR. WATTERSON: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: The next
speaker we have is Bill Lloyd of the
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Cariboo-Tsilhqot'in Conservation Society.
PRESENTATION BY BILL LLOYD:
MR. LLOYD: Thank you, Panel,
for allowing us the voice here.
I apologize for my nervousness,
but I've never done this before. Might have to
bear with me a little bit.
My name is Bill Lloyd. I'm
addressing you on behalf of the Cariboo-Chilcotin
Conservation Society. As a director, I've agreed
to address mining and other watershed issues on
their behalf. I've got a work history in the
mining industry and a bit of mining education
which kind of gave me the short straw to get that
portfolio, I suppose.
But at the same time when we
make this presentation -- I know this is a
technical hearing and I want to make it brief and
I want to make it from a layman's point of view in
the sense that we aren't experts but we are
concerned about the long term effects of this
project.
That perhaps from our point of
view we could help the Panel look at a couple of
small issues regarding end-of-mine life.
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As far as the Cariboo-Chilcotin
Conservation Society, we're a volunteer, small
group. Most of us have lived and worked -- most
of the board of directors has lived and worked in
this town for many years. And in my case, my
grandchildren go to school here and they are the
fifth generation of my family that's worked here.
Our mandate, I guess if you
could call it that, is to deal with resource
issues from a sustainable and environmental
responsible perspective rather than an
election-to-election perspective. So we look at
this project on the long term, not the 20 years of
mine life.
So what I would like to do is
to look at a couple issues that concern us as far
as the end-of-mine life plan is concerned.
Perhaps the first thing I
should get into is an observation -- maybe I
should start off by saying the two issues we're
going to look at are the fault structure effect on
the end-of-mine life plan that runs through the
pit, and a brief look at the end-of-mine life plan
proposed by Taseko.
I believe the Panel has been to
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the site, is that correct? When you observe Fish
Lake you probably noticed that it goes through a
narrow canyon that exits to the river and -- you
know, I'm sure you realize that that creek did not
make that cut through there. Not being a
geologist, but I would assume that is some kind of
a fault structure that it runs through.
If you observe that creek at
low flow periods it's quite obvious that the upper
upper reaches of the creek will have a
considerable amount of water in them, and when you
get to the bottom where it reaches the valley
floor it goes -- it's quite reduced.
Last year in October that
particular creek was dry at the bridge on the
Taseko Road. So I think that maybe those physical
characteristics that we see there are telling us
something which might be of value when we look at
the fault structure of this -- that's running
through the pit. I mean, we know that the pit is
in a fault zone, it's delineated or paralleled on
two sides by the Yellicon fault and the Fish Lake
fault. We have two major faults going through the
pit.
When the pit is excavated those
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fault zones are going to be exposed for thousands
of metres and up one side and down the other to
the bottom of the pit wall.
As we learned from Dr. Smith
and Dr. Eberhardt, those fault structures can act
as conduits, or act as barriers. And further to
the discussion in the previous two days we
obviously don't know which they are and what
particular location, and that's the nature of
faults, as we all know.
But at the same token we could
have a water wearing structure on this side. We
had like a positive conductive zone in the fault.
On that side we could have a negative conductive
-- maybe an exit for that same water, right (ph).
So when you fill the pit up and
you've got that exposed for so long and so much of
that fault exposed, obviously as the pit fills up
you got hydraulic pressure into those fall zones.
Now, I realize that nobody has
any way of knowing what's going to happen there,
even the Proponent, and I don't think there is any
way of probably mitigating that issue. But it's
just an issue that I've spent many hours in the
EIS and quite a bit of time on the ground up
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there.
It's not an issue that was
really dealt with properly, I don't think, in the
EIS in the sense it's not really brought to
anybody's attention.
Our concern is that as the pit
fills up, and the pit ultimately is a couple
hundred metres below the river, there is a
likelihood -- not a likelihood, but there's a
possibility that the pit could fill up to a static
level above the river, and if it has enough exit
water through those fault zones we have an acid
rock drainage situation from the pit walls and no
way of --
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Could you
speak closer to the microphone, please?
MR. LLOYD: Sorry.
I think that is a concern -- I
don't think it's (muffled) because I've worked
underground where we've had water entry through
faults and have tried to repair it through shot
crete (ph) and hydraulic grouting and it's not an
exact science.
When you look at the way a pit
is developed, I'm not aware of any way that that
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can be dealt with in a proper manner as you kind
of -- because there's no way of knowing what parts
of that fault are going to be water bearing or
water -- exit level or -- points until you start
to fill the pit up.
This is one concern we have.
And I guess if we say that those fears are
unfounded completely and we -- the pit does fill
up, then we have to look at Taseko's end-of-pit
life proposal which says that due to -- well,
simplification I guess.
Basically what they are saying
is they are hopeful that this pit will, due to
heavy metal deposition and zonal layering, will
fill up and -- zonal layer activity, you might
say, until the poor water at -- sorry, the
overflow at the end when it does get 47 years or
whatever, when it does fill up, is going to be,
you know, ready for the receiving environment,
which is the Taseko River.
They say in their report that
they have -- water treatment is a contingency
plan.
Well, you know, we're involved
with Gibraltar on their discharge to the Fraser
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River and whatnot. Right at the moment Gibraltar
Mines has a pit similar to this that's filled to
capacity, and they are going to dewater that pit
so they can continue mining.
And that pit, the effluent in
that pit is very toxic and it's going to require
major water treatment plant to deal with it at the
cost of many millions of dollars.
If we looked at what was
presented today and how this pit ranks as far as
-- which we didn't get a clear picture -- as far
acid rock drainage is concerned, it would be kind
of a stretch to think that we're not faced with
somewhat similar situation at Taseko Mines or at
Prosperity.
So if we look at the
end-of-mine life plan, if we have to put -- if a
water treatment plant is going to have to be
installed, the power line, that's going to be your
-- 47, which obviously this is not an exact
science. But whenever it happens, and water
treatment plant is put in. I notice in the EIS
that the power line is de-commissioned in the year
24.
We already have dewatering
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wells and monitoring wells around the TSF and
perhaps around Fish Lake that are supposedly going
to go on in perpetuity. All of a sudden we have
treatment plant at the pit rim that possibly has
to go on in perpetuity, and maybe water treatment
on the rest of the site.
We're kind of looking at the
hundred-year program here and thinking, you know,
we wonder about the consequences of this on the
long term. How is it going to affect our
grandchildren, great grandchildren and so on.
What I'm trying to say is our
basic perspective here is that this -- when you
look at the economic gain for 25 years, or
whatever, our position would be that is it worth
the risk?
And this is just two things
that we could point out. We obviously have made
written submissions to your folks, and, you know,
we have a lot of other concerns. But I was just
trying to keep this brief and trying to keep it
within the aspects of this particular forum. So
thank you very much.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Lloyd, for your presentation. And on a
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Saturday we're always pleased when people keep it
brief.
First, questions from
Government of Canada? Second, questions from
First Nations interested parties? Third,
questions from group interested parties? Fourth,
questions from individual interested parties?
Fifth, Taseko any questions?
MR. JONES: No questions
Mr. Chairman. I've got to say personally after
two days of technical stuff, it's nice to here a
layman's approach.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Panel
members, do we have any questions? George?
MR. KUPFER: One could say you
must have been very successful, everybody is still
listening and smiling so you did an effective job
for your first performance. Thank you. You
raised two important issues and they deserve to be
on the table. Thank you.
MR. SMYTH: I've got no
questions. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr. Lloyd,
thank you very much for your presentation.
The next step in the process is
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to ask Taseko to reply to presentations that have
been made during this session. And so turn it
over to you folks.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: We need to
make the slides work. Jason and/or Liv?
MR. JONES: We do have a
closing remarks primarily around pit stability,
TSF seepage and maintaining Fish Lake water level.
But I think there's also a few clarifying things
that may be of value to the Panel. So there was a
couple things we got thrown in here, but I think
we'll just start with Mr. Crozier talking about
TSF seepage.
MR. CROZIER: Mr. Chairman,
members of the Panel, everybody else. Thank you.
I think we've heard a lot about
seepage over the last couple of days, seepage
modelling, pumping tests, tills and basalts and
hydraulic conductivities, the values of hydraulic
conductivities for tills and basalts.
We've heard from the Panel
expert Dr. Leslie Smith, Dr. Eberhardt. We've
heard from the NRCan expert, Dr. Desbarats. We've
heard from Mr. Dan Watterson.
There's been a lot of very
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detailed discussion, and some conflicting opinions
have certainly been offered about which model to
believe, which seepage rates are appropriate for
use as the basis for the environmental impact
assessment. And I thought it would be useful to
clarify some of the matters that have come up over
the past couple of days in terms of the approach
taken by the Proponent.
So it looks like up at the left
there our slide is a little bit cut off on the
projector. On the left of the figure is a
schematic representation of the seepage rates used
in the EIS by the Proponent.
Schematically, if you look at
the central figure under the NRCan heading, the
tailings storage facility would be represented by
the square box, the main embankment would be the
triangle to the left and the triangle to the left
would capture the south and west embankments of
the facility, just schematically.
So the Taseko approach was to
use the results from two models to evaluate
seepage. The 2-D seepage modelling results from
Knight Piesold, the TSF designers that have
significant worldwide tailings dam experience that
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stretches back more than 70 years. The results
they calculated were used to evaluate the
potential seepage through the tailings embankment
and shallow foundation.
So, with reference to that
figure on the left, the two arrows that exit
through the sides to the top box and the triangle
-- the one that exits through the sides of the top
box and trying -- one that exists down through the
corner, and under the triangle stating 28 litres
per second. Taseko estimate for seepage that
would pass through and under the shallow
foundation of the main embankment.
And, similarly, on the other
side of the diagram, which is the combined seepage
through the south and west embankments. The
parameters used in this assessment were based on
testing results from underneath the tailings
storage facility to represent the foundation
conditions specific to the foundation of these
embankments. That follows standard design
practice in the industry for larger earth fill
embankments.
The total value carried forward
through embankments in the shallow foundation was
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55 litres per second into the environmental impact
statement.
For those of you new to
geotechnical design practice for large
earth-filled embankments, seepage through the
embankment is expected and design for this
includes completing the two-dimensional seepage
analyses.
Parameter selection is
generally conservative to allow for adequate
design and sizing of the filters used to collect
the seepage that may pass through main embankment
and drain it to seepage collection ponds.
However, as Dr. Desbarats
pointed out yesterday, the 2-D seepage modelling
does not allow seepage below 200 metres.
Basically there's no-flow boundary in that model
that's used. Nor does it provide an assessment of
potential migration pathways from the facility.
The limitations of this
two-dimensional assessment were addressed using
the 3-D modelling results. An estimate of 15
metres per second was used to design -- the design
case based on the out flow from the tailings
basin, that's the 15 litres per second shown in
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the bottom.
In terms of the water that then
reports from that 15 litres per second to the deep
groundwater zone, the estimate is 13-and-a-half
litres per second.
So the combined total estimate
from Taseko carried into the EIS was 70 litres per
second.
We heard yesterday NRCan
suggest that these results be disregarded.
I would like to talk a little
it about the NRCan model now. The NRCan seepage
model prevents flow through the embankments by
virtue of the way it sets up its boundary
conditions.
We know that's not the case in
reality but it is a conservative way of looking at
the amount of foundation seepage that you might
get. By setting your embankments as no flow
boundaries you effectively drive all of the
seepage that could occur at that facility down
into the foundation.
The NRCan estimate, based on
their base case of seepage from the tailings into
the shallow groundwater zone is a hundred litres
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per second for their base case.
I believe if you look at the
bottom, I've converted the 7,000 to 10,000 metres
cube per day that NRCan recommends be considered
for seepage into the shallow foundation into the
litres per second, that range is 81 to 116 litres
per second.
The asterisk there showing 65
litres per second, that's the estimate that you
get when you convert the results from the recharge
boundary condition that Dr. Desbarats has put
together, which compares favourably to the 70
litres per second that was used by Taseko.
The NRCan model also had a look
at how much seepage might pass under the
foundation of the main embankment. Their estimate
is 59 litres per second for their base case, and
the combined seepage under the south and west
embankments is 30 litres per second.
Their assessment of the amount
of water that would report to the deep groundwater
zones is 20 litres per second.
So we heard a little bit
yesterday about how the Taseko estimates were out
by an order of magnitude, 10 times, 11 times.
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When you look at these in larger numbers, that is
simply not the case. The combined estimate
carried forward by Taseko is 70 litres per second.
That's a NRCan recommendation, 81 to 116 litres
per second.
We heard Dr. Smith yesterday
say, or recommend, that for your consideration we
will -- or foundation seepage should be bracketed
at 20 to 100 litres per second.
And when asked where he felt
the real seepage value would be, he felt it would
be towards the upper end of that rage. When you
look at both the Taseko and NRCan values they are
both towards the upper end of that range.
In terms of hydro geological
seepage rates, a factor of two or less agreement
(ph) is really quite good between modelling
outputs.
We heard from Dr. Smith
yesterday. There are sound bases for the
parameters used in all the models given, the
purposes of the modelling stated by each of the
modelers, and that based on his review of the work
completed today, that the modelling approach used
was reasonable for understanding where seepage
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might -- where it might migrate to.
Couple of questions yesterday
about design practice, and what you do in ARD
areas.
Tailings and potentially acid
generating materials will be stored within the
tailings storage facility, consistent with
reasonable and prudent design practice with
construct and operation of the TSF, a monitor and
interception system is included in the design
should it be necessary.
We also heard from Dr. Smith
that a well-conceived optimized monitoring
interception well system could achieve a
interception efficiency at 80 to 90 percent using
wells, and potentially higher with optimize
seepage collection pond locations.
The value used by Taseko for
estimating seepage efficiency for interceptions
wells is 60 percent. We heard that that was
conservative. That value is based on practical
experience working in the contaminated sites,
industry that that BGC has gained and that I've a
acquired personally over the last 15 years of my
practice.
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The value for 60 percent was
used to account for the fact that you are not
going to be able to identify all the seepage
paths, should they occur right away. It's going
to take time and it's going to take an adaptive
management approach, that we also heard from Dr.
Smyth as being a reasonable approach. If you can
commit to it, you can get higher interception
recovery values.
That's about all I wanted to
say and the seepage. Thee's a couple of other
points of clarification that I thought might be
helpful.
The Panel asked Dr. Eberhardt
yesterday what the effect would be of excavating
sands and basalts with the till from the open pit,
homogenizing that mix of materials and using it in
the core zone of the dams.
Dr. Eberhardt suggested that
it's the overall hydraulic conductivity would
likely approach that of the till. And while I
agree with that assessment, I think that's a
pretty good guess on his part.
Fundamentally, you would never
do that to construct a core zone. The materials
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that would placed in a score zone would be
selectively borrowed and they would be placed in
a core zone which specific design specifications
controlling the particle relation, the percent
fines content, the compactive effort that would be
used to compact that material in place to achieve
a certain density.
And there would be limits on
maximum particle size. There would be limits on
what kind of compaction -- percent compaction you
need to achieve. All of this is standard
geochemical design in construction practice, and
it's used to achieve low hydraulic conductivity
core materials placed in the dams. There's real
precedent for this all over the place. It's done
every day.
So you would never borrow
basalt and sand and till and place that in your
core zone. You would selectively excavate to get
the material (muffled) that you need to achieve
the results that you want.
We've already heard some
concerns raised about data density and how you
extrapolate between things. That came up earlier
today.
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Dr. Smith, when asked by
Mr. Tony Pearse, indicated that an acceptable
basis for EA assessment would likely range from 15
to 60 locations. We also heard from Dr. Smith
that he would prefer the locations of these wells
along the embankment, alignments and around the
perimeter of the mine facility for the New
Prosperity project.
There are in the order of 30
wells in exist currently at the site and over 60
head targets were used to calibrate the model. So
I think we're in the middle towards higher end of
the range that Dr. Smith would consider
appropriate.
I'm going to turn it over to
Scott for addition comment.
MR. JONES: I was asking going
to turn it over to Mr. McManus.
MR. MCMANUS: There was a lot
of discussion about how is this going to be paid
for, what's the liability going to be if the mine
goes down early, do the taxpayers pick up this
cost, what's the property estimated.
And I saw the letter that
Livain sent to the Ministry Of Mines -- and thank
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you very much for doing that. That means that
they are going to clarify the law, and I don't
have to attempt that.
That said, I think one of the
things that people seem to be missing is when we
say that it cost $300 million to do this different
plan. It is quite a different plan. It's not
just moving the tailings. We also take into
account the additional rigor which is required
when making sure the seepage flows from the
tailings foundation, are captured very well. We
don't know exactly what it's going to be but we
take that into account.
We take into account the
collection system, seepage ponds, the pumping, the
fact that that pumping is probably going to need
to be there for long time. I don't know about in
perpetuity. That's a really long time.
So we take our best estimate of
what the whole site would look like over time. A
lot of that cost is in extra mining equipment to
move the rock that extra two-and-a-half kilometres
up to the dam; plus there's also pump systems and
everything required to move the tailings.
Whether or not there's a
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treatment system -- there is collection. So all
of that collection infracture would be include, or
is included in our extra cost, the $300 million.
We do consider that and we've
said we consider that there's going to be perhaps
treatment that is treated as a sensitivity
analysis.
So we look at -- that would be
an additional operating cost if the treatment
facility has to go in. It also would be
considered as part of the bonding, reclamation
bonding. Clarification from the province on that,
how that works.
Somebody said in here today
that that is kind of a double. We have to pay for
it plus we have to have a bond for it, and that's
true. We are not real pleased about that all the
time but that is the way it works.
So I presented on opening day a
comparison of the 2007 -- what the economics were
like at that time and what the economics were like
in 2010 when we reconsidered whether to resubmit
an environmental assessment on the New Prosperity
project which preserved the lake where it is.
That new assessment, that new
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economic assessment included all of those other
parameters, plus another sensitivity analysis,
plus that program, because of the other changes in
the world such as long term price of copper and
gold, foreign exchange, increase of materials and
commodities that we have to buy as well as what we
can sell. The New Prosperity project, just
because of all the exchanges together, is more
robust than it was as Prosperity.
A little bit -- and I think the
Ministry will confirm this on how bonding works
and I am an expert in this. I've been doing it
for 30 years now. I've been actually -- I was the
manager at Walmis (ph) for the last six years.
Big coal mine in British Columbia. And took it
through to closure. The closure plants I'm very
aware of what closure costs. A cole mine is a
little bit different than this, but thee's a
number of components you are reclamation.
So your disturbed area needs to
be taken back to a capability which is equal to or
comparable to prior-to-mine life. There's
demolition. You have to remove all of the
structure, infrastructure. There's capital cost
of infrastructure which you have to put in place,
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and things such as water treatment. We didn't
need that a Walmis, but we knew that that was
something we had to look at, make a contingency
for that.
Then there's long term
operations. And whether you have a treatment
plant or not, you have long term operations of
monitoring and continuing to maintain the site in
a condition that it does not effect the
environment, that's part of the permit.
In British Columbia when you
write your first mining application you have to
put in a closure plan. So closures planned from
the beginning. And the bonding is set -- get more
clarification on this again -- by the chief mines
inspector. Under the Minings Act.
And those funds are held in
place, and what I was referring to, or what the
EIS was referring to when we talk about the
release of those bond amounts is I think it's
section 10-6, 14 and 15 of the code, which says:
"Upon closure of the mine as the
company, as the Proponent or the
bondholder complete certain sections --"
so you are bonded for reclamation. You complete
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the reclamation. The Ministry comes and looks and
says you've met your obligations they released
that part of the bond.
In the case of a treatment
plant, and we have this situation at Gibraltar.
Part of our bond is for the construction portion
of the treatment plant. We've also got bonded for
operation of the treatment plant.
If you build a treatment plant
which is contemplated in your bonding which may
occur in the future -- we've talked to the chief
inspector about this and he says yeah, if that's a
component of your closure planting you've built it
then we no longer have to keep the capital
portion.
So I don't know if that helps.
I'm trying to clarify that -- we are saying the
same thing as the Ministry.
Is there anything else? Then
I'll pass it back to Mr. Scott.
MR. JONES: Thanks, John.
I just want to make a few
comments about the slope stability, and we
certainly heard from Dr. Eberhardt about the
nature of open pit design and the level of
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information to have a feasibility level design.
We talked about the ability to accumulate
knowledge and experience the rock mass and
behaviour of that rock mass as you move through
each phase of the pit, so by the time you get to
starting your mine, your final wall, you are able
to bring to bear all that knowledge and experience
that you've learned in the early phases.
In effect, I think it's fair to
say you can't know everything with absolute
certainty about the open pit until basically you
are finished with it.
But if you identify those
plausible conditions and you investigate the
threat or the likelihood of those plausible
concerns at the appropriate time, whether it be
pre-feasibility, feasibility, detail design or
throughout operations, as long as you do that at
the appropriate time that you can bring to bear
proven mitigation measures in advance to address
that, that is certain the way open pit mining
works and that's what we do.
I think at this stage we're
very confident that we have more than enough
understanding of the rock mass and have done
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enough design work to be very confident that the
project is feasible. And we've done that with our
own practical experience, team of engineers and
other professionals and supported by some of the
best consultants in the world.
So while there remain some
plausible conditions, that will be investigated
pry to detail design, at this stage of the project
-- and in my mind at this stage of the project
it's proof of concept for purposes of determining
whether there's the likelihood of a significant
adverse effect -- I would say we're there.
Yes, there's more information
to be gathered and assessed for detailed design,
and for Taseko's own decision-making in this whole
process as the project moves forward, as well as
for permitting, I think that we have evaluated the
likelihood, likely conditions, and certainly the
moderate to significant consequence events,
conditions, and we certainly have the flexibility
to investigate further and apply mitigation and
design and operations to address anything else.
So, again, that conclusion is
certainly based on many years of operating
experience and our knowledge of those techniques
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that are available to bring to bear in that
refinement or optimization of the final pit wall.
I did say I wanted to bring a
couple of points of clarification and I raise
these ones because there seemed to be a bit of
conversation around these, so I just offer these
for the Panel's benefit, hopefully.
We talked about the 200-metre
buffer around the pit. Certainly heard Dr.
Eberhardt's comment that buffer, in his view --
the concept of a rule of thumb and you shouldn't
use a rule of thumb unless it's a complex
evaluation then a rule of thumb is perhaps
appropriate.
I just wanted to make the point
that, well, we use a 200-metre buff. When you
look at our slope stability analysis, the extent
of the failures that those demonstrate is 50 to
100 metres. So, in effect, we've got double the
buffer that the analysis would suggest at this
point.
There was some discussion about
the potential for the flattening of the pit to get
-- push the crest of the pit closer to the lake.
And I just wanted to show a slide here. I'm not
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sure that everyone is aware of this. You will
remember this slide that showed the 43 degree
design slope and the flattening of 38 degrees.
Under this scenario, we still end up with a
220-metre buffer in here.
But I think it's important to
remember, because we kept talking about the slope,
the crest of the pit getting closer to the lake.
You can also move the crest, maintain the crest of
the pit at that distance from the lake, as long as
you do that before you get to the final push back.
You don't have to flatten
towards the lake. You can adjust the design of
the pit in the final phase to maintain the
appropriate distance from the lake.
I think Dr. Eberhardt, when he
responded to that, he said effectively you could
not mine quite as deep, which would do the same
thing.
The effect of doing that if you
wanted to maintain the same depth, obviously, you
could lose a little bit of the reserve here at the
bottom. But it's a very small amount and comes at
the end of the mine life. I just wanted to make
sure you're aware that of that.
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We also talked about the coffer
dams and the west dam which is currently located
200 metres from the design crest. And I think I
just wanted to point out -- I think I responded
that the location of that particular dam was
conceptual location, and the basis of that
location was to put it 200 metres from the crest.
And then we moved it slightly to avoid some
archaeological sites.
Well, we certainly have the
ability to move it 100 metres farther during
detailed design. Bear in mind, too, we're talking
about a structure that's 5 metres high. This is
not a big structure.
There were a couple things that
came up today that I thought might be worth
touching on and, one was the question about the
separation -- the segregation of potentially acid
generating material and non-acid generating within
the pit operations. And I think the question was
related to a little guy going out there and
sampling.
We treat that exactly the same
way we treat ore control, which is key to our
business. You don't want to be sending waste to
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the mill and you don't want to be throwing ore in
the waste dump. So it's the same approach. It's
sampling of the blast hole cuttings, doing the
analysis, coming back out after the blast and
actually outlining where that material sits,
whether this is non-acid generating material or
potentially acid draining material, treating it
just like you would a split between (muffled). We
bring to bear the same knowledge and experience
and techniques to do that.
I think the only difference is
in the mill, if you're sending waste to the mill
it will show up in your assay stream -- of the
mill. We're not sending this to a mill, so the
way we deal with that is sampling at the location
that it's placed. So routine sampling on the
non-acid generating waste stock pile to ensure
that the next (muffled) is not going there.
That's the only difference.
One more thing that I think I
have to clarify, and that was the question that
came up about soil and overburden. The question
of what is the soil, it was one of the previous
speakers concerned about soil should be considered
as a source term.
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I just wanted to clarify that
the soil that we're talking about is topsoil. It
is topsoil to be used in reclamation. The
overburden component is stored with the waste
drop. So there's a non-acid generating component
of overburden and an acid generating component.
The non-acid generating component is stored with
the waste rock, and the potentially acid
generating overburden goes to the tailings storage
facility.
So I think those were my points
that I thought might be of value in terms of
clarifying. And, John, I was going to ask you to
touch on the regulatory component in terms of
permitting and compliance.
Thanks, John.
The permitting exercise in
British Columbia is an adaptive management plan
exercise. You put forward a permit application
which covers pretty much all aspects of what the
mine is going to be, the open pit, the
geotechnical designs, your water treatment, or
your water protection, your closure plan,
reclamation, wildlife management, current use,
geography, climate, geology. All of that is in
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your initial operation.
Then you go through an exercise
with the Ministry where they go back and forth and
say, well, we like this but we don't like that.
We need something more here.
Eventually you're mine is at
permit which allows you to proceed to construction
and operation. It also has an operating system
component which is for health and safety, road
widths, speeds, you have traffic. What you are
through-put in the mill is going to be, what type
of equipment that you use.
Once you do that, that isn't
just the next 20 years you do exactly that. You
have -- there is a continuous inspection phase.
There's reporting, monitoring of everything that
you've said you were going to put in and whether
you do it or not. As you monitor you always learn
something and you need to adapt to it, whether
it's -- sometimes you can make the pit wall
steeper. Sometimes you have to make them flatter.
Sometimes there's less of this or more of that.
So you update your permit with
the Ministry of Mines through a series of
amendments so -- the Mines Act permit is actually
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a live document. It's not something that you
screw into a box and never touch it. You are
always added.
Same thing with reclamation and
closure plan. We have to re-submit reclamation
reports annually. Once every five years we update
and submit a whole new closure plan which takes
into effect whether there's sometimes just new
recollections. Actually, a lot of times there's
regulations and how do we, as the mine operator,
propose to meet the regulations and how do we do
that and then it's permitted or not permitted and
you work on it.
So that goes through not just
to closure, through the whole operation phase. It
goes through to closure then it continues after
closure.
So a mine at permit isn't like
a driver's licence where you say, okay, once a
year you get your driver's licence then you apply
for a new one. You are constantly in contact with
the Ministry of Mines and your other permits --
environment permit with the Ministry of
Environment is similar.
I'm sure you know these things
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as the Panel, but I just need to make sure that
you've heard it from us. I wanted to be clear
about that.
MR. JONES: Thanks, John.
Trevor was going to talk about maintaining the
water level in Fish Lake.
MR. CROZIER: I was going to
provide a number of additional clarifications that
I thought might be of benefit to the Panel given
some of the questions that were asked. And some
of the assertions that we've heard from reviewers
of our work who aren't intimately familiar with
the details of our work.
First, with regards to the top
layer used in our numerical model. I've heard a
number of comments or concerns that we're lumping
the basalt unit here in with the till, with the
top layer of our model. That's incorrect.
The units that we've lumped, if
you will, into the top layer of our model are the
basal till in yellow and the silt clay mix in this
top zone.
The basalt and the units deeper
down in this section which shows the open pit here
and Fish Lake over at the left, are part of the
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second layer our model which is the high hydraulic
conductivity of the model that we use.
That's the first comment that I
had with relation to this section. This section
actually is AA. It runs from here through here.
This shows the pit and this shows Fish Lake.
Some other interesting units
that are shown here -- this slide is the
overburden contact. Beneath that the rock units.
Above that is a number of units including silts,
tills, basalts.
As I just explained, the basalt
doesn't get captured in that top layer. So it's
just till or units like silt and clay which have
comparable hydraulic conductivities to till. Very
low hydraulic conductivities.
The next comment that I think
is relevant -- we've lot of concerns about faults
and what they might do to Fish Lake, what they
might mean for groundwater flow to -- Mr. Lloyd
just expressed concern about flow down the Taseko
River.
These red lines are the
inferred traces of the east and QD fault. You can
see they don't extend to surface. These faults
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are overlain by the overburden deposits.
The other thing you can see is
they're showing up as discreet features in this
section. What that means is they are not running
under Fish Lake. Fish Lake is over here. These
faults run out like this approximately
north/south, so they are not actually underlying
Fish Lake based on the direction that we
interpreted from the available results.
I just wanted to touch on that
again. This is the log (muffled) 94-164. This is
the pumping well. Don't worry, I'm not going to
get into another argument about pumping wells,
pumping curves or anything like that. Not just
yet anyways.
What I wanted to show is in
this well the column that's been logged is plain
gravel, which is a till unit, and then clay. That
20 metres is what would be interpreted as the top
layer of our model. This underlying, very complex
sequence of fine sand and gravel, basalt -- strong
and broken basalt -- brown clay, red clay, green
rock, red clay, gravel conglomerate, all of this
would be captured in the -- down to the first
hundred metres would be captured in that second
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layer of our model, which is the high hydraulic
conductivity layer of our model.
So what does that mean? Have
we adequately represented this complex
stratigraphy by that top layer, or that second
layer, by lumping them all together? What are we
doing.
So I wanted to present the
results of the hydraulic conductivity packer
testing data that we have between Fish Lake and
the pit. So that's what these data are.
So the blue are holes that are
actually in the open pit, and the drill holes in
black, those data points are in between Fish Lake
and the open pit. This yellow box shows you the
range of values that we've used for that upper
layer, that till layer.
As you can see, it only goes
down the 30 metres, and it ranges from about 2.7
times 10 to the minus seven down to about 1 times
10 to the minus eight. This middle bar, that's
our model set parameter. That's the one that
comes out of calibration.
The grey rocks down to one
hundred meters, is the second layer of our model.
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You can see where all the packer testing results
are plotting. There's a fair range in there.
Again, the central line is the
best fit, the best estimate parameter, and the
sensitivity range that we've used at the high end
is over here.
So we input value one times 10
to the minus 6 meters per second. What you'll
notice is that captures the majority of the packer
testing data that are out there, and that's --
when do you the quick math on meters per second to
centimeters per second, that's of the order that
Mr. Watterson was talking about when he was
pointing at the real data earlier today.
These data points over here in
blue, they are actually packer tests that are
within holes that are drilled in the pit, so those
may provide the basis for some of the concerns
expressed in earlier design reports, not the
current interpretation of the data, and the data I
might add and the designs.
But earlier geochemical
engineers may have looked at these and said, look,
there's some fairly high hydraulic conductivity in
the pit, we need to be prepared to deal with that
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water should we have significant in-flows.
That would have been the
approach that's been taken. We heard Dr.
Eberhardt say that it's a managed uncertainty.
Being prepared to implement a dewatering system
that could address in flows like that, it's
prudent, it's reasonable design practice.
Down in the second layer here,
100 to 200 meters, again we're capturing the
majority of the data, and down deep the hydraulic
conductivities are quite low. You can see there
is some uncertainty involved with packer testing
data points and calibration.
One of the things commonly of
issue is once you start getting down into 10 to
the minus 7, 10 to the minus 8 range, you start to
lose resolution on your packer testing results
because you're not able to inject very much water
into the foundation, it's very tight. So you
start to have difficulties measuring flows. So
your confidence on those ranges go a little
further. Might be two times 10 to the minus 8,
which are these guys; might be one times 10 to the
minus 8, it might be lower. But it's very low
hydraulic conductivity.
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I just wanted to offer that
clarification.
We've also heard of concerns
about faults and -- to use some language I heard
yesterday: What does no evidence of significant
permeability in the faults mean? And similar
statements.
Well, in this case what it
means is we've got packer testing data from three
data points, sourced from two holes. What you'll
see is those hydraulic conductivities are really
at the very low end of the range that we're
considering -- two times 10 to the minus 11 meters
per second; one times -- or two times 10 to the
minus 8, 8 times 10 to the minus 9.
So that leads us to believe
that the hydraulic conductivity in those zones --
and by the way, those tests were constructed
across intervals that were between 5 and I believe
14 meters long. So we tested a fairly long
section of the rock in those areas and learned
that they were fairly low hydraulic conductivity.
Does that address concerns that
were raised with regards to the potential for
fracture zones adjacent -- potentially gouge (ph)
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central zone, as Dr. Eberhardt was talking and
we've heard a number of people get concerned
about. No.
But that's a source of
uncertainty that we're left to deal with.
One of the other ways of
looking at that source of uncertainty is to
consider the age and activation history of the
faults. The QD and the east faults, we know they
are covered by overburden, and we know the last
activation of those faults that's been estimated
is before an episode of vein intrusion and
precipitation.
So what that means is there's
potential for both the intrusions of materials
associated with the mineralogy and precipitation
of things like gypsum or calcite or other
minerals. There's the potential for those
fracture zones to be healed by those intrusions.
Another interesting thing to
consider is that the QD and east faults run
north/south, approximately, whereas one of the
vein sets that's come in runs east/west. So what
that means is east/west veining could be healing
portions or sections of that fault, be cross
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cutting them if you will. So it's going to be
potentially limiting conduits or long conduits of
flow.
So that's a little bit
circumstantial. But that's one way of looking at
the fact that we've got reasonable basis to
believe that large fractures always don't exist.
Dr. Smith and Dr. Eberhardt
both confirmed yesterday that, depending on the
fault, you might have really high hydraulic
conductivity, you might have no hydraulic
conductivity. You might have hydraulic
conductivity that's comparable to what's going on
in the rock.
While there is uncertainty
there, the approach that we took was to go with
the data that we do have and to anticipate that we
would need additional (muffled) detail design
stage to confirm or address potential uncertainty
related to those questions.
I've already talked about the
fact these two faults -- the QD and the east --
don't daylight (ph) at surface. Significant
thickness of overburden materials, and they don't
run under Fish Lake.
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Mr. Lloyd in his discussion
earlier this afternoon raised a concern about the
potential for these faults to run down the Taseko
River. When you follow the currently interpreted
alignment of those faults, they don't actually
intersect that canyon section downstream of the
pit.
I also wanted to touch a little
bit on some of the statements that have been made
about our interpretation of the pumping test data.
We didn't consider it invalid. Our concern is
related to the lack of confidence in the constant
pumping rate. Without that constant pumping rate
you can't calculate (muffled) -- of hydraulic
conductivity and storage.
That's the extent of our
concern. There's other insights that be can
gained from the results of that pumping test. As
it pertains to depressurization and pit
dewatering, what you can look at is that within
the pumping well you're able to achieve 60 meters
of drawdown over a roughly two-day period during
both tests.
And in adjacent monitoring
wells you achieve drawdowns of between 9 and 12
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meters at radial distances of 10 to 31 meters.
What does that mean? Well,
that means that you can be reasonably confident
that at the pumping rate they were using, you are
going to be able to depressurize and control water
flow in that unit.
When you think about the fact
that based on opinion experience the drawdown
achieved in that well indicates you've got
substantially lower hydraulic conductivity
interpreted results, and you may be pumping at 40
gallons a minutes, or 20 gallons a minute when you
average it out. That means that you've got a
really, really good basis for thinking you can
depressurize those units. You are not going to
have a significant in flow. You are going to be
able to control that water flow.
This is a figure -- I apologize
for the charts and the lines. But it's sourced
from Driscoll, which is a very thick book on
groundwater and wells and how to interpret pumping
tests.
One of the interpretations that
can be done with the pumping test data that we do
have that doesn't consider pumping rates -- so you
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can get rid of that source of concern in the
analysis -- is to have a look at what the residual
drawdown is, compare it to the ratio of the time
that you drew the well down while you were
pumping, divided by the time it takes for that
well to recover.
And what that analysis can do
is it can give you an idea whether or not there
was a barrier boundary effect that was encountered
by your pumping test. A barrier boundary effect
is a limit or extent to the aquifer, so once you
run into it you start to draw the water levels
down much faster.
The other thing you can look at
is whether or not it's an aquifer of limited
aerial extent, depending on where things plot.
A theoretically perfect pumping
test would follow very close along this line. A
curve that shows significant recharge effects to
the aquifer would plot here anywhere above 2 on
this ratio when you get back to two zero residual
drawdown.
Any of the lines that plot
below this theoretical position would indicate
that you've got incomplete recovery due to limited
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extent of the aquifer.
So these are the results. They
are from appendix 36-H of the 2009 EIS showing
that plot residual drawdown and the ratio of T
over T prime for pumping test one.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Mr. Crozier,
I think I'm sure you said it, but I missed T and T
prime. Would you repeat that --
MR. CROZIER: "T" is the time
that you pump, and "T prime" is the time that the
well recovers. So what you are looking for is
differences in recovery time and shapes in the
curve, and that can inform you on what is going on
with the recharge.
So for pumping test one, got a
couple of curves from the observation wells, and
what they show you is that in one case it's
theoretically near perfect, and the other case
you've got slightly greater than one.
What that means is, when we go
back up a page. These guys in here, that's where
you're changing the storage. So what you might be
doing is drawing the pressure down in the unit
that can consolidate and supply water to a more
conductive unit above it. So leakage from silt
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clay to a sand and gravel unit.
When you go to the second test
and you examine the recovery, what you see the
every single one of those lines plots down here
below this zero point. What that clearly
indicates is an aquifer of limited aerial extent.
That's consistent with Dr.
Eberhardt's review and interpretation of the
geology as we heard yesterday for that sand gravel
units -- or those sand units.
That couple with the ability to
depressurize or draw the water double down quickly
over a relatively short period of time, really
paints a strong favourable position for being able
to control water in those units.
The other thing it also
demonstrates is there's no recharge, or limited
recharge being supplied to the well of the
aquifers during the test, at least during the
period it was pumped.
So that is another way of
saying there's no direct connection between the
pumped well and Fish Lake. It's another way of
saying there's not a high recharge capacity
evident in this pumping test.
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So that kind of forms the basis
for us not being -- not going too much further
with that pumping test calibration. It also
supports the way we've lumped the parameters
together. We're not seeing evidence of the
significant through going aquifer that could act
as a pathway for migration or other things like
that.
That's pretty much the limits
of the clarifications I wanted to provide on our
interpretation today.
MR. JONES: Just a couple of
little things. I just didn't want to leave it
hanging.
There was some discussion
yesterday about a potential undertaking to look at
supporting the seepage collection efficiencies you
might see in a seepage collection pond, and that
was kind of a recommendation that Dr. Smith had
related to his review.
I just want to say, we're still
seriously considering that. We just haven't had a
chance to finalize our thoughts, and we would
certainly get back to the Panel in the next couple
of days on that.
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CHAIRPERSON ROSS: For greater
certainty, it was also a request from the Panel.
MR. JONES: Got it.
I think the last thing I wanted
to say was: We know this project inside out.
We've been working on it for quite a while now,
and I realize there's a large body of information
-- as I'm sure you guys are aware too.
I just want to say, look, we
stand behind everything that's in that, provided
it's taken in the context that it's provided.
Certainly if there is something
that you guys can't find or that we can't respond
to quickly or put our fingers on it, absolutely
we're happy to undertake to find whatever it is.
I think that's all we had to
offer, subject to whatever you might like us to
offer in addition.
CHAIRPERSON ROSS: Thank you,
Mr. Jones.
Do we have any questions,
gentlemen? I think we might be done then for this
session.
I usually do something that
says thank you all for your input. The
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information we have received has been anywhere
from helpful to extremely helpful and we very much
appreciate that.
Tomorrow, as I've indicated
earlier, is a day off and Monday morning at 9
o'clock we'll return with -- I think it's aquatic
environment, day one. Do we have a closing
ceremonies? Yes.
I thank you for your
contributions, and we'll have a closing ceremony
now.
--- Closing ceremonies
--- All the foregoing non-English words, when
spellings not provided, are represented
phonetically.
--- Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at
4:35 p.m., to resume at 9:00 a.m. on
Monday, July 29th, 2013.
**************
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I, SANDRA BRERETON, a certified Court Reporter in
the Province of Ontario, hereby certify the
foregoing pages to be an accurate transcription of
my notes to the best of my skill and ability.
Je, Sandra Brereton, un sténographe officiel dans
la province de l'Ontario, certifie que les pages
ci-hautes sont une transcription conforme de mes
notes au meilleur de mes capacités.
Sandra Brereton,
Sandra Brereton, CSR, RPR
Certified Court Reporter.