canadian homegrown? a different kind of green: on the appeal of radical islam among young muslim...

7/30/2019 Canadian homegrown? A different kind of green: On the appeal of radical Islam among young Muslim Canadians

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MSc in the Faculty of Economics

(International Relations)

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

Candidate Examination #34954

Number of words: 9990

Canadian homegrown? A different kind of green:

On the appeal of radical Islam among young Muslim Canadians


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I have read and understood the Schools rules on plagiarism and assessment offences and

the work herein is my own apart from properly referenced quotations.

Table of Contents: 2

Introduction: 3

Terrorism in Canada - a backgrounder: 4

Muslims in Canada origins and demographics: 6

The story behind radical Islam: 9

Case study #1: The Toronto Bomb Plot: 12

Case Study #2: Mohammed Momin Khawaja: 14

Conventional explanations of terrorism: 15

A theory of diaspora politics: 16

A theory of social networks: 20

The importance of cognitive openings: 22

A strategic logic: 22

Discursive production?: 23

Reislamization: 26

Discussion: 31

Conclusion: 37

Bibliography: 40

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Introduction:

Notwithstanding the global paradigm shift to the War on Terror, terrorism is not a

new development in international relations. As long as there have been defined and

bounded territories, there have been actors that would seek to transcend them, in many

cases violently. Indeed the vocabulary of terror has origins in the French Revolution 1. But

only in the late 19th century did the term come into common usage, with the emergence of

the Russian anarchists. Terrorism is sometimes sponsored by other states, but in general it

primarily signifies acts of violence against innocent civilians committed by non-state

actors, acts that are intended to challenge an existing political order. It is the latter, in the

form of radical Islamist terrorism, that this paper will concern itself with. Since the 9/11

attacks in 2001, radical Islamist terrorism has entered the Western policy making

vocabulary in a way that had not existed previously. This paper will address two radical

Islamist terrorist plots, both with Canadian connections, neither of which came to

fruition. A comparative case study approach will be used: that of Momin Khawaja, an

Ottawa man jailed for his connections to a British jihadist plot, and that of the 18

individuals charged in the 2006 Toronto Bomb Plot. The one common link was radical

Islam. Consequently I will seek to answer the question: how to explain the appeal of

radical Islamist terrorism in a Canadian context?

This paper will attempt to utilize a number of theoretical frameworks to explain

1The word terroritself entered the Wests political vocabulary as a name for Frenchrevolutionaries actions against their domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794. Tilly, Charles. Terror,

terrorism, terrorists. Sociological Theory, Volume 22, Number 1, March 2004, pp. 7

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them: a social movements/networks approach as outlined by Sageman (2004) and

Wiktorowicz (2004) (2005); Papes (2006) occupational logic; an identity crisis

triggered by the processes of deterritorialization and reislamization as outlined by Roy

(2004); and along similar lines the crisis of authority and the fractionalization of Islamic

identity resulting in new forms of Islamic being and practice (Devji, 2005). Although it

might be seductive to talk of the appeal of a monolithic Islamist international, there is in

fact a myriad of movements within Islamism. This paper deals with its most potent form.

In terms of explanations themselves, it seems that the path to radical Islam is highly

individual, though it is facilitated by a number of factors, including but not limited to the

role of social networks, and that of the mass media, particularly the internet, the

dissolution of traditional Islamic authority, and the very fact of being a Muslim in a

Western context.

Terrorism in Canada - a backgrounder:

Contrary to the view that Canada has been largely ignored by history - in terms of

being spared from political violence - terrorism has occurred consistently: peaceable

kingdom it is not. (Howard, 1998) Since its founding in 1867, domestic and transnational

terrorism manifested itself in the form of the Doukhbors, the FLQ, Sikh separatists and

Tamil nationalists, among others. Between 1960 and 1989 there were 428 incidents of

terrorism that originated in Canada. (Kellet, 1995) The 1985 bombing of an Air India

flight from Canada killed 329 people, including 280 Canadians. At the same time Canada

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has been used as a base from which to raise funds for transnational organizations, plan

terror attacks in other parts of the world, and/or take part in national liberation struggles.

(Langois et al. 2005) Activity of a radical Islamic nature in Canada began to manifest

itself in the mid-1990s. (CSIS, 2004a) ) In short, Canada has passed through what have

been called the four waves of terror.2 Among the Islamist causes were specific overseas

national liberation projects such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya and fundraising

for political parties such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. In general,

they shared an international trajectory: the nature of the overall Islamist discourse

generally ignored Canada as a target, and in this sense Canada was a secondary area of

radical Islamist activity. 3 But this changed somewhat in the years since 9/11. Canada

was not immune to the shift to the war on terror as a policy priority. Given its proximity

to and close relationship with the United States, some complementarity between the two

nations defense and security policies would be expected. Accordingly, Canada has been

a reluctant participant of the War on Terror since it began in 2001, participating in some

2Rapoport identifies broad four waves in terrorism. The initial wave began in Russia in the late1880s, after the assassination of Czar Nicholas II, soon spreading to the West. This Anarchist

wave was the first real global terrorist experience. The second, an anti-colonial in nature,

appeared in the 1920s, amidst hopes of self-determination in the aftermath of WWI. These

feelings intensified in the run-up to World War II and its follow-up. The third wave emerged in

the 1960s, led by the New Left i.e. the Weather Underground, various Red Army factions, the

Red Brigades, the Viet Cong and the PLO. But most compelling for the purposes of our

discussion is the establishment of the fourth wave in 1979; the year of the Iranian Revolution, the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the start of a new Islamic century. While the first threewaves were secular in nature, sharing in some ways a commitment to more democracy, self-

determination, and social justice, the fourth wave is anti-secular and anti-democratic, aiming for

sharia-based theocracy. See Rapoport, David. The Fourth Wave: September 11th in the History of

Terrorism. Current History, December, 2001. pp. 419-4243 Secondary activity areas serve as bases for support activities such as recruitment, planning,

sheltering fugitives, and funding. Secondary areas tend to have low levels of violence in order to

minimize political and police attention. Leman-Langlois, Stphane and Jean-Paul Brodeur.

Terrorism Old and New: Counterterrorism in Canada. Police Practice and Research. 6:2. pp. 136

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US-led operations Afghanistan, while refraining from others Iraq. Arguably as a

result of the former, it was targeted by al-Qaeda.

Muslims in Canada origins and demographics:

There are almost 800,000 Muslims in Canada. (Jedwab, 2005). With the removal of

European immigration preferences in the late 1960s Muslims began to arrive in

significant numbers. According to the Canadian Census of 1971, there were 33, 000

Muslims. In 1981, there were 98, 000. By 1991, more than 250 000 and by 2001, 579

000. (Statcan, 2006) The vast majority are first generation, arriving as immigrants since

the 1970s, although a growing cohort is second generation. Muslim immigration to

Canada seemed to follow global politics: Idi Amins capricious rule in East Africa,

brought in Ismaili Muslims in the 1970s. An influx of Iranian Shia arrived in following

the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. In the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion,

small, but consistent numbers of Afghan refugees came throughout the 1980s. Algerians,

Bosnians, and Somalis arrived throughout the 1990s. These were all in addition to the

normal patterns of immigration. As a result, the Muslim community in Canada is more

diverse than that of Europe, where each receiving country has traditionally been

dominated by a few sending countries i.e. Turks in Germany, North Africans in France,

South Asians in Britain.

In terms of the idea of some Muslims as aggrieved minorities, one could argue for a

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statistical basis for such reasoning. Worries that Muslims in Canada will undergo a

ghettoization process are worst-case scenarios, but not necessarily ones grounded in

hyperbole. For example, in terms of unemployment rates, there is a significant gap

between Muslims and non-Muslims. In 2000, the national unemployment rate was 7.4%.

The unemployment rate for Muslims was 14.4%.4 Differing levels of labour force

participation also lend credence to the idea of a community apart from the mainstream.

The national labour force participation rate was 66.4%. But only 61.3% of Muslims were

active in the labour force. Nation-wide the male participation rate was 72.7% and for

females, 60.5%. While 72.2 of Muslim males are in the labour force, only 49.1 Muslim

females are. While women from a wide variety of ethno-religious communities generally

have lower participation rates, the rate for Muslim women is the lowest of all. 5 This

could reify the idea that Muslims in Canada are much like Muslims in other Western

democracies - insular, segregated and seeing themselves apart from the mainstream.

But other evidence suggests that in contrast to European Muslims, Canadian

Muslims are much better off.6 Currently one sitcom on Canadian television - Little

Mosque on the Prairie presents the human face of the Muslim experience in Canada, a

breakthrough of sorts. It is not difficult to make the claim that the vast majority of reject

the use of violence and the extremism of a handful of radical Islamist groups. 7And while

4 Canadian Social Trends #2006001. Summer, 2006, no. 81. June 28, 20065Canadian Social Trends #2006001. Summer, 2006, no. 81. June 28, 2006. 6 Greater than 80% of Canadian Muslims are broadly satisfied with their lives in Canada.

Only 17% feel that many or most Canadians are hostile to Islam. Glad to be Canadian,

Muslims say. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/02/12/muslim-poll.html782% of Muslims surveyed had no sympathy for the actions of the Toronto 18. Glad to

be Canadian, Muslims sayhttp://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/02/12/muslim-poll.html

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there might be growing unease among Western populations with large Muslim

communities, the situation in Canada is somewhat less grim. For example, in Quebec, the

province with the second largest number of Muslims, 61% of those polled felt that

Muslim integration has been successful. Among Quebecers aged 18-24 that number rose

to 85%.8 There is no dichotomy between being a Muslim and being a Canadian: Muslims

who rated their religious identity as very important had a very strong sense of belonging

to Canada.9

This is what makes the appeal of radical Islam difficult to understand. In the

aftermath of 9/11, significant hurdles to the proliferation of radical Islamist groups have

been erected: greater surveillance from security and police agencies such as the Canadian

Security and Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as

enhanced anti-terrorism legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism Act10, are examples of this

new environment. At the same time there are unsympathetic elements within Muslim

communities, many actively so, who wish to isolate such radicals and reduce their appeal

to young Muslims.11 These constraints do not augur well for the recruitment of new

members; given that similar activity has not been exposed since then gives one reason for

8 Jedwab, Jack. Is there a backlash against multiculturalism in Canada? Montreal,

Association for Canadian Studies. December 18, 2006.967.1% of Muslims who had a very strong sense of belonging to Canada had an equally

strong attachment to their religious identity.Jedwab, Jack. The Young and the Rootless:Measuring Ethnicity and Belonging To Canada. Montreal, Association for Canadian

Studies. June 28, 2007. pp. 14.10 In December, 2001, the government passed Canadas first anti-terrorism bill. It

explicitly defined terrorism and also amended existing legislation, primarily to the

Criminal Code.11 The Toronto Bomb Plot was uncovered in part by a Muslim Canadian surveillant,

Mubin Shaikh, who while a Salafist, advocated working within the system.

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optimism. But at the same time, potential recruits may be going to greater efforts to

conceal their membership or affiliation with radical Islam. Seen in another light, perhaps

it is not so difficult to understand: the waning appeal the jihadi movement experienced in

the late 1990s has been reinvigorated by the Iraqi War, providing as it does a relentless

flow of images of death and destruction. If radical Islamists needed a new battleground

after their expulsion/ withdrawal from Afghanistan, there couldnt be a more fitting

environment in which to incubate and indoctrinate the next generation of jihadis. An

unfortunate byproduct is the discursive reinforcement of a schism between the West and

the Rest, particularly the Islamic world, giving weight to the much-maligned, much-

hyped clash of civilizations.12

The story behind radical Islam:

Radical Islam is the term used describe the ideology of Islamic-inspired revivalist

movements, many of which have a commitment to a perpetual jihad.(Sageman, 2004) For

our purposes, this definition includes the use of violence. The intellectual origins of jihad

in the 20th century are deep-rooted, evolving from the seeds of Islamism planted in the

aftermath of WWI, with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928.

Its founder Hasan al-Banna was partly inspired by anti-colonial and anti-Western

12 In a 2006 Pew Survey of Muslims in five countries Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan,

Pakistan and Turkey no country held a majority with a favourable impression of the

United States, a palpable shift from 2000 when at least Indonesia and Turkey did. From

2000 until 2006, all five countries registered declines in their opinion of the U.S.

America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas. Pew Global

Attitudes Project.06.13.06

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sentiments, but he was also influenced by the earlier writings of Mohammad Abdu and

Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Islamic intellectuals of the late 19 th century who believed that

European domination of the Muslim world was the result of Muslims having strayed

from Islam. While not officially calling for sharia, the movement aimed for the

restoration of the Caliphate [which had been abolished in 1923], and the use of the Koran

to guide society, both of which implied theocratic governance. It did not advocate jihad

as a violent enterprise, but as a personal struggle. But because of its influence on other

more radical Islamist intellectuals, most notably the Indian Mawdudi and the Egyptian

Said Qutb, a stigma of religious-inspired political violence hung over it. 13 Their ideas

were considerably more radical than that of their predecessors, particularly in their

position on the role of violence and the idea of perpetual jihad.

Although Qutb was a member of the Egyptian Brotherhood, he transformed the

personal, defensive jihad as envisioned by al-Banna into something much more

confrontational. Embittered by his experiences while imprisoned under the secular, pan-

Arabist regime of Nasser, he subsequently published Milestones in 1964, arguably a

handbook of Islamic revivalism, before being executed in 1966. Its publication, became

inspired generations of radical Islamists, including Osama Bin Laden, who saw perpetual

war in the form of jihad as the best way to establish divine rule. This was in contrast to

the formal renunciation of violence from more mainstream Islamist movements. The

intellectual gap between the two continued to grow in the 1970s as formerly prohibited

13 Mawdudi was the founder of Jama'at al-Islami in Lahore, Pakistans oldest political

party.

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Islamist movements and parties began to be included in political processes in the region.

It was only during the 1980s that the idea of this type of jihad came to the attention

of the West in any meaningful way. Intellectual discussion of revolutionary Islamist

nature gave way to concrete action in the form of two key events: the 1979 Islamic

Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year 14. Muslims

from around the world went to Afghanistan under the rubric of anti-Soviet jihad. The

majority were Arabs from the Middle East, and their sojourn was long enough for them to

earn the moniker Afghan Arabs. In agreement on a common goal, to rid the country of

infidels, they became indoctrinated in the ideology of jihad.15 Radicalized, battle-

hardened, and emboldened by their defeat of a global superpower, many returned home

to set up organizations that tested the patience of reluctant regimes throughout the Middle

East and elsewhere, anxious as they were about potential social unrest.

From the Wests point of view, the problem with the radical Islamists was and

continues to be their misbelief that jihad is one of the five pillars of Islam - profession of

faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and pilgrimage to Mecca - duties incumbent upon

every Muslim. They see it as an individual action [fard ayn] when historically it was

seen as a collective duty [fard kifaya] only to be undertaken in special circumstance and

linked to the larger Islamic community or ummah. (Roy, 2006, 41) That is not to suggest

that radical Islamists are united in their discourse. Within this minority within Islam exist

14 Although the Iranian Revolution was Shia by nature and by design, it paralleled radical

Islam (Sunni-derived as it was) in its revolutionary bent.15 Estimates of their numbers range from 10,000 to 50,000.

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framing contests and battles for legitimacy that present highly discordant points of view.

(Gergez, 2005, Wiktorowicz, 2005) As much as doomsdayers, dreamers and demagogues

on all sides of the spectrum would like to suggest, there has never been an Islamist

international.

Case study #1: The Toronto Bomb Plot:

In June, 2006, Canadian law enforcement and security agencies in the Greater

Toronto Area announced the capture of 17 alleged members of an Islamist terrorist

network. An 18th suspect was taken into custody two months later. They were accused of

planning a series of major attacks on targets in Toronto and Ottawa. The group had been

under surveillance by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) since 2004

as part of routine intelligence gathering and monitoring of select internet chat sites. The

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) joined the investigation in 2005. A Canadian of

Indian Muslim descent, Mubin Shaikh, served as an infiltrator. Though the arrested were

all Canadians of different origins - some were born in Canada, some came to Canada as

children, and one as an adult - the one common link between all of them was their

religion. All were Muslim. A direct connection to al-Qaeda , although it might have been

an inspiration.

Their initial profiles will be presented here in birth order, before going into greater

detail elsewhere in the paper16: In some cases, information is limited, either because of

16 In-depth: The Toronto Bomb Plot CBC News Online: Profiles of the Suspects:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/toronto-bomb-plot/suspects.html

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the ages of the youth involved, and because of court-imposed restrictions on the

publication of information related to the trial. The oldest, Qayyum Abdul Jamal, 43, was

seen as the ringleader of the group, responsible for bringing the individuals together.

Although he was born in Pakistan, it is not yet known when he came to Canada. Though

educated as an engineering technician, he was employed as a bus driver at the time of his

arrests. He was an active member of the Al-Rahman Islamic Centre in Mississauga,

sitting on the board of directors and involved in leading daily prayers. Thirty-year-old

Shareef Abdelhaleem was born in Egypt but came to Canada when he was ten with his

family. At the time of his arrests he was a computer programmer. Steven Vikas Chand,

25, was a Hindu convert to Islam, attending the Salaheddin Islamic Centre in

Scarborough. Yasim Abdi Mohamed, 24, was born in Somalia, coming to Canada with

his family at 7. He was already serving a two-year sentence on weapons smuggling

charges at the time of the arrests. Jahmaal James, 23, also attended the Salaheddin

Islamic Centre, and along with Chand, proselytized at local schools. He was married to a

woman from Pakistan, but was otherwise. Unemployed at the time of his arrest.

Mohammed Dirie, 22, was the other Somali in the group, having also come to Canada at

7 with his family. In fact he was arrested alongside Abdi Mohamed, serving the same

sentence on weapons smuggling charges. Fahim Ahmed, 21, attended Meadowvale

Secondary School in Mississauga as well as the Salaheddin Islamic Centre and was

married with two children when he was arrested. Little is known of Asad Ansari, 21,

apart from his age. Ahmad Mustafa Ghany, 21 was born in Canada and recently

graduated from McMaster University with a B.Sc. in Health Sciences. Zakaria Amara,

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20, attended Meadowvale Secondary School and was an Electrical Engineering student at

Ryerson University in Toronto. Amin Mohamed Durrani, 19, was enrolled in aviation

courses at Centennial College in Scarborough and also attended the Salaheddin Islamic

Centre. He also distributed Islamic pamphlets at local schools from time to time. Saad

Khalid, 19, was Pakistani-born, having come to Canada at 8 with his family. He attended

Meadowvale Secondary School where he created a Religious Awareness Club. At the

time of his arrests he was a business student at the University of Toronto. Ibrahim Al-

khalil Mohammed Aboud, 19, attended the Al-Rahman Islamic Centre in Mississauga.

Currently he is a student at Ryerson University. The identities of the five minors are

protected. But as of August, 2007, charges were stayed against three of the five. Some of

the others have been released on bail. At the moment, trials have yet to begin.

Case study #2: Mohammed Momin Khawaja17:

Khawaja was the first person charged under the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act of

2001. Arrested in 2004 as apart of a joint British-Canadian investigation, he was accused

of participating in the activities of a terrorist group, and facilitating terrorist activity. Nine

men of Pakistani heritage were arrested, 8 in Britain, and Khawaja in Canada. The group

was allegedly linked to the 7/7 bombers and were planning their own attacks.

He was born in Canada on April 14, 1979. His parents are both Pakistani

immigrants who met in Ottawa after migrating to Canada separately in the 1970s. He has

17In-depth: Canadian Security CBC News Online: Mohammed Momin Khawaja

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnsecurity/khawaja_mohammad.html

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three brothers and one sister. From 1988 until 1993 the family lived in Yanbu, Saudi

Arabia. After graduating from high school in 1998, he studied computer programming at

Algonquin College. In 2001 , he graduated from Algonquin College. In Winter 2002, he

spent time in Pakistan, ostensibly in search of a wife, returning to Canada after 3 months.

In Fall 2003, Khawaja flew to Pakistan to meet Zeba Khan, a woman he met online,

eventually proposing. There he met Mohammed Junaid Babar, later linked to both al-

Qaeda and the British bomb plot. In October, a wedding engagement was announced but

was eventually called off. A few weeks later in November, he began working with the

London-based terror suspects. Arriving in London from Pakistan in February, he met two

individuals, one of whom was Omar Khayyam, the ringleader in the London Bombings,

before leaving for Canada a few weeks later. In March, 2004 Khawaja was arrested in

Canada. British arrests followed. In June 2004, Junaid Babar pleaded guilty to his

terrorism charges, admitting he was connected to both al-Qaeda and Khawajas group in

the UK. Khawaja is currently in detention awaiting trial.

Conventional explanations of terrorism:

As Pape (2006) and Sageman (2004) note, a common perception explains

terrorisms appeal as one aggravated by poverty in an assymetrical power situation. For

the dispossessed, marginalized and disenfranchised, it is an effective weapon against

bureaucratized states with their professional armies and anathema to civilian violence. In

this explanatory framework, earlier national liberation struggles such as that of the

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Palestinians had a component that included poverty. However in the radical Islamist

incarnation of terrorism, poverty is not a significant factor, and national liberation is

transcended. If anything national liberation is used as a justification for larger action, but

is not the main focus. The attempt to explain the motivation using socio-economic

explanations is tempting. But research suggests that many terrorists do not evince these

traits. (Cronin and Ludes, 2007, Pape, 2006, Roy, 2006, Sageman, 2004)

There has also been an assumption that some element of state sponsorship was

necessary for a terrorist organization to be considered a serious threat. (Sterling, 1981)

The Islamic Republic of Iran could be thought of as the prime example of state-sponsored

terrorist activity, supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. But the incidences of Islamist-based

terrorism around the world in the last decade indicate that terrorist groups do not require

official state sponsorship to be effective and lethal threats. Neither the Toronto 18 nor

Khawaja were state sponsored, but rather were loosely linked groups of individuals. In

this sense, they are manifestations of new terrorism. (Hoffmann, 1998. Laqueur, 1999).

New terrorism differs from the old in terms of its structure, personnel, and attitude

toward violence. It is characterized by often ad hoc, transitory networks staffed by

amateurs versed in the ways of information technology. New terrorists do not hesitate to

harm civilians using whatever means available, including the use of chemical, biological,

radiological or nuclear weapons. (Tucker, 2002, 1). One of the differences between

traditional Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and modern radical Islamists

such as al-Qaeda is the use of violence and the choice of target. The Canadian suspects in

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the Toronto bomb plot expressed such interest, following a trajectory that began with

pseudo-military activities such as paintball shooting and later attempting to purchase 3

tons of ammonium nitrate, a component in explosives, similar to those used in the

Oklahoma City bombings of more than a decade ago.

A theory of diaspora politics:

Given the numbers of Muslims in Canada and their transnational connections,

virtual or otherwise, the possibility of Islamic radicalization cannot be completely

discounted. In comparison to the general population, there are indications of sympathy

towards some elements of radical Islamist ideologies.18 This is open to a number of

interpretations. One might refer to the role of diaspora politics. Diasporas are inherently

transnational: maintaining linkages with their homeland through networks that highlight

social, economic, political and emotional ties are also the means through which they exert

political influence. (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001) They are transnational because diaspora

members identify themselves, or are identified by others, as part of their homelands

national community, and as such are often entangled in homeland-related affairs.

(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001)

But this perspective is somewhat problematic because a religious community is not

18 40% of Canadian Muslims feel there is a struggle between moderates and

fundamentalists in Canada. Of those, 80% identify with the moderates, while 14%

identify with the fundamentalists. Canadas Muslims: An International Comparison.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/islam/muslim-survey.html

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defined in the same way. After all can one really talk about an Islamic diaspora? In the

original context, it referred to a Jewish phenomenon - namely exile from the ancestral

homeland and an inability to return for political reasons. The definition has since

expanded to encompass any groups of people with a common origin who have come to

reside outside their traditional homeland. But Canadian Muslims come from a myriad of

cultural, ethnic, racial, and national backgrounds; they do not have a common origin. In

the greater Toronto area, home to about 400,000 Muslims, there are more than 50

mosques, reflecting the diverse nature of the community.19But if bonds to the homeland

are one of defining features of a diaspora, then to whom or what is a Pakistani-Canadian

Muslim tied to? Pakistan or Mecca? Ethno-national connections are not easily

discounted:

Although the religious element may be emphasized in their identity,

practically and on a daily basis these diasporas maintain their ethno-national identity,

hence they confront problems and dilemmas similar to those faced by less religious

or more secular Diasporas. The argument is that religion only buttresses the

affiliation of members in these entities. Furthermore, there is no doubt that their

main connections are with their countries of origin rather than with an abstract

Muslim World or a Muslim Diaspora. (Sheffer, 2002, 16)

However this way of defining a diaspora discounts the existence of the ummah - the

universal brotherhood that unites all Muslims in faith regardless of race, ethnic origin,

19 Adam, Mohammed. Canadian Muslims are grappling with how to preserve their faith

and protect their identity. Ottawa Citizen, August 14, 2005

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culture, and nationality. Membership in this community transcends of all other

allegiances, an identity that is transnational and even post-modern, although it is more an

imagined community than an actuality. At the same time, not all imagined

communities are national in terms of their demands for sovereignty. (Anderson, 1983)

Furthermore for those undergoing the process of what Roy terms reislamization,, there

isnt an active self-identification as members of a diaspora (e.g. being Pakistani and

Canadian) They are not reifying the notion of a homeland or solidifying connections to it.

They do not participate or involve themselves in activities related to the homeland. The

link is no longer between a diaspora and a host country, but between immigrants and new

sets of identities, most of them being provided by the host country. (Roy, 2006, 22) But

this framework does not explain the appeal of a particularly ideological form of Islam,

that of radical Islam, and its appeal to young Muslims.

A theory of social networks:

Social movement theory can shed some light on the appeal of ideological

movements. One particular study looked at the biographies of 172 radical Islamist

terrorists, challenging conventional explanations of terrorism (Sageman, 2004). Rather

than positing poverty or resistance to occupation, Sageman instead suggests a theory of

social networks made up of relatively affluent and well-educated, yet alienated young

men who become indoctrinated in the language of radical Islam. While originating with

the individual, acts of terrorism are most often group-based endeavours, dependent on

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social networks. Corresponding variables include mutual ideological commitment, the

construction and maintenance of group identity, peer pressure, thorough indoctrination,

and ongoing ideological reinforcement. (Sageman, 2004)

He distinguishes between global salafi jihad as opposed to salafi jihad sans global.

Whereas Salafi jihad is an Islamic revivalist movement which advocates the violent

overthrow of the near enemy - local Muslim government - to establish an Islamist state,

global salafi jihad is directed at the far enemy - foreign governments and populations.

Local governments are not targeted because they are merely pawns of the West. It is a

confrontation between Islam and the dominant Western powers. It is not based on a

hatred for the West, but holds Western values in contempt. (Sageman, 2004)

Sageman makes it clear that there are no common social factors or predisposition

for terrorism. Profiles based on age, sex, national origin, religion, education, and

socioeconomic background are of limited use in identifying real terrorists. There is no

one profile of a radical Islamist terrorist, but there are similar trajectories. The movement

is political as well as religious. Becoming a jihadi is not a single step, but a gradual

evolution. Potential recruits are not indoctrinated in the traditional sense.. Rather contact

with like-minded individuals presages the steps to become a full-fledged jihadi. The one

commonality is their link to jihad, usually with someone who has directly experienced it,

often in Afghanistan. This individual is most often encountered at a mosque, where much

of the transformation occurs, and where those dedicated enough become fully radicalized.

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But the appeal of radical Islam would not be universal: it appeals more to those already

religiously dissatisfied. (Sageman, 2004)

The importance of cognitive openings:

Another attempt to explain the appeal of radical Islam uses a case study approach -

that of al-Mujahiroun, a London-based radical Islamist organization. (Wiktorowicz,

2005) Three questions are posited: what explains the initial interest in such groups? Once

exposed to a particular movement, how are individuals persuaded of its credibility? Once

the above have been accomplished, how are new activists persuaded to engage in high-

risk activity? (Wiktorowicz, 2005)

In the first stage, an individuals existing beliefs are challenged by what he terms a

cognitive opening. Individuals already predisposed to new ways of thinking would be

most likely to succumb to this opening. A cognitive opening can be inspired by any

number of reasons: discrimination, socio-economic deprivation, political repression,

family dynamics, and identity crisis, but also through direct contact with activist

organizations. There is no one single mechanism for this initial interest, but cognitive

openings aid the process of radicalization. (Wiktorowicz, 2005)

For some, this process creates a religious quest, and for a few this can lead to

contact with radical Islamist groups. Given the highly decentralized nature of authority in

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Islam, now more than ever, radical Islamist organizations looking for recruits need to be

convincing, credible, and authentic, or at least seen as such. In the marketplace of

religious knowledge where individuals can pick and choose from any number of groups,

any groups lacking legitimacy will lose out. Only after confirmation of such credibility

does the process of religious conversion begin. (Wiktorowicz, 2005)

Once confirmation of legitimacy occurs, the most difficult aspect begins: the

conversion of their belief system into concrete action, often of a high-risk nature.

Ideological socialization facilitates this process by appealing to the individuals self-

interest individual understandings of self-interest shift in a way that encourages

progression to high-risk Islamic activism. Potential participants are taught that salvation

is an individuals primary self-interest. (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 6) A commitment to the

groups ideology is thus seen as guaranteeing a place in the hereafter.

A strategic logic:

Is there a strategic logic to suicide terrorism? (Pape, 2005) Even though neither of

our cases involved acts of suicide, it is a useful construct. Pape distinguishes between

three forms of terrorism: 1. demonstrative. 2. destructive. and 3. suicide. An analysis of

315 suicide bombings from 1980 2003 concluded that participants were motivated more

by national liberation struggles than anything else: They were not religious fanatics,

irresponsible adolescents, or sexually frustrated males. There were no known psycho-

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pathologies. Nor were they poor, education-wise or economically, neither in absolute or

relative terms. Instead he suggests that nearly all suicide attacks had a specific goal: to

compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists

consider to be their homeland. (Pape, 2005, 4)

The strategic logic downplays the role of religion. It is not the main factor, but an

effective tool used to recruit terrorists as part of larger strategic objectives. It is his

classification of the other two forms of terrorism that are relevant to this paper.

Demonstrative terrorism is as much about political goals as it is about violence,

concerned as it is with gaining publicity. There are three reasons behind these public

relations exercises: 1. for recruitment purposes. 2. to gain attention from soft-liners on the

other side. 3. To gain attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other

side. Hostage taking, airline hijacking, and advance notified explosions are used to

highlight the issue at hand to a target audience. But the violence is not intentionally

destructive because that would reduce sympathy for the cause. If anything, in cases of

demonstrative terrorism, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people

dead. (Pape, 10, 2005).

Destructive terrorism is more aggressive, using coercive measures such as the

threat of injury or death. As destructive terrorists often seek to intentionally harm a

specific audience, they risk losing sympathy for their cause. Activity is carefully weighed

according to the groups political objectives: the Baader-Meinhof gang selectively

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targeted wealthy German industrialists, alienating some Germans, but not others.

Palestinian terrorist groups in the 1970s sought to kill as many Israelis as possible,

alienating Israelis and diasporic Jews, but at the same time retaining an element of

sympathy among Muslim populations. (Pape, 2005)

Discursive production?

For Devji (2005) jihad operates in a world of interrelated global events and effects,

where any event could unintentionally transform ones own destiny. Since intentionality

becomes impossible, jihad is an ethical performance rather than an intentional act, one

aimed at achieving justice. The consistent criticism of the jihadist project that there are

no defined political goals, but simply an unending litany of complaints revolving around

the oppression and/or humiliation of Muslims is evidence of this. In other words, in the

absence of political objectives, any action taken becomes ethical by default.(Devji, 2005)

A choice becomes ethical when it is made without referring to any authority;

instead one takes full responsibility for ones actions. Ethical acts are not instrumental,

but an end in themselves, performed out of a sense of duty, and independent from any

external truth. The way that radical Islam evokes jihad and manipulates Islamic

jurisprudence allows the individual to dissociate himself from traditional sources of

authority: Islamic history and authority has been completely disaggregated and is no

longer clustered within more or less distinct lineages of doctrine or ideology that can be

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identified with particular groups. (Devji, 2005, 50) Consequently jurisprudence becomes

ethical rather than political as it now functions as the personal representation of authority.

One might argue that jihad becomes an ethical practice because a political response is

seen as futile, especially given the history of Islamist movements in general, one in which

political defeat and repression have been the norm.

At the same time the universalization of Islam is aided by the mass media. The

ummah becomes both virtualized and actualized, acting as both witness and participant in

the mediated worlds of jihad and martyrdom. But it also unites Muslims and non-

Muslims in a common visual practice. The act of witnessing makes individuals

themselves responsible for their decision to join the jihad or not: the role of mass media

in the jihad goes further than mere influence. Instead the jihad itself can be seen as an

offspring of the media. (Devji, 2005, 88) But this process fragments Islamic practice

and shifts its from a unified and coherent set of ideas and beliefs to a set of idiosyncratic

ethical practices, whether Holy War, martyrdom, and prayer: the jihads world of

reference is far more connected to the dreams and nightmares of the media than it is to

any traditional school of Islamic jurisprudence or political thought. (Devji, 2005, 90)

This fragmentation is also illustrated by the shift of jihad from the Middle East to the

peripheries of Islam, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Breaking with

conventional Islamic authorities and state-centric conceptions of identity and belonging

underscores a universalist message, a way of seeing the world in other ways. (Devji,

2005)

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The result of this is the individualization of Islam: independent thought is critical in

the radical Islamist discourse, giving groups political and religious flexibility. Most

Muslims, lacking the requisite religious knowledge of Islam are required to obey taqlid,

submission to authority - authority held by the ulemma. But radical Islamists hijack the

process, issuing fatwas and calls to jihad without the necessary theological grounding,

bypassing the ulemma and creating their own discourse. The dissolution of Islamic

authority is Janus-faced: it sows the seeds of confusion, leaving vulnerable Muslims as

targets for more dangerous forms of Islamic revivalism. But it also underscores a certain

democratization of authority. (Devji, 2005)

Caught in a spiritual vacuum, Islam in jihad loses access to divine guidance,

leaving Muslims in a state of uncertainty. But undertaking acts of faith in such an

atmosphere becomes the highest expression of faith precisely because practice as a

Muslim becomes an individual duty lacking the sanction of a sacred authority. This is

illustrated by the practice of martyrdom in a world of global effects lacking any

intentionality, only this act allows the Muslim to assert himself as an individual. (Devji,

2005)

Reislamisation:

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For Roy (2006) the enigmatic aspect of a revival of Islam, particularly among

second generation Western Muslims is not so puzzling - it is a result of their present

circumstances - living as minorities amidst the pervasiveness, popularity and prerogative

of Western norms, values, and influences. The tendency to revivalism occurs as part of

the efforts of Western and Westernized Muslims to assert their identity in a non-Islamic

context. Muslims as minorities are not new, but historically this status was as a result of

conquest or loss of political power rather than voluntary immigration. (Roy, 2006)

Islamic revivalism is not so much about Islam per se. Rather it is about how Islam

is used to help shape and explain life in profoundly secular environments; religion has

seemingly lost all social authority. Nonetheless Islamism in general holds little appeal for

many Western Muslims because they are already uprooted, migrants and or/living in a

minority. (Roy, 2006, 2) Instead they are experiencing the deterritorialization of Islam:

ethnic and religious borders no longer correspond to any defined geographical territory,

but operate in a post-modern sense, as discursive constructs, more vocal than territorial.

As constructs, they are at once fragile, transitory, and the subject of ardent passions,

leading to a never-ending question of what it means to be a Muslim i.e. reislamization.

But this is not the preoccupation of most Muslims, who live in a Western context without

undergoing severe existential crises: To be a Muslim in the West is not a schizophrenic

experience. (Roy, 2006, 21)

As he sees it, the objectification of Islam is a logical consequence of the declining

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social authority of religion and the concurrent rise of westernization and globalization.

Reislamization severs the links between a given culture, making it adaptive and versatile

in any cultural context. The issue of identity becomes explicit, especially important in

times of political crisis, i.e. after 9/11, when even nominal Muslims must explain what it

means to be a Muslim. Because religious authority is lacking in the West, explanation

becomes democratized: the explanatory task falls to each and every Muslim. (Roy, 2006,

24) Muslim identity, self-evident when part of a pre-existing cultural history, is now

exclusively enveloped within an alien cast, explicitly Western, and non-Muslim. This can

lead to a crisis of identity for some, leading to more explicit demonstrations of faith,

oftentimes a prelude on the path to radical Islam or what he terms neo-fundamentalism.

(Roy, 2006) . This sort of Islamic identity creation is detached from traditional cultural

links, one that is ahistorical and deeply skeptical of the idea of roots. For this particular

group, westernization is something other than becoming western.(Roy, 2006, 21)

Consequently, neo-fundamentalism is more prevalent among rootless second and

third generation Muslims. It is complemented by an aggressive multiculturalism that

rejects integration into Western society. It also rejects any attempts at identifying with the

idea of the nation-state itself, instead focusing its attention on the ummah. (Roy, 2006) In

this sense it is a post-modern cosmopolitan project, rejecting as it does a statist

conception of citizenship and belonging. These resislamicized conceptions transcend

traditional interpretations of Islam and instead are dominated by visions of a return to a

more idyllic and distilled version of Islam, freed from what are seen as heretical

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transgressions rather than theological innovations more than a millennium in the making.

A schism has consequently developed between mainstream Islamist movements

that are tied to specific national projects [i.e. the PLO] and a new generation of uprooted

militants who wish to move beyond traditional territorial definitions of Islamic identity

in order to reconnect the ummah. Neo-fundamentalism is not a reaction against

Westernization. Rather it is a product and agent of it: The illusion held by the Islamic

radicals is that they represent tradition, when in fact they represent a negative form of

westernization. (Roy, 2006, 20)

This type of Islamic identification leaves considerable scope for the interpretation

of Islamic knowledge, independent of the traditional religious middlemen, the ulemma

that acted as intermediaries between knowledge and believers. It allows radicals to

deliberately blur the divide between themselves and the ulemma, doing away with the

orthodox and embarking on paths once thought to be strictly heretical. The internet

assumes great importance in the diffusion of such information: the violence associated

with radical Islam becomes an effective propaganda tool, useful both as a recruiting tool

and as a means to antagonize Western publics and policy makers. Although among some

Muslims there is nostalgia for an Islamic golden age, Islamic radicals do not agitate for

such a return. Rather they aim to bring about a new golden age one that does away with

the past, representing as it does a certain existential failure. (Roy, 2006, 13)

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Discussion:

From the above, we can see that there are many factors that create the cognitive

openings which allow for acceptance of radical Islam to take root. Conspicuous is the

role of the media and in particular that of exploitative internet-based propaganda, framing

the debate through a particular lens: conflicts in Iraq and elsewhere; a perception of an

Islamophobia, reflected in the media in a post-9/11 context i.e the Danish cartoon affair;

perceptions of the hypocrisy of Western Middle East foreign policy, preaching

democratic ideals yet supporting authoritarian regimes; recurring debates on headscarves

in France, Britain and elsewhere; and the application of anti-terrorist legislation that

seems to be directed towards the Muslim community. These exemplify the way in which

Muslims around the world are harassed, humiliated and cast aside in a hyper-globalized,

hyper-capitalist world dominated by a hyper-power. As Devji noted collectively this

creates a kind of metaphysical impotence - an inability to create spaces for alternative

methods of discourse, which then becomes a justification for the closure of any

alternative except terrorism. (Devji, 2005)

The role of the internet is difficult to ignore. Internet-enhanced global connectivity

has allowed ideologies of all kinds to mutate and proliferate far beyond their local

origins, in the process captivating some, repulsing others, but arguably ignored by most.

The members of the Toronto Bomb Plot were discovered through the monitoring of select

internet chat rooms by CSIS, where members of the group would often share their ideas

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with one another. It was online browsing and chatting that led Khawaja to the writings of

Zeba Khan, eventually flying to Pakistan to propose marriage. These actions represent

Devjis discursive construction that is enhanced through media imagery and circuitries -

both cases used the internet to reconnect with an Islamic identity, in the process

distancing themselves from connections to their local environment.

But in the ideological marketplace that is the internet, too much information makes

adequate reflection difficult. Though internet-savvy, many youth lack the proper context

for analysis: the internet offers easily digestible presentations of Islam, myriad in forms,

open to more interpretations than ever. The Toronto 18 were not linked to al-Qaeda, but

there are suggestions that they were highly influenced by its message, one that has

become increasingly sophisticated and net-savvy. But such selective processing leads to a

highly constricted view of the world.: This type of view, available all over the internet,

distorts ones views of the world and can lead to extremist opinions. (Sageman, 2004,

20).

Before our subjects began their shift towards radical Islam, they were

indistinguishable from others of their social milieu. Few were devout Muslims as

children. There was little criminal history up until the time of the arrests. Though it has

been noted that there is a lack of a common profile among recruits to radical Islam, there

are certain elements that they do have in common. All were males, and except one,

Qayyum Abdul Jamal, 43, all were under 30 at the time of their arrests. Five of the

members of the Toronto Bomb Plot were born outside Canada: however four came to

Canada as very young children. Most could be described as second generation. Out of 19

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individuals in total, only Chand was a convert. They were from educated, middle class

backgrounds. Ghanys father was a urologist, originally from Trinidad and Tobago.

Abdelhaleems was an engineer with Atomic Energy of Canada. Socio-economic

deprivation was not a factor in any of their upbringings. Of the 12 men in the Toronto

Bomb plot, all had finished high school, two were university students, and Ghany was a

recent graduate with a BSc. Health Sciences.

Khawaja epitomized this milieu. He studied computer programming at Algonquin

College in Ottawa. His father, Mahboob, was well-educated and a published author,

holding both an MA and PhD in Political Science. In general their academic backgrounds

were of a hard sciences variety computer science, engineering, health sciences rather

than softer social sciences or humanities. This might not be significant in itself, although

other radical Islamists also had similar academic backgrounds, specifically the 9/11

hijackers. One might even go so far as to suggest that profiles which share a middle class

background and some academic study are more likely to produce recruits to the cause. 20

They did not grow up isolated from Islamic environments: Greater Toronto and

Ottawa are home to large communities of Muslims from a wide variety of ethno-national

backgrounds. Khawaja and the Toronto 18 represent the diversity of the Muslim

population: Pakistan, Egypt, Somalia, Fiji and Trinidad and Tobago. These communities

while not ghettoized in the traditional sense, congregate in specific areas. It is in Southern

20 Most activists are university students or recent college graduates with aspirations of

upward mobility, a finding that is consistent with comparative research on the

demographics of Islamic movements in the Middle East. (Wiktorowicz, 2005, 91)

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Ontario where almost 40% of Canadas annual flow of immigrants arrives. (Statcan,

2006) Without the existence of these enclaves, the process of radicalization might have

been more difficult: these young men were actively connected to ethno-national

communities that helped facilitate the movement of ideas, capital and people to all four

corners of the globe, ideas that included radical Islam. For the Toronto 18, this was

exemplified by Jamal, a Pakistani who came to Canada and preached a doctrine of

radical Islam. One might refer to this as an exemplification of diasporic politics. But

conversely it might be worth noting that relations between militants and their country of

origin, are weak or non-existent; we are facing not a diaspora but a truly deterritorialized

population. (Roy, 2006, 305) This idea is reinforced by the notable absence of activity in

their ancestral homelands, a recurring theme among radical Islamists. Neither Pakistan,

Egypt, Trinidad nor Fiji were targets or areas of active participation by any one of our

case studies.

They appeared comfortably ensconced in their local suburban communities i.e.

mainstream Canadian, as well as being able to navigate the worlds of their particular

ethno-national communities. But a closer analysis suggests that it is such a background

that can lead to the crisis of identity that sparks the cognitive opening towards Islam: as

minorities navigating different cultures, they are particularly vulnerable to religious-

seeking behaviour. (Wiktorowicz, 2005) This process is most notable in the case of

adolescents, who are at an age where the quest for identity is most acute. Similar to other

radical Islamists plots in Europe, these young men evinced symptoms of a struggle with

identity and meaning. (Roy, 2006) A desire to become a part of something larger than

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themselves seemed to conceptualize the thinking of these second-generation Muslims.

Dissatisfaction with ones current situation is evinced in the following poem by Zakaria

Amara, written in 2001:

Please someone find me

I want to find the light

But no one is there to guide me

Open the door someone give me its key21

Roy (2006) notes that Muslims in the West are living as minorities. Although they

have always existed as minorities in world history, they had time to build their own

culture, or at least to share in the dominant culture. In the lack of such a context, modern

western Muslims have had to reinvent themselves through reislamization. (Roy, 2006)

This was present in both groups. Saad Khalid, Fahid Ahmed, and Zakaria Amara were

members of a Religious Awareness Club started by Khalid. Although they were not

known as being religious in their youth, that began to change in adolescence. During

school lunch breaks, Khalid would preach to other students. At times calling themselves

the Meadowvale Brothers, both online and at school, they moved from wearing non-

descript clothing to more traditional dress. (Silber et. Al., 2005, 35)

In line with Sageman (2004) and Wiktorowiczs (2005) work is the prominent

networking aspect of both cases. For the Toronto 18, the Salaheddin Islamic Centre in

Scarborough, the al-Rahman Islamic Centre in Mississauga, and Meadowvale Secondary

School in Mississauga were key focal points at which to gather and exchange information

21 Silber, Mitchell D. and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown

Threat, New York. New York City Police Department. 2007. pp. 35.

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and ideas steeped in the language and imagery of radical Islam. Ahmed, Chand, Durrani

and James regularly attended the first. Aboud and Jamal attended the second. Ahmed

also, along with Amara and Khalid attended Meadowvale. The linkages between groups

was also extended directly through family. Amara and Ghany and were both married to

sisters from the Farooq family [otherwise unrelated to this case]. Although one should not

indulge in idle speculation, it is probably safe to say that the unnamed youth also attended

one or more of the above institutions. Movement through different social circles

eventually created a larger network, one centered around an identity that transcended the

particular the actualization of the previously virtual ummah. As Sageman (2005) and

Wiktorowicz (2004) note, co-fraternization reinforces an Islamicized identity: consistent

socialization around a shared ideological framework leads to an increasing confidence in

the radical Islamist message. The more time they spent with one another, the more their

views began to calcify, a process common to social movements theory.

For Wiktorowicz (2005) cognitive openings can occur through exposure to radical

Islamist messages online, but also through personal trauma. Canadian-born Steven

Vikash Chand was the son of Hindu immigrants from Fiji. He served as a military

reservist for four years. Somewhere during this period he converted to Islam. One could

speculate that his cognitive opening was created with the divorce of his parents,

distancing him from his family and exacerbating feelings of alienation. As a member of

the Toronto 18, he was seen as more zealous than his compatriots in the plot, expected

given his status as a convert. Converts are often present in radical Islamist organizations

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and their need to prove their religious convictions often drives them to outperform their

associates. It was Chands idea to behead the Prime Minister. (Silber et. al. 2007)

Khawajas case is somewhat more complex. But given his fathers influence [a

published author of books critical of the role of the West in the Middle East], his time in

Saudi Arabia as a boy and later trips to Pakistan, his gradual turn to radical Islam is

perhaps not surprising. After enrolling at Algonquin College in 1998, ostentatious

displays of religiosity increased: he grew a beard and taught children the Koran and

Islamic history at a local mosque, before finally graduating in 2001. In the Summer of

2003, Khawaja befriended other young Muslims, playing paintball together, as well

visiting a shooting range once or twice a month, registering under false names,

understandable given the increased scrutiny that young Muslims in Western face. Their

behaviour underscores the gradual shift in identification towards a greater Islamic

community and away from previous identities, typical among new recruits. (Devji, 2005;

Roy, 2006; Sageman, 2004, Wiktorowicz, 2005) Old friends, family members, and

previous beliefs and habits give way to an identity fixed around an explicitly Islamic

identity, usually rooted in Salafism. In this context the affronts against Islam and

Muslims become more acutely felt: this inside versus outside dichotomy intensified by a

general withdrawing from society at large, including the mosque. For those like the

Toronto 18, the majority of Muslims would be seen as passive participants in the global

ummah, with a nominal connection to Islam, whereas they would see themselves as what

Roy (2006) termed the vanguard of the ummah.

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Another aspect of radical Islam that Devji, Roy, Sageman, and Wiktorowicz have

emphasized is the ongoing decentralization and desacralization of Islamic authority. The

Meadowvale brothers engaged in proselytization activities, preaching to students during

lunch breaks. There was similar activity on the other side of the city in Scarborough,

where Chand and James would distribute Islamist leaflets to young people at local

schools. None were versed in Islamic theology or jurisprudence, though many exhibited

some of the more noticeable manifestations of radicalization: greater interest in the plight

of Muslims, the growth of beards, the reversion to traditional dress, the rejection of

alcohol and more frequent attendance at mosques. The absence of traditional authority

figures enhances the emotional pull of particular ideological points of view: emotional

intensification and heightened politicization is aided in the case of mentors who often do

not have the requisite grounding in Islamic jurisprudence.(Wiktorowicz, 2004)

Khawajas contact with Mohammed Junaid Babar while in Pakistan proved ominous,

moving Khawajas nascent ideological comment beyond the incubation phase. It was

after their meeting in Pakistan that Khawaja was put into contact with radicals based in

London. The dissolution of authority was best epitomized in the case of the Toronto 18

through Abdul Jamal. The lone adult in the group was a strident example of antagonistic

Salafism. Although he was a member of the board at the al-Rahman Centre in

Mississauga, he had no formal religious training. Jamal worked with youth at the mosque.

Because he was on the mosques board, his views were influential and his position of

authority entrenched his credibility, very much in line with Roys (2006) and Devjis

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(2005) argument that the contemporary decentralization of authority in Islam allows it to

be reconstructed and reconstituted in a purified form, one that is highly idiosyncratic,

but one lacking in objectives. The plans to blow up the CN Tower, storm Parliament and

behead the Canadian Prime Minister, in the case of the Toronto 18, or replicate the 7/7

bombings in the case of Khawajas group, epitomize Papes (2006) idea of demonstrative

terrorism. But apart from the effects of such attacks from a discursive point of view, it is

not clear what their plans afterwards might have been or what they hoped to achieve,

something seemingly in common with radical Islamist movements around the world.

Conclusion:

This paper collected several theoretical explanations to understand the occurrence

of radical Islamist terrorism in Canada using a comparative case study approach. Their

descriptions of the shift to identities grounded in radical Islam are useful constructs,

sharing some broad parallels. However it is difficult to be able to use any of them on their

own as predictive tools to identify future instances of radical Islamist terrorism. After all

not every Muslim with such profile would consider becoming part of a terrorist network.

Besides it would be presumptuous to assume that there is a single reason that

individuals take up the cause of radical Islam: there a myriad of possible explanations,

including, but not limited to, the influence of family and friends, charismatic religious

leaders with an extremist agenda in a highly decentralized environment, a general sense

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of anger at what is perceived as the oppression of Muslims, the role of the mass media,

and the forces of globalization. This is by no means definitive: The terms terror,

terrorism, and terrorist do not identify causally coherent and distinct social phenomena

but are strategies that recur across a wide variety of actors and political situations. (Tilly,

2004, 7) The key element in understanding the appeal of radical Islam is that it is a

process begun by the individual. Only after sufficient contact with the ideology, online or

at a mosque, does the networking begin that leads to full-blown radicalization.

But though these individuals were loosely linked, they werent networked in the

traditional sense. Rather they were part of the expansion of non-professionalized

terrorism. (Tucker, 2001) It seems as both religious and ethnic minorities they saw in

radical Islam the appeal of rebellion, a movement that would give their lives meaning and

help them redefine themselves in terms of their relationship with Islam. Though

ostensibly motivated by a desire to act in Islams name, they were neither adept nor adroit

enough to achieve their goals. Their failures are emblematic of their structure: though

inspired by internet jihadism, their amateur, decentralized, and non-hierarchal nature,

almost guaranteed failure, or at the very least drastically reduced their possibilities of

success.

Though the explanatory frameworks may differ, they do seemingly converge in a

telling area: the destruction of old forms of practice has a created a new kind of Muslim.

There is an acknowledgement of the democratizing aspect of this new experience, in that

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traditional forms of authority have been circumvented, resulting in a crisis of authority.

At the same, Muslim identity in a Western context is in flux, aided and abetted by the

aforementioned crisis, but also by the dynamics of the era that we live in.

But there is a possibility of something unanticipated: the decentralization of

authority might prompt more debate both within the traditional institutional bodies of

Islam scattered around the world and Muslim communities everywhere, isolating and

extinguishing the flame of extremism before it burns brighter.

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Devji, Faisal. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Hurst and

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Gerges, Fawaz. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. New York: Cambridge

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canadian homegrown? a different kind of green: on the appeal of radical islam among young muslim...

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