capability theory and the future of natos decisionmaking rules

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Capability Theory and the Future of NATO's Decisionmaking RulesAuthor(s): Jack E. Vincent, Ira L. Straus and Richard R. BiondiReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 67-86Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425783.

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-R EgSItAR Cf? 2001 Journal fPeaceResearch,vol.38, no. 1, 2001, pp. 67-86SagePublicationsLondon,ThousandOaks,CA4ndNewDelhi)[0022-3433(200101)38:1;67-86; 015589]

Capability Theory and the Future of NATO'sDecisionmaking Rules*JACK E. VINCENTDepartment of Political Science, University of IdahoIRA L. STRAUSProgram on Transitions to Democracy, George Washington UniversityRICHARD R. BIONDIDepartment of Political Science, University of Idaho

Afteryearsof relativestabilityin termsof both mission and membership,NATO is undergoingrapidchange in both areas,primarilybecauseof the end of the Cold War.Currently, he most importantmembershipissue involves the inclusion of former Cold War 'enemy'states from Centraland EasternEurope.In addition,NATO has,in effect,becomea peacekeepingarmof the United Nations in Bosnia,a mission that was certainlynot anticipatedwithin the originalNATO charter,aswell as a peacemakerin Kosovo.These criticalchangesmay haveprofound consequencesfor NATO's future.In this articlewe explorethe attitudes towardsNATO of a cross-nationalsample of internationalrelations scholarsand practitionersdrawnfrom NATO nations. Takingthe same approachused in Vincent'sstudies ofUN delegate attitudes, we apply 'capability theory' to the observed variation in attitudes towardsNATO'sdecisionmakingstructure.That is, we expectthat the criticalexplanationof the divisionof atti-tudes towardsNATO's method of decisionmakingwill relateto the 'capability' f the nation to whichthe respondent belongs. This is predictedsince nations, under the theory,attempt to augment theircapabilities hroughtheirmembership n internationalorganizations. t follows they will tend to valuethe organization o the extent of the augmentation.Because the decisionmakingrulesof NATO, whicharecurrentlybasedon consensus,could preventNATO from acting if a single 'new' memberdisagreedwith a proposedNATO course of action, we feel that capability theory may be applicable,since thiswould affectthe capabilitiesof the other members. In general,we find significantsupportfor this 'capa-bility' interpretationof attitudinal differencesrelatingto possiblealterationof NATO's decisionmakingrules.

IntroductionDuring the Cold War, the North AtlanticTreatyOrganization NATO)operatedundera clear and concise mandateof deterring he

The datarelevant o this projectwill be placedin theMartinArchives(http://peace.martin.uidaho.edu;-mail:[email protected]). ll Martin data are available oserious cholarsorjoint projects.

SovietUnion fromattackingWesternEurope.Economic and militarystrengthbolsteredbyAtlanticunityand resolve ervedas one of theAtlanticcommunity's uccessfuldeterrents. twasundersuchconditions that thepracticeofunanimityand the requirement f consensusin NATO's decisionmaking structurewererelatively uccessful.Today,the Cold War is

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68 journal of PEACE RESEARCHover,the Soviet threat s gone and NATO hasredefined its role by engaging in a majorpeacekeepingoperation n Bosniaaswell as apeacemakingoperation in Kosovo.Withoutthe specterof Sovietexpansionism,NATO'spurpose s no longeras clearand concise as itonce was. Although NATO's strategicconcept still defines NATO as a defensivealliance,1 he available videncesuggeststhatNATO hasexpanded ts mandate aswellasits membership to maintain ts relevancenthe new European ecurityarchitecture.Now that NATO has enlarged itsmandate,as well as its membership,how willits decisionmaking tructure are n the post-Cold War era? First, will the practice ofunanimity in NATO's decisionmakingincreasingly onstrain heabilityof NATO tomeet the challenges of the 21st century?While NATO's involvement in Kosovopro-vides enough empiricalevidence to suggestthat it can muster the necessary onsensus toauthorize the use of force under certaincircumstances,NATO is learningtoday thatreachinga consensusthatsomething 'should'be done is much easierthan reachinga con-sensuson 'how' something should be done.Considering hatNATO'snew andexpandedmandate s likely to requireNATO to addresscontentious issues that transcend past ex-perience,should NATO adaptor modify itsdecisionmakingstructure or convenience ofdecisionmakingwith awidermembership? fthe answer is 'yes', should NATO adopt adecisionmakingstructure based on consen-sus, minusone or two, or developa qualifiedmajorityvoting system?Second, will NATO enlargement ncreas-inglyconstrain he ability of NATO to makedecisions by methods of unanimity or con-sensus? One cannot dismiss the fact thatHungary, the Czech Republic, and Polandl Concludedfrom 'The Alliance'sStrategicConcept'asagreedupon by the Heads of Stateand Governmentpar-ticipating n the meetingof theNorthAtlanticCouncil nRome,7-8 November1991.

are not experienced Western democracies.BecauseNATO's newest members grew upon the oppositeside of the IronCurtain,onecannot guarantee that their positions onissues pertaining to international peace andsecuritywill necessarilyreflect those of themore experienced democracies withinNATO. The lessonsthatCentraland EasternEuropean eaders earned romthe Cold Warare bound to be differentfrom the lessonsthat are freshwithin the minds of Westernleaders.While NATO has demonstratedanability to successfully ncorporatecountrieswith differenthistoricalexperienceswithinits ranks,such as the inclusion of Germanyafter World War II, the threat of Sovietexpansionismservedas a unifyingagent thatencouragedconsensus. However,this unify-ing stimulus no longer exists;thus openingthe door to future challenges to NATO'sharmonyof interest- particularlyn regardto NATO-Russian relations. Consideringthat Russia has voiced its opposition toNATO enlargement, should Central andEasternEuropeancountrieshold a veto overfuture policies affecting the relationshipbetween NATO and Russia? In general,should representativesf Centraland EasternEuropean countries (including Russia) beinvited to participate in the meetings thatwork out plansforadaptationandexpansionof NATO?

The purposeof this articleis to evaluatethe potential application of 'capabilitytheory'asa meansof predictinghow a cross-national sample of international relationsscholarsandpractitionersrom NATO coun-tries2with varying economic and military2 When this studywas initiated n December1997, theinclusionof Centraland EasternEuropeancountries nNATO wasstill in its formativetage,asthe NATO Headsof Stateand Governmenthad only recently nvited theCzechRepublic,Hungary, nd Poland o beginaccessionnegotiations.However, in anticipationof their actualmembershipn NATO,academicsromHungary,Poland,andthe CzechRepublicwere nvitedto participate.nter-national relationsscholarsfrom Poland and the CzechRepublicarerepresentedn thisstudy.

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Jack E. Vincen et a . CAPABILITYAND NATO'S DECISIONMAKINGcapabilitieswill tend to answer the abovequestions.While academicsmay not play adirect role in the creationof foreignpolicyintheir respectivestates,one could argue thattheycould, andprobablydo, playan indirectrole in foreign policy development.Becauseinternational relations scholars and prac-titioners are among the sources decision-makers turn to for theirconceptsand ideas,evaluating thefir attitudina responses canprovide mportant nsightstha might other-wise go unnoticed, By demonstrating thatthereis a relationshipbetween the attitudesof 'unofficial'opinion-shapersand the rela-tive capabilities of their respective statestowards certain questions regarding NATO'sdecisionmaking structure, we hope toencourage further academic study of atti-tudesat the 'official' evel of NATO decision-making.

It is important to recgiz that 'official'NATO decisionmakersmay not share thesame attitudesof oursampleof internationalrlations scholars and practitioners. We arethus unableo demonstrate empirically thatour resul are applicableat the 'official' evelat this time. However, t can be arguedthatNATO decisionmakers would be more,ratherthan less, inclined to take into con-sideration the relative capabilitiesof theirrespectivestates when they forge their atti-tudes toward decisionmaking rules. There-fore, we feel comfortable sugstng thatfuture tss of support patterns among'official'NATO actorsmayreflect he kindof

sults obtained by Vincent when he sur-veyed UN delegates. However, por toengaging n a costlystudyof 'official'NATOactors, t is importantto establishempiricallythat capabilitytheory has the potential toapply to issues pertaining to the evolution ofNATO.Because NATO is creeping towardsassuminga mandatesimilarto the UN's, wefeel the same foes that influence the atti-tudesof UN deegates may beginto influence

otherexpertaudiences,such as internationalrelationsscholarsand practitioners.Using,basically,hesamesurvey-research ethodol-ogy employed by Vincent in his analysisofsupport patternsamong UN delegates,wetestandconfirma propositiondeducedfromcapability theory, namely, the propositionthat scholars from stateswith higher econ-omic and military indicators will be moreinclined to support changing NATOs de-cisionmaking rules to avoid possible insti-tutionalparalysis sNATO opens its gatestolower-capabili states. Scholars from suchstates,on the otherhand,arepredictedto belesswilling to changeNATOs decisionmak-ing rules, because such rules and theirmembershipenhancethe capabilitiesof theirrespective states. That is, such states can con-strain the actions and options of higher-capability tatesbothvwithinNATO (throughthe consensus rule) and outside of NATO(through the collectivedefenserule).Whilethe abilityof capability heoryto predicttheattitudinalpatternsof 'official' NATO de-cisionmakers is not demonstrated in thisstudy,we ourresultsdo prode theneces-sary evidence to warrant further explorationof capabilit theor's potential applicationbeyondthe UnitedNationssystem.Capability Theory and UNAttitudesWhen Vincent sampledsupport patrns ofUN delegates acro time (1961-88), hehypothesized that delete attitudes wouldbe influenced by the rative capabilitiesoftheir respective states. According to Vincent(1991: 98):

[capabilityheory] anbe seenas anextensionof realism'whichemphasizeshe conceptofrelentlesstrugglebetweennationsas a mostlikely componentof international relations(Crabb, 1972 Morgenthau, 1972; Sullivan,1976; Wright, 1965). Weakernations, in thisapplication,attemptto use the UnitedNationsto augment their powe relativeto stronger

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70 journal of PEACE RESEARCHnations.Stronger ations,on theotherhand,have ittleneedforsuchan augmentationoaccomplishpolitical/militarybjectives.Inaddition, .. . capablestates, becauseof theirloweraffect owardheorganization,illtendto 'see' hings n 'static'erms, .e., tend to bemoresatisfiedwith votingand membershiparrangementsutless nclined o 'see' hangeas likely n suchareas. n general,hen,themostcapablenternationalctorswill haveakindof anti-UNorientation,omparedo lesscapable ctors.

Capabilitytheory was found to have appli-cation not only to attitudes towardsorgansbut over a wide rangeof additional issues aswell. It was arguedthatbecausethe SecurityCouncil (SC) is associated with the morecapable tates,and, in asense,augments heircapabilities,these would tend to be morepositivetoward t thanthe lesscapablestates.Evaluation n all cases was in termsof devia-tions of the more capable, comparedto theless capable,from the grand mean of all del-egatessampled.That is, in the caseof the SC,delegates from the more capablestates werepredicted o be on the 'positiveside' anddel-egatesfrom less capablestates on the 'nega-tive side' of the grandmean. This provedtobe true foritemsevaluatingSC performance,a proposalto strengthen he SC and satisfac-tion with membership as well as votingarrangements.An oppositepattern,of nega-tivism on the part of the more capable,waspredicted and found for the GeneralAssem-bly, ECOSOC, and the Secretariat.Evenwhen more general issueswere probed, themore capabletended to be on the 'negativeside'of a proposal orgreater conomiccom-mitment from richernations, on the likeli-hood of world government replacing theUN, on theoverall mportanceof theUN, onthe desirabilityof controlling all weaponsrelating o war,and on givingmore attentionto the control of nuclearweapons. Only onproposals to control population, pollution,in-flation, and drugs did they emergeon thepositive side of the grandmean.

CapabilityTheory and NATODecisionmakingWhen we apply the central tenets of capa-bility theorytowardNATO decisionmakingit is important that we take into consider-ation the majordifferencesbetween NATOand the United Nations. While NATO isbeginningto assumea mandatesimilar o theUN's, itshistoryandcompositionareentirelydifferent n significantways.What follows isa briefdiscussionof the centralassumptionsabout NATO's decisionmaking structurethat guided our application of capabilitytheoryin this study.When NATO wasoriginally stablishedn1949 it was considereddesirable o use un-animityfor its decisionmaking, ince a clearand concise mandate of deterring Sovietaggressionwas generally supported by allmembers.A publicfront of Atlanticsolidarityand a habitualexerciseof Atlanticunitywereseen asnecessary omponentsof NATO'scol-lectivedefenseposture.Unanimousproclama-tion of Alliance resolutionswas a form ofexercising olidarity, ven though the NorthAtlanticTreaty,hichcreatedheNorth Atlan-tic Councilas thedecisionmaking odyfortheAlliance,3 ontainsnothing that specifiescon-sensusas the ruleformakingdecisions. n fact,according to the late AmbassadorTheodoreAchilles,4 majorauthorof theTreaty,NATOplannersdeliberatelyeft thatpoint flexiblesothat the Council would be free to act (as itrarely has) without consensus.Nevertheless,the daily practiceof NATO decisionmakinghas historically emphasizedunanimity.As3 While the North AtlanticCouncil (NAC) servesas thesupremedecisionmakingbody in NATO, one cannotignoreallegationshat NATO'sMilitaryCommitteeandDefense PlanningCommittee (DPC) - along with theMajor NATO Commands(MNCs) - hold considerableinfluenceoverdecisionmakinghatoften goesuncheckedby the NAC. However,hisstudyfocuseson thepolitical,rather hanthemilitary, spectof NATOdecisionmaking.4 Interviewby IraStrauswith TheodoreAchilles n theoffices of the Atlantic Council of the United States,Washington,DC, 18 March1983.

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Jack E. Vincent et al. CAPABILITY AND NATO'S DECISIONMAKINGlong as there was only one real mission- toplan, prepare,and exercise ogetherfor jointresistanceo an invasionof WesternEuropethe rule of unanimityand the practiceof con-sensuswereconsideredpragmatic ndnot toodamaging constraints.

Today,however, he issuesaremorevariedand fast-paced, and NATO's mandate islargelyup for grabs.Some would like to seeNATO remain a collective defense organiz-ation,basedon ArticleV of theNorth Atlan-tic Treaty,and directedagainst Russia withthe rule of unanimity rigidly maintained.Others see NATO as avehicleforpromotingWestern values and principles (such asdemocracy)from Pragueto Vilnius, or evento Vladivostok,based on the preambleandArticlesII and IV of the Treaty.Because thenew issuesfacingtheAlliancearemorepoliti-calandvaried n nature,therecould be a ten-dency to gridlock,and the unanimityrule inthe North Atlantic Council could lead toNATO'sinability to respond o variouscriseseffectively.This tendency could be increasedby two causalfactors.First, the rule of un-animity, f it is maintainedunder a set of newpost-Cold War conditions, could provedivisive, since consensus ceases to be auto-maticwhen the issuesbecome morepolitical,or when they arise and change rapidly.Second, increasingNATO membershipaddsnew players o the set that areneededfor theconsensus, and the new players are quitedifferent from the old ones in theircapabili-ties, memories,habits,fears,and hates.

Capability theory suggests, accordingly,that stronger states, possibly desiring anincreasedpolitical role forNATO to success-fullyengageRussia,mightwish to changethedecisionmakingstructureof NATO in orderto free themselves from the constraintsassociated with unanimity.We should notethe completely different situationthat existsin the UN on this issue.In the SC, the mostcapable actors (the 'Big 5') alone hold theveto, and can prevent, by its use, any SC

actions against themselves, even if all otherSC states are in favor of such an action.Theveto in this caseenhances the capabilitiesofeachof the Big 5. It is natural, herefore, orthem and theiralliesto supportthe veto forthe Big 5 and not want to extend it. InNATO, however, which, by its very exist-ence, enhancesthe capabilitiesof its currentmembersand in which unanimityhas beenrelatively easy to achieve, any extension ofcurrent decisionmakingrules to new statesmay prevent decisive action as well as apossible expansionof mandate.A reformeddecisionmakingstructure(where no singlestate could block action)could give strongerstates in NATO more flexibility to useNATO to pursuetheirforeignpolicy objec-tives while NATO enlarges ts mandateandmembership.We should remember, n this connection,that NATO will likely remain a 'mostcapable'dominatedorganizationor the fore-seeable future, unless large numbers of lesscapable stateswereto join it. In the UN, bycontrast, the tension between the morecapable and less capablewas clearlyin evi-dence during its construction phase at itsfounding in San Francisco.The veto in theUN setting was viewed as criticalby the Big5.The currentNATO membership,however,may see its application in NATO as animpediment,since its appliedeffectwould beto enhance the capabilitiesof the leastpower-ful new members. That is, such lower-capability members could block NATOaction, even if the original, more capablemembers achievedconsensus.

MethodologyTo test capability theorywe employed basi-callythe samesurvey-researchmethodologyused by Vincent in his studies of supportpatterns at the United Nations among UNdelegates. Data were obtained from amulti-purpose,Internet-basedquestionnaire

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72 journal of PEACE RESEARCHcompleted from December 1997 throughFebruary1998 by 83 internationalrelationsscholars from 13 NATO countries (theCzech Republic and Poland included).5Potentialrespondentsto the 'Evaluating heSufficiency of NATO Reforms for theInclusion of Russia Survey'were identifiedand invited to take the survey from websites of academic institutions, nongovern-mental organizations and email discussiongroups. Respondents were limited to thosewith accessto the World Wide Web and anability to understand the Englishlanguage.To be included in the following surveyanalysis, respondents had to (1) hold anadvanced degree (MA or above) in an aca-demic field relevant to the study - in thiscase international relations, security, orRussian-related studies - and (2) be acitizen of a NATO, or officially invited,country.To collect the data we used the same'answer line' approach taken in Vincent'sstudies. Each respondent was requested toindicate the strength of their opinions onvarious issues by marking an answer line,where the exact center indicatesneutrality.Thus, all lines took the followingform:

NeutralPointStronglyAgree 0 _StronglyDisagree

Naturally, he respondentcould checkanyplaceon the answer ine. The main ideawasthatagreement,or disagreement, ncreasesasyou moveawayfrom the center of theanswerline. Each location on the line was given anumericalvaluerangingfrom 1 for stronglyagree or highly supportive) o 21 forstronglydisagree (or highly negative), with thenumber 11 serving as the neutral number.5 Initially,we were concerned hat respondentsrom theUnited Statesweredriving he dataandpossiblyskewingthe results.However,afterremovingall US responses ndrerunningheanalysis,we foundthat the results ontinuedto supportourpredictions educed romcapability heory.

When a particular urveyrespondentfailedto markaparticular uestion,such omissionswere entered into SPSS 8.0 for Windows asmissingdata.After the questionnairedatawereenteredinto SPSS it was mergedwith another data-set composedof economic andmilitarycapa-bilityindicators.The purposeof mergingthetwo datasetswas to determine f respondentsfromstateswith highercapabilitieshadaten-dency to answer he variousquestionsdiffer-entlythanrespondents romlower-capabilitystates, n linewith capability heory.The testson theseattributesare not simplyredundanton the same kind of capability ndicators.Afactoranalysisof 23 variables romwhich thecapabilityvariableswere taken shows that theheaviest loadings (using Kaiser's VarimaxCriterionfor rotation)arespreadacross ourof fiveorthogonaldimensions(seeAppendixA). Thus, for the most part, the tests arenotsimply redundanttests on the same kind ofcapabilitybut representtests across at leastfour differentkinds of capability.All datawere then standardized6nd eachquestion pertainingto NATO decisionmak-ing was re-coded into a separatevariabledividing the respondents into two groupsrepresentingeither a supportiveor negativetendency,relative o the grandmean. Divid-ing the standardized ariableat zero, or thegrand mean, responses representinga moresupportive direction were assigned a 1.Responses n a more negativedirectionfromthe grand mean were assigned a 2. Suchcoding sets up the analysisof mean differ-ences. In otherwords,is the mean locationofthe capable in line with expectations,com-pared to the less capable?Do both divergefrom the grandmean?

6 Standardizinghe data indicateshow many standarddeviationunitsaboveorbelow hegrandmeana value alls.Allvaluesbelowzero= 1 and all valuesabovezero= 2.



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Jack E. Vincent et al. CAPABILITY AND NATO's DECISIONMAKINGQuestions and Predictionsfor theCapabilityTestTable I contains predictionsbased on capa-bility theory for six questions relating toNATO decisionmaking and one questionrelatingto the issueof whetheror not repre-sentativesof Central and EasternEuropeancountries, including Russia, should partici-pate in the meetingsthatworkout plansforadaptation and enlargement of NATO.These particularquestions were inspiredbydiscussionand policy proposalsadvancedbythe Committee on Eastern Europe andRussiain NATO (CEERN) in their report,'Bringing Eastern Europe and Russia into

NATO' (Straus, 1994). While these de-cisionmakingconcepts are not new to therealm of internationalorganization,outsideof CEERN there has been little open dis-cussion at the 'official' level of their appli-cationwithin NATO.

Findingsfor the CapabilityTestTableII presentsthe descriptivefindingsofthe study in relationto eachcapability ndi-cator tested. Included in the table is a com-parisonbetween the mean of all respondentsfrom the United States (USA), the highest-capability state in NATO, and all other

Table I. Predictions for Questions RegardingNATO's Decisionmaking StructurePredictionsfor Groups*

For Group I For Group2Question (Moresupportive) (Morenegative)Question 1 Central and Eastern European countries should Higher capability Lower capabilitynot hold a veto over future policies affecting the relationshipbetween NATO and Russia.Question2 Representativesof Central and Eastern European Lower capability Higher capabilitycountries (including Russia) should be invited to participatein the meetings that work out plans for adaptation andexpansion of NATO.Question3 The practice of unanimity in NATO's Higher capability Lower capabilitydecisionmaking will increasingly constrain the ability ofNATO to meet the challenges of the 21st century.Question4 NATO enlargement will increasingly constrain Higher capability Lower capabilitythe ability of NATO to make decisions by methods ofunanimity or consensus.Question5 Before it expands, NATO should adapt or Higher capability Lower capabilitymodify its decisionmaking structure for convenience ofdecisionmaking with a wider membership.Question6 NATO should adopt a decisionmaking Higher capability Lower capabilitystructure based on consensus minus one or two.Question7 NATO should adopt a decisionmaking Higher capability Lower capabilitystructure based on qualified majority voting.*Group1 representsespondentswhose answerswere dentified o be on thepositive ideof thegrandmean.Group2represents espondentswhose answerswere dentified o be on thenegative ide of thegrandmean.Positiveandnegativedoesnot imply agreement rdisagreement,utsimplywhere herespondenttood in relation o the grandmean.

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74 journal of PEACE RESEARCHparticipants not from the United States(NUSA), along with the grandmean of allrespondents in the survey. Technically, itmight be more precise to speak of threeclassesin NATO: (1) the highest-capabilitystate(the USA, whose role is often describedas 'leadership'and sometimes as 'hegem-onic'); (2) the intermediate-capabilitytates(Britain,France,Germany,maybeItaly thetraditionalEuropeangreat powers);and (3)the lower-capability states. In practice,however, these groups tend to divide intohigh-capabilitystates (the USA, and maybeits strongest supporters, Britain andGermany)andlow-capability tates.Bycom-paring USA and non-USA means, we candetermine whether capabilitytheory has atendency to reflectthe technicaldivisionsofpower or the practical assumingcapabilitytheoryis correct.It is important, when reviewing theresults, o consider that the applicationmustbe framedin termsof significantdifferencesbetween the UN and NATO. Becauseof itsalmost universalmembership, he UN spansa wide range of capability differences.NATO, by comparison, consists mostly ofhighly capable nations in socio-economicterms. For example, if we standardizeGNPper capita for the world, the UN averagestandsatzero,while the average orNATO is1.6, thatis, 1.6 standarddeviationsabovetheaverage. Eastern European nations, a numberof which are under consideration for fullmembership n NATO, averageonly 0.20 ofa standarddeviationabovetheaverage.Thus,if capability theory is found to apply forcurrent NATO members (including theCzech Republic, Hungary,and Poland),thisfinding would tend to suggestthat, if moreand more lower-capabilitytatesarebroughtinto NATO, the samekind of tension foundin the UN, between the more capable andless capable,is likely to develop.We do notexpect relatively argedifferences o manifestthemselves(asin the UN), but we do expect

more modest differencesto appearbetweenthe most and least capable, in line with thetheory. And, as stated above, if expansiondoescontinue,such modestdifferences ouldbecome significantly larger as capabilitydifferencesbecome morepronounced.To give the reader an indication of theoverall uccessof capability heory n termsofpredicting the relative direction of powerregarding he seven questions,a correlationand its significanceevelwere obtainedusingPhi by establishinga separatedatabasecom-posedof theprediction/finding esults.7Eachquestion had two predictions,high and low,and two confirmations or non-confirma-tions. Within the new dataset,the predictionfor high capabilitywas alwayscoded 2, andthe predictionfor low capabilitywas alwayscoded 1. If the predictionforhigh capabilitywas confirmed, it was alwayscoded 2 (orcoded 1 if it failed); f the predictionfor lowcapabilitywasconfirmed t wasalwayscoded1 (or coded 2 if it failed).A total of 72 pre-dictions were madeusing capability heoryasa theoretical ens and 62 of them were sup-ported empiricallywith anoverallcorrelationof 0.722 with 0.000 significanceusingPhi.8The abovetechnique s basically he sameas the one usedbyVincent in his 1991 studyof UN delegateattitudes.That is, in bothcases, the mean responseon the answerlineusingattributecategoriess predictedandthetest is a non-parametric est (Phi).The maindifference between the studies is that in theUN studyPhi is repeatedoverandoveragainfor each questionnaire item, while the entire7 Only questions1 and6 hadsignificant ifferencesn themeansusinga UnivariateANOVA test.8 NATO includes19 stateswith the additionof Poland,the CzechRepublic,andHungary. cholars rom5 of the19 statesdid not chooseto cooperatewith the project.Adiscriminant nalysis eparating ooperatingNATO states(intermsof participationf scholarsromsuchstates) romnon-cooperatingNATO states showed no significantdifferencesbetween cooperating and non-cooperatingNATO states n respectof the fivecapabilityndicators. tis likely, hen,thathadtheybeen ncluded heresultswouldhaveremainedhesame.

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76 journal of PEACE RESEARCHpredictionis made as to which side of thegrandmean, on the questionnaire tems, therespondents from the most capable statesshould locate, i.e. either above or below thegrand mean. Since Phi does not assumenormaldistributionst allowsus to effectivelytest the successof such predictions.To makesure that deviant cases on the questionnairelines arenot drivingresultsand thatthe overallfit issignificant, n alternative nalysiswas alsoperformedusingdiscriminantunctionanaly-sis.A generalcapabilityndex was createdbyadding the z-scores of the capabilityindi-cators. The general capability index wasbrokenatthemean to getthe classifications fbelowaverage apability1) andaboveaveragecapability2).Allquestionnaire atawerecon-verted o the ranksandthe discriminantunc-tion analysis applied. Examinationof thestructurematrix showed agreementwith thepredictions n TableI. The canonical corre-lation is 0.563 (at sig.=000) and 71% of thecaseswere correctlypredicted.

Appendix B gives the plots of the capa-bility classificationswith the five question-naireitems treated n TableII. It also showsthe results of a threefold classification ofrankedcapability,with 1 definingthe lowestrankedcapability,2 the intermediaterankedcapability, and 3 the highest ranked capa-bility. It can be seen thatin all casesthe meanrank 'center' orms a patternconsistentwiththe predictions derived from capabilitytheory. Also, as noted above, agreementofinitial resultsalso continues, even when analternativemode of analysis s adopted (dis-criminantfunctionanalysis),using a generalcapability ndex applied solely to rank data.Thus, deviantcasescannotbedrivingresults,since these alternativerank forms of analysisall agreewith Table II.

From a theoreticalperspective, herefore,capability theory is generally supported asmodified for NATO decisionmaking.Thereis a tendency for scholarsfrom states withhigh capabilitiesn NATO to bemorewilling

to changeNATO'sdecisionmaking tructureto successfullyengage Russia and meet thechallengesof the 21st century.Although the'attitudinaldirection',that is, moresupport-ive or lesssupportive han the grandmean, issignificantly in line with the predictionsusing capability heory,the degreeof differ-ence, as predicted, s not as greatas it wouldbe if NATO includedmore stateswith lowercapabilities (assuming the theory is true).The overall attitudinalocation'(determinedby the grand mean location on the answerlines coupledwith theirrelatively mall stan-darddeviations)also suggeststhat there is astrong 'common cause' orientation amonginternational relations scholars and prac-titioners from NATO countries.The capa-bility analysis results, however, do suggestthatthismaychangeshouldNATO continueto addlower-capabilitytates.Followingsuchapathmaypossiblycreate he kinds of strongattitudinalsplitsalong capability ines foundin the United Nations setting.

Motives and IdeologicalPreferencesNow that we have established hat a relation-shipexistsbetween theattitudesof academicsand theirrespective tates'attributes,we needto determinewhether there is a relationshipbetween the ideological preferences andmotives of our respondents, and theiranswers o thequestionsconcerningNATO'sdecisionmakingstructure.The same generalapproach used in the capability tests wasemployedto determine f such a relationshipexisted. The dependent variables, the sixquestionsrelating o NATO decisionmakingand the one relatingto the issue of whetheror not Centraland EasternEuropeancoun-tries, including Russia, should participatein NATO's adaptation and enlargementprocess,remained the same;however,ratherthan using capability ndicatorsas the inde-pendentvariables,we used 11 questionsthatexploremotives and ideologicalpreferences.



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Jack E. Vincent et al. CAPABILITYAND NATO'S DECISIONMAKINGThe questions measuring motives and

ideologicalpreferencespresentedto the par-ticipantsof the 'Evaluatinghe SufficiencyofNATO Reformsfor the Inclusion of RussiaSurvey (1997-98)' were inspired by thedebate over NATO enlargement and itspotential mpacton Russia.Afterasubstantialreviewof articlesandpolicypapersrepresent-ing the views of international relationsscholarsandpractitionersrom 1994 to 1997,threemajorthemes wereidentified.The firstwas that NATO should not expand itsmembership or mandate but maintain itsoriginal dentity.According o AlanTonelson,a majorityof critics of NATO enlargement'seemprimarilyconcernedwith the possibleimpactof NATO expansionon Russia.Theyfearthat bringingthe allianceto the formerSovietUnion'sborderswill speedthe triumphof Russia's evanchist,reactionary orcesandultimately usher in a second cold war inEurope' (Tonelson, 1998: 41). If NATOenlargementalienatesRussiawhile advancingsecurity guaranteesto Central and EasternEuropean ountries hat theWest hasnot his-toricallydefended n pastconflicts,willRussiatest NATO's resolve?Thus, for this groupofcritics, the credibility of NATO securityguaranteesbecomes a seriousareaof concern.

The second themewasthatNATO shouldexpand its membership to include Centraland EasternEuropeancountries, other thanRussia, without changing its institutionalstructure.This particular heme is expressedthrough the work of RAND scholarRichardL. Kugler, who believes that the 'UnitedStates needs to think deeplyand planwiselyin handling the emerging geopoliticsof EastCentral Europe' (1996: 267). For Kugler,NATO enlargement is a necessary com-ponent of a military endgame designed to'forge sensible defense arrangementswithnew membersthat carry out Article 5 com-mitments while not posing an offensivethreatto Russiaor other countriesremainingoutside the alliance' p. 268). For affiliatesof

this theme, a Russia-in-NATOoption is notheavily desired because they tend to agreewith Kuglerthat 'Russia's ew statistforeignpolicycallsforCISreintegration ndopposesNATO enlargement' p. 267).The third theme represented he ideathatNATO should expand its membership toincludeCentraland EasternEuropeancoun-tries, including Russia, or be replaced byanother organizationor structure.Like thefirst group opposing NATO enlargement,this theme includesindividualswho are con-cerned about the impactof NATO enlarge-ment on Russiaand presentsthe view thatNATO's institutional structure should bemodified, transformed,or replacedto meetthe challengesof the new Europeansecurityarchitecture.Voices within this theme rangefrom those who believe that the 'UnitedStatesshould look beyond NATO for a suc-cessor organization- startingwith CSCE'(Clarke,1993-94: 35) to those who believeaRussia-in-NATOoutcome is a vital step forthe Atlantic community (for further dis-cussion,see Straus, 1995, 1996).TableIII is a list of the 11 questionsusedin our analysisas well as the grandmean forrespondentsfrom the United States(USA),all respondents TOT), and respondentsnotfrom the United States(NUSA).

Although the questionsusedin thisappli-cation were inspiredby ideologicalmotivesand preferences, we do not advance thenotion thatwe can predictanswersbased onthe relativecapabilitiesof the respondent'sstate. Rather,we limit our application ofcapability theory to predicting attitudesrelating to changing NATO's decision-makingstructure.In general,we believe thatissues of powerare morepronouncedduringthe phase when decisionmakers determinehow something should be done ratherthanthe phase when they determine that some-thing should be done. The historyof inter-national organizationtends to mimic thisproposition.If we analyzea majorityof the

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78 journal of PEACE RESEARCHTable II. Means orQuestionsMeasuringMotivesandIdeologicalPreferencesQuestionsmeasuringmotives ndideologicalpreferences GM GM* GMUSA TOT NUSAQuestion Pleasendicateyoursatisfaction rdissatisfaction iththecurrent NATO enlargement policy. 13 13 11Question NATO shouldenlarge venif the resultof suchenlargementis a perception f isolation n Russia. 14 14 12Question US influencen Europewill diminish f NATO doesnot expand. 13 13 13Question Whatkind of impactwill the currentNATOenlargementpolicyhaveon Russia'swillingnesso pursuearmscontrolanddisarmamentreatiesn the future? 14 14 13Question The currentNATOenlargement olicywillerode hecredibility f American ecurity uarantees. 12 12 12Question What kindof impactwill NATOenlargementwithout theinclusionof Russiahaveon Russia's emocratic eform fforts? 14 14 13Question Thereshouldbe citizenparticipationn theprocessof shapingNATOpolicyon adaptation ndenlargement. 10 9 8Question A semi-officialitizens' onvention,composedof citizendelegates ppointedbythegovernmentsf NATO andPartnershiporPeacecountries, houldbe heldin the near uturedesigned o examinehowgreater olitical,economic,andenvironmentalooperation mongtheirpeoplesmaybe promoted. 12 12 11Question Russia houldbeinvited o joinNATO beforeNATOmemberships offered o countriesdirectlyborderingRussia. 13 13 14Question 0 Russia houldbe invited o join NATOonlyif theydemonstrate emocratic nd economicstabilityor a periodof timeagreedto byNATOpolicymakers. 9 10 9Question 1 NATOshould be significantlyransformedrreplacedwithanentirelynewsecurity rganizationf Russia s goingto participateullyin a newEuropean ecurity rchitecture. 11 11 9* Indicates heoverall randmeanfor thequestion.

existing international organizations, such asthe United Nations, we find that power,more often than not, is consolidatedamongthe world's most capable actors - eventhough a consensus exists pertainingto theprinciplesand purposesof the organization.Findings for Ideological Preferencesand Motives TestWhen asignificantdifferencen the means ofa dependentvariableweredetectedbetween

more support and less support (than thegrand mean) when compared to the ques-tions in TableIII, the independentvariableswereanalyzed or theirpotential explanatorypower. Only two out of seven dependentvariablesdisplayed a relationshipwith theindependent variables.First, it was foundthat respondents who tended to be morecritical of the current NATO enlargementpolicy were more willing to emphasize thepotential negative mpactof enlargementon



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Jack E. Vincent et al. CAPABILITY AND NATO's DECISIONMAKINGRussia's democratic reform efforts, moreinclined to see regionalproblem-solvingandcooperationas a positiveoutcome,and moreinclined to believe that NATO enlargementwould increasinglyconstrain the ability ofNATO to makedecisionsbymethodsof una-nimity or consensus. On the other hand,those who tended to be satisfiedwith thecurrent NATO enlargement policy weremorewillingto downplaythepotentialnega-tiveimpactof enlargementon Russia's emo-cratic reform efforts, less willing to pursueidealisticaspirations,and not convinced thatenlargement would increasingly constrainthe ability of NATO to make decisions bymethods of unanimityor consensus.Second, a similar pattern was foundamong respondentswho tended to believethatrepresentativesromCentralandEasternEuropean countries, including Russia,should be invited to participate n the meet-ings that work out plans for NATO adap-tation and enlargement. Respondents whoappeared o value idealisticaspirationsweremore inclined to agree that NATO enlarge-ment should be an open and transparentprocess - perhaps to avoid isolatingRussia.Forthis group,significantNATO reform (orits actualreplacement)would be required orRussiaeven to participate n the new Euro-pean security architecture. Those whoappeared to reject idealistic notions weregenerally not interested in inviting Centraland EasternEuropean (and Russian) repre-sentatives into the process of enlargementandadaptationof NATO.This grouptendedto reject he notion thatNATO hadto be sig-nificantly transformedor replacedwith anentirely new securityorganization f Russiawas going to fullyparticipaten a new Euro-pean securityarchitecture.In Table IV the means of the significantindependent variablesfor respondents whotend to be more supportive of the tworelevant questions are compared with themeans of the significant independent

variables for respondents who tend to benegative(in relationto the grandmean). Forexample,respondentsassignedto the nega-tive group on the firstdependentvariable nTableIV had an overall mean of 10 on thequestionmeasuringtheirsatisfactionor dis-satisfactionwith the currentNATO enlarge-ment policy. That is, those who tend todisagreewith the notion thatNATO enlarge-mentwould increasingly onstrain heabilityof NATO to make decisionsby methods ofunanimityorconsensusalso havea tendencyto be moresatisfiedwith the currentNATOenlargementpolicy.

The failureof the motivesand ideologicalpreferences ests to help explainwhy respon-dentsdisplayedawillingness o actually daptormodifyNATO'sdecisionmaking tructurestrengthensourclaim thattheattitudesof therespondents towards this issue-area wererelated to the economic and militarycapa-bilities of their respectivestates. In fairness,however,we have to consider that academicswho believeNATO enlargementwill increas-inglyconstrain he abilityof NATO to makedecisionsby methods of unanimity or con-sensus might not have identified stronglywith awillingnessto adaptormodify NATOdecisionmaking because they have a ten-dency to believe that NATO should be sig-nificantly transformed or even replaced.Thus, simply changing NATO's decision-making structure would be meaninglesswithout changing its overall structure.However, it should be noted fromTable IIIthat the non-USA samplewas more inclinedto agreethat NATO should be significantlytransformed r replacedwith anentirelynewsecurityorganization f Russia was going tofully participate n a new Europeansecurityarchitecture.

ConclusionWe havedemonstrated hatcapability heoryis applicablebeyond the UN, thus opening

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80 journal of PEACE RESEARCHTable V. Resultsof theIdeologicalPreferencendMotivesTest

SignificantndependentariableSurveyuestion)

Mean or more Mean orsupportiveroup negative roup Sig.onthequestion on thequestion levelDependentVariableNATOdecisionmakinguestion)Question NATOenlargementwill increasinglyonstrainheabilityof NATO to makedecisionsbymethodsof unanimityorconsensus.

(Agree)SupportiveGroup_____< 7 > _____ NegativeGroup Disagree)*Please ndicateyoursatisfaction rdissatisfaction iththecurrentNATOenlargement olicy.NATOshouldenlarge venif theresultof suchenlargementis a perception f isolation n Russia.The currentNATOenlargement olicywill erodethe

credibility f American ecurity uarantees.Thereshouldbe citizenparticipationn theprocessofshapingNATOpolicyon adaptation ndenlargement.A semi-official itizens' onvention,composedof citizendelegates ppointedbythegovernments f NATO andPartnershiporPeacecountries, houldbeheldin the nearfuturedesigned o examinehowgreater olitical,economic,and environmentalooperation mongtheirpeoplesmaybepromoted.NATOshouldbesignificantlyransformedr replacedwithanentirelynewsecurityorganizationf Russia sgoingto fullyparticipaten a newEuropean ecurityarchitecture.

1315

10 .02211 .003

11 14 .0098

10

12 .003

13 .049

8 14 .000

DependentVariableCEEandRussia's articipationn NATOadaptation)Question Representativesf CentralandEasternEuropean ountries includingRussia) houldbeinvitedto participaten themeetings hat workout plans oradaptation ndexpansion f NATO.(Agree)SupportiveGroup__ _ _ _ _ _ _Negative Group(Disagree)Whatkind of impactwillNATOenlargementwithouttheinclusionof Russiahaveon Russia's emocratic eform

efforts? 15 12 .002A semi-official itizens' onvention,composedof citizendelegates ppointedby thegovernments f NATOandPartnershiporPeacecountries, houldbeheldin thenearfuturedesigned o examinehowgreater olitical,economic,and environmentalooperation mongtheirpeoplesmaybe promoted. 10 13 .019Russia houldbe invited o joinNATO beforeNATOmemberships offered o countriesdirectlyborderingRussia. 11 16 .002NATOshouldbesignificantlyransformedr replacedwithanentirelynewsecurity rganizationf Russias goingtoparticipateullyin a new European ecurity rchitecture. G 13 .034

*The score7 representshegrandmean forQuestion4.



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Jack E. Vincent et al. CAPABILITYAND NATO's DECISIONMAKINGthe door to morerigorous ests of itsexplana-tory power as a general, rather than case-specific, theory. A derivative of the realistschoolofthought, capability heorycanserveas an avenuefor testing the centralassump-tions of realism n a mannerthat avoids thepitfallsof treatingstates as if theywere indi-viduals.Byfocusingon the decisionmaker, rin this case theopinion-shaper,we essentiallyprovide an alternative evel of analysiswithwhich to test the effectsof powerwithin theinternationalsystem. Naturally,our resultshave to be balanced with other consider-ations facing decisionmakers,such as ideo-logicalpreferences,motives,andinstitutionalconstraints;however, this does not, in anyway,diminishthe importanceof our results.After all, we must strive to understand asmany factors involved in the decision-making process as possible - the effect ofcapability, r lackthereof,beingone of them.Furtherstudy is obviously necessarytoevaluate capability theory's applicabilityatthe 'official' evel of NATO decisionmaking.From an empirical perspective, we cannotdismiss the fact that the United Stateshasnotpushed for a transformation in NATO'sdecisionmaking structure, as our studywould predict.Thus far, the issue of flexi-bility in political decisionmakinghas beenavoided, and NATO has opted for workingto increase its flexibilitysolely on the mili-tary-operational evel, through 'CombinedJoint TaskForces' CJTF),known informallyas 'coalitions of the willing'. It is not clearwhat would happen if a 'coalition of thewilling' wereprepared o formbut a consen-sus of all NATO memberswas not achievedto authorize it. However, no crisis has yetoccurredover this possibility.

It can also be argued hattherehasbeen aninformal turn toward a more flexibleinterpretation f the meaningof'consensus'.Perhaps here is more emphasison the obli-gation to compromise in order to comequickly to a common decision and lessemphasison unanimityor on nationalprivi-legesof veto of NATO decisions.It shouldbenoted, however,that in its language so farNATO has come down on both sides on thisissue,yet the evidencedoes not suggest thatthere has been a meaningfulshift in practice.The issueof NATO decisionmakingprob-lems, in sum, remainsat a formativestageinwhich few decisionmakers have, at leastopenly,pronounced sharp opinions or com-mitments. For the most part there is only avagueuneasinessabout whatthe futureholdsfor decisionmaking with an expandedmembershipand a broader, aster-changingmission. From a policymakingperspective,apreferenceto hope for informal,pragmaticadjustmentsas problems arise and a reluc-tance to declare n favor of any formal solu-tion appear o be prevalent.

Needless to say, there is a tremendousamount of work that remains to be done tostrengthen the explanatory power of capa-bility theory at the 'official' evel of NATOdecisionmaking. Suggested avenues ofapproach include quantitative analyses ofsurvey results obtained from actual NATOactors as well as qualitativeand comparativestudies of the decisionmaking behavior ofNATO actors since the inclusion of former'enemy' states. Naturally, the continueddebateoverthefutureof NATO enlargementwill serve as a catalystfor furtherstudy andanalysis.

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82 journal of PEACE RESEARCHAppendixA. Spreadof CapabilityIndicatorsAcrossthe Factorsof AttributesRotatedComponent Matrix(a,b)

i^ 1 Component* 1 2* ' 3*' 4* 5E_vl GNPpercapita j16* .382 -.179 -8.431E-02 .179(millions)*E v2 Population(total)* 9.293E-03 9.088E-02 .937* -2.075E-02 -6.562E-02E v3 Populationurban% -.819 .174 -.146 .205 - .222E_v4 Fertility .878 -8.946E-02 -191 .279 -.190E_v5 Life expectancy ."""-959 8.488E-02 5.997E-02 3.457E-02 2.829E-03E_v6 Infantmortality (per .938 -6.049E-02 -5.936E02 -1.994E-02 i -9.163E-031000 deaths)E_v7 Population per .767 2.71E-02 --.119 -.195 .103physicianE_v8 Passengercars -.115 .957 .108 T-1.805E-02 -4.083E-02Ev9 Populationurbantotal -9.977E-02 .392 .872 -4.374E-02 -5.950E-2t vlO Urbanpopulation% -.820 .174 -.146 .202 ; .222of totalE_vll Populationgrowth .549 -. 12 -.200 .585 -.230rate annual%E_vl2 Populationgrowth .776 - 119 - 139 .306 -.214rate urban%E_v1l3Populationdensity sq _-.17 -5.917E-02 9.676E-03 -2.800E-02 .581kmE_vl4 Birthrate crudeper .896 -.120 -.152 - .220 -.1971000E_v15 Death ratecrudeper 708 .105 -.131 -5.734E-02 .492-1000 -

; E_v16 Arms exportsin -8.100E-02 -.922 .189 6.255E-03 5.514E-03millions- E_vl7 Armedforces 6.748E-02 .373 .841* .167 - .128(thousands)*E_v18 Armedforces per -214 -1.68E-02 -1.805E-02 .639 .5231000 populationE_vl9 Arms imports -. 151 .277 .121 .519* -. 162(millions)*E_v20 Civil rights, 1- most .640 -.212 .213" .560 .143E~~~~~~~~ 2w z : .xedtu2~ v w .E_v21Military xpenditures - .233E-02 .912 ' .289 . 7.544E-02 -2.528E-03(millions)* r . . . .E_v22 Political rights, 1 = 640 -.197 .138 .548 .137mostE_v23GNP* -.169 .912* .175 -3.203E-02 -2.618E-02Extractionmethiod:PrincipalComponentAnalysisRotationmethod:Varimaxwith KaiserNormalizationa Rotationconverged in 7 iterations* Locates the capabilityindicatorused, its largestloadingandthe factor involved.



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83ack E. Vincent et al. CAPABILITYAND NATO'S DECISIONMAKING

Appendix B. Plots of the Twofold and Threefold Classifications of the RankedGeneralCapabilityIndex with the Ranked FiveQuestionnaireItemsin TableIITwofold

Plot 1100'80? -- _^60-40.20

capability theory and the future of natos decisionmaking rules

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