capitalist cuban case. pdf
TRANSCRIPT
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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Capitalist Dependency and Socialist Dependency: The Case of CubaAuthor(s): Robert A. Packenham
Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp.59-92Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165736 .
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8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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CAPITALIST
EPENDENCY
AND
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
THE
CASE OF
CUBA
by
ROBERTA. PACKENHAM
INTRODUCTION
IS
SOCIALISM
A
MEANS
TO
ELIMINATE
or reduce
dependency
and its
alleged
concomitants?
According
to
a
number of
authors,
in-
cluding
those
of the most
influential
recent
approaches
to the
study
of LatinAmerican politics and development, it is. Indeed, for most of
these authors socialism
is the
only
desirable or
acceptable
way
to ad-
dress the
problems
of
dependent
capitalism.
For
them,
capitalism
is
inherently exploitative
and
repressive;
socialism is
the
only
desir-
able
or
acceptable
path
to a more
autonomous,
egalitarian,
free and
just
society
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
ix-xxiv,
209-216).
As
some
of
the
foregoing
implies,
and
as
is obvious to
anyone
fa-
miliar with the
literature,
for
many
authors
the truth or
falsity
of this
view is
not
a
matter amenable to resolution
by
anything
so
mundane
as reference to historical
experience.
For such
analysts,
this view is
true
by
definition.
The
analyst
using
this
perspective
first assumes
it to
be true and then demonstrates that
it is true
by citing
data that
support
it
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
x).
In
this
interpretation,
the
practice
of
comparing hypotheses
against
evidence and
rejecting
or
modifying
the
hypothesis
if
the evidence fails to
be
supportive
is
formal, undialectical,
positivist,
ethnocentric,
and
bourgeois
(Cordoso,
1977:15).
Additionally, there is another problem with a different origin but
the
same
result.
Edy
Kaufman
(1976:14-15)
has noted that
manypoli-
cymakers
and
partisans
of both Communist
and
capitalist
countries
reject,
apriori,
the
possibility
of
any
analogies, parallels,
or
compari-
sons of
the
influences exerted
by
the two
superpowers
on
smaller
countries. Extreme
partisans
of
both
camps,
Kaufman
reports,
Robert
A.
Packenham
s
Professorof PoliticalScience at Stanford
University.
Recentpublications include TheDependency Perspectiveand Analytic
Dependency;,
in
NORTH/SOUTH
RELATIONS
y
Charles Doran et al
(eds.)
(Praeger,
1983),
and
The
Changing
Political Discourse
in
Brazil,
1964-1985,
n
Wayne
Selcher's
(ed.)
POLITICAL IBERALIZATIONN
BRAZIL
Westview,
986).
The author s indebted to
Stephen
Krasner,
who
made
useful criticisms of the initial draftof this
article.
59
CAPITALIST
EPENDENCY
AND
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
THE
CASE OF
CUBA
by
ROBERTA. PACKENHAM
INTRODUCTION
IS
SOCIALISM
A
MEANS
TO
ELIMINATE
or reduce
dependency
and its
alleged
concomitants?
According
to
a
number of
authors,
in-
cluding
those
of the most
influential
recent
approaches
to the
study
of LatinAmerican politics and development, it is. Indeed, for most of
these authors socialism
is the
only
desirable or
acceptable
way
to ad-
dress the
problems
of
dependent
capitalism.
For
them,
capitalism
is
inherently exploitative
and
repressive;
socialism is
the
only
desir-
able
or
acceptable
path
to a more
autonomous,
egalitarian,
free and
just
society
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
ix-xxiv,
209-216).
As
some
of
the
foregoing
implies,
and
as
is obvious to
anyone
fa-
miliar with the
literature,
for
many
authors
the truth or
falsity
of this
view is
not
a
matter amenable to resolution
by
anything
so
mundane
as reference to historical
experience.
For such
analysts,
this view is
true
by
definition.
The
analyst
using
this
perspective
first assumes
it to
be true and then demonstrates that
it is true
by citing
data that
support
it
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
x).
In
this
interpretation,
the
practice
of
comparing hypotheses
against
evidence and
rejecting
or
modifying
the
hypothesis
if
the evidence fails to
be
supportive
is
formal, undialectical,
positivist,
ethnocentric,
and
bourgeois
(Cordoso,
1977:15).
Additionally, there is another problem with a different origin but
the
same
result.
Edy
Kaufman
(1976:14-15)
has noted that
manypoli-
cymakers
and
partisans
of both Communist
and
capitalist
countries
reject,
apriori,
the
possibility
of
any
analogies, parallels,
or
compari-
sons of
the
influences exerted
by
the two
superpowers
on
smaller
countries. Extreme
partisans
of
both
camps,
Kaufman
reports,
Robert
A.
Packenham
s
Professorof PoliticalScience at Stanford
University.
Recentpublications include TheDependency Perspectiveand Analytic
Dependency;,
in
NORTH/SOUTH
RELATIONS
y
Charles Doran et al
(eds.)
(Praeger,
1983),
and
The
Changing
Political Discourse
in
Brazil,
1964-1985,
n
Wayne
Selcher's
(ed.)
POLITICAL IBERALIZATIONN
BRAZIL
Westview,
986).
The author s indebted to
Stephen
Krasner,
who
made
useful criticisms of the initial draftof this
article.
59
CAPITALIST
EPENDENCY
AND
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
THE
CASE OF
CUBA
by
ROBERTA. PACKENHAM
INTRODUCTION
IS
SOCIALISM
A
MEANS
TO
ELIMINATE
or reduce
dependency
and its
alleged
concomitants?
According
to
a
number of
authors,
in-
cluding
those
of the most
influential
recent
approaches
to the
study
of LatinAmerican politics and development, it is. Indeed, for most of
these authors socialism
is the
only
desirable or
acceptable
way
to ad-
dress the
problems
of
dependent
capitalism.
For
them,
capitalism
is
inherently exploitative
and
repressive;
socialism is
the
only
desir-
able
or
acceptable
path
to a more
autonomous,
egalitarian,
free and
just
society
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
ix-xxiv,
209-216).
As
some
of
the
foregoing
implies,
and
as
is obvious to
anyone
fa-
miliar with the
literature,
for
many
authors
the truth or
falsity
of this
view is
not
a
matter amenable to resolution
by
anything
so
mundane
as reference to historical
experience.
For such
analysts,
this view is
true
by
definition.
The
analyst
using
this
perspective
first assumes
it to
be true and then demonstrates that
it is true
by citing
data that
support
it
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
x).
In
this
interpretation,
the
practice
of
comparing hypotheses
against
evidence and
rejecting
or
modifying
the
hypothesis
if
the evidence fails to
be
supportive
is
formal, undialectical,
positivist,
ethnocentric,
and
bourgeois
(Cordoso,
1977:15).
Additionally, there is another problem with a different origin but
the
same
result.
Edy
Kaufman
(1976:14-15)
has noted that
manypoli-
cymakers
and
partisans
of both Communist
and
capitalist
countries
reject,
apriori,
the
possibility
of
any
analogies, parallels,
or
compari-
sons of
the
influences exerted
by
the two
superpowers
on
smaller
countries. Extreme
partisans
of
both
camps,
Kaufman
reports,
Robert
A.
Packenham
s
Professorof PoliticalScience at Stanford
University.
Recentpublications include TheDependency Perspectiveand Analytic
Dependency;,
in
NORTH/SOUTH
RELATIONS
y
Charles Doran et al
(eds.)
(Praeger,
1983),
and
The
Changing
Political Discourse
in
Brazil,
1964-1985,
n
Wayne
Selcher's
(ed.)
POLITICAL IBERALIZATIONN
BRAZIL
Westview,
986).
The author s indebted to
Stephen
Krasner,
who
made
useful criticisms of the initial draftof this
article.
59
CAPITALIST
EPENDENCY
AND
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
THE
CASE OF
CUBA
by
ROBERTA. PACKENHAM
INTRODUCTION
IS
SOCIALISM
A
MEANS
TO
ELIMINATE
or reduce
dependency
and its
alleged
concomitants?
According
to
a
number of
authors,
in-
cluding
those
of the most
influential
recent
approaches
to the
study
of LatinAmerican politics and development, it is. Indeed, for most of
these authors socialism
is the
only
desirable or
acceptable
way
to ad-
dress the
problems
of
dependent
capitalism.
For
them,
capitalism
is
inherently exploitative
and
repressive;
socialism is
the
only
desir-
able
or
acceptable
path
to a more
autonomous,
egalitarian,
free and
just
society
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
ix-xxiv,
209-216).
As
some
of
the
foregoing
implies,
and
as
is obvious to
anyone
fa-
miliar with the
literature,
for
many
authors
the truth or
falsity
of this
view is
not
a
matter amenable to resolution
by
anything
so
mundane
as reference to historical
experience.
For such
analysts,
this view is
true
by
definition.
The
analyst
using
this
perspective
first assumes
it to
be true and then demonstrates that
it is true
by citing
data that
support
it
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
x).
In
this
interpretation,
the
practice
of
comparing hypotheses
against
evidence and
rejecting
or
modifying
the
hypothesis
if
the evidence fails to
be
supportive
is
formal, undialectical,
positivist,
ethnocentric,
and
bourgeois
(Cordoso,
1977:15).
Additionally, there is another problem with a different origin but
the
same
result.
Edy
Kaufman
(1976:14-15)
has noted that
manypoli-
cymakers
and
partisans
of both Communist
and
capitalist
countries
reject,
apriori,
the
possibility
of
any
analogies, parallels,
or
compari-
sons of
the
influences exerted
by
the two
superpowers
on
smaller
countries. Extreme
partisans
of
both
camps,
Kaufman
reports,
Robert
A.
Packenham
s
Professorof PoliticalScience at Stanford
University.
Recentpublications include TheDependency Perspectiveand Analytic
Dependency;,
in
NORTH/SOUTH
RELATIONS
y
Charles Doran et al
(eds.)
(Praeger,
1983),
and
The
Changing
Political Discourse
in
Brazil,
1964-1985,
n
Wayne
Selcher's
(ed.)
POLITICAL IBERALIZATIONN
BRAZIL
Westview,
986).
The author s indebted to
Stephen
Krasner,
who
made
useful criticisms of the initial draftof this
article.
59
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
reach
he
point
of
absurdity
by
denying
the
possibility
of
a
compari-
son,
on the
grounds
that
the
policies
of the
superpowers
are
not
identicaland are thereforenot
comparable.
his
paper
assumes that
comparisons
are
possible.
Indeed,
without
this
assumption,
the
claim
that socialism is
superior
to
capitalism
s
nonsense.
For
those who do believe that historical
experience
can,
and
should,
be
examined
as a means
to
illuminate
the
truth-value f such
claims,
however,
comparative
analyses
of
capitalist
and
socialist
cases
are
indispensable.
Kaufman
reports
that,
on
his
visits to
both
LatinAmericaand Eastern
Europe,
he
encounteredcriticism
of
the
paramountsuperpoweryet very little awareness of the restrictions
imposed by
the
rival
superpower
in
other
regions
(1976:15).
The
present study
hopes
to
heighten
that awareness
through
a
compara-
tive
analysis
of the
rival
superpowers
in
the same
region.
Broadly
speaking,
two
ways
of
comparingcapitalist
with
socialist
dependen-
cy immediately suggest
themselves and
appear
to
dominate
the lit-
erature: ross-sectional
comparisons
and
longitudinal
comparisons.
When one
does cross-sectional
comparisons,
one
typically
com-
pares, say,
the
situation
of
Eastern
European
countries
vis-a-vis he
U.S.S.R.with the situationof LatinAmericancountries vis-a-vis he
United States.When one does
longitudinal analysis,
one can
com-
pare
the
situationof the same
country
before
and
afterthe adventof
socialism:
say,
Cuba before and
after
1959,
Chile before and after
1970,
Nicaragua
before and after
1979,
Grenada before and
after
1979.
In this
paper
the
longitudinal
method is used and the
case se-
lected for
analysis
is
Cuba.
The longitudinalmethod normallyenables the analystto hold
variablesconstant to a
greater
extent
than
is
possible
when two
dif-
ferentcountriesare
studied.
Language,
historical
radition
and
mem-
ory,
cultural
baselines,
basic
geographic
and material
circumstances,
and
population
are all factors that
remain more
or
less constant
whenever
a
particular
case
is studied over time. When some
pro-
found
event,
like
the
Cuban
Revolution,
occurs
in
one
country,
one
can more or
less
hold these other
factorsconstant and make reason-
able inferences about
the
degree
and
form
of
changes
in
the
country
that
may
havebeen
brought
about (or not)
by
that
profound
event.
Of
course,
in
fact,
other
variables
do
change;
it is
not true that the
profound
event
is
the
only
alteration.So the method
is
not
airtight
(to
say
the
least).
No method
is
airtight.
However,
he method of lon-
gitudinal
analysis
-
comparing
different
systems
within
the
same
reach
he
point
of
absurdity
by
denying
the
possibility
of
a
compari-
son,
on the
grounds
that
the
policies
of the
superpowers
are
not
identicaland are thereforenot
comparable.
his
paper
assumes that
comparisons
are
possible.
Indeed,
without
this
assumption,
the
claim
that socialism is
superior
to
capitalism
s
nonsense.
For
those who do believe that historical
experience
can,
and
should,
be
examined
as a means
to
illuminate
the
truth-value f such
claims,
however,
comparative
analyses
of
capitalist
and
socialist
cases
are
indispensable.
Kaufman
reports
that,
on
his
visits to
both
LatinAmericaand Eastern
Europe,
he
encounteredcriticism
of
the
paramountsuperpoweryet very little awareness of the restrictions
imposed by
the
rival
superpower
in
other
regions
(1976:15).
The
present study
hopes
to
heighten
that awareness
through
a
compara-
tive
analysis
of the
rival
superpowers
in
the same
region.
Broadly
speaking,
two
ways
of
comparingcapitalist
with
socialist
dependen-
cy immediately suggest
themselves and
appear
to
dominate
the lit-
erature: ross-sectional
comparisons
and
longitudinal
comparisons.
When one
does cross-sectional
comparisons,
one
typically
com-
pares, say,
the
situation
of
Eastern
European
countries
vis-a-vis he
U.S.S.R.with the situationof LatinAmericancountries vis-a-vis he
United States.When one does
longitudinal analysis,
one can
com-
pare
the
situationof the same
country
before
and
afterthe adventof
socialism:
say,
Cuba before and
after
1959,
Chile before and after
1970,
Nicaragua
before and after
1979,
Grenada before and
after
1979.
In this
paper
the
longitudinal
method is used and the
case se-
lected for
analysis
is
Cuba.
The longitudinalmethod normallyenables the analystto hold
variablesconstant to a
greater
extent
than
is
possible
when two
dif-
ferentcountriesare
studied.
Language,
historical
radition
and
mem-
ory,
cultural
baselines,
basic
geographic
and material
circumstances,
and
population
are all factors that
remain more
or
less constant
whenever
a
particular
case
is studied over time. When some
pro-
found
event,
like
the
Cuban
Revolution,
occurs
in
one
country,
one
can more or
less
hold these other
factorsconstant and make reason-
able inferences about
the
degree
and
form
of
changes
in
the
country
that
may
havebeen
brought
about (or not)
by
that
profound
event.
Of
course,
in
fact,
other
variables
do
change;
it is
not true that the
profound
event
is
the
only
alteration.So the method
is
not
airtight
(to
say
the
least).
No method
is
airtight.
However,
he method of lon-
gitudinal
analysis
-
comparing
different
systems
within
the
same
reach
he
point
of
absurdity
by
denying
the
possibility
of
a
compari-
son,
on the
grounds
that
the
policies
of the
superpowers
are
not
identicaland are thereforenot
comparable.
his
paper
assumes that
comparisons
are
possible.
Indeed,
without
this
assumption,
the
claim
that socialism is
superior
to
capitalism
s
nonsense.
For
those who do believe that historical
experience
can,
and
should,
be
examined
as a means
to
illuminate
the
truth-value f such
claims,
however,
comparative
analyses
of
capitalist
and
socialist
cases
are
indispensable.
Kaufman
reports
that,
on
his
visits to
both
LatinAmericaand Eastern
Europe,
he
encounteredcriticism
of
the
paramountsuperpoweryet very little awareness of the restrictions
imposed by
the
rival
superpower
in
other
regions
(1976:15).
The
present study
hopes
to
heighten
that awareness
through
a
compara-
tive
analysis
of the
rival
superpowers
in
the same
region.
Broadly
speaking,
two
ways
of
comparingcapitalist
with
socialist
dependen-
cy immediately suggest
themselves and
appear
to
dominate
the lit-
erature: ross-sectional
comparisons
and
longitudinal
comparisons.
When one
does cross-sectional
comparisons,
one
typically
com-
pares, say,
the
situation
of
Eastern
European
countries
vis-a-vis he
U.S.S.R.with the situationof LatinAmericancountries vis-a-vis he
United States.When one does
longitudinal analysis,
one can
com-
pare
the
situationof the same
country
before
and
afterthe adventof
socialism:
say,
Cuba before and
after
1959,
Chile before and after
1970,
Nicaragua
before and after
1979,
Grenada before and
after
1979.
In this
paper
the
longitudinal
method is used and the
case se-
lected for
analysis
is
Cuba.
The longitudinalmethod normallyenables the analystto hold
variablesconstant to a
greater
extent
than
is
possible
when two
dif-
ferentcountriesare
studied.
Language,
historical
radition
and
mem-
ory,
cultural
baselines,
basic
geographic
and material
circumstances,
and
population
are all factors that
remain more
or
less constant
whenever
a
particular
case
is studied over time. When some
pro-
found
event,
like
the
Cuban
Revolution,
occurs
in
one
country,
one
can more or
less
hold these other
factorsconstant and make reason-
able inferences about
the
degree
and
form
of
changes
in
the
country
that
may
havebeen
brought
about (or not)
by
that
profound
event.
Of
course,
in
fact,
other
variables
do
change;
it is
not true that the
profound
event
is
the
only
alteration.So the method
is
not
airtight
(to
say
the
least).
No method
is
airtight.
However,
he method of lon-
gitudinal
analysis
-
comparing
different
systems
within
the
same
reach
he
point
of
absurdity
by
denying
the
possibility
of
a
compari-
son,
on the
grounds
that
the
policies
of the
superpowers
are
not
identicaland are thereforenot
comparable.
his
paper
assumes that
comparisons
are
possible.
Indeed,
without
this
assumption,
the
claim
that socialism is
superior
to
capitalism
s
nonsense.
For
those who do believe that historical
experience
can,
and
should,
be
examined
as a means
to
illuminate
the
truth-value f such
claims,
however,
comparative
analyses
of
capitalist
and
socialist
cases
are
indispensable.
Kaufman
reports
that,
on
his
visits to
both
LatinAmericaand Eastern
Europe,
he
encounteredcriticism
of
the
paramountsuperpoweryet very little awareness of the restrictions
imposed by
the
rival
superpower
in
other
regions
(1976:15).
The
present study
hopes
to
heighten
that awareness
through
a
compara-
tive
analysis
of the
rival
superpowers
in
the same
region.
Broadly
speaking,
two
ways
of
comparingcapitalist
with
socialist
dependen-
cy immediately suggest
themselves and
appear
to
dominate
the lit-
erature: ross-sectional
comparisons
and
longitudinal
comparisons.
When one
does cross-sectional
comparisons,
one
typically
com-
pares, say,
the
situation
of
Eastern
European
countries
vis-a-vis he
U.S.S.R.with the situationof LatinAmericancountries vis-a-vis he
United States.When one does
longitudinal analysis,
one can
com-
pare
the
situationof the same
country
before
and
afterthe adventof
socialism:
say,
Cuba before and
after
1959,
Chile before and after
1970,
Nicaragua
before and after
1979,
Grenada before and
after
1979.
In this
paper
the
longitudinal
method is used and the
case se-
lected for
analysis
is
Cuba.
The longitudinalmethod normallyenables the analystto hold
variablesconstant to a
greater
extent
than
is
possible
when two
dif-
ferentcountriesare
studied.
Language,
historical
radition
and
mem-
ory,
cultural
baselines,
basic
geographic
and material
circumstances,
and
population
are all factors that
remain more
or
less constant
whenever
a
particular
case
is studied over time. When some
pro-
found
event,
like
the
Cuban
Revolution,
occurs
in
one
country,
one
can more or
less
hold these other
factorsconstant and make reason-
able inferences about
the
degree
and
form
of
changes
in
the
country
that
may
havebeen
brought
about (or not)
by
that
profound
event.
Of
course,
in
fact,
other
variables
do
change;
it is
not true that the
profound
event
is
the
only
alteration.So the method
is
not
airtight
(to
say
the
least).
No method
is
airtight.
However,
he method of lon-
gitudinal
analysis
-
comparing
different
systems
within
the
same
60000
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PACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
country
over time
-
clearly
has natural
strengths
that
deserve to be
exploited. Comparative olitics
can
be
done
bycomparing
different
systems
over time
within the same
country
as
well as
by
comparing
different
countries
to one
another.
Within
Latin
America
Cuba
s
by
far he best case available
f
one
wants
to
make
systematic
longitudinal
comparisons
of
capitalism
with socialism. Its
experience
with
socialism
is now more
than
a
quarter-century
ld.
By
contrast,
he
socialist
experiments
in
Chile
and Grenada
were
very
short-lived Allende's
socialist
experiment
lasted
only
three
years,
the
NewJewel
regime
only
four.The Nicara-
guan experimenthas hadonlysix orsevenyears.Moreover,he emo-
tionalism,
politicization,
and
theatricality
hat
have
pervadedanaly-
ses of
Cuba
and thatdominate
writing
about
the other cases are now
abating
a
bit
in
the Cuban
case,
although
they
are
still
common.
STRUCTURALECONOMIC
DEPENDENCY
BEFORE
AND
AFTER
1959
BASIC
TO
THE
DEPENDENT
ONDITION
s structural
ependen-
cy:
monoculture,
reliance on
exports,
trade
partner
concentration,
capital dependency,
technological
dependency,
and
the like. Not
only
Cuba's
eaders,
but
many
intellectuals
outside
Cuba,
thought
Cuba's tructural
conomic
dependency
would
change
significantly
under socialism.
Some
think
it has
changed
significantly
(LeoGrande,
1979).
Letus see
what has
happened.
Diversification
of
Production/Monoculture
in
Production
The more diversifieda nation's conomy,the less the degree of
dependency.
The less diversified
the
economy,
the
greater
the de-
gree
of
dependency.
Thus,
an
economy
with a varied
production
structure
e.g.,
one that
produces
industrial
goods
rather han
just
primary
products,
a
variety
of
agricultural
products
rather
han
just
one, etc.,
is less
dependent
than
an
economy
based
overwhelmingly
on
just
one
product.
Before
the
Revolution
Cuba
was a classic
case of monoculture
(relianceon one cropsugar)asthe mainpropof the nationalecono-
my.
In
the
early stages
of the
Revolution,
diversification
was
an
idealistic
goal..., promoted
vigorously
but
irrationally
n
1961-63
with
poor
results.
Since
1964
economic
realitypushed
diver-
sificationdown
to the
bottom
of
Cuba's
priorities.
n
spite
of
great
ex-
pectations,
sugar
continues
to
be
the
dominant
sector
in
the
econo-
country
over time
-
clearly
has natural
strengths
that
deserve to be
exploited. Comparative olitics
can
be
done
bycomparing
different
systems
over time
within the same
country
as
well as
by
comparing
different
countries
to one
another.
Within
Latin
America
Cuba
s
by
far he best case available
f
one
wants
to
make
systematic
longitudinal
comparisons
of
capitalism
with socialism. Its
experience
with
socialism
is now more
than
a
quarter-century
ld.
By
contrast,
he
socialist
experiments
in
Chile
and Grenada
were
very
short-lived Allende's
socialist
experiment
lasted
only
three
years,
the
NewJewel
regime
only
four.The Nicara-
guan experimenthas hadonlysix orsevenyears.Moreover,he emo-
tionalism,
politicization,
and
theatricality
hat
have
pervadedanaly-
ses of
Cuba
and thatdominate
writing
about
the other cases are now
abating
a
bit
in
the Cuban
case,
although
they
are
still
common.
STRUCTURALECONOMIC
DEPENDENCY
BEFORE
AND
AFTER
1959
BASIC
TO
THE
DEPENDENT
ONDITION
s structural
ependen-
cy:
monoculture,
reliance on
exports,
trade
partner
concentration,
capital dependency,
technological
dependency,
and
the like. Not
only
Cuba's
eaders,
but
many
intellectuals
outside
Cuba,
thought
Cuba's tructural
conomic
dependency
would
change
significantly
under socialism.
Some
think
it has
changed
significantly
(LeoGrande,
1979).
Letus see
what has
happened.
Diversification
of
Production/Monoculture
in
Production
The more diversifieda nation's conomy,the less the degree of
dependency.
The less diversified
the
economy,
the
greater
the de-
gree
of
dependency.
Thus,
an
economy
with a varied
production
structure
e.g.,
one that
produces
industrial
goods
rather han
just
primary
products,
a
variety
of
agricultural
products
rather
han
just
one, etc.,
is less
dependent
than
an
economy
based
overwhelmingly
on
just
one
product.
Before
the
Revolution
Cuba
was a classic
case of monoculture
(relianceon one cropsugar)asthe mainpropof the nationalecono-
my.
In
the
early stages
of the
Revolution,
diversification
was
an
idealistic
goal..., promoted
vigorously
but
irrationally
n
1961-63
with
poor
results.
Since
1964
economic
realitypushed
diver-
sificationdown
to the
bottom
of
Cuba's
priorities.
n
spite
of
great
ex-
pectations,
sugar
continues
to
be
the
dominant
sector
in
the
econo-
country
over time
-
clearly
has natural
strengths
that
deserve to be
exploited. Comparative olitics
can
be
done
bycomparing
different
systems
over time
within the same
country
as
well as
by
comparing
different
countries
to one
another.
Within
Latin
America
Cuba
s
by
far he best case available
f
one
wants
to
make
systematic
longitudinal
comparisons
of
capitalism
with socialism. Its
experience
with
socialism
is now more
than
a
quarter-century
ld.
By
contrast,
he
socialist
experiments
in
Chile
and Grenada
were
very
short-lived Allende's
socialist
experiment
lasted
only
three
years,
the
NewJewel
regime
only
four.The Nicara-
guan experimenthas hadonlysix orsevenyears.Moreover,he emo-
tionalism,
politicization,
and
theatricality
hat
have
pervadedanaly-
ses of
Cuba
and thatdominate
writing
about
the other cases are now
abating
a
bit
in
the Cuban
case,
although
they
are
still
common.
STRUCTURALECONOMIC
DEPENDENCY
BEFORE
AND
AFTER
1959
BASIC
TO
THE
DEPENDENT
ONDITION
s structural
ependen-
cy:
monoculture,
reliance on
exports,
trade
partner
concentration,
capital dependency,
technological
dependency,
and
the like. Not
only
Cuba's
eaders,
but
many
intellectuals
outside
Cuba,
thought
Cuba's tructural
conomic
dependency
would
change
significantly
under socialism.
Some
think
it has
changed
significantly
(LeoGrande,
1979).
Letus see
what has
happened.
Diversification
of
Production/Monoculture
in
Production
The more diversifieda nation's conomy,the less the degree of
dependency.
The less diversified
the
economy,
the
greater
the de-
gree
of
dependency.
Thus,
an
economy
with a varied
production
structure
e.g.,
one that
produces
industrial
goods
rather han
just
primary
products,
a
variety
of
agricultural
products
rather
han
just
one, etc.,
is less
dependent
than
an
economy
based
overwhelmingly
on
just
one
product.
Before
the
Revolution
Cuba
was a classic
case of monoculture
(relianceon one cropsugar)asthe mainpropof the nationalecono-
my.
In
the
early stages
of the
Revolution,
diversification
was
an
idealistic
goal..., promoted
vigorously
but
irrationally
n
1961-63
with
poor
results.
Since
1964
economic
realitypushed
diver-
sificationdown
to the
bottom
of
Cuba's
priorities.
n
spite
of
great
ex-
pectations,
sugar
continues
to
be
the
dominant
sector
in
the
econo-
country
over time
-
clearly
has natural
strengths
that
deserve to be
exploited. Comparative olitics
can
be
done
bycomparing
different
systems
over time
within the same
country
as
well as
by
comparing
different
countries
to one
another.
Within
Latin
America
Cuba
s
by
far he best case available
f
one
wants
to
make
systematic
longitudinal
comparisons
of
capitalism
with socialism. Its
experience
with
socialism
is now more
than
a
quarter-century
ld.
By
contrast,
he
socialist
experiments
in
Chile
and Grenada
were
very
short-lived Allende's
socialist
experiment
lasted
only
three
years,
the
NewJewel
regime
only
four.The Nicara-
guan experimenthas hadonlysix orsevenyears.Moreover,he emo-
tionalism,
politicization,
and
theatricality
hat
have
pervadedanaly-
ses of
Cuba
and thatdominate
writing
about
the other cases are now
abating
a
bit
in
the Cuban
case,
although
they
are
still
common.
STRUCTURALECONOMIC
DEPENDENCY
BEFORE
AND
AFTER
1959
BASIC
TO
THE
DEPENDENT
ONDITION
s structural
ependen-
cy:
monoculture,
reliance on
exports,
trade
partner
concentration,
capital dependency,
technological
dependency,
and
the like. Not
only
Cuba's
eaders,
but
many
intellectuals
outside
Cuba,
thought
Cuba's tructural
conomic
dependency
would
change
significantly
under socialism.
Some
think
it has
changed
significantly
(LeoGrande,
1979).
Letus see
what has
happened.
Diversification
of
Production/Monoculture
in
Production
The more diversifieda nation's conomy,the less the degree of
dependency.
The less diversified
the
economy,
the
greater
the de-
gree
of
dependency.
Thus,
an
economy
with a varied
production
structure
e.g.,
one that
produces
industrial
goods
rather han
just
primary
products,
a
variety
of
agricultural
products
rather
han
just
one, etc.,
is less
dependent
than
an
economy
based
overwhelmingly
on
just
one
product.
Before
the
Revolution
Cuba
was a classic
case of monoculture
(relianceon one cropsugar)asthe mainpropof the nationalecono-
my.
In
the
early stages
of the
Revolution,
diversification
was
an
idealistic
goal..., promoted
vigorously
but
irrationally
n
1961-63
with
poor
results.
Since
1964
economic
realitypushed
diver-
sificationdown
to the
bottom
of
Cuba's
priorities.
n
spite
of
great
ex-
pectations,
sugar
continues
to
be
the
dominant
sector
in
the
econo-
61111
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
my,
and
only
modest advances have been
made
in
the diversification
of the
nonsugar
sector
(Mesa-Lago
1981:179).
The overall result is that
Sugar
monoculture is more
pro-
nounced now
than before the
Revolution
Mesa-Lago,
981:
64).
In
the fifties and
early
sixties,
Fidel
Castroand other
Cuban eaders
in-
sisted
that the
economic
doctrine of
comparative
advantage
used to
justify
Cuba's
ugar
monoculture
was
a
mystification
of
capitalist
co-
nomic
ideology,
designed
to
keep
Cuba
in
economic servitude.
By
the
mid-seventies, however,
Castro
was
attacking
what he called
anti-sugar
ttitudes
and
he
pledged
that Cuba would
stick
to
sugar preciselybecause of the comparativeadvantagesof thatprod-
uct
(Castro
as
quoted by
Mesa-Lago,
981:
65).
Overall
Dependency
on
Trade
The
larger
he trade
sector
in
relation
to total
economic
activity
the more
dependent
the
country's
economy.
In
1946-58
the
average
ratio
of
Cuba's
xports
to
GNP
was
30.6%
and
declining
while that
of
imports
was
25.7%
and
increasing.
Total rade
as a
percent
of GNP
was
56.3%
and
stagnant.
What
happened
afterthe Revolution?
A
rigorous comparison
is
difficult,
if not
impossible,
because
after
he Revolution
he
Cubans
stopped
computing
GNP
and
began
to make
other
computations
instead:
global
social
product
(GSP),
total
material
product
(TMP),
and
gross
material
product
(GMP).
These
concepts
were
developed
in the
Soviet
Union
and are
not di-
rectly comparable
o the Western
concept
of
GNP
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
199-202).
If
one
ignores
this
problem,
and
directly compares
trade/
GNP
before
1959
with
trade/GMP
after
1959,
then there
appears
to
havebeen a reductionin overalltradedependency.In1962-78,aver-
age proportion
of
exports
in relation to the
GMP
(Gross
Material
Product)
was
only
21%
and
the
average
ratio of
total
trade
to GMP
was
only
48.5%
(Mesa-Lago
1981:
79;
LeoGrande,
1979:
5-8).
How-
ever,
GNPand GMPare
not
the
same,
and therefore his
comparison
is
misleading.
Moreover,
as
we shall see
below,
export
figures
are
massively
distorted
by
the
world
sugar price,
whereas
import
ratios
are
much more
stable and reliable indicators
of trade
dependence.
Some
of these
problems
are avoided
by
tracing
trends
in trade
dependency
after the Revolution,using consistent definitions and
indicators rom
1962
to
1978.
These
data
show that Cuba's radede-
pendency
increased
in the
1970s
as
compared
to the
1960s.
This
pat-
tern holds
on all three indicatorsof
trade
as a
percentage
of GMP: x-
ports
went
up,
from an
average
of
16%
of
GMP
in
the
1960s
to an
my,
and
only
modest advances have been
made
in
the diversification
of the
nonsugar
sector
(Mesa-Lago
1981:179).
The overall result is that
Sugar
monoculture is more
pro-
nounced now
than before the
Revolution
Mesa-Lago,
981:
64).
In
the fifties and
early
sixties,
Fidel
Castroand other
Cuban eaders
in-
sisted
that the
economic
doctrine of
comparative
advantage
used to
justify
Cuba's
ugar
monoculture
was
a
mystification
of
capitalist
co-
nomic
ideology,
designed
to
keep
Cuba
in
economic servitude.
By
the
mid-seventies, however,
Castro
was
attacking
what he called
anti-sugar
ttitudes
and
he
pledged
that Cuba would
stick
to
sugar preciselybecause of the comparativeadvantagesof thatprod-
uct
(Castro
as
quoted by
Mesa-Lago,
981:
65).
Overall
Dependency
on
Trade
The
larger
he trade
sector
in
relation
to total
economic
activity
the more
dependent
the
country's
economy.
In
1946-58
the
average
ratio
of
Cuba's
xports
to
GNP
was
30.6%
and
declining
while that
of
imports
was
25.7%
and
increasing.
Total rade
as a
percent
of GNP
was
56.3%
and
stagnant.
What
happened
afterthe Revolution?
A
rigorous comparison
is
difficult,
if not
impossible,
because
after
he Revolution
he
Cubans
stopped
computing
GNP
and
began
to make
other
computations
instead:
global
social
product
(GSP),
total
material
product
(TMP),
and
gross
material
product
(GMP).
These
concepts
were
developed
in the
Soviet
Union
and are
not di-
rectly comparable
o the Western
concept
of
GNP
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
199-202).
If
one
ignores
this
problem,
and
directly compares
trade/
GNP
before
1959
with
trade/GMP
after
1959,
then there
appears
to
havebeen a reductionin overalltradedependency.In1962-78,aver-
age proportion
of
exports
in relation to the
GMP
(Gross
Material
Product)
was
only
21%
and
the
average
ratio of
total
trade
to GMP
was
only
48.5%
(Mesa-Lago
1981:
79;
LeoGrande,
1979:
5-8).
How-
ever,
GNPand GMPare
not
the
same,
and therefore his
comparison
is
misleading.
Moreover,
as
we shall see
below,
export
figures
are
massively
distorted
by
the
world
sugar price,
whereas
import
ratios
are
much more
stable and reliable indicators
of trade
dependence.
Some
of these
problems
are avoided
by
tracing
trends
in trade
dependency
after the Revolution,using consistent definitions and
indicators rom
1962
to
1978.
These
data
show that Cuba's radede-
pendency
increased
in the
1970s
as
compared
to the
1960s.
This
pat-
tern holds
on all three indicatorsof
trade
as a
percentage
of GMP: x-
ports
went
up,
from an
average
of
16%
of
GMP
in
the
1960s
to an
my,
and
only
modest advances have been
made
in
the diversification
of the
nonsugar
sector
(Mesa-Lago
1981:179).
The overall result is that
Sugar
monoculture is more
pro-
nounced now
than before the
Revolution
Mesa-Lago,
981:
64).
In
the fifties and
early
sixties,
Fidel
Castroand other
Cuban eaders
in-
sisted
that the
economic
doctrine of
comparative
advantage
used to
justify
Cuba's
ugar
monoculture
was
a
mystification
of
capitalist
co-
nomic
ideology,
designed
to
keep
Cuba
in
economic servitude.
By
the
mid-seventies, however,
Castro
was
attacking
what he called
anti-sugar
ttitudes
and
he
pledged
that Cuba would
stick
to
sugar preciselybecause of the comparativeadvantagesof thatprod-
uct
(Castro
as
quoted by
Mesa-Lago,
981:
65).
Overall
Dependency
on
Trade
The
larger
he trade
sector
in
relation
to total
economic
activity
the more
dependent
the
country's
economy.
In
1946-58
the
average
ratio
of
Cuba's
xports
to
GNP
was
30.6%
and
declining
while that
of
imports
was
25.7%
and
increasing.
Total rade
as a
percent
of GNP
was
56.3%
and
stagnant.
What
happened
afterthe Revolution?
A
rigorous comparison
is
difficult,
if not
impossible,
because
after
he Revolution
he
Cubans
stopped
computing
GNP
and
began
to make
other
computations
instead:
global
social
product
(GSP),
total
material
product
(TMP),
and
gross
material
product
(GMP).
These
concepts
were
developed
in the
Soviet
Union
and are
not di-
rectly comparable
o the Western
concept
of
GNP
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
199-202).
If
one
ignores
this
problem,
and
directly compares
trade/
GNP
before
1959
with
trade/GMP
after
1959,
then there
appears
to
havebeen a reductionin overalltradedependency.In1962-78,aver-
age proportion
of
exports
in relation to the
GMP
(Gross
Material
Product)
was
only
21%
and
the
average
ratio of
total
trade
to GMP
was
only
48.5%
(Mesa-Lago
1981:
79;
LeoGrande,
1979:
5-8).
How-
ever,
GNPand GMPare
not
the
same,
and therefore his
comparison
is
misleading.
Moreover,
as
we shall see
below,
export
figures
are
massively
distorted
by
the
world
sugar price,
whereas
import
ratios
are
much more
stable and reliable indicators
of trade
dependence.
Some
of these
problems
are avoided
by
tracing
trends
in trade
dependency
after the Revolution,using consistent definitions and
indicators rom
1962
to
1978.
These
data
show that Cuba's radede-
pendency
increased
in the
1970s
as
compared
to the
1960s.
This
pat-
tern holds
on all three indicatorsof
trade
as a
percentage
of GMP: x-
ports
went
up,
from an
average
of
16%
of
GMP
in
the
1960s
to an
my,
and
only
modest advances have been
made
in
the diversification
of the
nonsugar
sector
(Mesa-Lago
1981:179).
The overall result is that
Sugar
monoculture is more
pro-
nounced now
than before the
Revolution
Mesa-Lago,
981:
64).
In
the fifties and
early
sixties,
Fidel
Castroand other
Cuban eaders
in-
sisted
that the
economic
doctrine of
comparative
advantage
used to
justify
Cuba's
ugar
monoculture
was
a
mystification
of
capitalist
co-
nomic
ideology,
designed
to
keep
Cuba
in
economic servitude.
By
the
mid-seventies, however,
Castro
was
attacking
what he called
anti-sugar
ttitudes
and
he
pledged
that Cuba would
stick
to
sugar preciselybecause of the comparativeadvantagesof thatprod-
uct
(Castro
as
quoted by
Mesa-Lago,
981:
65).
Overall
Dependency
on
Trade
The
larger
he trade
sector
in
relation
to total
economic
activity
the more
dependent
the
country's
economy.
In
1946-58
the
average
ratio
of
Cuba's
xports
to
GNP
was
30.6%
and
declining
while that
of
imports
was
25.7%
and
increasing.
Total rade
as a
percent
of GNP
was
56.3%
and
stagnant.
What
happened
afterthe Revolution?
A
rigorous comparison
is
difficult,
if not
impossible,
because
after
he Revolution
he
Cubans
stopped
computing
GNP
and
began
to make
other
computations
instead:
global
social
product
(GSP),
total
material
product
(TMP),
and
gross
material
product
(GMP).
These
concepts
were
developed
in the
Soviet
Union
and are
not di-
rectly comparable
o the Western
concept
of
GNP
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
199-202).
If
one
ignores
this
problem,
and
directly compares
trade/
GNP
before
1959
with
trade/GMP
after
1959,
then there
appears
to
havebeen a reductionin overalltradedependency.In1962-78,aver-
age proportion
of
exports
in relation to the
GMP
(Gross
Material
Product)
was
only
21%
and
the
average
ratio of
total
trade
to GMP
was
only
48.5%
(Mesa-Lago
1981:
79;
LeoGrande,
1979:
5-8).
How-
ever,
GNPand GMPare
not
the
same,
and therefore his
comparison
is
misleading.
Moreover,
as
we shall see
below,
export
figures
are
massively
distorted
by
the
world
sugar price,
whereas
import
ratios
are
much more
stable and reliable indicators
of trade
dependence.
Some
of these
problems
are avoided
by
tracing
trends
in trade
dependency
after the Revolution,using consistent definitions and
indicators rom
1962
to
1978.
These
data
show that Cuba's radede-
pendency
increased
in the
1970s
as
compared
to the
1960s.
This
pat-
tern holds
on all three indicatorsof
trade
as a
percentage
of GMP: x-
ports
went
up,
from an
average
of
16%
of
GMP
in
the
1960s
to an
62222
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
average
of
26%
in the
1970s;
imports
went from 24 -
31%;
and
total
trade ncreased from
40 to
56%.
In
1978,
total tradehad
reached
69%
of
GMP,
wice the
figure
(34.6%)
for
1962
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
80).
The
world
price
of
sugar
affects the indicators or both
exports
and total trade.
High prices
for
sugar
in
the
early
1970s
increased
them,
whereas low
prices
of
sugar
in
the
1960s
had decreased
them.
However,
no
parallel
distortion s
observed
with
respect
to
imports,
which are
consistently,
and
significantly,higher
than
export/GMP
ratios.Thus
Castro
complained
in
1978
that we have an
importer's
mentality
...
exports
must be
increased
with
(capitalist
countries)
and with the socialist region as well (Quoted in MesaLago,1981:
82).
In this
respect,
then,
dependence
under
socialism is
at
least as
great
as
it was
under
capitalism.
Monoculture
In
Exports
The more
diversified the
export
structure,
he less
dependent
the
country,
and vice
versa.
The
early
attempt by
the
Revolutionary
government
o
diversify
he
export
structure
was no more
successful
thanthe earlydriveto industrializeand diversify he overallecono-
my.
Thus,
from the
1920s
to the
1950s,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
ranged
from
70
to
92%,
averaging
81%
overall. From
1959
to
1976,
however,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
still
ranged
from
74 to
90%,
with an
average
of
82%.
In
short,
Cuba's
xport
structurecontinued
to be as
dependent during
the
Revolutionary
eriod
as it
had before
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
82-83;
LeoGrande,
1979:
8-11).
Trade-Partner
Concentration
A countrythatrelies
heavily
on
only
one or a few
trading
part-
ners is
more
dependent
than
a
country
with
a
larger
number
of trade
partners.
Before
the
Revolution,
rom
1946
to
1958,
Cuba's radewith
the United
States
averaged
69%
annually.
Of
this
total,
imports
from
the
U.S.
(77%)
surpassed
exports
to
the
U.S.
(63%)
(LeoGrande,
1979:14).
After he
Revolution,
rom
1961
o
1976,
the
average
annual
share of
Cuba's radewith
the USSRwas
48.5%.
Again,
mports
from
the Soviet
Union
(52%)
accounted for a
higher
proportion
of
the
total thanexportsto the SovietUnion (43%) (LeoGrande,1979:15).
Thus,
f
one
compares
the
average
or
Cuba's
rade
with
the two
prin-
cipal
countries
only,
for
the
years
before
and
after
1959,
then
there
has
been
significant
reduction
in
trade-partner
oncentration.
An
additional
point
should
be
noted,
however:
trade-partner
concentration
becomes much
higher
after
1959
if
the
indicator
n-
average
of
26%
in the
1970s;
imports
went from 24 -
31%;
and
total
trade ncreased from
40 to
56%.
In
1978,
total tradehad
reached
69%
of
GMP,
wice the
figure
(34.6%)
for
1962
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
80).
The
world
price
of
sugar
affects the indicators or both
exports
and total trade.
High prices
for
sugar
in
the
early
1970s
increased
them,
whereas low
prices
of
sugar
in
the
1960s
had decreased
them.
However,
no
parallel
distortion s
observed
with
respect
to
imports,
which are
consistently,
and
significantly,higher
than
export/GMP
ratios.Thus
Castro
complained
in
1978
that we have an
importer's
mentality
...
exports
must be
increased
with
(capitalist
countries)
and with the socialist region as well (Quoted in MesaLago,1981:
82).
In this
respect,
then,
dependence
under
socialism is
at
least as
great
as
it was
under
capitalism.
Monoculture
In
Exports
The more
diversified the
export
structure,
he less
dependent
the
country,
and vice
versa.
The
early
attempt by
the
Revolutionary
government
o
diversify
he
export
structure
was no more
successful
thanthe earlydriveto industrializeand diversify he overallecono-
my.
Thus,
from the
1920s
to the
1950s,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
ranged
from
70
to
92%,
averaging
81%
overall. From
1959
to
1976,
however,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
still
ranged
from
74 to
90%,
with an
average
of
82%.
In
short,
Cuba's
xport
structurecontinued
to be as
dependent during
the
Revolutionary
eriod
as it
had before
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
82-83;
LeoGrande,
1979:
8-11).
Trade-Partner
Concentration
A countrythatrelies
heavily
on
only
one or a few
trading
part-
ners is
more
dependent
than
a
country
with
a
larger
number
of trade
partners.
Before
the
Revolution,
rom
1946
to
1958,
Cuba's radewith
the United
States
averaged
69%
annually.
Of
this
total,
imports
from
the
U.S.
(77%)
surpassed
exports
to
the
U.S.
(63%)
(LeoGrande,
1979:14).
After he
Revolution,
rom
1961
o
1976,
the
average
annual
share of
Cuba's radewith
the USSRwas
48.5%.
Again,
mports
from
the Soviet
Union
(52%)
accounted for a
higher
proportion
of
the
total thanexportsto the SovietUnion (43%) (LeoGrande,1979:15).
Thus,
f
one
compares
the
average
or
Cuba's
rade
with
the two
prin-
cipal
countries
only,
for
the
years
before
and
after
1959,
then
there
has
been
significant
reduction
in
trade-partner
oncentration.
An
additional
point
should
be
noted,
however:
trade-partner
concentration
becomes much
higher
after
1959
if
the
indicator
n-
average
of
26%
in the
1970s;
imports
went from 24 -
31%;
and
total
trade ncreased from
40 to
56%.
In
1978,
total tradehad
reached
69%
of
GMP,
wice the
figure
(34.6%)
for
1962
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
80).
The
world
price
of
sugar
affects the indicators or both
exports
and total trade.
High prices
for
sugar
in
the
early
1970s
increased
them,
whereas low
prices
of
sugar
in
the
1960s
had decreased
them.
However,
no
parallel
distortion s
observed
with
respect
to
imports,
which are
consistently,
and
significantly,higher
than
export/GMP
ratios.Thus
Castro
complained
in
1978
that we have an
importer's
mentality
...
exports
must be
increased
with
(capitalist
countries)
and with the socialist region as well (Quoted in MesaLago,1981:
82).
In this
respect,
then,
dependence
under
socialism is
at
least as
great
as
it was
under
capitalism.
Monoculture
In
Exports
The more
diversified the
export
structure,
he less
dependent
the
country,
and vice
versa.
The
early
attempt by
the
Revolutionary
government
o
diversify
he
export
structure
was no more
successful
thanthe earlydriveto industrializeand diversify he overallecono-
my.
Thus,
from the
1920s
to the
1950s,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
ranged
from
70
to
92%,
averaging
81%
overall. From
1959
to
1976,
however,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
still
ranged
from
74 to
90%,
with an
average
of
82%.
In
short,
Cuba's
xport
structurecontinued
to be as
dependent during
the
Revolutionary
eriod
as it
had before
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
82-83;
LeoGrande,
1979:
8-11).
Trade-Partner
Concentration
A countrythatrelies
heavily
on
only
one or a few
trading
part-
ners is
more
dependent
than
a
country
with
a
larger
number
of trade
partners.
Before
the
Revolution,
rom
1946
to
1958,
Cuba's radewith
the United
States
averaged
69%
annually.
Of
this
total,
imports
from
the
U.S.
(77%)
surpassed
exports
to
the
U.S.
(63%)
(LeoGrande,
1979:14).
After he
Revolution,
rom
1961
o
1976,
the
average
annual
share of
Cuba's radewith
the USSRwas
48.5%.
Again,
mports
from
the Soviet
Union
(52%)
accounted for a
higher
proportion
of
the
total thanexportsto the SovietUnion (43%) (LeoGrande,1979:15).
Thus,
f
one
compares
the
average
or
Cuba's
rade
with
the two
prin-
cipal
countries
only,
for
the
years
before
and
after
1959,
then
there
has
been
significant
reduction
in
trade-partner
oncentration.
An
additional
point
should
be
noted,
however:
trade-partner
concentration
becomes much
higher
after
1959
if
the
indicator
n-
average
of
26%
in the
1970s;
imports
went from 24 -
31%;
and
total
trade ncreased from
40 to
56%.
In
1978,
total tradehad
reached
69%
of
GMP,
wice the
figure
(34.6%)
for
1962
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
80).
The
world
price
of
sugar
affects the indicators or both
exports
and total trade.
High prices
for
sugar
in
the
early
1970s
increased
them,
whereas low
prices
of
sugar
in
the
1960s
had decreased
them.
However,
no
parallel
distortion s
observed
with
respect
to
imports,
which are
consistently,
and
significantly,higher
than
export/GMP
ratios.Thus
Castro
complained
in
1978
that we have an
importer's
mentality
...
exports
must be
increased
with
(capitalist
countries)
and with the socialist region as well (Quoted in MesaLago,1981:
82).
In this
respect,
then,
dependence
under
socialism is
at
least as
great
as
it was
under
capitalism.
Monoculture
In
Exports
The more
diversified the
export
structure,
he less
dependent
the
country,
and vice
versa.
The
early
attempt by
the
Revolutionary
government
o
diversify
he
export
structure
was no more
successful
thanthe earlydriveto industrializeand diversify he overallecono-
my.
Thus,
from the
1920s
to the
1950s,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
ranged
from
70
to
92%,
averaging
81%
overall. From
1959
to
1976,
however,
sugar's
hare of
total
exports
still
ranged
from
74 to
90%,
with an
average
of
82%.
In
short,
Cuba's
xport
structurecontinued
to be as
dependent during
the
Revolutionary
eriod
as it
had before
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
82-83;
LeoGrande,
1979:
8-11).
Trade-Partner
Concentration
A countrythatrelies
heavily
on
only
one or a few
trading
part-
ners is
more
dependent
than
a
country
with
a
larger
number
of trade
partners.
Before
the
Revolution,
rom
1946
to
1958,
Cuba's radewith
the United
States
averaged
69%
annually.
Of
this
total,
imports
from
the
U.S.
(77%)
surpassed
exports
to
the
U.S.
(63%)
(LeoGrande,
1979:14).
After he
Revolution,
rom
1961
o
1976,
the
average
annual
share of
Cuba's radewith
the USSRwas
48.5%.
Again,
mports
from
the Soviet
Union
(52%)
accounted for a
higher
proportion
of
the
total thanexportsto the SovietUnion (43%) (LeoGrande,1979:15).
Thus,
f
one
compares
the
average
or
Cuba's
rade
with
the two
prin-
cipal
countries
only,
for
the
years
before
and
after
1959,
then
there
has
been
significant
reduction
in
trade-partner
oncentration.
An
additional
point
should
be
noted,
however:
trade-partner
concentration
becomes much
higher
after
1959
if
the
indicator
n-
63333
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
cludes
not
only
the Soviet Union
but
also the countries
of the
CMEA
(Council
for MutualEconomic
Assistance),
whose trade
policies
are
influenced
by
the Soviet Unionmuch more
strongly
than trade
poli-
cies
of
U.S.
allies are
influenced
by
the
United
States.
If
we
use
this
indicator,
which is more
appropriate
han thatfor the U.S.S.R.
lone,
the difference between the
pre-1959
and
post-1959periods
vanishes.
From
1961
hrough
1978
the Socialist
countries
absorbed an
annual
average
of
73%
of
Cuba's rade
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
92)
as
compared
with the
averagepre-1959 igure
for the U.S.of
69%.
By1978
-
the
last
year
for
which
I
have
figures
-
Cuban
trade with the
USSRalone
reached69%(Mesa-Lago, 981:92). Bearing n mind thistrend,plus
the
close
political
and
economic
relationship
between
the
USSRand
the CMEA
ountries,
it
can
reasonably
be
maintained
that
in
terms
of trade
partner
concentration,
Cuba
today
is as vulnerable to
exter-
nal
economic
and
political
influence
as it was
before
the
Revolution
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
94;
see also
LeoGrande,
1979:13,17).
Finally,
even
if
one
uses the lowest
possible
indicator,
he
abso-
lute level of
trade-concentration
s still
very
high.
Capital Dependency
Although
direct
private foreign
investment
has
been
virtually
eliminated
in
Cubasince
the
Revolution,
his does
not
mean
depen-
dency
on
foreign capital
has
disappeared;
to
the
contrary,
t
is
mas-
sive. The Soviet
Union
is the
largest
source,
by
far,
of this
foreign capi-
tal
dependency
Soviet
capital
comes
mainly
in
the form of
(1)
repayable
loans,
(2)
nonrepayable
credits to finance Soviet-Cuban
trade
deficits,
(3)
direct aid
for
economic
development,
(4)
subsi-
dies to Cubanexports (especially sugar and nickel) as well as to
Cuban
imports
(especially
oil),
and
(5)
grants
for
military
assist-
ance.
Total
Soviet
capital
nflow to
Cuba,
as
of
1976,
was
estimated to
be
at least
$10
billion,
of which about
half
($4.9 billion)
had to be re-
paid
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
103).
Total economic aid from
the
Soviet
Union to
Cuba
hrough
1979
has
been estimated
at
$16.7
billion. Mil-
itary
aid for
the
same
period
is
estimated at
$3.7
billion
(Blasier,
1983:100-125).
It is
very
difficultto make
precise comparisons
between the lev-
els
of
Cuban
capital dependency
before
and
after
1959
because
of
problems
of
data
comparability.
However,
those who have
studied
the
problem agree
that
the
USSR
has
clearly
replaced
the U.S.as
the
major
ource
of
Cuban
nvestment
capital
(LeoGrande,
1979:18).
Of
course,
Soviet investments
by
their
very
nature involve nei-
cludes
not
only
the Soviet Union
but
also the countries
of the
CMEA
(Council
for MutualEconomic
Assistance),
whose trade
policies
are
influenced
by
the Soviet Unionmuch more
strongly
than trade
poli-
cies
of
U.S.
allies are
influenced
by
the
United
States.
If
we
use
this
indicator,
which is more
appropriate
han thatfor the U.S.S.R.
lone,
the difference between the
pre-1959
and
post-1959periods
vanishes.
From
1961
hrough
1978
the Socialist
countries
absorbed an
annual
average
of
73%
of
Cuba's rade
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
92)
as
compared
with the
averagepre-1959 igure
for the U.S.of
69%.
By1978
-
the
last
year
for
which
I
have
figures
-
Cuban
trade with the
USSRalone
reached69%(Mesa-Lago, 981:92). Bearing n mind thistrend,plus
the
close
political
and
economic
relationship
between
the
USSRand
the CMEA
ountries,
it
can
reasonably
be
maintained
that
in
terms
of trade
partner
concentration,
Cuba
today
is as vulnerable to
exter-
nal
economic
and
political
influence
as it was
before
the
Revolution
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
94;
see also
LeoGrande,
1979:13,17).
Finally,
even
if
one
uses the lowest
possible
indicator,
he
abso-
lute level of
trade-concentration
s still
very
high.
Capital Dependency
Although
direct
private foreign
investment
has
been
virtually
eliminated
in
Cubasince
the
Revolution,
his does
not
mean
depen-
dency
on
foreign capital
has
disappeared;
to
the
contrary,
t
is
mas-
sive. The Soviet
Union
is the
largest
source,
by
far,
of this
foreign capi-
tal
dependency
Soviet
capital
comes
mainly
in
the form of
(1)
repayable
loans,
(2)
nonrepayable
credits to finance Soviet-Cuban
trade
deficits,
(3)
direct aid
for
economic
development,
(4)
subsi-
dies to Cubanexports (especially sugar and nickel) as well as to
Cuban
imports
(especially
oil),
and
(5)
grants
for
military
assist-
ance.
Total
Soviet
capital
nflow to
Cuba,
as
of
1976,
was
estimated to
be
at least
$10
billion,
of which about
half
($4.9 billion)
had to be re-
paid
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
103).
Total economic aid from
the
Soviet
Union to
Cuba
hrough
1979
has
been estimated
at
$16.7
billion. Mil-
itary
aid for
the
same
period
is
estimated at
$3.7
billion
(Blasier,
1983:100-125).
It is
very
difficultto make
precise comparisons
between the lev-
els
of
Cuban
capital dependency
before
and
after
1959
because
of
problems
of
data
comparability.
However,
those who have
studied
the
problem agree
that
the
USSR
has
clearly
replaced
the U.S.as
the
major
ource
of
Cuban
nvestment
capital
(LeoGrande,
1979:18).
Of
course,
Soviet investments
by
their
very
nature involve nei-
cludes
not
only
the Soviet Union
but
also the countries
of the
CMEA
(Council
for MutualEconomic
Assistance),
whose trade
policies
are
influenced
by
the Soviet Unionmuch more
strongly
than trade
poli-
cies
of
U.S.
allies are
influenced
by
the
United
States.
If
we
use
this
indicator,
which is more
appropriate
han thatfor the U.S.S.R.
lone,
the difference between the
pre-1959
and
post-1959periods
vanishes.
From
1961
hrough
1978
the Socialist
countries
absorbed an
annual
average
of
73%
of
Cuba's rade
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
92)
as
compared
with the
averagepre-1959 igure
for the U.S.of
69%.
By1978
-
the
last
year
for
which
I
have
figures
-
Cuban
trade with the
USSRalone
reached69%(Mesa-Lago, 981:92). Bearing n mind thistrend,plus
the
close
political
and
economic
relationship
between
the
USSRand
the CMEA
ountries,
it
can
reasonably
be
maintained
that
in
terms
of trade
partner
concentration,
Cuba
today
is as vulnerable to
exter-
nal
economic
and
political
influence
as it was
before
the
Revolution
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
94;
see also
LeoGrande,
1979:13,17).
Finally,
even
if
one
uses the lowest
possible
indicator,
he
abso-
lute level of
trade-concentration
s still
very
high.
Capital Dependency
Although
direct
private foreign
investment
has
been
virtually
eliminated
in
Cubasince
the
Revolution,
his does
not
mean
depen-
dency
on
foreign capital
has
disappeared;
to
the
contrary,
t
is
mas-
sive. The Soviet
Union
is the
largest
source,
by
far,
of this
foreign capi-
tal
dependency
Soviet
capital
comes
mainly
in
the form of
(1)
repayable
loans,
(2)
nonrepayable
credits to finance Soviet-Cuban
trade
deficits,
(3)
direct aid
for
economic
development,
(4)
subsi-
dies to Cubanexports (especially sugar and nickel) as well as to
Cuban
imports
(especially
oil),
and
(5)
grants
for
military
assist-
ance.
Total
Soviet
capital
nflow to
Cuba,
as
of
1976,
was
estimated to
be
at least
$10
billion,
of which about
half
($4.9 billion)
had to be re-
paid
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
103).
Total economic aid from
the
Soviet
Union to
Cuba
hrough
1979
has
been estimated
at
$16.7
billion. Mil-
itary
aid for
the
same
period
is
estimated at
$3.7
billion
(Blasier,
1983:100-125).
It is
very
difficultto make
precise comparisons
between the lev-
els
of
Cuban
capital dependency
before
and
after
1959
because
of
problems
of
data
comparability.
However,
those who have
studied
the
problem agree
that
the
USSR
has
clearly
replaced
the U.S.as
the
major
ource
of
Cuban
nvestment
capital
(LeoGrande,
1979:18).
Of
course,
Soviet investments
by
their
very
nature involve nei-
cludes
not
only
the Soviet Union
but
also the countries
of the
CMEA
(Council
for MutualEconomic
Assistance),
whose trade
policies
are
influenced
by
the Soviet Unionmuch more
strongly
than trade
poli-
cies
of
U.S.
allies are
influenced
by
the
United
States.
If
we
use
this
indicator,
which is more
appropriate
han thatfor the U.S.S.R.
lone,
the difference between the
pre-1959
and
post-1959periods
vanishes.
From
1961
hrough
1978
the Socialist
countries
absorbed an
annual
average
of
73%
of
Cuba's rade
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
92)
as
compared
with the
averagepre-1959 igure
for the U.S.of
69%.
By1978
-
the
last
year
for
which
I
have
figures
-
Cuban
trade with the
USSRalone
reached69%(Mesa-Lago, 981:92). Bearing n mind thistrend,plus
the
close
political
and
economic
relationship
between
the
USSRand
the CMEA
ountries,
it
can
reasonably
be
maintained
that
in
terms
of trade
partner
concentration,
Cuba
today
is as vulnerable to
exter-
nal
economic
and
political
influence
as it was
before
the
Revolution
(Mesa-Lago,
981:
94;
see also
LeoGrande,
1979:13,17).
Finally,
even
if
one
uses the lowest
possible
indicator,
he
abso-
lute level of
trade-concentration
s still
very
high.
Capital Dependency
Although
direct
private foreign
investment
has
been
virtually
eliminated
in
Cubasince
the
Revolution,
his does
not
mean
depen-
dency
on
foreign capital
has
disappeared;
to
the
contrary,
t
is
mas-
sive. The Soviet
Union
is the
largest
source,
by
far,
of this
foreign capi-
tal
dependency
Soviet
capital
comes
mainly
in
the form of
(1)
repayable
loans,
(2)
nonrepayable
credits to finance Soviet-Cuban
trade
deficits,
(3)
direct aid
for
economic
development,
(4)
subsi-
dies to Cubanexports (especially sugar and nickel) as well as to
Cuban
imports
(especially
oil),
and
(5)
grants
for
military
assist-
ance.
Total
Soviet
capital
nflow to
Cuba,
as
of
1976,
was
estimated to
be
at least
$10
billion,
of which about
half
($4.9 billion)
had to be re-
paid
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
103).
Total economic aid from
the
Soviet
Union to
Cuba
hrough
1979
has
been estimated
at
$16.7
billion. Mil-
itary
aid for
the
same
period
is
estimated at
$3.7
billion
(Blasier,
1983:100-125).
It is
very
difficultto make
precise comparisons
between the lev-
els
of
Cuban
capital dependency
before
and
after
1959
because
of
problems
of
data
comparability.
However,
those who have
studied
the
problem agree
that
the
USSR
has
clearly
replaced
the U.S.as
the
major
ource
of
Cuban
nvestment
capital
(LeoGrande,
1979:18).
Of
course,
Soviet investments
by
their
very
nature involve nei-
64444
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PACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ther
Soviet-ownership
f
Cuban
properties norrepatriation
f
profits
in the normalsense of those terms. Other
ways
in
which the Soviets
may own Cubanpropertyand/or extract profits rom their in-
vestments
will
be discussed
below.
Debt
Dependency
In
1959
Cuba's
oreign
debt
was
$45.5
million.
This was less
than
1951
when
its debt had
been
$68.2
million
(LeoGrande,
1979:
19).
By
1976,
before the economic
crisis
hit
Latin
America,
a conser-
vativeestimate
of
Cuba's
ebt was
$6.2
billion.This was
136
times the
1959figure.In1975Cuba's ebtwas the third argest n LatinAmerica
in
absolute
terms,
after Brazil and
Mexico,
and
the
largest by
far
in
per
capita
erms:
4
times
thatof
Brazil,
3
times thatof
Mexico
(Mesa-
Lago,
1981:106).
By
the
end of
1977
Cuba
owed
$5.2
billion to social-
ist countries and
$4.2
billion to
capitalist
countries.Interest
rates to
the socialist countries
ranged
from zero to
2.5%.
Interest
ratesto the
capitalist
countries varied
but,
in
general,
were much
higher.
In
1972,
Cuba
signed
an
agreement
with
the USSR
o
suspend
its debt
payments
until
1986.
It
appears
that Cuba
is even
less
likely
to be
able to payin 1986thanit was in 1972 (Mesa-Lago, 981:104,105).
In
short,
25
years
after
he
Revolution,
Cuba's
debt
dependency
is
hundreds
of times
greater
than
it
had been under
capitalism.
Cuba's
ituation
with
regard
to the debt
crisis
is
certainly
no better
than that of
capitalist
countries
in the
region.
A
strong
argument
could be
made that
it is worse.
Energy Dependency
Cuba'sdependence upon foreign energy is immense, because
its naturalendowment
in
energy
resources
-
oil,
gas,
coal,
hydro-
power
-
is
very poor.
Dependency
on
oil
is
particularly
cute. The
level
of
Cuban
oil
imports
s on a
par
with countries
which are much
larger
and more
industrialized.
Astonishingly,virtually
all of Cuba's
oil comes
from
just
one
country:
In
1967-76
the
USSR
upplied
an
average
of
98%
of
Cuban
oil
imports.
This
oil
comes from Black Sea
ports
6,400
miles
away
Mesa-Lago,
981:
99).
The
freight
costs are
enormous,
amounting
to
7.3%
of total costs
in
the
1970s.
This
partic-
ularkind of oil
dependency
has
profound
mplications
orCuba's
o-
litical and
diplomatic
dependency
as
well
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
101;
LeoGrande,
979:26;
Thomas,
1971:
701,719-720;
Dominguez,
1978:
162-63).
With
respect
to these
measurements,
clearly
fundamental
and
essential,
Cuba's
nergy dependency
has not declined.
ther
Soviet-ownership
f
Cuban
properties norrepatriation
f
profits
in the normalsense of those terms. Other
ways
in
which the Soviets
may own Cubanpropertyand/or extract profits rom their in-
vestments
will
be discussed
below.
Debt
Dependency
In
1959
Cuba's
oreign
debt
was
$45.5
million.
This was less
than
1951
when
its debt had
been
$68.2
million
(LeoGrande,
1979:
19).
By
1976,
before the economic
crisis
hit
Latin
America,
a conser-
vativeestimate
of
Cuba's
ebt was
$6.2
billion.This was
136
times the
1959figure.In1975Cuba's ebtwas the third argest n LatinAmerica
in
absolute
terms,
after Brazil and
Mexico,
and
the
largest by
far
in
per
capita
erms:
4
times
thatof
Brazil,
3
times thatof
Mexico
(Mesa-
Lago,
1981:106).
By
the
end of
1977
Cuba
owed
$5.2
billion to social-
ist countries and
$4.2
billion to
capitalist
countries.Interest
rates to
the socialist countries
ranged
from zero to
2.5%.
Interest
ratesto the
capitalist
countries varied
but,
in
general,
were much
higher.
In
1972,
Cuba
signed
an
agreement
with
the USSR
o
suspend
its debt
payments
until
1986.
It
appears
that Cuba
is even
less
likely
to be
able to payin 1986thanit was in 1972 (Mesa-Lago, 981:104,105).
In
short,
25
years
after
he
Revolution,
Cuba's
debt
dependency
is
hundreds
of times
greater
than
it
had been under
capitalism.
Cuba's
ituation
with
regard
to the debt
crisis
is
certainly
no better
than that of
capitalist
countries
in the
region.
A
strong
argument
could be
made that
it is worse.
Energy Dependency
Cuba'sdependence upon foreign energy is immense, because
its naturalendowment
in
energy
resources
-
oil,
gas,
coal,
hydro-
power
-
is
very poor.
Dependency
on
oil
is
particularly
cute. The
level
of
Cuban
oil
imports
s on a
par
with countries
which are much
larger
and more
industrialized.
Astonishingly,virtually
all of Cuba's
oil comes
from
just
one
country:
In
1967-76
the
USSR
upplied
an
average
of
98%
of
Cuban
oil
imports.
This
oil
comes from Black Sea
ports
6,400
miles
away
Mesa-Lago,
981:
99).
The
freight
costs are
enormous,
amounting
to
7.3%
of total costs
in
the
1970s.
This
partic-
ularkind of oil
dependency
has
profound
mplications
orCuba's
o-
litical and
diplomatic
dependency
as
well
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
101;
LeoGrande,
979:26;
Thomas,
1971:
701,719-720;
Dominguez,
1978:
162-63).
With
respect
to these
measurements,
clearly
fundamental
and
essential,
Cuba's
nergy dependency
has not declined.
ther
Soviet-ownership
f
Cuban
properties norrepatriation
f
profits
in the normalsense of those terms. Other
ways
in
which the Soviets
may own Cubanpropertyand/or extract profits rom their in-
vestments
will
be discussed
below.
Debt
Dependency
In
1959
Cuba's
oreign
debt
was
$45.5
million.
This was less
than
1951
when
its debt had
been
$68.2
million
(LeoGrande,
1979:
19).
By
1976,
before the economic
crisis
hit
Latin
America,
a conser-
vativeestimate
of
Cuba's
ebt was
$6.2
billion.This was
136
times the
1959figure.In1975Cuba's ebtwas the third argest n LatinAmerica
in
absolute
terms,
after Brazil and
Mexico,
and
the
largest by
far
in
per
capita
erms:
4
times
thatof
Brazil,
3
times thatof
Mexico
(Mesa-
Lago,
1981:106).
By
the
end of
1977
Cuba
owed
$5.2
billion to social-
ist countries and
$4.2
billion to
capitalist
countries.Interest
rates to
the socialist countries
ranged
from zero to
2.5%.
Interest
ratesto the
capitalist
countries varied
but,
in
general,
were much
higher.
In
1972,
Cuba
signed
an
agreement
with
the USSR
o
suspend
its debt
payments
until
1986.
It
appears
that Cuba
is even
less
likely
to be
able to payin 1986thanit was in 1972 (Mesa-Lago, 981:104,105).
In
short,
25
years
after
he
Revolution,
Cuba's
debt
dependency
is
hundreds
of times
greater
than
it
had been under
capitalism.
Cuba's
ituation
with
regard
to the debt
crisis
is
certainly
no better
than that of
capitalist
countries
in the
region.
A
strong
argument
could be
made that
it is worse.
Energy Dependency
Cuba'sdependence upon foreign energy is immense, because
its naturalendowment
in
energy
resources
-
oil,
gas,
coal,
hydro-
power
-
is
very poor.
Dependency
on
oil
is
particularly
cute. The
level
of
Cuban
oil
imports
s on a
par
with countries
which are much
larger
and more
industrialized.
Astonishingly,virtually
all of Cuba's
oil comes
from
just
one
country:
In
1967-76
the
USSR
upplied
an
average
of
98%
of
Cuban
oil
imports.
This
oil
comes from Black Sea
ports
6,400
miles
away
Mesa-Lago,
981:
99).
The
freight
costs are
enormous,
amounting
to
7.3%
of total costs
in
the
1970s.
This
partic-
ularkind of oil
dependency
has
profound
mplications
orCuba's
o-
litical and
diplomatic
dependency
as
well
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
101;
LeoGrande,
979:26;
Thomas,
1971:
701,719-720;
Dominguez,
1978:
162-63).
With
respect
to these
measurements,
clearly
fundamental
and
essential,
Cuba's
nergy dependency
has not declined.
ther
Soviet-ownership
f
Cuban
properties norrepatriation
f
profits
in the normalsense of those terms. Other
ways
in
which the Soviets
may own Cubanpropertyand/or extract profits rom their in-
vestments
will
be discussed
below.
Debt
Dependency
In
1959
Cuba's
oreign
debt
was
$45.5
million.
This was less
than
1951
when
its debt had
been
$68.2
million
(LeoGrande,
1979:
19).
By
1976,
before the economic
crisis
hit
Latin
America,
a conser-
vativeestimate
of
Cuba's
ebt was
$6.2
billion.This was
136
times the
1959figure.In1975Cuba's ebtwas the third argest n LatinAmerica
in
absolute
terms,
after Brazil and
Mexico,
and
the
largest by
far
in
per
capita
erms:
4
times
thatof
Brazil,
3
times thatof
Mexico
(Mesa-
Lago,
1981:106).
By
the
end of
1977
Cuba
owed
$5.2
billion to social-
ist countries and
$4.2
billion to
capitalist
countries.Interest
rates to
the socialist countries
ranged
from zero to
2.5%.
Interest
ratesto the
capitalist
countries varied
but,
in
general,
were much
higher.
In
1972,
Cuba
signed
an
agreement
with
the USSR
o
suspend
its debt
payments
until
1986.
It
appears
that Cuba
is even
less
likely
to be
able to payin 1986thanit was in 1972 (Mesa-Lago, 981:104,105).
In
short,
25
years
after
he
Revolution,
Cuba's
debt
dependency
is
hundreds
of times
greater
than
it
had been under
capitalism.
Cuba's
ituation
with
regard
to the debt
crisis
is
certainly
no better
than that of
capitalist
countries
in the
region.
A
strong
argument
could be
made that
it is worse.
Energy Dependency
Cuba'sdependence upon foreign energy is immense, because
its naturalendowment
in
energy
resources
-
oil,
gas,
coal,
hydro-
power
-
is
very poor.
Dependency
on
oil
is
particularly
cute. The
level
of
Cuban
oil
imports
s on a
par
with countries
which are much
larger
and more
industrialized.
Astonishingly,virtually
all of Cuba's
oil comes
from
just
one
country:
In
1967-76
the
USSR
upplied
an
average
of
98%
of
Cuban
oil
imports.
This
oil
comes from Black Sea
ports
6,400
miles
away
Mesa-Lago,
981:
99).
The
freight
costs are
enormous,
amounting
to
7.3%
of total costs
in
the
1970s.
This
partic-
ularkind of oil
dependency
has
profound
mplications
orCuba's
o-
litical and
diplomatic
dependency
as
well
(Mesa-Lago,
1981:
101;
LeoGrande,
979:26;
Thomas,
1971:
701,719-720;
Dominguez,
1978:
162-63).
With
respect
to these
measurements,
clearly
fundamental
and
essential,
Cuba's
nergy dependency
has not declined.
65555
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
Technological
Dependency
In
analyzing capitalist countries, dependency
theorists
put
great
weight
on
technology.
Their
argument
s
that,
no matterwhat
happens
with other
indicators,
Latin
American
countries who
are
tied
to international
capitalism
are
both constrained and
exploited
through
lack of
autonomous
capability
n
basic
technology.
Depen-
dence
upon
foreign technology
is
perceived
as
an almost absolute
barrier
o autonomous
development
within the context
of
world
cap-
italism. Socialism
is
supposed
to
be the
way
to
break this barrier.
Although
data are
scarce,
regarding
Cuba's
echnological
de-
pendence, it is possible to make inferences aboutits dependency in
this area based
upon
whether
or not
Cuban
technological
innova-
tions are observable
in
economic,
or
other,
spheres.
On
this
basis,
there is
no evidence
of
any
reduction
in
the
degree
of
technological
dependency
compared
to that level under
capitalism.
By
contrast,
the
technological
dependency
of
capitalist
countries
in
Latin
Ameri-
ca,
and
in
other
parts
of the Third
World,
while
still
great,
has de-
clined
in
some areas
(Grieco,
1982;
Street
and
James,
1979).
Al-
though
there
is no
evidence the Cubans have
reduced
their
technology dependence
since
1959,
there has
consistently
been firm
evidence to show that
they
now have a
more balanced
appreciation
of the benefits of Western
capitalist
echnology
than was
true
in
the
early years.
Thus the Cuban
economist
(and
later
Vice
President),
Carlos
Rafael
Rodriguez,
stated
publicly,
in
1975,
that the socialist
camp
lacks a whole
range
of
technology
which is
only
available
rom
the
West.
In
1977,
Fidel Castro
himself
stated that the
United States
is the most
advanced
country
in
the world
in
technology
and sci-
ence; Cubacould benefit from everythingthatAmericahas (Both
quoted
in
Mesa-Lago,
981:
91).
Let us sum
up
Cuban
structural economic
dependence
as
follows:
Aspect
of
Economic
Dependency
Change/No
Change
Since
1959
Monocultureof
NationalProduction
No
Change
Overall
Trade
Dependency
No
Change
Monocultureof
Exports
No
Change
Trade
Partner
Concentration:
No
Change
USA/ComeconCountries
Trade
Partner
Concentrations:
Less
Dependency
USA/USSR
CapitalDependency
No
Change
Debt
Dependency
More
Dependency
EnergyDependency
More
Dependency
Technological
Dependency
No
Change
Technological
Dependency
In
analyzing capitalist countries, dependency
theorists
put
great
weight
on
technology.
Their
argument
s
that,
no matterwhat
happens
with other
indicators,
Latin
American
countries who
are
tied
to international
capitalism
are
both constrained and
exploited
through
lack of
autonomous
capability
n
basic
technology.
Depen-
dence
upon
foreign technology
is
perceived
as
an almost absolute
barrier
o autonomous
development
within the context
of
world
cap-
italism. Socialism
is
supposed
to
be the
way
to
break this barrier.
Although
data are
scarce,
regarding
Cuba's
echnological
de-
pendence, it is possible to make inferences aboutits dependency in
this area based
upon
whether
or not
Cuban
technological
innova-
tions are observable
in
economic,
or
other,
spheres.
On
this
basis,
there is
no evidence
of
any
reduction
in
the
degree
of
technological
dependency
compared
to that level under
capitalism.
By
contrast,
the
technological
dependency
of
capitalist
countries
in
Latin
Ameri-
ca,
and
in
other
parts
of the Third
World,
while
still
great,
has de-
clined
in
some areas
(Grieco,
1982;
Street
and
James,
1979).
Al-
though
there
is no
evidence the Cubans have
reduced
their
technology dependence
since
1959,
there has
consistently
been firm
evidence to show that
they
now have a
more balanced
appreciation
of the benefits of Western
capitalist
echnology
than was
true
in
the
early years.
Thus the Cuban
economist
(and
later
Vice
President),
Carlos
Rafael
Rodriguez,
stated
publicly,
in
1975,
that the socialist
camp
lacks a whole
range
of
technology
which is
only
available
rom
the
West.
In
1977,
Fidel Castro
himself
stated that the
United States
is the most
advanced
country
in
the world
in
technology
and sci-
ence; Cubacould benefit from everythingthatAmericahas (Both
quoted
in
Mesa-Lago,
981:
91).
Let us sum
up
Cuban
structural economic
dependence
as
follows:
Aspect
of
Economic
Dependency
Change/No
Change
Since
1959
Monocultureof
NationalProduction
No
Change
Overall
Trade
Dependency
No
Change
Monocultureof
Exports
No
Change
Trade
Partner
Concentration:
No
Change
USA/ComeconCountries
Trade
Partner
Concentrations:
Less
Dependency
USA/USSR
CapitalDependency
No
Change
Debt
Dependency
More
Dependency
EnergyDependency
More
Dependency
Technological
Dependency
No
Change
Technological
Dependency
In
analyzing capitalist countries, dependency
theorists
put
great
weight
on
technology.
Their
argument
s
that,
no matterwhat
happens
with other
indicators,
Latin
American
countries who
are
tied
to international
capitalism
are
both constrained and
exploited
through
lack of
autonomous
capability
n
basic
technology.
Depen-
dence
upon
foreign technology
is
perceived
as
an almost absolute
barrier
o autonomous
development
within the context
of
world
cap-
italism. Socialism
is
supposed
to
be the
way
to
break this barrier.
Although
data are
scarce,
regarding
Cuba's
echnological
de-
pendence, it is possible to make inferences aboutits dependency in
this area based
upon
whether
or not
Cuban
technological
innova-
tions are observable
in
economic,
or
other,
spheres.
On
this
basis,
there is
no evidence
of
any
reduction
in
the
degree
of
technological
dependency
compared
to that level under
capitalism.
By
contrast,
the
technological
dependency
of
capitalist
countries
in
Latin
Ameri-
ca,
and
in
other
parts
of the Third
World,
while
still
great,
has de-
clined
in
some areas
(Grieco,
1982;
Street
and
James,
1979).
Al-
though
there
is no
evidence the Cubans have
reduced
their
technology dependence
since
1959,
there has
consistently
been firm
evidence to show that
they
now have a
more balanced
appreciation
of the benefits of Western
capitalist
echnology
than was
true
in
the
early years.
Thus the Cuban
economist
(and
later
Vice
President),
Carlos
Rafael
Rodriguez,
stated
publicly,
in
1975,
that the socialist
camp
lacks a whole
range
of
technology
which is
only
available
rom
the
West.
In
1977,
Fidel Castro
himself
stated that the
United States
is the most
advanced
country
in
the world
in
technology
and sci-
ence; Cubacould benefit from everythingthatAmericahas (Both
quoted
in
Mesa-Lago,
981:
91).
Let us sum
up
Cuban
structural economic
dependence
as
follows:
Aspect
of
Economic
Dependency
Change/No
Change
Since
1959
Monocultureof
NationalProduction
No
Change
Overall
Trade
Dependency
No
Change
Monocultureof
Exports
No
Change
Trade
Partner
Concentration:
No
Change
USA/ComeconCountries
Trade
Partner
Concentrations:
Less
Dependency
USA/USSR
CapitalDependency
No
Change
Debt
Dependency
More
Dependency
EnergyDependency
More
Dependency
Technological
Dependency
No
Change
Technological
Dependency
In
analyzing capitalist countries, dependency
theorists
put
great
weight
on
technology.
Their
argument
s
that,
no matterwhat
happens
with other
indicators,
Latin
American
countries who
are
tied
to international
capitalism
are
both constrained and
exploited
through
lack of
autonomous
capability
n
basic
technology.
Depen-
dence
upon
foreign technology
is
perceived
as
an almost absolute
barrier
o autonomous
development
within the context
of
world
cap-
italism. Socialism
is
supposed
to
be the
way
to
break this barrier.
Although
data are
scarce,
regarding
Cuba's
echnological
de-
pendence, it is possible to make inferences aboutits dependency in
this area based
upon
whether
or not
Cuban
technological
innova-
tions are observable
in
economic,
or
other,
spheres.
On
this
basis,
there is
no evidence
of
any
reduction
in
the
degree
of
technological
dependency
compared
to that level under
capitalism.
By
contrast,
the
technological
dependency
of
capitalist
countries
in
Latin
Ameri-
ca,
and
in
other
parts
of the Third
World,
while
still
great,
has de-
clined
in
some areas
(Grieco,
1982;
Street
and
James,
1979).
Al-
though
there
is no
evidence the Cubans have
reduced
their
technology dependence
since
1959,
there has
consistently
been firm
evidence to show that
they
now have a
more balanced
appreciation
of the benefits of Western
capitalist
echnology
than was
true
in
the
early years.
Thus the Cuban
economist
(and
later
Vice
President),
Carlos
Rafael
Rodriguez,
stated
publicly,
in
1975,
that the socialist
camp
lacks a whole
range
of
technology
which is
only
available
rom
the
West.
In
1977,
Fidel Castro
himself
stated that the
United States
is the most
advanced
country
in
the world
in
technology
and sci-
ence; Cubacould benefit from everythingthatAmericahas (Both
quoted
in
Mesa-Lago,
981:
91).
Let us sum
up
Cuban
structural economic
dependence
as
follows:
Aspect
of
Economic
Dependency
Change/No
Change
Since
1959
Monocultureof
NationalProduction
No
Change
Overall
Trade
Dependency
No
Change
Monocultureof
Exports
No
Change
Trade
Partner
Concentration:
No
Change
USA/ComeconCountries
Trade
Partner
Concentrations:
Less
Dependency
USA/USSR
CapitalDependency
No
Change
Debt
Dependency
More
Dependency
EnergyDependency
More
Dependency
Technological
Dependency
No
Change
66666
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
It is
clear that Cubahas
neither
eliminated,
nor
significantly
re-
duced
its
structural
economic
dependency
since
1959
in
terms
of
these indicators.Given the
centrality
of economic factors
(modes
of
production
and
exchange)
in
Marxist
heory,
and neo-Marxist
per-
spectives
and heuristicorientations oward
analyses
of
dependen-
cy,
and
given
the
optimistic
predictions
of those
theories about the
transforming
ffects
that socialism would
render to these relation-
ships,
the
above
assessment reveals some
glaring
inconsistencies.
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
NON-EXPLOITATIVEAND BENEVOLENT?
DESPITE
THE
FOREGOING,
many
analysts
continue to
reject,
or
to
minimize,
the
degree
and
significance
of
Cuba
dependence
since
1959.
There
are
several
ways
in
which
this
has
been
done.
One
way
has
simply
been to
ignore
the
subject.
Thus Cardosoaffirms hat
the
Cubanrevolution
has
proved
that
dependency
can
be
broken. He
proves
his
by referring
to
Cuba's
relationship
with
the United
States
n
detail,
while he remains silent on the
subject
of
Cuba's ela-
tionship
with the SovietUnion (Cardoso,1973a:2).
A
second
way
has
been
to
dispute
the
analysis
(about
Cuba's
economic
dependence
since
1959)
and
to
argue
that Cuba's
depen-
dency
has
actually
declined,
in
terms
of
those indicators.The most
important
analysis
of this sort is
that
of
LeoGrande
1979).
When he
compared
Cubanstructural-economic
ependency
before
1959
with
thatafter
1959,
he found
that
6
indicatorsout of 28
showed no
signifi-
cant
change
in
dependency,and
16
showed
improvement.
While
LeoGrande'swork is serious and useful in manyrespects, it also has
serious
methodological
flaws.As
Mesa-Lago
1981:
229)
points
out,
of
those
16
indicators,
10
were
used
to
measure one variable
(trade
partner
oncentration,
n
which a
significant
reduction
n
dependen-
cy
was
registered)
while in
anothervariable
that
s,
the
foreign
debt,
that showed a
significant
ncrease
in
dependency)
only
one indica-
tor was used.
LeoGrandealso
defines
dependency
in
terms of
capi-
talist
characteristics,
uch as
profit
remittancesand income
inequali-
ties,
and then
points
to the
absence,
or
reduction,
of those
characteristicsunder socialism as proof thatdependency has been
eliminated
or reduced because
of
socialism. This
is
tautological.
When
dependency
declines
for an
indicator,
he
attributes t to social-
ism;
when
it does not
decline,
he attributes
t
to a
legacy
of
capital-
ism. In
other
words: heads socialism
wins,
tails
capitalism
loses.
It is
clear that Cubahas
neither
eliminated,
nor
significantly
re-
duced
its
structural
economic
dependency
since
1959
in
terms
of
these indicators.Given the
centrality
of economic factors
(modes
of
production
and
exchange)
in
Marxist
heory,
and neo-Marxist
per-
spectives
and heuristicorientations oward
analyses
of
dependen-
cy,
and
given
the
optimistic
predictions
of those
theories about the
transforming
ffects
that socialism would
render to these relation-
ships,
the
above
assessment reveals some
glaring
inconsistencies.
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
NON-EXPLOITATIVEAND BENEVOLENT?
DESPITE
THE
FOREGOING,
many
analysts
continue to
reject,
or
to
minimize,
the
degree
and
significance
of
Cuba
dependence
since
1959.
There
are
several
ways
in
which
this
has
been
done.
One
way
has
simply
been to
ignore
the
subject.
Thus Cardosoaffirms hat
the
Cubanrevolution
has
proved
that
dependency
can
be
broken. He
proves
his
by referring
to
Cuba's
relationship
with
the United
States
n
detail,
while he remains silent on the
subject
of
Cuba's ela-
tionship
with the SovietUnion (Cardoso,1973a:2).
A
second
way
has
been
to
dispute
the
analysis
(about
Cuba's
economic
dependence
since
1959)
and
to
argue
that Cuba's
depen-
dency
has
actually
declined,
in
terms
of
those indicators.The most
important
analysis
of this sort is
that
of
LeoGrande
1979).
When he
compared
Cubanstructural-economic
ependency
before
1959
with
thatafter
1959,
he found
that
6
indicatorsout of 28
showed no
signifi-
cant
change
in
dependency,and
16
showed
improvement.
While
LeoGrande'swork is serious and useful in manyrespects, it also has
serious
methodological
flaws.As
Mesa-Lago
1981:
229)
points
out,
of
those
16
indicators,
10
were
used
to
measure one variable
(trade
partner
oncentration,
n
which a
significant
reduction
n
dependen-
cy
was
registered)
while in
anothervariable
that
s,
the
foreign
debt,
that showed a
significant
ncrease
in
dependency)
only
one indica-
tor was used.
LeoGrandealso
defines
dependency
in
terms of
capi-
talist
characteristics,
uch as
profit
remittancesand income
inequali-
ties,
and then
points
to the
absence,
or
reduction,
of those
characteristicsunder socialism as proof thatdependency has been
eliminated
or reduced because
of
socialism. This
is
tautological.
When
dependency
declines
for an
indicator,
he
attributes t to social-
ism;
when
it does not
decline,
he attributes
t
to a
legacy
of
capital-
ism. In
other
words: heads socialism
wins,
tails
capitalism
loses.
It is
clear that Cubahas
neither
eliminated,
nor
significantly
re-
duced
its
structural
economic
dependency
since
1959
in
terms
of
these indicators.Given the
centrality
of economic factors
(modes
of
production
and
exchange)
in
Marxist
heory,
and neo-Marxist
per-
spectives
and heuristicorientations oward
analyses
of
dependen-
cy,
and
given
the
optimistic
predictions
of those
theories about the
transforming
ffects
that socialism would
render to these relation-
ships,
the
above
assessment reveals some
glaring
inconsistencies.
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
NON-EXPLOITATIVEAND BENEVOLENT?
DESPITE
THE
FOREGOING,
many
analysts
continue to
reject,
or
to
minimize,
the
degree
and
significance
of
Cuba
dependence
since
1959.
There
are
several
ways
in
which
this
has
been
done.
One
way
has
simply
been to
ignore
the
subject.
Thus Cardosoaffirms hat
the
Cubanrevolution
has
proved
that
dependency
can
be
broken. He
proves
his
by referring
to
Cuba's
relationship
with
the United
States
n
detail,
while he remains silent on the
subject
of
Cuba's ela-
tionship
with the SovietUnion (Cardoso,1973a:2).
A
second
way
has
been
to
dispute
the
analysis
(about
Cuba's
economic
dependence
since
1959)
and
to
argue
that Cuba's
depen-
dency
has
actually
declined,
in
terms
of
those indicators.The most
important
analysis
of this sort is
that
of
LeoGrande
1979).
When he
compared
Cubanstructural-economic
ependency
before
1959
with
thatafter
1959,
he found
that
6
indicatorsout of 28
showed no
signifi-
cant
change
in
dependency,and
16
showed
improvement.
While
LeoGrande'swork is serious and useful in manyrespects, it also has
serious
methodological
flaws.As
Mesa-Lago
1981:
229)
points
out,
of
those
16
indicators,
10
were
used
to
measure one variable
(trade
partner
oncentration,
n
which a
significant
reduction
n
dependen-
cy
was
registered)
while in
anothervariable
that
s,
the
foreign
debt,
that showed a
significant
ncrease
in
dependency)
only
one indica-
tor was used.
LeoGrandealso
defines
dependency
in
terms of
capi-
talist
characteristics,
uch as
profit
remittancesand income
inequali-
ties,
and then
points
to the
absence,
or
reduction,
of those
characteristicsunder socialism as proof thatdependency has been
eliminated
or reduced because
of
socialism. This
is
tautological.
When
dependency
declines
for an
indicator,
he
attributes t to social-
ism;
when
it does not
decline,
he attributes
t
to a
legacy
of
capital-
ism. In
other
words: heads socialism
wins,
tails
capitalism
loses.
It is
clear that Cubahas
neither
eliminated,
nor
significantly
re-
duced
its
structural
economic
dependency
since
1959
in
terms
of
these indicators.Given the
centrality
of economic factors
(modes
of
production
and
exchange)
in
Marxist
heory,
and neo-Marxist
per-
spectives
and heuristicorientations oward
analyses
of
dependen-
cy,
and
given
the
optimistic
predictions
of those
theories about the
transforming
ffects
that socialism would
render to these relation-
ships,
the
above
assessment reveals some
glaring
inconsistencies.
SOCIALISTDEPENDENCY:
NON-EXPLOITATIVEAND BENEVOLENT?
DESPITE
THE
FOREGOING,
many
analysts
continue to
reject,
or
to
minimize,
the
degree
and
significance
of
Cuba
dependence
since
1959.
There
are
several
ways
in
which
this
has
been
done.
One
way
has
simply
been to
ignore
the
subject.
Thus Cardosoaffirms hat
the
Cubanrevolution
has
proved
that
dependency
can
be
broken. He
proves
his
by referring
to
Cuba's
relationship
with
the United
States
n
detail,
while he remains silent on the
subject
of
Cuba's ela-
tionship
with the SovietUnion (Cardoso,1973a:2).
A
second
way
has
been
to
dispute
the
analysis
(about
Cuba's
economic
dependence
since
1959)
and
to
argue
that Cuba's
depen-
dency
has
actually
declined,
in
terms
of
those indicators.The most
important
analysis
of this sort is
that
of
LeoGrande
1979).
When he
compared
Cubanstructural-economic
ependency
before
1959
with
thatafter
1959,
he found
that
6
indicatorsout of 28
showed no
signifi-
cant
change
in
dependency,and
16
showed
improvement.
While
LeoGrande'swork is serious and useful in manyrespects, it also has
serious
methodological
flaws.As
Mesa-Lago
1981:
229)
points
out,
of
those
16
indicators,
10
were
used
to
measure one variable
(trade
partner
oncentration,
n
which a
significant
reduction
n
dependen-
cy
was
registered)
while in
anothervariable
that
s,
the
foreign
debt,
that showed a
significant
ncrease
in
dependency)
only
one indica-
tor was used.
LeoGrandealso
defines
dependency
in
terms of
capi-
talist
characteristics,
uch as
profit
remittancesand income
inequali-
ties,
and then
points
to the
absence,
or
reduction,
of those
characteristicsunder socialism as proof thatdependency has been
eliminated
or reduced because
of
socialism. This
is
tautological.
When
dependency
declines
for an
indicator,
he
attributes t to social-
ism;
when
it does not
decline,
he attributes
t
to a
legacy
of
capital-
ism. In
other
words: heads socialism
wins,
tails
capitalism
loses.
67777
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JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
Even
so,
LeoGrandeconcludes that
structural
conomic
dependen-
cy
has not
been
eliminated,
only
(in
his
view)
reduced. While this
work is
interesting,
it does not
effectively
challenge
the idea that
structural conomic
dependency
under
socialism remains
veryhigh.
A
third
approach
has
perhaps
been
the
most
subtle
and influen-
tial
in
dealing
with
the evidence
of
continued structural conomic
dependence
under socialism.
This
approach
concedes that
the
tran-
sition to socialism
has neither
eliminated,
nor
reduced,
dependency
as measured
by
the
foregoing
structural-economic
erms.
However,
it
does
suggest
thatwhile
dependency
in
those
terms
-
convention-
al dependence - has continued since 1959, the exploitationthat
characterized
capitalist
dependency
has
been
eliminated,
or at least
reduced,
under
socialism.
The
USSR
s
described as
a socialist
coun-
try
whose
relationship
to Cuba is
nonexploitative.
As Fidel Castro
himself
has
put
it,
How
can the Soviet
Union be labeled
imperialist?
Where are its
monopoly corporations?
Where
is
its
participation
n the
multina-
tional
companies?
What
factories,
what
mines,
what oil fields
does it
own
in the
underdeveloped
world?
What
worker
s
exploited
in
any
countryof Asia, Africa,or LatinAmericaby Sovietcapital?(Fagen,
1978a:
74).
In
this
view,
the Cuban
regime
and
its
foreign
and
domestic
pol-
icies are
fundamentally
Cuban,
n-Sovietand
independent
of
Sovi-
et
influence
except
in
ways
that
have
helped
Cuba
(Fagen,
1978a:69-
78).
The
argument
is
also
that even
though
structurally
Cuba's
international
ies and situation still
imply
a
significant
level
of vul-
nerability,
hese ties and situation
have not
in
the
main
conditioned
the Cubaneconomy in negativewaysas farasachievingthe primary
goal
of
directing
development
toward
human
wellbeing
and
more
equitable
distribution
Fagen,
1978b:
300).
Therefore,
Cuban for-
eign policies
have been
nationalistic,autonomous,
and authentical-
ly
Cuban,'
rather
han
influenced
by
the
USSR.Greatstress
is
laid
on
an
alleged
convergence
of interests between
Cuba
and the USSR
(Erisman,
1985;
Duncan,
1985).
According
o this
interpretation,
he
domestic transformation
o socialism has met
the real
needs
of the
vast
majority
of
the Cuban
people.
Whereas
dependence
upon
capitalismis perceived to have had malign consequences for the
Cuban
population,
conventional
dependence
upon
the
Soviet
Union,
a
socialist
country,
s
perceived
to have
benign
consequences
for the
Cuban
people
(Fagen,
1978a
and
1978b; Brundenius,1984;
Halebsky
and
Kirk,
1985).
Even
so,
LeoGrandeconcludes that
structural
conomic
dependen-
cy
has not
been
eliminated,
only
(in
his
view)
reduced. While this
work is
interesting,
it does not
effectively
challenge
the idea that
structural conomic
dependency
under
socialism remains
veryhigh.
A
third
approach
has
perhaps
been
the
most
subtle
and influen-
tial
in
dealing
with
the evidence
of
continued structural conomic
dependence
under socialism.
This
approach
concedes that
the
tran-
sition to socialism
has neither
eliminated,
nor
reduced,
dependency
as measured
by
the
foregoing
structural-economic
erms.
However,
it
does
suggest
thatwhile
dependency
in
those
terms
-
convention-
al dependence - has continued since 1959, the exploitationthat
characterized
capitalist
dependency
has
been
eliminated,
or at least
reduced,
under
socialism.
The
USSR
s
described as
a socialist
coun-
try
whose
relationship
to Cuba is
nonexploitative.
As Fidel Castro
himself
has
put
it,
How
can the Soviet
Union be labeled
imperialist?
Where are its
monopoly corporations?
Where
is
its
participation
n the
multina-
tional
companies?
What
factories,
what
mines,
what oil fields
does it
own
in the
underdeveloped
world?
What
worker
s
exploited
in
any
countryof Asia, Africa,or LatinAmericaby Sovietcapital?(Fagen,
1978a:
74).
In
this
view,
the Cuban
regime
and
its
foreign
and
domestic
pol-
icies are
fundamentally
Cuban,
n-Sovietand
independent
of
Sovi-
et
influence
except
in
ways
that
have
helped
Cuba
(Fagen,
1978a:69-
78).
The
argument
is
also
that even
though
structurally
Cuba's
international
ies and situation still
imply
a
significant
level
of vul-
nerability,
hese ties and situation
have not
in
the
main
conditioned
the Cubaneconomy in negativewaysas farasachievingthe primary
goal
of
directing
development
toward
human
wellbeing
and
more
equitable
distribution
Fagen,
1978b:
300).
Therefore,
Cuban for-
eign policies
have been
nationalistic,autonomous,
and authentical-
ly
Cuban,'
rather
han
influenced
by
the
USSR.Greatstress
is
laid
on
an
alleged
convergence
of interests between
Cuba
and the USSR
(Erisman,
1985;
Duncan,
1985).
According
o this
interpretation,
he
domestic transformation
o socialism has met
the real
needs
of the
vast
majority
of
the Cuban
people.
Whereas
dependence
upon
capitalismis perceived to have had malign consequences for the
Cuban
population,
conventional
dependence
upon
the
Soviet
Union,
a
socialist
country,
s
perceived
to have
benign
consequences
for the
Cuban
people
(Fagen,
1978a
and
1978b; Brundenius,1984;
Halebsky
and
Kirk,
1985).
Even
so,
LeoGrandeconcludes that
structural
conomic
dependen-
cy
has not
been
eliminated,
only
(in
his
view)
reduced. While this
work is
interesting,
it does not
effectively
challenge
the idea that
structural conomic
dependency
under
socialism remains
veryhigh.
A
third
approach
has
perhaps
been
the
most
subtle
and influen-
tial
in
dealing
with
the evidence
of
continued structural conomic
dependence
under socialism.
This
approach
concedes that
the
tran-
sition to socialism
has neither
eliminated,
nor
reduced,
dependency
as measured
by
the
foregoing
structural-economic
erms.
However,
it
does
suggest
thatwhile
dependency
in
those
terms
-
convention-
al dependence - has continued since 1959, the exploitationthat
characterized
capitalist
dependency
has
been
eliminated,
or at least
reduced,
under
socialism.
The
USSR
s
described as
a socialist
coun-
try
whose
relationship
to Cuba is
nonexploitative.
As Fidel Castro
himself
has
put
it,
How
can the Soviet
Union be labeled
imperialist?
Where are its
monopoly corporations?
Where
is
its
participation
n the
multina-
tional
companies?
What
factories,
what
mines,
what oil fields
does it
own
in the
underdeveloped
world?
What
worker
s
exploited
in
any
countryof Asia, Africa,or LatinAmericaby Sovietcapital?(Fagen,
1978a:
74).
In
this
view,
the Cuban
regime
and
its
foreign
and
domestic
pol-
icies are
fundamentally
Cuban,
n-Sovietand
independent
of
Sovi-
et
influence
except
in
ways
that
have
helped
Cuba
(Fagen,
1978a:69-
78).
The
argument
is
also
that even
though
structurally
Cuba's
international
ies and situation still
imply
a
significant
level
of vul-
nerability,
hese ties and situation
have not
in
the
main
conditioned
the Cubaneconomy in negativewaysas farasachievingthe primary
goal
of
directing
development
toward
human
wellbeing
and
more
equitable
distribution
Fagen,
1978b:
300).
Therefore,
Cuban for-
eign policies
have been
nationalistic,autonomous,
and authentical-
ly
Cuban,'
rather
han
influenced
by
the
USSR.Greatstress
is
laid
on
an
alleged
convergence
of interests between
Cuba
and the USSR
(Erisman,
1985;
Duncan,
1985).
According
o this
interpretation,
he
domestic transformation
o socialism has met
the real
needs
of the
vast
majority
of
the Cuban
people.
Whereas
dependence
upon
capitalismis perceived to have had malign consequences for the
Cuban
population,
conventional
dependence
upon
the
Soviet
Union,
a
socialist
country,
s
perceived
to have
benign
consequences
for the
Cuban
people
(Fagen,
1978a
and
1978b; Brundenius,1984;
Halebsky
and
Kirk,
1985).
Even
so,
LeoGrandeconcludes that
structural
conomic
dependen-
cy
has not
been
eliminated,
only
(in
his
view)
reduced. While this
work is
interesting,
it does not
effectively
challenge
the idea that
structural conomic
dependency
under
socialism remains
veryhigh.
A
third
approach
has
perhaps
been
the
most
subtle
and influen-
tial
in
dealing
with
the evidence
of
continued structural conomic
dependence
under socialism.
This
approach
concedes that
the
tran-
sition to socialism
has neither
eliminated,
nor
reduced,
dependency
as measured
by
the
foregoing
structural-economic
erms.
However,
it
does
suggest
thatwhile
dependency
in
those
terms
-
convention-
al dependence - has continued since 1959, the exploitationthat
characterized
capitalist
dependency
has
been
eliminated,
or at least
reduced,
under
socialism.
The
USSR
s
described as
a socialist
coun-
try
whose
relationship
to Cuba is
nonexploitative.
As Fidel Castro
himself
has
put
it,
How
can the Soviet
Union be labeled
imperialist?
Where are its
monopoly corporations?
Where
is
its
participation
n the
multina-
tional
companies?
What
factories,
what
mines,
what oil fields
does it
own
in the
underdeveloped
world?
What
worker
s
exploited
in
any
countryof Asia, Africa,or LatinAmericaby Sovietcapital?(Fagen,
1978a:
74).
In
this
view,
the Cuban
regime
and
its
foreign
and
domestic
pol-
icies are
fundamentally
Cuban,
n-Sovietand
independent
of
Sovi-
et
influence
except
in
ways
that
have
helped
Cuba
(Fagen,
1978a:69-
78).
The
argument
is
also
that even
though
structurally
Cuba's
international
ies and situation still
imply
a
significant
level
of vul-
nerability,
hese ties and situation
have not
in
the
main
conditioned
the Cubaneconomy in negativewaysas farasachievingthe primary
goal
of
directing
development
toward
human
wellbeing
and
more
equitable
distribution
Fagen,
1978b:
300).
Therefore,
Cuban for-
eign policies
have been
nationalistic,autonomous,
and authentical-
ly
Cuban,'
rather
han
influenced
by
the
USSR.Greatstress
is
laid
on
an
alleged
convergence
of interests between
Cuba
and the USSR
(Erisman,
1985;
Duncan,
1985).
According
o this
interpretation,
he
domestic transformation
o socialism has met
the real
needs
of the
vast
majority
of
the Cuban
people.
Whereas
dependence
upon
capitalismis perceived to have had malign consequences for the
Cuban
population,
conventional
dependence
upon
the
Soviet
Union,
a
socialist
country,
s
perceived
to have
benign
consequences
for the
Cuban
people
(Fagen,
1978a
and
1978b; Brundenius,1984;
Halebsky
and
Kirk,
1985).
68888
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
Proponents
of this third
approach
have
advanced
their
claims at
two levels
which are interrelated
empirically
but
which are
separa-
ble analytically.First,they argue in abstract erms that the mecha-
nisms of
capitalistexploitation
are eliminated
under socialism
and
replaced by nonexploitative
socialist mechanisms.
Second,
they
argue
that
specific,
concrete features
-
both internaland
external
-
of
Cuba's
dependency
under socialism have
been
much more
be-
nign
and less
exploitative
than those
of
capitalistdependency.
Letus
consider these
arguments
and see to what extent
the evidence
sup-
ports
them.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: MECHANISMS
OF INFLUENCE
AND
EXPLOITATION
ACCORDING
TO
THE
dependencia
approach
to Latin
American
development,
exploitation
in
peripheral
capitalist
countries does
not occur
simply
through
domination
by
foreign
powers
but
through
an alliance
of
foreign
capitalists,
domestic
capitalists
and the
depen-
dent
capitalist
state.
According
to this
model,
these actors
combine
to dominateandexploit the popularclasses. Theremaybe disputes
within
the
camp
of the dominant
actors but such
disputes
do not
alterthe fundamental
characterof the
relationship
n
which the
tri-
ple
alliance
(or
tri-pe
alliance)
of
foreign,
national,
and state
elites,
on the
one
hand,
dominate
and
exploit
the
popular
classes on
the
other.'
Socialism
is
supposed
to
change
all
this
in
a much
more
posi-
tive direction.
Indeed,
in
most
of
these formulations he
only way
to
bring
about theachievement
of
a more
egalitarian
or
more
justsoci-
ety s to destroycapitalistnstitutionsandto construct athstoward
socialism defined
in
Marxist
terms
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
xxiii-xxiv).
The situation that has
prevailed
in
Cuba since
1959
does not
support
these
arguments.Although
the mechanisms
and
specific
featuresof Cubansocialist
dependency
differsomewhat from
those
of
capitalist dependency,
Cuba has
experienced
mechanisms and
processes
of dominationand
exploitation
since
1959.
These
mecha-
nisms
and
processes
have
not been discussed or even noted
in
the
dependencia literature.Althoughin some waysthe socialist mecha-
nisms
may
be more
benign
thantheir
capitalistcounterparts,
n
other
ways they
are
malign, repressive,
and
exploitative.
The remainderof
this section will
analyze
the main
mechanisms of influence and ex-
ploitation,
ollowed
by
a detailed
discussion
of the
way
they
have
op-
erated
in
Cuba
since
1959.
Proponents
of this third
approach
have
advanced
their
claims at
two levels
which are interrelated
empirically
but
which are
separa-
ble analytically.First,they argue in abstract erms that the mecha-
nisms of
capitalistexploitation
are eliminated
under socialism
and
replaced by nonexploitative
socialist mechanisms.
Second,
they
argue
that
specific,
concrete features
-
both internaland
external
-
of
Cuba's
dependency
under socialism have
been
much more
be-
nign
and less
exploitative
than those
of
capitalistdependency.
Letus
consider these
arguments
and see to what extent
the evidence
sup-
ports
them.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: MECHANISMS
OF INFLUENCE
AND
EXPLOITATION
ACCORDING
TO
THE
dependencia
approach
to Latin
American
development,
exploitation
in
peripheral
capitalist
countries does
not occur
simply
through
domination
by
foreign
powers
but
through
an alliance
of
foreign
capitalists,
domestic
capitalists
and the
depen-
dent
capitalist
state.
According
to this
model,
these actors
combine
to dominateandexploit the popularclasses. Theremaybe disputes
within
the
camp
of the dominant
actors but such
disputes
do not
alterthe fundamental
characterof the
relationship
n
which the
tri-
ple
alliance
(or
tri-pe
alliance)
of
foreign,
national,
and state
elites,
on the
one
hand,
dominate
and
exploit
the
popular
classes on
the
other.'
Socialism
is
supposed
to
change
all
this
in
a much
more
posi-
tive direction.
Indeed,
in
most
of
these formulations he
only way
to
bring
about theachievement
of
a more
egalitarian
or
more
justsoci-
ety s to destroycapitalistnstitutionsandto construct athstoward
socialism defined
in
Marxist
terms
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
xxiii-xxiv).
The situation that has
prevailed
in
Cuba since
1959
does not
support
these
arguments.Although
the mechanisms
and
specific
featuresof Cubansocialist
dependency
differsomewhat from
those
of
capitalist dependency,
Cuba has
experienced
mechanisms and
processes
of dominationand
exploitation
since
1959.
These
mecha-
nisms
and
processes
have
not been discussed or even noted
in
the
dependencia literature.Althoughin some waysthe socialist mecha-
nisms
may
be more
benign
thantheir
capitalistcounterparts,
n
other
ways they
are
malign, repressive,
and
exploitative.
The remainderof
this section will
analyze
the main
mechanisms of influence and ex-
ploitation,
ollowed
by
a detailed
discussion
of the
way
they
have
op-
erated
in
Cuba
since
1959.
Proponents
of this third
approach
have
advanced
their
claims at
two levels
which are interrelated
empirically
but
which are
separa-
ble analytically.First,they argue in abstract erms that the mecha-
nisms of
capitalistexploitation
are eliminated
under socialism
and
replaced by nonexploitative
socialist mechanisms.
Second,
they
argue
that
specific,
concrete features
-
both internaland
external
-
of
Cuba's
dependency
under socialism have
been
much more
be-
nign
and less
exploitative
than those
of
capitalistdependency.
Letus
consider these
arguments
and see to what extent
the evidence
sup-
ports
them.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: MECHANISMS
OF INFLUENCE
AND
EXPLOITATION
ACCORDING
TO
THE
dependencia
approach
to Latin
American
development,
exploitation
in
peripheral
capitalist
countries does
not occur
simply
through
domination
by
foreign
powers
but
through
an alliance
of
foreign
capitalists,
domestic
capitalists
and the
depen-
dent
capitalist
state.
According
to this
model,
these actors
combine
to dominateandexploit the popularclasses. Theremaybe disputes
within
the
camp
of the dominant
actors but such
disputes
do not
alterthe fundamental
characterof the
relationship
n
which the
tri-
ple
alliance
(or
tri-pe
alliance)
of
foreign,
national,
and state
elites,
on the
one
hand,
dominate
and
exploit
the
popular
classes on
the
other.'
Socialism
is
supposed
to
change
all
this
in
a much
more
posi-
tive direction.
Indeed,
in
most
of
these formulations he
only way
to
bring
about theachievement
of
a more
egalitarian
or
more
justsoci-
ety s to destroycapitalistnstitutionsandto construct athstoward
socialism defined
in
Marxist
terms
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
xxiii-xxiv).
The situation that has
prevailed
in
Cuba since
1959
does not
support
these
arguments.Although
the mechanisms
and
specific
featuresof Cubansocialist
dependency
differsomewhat from
those
of
capitalist dependency,
Cuba has
experienced
mechanisms and
processes
of dominationand
exploitation
since
1959.
These
mecha-
nisms
and
processes
have
not been discussed or even noted
in
the
dependencia literature.Althoughin some waysthe socialist mecha-
nisms
may
be more
benign
thantheir
capitalistcounterparts,
n
other
ways they
are
malign, repressive,
and
exploitative.
The remainderof
this section will
analyze
the main
mechanisms of influence and ex-
ploitation,
ollowed
by
a detailed
discussion
of the
way
they
have
op-
erated
in
Cuba
since
1959.
Proponents
of this third
approach
have
advanced
their
claims at
two levels
which are interrelated
empirically
but
which are
separa-
ble analytically.First,they argue in abstract erms that the mecha-
nisms of
capitalistexploitation
are eliminated
under socialism
and
replaced by nonexploitative
socialist mechanisms.
Second,
they
argue
that
specific,
concrete features
-
both internaland
external
-
of
Cuba's
dependency
under socialism have
been
much more
be-
nign
and less
exploitative
than those
of
capitalistdependency.
Letus
consider these
arguments
and see to what extent
the evidence
sup-
ports
them.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: MECHANISMS
OF INFLUENCE
AND
EXPLOITATION
ACCORDING
TO
THE
dependencia
approach
to Latin
American
development,
exploitation
in
peripheral
capitalist
countries does
not occur
simply
through
domination
by
foreign
powers
but
through
an alliance
of
foreign
capitalists,
domestic
capitalists
and the
depen-
dent
capitalist
state.
According
to this
model,
these actors
combine
to dominateandexploit the popularclasses. Theremaybe disputes
within
the
camp
of the dominant
actors but such
disputes
do not
alterthe fundamental
characterof the
relationship
n
which the
tri-
ple
alliance
(or
tri-pe
alliance)
of
foreign,
national,
and state
elites,
on the
one
hand,
dominate
and
exploit
the
popular
classes on
the
other.'
Socialism
is
supposed
to
change
all
this
in
a much
more
posi-
tive direction.
Indeed,
in
most
of
these formulations he
only way
to
bring
about theachievement
of
a more
egalitarian
or
more
justsoci-
ety s to destroycapitalistnstitutionsandto construct athstoward
socialism defined
in
Marxist
terms
(Cardoso
and
Faletto,
1979:
xxiii-xxiv).
The situation that has
prevailed
in
Cuba since
1959
does not
support
these
arguments.Although
the mechanisms
and
specific
featuresof Cubansocialist
dependency
differsomewhat from
those
of
capitalist dependency,
Cuba has
experienced
mechanisms and
processes
of dominationand
exploitation
since
1959.
These
mecha-
nisms
and
processes
have
not been discussed or even noted
in
the
dependencia literature.Althoughin some waysthe socialist mecha-
nisms
may
be more
benign
thantheir
capitalistcounterparts,
n
other
ways they
are
malign, repressive,
and
exploitative.
The remainderof
this section will
analyze
the main
mechanisms of influence and ex-
ploitation,
ollowed
by
a detailed
discussion
of the
way
they
have
op-
erated
in
Cuba
since
1959.
69999
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
One
way
the Soviet
Union
influences Cuban domestic and for-
eign policies
and institutions is
through
the
leverage
established
by
Cuba's
structural
economic
dependency
on the Soviet Union.
The
structural
economic
characteristics
previously
described
are
fungi-
ble,
or
translatable,
into
influences
over
specific policies
and
institu-
tions
within
Cuba.
A
Russian
embassy
official,
Rudolf
Shliapnikov,
told Cuban
Communist
party
official Anibal
Escalante,
in
1967,
that
We
have
only
to
say
that
repairs
are
being
held
up
at Baku
for
three
weeks and
that's that
(From
a
speech
by
Radl Castro as
quoted
in
Thomas,
1971:
701) (Baku
is
the Soviet Union's
port
for
shipping
oil
to Cuba.) If one multiplies that chilling comment across the broad
spectrum
of the
USSR's
points
of
economic
leverage,
then
one
begins
to
appreciate
the
magnitude
of
Soviet
influence on Cuban affairs.
Mesa-Lago
describes some of
these
points
of
leverage
as follows:
The USSRhas the
capacity
to
cut the
supply
to the island of vir-
tually
all
oil,
most
capital,
foodstuffs,
and raw
materials,
about
one-
third
of
basic
capital
and
intermediate
goods,
and
probably
all
weap-
onry.
Additionally,
oss of Soviet
markets
would
mean an end to their
buying
about half
of
Cuban
sugar
at three times
the
price
of
the mar-
ket aswell aspurchaseof substantialamounts of nickel also at a sub-
sidized
price.
The
USSR
could also exert
powerful
influence
over
such
COMECON
ountries as the
GDR, Czechoslovakia,
and
Bulgar-
ia,
which
are
particularly
he
key
ones
in
trade
with
Cuba,
o
stop
eco-
nomic relationswith Cuba.
Finally
the
USSRcould stick to
the
1972
agreements
and
ask Cuba
to
start
repaying
n
1986
the
debt owed
the
Soviets. These are not
hypothetical
scenarios because
in
1968
the
USSRused the oil stick
and
in
the
1970s
the
economic-aid carrot o
influence crucial
shifts in Cuban
foreign
and domestic
policies
...
(Mesa-Lago,
981:1987).
LeoGrande,
who
sees
Cuba
as less
constrained
by
the
USSR
than does
Mesa-Lago,
writes
in
a
similar vein:
...
Cuba
is
highly
vulnerable
to
a
conscious
policy
of
politico-
economic coercion on the
part
of the
Soviet Union. Most
analysts
of
Cuban-Soviet elations
are
convinced
that the
USSR
ook
advantage
of this
vulnerability
n
late
1967
and
early
1968
by delaying petroleum
shipments
to
Cuba and
by moving
very
slowly
in
the
1968
annual
trade
agreement negotiations.
Shortly
hereafterCuban
foreign
poli-
cy
moved more
into line with Soviet
policy;
e.g.,
Cuba
oned down
its
denunciationsof pro-Sovietcommunistpartiesin LatinAmerica,re-
treated
from its
active
support
of
guerrilla
forces
in
the
continent,
and in
August
1968
gave qualified
support
to the Soviet intervention
in
Czechoslovakia ..
(LeoGrande,
1979:
26).
This
mechanism
of
influence
is more
potent
in
the case of so-
cialist
dependency
on the Soviet Union
than ever was true of
capital-
One
way
the Soviet
Union
influences Cuban domestic and for-
eign policies
and institutions is
through
the
leverage
established
by
Cuba's
structural
economic
dependency
on the Soviet Union.
The
structural
economic
characteristics
previously
described
are
fungi-
ble,
or
translatable,
into
influences
over
specific policies
and
institu-
tions
within
Cuba.
A
Russian
embassy
official,
Rudolf
Shliapnikov,
told Cuban
Communist
party
official Anibal
Escalante,
in
1967,
that
We
have
only
to
say
that
repairs
are
being
held
up
at Baku
for
three
weeks and
that's that
(From
a
speech
by
Radl Castro as
quoted
in
Thomas,
1971:
701) (Baku
is
the Soviet Union's
port
for
shipping
oil
to Cuba.) If one multiplies that chilling comment across the broad
spectrum
of the
USSR's
points
of
economic
leverage,
then
one
begins
to
appreciate
the
magnitude
of
Soviet
influence on Cuban affairs.
Mesa-Lago
describes some of
these
points
of
leverage
as follows:
The USSRhas the
capacity
to
cut the
supply
to the island of vir-
tually
all
oil,
most
capital,
foodstuffs,
and raw
materials,
about
one-
third
of
basic
capital
and
intermediate
goods,
and
probably
all
weap-
onry.
Additionally,
oss of Soviet
markets
would
mean an end to their
buying
about half
of
Cuban
sugar
at three times
the
price
of
the mar-
ket aswell aspurchaseof substantialamounts of nickel also at a sub-
sidized
price.
The
USSR
could also exert
powerful
influence
over
such
COMECON
ountries as the
GDR, Czechoslovakia,
and
Bulgar-
ia,
which
are
particularly
he
key
ones
in
trade
with
Cuba,
o
stop
eco-
nomic relationswith Cuba.
Finally
the
USSRcould stick to
the
1972
agreements
and
ask Cuba
to
start
repaying
n
1986
the
debt owed
the
Soviets. These are not
hypothetical
scenarios because
in
1968
the
USSRused the oil stick
and
in
the
1970s
the
economic-aid carrot o
influence crucial
shifts in Cuban
foreign
and domestic
policies
...
(Mesa-Lago,
981:1987).
LeoGrande,
who
sees
Cuba
as less
constrained
by
the
USSR
than does
Mesa-Lago,
writes
in
a
similar vein:
...
Cuba
is
highly
vulnerable
to
a
conscious
policy
of
politico-
economic coercion on the
part
of the
Soviet Union. Most
analysts
of
Cuban-Soviet elations
are
convinced
that the
USSR
ook
advantage
of this
vulnerability
n
late
1967
and
early
1968
by delaying petroleum
shipments
to
Cuba and
by moving
very
slowly
in
the
1968
annual
trade
agreement negotiations.
Shortly
hereafterCuban
foreign
poli-
cy
moved more
into line with Soviet
policy;
e.g.,
Cuba
oned down
its
denunciationsof pro-Sovietcommunistpartiesin LatinAmerica,re-
treated
from its
active
support
of
guerrilla
forces
in
the
continent,
and in
August
1968
gave qualified
support
to the Soviet intervention
in
Czechoslovakia ..
(LeoGrande,
1979:
26).
This
mechanism
of
influence
is more
potent
in
the case of so-
cialist
dependency
on the Soviet Union
than ever was true of
capital-
One
way
the Soviet
Union
influences Cuban domestic and for-
eign policies
and institutions is
through
the
leverage
established
by
Cuba's
structural
economic
dependency
on the Soviet Union.
The
structural
economic
characteristics
previously
described
are
fungi-
ble,
or
translatable,
into
influences
over
specific policies
and
institu-
tions
within
Cuba.
A
Russian
embassy
official,
Rudolf
Shliapnikov,
told Cuban
Communist
party
official Anibal
Escalante,
in
1967,
that
We
have
only
to
say
that
repairs
are
being
held
up
at Baku
for
three
weeks and
that's that
(From
a
speech
by
Radl Castro as
quoted
in
Thomas,
1971:
701) (Baku
is
the Soviet Union's
port
for
shipping
oil
to Cuba.) If one multiplies that chilling comment across the broad
spectrum
of the
USSR's
points
of
economic
leverage,
then
one
begins
to
appreciate
the
magnitude
of
Soviet
influence on Cuban affairs.
Mesa-Lago
describes some of
these
points
of
leverage
as follows:
The USSRhas the
capacity
to
cut the
supply
to the island of vir-
tually
all
oil,
most
capital,
foodstuffs,
and raw
materials,
about
one-
third
of
basic
capital
and
intermediate
goods,
and
probably
all
weap-
onry.
Additionally,
oss of Soviet
markets
would
mean an end to their
buying
about half
of
Cuban
sugar
at three times
the
price
of
the mar-
ket aswell aspurchaseof substantialamounts of nickel also at a sub-
sidized
price.
The
USSR
could also exert
powerful
influence
over
such
COMECON
ountries as the
GDR, Czechoslovakia,
and
Bulgar-
ia,
which
are
particularly
he
key
ones
in
trade
with
Cuba,
o
stop
eco-
nomic relationswith Cuba.
Finally
the
USSRcould stick to
the
1972
agreements
and
ask Cuba
to
start
repaying
n
1986
the
debt owed
the
Soviets. These are not
hypothetical
scenarios because
in
1968
the
USSRused the oil stick
and
in
the
1970s
the
economic-aid carrot o
influence crucial
shifts in Cuban
foreign
and domestic
policies
...
(Mesa-Lago,
981:1987).
LeoGrande,
who
sees
Cuba
as less
constrained
by
the
USSR
than does
Mesa-Lago,
writes
in
a
similar vein:
...
Cuba
is
highly
vulnerable
to
a
conscious
policy
of
politico-
economic coercion on the
part
of the
Soviet Union. Most
analysts
of
Cuban-Soviet elations
are
convinced
that the
USSR
ook
advantage
of this
vulnerability
n
late
1967
and
early
1968
by delaying petroleum
shipments
to
Cuba and
by moving
very
slowly
in
the
1968
annual
trade
agreement negotiations.
Shortly
hereafterCuban
foreign
poli-
cy
moved more
into line with Soviet
policy;
e.g.,
Cuba
oned down
its
denunciationsof pro-Sovietcommunistpartiesin LatinAmerica,re-
treated
from its
active
support
of
guerrilla
forces
in
the
continent,
and in
August
1968
gave qualified
support
to the Soviet intervention
in
Czechoslovakia ..
(LeoGrande,
1979:
26).
This
mechanism
of
influence
is more
potent
in
the case of so-
cialist
dependency
on the Soviet Union
than ever was true of
capital-
One
way
the Soviet
Union
influences Cuban domestic and for-
eign policies
and institutions is
through
the
leverage
established
by
Cuba's
structural
economic
dependency
on the Soviet Union.
The
structural
economic
characteristics
previously
described
are
fungi-
ble,
or
translatable,
into
influences
over
specific policies
and
institu-
tions
within
Cuba.
A
Russian
embassy
official,
Rudolf
Shliapnikov,
told Cuban
Communist
party
official Anibal
Escalante,
in
1967,
that
We
have
only
to
say
that
repairs
are
being
held
up
at Baku
for
three
weeks and
that's that
(From
a
speech
by
Radl Castro as
quoted
in
Thomas,
1971:
701) (Baku
is
the Soviet Union's
port
for
shipping
oil
to Cuba.) If one multiplies that chilling comment across the broad
spectrum
of the
USSR's
points
of
economic
leverage,
then
one
begins
to
appreciate
the
magnitude
of
Soviet
influence on Cuban affairs.
Mesa-Lago
describes some of
these
points
of
leverage
as follows:
The USSRhas the
capacity
to
cut the
supply
to the island of vir-
tually
all
oil,
most
capital,
foodstuffs,
and raw
materials,
about
one-
third
of
basic
capital
and
intermediate
goods,
and
probably
all
weap-
onry.
Additionally,
oss of Soviet
markets
would
mean an end to their
buying
about half
of
Cuban
sugar
at three times
the
price
of
the mar-
ket aswell aspurchaseof substantialamounts of nickel also at a sub-
sidized
price.
The
USSR
could also exert
powerful
influence
over
such
COMECON
ountries as the
GDR, Czechoslovakia,
and
Bulgar-
ia,
which
are
particularly
he
key
ones
in
trade
with
Cuba,
o
stop
eco-
nomic relationswith Cuba.
Finally
the
USSRcould stick to
the
1972
agreements
and
ask Cuba
to
start
repaying
n
1986
the
debt owed
the
Soviets. These are not
hypothetical
scenarios because
in
1968
the
USSRused the oil stick
and
in
the
1970s
the
economic-aid carrot o
influence crucial
shifts in Cuban
foreign
and domestic
policies
...
(Mesa-Lago,
981:1987).
LeoGrande,
who
sees
Cuba
as less
constrained
by
the
USSR
than does
Mesa-Lago,
writes
in
a
similar vein:
...
Cuba
is
highly
vulnerable
to
a
conscious
policy
of
politico-
economic coercion on the
part
of the
Soviet Union. Most
analysts
of
Cuban-Soviet elations
are
convinced
that the
USSR
ook
advantage
of this
vulnerability
n
late
1967
and
early
1968
by delaying petroleum
shipments
to
Cuba and
by moving
very
slowly
in
the
1968
annual
trade
agreement negotiations.
Shortly
hereafterCuban
foreign
poli-
cy
moved more
into line with Soviet
policy;
e.g.,
Cuba
oned down
its
denunciationsof pro-Sovietcommunistpartiesin LatinAmerica,re-
treated
from its
active
support
of
guerrilla
forces
in
the
continent,
and in
August
1968
gave qualified
support
to the Soviet intervention
in
Czechoslovakia ..
(LeoGrande,
1979:
26).
This
mechanism
of
influence
is more
potent
in
the case of so-
cialist
dependency
on the Soviet Union
than ever was true of
capital-
70000
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PACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALISTS.SOCIALIST EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALISTS.SOCIALIST EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALISTS.SOCIALIST EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
UBA
-
CAPITALISTS.SOCIALIST EPENDENCY
ist
dependency
because the Soviet
state
controlsand
coordinatesthe
instrumentsof
economic
leverage
to
a far
greaterdegree
than the
United
States ever controlled U.S. economic activities
in
Cuba.
In-
deed,
failureof the U.S.
government
to
guide
U.S.
private
nvestment
and trade
policies
in
a direction
conducive
to the U.S.
public
interest
during
he
1950s
has
been identified
as
a
major
law
in
U.S.
policy
that
not
only
contributed to difficulties
with
Cuba
but
also led to
the
eventual
collapse
of the
U.S.-Cuba
elationship
(Johnson,
1965).
A
second
mechanism
-
really
a set of mechanisms
-
is
organiza-
tional.
Many
organizations
nstitutionalize
he
linkages
between the
Soviet Unionand Cuba.It hasbeen suggested that studyingSoviet
relations
with
LatinAmericawithout
studying
the
relations
between
the Communist
Party
of the Soviet Union
(CPSU)
and the Latin
AmericanCPs
would be as
unrealisticas
ignoring
multinational
or-
porations
n
examining
U.S.
policies
toward
the
area
(Blasier,
1983:
68).
This
certainly
holds for
Cuba,
yet many
dependencia
analyses
of
Cuba
which
express great
concern
regarding
activitiesof
multina-
tional
corporations
prior
o
1959
are silent
on
the
subject
of the
CPSU
after
1959.
On the basis of a detailed
study
by
Andres
Suarez,
Jorge
Dominguez
has concluded
that,
in
the first half of the
1960s,
Prime
MinisterFidel
Castro
acquiesced
in the
formationand de-
velopment
of a
revolutionary
party,
and
eventually
a
Communist
party,
irstas
an
effort o obtain further
upport
from
the Soviet
Union,
then
as
a condition of
continued Soviet
support...
Subsequent
events
furthervalidated Suarez's
analysis,
when
he
extended
it into the
1970s.
As
the disastrous
year
of
1970
came to an
end,
the Soviet
Union
once
again
rescued
Cuba,
but
this time on con-
ditionthata
major
reorganization
ofthe Cuban
government,
under
Soviet
guidance,
be undertaken
(Dominguez
1978:
159;
emphasis
added).
Thus not
only
the CubanCommunist
Party,
ut the entire Cuban
bureaucratic
pparatus,
was
reshaped
in
significant
measure
by
the
SovietUnion.
The main
instrument
orthis
reshaping
was the Cuban-
SovietCommission
for
Economic,
Scientific,
and
Technical
Collabo-
ration,
established
in
1970.
According
to
Domfnguez,
the details
of
this
agreement
made evident how vast and
decisive
Soviet
influ-
ence would
become within the
Cuban
government...
The
Com-
mission henceforth coordinated the
efforts of the
Cuban Ministries
of
Foreign
TradeMerchantMarine
and
Ports,
Basic
Industries,
and
Mining
and
Metallurgy.
t also coordinated
the activitiesof the
Agen-
cy
for
AgriculturalDevelopment,
the
Agricultural
Mechanization
ist
dependency
because the Soviet
state
controlsand
coordinatesthe
instrumentsof
economic
leverage
to
a far
greaterdegree
than the
United
States ever controlled U.S. economic activities
in
Cuba.
In-
deed,
failureof the U.S.
government
to
guide
U.S.
private
nvestment
and trade
policies
in
a direction
conducive
to the U.S.
public
interest
during
he
1950s
has
been identified
as
a
major
law
in
U.S.
policy
that
not
only
contributed to difficulties
with
Cuba
but
also led to
the
eventual
collapse
of the
U.S.-Cuba
elationship
(Johnson,
1965).
A
second
mechanism
-
really
a set of mechanisms
-
is
organiza-
tional.
Many
organizations
nstitutionalize
he
linkages
between the
Soviet Unionand Cuba.It hasbeen suggested that studyingSoviet
relations
with
LatinAmericawithout
studying
the
relations
between
the Communist
Party
of the Soviet Union
(CPSU)
and the Latin
AmericanCPs
would be as
unrealisticas
ignoring
multinational
or-
porations
n
examining
U.S.
policies
toward
the
area
(Blasier,
1983:
68).
This
certainly
holds for
Cuba,
yet many
dependencia
analyses
of
Cuba
which
express great
concern
regarding
activitiesof
multina-
tional
corporations
prior
o
1959
are silent
on
the
subject
of the
CPSU
after
1959.
On the basis of a detailed
study
by
Andres
Suarez,
Jorge
Dominguez
has concluded
that,
in
the first half of the
1960s,
Prime
MinisterFidel
Castro
acquiesced
in the
formationand de-
velopment
of a
revolutionary
party,
and
eventually
a
Communist
party,
irstas
an
effort o obtain further
upport
from
the Soviet
Union,
then
as
a condition of
continued Soviet
support...
Subsequent
events
furthervalidated Suarez's
analysis,
when
he
extended
it into the
1970s.
As
the disastrous
year
of
1970
came to an
end,
the Soviet
Union
once
again
rescued
Cuba,
but
this time on con-
ditionthata
major
reorganization
ofthe Cuban
government,
under
Soviet
guidance,
be undertaken
(Dominguez
1978:
159;
emphasis
added).
Thus not
only
the CubanCommunist
Party,
ut the entire Cuban
bureaucratic
pparatus,
was
reshaped
in
significant
measure
by
the
SovietUnion.
The main
instrument
orthis
reshaping
was the Cuban-
SovietCommission
for
Economic,
Scientific,
and
Technical
Collabo-
ration,
established
in
1970.
According
to
Domfnguez,
the details
of
this
agreement
made evident how vast and
decisive
Soviet
influ-
ence would
become within the
Cuban
government...
The
Com-
mission henceforth coordinated the
efforts of the
Cuban Ministries
of
Foreign
TradeMerchantMarine
and
Ports,
Basic
Industries,
and
Mining
and
Metallurgy.
t also coordinated
the activitiesof the
Agen-
cy
for
AgriculturalDevelopment,
the
Agricultural
Mechanization
ist
dependency
because the Soviet
state
controlsand
coordinatesthe
instrumentsof
economic
leverage
to
a far
greaterdegree
than the
United
States ever controlled U.S. economic activities
in
Cuba.
In-
deed,
failureof the U.S.
government
to
guide
U.S.
private
nvestment
and trade
policies
in
a direction
conducive
to the U.S.
public
interest
during
he
1950s
has
been identified
as
a
major
law
in
U.S.
policy
that
not
only
contributed to difficulties
with
Cuba
but
also led to
the
eventual
collapse
of the
U.S.-Cuba
elationship
(Johnson,
1965).
A
second
mechanism
-
really
a set of mechanisms
-
is
organiza-
tional.
Many
organizations
nstitutionalize
he
linkages
between the
Soviet Unionand Cuba.It hasbeen suggested that studyingSoviet
relations
with
LatinAmericawithout
studying
the
relations
between
the Communist
Party
of the Soviet Union
(CPSU)
and the Latin
AmericanCPs
would be as
unrealisticas
ignoring
multinational
or-
porations
n
examining
U.S.
policies
toward
the
area
(Blasier,
1983:
68).
This
certainly
holds for
Cuba,
yet many
dependencia
analyses
of
Cuba
which
express great
concern
regarding
activitiesof
multina-
tional
corporations
prior
o
1959
are silent
on
the
subject
of the
CPSU
after
1959.
On the basis of a detailed
study
by
Andres
Suarez,
Jorge
Dominguez
has concluded
that,
in
the first half of the
1960s,
Prime
MinisterFidel
Castro
acquiesced
in the
formationand de-
velopment
of a
revolutionary
party,
and
eventually
a
Communist
party,
irstas
an
effort o obtain further
upport
from
the Soviet
Union,
then
as
a condition of
continued Soviet
support...
Subsequent
events
furthervalidated Suarez's
analysis,
when
he
extended
it into the
1970s.
As
the disastrous
year
of
1970
came to an
end,
the Soviet
Union
once
again
rescued
Cuba,
but
this time on con-
ditionthata
major
reorganization
ofthe Cuban
government,
under
Soviet
guidance,
be undertaken
(Dominguez
1978:
159;
emphasis
added).
Thus not
only
the CubanCommunist
Party,
ut the entire Cuban
bureaucratic
pparatus,
was
reshaped
in
significant
measure
by
the
SovietUnion.
The main
instrument
orthis
reshaping
was the Cuban-
SovietCommission
for
Economic,
Scientific,
and
Technical
Collabo-
ration,
established
in
1970.
According
to
Domfnguez,
the details
of
this
agreement
made evident how vast and
decisive
Soviet
influ-
ence would
become within the
Cuban
government...
The
Com-
mission henceforth coordinated the
efforts of the
Cuban Ministries
of
Foreign
TradeMerchantMarine
and
Ports,
Basic
Industries,
and
Mining
and
Metallurgy.
t also coordinated
the activitiesof the
Agen-
cy
for
AgriculturalDevelopment,
the
Agricultural
Mechanization
ist
dependency
because the Soviet
state
controlsand
coordinatesthe
instrumentsof
economic
leverage
to
a far
greaterdegree
than the
United
States ever controlled U.S. economic activities
in
Cuba.
In-
deed,
failureof the U.S.
government
to
guide
U.S.
private
nvestment
and trade
policies
in
a direction
conducive
to the U.S.
public
interest
during
he
1950s
has
been identified
as
a
major
law
in
U.S.
policy
that
not
only
contributed to difficulties
with
Cuba
but
also led to
the
eventual
collapse
of the
U.S.-Cuba
elationship
(Johnson,
1965).
A
second
mechanism
-
really
a set of mechanisms
-
is
organiza-
tional.
Many
organizations
nstitutionalize
he
linkages
between the
Soviet Unionand Cuba.It hasbeen suggested that studyingSoviet
relations
with
LatinAmericawithout
studying
the
relations
between
the Communist
Party
of the Soviet Union
(CPSU)
and the Latin
AmericanCPs
would be as
unrealisticas
ignoring
multinational
or-
porations
n
examining
U.S.
policies
toward
the
area
(Blasier,
1983:
68).
This
certainly
holds for
Cuba,
yet many
dependencia
analyses
of
Cuba
which
express great
concern
regarding
activitiesof
multina-
tional
corporations
prior
o
1959
are silent
on
the
subject
of the
CPSU
after
1959.
On the basis of a detailed
study
by
Andres
Suarez,
Jorge
Dominguez
has concluded
that,
in
the first half of the
1960s,
Prime
MinisterFidel
Castro
acquiesced
in the
formationand de-
velopment
of a
revolutionary
party,
and
eventually
a
Communist
party,
irstas
an
effort o obtain further
upport
from
the Soviet
Union,
then
as
a condition of
continued Soviet
support...
Subsequent
events
furthervalidated Suarez's
analysis,
when
he
extended
it into the
1970s.
As
the disastrous
year
of
1970
came to an
end,
the Soviet
Union
once
again
rescued
Cuba,
but
this time on con-
ditionthata
major
reorganization
ofthe Cuban
government,
under
Soviet
guidance,
be undertaken
(Dominguez
1978:
159;
emphasis
added).
Thus not
only
the CubanCommunist
Party,
ut the entire Cuban
bureaucratic
pparatus,
was
reshaped
in
significant
measure
by
the
SovietUnion.
The main
instrument
orthis
reshaping
was the Cuban-
SovietCommission
for
Economic,
Scientific,
and
Technical
Collabo-
ration,
established
in
1970.
According
to
Domfnguez,
the details
of
this
agreement
made evident how vast and
decisive
Soviet
influ-
ence would
become within the
Cuban
government...
The
Com-
mission henceforth coordinated the
efforts of the
Cuban Ministries
of
Foreign
TradeMerchantMarine
and
Ports,
Basic
Industries,
and
Mining
and
Metallurgy.
t also coordinated
the activitiesof the
Agen-
cy
for
AgriculturalDevelopment,
the
Agricultural
Mechanization
71111
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
Agency,
the Institutes
of
Fishing
and
of
Civil
Aeronautics,
and the
Electric Power
Enterprise.
The
Cuban-Soviet
Commission itself
be-
came a new
agency
which
pushed
the Cuban
government
toward
furtherbureaucratization nd
centralization
of
power.
The
Commis-
sion
met
frequently
and
regularly.
ll
the
agencies
it
coordinated
were
required
to
have
systematic,
ormal bureaucratic
procedures
under
the
guidance
of
Soviet technicians
(whose
numbers
in
Cuba
consequently
increased
vastly
in the
early
1970s)
in
order
to make
effective
use
of Soviet
assistance
(Dominguez,
1978:159-160;
em-
phases
added).
In 1972 Cubajoined the Council for MutualEconomicAssist-
ance
(CMEA,
or
COMECON).
From
the
mid-1970s
on,
the
Cuban
5-year
plans
(a
conceptual
device
borrowed
from the
USSR)
have
been
fully
coordinated
with the Soviet
5-yearplans.
Even
the
Cuban
system
of national
accounting
has been revised
along
Soviet
lines
(Dominguez,
1978;
Mesa-Lago,
981:199-202).
In
short,
the Soviets
are
deeply
involved
in
every
sector
of Cuba's
conomy
and
in most
government
ministries.
In
addition
to the ones mentioned
above,
they
are
also involved
in
the
Ministry
of Interior
and its
espionage
branch, he DGI (Direcci6n Generalde Inteligencia), which works
closely
with
the Soviet KGB
(Talbott,
1978b:
39;
Dominguez,
1978:
160).
A
third
mechanism
is
provided
by
the
high degree
of
common
interests
share
by
Fidel
Castro
and
the
Cuban
leaders,
on the
one
hand,
with those
of Soviet leaders
on the other. While
this
commonality
of interests
s
by
no
means
complete,
it is extraordinari-
ly
high by any
standard,
and
much
higher
than that shared
by
either
partywith the Cubanpeople.
Whatare
the
major
nterests of Fidel
Castro
and the Cuban
rul-
ing
elite?As
Hugh
Thomasand
his
colleagues
have
recently pointed
out
(1984; 5),
the
regime's
nterests
or
priorities
have remained
rela-
tively
unchanged
since
1959.
They
are,
in
order of
importance,
(1)
maintaining
Castro's
power
undiluted;
(2)
converting
Cuba
into a
worldclass
actorwith
major
nternational
nfluence;
and
(3)
trans-
forming
Cuban
society.
Castro
has
had considerable success
in
achieving
these
goals,
and
the
degree
of
success has been
directly
relatedto the orderof priority.This success owes much to the Soviet
Union.
Soviet
support
has been
indispensable
for
the
survival
of the
Castro
regime,
both
economically
and
militarily.
t
has enabled
Cas-
tro to
play
an
international
role
he
otherwise
could
never
have
played
in
his efforts
to
reshape
Cuban
society.
Agency,
the Institutes
of
Fishing
and
of
Civil
Aeronautics,
and the
Electric Power
Enterprise.
The
Cuban-Soviet
Commission itself
be-
came a new
agency
which
pushed
the Cuban
government
toward
furtherbureaucratization nd
centralization
of
power.
The
Commis-
sion
met
frequently
and
regularly.
ll
the
agencies
it
coordinated
were
required
to
have
systematic,
ormal bureaucratic
procedures
under
the
guidance
of
Soviet technicians
(whose
numbers
in
Cuba
consequently
increased
vastly
in the
early
1970s)
in
order
to make
effective
use
of Soviet
assistance
(Dominguez,
1978:159-160;
em-
phases
added).
In 1972 Cubajoined the Council for MutualEconomicAssist-
ance
(CMEA,
or
COMECON).
From
the
mid-1970s
on,
the
Cuban
5-year
plans
(a
conceptual
device
borrowed
from the
USSR)
have
been
fully
coordinated
with the Soviet
5-yearplans.
Even
the
Cuban
system
of national
accounting
has been revised
along
Soviet
lines
(Dominguez,
1978;
Mesa-Lago,
981:199-202).
In
short,
the Soviets
are
deeply
involved
in
every
sector
of Cuba's
conomy
and
in most
government
ministries.
In
addition
to the ones mentioned
above,
they
are
also involved
in
the
Ministry
of Interior
and its
espionage
branch, he DGI (Direcci6n Generalde Inteligencia), which works
closely
with
the Soviet KGB
(Talbott,
1978b:
39;
Dominguez,
1978:
160).
A
third
mechanism
is
provided
by
the
high degree
of
common
interests
share
by
Fidel
Castro
and
the
Cuban
leaders,
on the
one
hand,
with those
of Soviet leaders
on the other. While
this
commonality
of interests
s
by
no
means
complete,
it is extraordinari-
ly
high by any
standard,
and
much
higher
than that shared
by
either
partywith the Cubanpeople.
Whatare
the
major
nterests of Fidel
Castro
and the Cuban
rul-
ing
elite?As
Hugh
Thomasand
his
colleagues
have
recently pointed
out
(1984; 5),
the
regime's
nterests
or
priorities
have remained
rela-
tively
unchanged
since
1959.
They
are,
in
order of
importance,
(1)
maintaining
Castro's
power
undiluted;
(2)
converting
Cuba
into a
worldclass
actorwith
major
nternational
nfluence;
and
(3)
trans-
forming
Cuban
society.
Castro
has
had considerable success
in
achieving
these
goals,
and
the
degree
of
success has been
directly
relatedto the orderof priority.This success owes much to the Soviet
Union.
Soviet
support
has been
indispensable
for
the
survival
of the
Castro
regime,
both
economically
and
militarily.
t
has enabled
Cas-
tro to
play
an
international
role
he
otherwise
could
never
have
played
in
his efforts
to
reshape
Cuban
society.
Agency,
the Institutes
of
Fishing
and
of
Civil
Aeronautics,
and the
Electric Power
Enterprise.
The
Cuban-Soviet
Commission itself
be-
came a new
agency
which
pushed
the Cuban
government
toward
furtherbureaucratization nd
centralization
of
power.
The
Commis-
sion
met
frequently
and
regularly.
ll
the
agencies
it
coordinated
were
required
to
have
systematic,
ormal bureaucratic
procedures
under
the
guidance
of
Soviet technicians
(whose
numbers
in
Cuba
consequently
increased
vastly
in the
early
1970s)
in
order
to make
effective
use
of Soviet
assistance
(Dominguez,
1978:159-160;
em-
phases
added).
In 1972 Cubajoined the Council for MutualEconomicAssist-
ance
(CMEA,
or
COMECON).
From
the
mid-1970s
on,
the
Cuban
5-year
plans
(a
conceptual
device
borrowed
from the
USSR)
have
been
fully
coordinated
with the Soviet
5-yearplans.
Even
the
Cuban
system
of national
accounting
has been revised
along
Soviet
lines
(Dominguez,
1978;
Mesa-Lago,
981:199-202).
In
short,
the Soviets
are
deeply
involved
in
every
sector
of Cuba's
conomy
and
in most
government
ministries.
In
addition
to the ones mentioned
above,
they
are
also involved
in
the
Ministry
of Interior
and its
espionage
branch, he DGI (Direcci6n Generalde Inteligencia), which works
closely
with
the Soviet KGB
(Talbott,
1978b:
39;
Dominguez,
1978:
160).
A
third
mechanism
is
provided
by
the
high degree
of
common
interests
share
by
Fidel
Castro
and
the
Cuban
leaders,
on the
one
hand,
with those
of Soviet leaders
on the other. While
this
commonality
of interests
s
by
no
means
complete,
it is extraordinari-
ly
high by any
standard,
and
much
higher
than that shared
by
either
partywith the Cubanpeople.
Whatare
the
major
nterests of Fidel
Castro
and the Cuban
rul-
ing
elite?As
Hugh
Thomasand
his
colleagues
have
recently pointed
out
(1984; 5),
the
regime's
nterests
or
priorities
have remained
rela-
tively
unchanged
since
1959.
They
are,
in
order of
importance,
(1)
maintaining
Castro's
power
undiluted;
(2)
converting
Cuba
into a
worldclass
actorwith
major
nternational
nfluence;
and
(3)
trans-
forming
Cuban
society.
Castro
has
had considerable success
in
achieving
these
goals,
and
the
degree
of
success has been
directly
relatedto the orderof priority.This success owes much to the Soviet
Union.
Soviet
support
has been
indispensable
for
the
survival
of the
Castro
regime,
both
economically
and
militarily.
t
has enabled
Cas-
tro to
play
an
international
role
he
otherwise
could
never
have
played
in
his efforts
to
reshape
Cuban
society.
Agency,
the Institutes
of
Fishing
and
of
Civil
Aeronautics,
and the
Electric Power
Enterprise.
The
Cuban-Soviet
Commission itself
be-
came a new
agency
which
pushed
the Cuban
government
toward
furtherbureaucratization nd
centralization
of
power.
The
Commis-
sion
met
frequently
and
regularly.
ll
the
agencies
it
coordinated
were
required
to
have
systematic,
ormal bureaucratic
procedures
under
the
guidance
of
Soviet technicians
(whose
numbers
in
Cuba
consequently
increased
vastly
in the
early
1970s)
in
order
to make
effective
use
of Soviet
assistance
(Dominguez,
1978:159-160;
em-
phases
added).
In 1972 Cubajoined the Council for MutualEconomicAssist-
ance
(CMEA,
or
COMECON).
From
the
mid-1970s
on,
the
Cuban
5-year
plans
(a
conceptual
device
borrowed
from the
USSR)
have
been
fully
coordinated
with the Soviet
5-yearplans.
Even
the
Cuban
system
of national
accounting
has been revised
along
Soviet
lines
(Dominguez,
1978;
Mesa-Lago,
981:199-202).
In
short,
the Soviets
are
deeply
involved
in
every
sector
of Cuba's
conomy
and
in most
government
ministries.
In
addition
to the ones mentioned
above,
they
are
also involved
in
the
Ministry
of Interior
and its
espionage
branch, he DGI (Direcci6n Generalde Inteligencia), which works
closely
with
the Soviet KGB
(Talbott,
1978b:
39;
Dominguez,
1978:
160).
A
third
mechanism
is
provided
by
the
high degree
of
common
interests
share
by
Fidel
Castro
and
the
Cuban
leaders,
on the
one
hand,
with those
of Soviet leaders
on the other. While
this
commonality
of interests
s
by
no
means
complete,
it is extraordinari-
ly
high by any
standard,
and
much
higher
than that shared
by
either
partywith the Cubanpeople.
Whatare
the
major
nterests of Fidel
Castro
and the Cuban
rul-
ing
elite?As
Hugh
Thomasand
his
colleagues
have
recently pointed
out
(1984; 5),
the
regime's
nterests
or
priorities
have remained
rela-
tively
unchanged
since
1959.
They
are,
in
order of
importance,
(1)
maintaining
Castro's
power
undiluted;
(2)
converting
Cuba
into a
worldclass
actorwith
major
nternational
nfluence;
and
(3)
trans-
forming
Cuban
society.
Castro
has
had considerable success
in
achieving
these
goals,
and
the
degree
of
success has been
directly
relatedto the orderof priority.This success owes much to the Soviet
Union.
Soviet
support
has been
indispensable
for
the
survival
of the
Castro
regime,
both
economically
and
militarily.
t
has enabled
Cas-
tro to
play
an
international
role
he
otherwise
could
never
have
played
in
his efforts
to
reshape
Cuban
society.
72222
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA-
CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
What are
the main interests of
the
USSR
in
Cuba? Cuba
has
been,
in
Blasier's
terminology,
an
economic
liability
for
the
USSR
but
a
political
asset
(1983: 99-128):
Cuba
may
be the Soviet
Union'smost
important
political
wind-
fall since WorldWar
I
...
Cubahas
played
a
unique
role
in
bolstering
the
authority
and
appeal
of
Soviet
doctrine,
the
universal claims
of
which
require
intermittent
validation. Communist
Cuba has
helped
make the
Sovietcontention that communism
is the wave of the
future
more believable.
Thus
the
Marxist-Leninist
egime
in
Cuba has
strengthened
Soviet
influence,
most
particularly
n
the Third
World.
But
Cuba
has
had more than a
demonstration
effect;
Castro
has
sought to mobilize revolutionaryorces around the world and
sup-
ported,
where it suited
him,
Soviet
political
objectives.
Soviet
eaders
have
been
particularly
pleased
that
Cuba introduced the
first
Com-
munist state in the Western
Hemisphere,
and
it
has
been a useful
ally
in
political
competition
with the
United States
(Blasier,
1983:
99).
In
addition,
Cuba has
been
able
to
do
in
Africa,
the
Middle
East,
the Caribbean and
Central America
things
that the Russians
cannot
do
as
well or
at
all. It
represents
Soviet
positions
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement. It
supports
unpopular
Soviet
actions
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and Poland.
Thus,
although
the
interests
of Fidel Castro
and the
Soviets
are
not identical
by any
means,
they
are
relatively
congenial.
Each is
use-
ful to
the other and
both sides
know
it. With
respect
to these two sets
of
actors,
therefore,
the
widely-held
thesis
of
convergence
of inter-
ests has
a
great
deal of
validity.
However,
it is
critically
important
to make a distinction
between
the Cuban
ruling
elite and
the
Cuban
population
as
a whole. What
Cuban interests are served by supporting the Soviet invasions of
Czechoslovakia
and
Afghanistan
and Soviet
sponsorship
of
military
suppression
in Poland?
These
policies
make no sense
in
terms of
the
interests
of the Cuban
people.
They
make
great
sense,
however,
in
terms
of
the interests of
Fidel
Castro.
Thus,
Castro
has
his own reasons for
approving
Soviet
military
upport
for
faltering
socialist
governments
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan
and
Poland.
He
would
hope
to
have
such
support
if
the
Cuban
gov-
ernment
were
similarly
hreatened... The main
justification
or Sovi-
et military uppressionis that socialist regimesarebeing threatened
with
'foreign
intervention'
by
'imperialist'
nations ...
if
Castro
is
counting
on
the
USSR
to
protect
him from
'imperialism'
(or
local
forces
linked to
'imperialism'),
he
must
necessarilyapprove
he Sovi-
et
defense
of 'socialism'
elsewhere
(Blasier,
1983:
109;
emphasis
added).
What are
the main interests of
the
USSR
in
Cuba? Cuba
has
been,
in
Blasier's
terminology,
an
economic
liability
for
the
USSR
but
a
political
asset
(1983: 99-128):
Cuba
may
be the Soviet
Union'smost
important
political
wind-
fall since WorldWar
I
...
Cubahas
played
a
unique
role
in
bolstering
the
authority
and
appeal
of
Soviet
doctrine,
the
universal claims
of
which
require
intermittent
validation. Communist
Cuba has
helped
make the
Sovietcontention that communism
is the wave of the
future
more believable.
Thus
the
Marxist-Leninist
egime
in
Cuba has
strengthened
Soviet
influence,
most
particularly
n
the Third
World.
But
Cuba
has
had more than a
demonstration
effect;
Castro
has
sought to mobilize revolutionaryorces around the world and
sup-
ported,
where it suited
him,
Soviet
political
objectives.
Soviet
eaders
have
been
particularly
pleased
that
Cuba introduced the
first
Com-
munist state in the Western
Hemisphere,
and
it
has
been a useful
ally
in
political
competition
with the
United States
(Blasier,
1983:
99).
In
addition,
Cuba has
been
able
to
do
in
Africa,
the
Middle
East,
the Caribbean and
Central America
things
that the Russians
cannot
do
as
well or
at
all. It
represents
Soviet
positions
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement. It
supports
unpopular
Soviet
actions
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and Poland.
Thus,
although
the
interests
of Fidel Castro
and the
Soviets
are
not identical
by any
means,
they
are
relatively
congenial.
Each is
use-
ful to
the other and
both sides
know
it. With
respect
to these two sets
of
actors,
therefore,
the
widely-held
thesis
of
convergence
of inter-
ests has
a
great
deal of
validity.
However,
it is
critically
important
to make a distinction
between
the Cuban
ruling
elite and
the
Cuban
population
as
a whole. What
Cuban interests are served by supporting the Soviet invasions of
Czechoslovakia
and
Afghanistan
and Soviet
sponsorship
of
military
suppression
in Poland?
These
policies
make no sense
in
terms of
the
interests
of the Cuban
people.
They
make
great
sense,
however,
in
terms
of
the interests of
Fidel
Castro.
Thus,
Castro
has
his own reasons for
approving
Soviet
military
upport
for
faltering
socialist
governments
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan
and
Poland.
He
would
hope
to
have
such
support
if
the
Cuban
gov-
ernment
were
similarly
hreatened... The main
justification
or Sovi-
et military uppressionis that socialist regimesarebeing threatened
with
'foreign
intervention'
by
'imperialist'
nations ...
if
Castro
is
counting
on
the
USSR
to
protect
him from
'imperialism'
(or
local
forces
linked to
'imperialism'),
he
must
necessarilyapprove
he Sovi-
et
defense
of 'socialism'
elsewhere
(Blasier,
1983:
109;
emphasis
added).
What are
the main interests of
the
USSR
in
Cuba? Cuba
has
been,
in
Blasier's
terminology,
an
economic
liability
for
the
USSR
but
a
political
asset
(1983: 99-128):
Cuba
may
be the Soviet
Union'smost
important
political
wind-
fall since WorldWar
I
...
Cubahas
played
a
unique
role
in
bolstering
the
authority
and
appeal
of
Soviet
doctrine,
the
universal claims
of
which
require
intermittent
validation. Communist
Cuba has
helped
make the
Sovietcontention that communism
is the wave of the
future
more believable.
Thus
the
Marxist-Leninist
egime
in
Cuba has
strengthened
Soviet
influence,
most
particularly
n
the Third
World.
But
Cuba
has
had more than a
demonstration
effect;
Castro
has
sought to mobilize revolutionaryorces around the world and
sup-
ported,
where it suited
him,
Soviet
political
objectives.
Soviet
eaders
have
been
particularly
pleased
that
Cuba introduced the
first
Com-
munist state in the Western
Hemisphere,
and
it
has
been a useful
ally
in
political
competition
with the
United States
(Blasier,
1983:
99).
In
addition,
Cuba has
been
able
to
do
in
Africa,
the
Middle
East,
the Caribbean and
Central America
things
that the Russians
cannot
do
as
well or
at
all. It
represents
Soviet
positions
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement. It
supports
unpopular
Soviet
actions
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and Poland.
Thus,
although
the
interests
of Fidel Castro
and the
Soviets
are
not identical
by any
means,
they
are
relatively
congenial.
Each is
use-
ful to
the other and
both sides
know
it. With
respect
to these two sets
of
actors,
therefore,
the
widely-held
thesis
of
convergence
of inter-
ests has
a
great
deal of
validity.
However,
it is
critically
important
to make a distinction
between
the Cuban
ruling
elite and
the
Cuban
population
as
a whole. What
Cuban interests are served by supporting the Soviet invasions of
Czechoslovakia
and
Afghanistan
and Soviet
sponsorship
of
military
suppression
in Poland?
These
policies
make no sense
in
terms of
the
interests
of the Cuban
people.
They
make
great
sense,
however,
in
terms
of
the interests of
Fidel
Castro.
Thus,
Castro
has
his own reasons for
approving
Soviet
military
upport
for
faltering
socialist
governments
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan
and
Poland.
He
would
hope
to
have
such
support
if
the
Cuban
gov-
ernment
were
similarly
hreatened... The main
justification
or Sovi-
et military uppressionis that socialist regimesarebeing threatened
with
'foreign
intervention'
by
'imperialist'
nations ...
if
Castro
is
counting
on
the
USSR
to
protect
him from
'imperialism'
(or
local
forces
linked to
'imperialism'),
he
must
necessarilyapprove
he Sovi-
et
defense
of 'socialism'
elsewhere
(Blasier,
1983:
109;
emphasis
added).
What are
the main interests of
the
USSR
in
Cuba? Cuba
has
been,
in
Blasier's
terminology,
an
economic
liability
for
the
USSR
but
a
political
asset
(1983: 99-128):
Cuba
may
be the Soviet
Union'smost
important
political
wind-
fall since WorldWar
I
...
Cubahas
played
a
unique
role
in
bolstering
the
authority
and
appeal
of
Soviet
doctrine,
the
universal claims
of
which
require
intermittent
validation. Communist
Cuba has
helped
make the
Sovietcontention that communism
is the wave of the
future
more believable.
Thus
the
Marxist-Leninist
egime
in
Cuba has
strengthened
Soviet
influence,
most
particularly
n
the Third
World.
But
Cuba
has
had more than a
demonstration
effect;
Castro
has
sought to mobilize revolutionaryorces around the world and
sup-
ported,
where it suited
him,
Soviet
political
objectives.
Soviet
eaders
have
been
particularly
pleased
that
Cuba introduced the
first
Com-
munist state in the Western
Hemisphere,
and
it
has
been a useful
ally
in
political
competition
with the
United States
(Blasier,
1983:
99).
In
addition,
Cuba has
been
able
to
do
in
Africa,
the
Middle
East,
the Caribbean and
Central America
things
that the Russians
cannot
do
as
well or
at
all. It
represents
Soviet
positions
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement. It
supports
unpopular
Soviet
actions
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and Poland.
Thus,
although
the
interests
of Fidel Castro
and the
Soviets
are
not identical
by any
means,
they
are
relatively
congenial.
Each is
use-
ful to
the other and
both sides
know
it. With
respect
to these two sets
of
actors,
therefore,
the
widely-held
thesis
of
convergence
of inter-
ests has
a
great
deal of
validity.
However,
it is
critically
important
to make a distinction
between
the Cuban
ruling
elite and
the
Cuban
population
as
a whole. What
Cuban interests are served by supporting the Soviet invasions of
Czechoslovakia
and
Afghanistan
and Soviet
sponsorship
of
military
suppression
in Poland?
These
policies
make no sense
in
terms of
the
interests
of the Cuban
people.
They
make
great
sense,
however,
in
terms
of
the interests of
Fidel
Castro.
Thus,
Castro
has
his own reasons for
approving
Soviet
military
upport
for
faltering
socialist
governments
in
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan
and
Poland.
He
would
hope
to
have
such
support
if
the
Cuban
gov-
ernment
were
similarly
hreatened... The main
justification
or Sovi-
et military uppressionis that socialist regimesarebeing threatened
with
'foreign
intervention'
by
'imperialist'
nations ...
if
Castro
is
counting
on
the
USSR
to
protect
him from
'imperialism'
(or
local
forces
linked to
'imperialism'),
he
must
necessarilyapprove
he Sovi-
et
defense
of 'socialism'
elsewhere
(Blasier,
1983:
109;
emphasis
added).
73333
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
What his
example suggests,
and
the
next
section documents
in
a
more
systematic
and
comprehensive
fashion,
is
that
most
policies
in Cubado not serve the interestsof the Cuban
population
as a whole
nearly
so much
as
they
serve the interests of
the Cuban
ruling
elite
and
its Soviet
sponsors.
If,
as
Evans,Cardoso,
and
other
dependencia
writers
claim,
there is a
tri-pe
alliance of
multinational,state,
and
local
capital
in
countries
on the
periphery
f
capitalism
that ex-
ploits
the
population
of these
countries,
then there
is
also a
bi-poalli-
ance of
Sovietand
Cuban
elites which
exploits
the Cuban
population
in
ways
and to
degrees
never
realized
in
pre-1959
Cuba
or
in
other
peripheralcapitalistcountries.2
Unfortunately,
his
sort of
analysis
is never made
by
partisans
of
the
Castro
egime
or
by
proponents
of the
dependencia
perspective
on
LatinAmerican
development.
They
reject
or
ignore
even
the
pos-
sibility
of
conflicting
interests between
the
Cuban elite and the
Cuban
population. They
claim or assume
that
what has been
good
for the Cuban and Soviet
elites has
also been
good
for the
Cuban
people.
Yet,
if the standards
hey
use to
analyze critically
such
pe-
ripheralcapitalist
countries
as,
say,
Brazil,
or
Cuba before
1959,
are
applied
to Cubaafter1959,thenitbecomes clearthat he Castro lite,
whose interests
are
dialectically
and
intimately
intertwined
with
those of
the Soviet
government,
s
systematically
dominating
and ex-
ploiting
the
Cuban
people.
Letus now turnto
the concrete manifes-
tationsof those common
interests,
and
of the
other mechanisms
just
described.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: SPECIFICFEATURES
DEPENDENCIA
uthors,
defenders
of
Cuban
socialism,
and other
analysts
have
offered a numberof
hypotheses
about
the
specific pro-
cesses, institutions,
and
policies they
believe have characterized
o-
cialist
dependency
in
Cuba.
Following
are five such
hypotheses:
First,
hey say
that
under
socialism
there is no
capitalist
nvest-
ment
and therefore
noprofit
repatriation
rom Cubato the USSR.
n
this
view,
whereas
capitalist
economic
dependency
involved invest-
ments
and
profits
and
was therefore
exploitative,
socialist economic
dependency does not involve investments andprofitsand therefore
is not
exploitative.
Second,
socialism
has made
possible
changes
in
Cuba's
nternal
social structure
which were
impossible
under
capitalism
and which
are
more
just
and
equitable
than the
pre-1959 capitalist
social
system.
What his
example suggests,
and
the
next
section documents
in
a
more
systematic
and
comprehensive
fashion,
is
that
most
policies
in Cubado not serve the interestsof the Cuban
population
as a whole
nearly
so much
as
they
serve the interests of
the Cuban
ruling
elite
and
its Soviet
sponsors.
If,
as
Evans,Cardoso,
and
other
dependencia
writers
claim,
there is a
tri-pe
alliance of
multinational,state,
and
local
capital
in
countries
on the
periphery
f
capitalism
that ex-
ploits
the
population
of these
countries,
then there
is
also a
bi-poalli-
ance of
Sovietand
Cuban
elites which
exploits
the Cuban
population
in
ways
and to
degrees
never
realized
in
pre-1959
Cuba
or
in
other
peripheralcapitalistcountries.2
Unfortunately,
his
sort of
analysis
is never made
by
partisans
of
the
Castro
egime
or
by
proponents
of the
dependencia
perspective
on
LatinAmerican
development.
They
reject
or
ignore
even
the
pos-
sibility
of
conflicting
interests between
the
Cuban elite and the
Cuban
population. They
claim or assume
that
what has been
good
for the Cuban and Soviet
elites has
also been
good
for the
Cuban
people.
Yet,
if the standards
hey
use to
analyze critically
such
pe-
ripheralcapitalist
countries
as,
say,
Brazil,
or
Cuba before
1959,
are
applied
to Cubaafter1959,thenitbecomes clearthat he Castro lite,
whose interests
are
dialectically
and
intimately
intertwined
with
those of
the Soviet
government,
s
systematically
dominating
and ex-
ploiting
the
Cuban
people.
Letus now turnto
the concrete manifes-
tationsof those common
interests,
and
of the
other mechanisms
just
described.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: SPECIFICFEATURES
DEPENDENCIA
uthors,
defenders
of
Cuban
socialism,
and other
analysts
have
offered a numberof
hypotheses
about
the
specific pro-
cesses, institutions,
and
policies they
believe have characterized
o-
cialist
dependency
in
Cuba.
Following
are five such
hypotheses:
First,
hey say
that
under
socialism
there is no
capitalist
nvest-
ment
and therefore
noprofit
repatriation
rom Cubato the USSR.
n
this
view,
whereas
capitalist
economic
dependency
involved invest-
ments
and
profits
and
was therefore
exploitative,
socialist economic
dependency does not involve investments andprofitsand therefore
is not
exploitative.
Second,
socialism
has made
possible
changes
in
Cuba's
nternal
social structure
which were
impossible
under
capitalism
and which
are
more
just
and
equitable
than the
pre-1959 capitalist
social
system.
What his
example suggests,
and
the
next
section documents
in
a
more
systematic
and
comprehensive
fashion,
is
that
most
policies
in Cubado not serve the interestsof the Cuban
population
as a whole
nearly
so much
as
they
serve the interests of
the Cuban
ruling
elite
and
its Soviet
sponsors.
If,
as
Evans,Cardoso,
and
other
dependencia
writers
claim,
there is a
tri-pe
alliance of
multinational,state,
and
local
capital
in
countries
on the
periphery
f
capitalism
that ex-
ploits
the
population
of these
countries,
then there
is
also a
bi-poalli-
ance of
Sovietand
Cuban
elites which
exploits
the Cuban
population
in
ways
and to
degrees
never
realized
in
pre-1959
Cuba
or
in
other
peripheralcapitalistcountries.2
Unfortunately,
his
sort of
analysis
is never made
by
partisans
of
the
Castro
egime
or
by
proponents
of the
dependencia
perspective
on
LatinAmerican
development.
They
reject
or
ignore
even
the
pos-
sibility
of
conflicting
interests between
the
Cuban elite and the
Cuban
population. They
claim or assume
that
what has been
good
for the Cuban and Soviet
elites has
also been
good
for the
Cuban
people.
Yet,
if the standards
hey
use to
analyze critically
such
pe-
ripheralcapitalist
countries
as,
say,
Brazil,
or
Cuba before
1959,
are
applied
to Cubaafter1959,thenitbecomes clearthat he Castro lite,
whose interests
are
dialectically
and
intimately
intertwined
with
those of
the Soviet
government,
s
systematically
dominating
and ex-
ploiting
the
Cuban
people.
Letus now turnto
the concrete manifes-
tationsof those common
interests,
and
of the
other mechanisms
just
described.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: SPECIFICFEATURES
DEPENDENCIA
uthors,
defenders
of
Cuban
socialism,
and other
analysts
have
offered a numberof
hypotheses
about
the
specific pro-
cesses, institutions,
and
policies they
believe have characterized
o-
cialist
dependency
in
Cuba.
Following
are five such
hypotheses:
First,
hey say
that
under
socialism
there is no
capitalist
nvest-
ment
and therefore
noprofit
repatriation
rom Cubato the USSR.
n
this
view,
whereas
capitalist
economic
dependency
involved invest-
ments
and
profits
and
was therefore
exploitative,
socialist economic
dependency does not involve investments andprofitsand therefore
is not
exploitative.
Second,
socialism
has made
possible
changes
in
Cuba's
nternal
social structure
which were
impossible
under
capitalism
and which
are
more
just
and
equitable
than the
pre-1959 capitalist
social
system.
What his
example suggests,
and
the
next
section documents
in
a
more
systematic
and
comprehensive
fashion,
is
that
most
policies
in Cubado not serve the interestsof the Cuban
population
as a whole
nearly
so much
as
they
serve the interests of
the Cuban
ruling
elite
and
its Soviet
sponsors.
If,
as
Evans,Cardoso,
and
other
dependencia
writers
claim,
there is a
tri-pe
alliance of
multinational,state,
and
local
capital
in
countries
on the
periphery
f
capitalism
that ex-
ploits
the
population
of these
countries,
then there
is
also a
bi-poalli-
ance of
Sovietand
Cuban
elites which
exploits
the Cuban
population
in
ways
and to
degrees
never
realized
in
pre-1959
Cuba
or
in
other
peripheralcapitalistcountries.2
Unfortunately,
his
sort of
analysis
is never made
by
partisans
of
the
Castro
egime
or
by
proponents
of the
dependencia
perspective
on
LatinAmerican
development.
They
reject
or
ignore
even
the
pos-
sibility
of
conflicting
interests between
the
Cuban elite and the
Cuban
population. They
claim or assume
that
what has been
good
for the Cuban and Soviet
elites has
also been
good
for the
Cuban
people.
Yet,
if the standards
hey
use to
analyze critically
such
pe-
ripheralcapitalist
countries
as,
say,
Brazil,
or
Cuba before
1959,
are
applied
to Cubaafter1959,thenitbecomes clearthat he Castro lite,
whose interests
are
dialectically
and
intimately
intertwined
with
those of
the Soviet
government,
s
systematically
dominating
and ex-
ploiting
the
Cuban
people.
Letus now turnto
the concrete manifes-
tationsof those common
interests,
and
of the
other mechanisms
just
described.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY: SPECIFICFEATURES
DEPENDENCIA
uthors,
defenders
of
Cuban
socialism,
and other
analysts
have
offered a numberof
hypotheses
about
the
specific pro-
cesses, institutions,
and
policies they
believe have characterized
o-
cialist
dependency
in
Cuba.
Following
are five such
hypotheses:
First,
hey say
that
under
socialism
there is no
capitalist
nvest-
ment
and therefore
noprofit
repatriation
rom Cubato the USSR.
n
this
view,
whereas
capitalist
economic
dependency
involved invest-
ments
and
profits
and
was therefore
exploitative,
socialist economic
dependency does not involve investments andprofitsand therefore
is not
exploitative.
Second,
socialism
has made
possible
changes
in
Cuba's
nternal
social structure
which were
impossible
under
capitalism
and which
are
more
just
and
equitable
than the
pre-1959 capitalist
social
system.
74444
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/capitalist-cuban-case-pdf 18/35
PACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
Third,
ocialism
has
broken
the
pattern
of
dependency
on
im-
ported
U.S.culture
and
replaced
it with
authentically
nationalcultur-
al
expressions.
Fourth,
ocialism
has
made
possible
true,
substantive emoc-
racy
rather han
authoritarianism,
r the
formal,
proceduralpolitical
democracy
that obtained
before
1959.
Finally
since
1959
Cuba's
oreign diplomatic
and
military
activi-
ties have been
autonomous,
independent,
authentically
national
policies
in
the Cubannational
interest, whereas,
before
1959,
these
activities
and
policies
were
subordinated
o,
and
exploited
by,
he
in-
terestsof the United States.
Notice that these
hypotheses
stress
the internal
aspects
of
post-
1959
Cuban
development
as
much as
-
if
not
more than
-
the exter-
nal
aspects.
This is consistent
with the
analysis
these
authorsmake
of
peripheral
capitalist
countries,
where
the main
emphasis
is
also
on
the internal
manifestations or
expressions
of
dependency
(Cardoso
and
Faletto, 979,
passim).
Their dea is that nternaldevel-
opment patterns
are
inextricably
ntertwined
with
the external con-
text,
whether
capitalist
or
socialist,
and that
the
transformationrom
capitalist
o socialist
dependency
will be associatedwith the
benign
patterns
of
development
just
hypothesized.
Letus examine
specific
featuresof Cuba'sdomestic and
foreign
policies
and
institutions in the context of socialist
dependency,
in
order o see how these
hypotheses
stand
up.
It
will
be shown
that,
ar
from
confirming
these five
hypotheses,
the
evidence
stronglyrejects
them and
supports
instead the
hypotheses
about
the
mechanisms
and
processes
of socialist
dependency
and
exploitation
that were
presented in the preceding section.
Social and Economic
Aspects
Mostdiscussions
of
this
topic
claim thatthe Revolution's
ccom-
plishments
in
the social
sphere
have been enormous.
While eco-
nomic
problems
are
noted,
these
are attributed o the
U.S.economic
embargo. They
are neither taken
very seriously
nor
given
much
weight
as
a
commentary
on
the
Revolution.While this
picture
may
contain
some elements
of
truth,
t also contains two errors:
1)
The
assessment
of social
gains
is
incomplete;
(2)
it
misperceives
and un-
derestimates
the
economic
failings
or both.
We
begin
with the
Revolution's
roudest
achievement,
the so-
cial
gains.
Post-1959
ccomplishments
in
the areasof
literacy,
duca-
tional
opportunity,
ural
development,
land
reform,
housing,
health
Third,
ocialism
has
broken
the
pattern
of
dependency
on
im-
ported
U.S.culture
and
replaced
it with
authentically
nationalcultur-
al
expressions.
Fourth,
ocialism
has
made
possible
true,
substantive emoc-
racy
rather han
authoritarianism,
r the
formal,
proceduralpolitical
democracy
that obtained
before
1959.
Finally
since
1959
Cuba's
oreign diplomatic
and
military
activi-
ties have been
autonomous,
independent,
authentically
national
policies
in
the Cubannational
interest, whereas,
before
1959,
these
activities
and
policies
were
subordinated
o,
and
exploited
by,
he
in-
terestsof the United States.
Notice that these
hypotheses
stress
the internal
aspects
of
post-
1959
Cuban
development
as
much as
-
if
not
more than
-
the exter-
nal
aspects.
This is consistent
with the
analysis
these
authorsmake
of
peripheral
capitalist
countries,
where
the main
emphasis
is
also
on
the internal
manifestations or
expressions
of
dependency
(Cardoso
and
Faletto, 979,
passim).
Their dea is that nternaldevel-
opment patterns
are
inextricably
ntertwined
with
the external con-
text,
whether
capitalist
or
socialist,
and that
the
transformationrom
capitalist
o socialist
dependency
will be associatedwith the
benign
patterns
of
development
just
hypothesized.
Letus examine
specific
featuresof Cuba'sdomestic and
foreign
policies
and
institutions in the context of socialist
dependency,
in
order o see how these
hypotheses
stand
up.
It
will
be shown
that,
ar
from
confirming
these five
hypotheses,
the
evidence
stronglyrejects
them and
supports
instead the
hypotheses
about
the
mechanisms
and
processes
of socialist
dependency
and
exploitation
that were
presented in the preceding section.
Social and Economic
Aspects
Mostdiscussions
of
this
topic
claim thatthe Revolution's
ccom-
plishments
in
the social
sphere
have been enormous.
While eco-
nomic
problems
are
noted,
these
are attributed o the
U.S.economic
embargo. They
are neither taken
very seriously
nor
given
much
weight
as
a
commentary
on
the
Revolution.While this
picture
may
contain
some elements
of
truth,
t also contains two errors:
1)
The
assessment
of social
gains
is
incomplete;
(2)
it
misperceives
and un-
derestimates
the
economic
failings
or both.
We
begin
with the
Revolution's
roudest
achievement,
the so-
cial
gains.
Post-1959
ccomplishments
in
the areasof
literacy,
duca-
tional
opportunity,
ural
development,
land
reform,
housing,
health
Third,
ocialism
has
broken
the
pattern
of
dependency
on
im-
ported
U.S.culture
and
replaced
it with
authentically
nationalcultur-
al
expressions.
Fourth,
ocialism
has
made
possible
true,
substantive emoc-
racy
rather han
authoritarianism,
r the
formal,
proceduralpolitical
democracy
that obtained
before
1959.
Finally
since
1959
Cuba's
oreign diplomatic
and
military
activi-
ties have been
autonomous,
independent,
authentically
national
policies
in
the Cubannational
interest, whereas,
before
1959,
these
activities
and
policies
were
subordinated
o,
and
exploited
by,
he
in-
terestsof the United States.
Notice that these
hypotheses
stress
the internal
aspects
of
post-
1959
Cuban
development
as
much as
-
if
not
more than
-
the exter-
nal
aspects.
This is consistent
with the
analysis
these
authorsmake
of
peripheral
capitalist
countries,
where
the main
emphasis
is
also
on
the internal
manifestations or
expressions
of
dependency
(Cardoso
and
Faletto, 979,
passim).
Their dea is that nternaldevel-
opment patterns
are
inextricably
ntertwined
with
the external con-
text,
whether
capitalist
or
socialist,
and that
the
transformationrom
capitalist
o socialist
dependency
will be associatedwith the
benign
patterns
of
development
just
hypothesized.
Letus examine
specific
featuresof Cuba'sdomestic and
foreign
policies
and
institutions in the context of socialist
dependency,
in
order o see how these
hypotheses
stand
up.
It
will
be shown
that,
ar
from
confirming
these five
hypotheses,
the
evidence
stronglyrejects
them and
supports
instead the
hypotheses
about
the
mechanisms
and
processes
of socialist
dependency
and
exploitation
that were
presented in the preceding section.
Social and Economic
Aspects
Mostdiscussions
of
this
topic
claim thatthe Revolution's
ccom-
plishments
in
the social
sphere
have been enormous.
While eco-
nomic
problems
are
noted,
these
are attributed o the
U.S.economic
embargo. They
are neither taken
very seriously
nor
given
much
weight
as
a
commentary
on
the
Revolution.While this
picture
may
contain
some elements
of
truth,
t also contains two errors:
1)
The
assessment
of social
gains
is
incomplete;
(2)
it
misperceives
and un-
derestimates
the
economic
failings
or both.
We
begin
with the
Revolution's
roudest
achievement,
the so-
cial
gains.
Post-1959
ccomplishments
in
the areasof
literacy,
duca-
tional
opportunity,
ural
development,
land
reform,
housing,
health
Third,
ocialism
has
broken
the
pattern
of
dependency
on
im-
ported
U.S.culture
and
replaced
it with
authentically
nationalcultur-
al
expressions.
Fourth,
ocialism
has
made
possible
true,
substantive emoc-
racy
rather han
authoritarianism,
r the
formal,
proceduralpolitical
democracy
that obtained
before
1959.
Finally
since
1959
Cuba's
oreign diplomatic
and
military
activi-
ties have been
autonomous,
independent,
authentically
national
policies
in
the Cubannational
interest, whereas,
before
1959,
these
activities
and
policies
were
subordinated
o,
and
exploited
by,
he
in-
terestsof the United States.
Notice that these
hypotheses
stress
the internal
aspects
of
post-
1959
Cuban
development
as
much as
-
if
not
more than
-
the exter-
nal
aspects.
This is consistent
with the
analysis
these
authorsmake
of
peripheral
capitalist
countries,
where
the main
emphasis
is
also
on
the internal
manifestations or
expressions
of
dependency
(Cardoso
and
Faletto, 979,
passim).
Their dea is that nternaldevel-
opment patterns
are
inextricably
ntertwined
with
the external con-
text,
whether
capitalist
or
socialist,
and that
the
transformationrom
capitalist
o socialist
dependency
will be associatedwith the
benign
patterns
of
development
just
hypothesized.
Letus examine
specific
featuresof Cuba'sdomestic and
foreign
policies
and
institutions in the context of socialist
dependency,
in
order o see how these
hypotheses
stand
up.
It
will
be shown
that,
ar
from
confirming
these five
hypotheses,
the
evidence
stronglyrejects
them and
supports
instead the
hypotheses
about
the
mechanisms
and
processes
of socialist
dependency
and
exploitation
that were
presented in the preceding section.
Social and Economic
Aspects
Mostdiscussions
of
this
topic
claim thatthe Revolution's
ccom-
plishments
in
the social
sphere
have been enormous.
While eco-
nomic
problems
are
noted,
these
are attributed o the
U.S.economic
embargo. They
are neither taken
very seriously
nor
given
much
weight
as
a
commentary
on
the
Revolution.While this
picture
may
contain
some elements
of
truth,
t also contains two errors:
1)
The
assessment
of social
gains
is
incomplete;
(2)
it
misperceives
and un-
derestimates
the
economic
failings
or both.
We
begin
with the
Revolution's
roudest
achievement,
the so-
cial
gains.
Post-1959
ccomplishments
in
the areasof
literacy,
duca-
tional
opportunity,
ural
development,
land
reform,
housing,
health
75555
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JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
care,
nutritional
standards,
employment,
class
relations,
moral
re-
forms
(against prostitution,gambling,corruption,
and
homosexu-
ality),
and racialand sexual
equality
are
widely
noted andhave been
described
in
detail
by many
authors.
However,
even in this
sphere
of
greatest
accomplishment,
the
record
is
by
no means all
positive
or
nonexploitative,
nor is this
progress necessarily
related to the Revo-
lution, socialism,
Soviet
support;
much
of it
has
roots in
the
capitalist
period.
In
the
first
place,
in
comparison
with other
Latin
American
countries
Cubabefore
1959
was not
only relatively
well-off,
as
mea-
sured by per capitaincome, but also quite progressivein terms of
such
social indicators as
literacy,
educational
opportunity,
and
per
capita
evels of
energy consumption,
daily
newspaper
circulation,
ra-
dios,
television
sets,
and
physicians.
Indeed,
Cubawas
on
a
par
with
many European
countries
according
to these indicators
(Gonzalez,
1974:14-19).
f
it
is
true
thatthese
patterns
refer
o
aggregate
statistics
of resources
concentrated
n
the
cities,
it is
also true that
n
1959
most
Cubans
(56%)
were urbanites
(Gonzalez,
1974:14).
This
point
is
not
sufficientlynoted. In addition the Cubanpopulationwas 75% iter-
ate and
99%
Spanish-speaking.
How
many
radios
did
the
rich
listen
to
compared
to the
poor?
Nutritional evels were
higher
and infant
mortality
rates
substantially
lower
in
Cuba than
in
most of Latin
America.
Besides,
there was never the
phenomenon
of boat
people,
even
under Batista.
Second,
some of
Castro's ocial
accomplishments
are more
ap-
parent
than
real. Much
employment
s
still
disguised
unemploy-
ment.
Rural-urban
isparities
persist
(del
Aguila,
1984:172).
The
po-
liticalelite, which is ipsofacto the economic and social elite, is still
overwhelmingly
male and white
(Dominguez,
1978:
226).
In
these
respects
and
others,
the
unequal
and/or
exploitative
featuresattrib-
uted to
capitalism
continue
under
socialism
-
at
times
to
lesser de-
gree,
otherwise to
the
same,
or even a
greater,
degree.
Political
power
of Cubanwomen
is no
greater
oday
than
it was
in
1959
(Dominguez,
1978:
494-504).
Homophobia
is far
greater
under
Cuban socialism
than
it
ever
was
under
capitalism,
n
part
because
now
it is
backed
by
the force of Fidel Castro's
ersonalityand the Cubanstateapparatus
in
addition to cultural
predilections.
Access to the
political
elite for
blacks and mulattoes
(Batista
himself
was
mulatto)
has
remained
about the
same
(Dominguez,
1978:
224-227).
Third,
here
has
been a dramatic
worsening
in
many
areas
dur-
ing
the
course of the Revolution.
First
mpulses
towardsocial
equali-
care,
nutritional
standards,
employment,
class
relations,
moral
re-
forms
(against prostitution,gambling,corruption,
and
homosexu-
ality),
and racialand sexual
equality
are
widely
noted andhave been
described
in
detail
by many
authors.
However,
even in this
sphere
of
greatest
accomplishment,
the
record
is
by
no means all
positive
or
nonexploitative,
nor is this
progress necessarily
related to the Revo-
lution, socialism,
Soviet
support;
much
of it
has
roots in
the
capitalist
period.
In
the
first
place,
in
comparison
with other
Latin
American
countries
Cubabefore
1959
was not
only relatively
well-off,
as
mea-
sured by per capitaincome, but also quite progressivein terms of
such
social indicators as
literacy,
educational
opportunity,
and
per
capita
evels of
energy consumption,
daily
newspaper
circulation,
ra-
dios,
television
sets,
and
physicians.
Indeed,
Cubawas
on
a
par
with
many European
countries
according
to these indicators
(Gonzalez,
1974:14-19).
f
it
is
true
thatthese
patterns
refer
o
aggregate
statistics
of resources
concentrated
n
the
cities,
it is
also true that
n
1959
most
Cubans
(56%)
were urbanites
(Gonzalez,
1974:14).
This
point
is
not
sufficientlynoted. In addition the Cubanpopulationwas 75% iter-
ate and
99%
Spanish-speaking.
How
many
radios
did
the
rich
listen
to
compared
to the
poor?
Nutritional evels were
higher
and infant
mortality
rates
substantially
lower
in
Cuba than
in
most of Latin
America.
Besides,
there was never the
phenomenon
of boat
people,
even
under Batista.
Second,
some of
Castro's ocial
accomplishments
are more
ap-
parent
than
real. Much
employment
s
still
disguised
unemploy-
ment.
Rural-urban
isparities
persist
(del
Aguila,
1984:172).
The
po-
liticalelite, which is ipsofacto the economic and social elite, is still
overwhelmingly
male and white
(Dominguez,
1978:
226).
In
these
respects
and
others,
the
unequal
and/or
exploitative
featuresattrib-
uted to
capitalism
continue
under
socialism
-
at
times
to
lesser de-
gree,
otherwise to
the
same,
or even a
greater,
degree.
Political
power
of Cubanwomen
is no
greater
oday
than
it was
in
1959
(Dominguez,
1978:
494-504).
Homophobia
is far
greater
under
Cuban socialism
than
it
ever
was
under
capitalism,
n
part
because
now
it is
backed
by
the force of Fidel Castro's
ersonalityand the Cubanstateapparatus
in
addition to cultural
predilections.
Access to the
political
elite for
blacks and mulattoes
(Batista
himself
was
mulatto)
has
remained
about the
same
(Dominguez,
1978:
224-227).
Third,
here
has
been a dramatic
worsening
in
many
areas
dur-
ing
the
course of the Revolution.
First
mpulses
towardsocial
equali-
care,
nutritional
standards,
employment,
class
relations,
moral
re-
forms
(against prostitution,gambling,corruption,
and
homosexu-
ality),
and racialand sexual
equality
are
widely
noted andhave been
described
in
detail
by many
authors.
However,
even in this
sphere
of
greatest
accomplishment,
the
record
is
by
no means all
positive
or
nonexploitative,
nor is this
progress necessarily
related to the Revo-
lution, socialism,
Soviet
support;
much
of it
has
roots in
the
capitalist
period.
In
the
first
place,
in
comparison
with other
Latin
American
countries
Cubabefore
1959
was not
only relatively
well-off,
as
mea-
sured by per capitaincome, but also quite progressivein terms of
such
social indicators as
literacy,
educational
opportunity,
and
per
capita
evels of
energy consumption,
daily
newspaper
circulation,
ra-
dios,
television
sets,
and
physicians.
Indeed,
Cubawas
on
a
par
with
many European
countries
according
to these indicators
(Gonzalez,
1974:14-19).
f
it
is
true
thatthese
patterns
refer
o
aggregate
statistics
of resources
concentrated
n
the
cities,
it is
also true that
n
1959
most
Cubans
(56%)
were urbanites
(Gonzalez,
1974:14).
This
point
is
not
sufficientlynoted. In addition the Cubanpopulationwas 75% iter-
ate and
99%
Spanish-speaking.
How
many
radios
did
the
rich
listen
to
compared
to the
poor?
Nutritional evels were
higher
and infant
mortality
rates
substantially
lower
in
Cuba than
in
most of Latin
America.
Besides,
there was never the
phenomenon
of boat
people,
even
under Batista.
Second,
some of
Castro's ocial
accomplishments
are more
ap-
parent
than
real. Much
employment
s
still
disguised
unemploy-
ment.
Rural-urban
isparities
persist
(del
Aguila,
1984:172).
The
po-
liticalelite, which is ipsofacto the economic and social elite, is still
overwhelmingly
male and white
(Dominguez,
1978:
226).
In
these
respects
and
others,
the
unequal
and/or
exploitative
featuresattrib-
uted to
capitalism
continue
under
socialism
-
at
times
to
lesser de-
gree,
otherwise to
the
same,
or even a
greater,
degree.
Political
power
of Cubanwomen
is no
greater
oday
than
it was
in
1959
(Dominguez,
1978:
494-504).
Homophobia
is far
greater
under
Cuban socialism
than
it
ever
was
under
capitalism,
n
part
because
now
it is
backed
by
the force of Fidel Castro's
ersonalityand the Cubanstateapparatus
in
addition to cultural
predilections.
Access to the
political
elite for
blacks and mulattoes
(Batista
himself
was
mulatto)
has
remained
about the
same
(Dominguez,
1978:
224-227).
Third,
here
has
been a dramatic
worsening
in
many
areas
dur-
ing
the
course of the Revolution.
First
mpulses
towardsocial
equali-
care,
nutritional
standards,
employment,
class
relations,
moral
re-
forms
(against prostitution,gambling,corruption,
and
homosexu-
ality),
and racialand sexual
equality
are
widely
noted andhave been
described
in
detail
by many
authors.
However,
even in this
sphere
of
greatest
accomplishment,
the
record
is
by
no means all
positive
or
nonexploitative,
nor is this
progress necessarily
related to the Revo-
lution, socialism,
Soviet
support;
much
of it
has
roots in
the
capitalist
period.
In
the
first
place,
in
comparison
with other
Latin
American
countries
Cubabefore
1959
was not
only relatively
well-off,
as
mea-
sured by per capitaincome, but also quite progressivein terms of
such
social indicators as
literacy,
educational
opportunity,
and
per
capita
evels of
energy consumption,
daily
newspaper
circulation,
ra-
dios,
television
sets,
and
physicians.
Indeed,
Cubawas
on
a
par
with
many European
countries
according
to these indicators
(Gonzalez,
1974:14-19).
f
it
is
true
thatthese
patterns
refer
o
aggregate
statistics
of resources
concentrated
n
the
cities,
it is
also true that
n
1959
most
Cubans
(56%)
were urbanites
(Gonzalez,
1974:14).
This
point
is
not
sufficientlynoted. In addition the Cubanpopulationwas 75% iter-
ate and
99%
Spanish-speaking.
How
many
radios
did
the
rich
listen
to
compared
to the
poor?
Nutritional evels were
higher
and infant
mortality
rates
substantially
lower
in
Cuba than
in
most of Latin
America.
Besides,
there was never the
phenomenon
of boat
people,
even
under Batista.
Second,
some of
Castro's ocial
accomplishments
are more
ap-
parent
than
real. Much
employment
s
still
disguised
unemploy-
ment.
Rural-urban
isparities
persist
(del
Aguila,
1984:172).
The
po-
liticalelite, which is ipsofacto the economic and social elite, is still
overwhelmingly
male and white
(Dominguez,
1978:
226).
In
these
respects
and
others,
the
unequal
and/or
exploitative
featuresattrib-
uted to
capitalism
continue
under
socialism
-
at
times
to
lesser de-
gree,
otherwise to
the
same,
or even a
greater,
degree.
Political
power
of Cubanwomen
is no
greater
oday
than
it was
in
1959
(Dominguez,
1978:
494-504).
Homophobia
is far
greater
under
Cuban socialism
than
it
ever
was
under
capitalism,
n
part
because
now
it is
backed
by
the force of Fidel Castro's
ersonalityand the Cubanstateapparatus
in
addition to cultural
predilections.
Access to the
political
elite for
blacks and mulattoes
(Batista
himself
was
mulatto)
has
remained
about the
same
(Dominguez,
1978:
224-227).
Third,
here
has
been a dramatic
worsening
in
many
areas
dur-
ing
the
course of the Revolution.
First
mpulses
towardsocial
equali-
76666
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS.
SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ty
have
been
replaced
by
a
distinct turn towarda social
elitism,
not
the old
capitalist
orm
but a new socialist
form.
Thus,
initial
opposi-
tion to
sociolismo
buddyism
or
cronyism)
has
given
way
to a
new
class of
party
functionaries and
state bureaucratswith
privileged
housing,
department
tores,
vacation
villas,
access to
hardcurrencies
and
luxury
goods
(Gonzalez,
1974:
10;
Dominguez,
1978, 232;
Maidique,
1983:
32).
As
in
the Soviet
Union,
rates of divorce have
in-
creased
dramatically
ince
1959
and
now
stand
at a
very high
level
even
weighed
on a world scale
(Domfnguez,
1978:
501;
Maidique,
1983:
30).
Corruption
and
illegal
economic
profiteering
have
increased.
Fourth,
given
the natureof
the
Cuban
state,
and of
state-society
relations
since the
Revolution,
most of
these
social benefits have
very
high political
costs
directly,
and
necessarily,
associated
with
them.
The
government
apparatus
hat
provides
food,
housing,
health
care,
and educational
opportunity
has enormous
power
over individuals
and
groups
in
Cuban
society
for
that
very
reason.
Every
Cuban
knows
this,
and such
knowledge, together
with other
political
mechanisms
of
the Cuban
state,
makes
significant
dissent
by
Cubancitizens both
risky
and
costly.
Astatewhich is able and
willing
to
deny
food to
po-
litical
nonconformists,
and which exercises
that
power,
has a
unique
instrument
or
compelling
popular
support
at its
disposal.
Finally,
he
argument
hata combination
of
socialist transforma-
tion,
a
profoundly
undemocratic
political system,
and a massive eco-
nomic
decline,
was
necessary
to
accomplish
social
change
is
a dubi-
ous one. For
example,
Costa
Rica
has manifested a
comparably
progressive
socioeconomic
profile
-
low
unemployment,
high
healthstandards,ow illiteracy while retainingapluralistic,demo-
cratic
political system;
it
also
displays
a
higher
standardof
living
and
much
greater
economic
dynamism
than Cuba.
Thus,
and
in
light
of
these
considerations,
he
social
achievements of the revolution
ap-
pear
less
impressive
than
many analyses suggest.
Some achieve-
ments
may
have been easier to
bring
about under a socialist
depen-
dency,
but
it was
by
no means the
only
way
to
achieve
them,
and
obviously
has had an
exploitative
side as
well.
In
addition,
an enormous economic
price
has
been
paid
and
is
still
being paid.
Before1959 Cubahad one of the most
progressive
socioeconomic
profiles
of
any country
in Latin
America.
In
1952
it
ranked
3rd
among
all Latin
American
countries
in
gross
national
product
per
capita.
Since
1959,
Cubahas been transformed
nto one
of the least
productive
countries
in
the
region:
it ranked
15th
n
a list
ty
have
been
replaced
by
a
distinct turn towarda social
elitism,
not
the old
capitalist
orm
but a new socialist
form.
Thus,
initial
opposi-
tion to
sociolismo
buddyism
or
cronyism)
has
given
way
to a
new
class of
party
functionaries and
state bureaucratswith
privileged
housing,
department
tores,
vacation
villas,
access to
hardcurrencies
and
luxury
goods
(Gonzalez,
1974:
10;
Dominguez,
1978, 232;
Maidique,
1983:
32).
As
in
the Soviet
Union,
rates of divorce have
in-
creased
dramatically
ince
1959
and
now
stand
at a
very high
level
even
weighed
on a world scale
(Domfnguez,
1978:
501;
Maidique,
1983:
30).
Corruption
and
illegal
economic
profiteering
have
increased.
Fourth,
given
the natureof
the
Cuban
state,
and of
state-society
relations
since the
Revolution,
most of
these
social benefits have
very
high political
costs
directly,
and
necessarily,
associated
with
them.
The
government
apparatus
hat
provides
food,
housing,
health
care,
and educational
opportunity
has enormous
power
over individuals
and
groups
in
Cuban
society
for
that
very
reason.
Every
Cuban
knows
this,
and such
knowledge, together
with other
political
mechanisms
of
the Cuban
state,
makes
significant
dissent
by
Cubancitizens both
risky
and
costly.
Astatewhich is able and
willing
to
deny
food to
po-
litical
nonconformists,
and which exercises
that
power,
has a
unique
instrument
or
compelling
popular
support
at its
disposal.
Finally,
he
argument
hata combination
of
socialist transforma-
tion,
a
profoundly
undemocratic
political system,
and a massive eco-
nomic
decline,
was
necessary
to
accomplish
social
change
is
a dubi-
ous one. For
example,
Costa
Rica
has manifested a
comparably
progressive
socioeconomic
profile
-
low
unemployment,
high
healthstandards,ow illiteracy while retainingapluralistic,demo-
cratic
political system;
it
also
displays
a
higher
standardof
living
and
much
greater
economic
dynamism
than Cuba.
Thus,
and
in
light
of
these
considerations,
he
social
achievements of the revolution
ap-
pear
less
impressive
than
many analyses suggest.
Some achieve-
ments
may
have been easier to
bring
about under a socialist
depen-
dency,
but
it was
by
no means the
only
way
to
achieve
them,
and
obviously
has had an
exploitative
side as
well.
In
addition,
an enormous economic
price
has
been
paid
and
is
still
being paid.
Before1959 Cubahad one of the most
progressive
socioeconomic
profiles
of
any country
in Latin
America.
In
1952
it
ranked
3rd
among
all Latin
American
countries
in
gross
national
product
per
capita.
Since
1959,
Cubahas been transformed
nto one
of the least
productive
countries
in
the
region:
it ranked
15th
n
a list
ty
have
been
replaced
by
a
distinct turn towarda social
elitism,
not
the old
capitalist
orm
but a new socialist
form.
Thus,
initial
opposi-
tion to
sociolismo
buddyism
or
cronyism)
has
given
way
to a
new
class of
party
functionaries and
state bureaucratswith
privileged
housing,
department
tores,
vacation
villas,
access to
hardcurrencies
and
luxury
goods
(Gonzalez,
1974:
10;
Dominguez,
1978, 232;
Maidique,
1983:
32).
As
in
the Soviet
Union,
rates of divorce have
in-
creased
dramatically
ince
1959
and
now
stand
at a
very high
level
even
weighed
on a world scale
(Domfnguez,
1978:
501;
Maidique,
1983:
30).
Corruption
and
illegal
economic
profiteering
have
increased.
Fourth,
given
the natureof
the
Cuban
state,
and of
state-society
relations
since the
Revolution,
most of
these
social benefits have
very
high political
costs
directly,
and
necessarily,
associated
with
them.
The
government
apparatus
hat
provides
food,
housing,
health
care,
and educational
opportunity
has enormous
power
over individuals
and
groups
in
Cuban
society
for
that
very
reason.
Every
Cuban
knows
this,
and such
knowledge, together
with other
political
mechanisms
of
the Cuban
state,
makes
significant
dissent
by
Cubancitizens both
risky
and
costly.
Astatewhich is able and
willing
to
deny
food to
po-
litical
nonconformists,
and which exercises
that
power,
has a
unique
instrument
or
compelling
popular
support
at its
disposal.
Finally,
he
argument
hata combination
of
socialist transforma-
tion,
a
profoundly
undemocratic
political system,
and a massive eco-
nomic
decline,
was
necessary
to
accomplish
social
change
is
a dubi-
ous one. For
example,
Costa
Rica
has manifested a
comparably
progressive
socioeconomic
profile
-
low
unemployment,
high
healthstandards,ow illiteracy while retainingapluralistic,demo-
cratic
political system;
it
also
displays
a
higher
standardof
living
and
much
greater
economic
dynamism
than Cuba.
Thus,
and
in
light
of
these
considerations,
he
social
achievements of the revolution
ap-
pear
less
impressive
than
many analyses suggest.
Some achieve-
ments
may
have been easier to
bring
about under a socialist
depen-
dency,
but
it was
by
no means the
only
way
to
achieve
them,
and
obviously
has had an
exploitative
side as
well.
In
addition,
an enormous economic
price
has
been
paid
and
is
still
being paid.
Before1959 Cubahad one of the most
progressive
socioeconomic
profiles
of
any country
in Latin
America.
In
1952
it
ranked
3rd
among
all Latin
American
countries
in
gross
national
product
per
capita.
Since
1959,
Cubahas been transformed
nto one
of the least
productive
countries
in
the
region:
it ranked
15th
n
a list
ty
have
been
replaced
by
a
distinct turn towarda social
elitism,
not
the old
capitalist
orm
but a new socialist
form.
Thus,
initial
opposi-
tion to
sociolismo
buddyism
or
cronyism)
has
given
way
to a
new
class of
party
functionaries and
state bureaucratswith
privileged
housing,
department
tores,
vacation
villas,
access to
hardcurrencies
and
luxury
goods
(Gonzalez,
1974:
10;
Dominguez,
1978, 232;
Maidique,
1983:
32).
As
in
the Soviet
Union,
rates of divorce have
in-
creased
dramatically
ince
1959
and
now
stand
at a
very high
level
even
weighed
on a world scale
(Domfnguez,
1978:
501;
Maidique,
1983:
30).
Corruption
and
illegal
economic
profiteering
have
increased.
Fourth,
given
the natureof
the
Cuban
state,
and of
state-society
relations
since the
Revolution,
most of
these
social benefits have
very
high political
costs
directly,
and
necessarily,
associated
with
them.
The
government
apparatus
hat
provides
food,
housing,
health
care,
and educational
opportunity
has enormous
power
over individuals
and
groups
in
Cuban
society
for
that
very
reason.
Every
Cuban
knows
this,
and such
knowledge, together
with other
political
mechanisms
of
the Cuban
state,
makes
significant
dissent
by
Cubancitizens both
risky
and
costly.
Astatewhich is able and
willing
to
deny
food to
po-
litical
nonconformists,
and which exercises
that
power,
has a
unique
instrument
or
compelling
popular
support
at its
disposal.
Finally,
he
argument
hata combination
of
socialist transforma-
tion,
a
profoundly
undemocratic
political system,
and a massive eco-
nomic
decline,
was
necessary
to
accomplish
social
change
is
a dubi-
ous one. For
example,
Costa
Rica
has manifested a
comparably
progressive
socioeconomic
profile
-
low
unemployment,
high
healthstandards,ow illiteracy while retainingapluralistic,demo-
cratic
political system;
it
also
displays
a
higher
standardof
living
and
much
greater
economic
dynamism
than Cuba.
Thus,
and
in
light
of
these
considerations,
he
social
achievements of the revolution
ap-
pear
less
impressive
than
many analyses suggest.
Some achieve-
ments
may
have been easier to
bring
about under a socialist
depen-
dency,
but
it was
by
no means the
only
way
to
achieve
them,
and
obviously
has had an
exploitative
side as
well.
In
addition,
an enormous economic
price
has
been
paid
and
is
still
being paid.
Before1959 Cubahad one of the most
progressive
socioeconomic
profiles
of
any country
in Latin
America.
In
1952
it
ranked
3rd
among
all Latin
American
countries
in
gross
national
product
per
capita.
Since
1959,
Cubahas been transformed
nto one
of the least
productive
countries
in
the
region:
it ranked
15th
n
a list
77777
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
of
20 countries
in
gross
national
productper capita
n
1981.
No other
country
dropped
in
ranking,
rom
1952
to
1981,
by
more than
3
plac-
es; Cuba
dropped
12
places
(Thomas et
al,
1984:
29).
In
short,
the
Cuban
Revolution
has
performed
poorly
in
terms of both
productivi-
ty
and
creating
new wealth
(as
distinguished
from
dividing
up
wealth
that
has
already
been
created).
True,
there have been
no
capitalist
investments,
and
thus no
profit
remittances,
by
the Soviet Union. Socialist
systems, by
defini-
tion,
do not make
capitalist
investments or remit
capitalist profits.
Moreover,
ince Marxisteconomic terms define
profit
as
exploita-
tive, it follows that a profit-lesssystem is non-exploitative n that re-
spect.
These
points
are true
by
definition.
However,
to
anyone
not
bound
by
Marxist
definitions,
t is
apparent
hat
capitalist
nvestment
and
profits
can offer benefits
in
a
generative,productive,
positive-
sum
process.
While
this
notion
is
unacceptable
to
Marxists,
ven so-
phisticated
ones,
elsewhere
it is considered as
elementary
econom-
ics.
Criticsoften cite
examples
of
profits
exceeding
total investment
to
illustrate he
exploitative
effects of
capitalism.
Such
arguments g-
nore
several
things,
such as the
multiplier
effects of the
capital
in-
vested, as well as those cases where investmentswere unproductive
and
the investor ost
his
investment.
Risk
of such losses
is
one factor
which
entitles
an investor to
profits.
Finally,
critics overlook
the
fact
that
the Cubans hemselves
now
frequently
reject
theoretical
prem-
ises about
the
exploitative
effects of
capital
at
the
practical
level
when
they appeal
for direct
private
investment,
commercial loans
and hard
capitalist
currencies.
Inconsistency
in
Cuban
adherence to
Marxist
heory
is evidenced
by
the ambivalence towards trade. On
the one hand,free tradeandinvestmentare described asexploitative
in
effect;
on the
other,
Cuba
protests any
limitation on that trade
(such
as that
posed
by
the
U.S.
embargo,
pejoratively,
ut inaccurate-
ly,
termed a
blockade)
as hurtful
o
the
economy
when,
theoretically
at
least,
it
should be
considered
beneficial.
Increasingly
t has come
to
seem
as if
social
gains
of the
Revolu-
tion
have come
largely
from
dismantling
the
productive
mecha-
nisms of
capitalistdependency
without
replacing
them
in
effective
ways.
A
once
productive
island has
thus
been transformed
nto an
economic liability.Its problems stem from a varietyof sources, in-
cluding arbitrary
nd
ill-informed nterventions
of
Fidel Castro
him-
self.
The
U.S.
economic
embargo
has
been cited as
one reason. The
most fundamental
problems,
however,
are inherent
in the
character
of Cuba's
ssociated-dependent
socialist
situation;
hey
are structur-
of
20 countries
in
gross
national
productper capita
n
1981.
No other
country
dropped
in
ranking,
rom
1952
to
1981,
by
more than
3
plac-
es; Cuba
dropped
12
places
(Thomas et
al,
1984:
29).
In
short,
the
Cuban
Revolution
has
performed
poorly
in
terms of both
productivi-
ty
and
creating
new wealth
(as
distinguished
from
dividing
up
wealth
that
has
already
been
created).
True,
there have been
no
capitalist
investments,
and
thus no
profit
remittances,
by
the Soviet Union. Socialist
systems, by
defini-
tion,
do not make
capitalist
investments or remit
capitalist profits.
Moreover,
ince Marxisteconomic terms define
profit
as
exploita-
tive, it follows that a profit-lesssystem is non-exploitative n that re-
spect.
These
points
are true
by
definition.
However,
to
anyone
not
bound
by
Marxist
definitions,
t is
apparent
hat
capitalist
nvestment
and
profits
can offer benefits
in
a
generative,productive,
positive-
sum
process.
While
this
notion
is
unacceptable
to
Marxists,
ven so-
phisticated
ones,
elsewhere
it is considered as
elementary
econom-
ics.
Criticsoften cite
examples
of
profits
exceeding
total investment
to
illustrate he
exploitative
effects of
capitalism.
Such
arguments g-
nore
several
things,
such as the
multiplier
effects of the
capital
in-
vested, as well as those cases where investmentswere unproductive
and
the investor ost
his
investment.
Risk
of such losses
is
one factor
which
entitles
an investor to
profits.
Finally,
critics overlook
the
fact
that
the Cubans hemselves
now
frequently
reject
theoretical
prem-
ises about
the
exploitative
effects of
capital
at
the
practical
level
when
they appeal
for direct
private
investment,
commercial loans
and hard
capitalist
currencies.
Inconsistency
in
Cuban
adherence to
Marxist
heory
is evidenced
by
the ambivalence towards trade. On
the one hand,free tradeandinvestmentare described asexploitative
in
effect;
on the
other,
Cuba
protests any
limitation on that trade
(such
as that
posed
by
the
U.S.
embargo,
pejoratively,
ut inaccurate-
ly,
termed a
blockade)
as hurtful
o
the
economy
when,
theoretically
at
least,
it
should be
considered
beneficial.
Increasingly
t has come
to
seem
as if
social
gains
of the
Revolu-
tion
have come
largely
from
dismantling
the
productive
mecha-
nisms of
capitalistdependency
without
replacing
them
in
effective
ways.
A
once
productive
island has
thus
been transformed
nto an
economic liability.Its problems stem from a varietyof sources, in-
cluding arbitrary
nd
ill-informed nterventions
of
Fidel Castro
him-
self.
The
U.S.
economic
embargo
has
been cited as
one reason. The
most fundamental
problems,
however,
are inherent
in the
character
of Cuba's
ssociated-dependent
socialist
situation;
hey
are structur-
of
20 countries
in
gross
national
productper capita
n
1981.
No other
country
dropped
in
ranking,
rom
1952
to
1981,
by
more than
3
plac-
es; Cuba
dropped
12
places
(Thomas et
al,
1984:
29).
In
short,
the
Cuban
Revolution
has
performed
poorly
in
terms of both
productivi-
ty
and
creating
new wealth
(as
distinguished
from
dividing
up
wealth
that
has
already
been
created).
True,
there have been
no
capitalist
investments,
and
thus no
profit
remittances,
by
the Soviet Union. Socialist
systems, by
defini-
tion,
do not make
capitalist
investments or remit
capitalist profits.
Moreover,
ince Marxisteconomic terms define
profit
as
exploita-
tive, it follows that a profit-lesssystem is non-exploitative n that re-
spect.
These
points
are true
by
definition.
However,
to
anyone
not
bound
by
Marxist
definitions,
t is
apparent
hat
capitalist
nvestment
and
profits
can offer benefits
in
a
generative,productive,
positive-
sum
process.
While
this
notion
is
unacceptable
to
Marxists,
ven so-
phisticated
ones,
elsewhere
it is considered as
elementary
econom-
ics.
Criticsoften cite
examples
of
profits
exceeding
total investment
to
illustrate he
exploitative
effects of
capitalism.
Such
arguments g-
nore
several
things,
such as the
multiplier
effects of the
capital
in-
vested, as well as those cases where investmentswere unproductive
and
the investor ost
his
investment.
Risk
of such losses
is
one factor
which
entitles
an investor to
profits.
Finally,
critics overlook
the
fact
that
the Cubans hemselves
now
frequently
reject
theoretical
prem-
ises about
the
exploitative
effects of
capital
at
the
practical
level
when
they appeal
for direct
private
investment,
commercial loans
and hard
capitalist
currencies.
Inconsistency
in
Cuban
adherence to
Marxist
heory
is evidenced
by
the ambivalence towards trade. On
the one hand,free tradeandinvestmentare described asexploitative
in
effect;
on the
other,
Cuba
protests any
limitation on that trade
(such
as that
posed
by
the
U.S.
embargo,
pejoratively,
ut inaccurate-
ly,
termed a
blockade)
as hurtful
o
the
economy
when,
theoretically
at
least,
it
should be
considered
beneficial.
Increasingly
t has come
to
seem
as if
social
gains
of the
Revolu-
tion
have come
largely
from
dismantling
the
productive
mecha-
nisms of
capitalistdependency
without
replacing
them
in
effective
ways.
A
once
productive
island has
thus
been transformed
nto an
economic liability.Its problems stem from a varietyof sources, in-
cluding arbitrary
nd
ill-informed nterventions
of
Fidel Castro
him-
self.
The
U.S.
economic
embargo
has
been cited as
one reason. The
most fundamental
problems,
however,
are inherent
in the
character
of Cuba's
ssociated-dependent
socialist
situation;
hey
are structur-
of
20 countries
in
gross
national
productper capita
n
1981.
No other
country
dropped
in
ranking,
rom
1952
to
1981,
by
more than
3
plac-
es; Cuba
dropped
12
places
(Thomas et
al,
1984:
29).
In
short,
the
Cuban
Revolution
has
performed
poorly
in
terms of both
productivi-
ty
and
creating
new wealth
(as
distinguished
from
dividing
up
wealth
that
has
already
been
created).
True,
there have been
no
capitalist
investments,
and
thus no
profit
remittances,
by
the Soviet Union. Socialist
systems, by
defini-
tion,
do not make
capitalist
investments or remit
capitalist profits.
Moreover,
ince Marxisteconomic terms define
profit
as
exploita-
tive, it follows that a profit-lesssystem is non-exploitative n that re-
spect.
These
points
are true
by
definition.
However,
to
anyone
not
bound
by
Marxist
definitions,
t is
apparent
hat
capitalist
nvestment
and
profits
can offer benefits
in
a
generative,productive,
positive-
sum
process.
While
this
notion
is
unacceptable
to
Marxists,
ven so-
phisticated
ones,
elsewhere
it is considered as
elementary
econom-
ics.
Criticsoften cite
examples
of
profits
exceeding
total investment
to
illustrate he
exploitative
effects of
capitalism.
Such
arguments g-
nore
several
things,
such as the
multiplier
effects of the
capital
in-
vested, as well as those cases where investmentswere unproductive
and
the investor ost
his
investment.
Risk
of such losses
is
one factor
which
entitles
an investor to
profits.
Finally,
critics overlook
the
fact
that
the Cubans hemselves
now
frequently
reject
theoretical
prem-
ises about
the
exploitative
effects of
capital
at
the
practical
level
when
they appeal
for direct
private
investment,
commercial loans
and hard
capitalist
currencies.
Inconsistency
in
Cuban
adherence to
Marxist
heory
is evidenced
by
the ambivalence towards trade. On
the one hand,free tradeandinvestmentare described asexploitative
in
effect;
on the
other,
Cuba
protests any
limitation on that trade
(such
as that
posed
by
the
U.S.
embargo,
pejoratively,
ut inaccurate-
ly,
termed a
blockade)
as hurtful
o
the
economy
when,
theoretically
at
least,
it
should be
considered
beneficial.
Increasingly
t has come
to
seem
as if
social
gains
of the
Revolu-
tion
have come
largely
from
dismantling
the
productive
mecha-
nisms of
capitalistdependency
without
replacing
them
in
effective
ways.
A
once
productive
island has
thus
been transformed
nto an
economic liability.Its problems stem from a varietyof sources, in-
cluding arbitrary
nd
ill-informed nterventions
of
Fidel Castro
him-
self.
The
U.S.
economic
embargo
has
been cited as
one reason. The
most fundamental
problems,
however,
are inherent
in the
character
of Cuba's
ssociated-dependent
socialist
situation;
hey
are structur-
78888
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PACKENHAM:UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:UBA
-
CAPITALIST
S.
SOCIALIST
EPENDENCY
al.
As
Leontiev
pointed
out more than a decade
ago, they
are
funda-
mentally
the same as those that
plagued
the
Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, .e. the
characteristically
ow
productivity
of
labor,
rooted
in
the basic differences between
a
socialistic and an
in-
dividualistic
ociety.
Leontiev
went
on to
argue
thatthe
productivity
of labor
seems
to
be
lower now than
it
was before the revolution. With
the
same
equipment
and under otherwise identical
physical
conditions
the same
worker,
or the
same
group
of
workers,
eems to
produce
in
all branches
of
industry
and
agriculture
maller
amounts
of
goods,
or
goods of lowerquality,orboth, than would have been producedbe-
fore
the revolution.
The so-called
moral
ncentives... seem ineffective as a means of
inducing
laborers,
white-collar
workers,
managerial
and
supervisory
personnel
to
perform
heir
respective
jobs
as well as
they
did
before
the revolution ...
(Leontiev
1971,
pp.
19,
21).
Subsequent
events have confirmed this
analysis.
While
the Cu-
bans
have made some
adjustments,
heir
ideological
and
political
commitments
prevent
them
from
correcting
hese
structural
efects,
which areinherentin the Cubanmodel.
Thus,
once socialist
Cubadivided
up
-
and
fairlyrapidly
at that
-
the fruitsof
its earlier
capitalistdevelopment,
economic costs of the
present
system
have become more evident.
To be
sure,
some claim economic and
social costs
apply only
to
the
Cuban
upper
and middle
classes,
i.e.,
for
gusanos
(literally
worms',
he
epithet
used
by
the
Castro
regime
to
refer o Cubanex-
iles).
However,
most of the
approximately
125,000
Cuban
boat
peo-
ple,
who
left
in
1980,
were
poor
and
working
class. To
date
a
tenth of
the Cubanpopulationhasfled the island.Ithasbeen estimated that
up
to two million more would leave
if
they
could.3
Nothing
remotely
resembling
these
phenomena
existed before
1959,
not
even
during
the worst
days
of
Batista.
Political
aspects
If
there are
problems
and costs
in
the social
and economic are-
as,
even more
profound
modes of
exploitation
under socialist de-
pendency
occur in
the
political,
cultural,
and
military-diplomatic
r-
eas. These affect not
only
the
affluent,
but also the middle and
working
class as well as
the
poor people
of
Cuba,
directly
and
intensely.
There
is
no democratic
rule in
Cuba
n
the sense
of
citizens ex-
ercising
any
control
over
governmental
officials.To
the
contrary,
he
al.
As
Leontiev
pointed
out more than a decade
ago, they
are
funda-
mentally
the same as those that
plagued
the
Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, .e. the
characteristically
ow
productivity
of
labor,
rooted
in
the basic differences between
a
socialistic and an
in-
dividualistic
ociety.
Leontiev
went
on to
argue
thatthe
productivity
of labor
seems
to
be
lower now than
it
was before the revolution. With
the
same
equipment
and under otherwise identical
physical
conditions
the same
worker,
or the
same
group
of
workers,
eems to
produce
in
all branches
of
industry
and
agriculture
maller
amounts
of
goods,
or
goods of lowerquality,orboth, than would have been producedbe-
fore
the revolution.
The so-called
moral
ncentives... seem ineffective as a means of
inducing
laborers,
white-collar
workers,
managerial
and
supervisory
personnel
to
perform
heir
respective
jobs
as well as
they
did
before
the revolution ...
(Leontiev
1971,
pp.
19,
21).
Subsequent
events have confirmed this
analysis.
While
the Cu-
bans
have made some
adjustments,
heir
ideological
and
political
commitments
prevent
them
from
correcting
hese
structural
efects,
which areinherentin the Cubanmodel.
Thus,
once socialist
Cubadivided
up
-
and
fairlyrapidly
at that
-
the fruitsof
its earlier
capitalistdevelopment,
economic costs of the
present
system
have become more evident.
To be
sure,
some claim economic and
social costs
apply only
to
the
Cuban
upper
and middle
classes,
i.e.,
for
gusanos
(literally
worms',
he
epithet
used
by
the
Castro
regime
to
refer o Cubanex-
iles).
However,
most of the
approximately
125,000
Cuban
boat
peo-
ple,
who
left
in
1980,
were
poor
and
working
class. To
date
a
tenth of
the Cubanpopulationhasfled the island.Ithasbeen estimated that
up
to two million more would leave
if
they
could.3
Nothing
remotely
resembling
these
phenomena
existed before
1959,
not
even
during
the worst
days
of
Batista.
Political
aspects
If
there are
problems
and costs
in
the social
and economic are-
as,
even more
profound
modes of
exploitation
under socialist de-
pendency
occur in
the
political,
cultural,
and
military-diplomatic
r-
eas. These affect not
only
the
affluent,
but also the middle and
working
class as well as
the
poor people
of
Cuba,
directly
and
intensely.
There
is
no democratic
rule in
Cuba
n
the sense
of
citizens ex-
ercising
any
control
over
governmental
officials.To
the
contrary,
he
al.
As
Leontiev
pointed
out more than a decade
ago, they
are
funda-
mentally
the same as those that
plagued
the
Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, .e. the
characteristically
ow
productivity
of
labor,
rooted
in
the basic differences between
a
socialistic and an
in-
dividualistic
ociety.
Leontiev
went
on to
argue
thatthe
productivity
of labor
seems
to
be
lower now than
it
was before the revolution. With
the
same
equipment
and under otherwise identical
physical
conditions
the same
worker,
or the
same
group
of
workers,
eems to
produce
in
all branches
of
industry
and
agriculture
maller
amounts
of
goods,
or
goods of lowerquality,orboth, than would have been producedbe-
fore
the revolution.
The so-called
moral
ncentives... seem ineffective as a means of
inducing
laborers,
white-collar
workers,
managerial
and
supervisory
personnel
to
perform
heir
respective
jobs
as well as
they
did
before
the revolution ...
(Leontiev
1971,
pp.
19,
21).
Subsequent
events have confirmed this
analysis.
While
the Cu-
bans
have made some
adjustments,
heir
ideological
and
political
commitments
prevent
them
from
correcting
hese
structural
efects,
which areinherentin the Cubanmodel.
Thus,
once socialist
Cubadivided
up
-
and
fairlyrapidly
at that
-
the fruitsof
its earlier
capitalistdevelopment,
economic costs of the
present
system
have become more evident.
To be
sure,
some claim economic and
social costs
apply only
to
the
Cuban
upper
and middle
classes,
i.e.,
for
gusanos
(literally
worms',
he
epithet
used
by
the
Castro
regime
to
refer o Cubanex-
iles).
However,
most of the
approximately
125,000
Cuban
boat
peo-
ple,
who
left
in
1980,
were
poor
and
working
class. To
date
a
tenth of
the Cubanpopulationhasfled the island.Ithasbeen estimated that
up
to two million more would leave
if
they
could.3
Nothing
remotely
resembling
these
phenomena
existed before
1959,
not
even
during
the worst
days
of
Batista.
Political
aspects
If
there are
problems
and costs
in
the social
and economic are-
as,
even more
profound
modes of
exploitation
under socialist de-
pendency
occur in
the
political,
cultural,
and
military-diplomatic
r-
eas. These affect not
only
the
affluent,
but also the middle and
working
class as well as
the
poor people
of
Cuba,
directly
and
intensely.
There
is
no democratic
rule in
Cuba
n
the sense
of
citizens ex-
ercising
any
control
over
governmental
officials.To
the
contrary,
he
al.
As
Leontiev
pointed
out more than a decade
ago, they
are
funda-
mentally
the same as those that
plagued
the
Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, .e. the
characteristically
ow
productivity
of
labor,
rooted
in
the basic differences between
a
socialistic and an
in-
dividualistic
ociety.
Leontiev
went
on to
argue
thatthe
productivity
of labor
seems
to
be
lower now than
it
was before the revolution. With
the
same
equipment
and under otherwise identical
physical
conditions
the same
worker,
or the
same
group
of
workers,
eems to
produce
in
all branches
of
industry
and
agriculture
maller
amounts
of
goods,
or
goods of lowerquality,orboth, than would have been producedbe-
fore
the revolution.
The so-called
moral
ncentives... seem ineffective as a means of
inducing
laborers,
white-collar
workers,
managerial
and
supervisory
personnel
to
perform
heir
respective
jobs
as well as
they
did
before
the revolution ...
(Leontiev
1971,
pp.
19,
21).
Subsequent
events have confirmed this
analysis.
While
the Cu-
bans
have made some
adjustments,
heir
ideological
and
political
commitments
prevent
them
from
correcting
hese
structural
efects,
which areinherentin the Cubanmodel.
Thus,
once socialist
Cubadivided
up
-
and
fairlyrapidly
at that
-
the fruitsof
its earlier
capitalistdevelopment,
economic costs of the
present
system
have become more evident.
To be
sure,
some claim economic and
social costs
apply only
to
the
Cuban
upper
and middle
classes,
i.e.,
for
gusanos
(literally
worms',
he
epithet
used
by
the
Castro
regime
to
refer o Cubanex-
iles).
However,
most of the
approximately
125,000
Cuban
boat
peo-
ple,
who
left
in
1980,
were
poor
and
working
class. To
date
a
tenth of
the Cubanpopulationhasfled the island.Ithasbeen estimated that
up
to two million more would leave
if
they
could.3
Nothing
remotely
resembling
these
phenomena
existed before
1959,
not
even
during
the worst
days
of
Batista.
Political
aspects
If
there are
problems
and costs
in
the social
and economic are-
as,
even more
profound
modes of
exploitation
under socialist de-
pendency
occur in
the
political,
cultural,
and
military-diplomatic
r-
eas. These affect not
only
the
affluent,
but also the middle and
working
class as well as
the
poor people
of
Cuba,
directly
and
intensely.
There
is
no democratic
rule in
Cuba
n
the sense
of
citizens ex-
ercising
any
control
over
governmental
officials.To
the
contrary,
he
79999
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JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
logic
of
the
Revolution,
both
publicly
and
within the
ruling
circles,
is the reverse:
eaders
guide,
direct,
and control
citizens in
the
ways
of
Revolutionary
ruth and virtue. The idea of citizens
controlling
leaders
is
characterized
by
the
leadership
as
bourgeois,
reactionary,
and
counterrevolutionary.
n
Cuba,
the
Revolutionand its
leaders
legitimate
the
constitution,
the
courts,
the
administration,
he
party,
the mass
organizations,
and the elections
-
and
not
vice
versa
(Dominguez,
1978:
261).
Accordingly,
within
Cuba
itself
power
centers,
first
and fore-
most,
on
Fidel
Castro,
and,
second,
on the
people
closest
to him.
Fidel Castrohas been undisputed socialistcaudillo of Cubafor
more than a
quarter
century,
.e.
for most
of
his
adult life
and
that of
the entire
post-1959
system.
It is a
remarkable
chievementwith
few
parallels
on
a
world scale.
Castro
has well
met
his first
priority
of
maintaining
his
power
undiluted
during
this
period.
Especially
in
the
1970s
and
1980s,
the
CubanCommunist
Party
(CCP),
the civilian
bureaucracy,
and
the
military
have
grown
in
numbers,
organizational apacity
and
complexity,
and
influence,
al-
though
all remain
systematically
subordinated to Fidel
Castro
and
the CCP.Below this
hierarchy
of
power
are the mass
organizations:
the
Committeesfor
the Defense of
the Revolution
CDRs),
the
Fede-
ration
of
CubanWomen
(FMC),
labor
unions,
youth
organizations.
Finally
here are elected
legislative
bodies
(assemblies)
and
judicial
structuresat
national,
provincial,
and local level.
However,
except
in
limited,
controlled
ways,
these
bodies
do
not
have the
functions
as-
sociated
with them
in
political
democracies.
These
political
mechanisms are used
for
various
domestic
and
foreignpolicy objectivesset by the political elite. One of the main
stated
objectives
is
to
create
new
socialist
citizens who
will
be free
of
the values
and
characteristics
hat
are
glorified
and
practiced
in
politically-liberal,
apitalist
societies.
The
regime
is
resolutely
anti-
liberal. Liberal ocieties
place
a
high
value
on
individualism,
com-
petition,
pluralism,
basic
freedoms and
group autonomy.
Fromthe
point
of view
of
the Cuban
system,
these
values
and
practices
are
egotistical,
alienating, atomizing,
divisive,
and
undisciplined.
The
aim of
the Revolution
s,
and
must
be,
to eliminate them.
Cuba'sead-
ersarguethatthese values andpracticesaredeeply ingrainedas a re-
sult
of
Cuba's
ong previous
capitalist history.
To
get
rid
of
them,
therefore,
the state needs
a
vanguard
of
enlightened
teachers
and
leaders to correct
the
unenlightened
masses
to a
realizationof
their
true needs and
interests.
logic
of
the
Revolution,
both
publicly
and
within the
ruling
circles,
is the reverse:
eaders
guide,
direct,
and control
citizens in
the
ways
of
Revolutionary
ruth and virtue. The idea of citizens
controlling
leaders
is
characterized
by
the
leadership
as
bourgeois,
reactionary,
and
counterrevolutionary.
n
Cuba,
the
Revolutionand its
leaders
legitimate
the
constitution,
the
courts,
the
administration,
he
party,
the mass
organizations,
and the elections
-
and
not
vice
versa
(Dominguez,
1978:
261).
Accordingly,
within
Cuba
itself
power
centers,
first
and fore-
most,
on
Fidel
Castro,
and,
second,
on the
people
closest
to him.
Fidel Castrohas been undisputed socialistcaudillo of Cubafor
more than a
quarter
century,
.e.
for most
of
his
adult life
and
that of
the entire
post-1959
system.
It is a
remarkable
chievementwith
few
parallels
on
a
world scale.
Castro
has well
met
his first
priority
of
maintaining
his
power
undiluted
during
this
period.
Especially
in
the
1970s
and
1980s,
the
CubanCommunist
Party
(CCP),
the civilian
bureaucracy,
and
the
military
have
grown
in
numbers,
organizational apacity
and
complexity,
and
influence,
al-
though
all remain
systematically
subordinated to Fidel
Castro
and
the CCP.Below this
hierarchy
of
power
are the mass
organizations:
the
Committeesfor
the Defense of
the Revolution
CDRs),
the
Fede-
ration
of
CubanWomen
(FMC),
labor
unions,
youth
organizations.
Finally
here are elected
legislative
bodies
(assemblies)
and
judicial
structuresat
national,
provincial,
and local level.
However,
except
in
limited,
controlled
ways,
these
bodies
do
not
have the
functions
as-
sociated
with them
in
political
democracies.
These
political
mechanisms are used
for
various
domestic
and
foreignpolicy objectivesset by the political elite. One of the main
stated
objectives
is
to
create
new
socialist
citizens who
will
be free
of
the values
and
characteristics
hat
are
glorified
and
practiced
in
politically-liberal,
apitalist
societies.
The
regime
is
resolutely
anti-
liberal. Liberal ocieties
place
a
high
value
on
individualism,
com-
petition,
pluralism,
basic
freedoms and
group autonomy.
Fromthe
point
of view
of
the Cuban
system,
these
values
and
practices
are
egotistical,
alienating, atomizing,
divisive,
and
undisciplined.
The
aim of
the Revolution
s,
and
must
be,
to eliminate them.
Cuba'sead-
ersarguethatthese values andpracticesaredeeply ingrainedas a re-
sult
of
Cuba's
ong previous
capitalist history.
To
get
rid
of
them,
therefore,
the state needs
a
vanguard
of
enlightened
teachers
and
leaders to correct
the
unenlightened
masses
to a
realizationof
their
true needs and
interests.
logic
of
the
Revolution,
both
publicly
and
within the
ruling
circles,
is the reverse:
eaders
guide,
direct,
and control
citizens in
the
ways
of
Revolutionary
ruth and virtue. The idea of citizens
controlling
leaders
is
characterized
by
the
leadership
as
bourgeois,
reactionary,
and
counterrevolutionary.
n
Cuba,
the
Revolutionand its
leaders
legitimate
the
constitution,
the
courts,
the
administration,
he
party,
the mass
organizations,
and the elections
-
and
not
vice
versa
(Dominguez,
1978:
261).
Accordingly,
within
Cuba
itself
power
centers,
first
and fore-
most,
on
Fidel
Castro,
and,
second,
on the
people
closest
to him.
Fidel Castrohas been undisputed socialistcaudillo of Cubafor
more than a
quarter
century,
.e.
for most
of
his
adult life
and
that of
the entire
post-1959
system.
It is a
remarkable
chievementwith
few
parallels
on
a
world scale.
Castro
has well
met
his first
priority
of
maintaining
his
power
undiluted
during
this
period.
Especially
in
the
1970s
and
1980s,
the
CubanCommunist
Party
(CCP),
the civilian
bureaucracy,
and
the
military
have
grown
in
numbers,
organizational apacity
and
complexity,
and
influence,
al-
though
all remain
systematically
subordinated to Fidel
Castro
and
the CCP.Below this
hierarchy
of
power
are the mass
organizations:
the
Committeesfor
the Defense of
the Revolution
CDRs),
the
Fede-
ration
of
CubanWomen
(FMC),
labor
unions,
youth
organizations.
Finally
here are elected
legislative
bodies
(assemblies)
and
judicial
structuresat
national,
provincial,
and local level.
However,
except
in
limited,
controlled
ways,
these
bodies
do
not
have the
functions
as-
sociated
with them
in
political
democracies.
These
political
mechanisms are used
for
various
domestic
and
foreignpolicy objectivesset by the political elite. One of the main
stated
objectives
is
to
create
new
socialist
citizens who
will
be free
of
the values
and
characteristics
hat
are
glorified
and
practiced
in
politically-liberal,
apitalist
societies.
The
regime
is
resolutely
anti-
liberal. Liberal ocieties
place
a
high
value
on
individualism,
com-
petition,
pluralism,
basic
freedoms and
group autonomy.
Fromthe
point
of view
of
the Cuban
system,
these
values
and
practices
are
egotistical,
alienating, atomizing,
divisive,
and
undisciplined.
The
aim of
the Revolution
s,
and
must
be,
to eliminate them.
Cuba'sead-
ersarguethatthese values andpracticesaredeeply ingrainedas a re-
sult
of
Cuba's
ong previous
capitalist history.
To
get
rid
of
them,
therefore,
the state needs
a
vanguard
of
enlightened
teachers
and
leaders to correct
the
unenlightened
masses
to a
realizationof
their
true needs and
interests.
logic
of
the
Revolution,
both
publicly
and
within the
ruling
circles,
is the reverse:
eaders
guide,
direct,
and control
citizens in
the
ways
of
Revolutionary
ruth and virtue. The idea of citizens
controlling
leaders
is
characterized
by
the
leadership
as
bourgeois,
reactionary,
and
counterrevolutionary.
n
Cuba,
the
Revolutionand its
leaders
legitimate
the
constitution,
the
courts,
the
administration,
he
party,
the mass
organizations,
and the elections
-
and
not
vice
versa
(Dominguez,
1978:
261).
Accordingly,
within
Cuba
itself
power
centers,
first
and fore-
most,
on
Fidel
Castro,
and,
second,
on the
people
closest
to him.
Fidel Castrohas been undisputed socialistcaudillo of Cubafor
more than a
quarter
century,
.e.
for most
of
his
adult life
and
that of
the entire
post-1959
system.
It is a
remarkable
chievementwith
few
parallels
on
a
world scale.
Castro
has well
met
his first
priority
of
maintaining
his
power
undiluted
during
this
period.
Especially
in
the
1970s
and
1980s,
the
CubanCommunist
Party
(CCP),
the civilian
bureaucracy,
and
the
military
have
grown
in
numbers,
organizational apacity
and
complexity,
and
influence,
al-
though
all remain
systematically
subordinated to Fidel
Castro
and
the CCP.Below this
hierarchy
of
power
are the mass
organizations:
the
Committeesfor
the Defense of
the Revolution
CDRs),
the
Fede-
ration
of
CubanWomen
(FMC),
labor
unions,
youth
organizations.
Finally
here are elected
legislative
bodies
(assemblies)
and
judicial
structuresat
national,
provincial,
and local level.
However,
except
in
limited,
controlled
ways,
these
bodies
do
not
have the
functions
as-
sociated
with them
in
political
democracies.
These
political
mechanisms are used
for
various
domestic
and
foreignpolicy objectivesset by the political elite. One of the main
stated
objectives
is
to
create
new
socialist
citizens who
will
be free
of
the values
and
characteristics
hat
are
glorified
and
practiced
in
politically-liberal,
apitalist
societies.
The
regime
is
resolutely
anti-
liberal. Liberal ocieties
place
a
high
value
on
individualism,
com-
petition,
pluralism,
basic
freedoms and
group autonomy.
Fromthe
point
of view
of
the Cuban
system,
these
values
and
practices
are
egotistical,
alienating, atomizing,
divisive,
and
undisciplined.
The
aim of
the Revolution
s,
and
must
be,
to eliminate them.
Cuba'sead-
ersarguethatthese values andpracticesaredeeply ingrainedas a re-
sult
of
Cuba's
ong previous
capitalist history.
To
get
rid
of
them,
therefore,
the state needs
a
vanguard
of
enlightened
teachers
and
leaders to correct
the
unenlightened
masses
to a
realizationof
their
true needs and
interests.
80000
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81111
ACKENHAM:CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
The
Cuban
political
system
is elitist and
hierarchical
both
in
its
principles,
which
undergird
and
legitimize
it,
and
in its
political
in-
stitutions and
processes.
The latter have become
enormously
power-
ful devices
for
controlling
Cuban citizens.
There is
literally
no
sphere
of
human
activity
that
is
immune from state
supervision
be-
cause there are no
moral or ethical constraints on
state action
vis-a-vis
the individual
except
the needs of
the
Revolution,
which are
deter-
mined
by
the
top
leadership.
State
penetration
of
any
area
of
individual and
group
life
is
legit-
imate.
The combination of
elaborate,
powerful
state
organizational
structures, the legitimating myths of the Revolution, Fidel Castro's
charisma,
together
with
other
factors,
all assure
that,
in
practical
terms,
the actual
degree
of that
penetration
is
enormous.
In
these
circumstances,
civil liberties
have no
meaning
either
conceptually
or
practically,
nor
does the idea of
the
autonomy
of
in-
dividuals
and
groups
from state
power.
The
idea of a
legitimate
op-
position
is
foreign
and subversive.
The
operative principle
is:
Within the
Revolution,
anything;
outside the
Revolution,
nothing '
This
standard
can be
very
elastic,
meaning
whatever the state
choos-
es it to mean.
Communications
media are
totally
controlled
by
the
political
elite. Criticism of the
regime
and its leaders
-
even
(especially?)
jokes
about them
-
are
prohibited.
According
to
Hugh
Thomas
(1971:1463),
Compared
with
the Cuban
press,
that of
Spain
(under
Franco)
might
be considered
sparkling'
Lee
Lockwood notes
that
the Cuban
media are not
only
dull,
dogmatic, repetitious,
and
syco-
phantic
but also uninformative.
In
fact,
he
writes,
the
Cuban
press
is so mediocre that even Fidel can't stand it; I had personally wit-
nessed
how
every
morning
at
breakfast
he
read the
AP
and
UPI wire
service
reports
first
(and
carefully)
before
skimming idly through
Granmd'
(Lockwood,
1970:18).
Castro
has
railed
at
the U.S. media
because
of their
alleged
elitism,
monopoly power,
and subservience
to
government policies,
yet
these
charges
apply
to
his own
system
more
accurately
than
to
the U.S.
system. Clearly
control of the
media,
both
and
electronic,
affords Castro
a
powerful
instrument with
which to
direct and dominate
the Cuban
population.
To
give
just
one
example,
the Cuban
government
controls all information
pertaining
to
the human and material
costs
of Cuba's
military
activities
in Africa.
It is
inconceivable
that the
government
would
(or could)
tolerate
investigative
reporting
or
a
pluralistic,
free
press.
The
political
elite
utilize mass
organizations
to
enforce
loyalty
The
Cuban
political
system
is elitist and
hierarchical
both
in
its
principles,
which
undergird
and
legitimize
it,
and
in its
political
in-
stitutions and
processes.
The latter have become
enormously
power-
ful devices
for
controlling
Cuban citizens.
There is
literally
no
sphere
of
human
activity
that
is
immune from state
supervision
be-
cause there are no
moral or ethical constraints on
state action
vis-a-vis
the individual
except
the needs of
the
Revolution,
which are
deter-
mined
by
the
top
leadership.
State
penetration
of
any
area
of
individual and
group
life
is
legit-
imate.
The combination of
elaborate,
powerful
state
organizational
structures, the legitimating myths of the Revolution, Fidel Castro's
charisma,
together
with
other
factors,
all assure
that,
in
practical
terms,
the actual
degree
of that
penetration
is
enormous.
In
these
circumstances,
civil liberties
have no
meaning
either
conceptually
or
practically,
nor
does the idea of
the
autonomy
of
in-
dividuals
and
groups
from state
power.
The
idea of a
legitimate
op-
position
is
foreign
and subversive.
The
operative principle
is:
Within the
Revolution,
anything;
outside the
Revolution,
nothing '
This
standard
can be
very
elastic,
meaning
whatever the state
choos-
es it to mean.
Communications
media are
totally
controlled
by
the
political
elite. Criticism of the
regime
and its leaders
-
even
(especially?)
jokes
about them
-
are
prohibited.
According
to
Hugh
Thomas
(1971:1463),
Compared
with
the Cuban
press,
that of
Spain
(under
Franco)
might
be considered
sparkling'
Lee
Lockwood notes
that
the Cuban
media are not
only
dull,
dogmatic, repetitious,
and
syco-
phantic
but also uninformative.
In
fact,
he
writes,
the
Cuban
press
is so mediocre that even Fidel can't stand it; I had personally wit-
nessed
how
every
morning
at
breakfast
he
read the
AP
and
UPI wire
service
reports
first
(and
carefully)
before
skimming idly through
Granmd'
(Lockwood,
1970:18).
Castro
has
railed
at
the U.S. media
because
of their
alleged
elitism,
monopoly power,
and subservience
to
government policies,
yet
these
charges
apply
to
his own
system
more
accurately
than
to
the U.S.
system. Clearly
control of the
media,
both
and
electronic,
affords Castro
a
powerful
instrument with
which to
direct and dominate
the Cuban
population.
To
give
just
one
example,
the Cuban
government
controls all information
pertaining
to
the human and material
costs
of Cuba's
military
activities
in Africa.
It is
inconceivable
that the
government
would
(or could)
tolerate
investigative
reporting
or
a
pluralistic,
free
press.
The
political
elite
utilize mass
organizations
to
enforce
loyalty
The
Cuban
political
system
is elitist and
hierarchical
both
in
its
principles,
which
undergird
and
legitimize
it,
and
in its
political
in-
stitutions and
processes.
The latter have become
enormously
power-
ful devices
for
controlling
Cuban citizens.
There is
literally
no
sphere
of
human
activity
that
is
immune from state
supervision
be-
cause there are no
moral or ethical constraints on
state action
vis-a-vis
the individual
except
the needs of
the
Revolution,
which are
deter-
mined
by
the
top
leadership.
State
penetration
of
any
area
of
individual and
group
life
is
legit-
imate.
The combination of
elaborate,
powerful
state
organizational
structures, the legitimating myths of the Revolution, Fidel Castro's
charisma,
together
with
other
factors,
all assure
that,
in
practical
terms,
the actual
degree
of that
penetration
is
enormous.
In
these
circumstances,
civil liberties
have no
meaning
either
conceptually
or
practically,
nor
does the idea of
the
autonomy
of
in-
dividuals
and
groups
from state
power.
The
idea of a
legitimate
op-
position
is
foreign
and subversive.
The
operative principle
is:
Within the
Revolution,
anything;
outside the
Revolution,
nothing '
This
standard
can be
very
elastic,
meaning
whatever the state
choos-
es it to mean.
Communications
media are
totally
controlled
by
the
political
elite. Criticism of the
regime
and its leaders
-
even
(especially?)
jokes
about them
-
are
prohibited.
According
to
Hugh
Thomas
(1971:1463),
Compared
with
the Cuban
press,
that of
Spain
(under
Franco)
might
be considered
sparkling'
Lee
Lockwood notes
that
the Cuban
media are not
only
dull,
dogmatic, repetitious,
and
syco-
phantic
but also uninformative.
In
fact,
he
writes,
the
Cuban
press
is so mediocre that even Fidel can't stand it; I had personally wit-
nessed
how
every
morning
at
breakfast
he
read the
AP
and
UPI wire
service
reports
first
(and
carefully)
before
skimming idly through
Granmd'
(Lockwood,
1970:18).
Castro
has
railed
at
the U.S. media
because
of their
alleged
elitism,
monopoly power,
and subservience
to
government policies,
yet
these
charges
apply
to
his own
system
more
accurately
than
to
the U.S.
system. Clearly
control of the
media,
both
and
electronic,
affords Castro
a
powerful
instrument with
which to
direct and dominate
the Cuban
population.
To
give
just
one
example,
the Cuban
government
controls all information
pertaining
to
the human and material
costs
of Cuba's
military
activities
in Africa.
It is
inconceivable
that the
government
would
(or could)
tolerate
investigative
reporting
or
a
pluralistic,
free
press.
The
political
elite
utilize mass
organizations
to
enforce
loyalty
The
Cuban
political
system
is elitist and
hierarchical
both
in
its
principles,
which
undergird
and
legitimize
it,
and
in its
political
in-
stitutions and
processes.
The latter have become
enormously
power-
ful devices
for
controlling
Cuban citizens.
There is
literally
no
sphere
of
human
activity
that
is
immune from state
supervision
be-
cause there are no
moral or ethical constraints on
state action
vis-a-vis
the individual
except
the needs of
the
Revolution,
which are
deter-
mined
by
the
top
leadership.
State
penetration
of
any
area
of
individual and
group
life
is
legit-
imate.
The combination of
elaborate,
powerful
state
organizational
structures, the legitimating myths of the Revolution, Fidel Castro's
charisma,
together
with
other
factors,
all assure
that,
in
practical
terms,
the actual
degree
of that
penetration
is
enormous.
In
these
circumstances,
civil liberties
have no
meaning
either
conceptually
or
practically,
nor
does the idea of
the
autonomy
of
in-
dividuals
and
groups
from state
power.
The
idea of a
legitimate
op-
position
is
foreign
and subversive.
The
operative principle
is:
Within the
Revolution,
anything;
outside the
Revolution,
nothing '
This
standard
can be
very
elastic,
meaning
whatever the state
choos-
es it to mean.
Communications
media are
totally
controlled
by
the
political
elite. Criticism of the
regime
and its leaders
-
even
(especially?)
jokes
about them
-
are
prohibited.
According
to
Hugh
Thomas
(1971:1463),
Compared
with
the Cuban
press,
that of
Spain
(under
Franco)
might
be considered
sparkling'
Lee
Lockwood notes
that
the Cuban
media are not
only
dull,
dogmatic, repetitious,
and
syco-
phantic
but also uninformative.
In
fact,
he
writes,
the
Cuban
press
is so mediocre that even Fidel can't stand it; I had personally wit-
nessed
how
every
morning
at
breakfast
he
read the
AP
and
UPI wire
service
reports
first
(and
carefully)
before
skimming idly through
Granmd'
(Lockwood,
1970:18).
Castro
has
railed
at
the U.S. media
because
of their
alleged
elitism,
monopoly power,
and subservience
to
government policies,
yet
these
charges
apply
to
his own
system
more
accurately
than
to
the U.S.
system. Clearly
control of the
media,
both
and
electronic,
affords Castro
a
powerful
instrument with
which to
direct and dominate
the Cuban
population.
To
give
just
one
example,
the Cuban
government
controls all information
pertaining
to
the human and material
costs
of Cuba's
military
activities
in Africa.
It is
inconceivable
that the
government
would
(or could)
tolerate
investigative
reporting
or
a
pluralistic,
free
press.
The
political
elite
utilize mass
organizations
to
enforce
loyalty
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD AFFAIRS
to the
regime
and
its
objectives
and
to
supervise
and
punish
possible
counterrevolutionaries.
Of
these
the most
important
are
the Com-
mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These were
founded
in
1960
with a
membership
of about
800,000
persons;
by
1983
they
had over
5
million
members,
or more than half
the
entire
population
(and
about
80%
of
the
adult
population).
The
specific
goals
have been
many
and
have variedsomewhat
over
time:
e.g. vigi-
lance,
local
government, public
health,
civil
defense;
of
which
the
major
continuing
theme has been
vigilance.
CDRs exist
to inte-
grate
Cubans
nto the
Revolution.
Being integrated
s,
in
effect,
a
requirement ornormallife in Cuba,whateverone'sfeelings toward
revolutionary
rule
and
policies
... even former
members of the
pre-
revolutionaryupper
class,
still
living
in
Cuba
in
mansions
with do-
mestic
servants,
have been
reported belonging
to a
committee,
be-
cause
being
a member
makes
life
easier
(Dominguez,
1978:
264).
By
contrast,
nonintegration
s more than
inconvenient,
it
is
danger-
ous.
Nonintegrated
ersons
are
publicly
vilified;
CDR
militants
hold
repudiation
meetings'
to
chastise,browbeat,
and
humiliate
those
who
want to leave
Cuba.
Merely
not
belonging
to
the
CDRs s
a political act. In a society that insists on revolutionarymilitancy,
those who
stand
on the sidelines
are vulnerable
(Domfnguez,
1978:
260-267;
del
Aguila,
1984:154-156).
With these
tools,
the
regime
does not need to use a
large
amount
of
physical
violence,
or
imprison large
numbers
of
people,
in
order
to
operate
a
totalitarian
ystem.
Of
course,
politically
moti-
vated
violence,
imprisonment,
and torture
have
been used
by
the re-
gime
on thousands
of
Cubans.
However,
he circumstances
just
de-
scribed, plus the U.S. escape hatch hroughwhich a full tenth of
the
population
have
passed,
have
kept
the amount of
overt
physical
violence
and
imprisonment
in
Cuba
to
relatively
low
levels com-
pared
to
regimes
in
the
USSR,
he
PRC,
or
Cambodia.
Nevertheless,
the
system
is no less totalitarian
or
all
that.
Moreover,
here are
other
effective forms of
violence
besides
political
murderand
physical
or-
ture and
imprisonment,
a
point
made
frequently
against
capitalist
culture but seldom
against
Cuba,
where
it
applies
with even
greater
force.
Culture
and Education
Nowhereare
the
influences
of the Soviet
model
of
development
in
Cuba
more
evident,
and
more
contrary
o
human
well
being,
than
in
the cultural
and
educational
spheres.
Intellectual
work at all
levels
is
intensely politicized.
All
cultural,
artistic,
and educational
to the
regime
and
its
objectives
and
to
supervise
and
punish
possible
counterrevolutionaries.
Of
these
the most
important
are
the Com-
mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These were
founded
in
1960
with a
membership
of about
800,000
persons;
by
1983
they
had over
5
million
members,
or more than half
the
entire
population
(and
about
80%
of
the
adult
population).
The
specific
goals
have been
many
and
have variedsomewhat
over
time:
e.g. vigi-
lance,
local
government, public
health,
civil
defense;
of
which
the
major
continuing
theme has been
vigilance.
CDRs exist
to inte-
grate
Cubans
nto the
Revolution.
Being integrated
s,
in
effect,
a
requirement ornormallife in Cuba,whateverone'sfeelings toward
revolutionary
rule
and
policies
... even former
members of the
pre-
revolutionaryupper
class,
still
living
in
Cuba
in
mansions
with do-
mestic
servants,
have been
reported belonging
to a
committee,
be-
cause
being
a member
makes
life
easier
(Dominguez,
1978:
264).
By
contrast,
nonintegration
s more than
inconvenient,
it
is
danger-
ous.
Nonintegrated
ersons
are
publicly
vilified;
CDR
militants
hold
repudiation
meetings'
to
chastise,browbeat,
and
humiliate
those
who
want to leave
Cuba.
Merely
not
belonging
to
the
CDRs s
a political act. In a society that insists on revolutionarymilitancy,
those who
stand
on the sidelines
are vulnerable
(Domfnguez,
1978:
260-267;
del
Aguila,
1984:154-156).
With these
tools,
the
regime
does not need to use a
large
amount
of
physical
violence,
or
imprison large
numbers
of
people,
in
order
to
operate
a
totalitarian
ystem.
Of
course,
politically
moti-
vated
violence,
imprisonment,
and torture
have
been used
by
the re-
gime
on thousands
of
Cubans.
However,
he circumstances
just
de-
scribed, plus the U.S. escape hatch hroughwhich a full tenth of
the
population
have
passed,
have
kept
the amount of
overt
physical
violence
and
imprisonment
in
Cuba
to
relatively
low
levels com-
pared
to
regimes
in
the
USSR,
he
PRC,
or
Cambodia.
Nevertheless,
the
system
is no less totalitarian
or
all
that.
Moreover,
here are
other
effective forms of
violence
besides
political
murderand
physical
or-
ture and
imprisonment,
a
point
made
frequently
against
capitalist
culture but seldom
against
Cuba,
where
it
applies
with even
greater
force.
Culture
and Education
Nowhereare
the
influences
of the Soviet
model
of
development
in
Cuba
more
evident,
and
more
contrary
o
human
well
being,
than
in
the cultural
and
educational
spheres.
Intellectual
work at all
levels
is
intensely politicized.
All
cultural,
artistic,
and educational
to the
regime
and
its
objectives
and
to
supervise
and
punish
possible
counterrevolutionaries.
Of
these
the most
important
are
the Com-
mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These were
founded
in
1960
with a
membership
of about
800,000
persons;
by
1983
they
had over
5
million
members,
or more than half
the
entire
population
(and
about
80%
of
the
adult
population).
The
specific
goals
have been
many
and
have variedsomewhat
over
time:
e.g. vigi-
lance,
local
government, public
health,
civil
defense;
of
which
the
major
continuing
theme has been
vigilance.
CDRs exist
to inte-
grate
Cubans
nto the
Revolution.
Being integrated
s,
in
effect,
a
requirement ornormallife in Cuba,whateverone'sfeelings toward
revolutionary
rule
and
policies
... even former
members of the
pre-
revolutionaryupper
class,
still
living
in
Cuba
in
mansions
with do-
mestic
servants,
have been
reported belonging
to a
committee,
be-
cause
being
a member
makes
life
easier
(Dominguez,
1978:
264).
By
contrast,
nonintegration
s more than
inconvenient,
it
is
danger-
ous.
Nonintegrated
ersons
are
publicly
vilified;
CDR
militants
hold
repudiation
meetings'
to
chastise,browbeat,
and
humiliate
those
who
want to leave
Cuba.
Merely
not
belonging
to
the
CDRs s
a political act. In a society that insists on revolutionarymilitancy,
those who
stand
on the sidelines
are vulnerable
(Domfnguez,
1978:
260-267;
del
Aguila,
1984:154-156).
With these
tools,
the
regime
does not need to use a
large
amount
of
physical
violence,
or
imprison large
numbers
of
people,
in
order
to
operate
a
totalitarian
ystem.
Of
course,
politically
moti-
vated
violence,
imprisonment,
and torture
have
been used
by
the re-
gime
on thousands
of
Cubans.
However,
he circumstances
just
de-
scribed, plus the U.S. escape hatch hroughwhich a full tenth of
the
population
have
passed,
have
kept
the amount of
overt
physical
violence
and
imprisonment
in
Cuba
to
relatively
low
levels com-
pared
to
regimes
in
the
USSR,
he
PRC,
or
Cambodia.
Nevertheless,
the
system
is no less totalitarian
or
all
that.
Moreover,
here are
other
effective forms of
violence
besides
political
murderand
physical
or-
ture and
imprisonment,
a
point
made
frequently
against
capitalist
culture but seldom
against
Cuba,
where
it
applies
with even
greater
force.
Culture
and Education
Nowhereare
the
influences
of the Soviet
model
of
development
in
Cuba
more
evident,
and
more
contrary
o
human
well
being,
than
in
the cultural
and
educational
spheres.
Intellectual
work at all
levels
is
intensely politicized.
All
cultural,
artistic,
and educational
to the
regime
and
its
objectives
and
to
supervise
and
punish
possible
counterrevolutionaries.
Of
these
the most
important
are
the Com-
mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These were
founded
in
1960
with a
membership
of about
800,000
persons;
by
1983
they
had over
5
million
members,
or more than half
the
entire
population
(and
about
80%
of
the
adult
population).
The
specific
goals
have been
many
and
have variedsomewhat
over
time:
e.g. vigi-
lance,
local
government, public
health,
civil
defense;
of
which
the
major
continuing
theme has been
vigilance.
CDRs exist
to inte-
grate
Cubans
nto the
Revolution.
Being integrated
s,
in
effect,
a
requirement ornormallife in Cuba,whateverone'sfeelings toward
revolutionary
rule
and
policies
... even former
members of the
pre-
revolutionaryupper
class,
still
living
in
Cuba
in
mansions
with do-
mestic
servants,
have been
reported belonging
to a
committee,
be-
cause
being
a member
makes
life
easier
(Dominguez,
1978:
264).
By
contrast,
nonintegration
s more than
inconvenient,
it
is
danger-
ous.
Nonintegrated
ersons
are
publicly
vilified;
CDR
militants
hold
repudiation
meetings'
to
chastise,browbeat,
and
humiliate
those
who
want to leave
Cuba.
Merely
not
belonging
to
the
CDRs s
a political act. In a society that insists on revolutionarymilitancy,
those who
stand
on the sidelines
are vulnerable
(Domfnguez,
1978:
260-267;
del
Aguila,
1984:154-156).
With these
tools,
the
regime
does not need to use a
large
amount
of
physical
violence,
or
imprison large
numbers
of
people,
in
order
to
operate
a
totalitarian
ystem.
Of
course,
politically
moti-
vated
violence,
imprisonment,
and torture
have
been used
by
the re-
gime
on thousands
of
Cubans.
However,
he circumstances
just
de-
scribed, plus the U.S. escape hatch hroughwhich a full tenth of
the
population
have
passed,
have
kept
the amount of
overt
physical
violence
and
imprisonment
in
Cuba
to
relatively
low
levels com-
pared
to
regimes
in
the
USSR,
he
PRC,
or
Cambodia.
Nevertheless,
the
system
is no less totalitarian
or
all
that.
Moreover,
here are
other
effective forms of
violence
besides
political
murderand
physical
or-
ture and
imprisonment,
a
point
made
frequently
against
capitalist
culture but seldom
against
Cuba,
where
it
applies
with even
greater
force.
Culture
and Education
Nowhereare
the
influences
of the Soviet
model
of
development
in
Cuba
more
evident,
and
more
contrary
o
human
well
being,
than
in
the cultural
and
educational
spheres.
Intellectual
work at all
levels
is
intensely politicized.
All
cultural,
artistic,
and educational
82222
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8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
activity
s evaluated
and
rewarded
exclusively
in
terms of
its contri-
bution
to
the
Revolution,
as
judged by
the
political
elite.
Intellectual
independence
and criticism
of
the
regime
are met with
official con-
tempt,
mass
humiliation,
and
various forms of
psychological
and
physical
repression.
The
most notorious
examples
are
those
of the
poets
Heberto Padilla and
Armando Valladaresand the dramatist
Anton
Arrufat,
ut
they
are
only
the
tip
of the
iceberg
(See
Ripoll,
1982).
Today
the vast
majority
(one
estimate is
95%)
of Cuban
writers
and creative
artistsare
in
exile. Mostare not
ex-Batistianos;
most
op-
posed Batista.Manywereactively nvolvedin the fightagainsthis re-
gime,
and
some even had
positions
in
the
Castro
government
n
the
early
years.
When the cultural
regimentation
and
dogmatism
became
intolerable,
hey
left.
Many
of these
exiles have
made,
and
are now
making,distinguished
contributions
n
the cultural
sphere.
One has
only
to
mention,
for
example,
the works
of
a
Carlos
Franqui,
a
Cabrera
nfante,
or
a dozen
distinguished
social
scientists.On the is-
land
itself,
however,
he
picture
is
very
different.
As
Thomas
and his
colleagues report:
In
1964,
in a
famous interview n
Paris,
novelist
Alejo Carpentier
was asked
why
he
had
not
written a novel
about the
Cuban Revolu-
tion.
He
answered that
unfortunatley
he had
been raised
and
educat-
ed
long
before
the Revolution
and the
burden
of
creating
newrevolu-
tionary
novels would have to fall on the
shoulders
of a
younger
generation.
'Twenty
ears
from
now,'
he
affirmed,
we will be
able to
read the
literaryproduction
of the new
Cuba.'Those
20
years
have
elapsed.
Tragically,
he Cuban revolution cannot offer a
single
nota-
ble
novelist,
a
famous
poet,
a
penetrating
essayist,
not even a
fresh
contributionto Marxistanalysis... Censorshipand fear havesmoth-
ered
creativity
n
Cuba.What s left on the
island
is
merely
the
inces-
sant
voice of official
propaganda
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42-43).
The
situation
would seem
to
be better
at the level of
mass edu-
cation.
However,
as
is often the
case,
impressive
figures regarding
aggregate
gains
in
educational
opportunity
are
misleading.
For
one
thing,
despite
claims to
the
contrary,
igher
education remainselit-
ist
in
Cuba
Thomas
et
a
1984:
p.
41).
Tests
of
political
loyalty
and
political
achievement are
applied
at all levels
of
the
educational
sys-
tem to determinewho has access to the best facilities and training.
Second,
the
quality
of
education has not
kept
pace
with
the
in-
crease
in
the
overall
quantity
of
educational
opportunity,
which,
as
noted
earlier,
were
already
relatively
great
before
1959.
To
the
con-
trary,
he
dogmatic,
politicized
characterof
education
has
impover-
activity
s evaluated
and
rewarded
exclusively
in
terms of
its contri-
bution
to
the
Revolution,
as
judged by
the
political
elite.
Intellectual
independence
and criticism
of
the
regime
are met with
official con-
tempt,
mass
humiliation,
and
various forms of
psychological
and
physical
repression.
The
most notorious
examples
are
those
of the
poets
Heberto Padilla and
Armando Valladaresand the dramatist
Anton
Arrufat,
ut
they
are
only
the
tip
of the
iceberg
(See
Ripoll,
1982).
Today
the vast
majority
(one
estimate is
95%)
of Cuban
writers
and creative
artistsare
in
exile. Mostare not
ex-Batistianos;
most
op-
posed Batista.Manywereactively nvolvedin the fightagainsthis re-
gime,
and
some even had
positions
in
the
Castro
government
n
the
early
years.
When the cultural
regimentation
and
dogmatism
became
intolerable,
hey
left.
Many
of these
exiles have
made,
and
are now
making,distinguished
contributions
n
the cultural
sphere.
One has
only
to
mention,
for
example,
the works
of
a
Carlos
Franqui,
a
Cabrera
nfante,
or
a dozen
distinguished
social
scientists.On the is-
land
itself,
however,
he
picture
is
very
different.
As
Thomas
and his
colleagues report:
In
1964,
in a
famous interview n
Paris,
novelist
Alejo Carpentier
was asked
why
he
had
not
written a novel
about the
Cuban Revolu-
tion.
He
answered that
unfortunatley
he had
been raised
and
educat-
ed
long
before
the Revolution
and the
burden
of
creating
newrevolu-
tionary
novels would have to fall on the
shoulders
of a
younger
generation.
'Twenty
ears
from
now,'
he
affirmed,
we will be
able to
read the
literaryproduction
of the new
Cuba.'Those
20
years
have
elapsed.
Tragically,
he Cuban revolution cannot offer a
single
nota-
ble
novelist,
a
famous
poet,
a
penetrating
essayist,
not even a
fresh
contributionto Marxistanalysis... Censorshipand fear havesmoth-
ered
creativity
n
Cuba.What s left on the
island
is
merely
the
inces-
sant
voice of official
propaganda
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42-43).
The
situation
would seem
to
be better
at the level of
mass edu-
cation.
However,
as
is often the
case,
impressive
figures regarding
aggregate
gains
in
educational
opportunity
are
misleading.
For
one
thing,
despite
claims to
the
contrary,
igher
education remainselit-
ist
in
Cuba
Thomas
et
a
1984:
p.
41).
Tests
of
political
loyalty
and
political
achievement are
applied
at all levels
of
the
educational
sys-
tem to determinewho has access to the best facilities and training.
Second,
the
quality
of
education has not
kept
pace
with
the
in-
crease
in
the
overall
quantity
of
educational
opportunity,
which,
as
noted
earlier,
were
already
relatively
great
before
1959.
To
the
con-
trary,
he
dogmatic,
politicized
characterof
education
has
impover-
activity
s evaluated
and
rewarded
exclusively
in
terms of
its contri-
bution
to
the
Revolution,
as
judged by
the
political
elite.
Intellectual
independence
and criticism
of
the
regime
are met with
official con-
tempt,
mass
humiliation,
and
various forms of
psychological
and
physical
repression.
The
most notorious
examples
are
those
of the
poets
Heberto Padilla and
Armando Valladaresand the dramatist
Anton
Arrufat,
ut
they
are
only
the
tip
of the
iceberg
(See
Ripoll,
1982).
Today
the vast
majority
(one
estimate is
95%)
of Cuban
writers
and creative
artistsare
in
exile. Mostare not
ex-Batistianos;
most
op-
posed Batista.Manywereactively nvolvedin the fightagainsthis re-
gime,
and
some even had
positions
in
the
Castro
government
n
the
early
years.
When the cultural
regimentation
and
dogmatism
became
intolerable,
hey
left.
Many
of these
exiles have
made,
and
are now
making,distinguished
contributions
n
the cultural
sphere.
One has
only
to
mention,
for
example,
the works
of
a
Carlos
Franqui,
a
Cabrera
nfante,
or
a dozen
distinguished
social
scientists.On the is-
land
itself,
however,
he
picture
is
very
different.
As
Thomas
and his
colleagues report:
In
1964,
in a
famous interview n
Paris,
novelist
Alejo Carpentier
was asked
why
he
had
not
written a novel
about the
Cuban Revolu-
tion.
He
answered that
unfortunatley
he had
been raised
and
educat-
ed
long
before
the Revolution
and the
burden
of
creating
newrevolu-
tionary
novels would have to fall on the
shoulders
of a
younger
generation.
'Twenty
ears
from
now,'
he
affirmed,
we will be
able to
read the
literaryproduction
of the new
Cuba.'Those
20
years
have
elapsed.
Tragically,
he Cuban revolution cannot offer a
single
nota-
ble
novelist,
a
famous
poet,
a
penetrating
essayist,
not even a
fresh
contributionto Marxistanalysis... Censorshipand fear havesmoth-
ered
creativity
n
Cuba.What s left on the
island
is
merely
the
inces-
sant
voice of official
propaganda
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42-43).
The
situation
would seem
to
be better
at the level of
mass edu-
cation.
However,
as
is often the
case,
impressive
figures regarding
aggregate
gains
in
educational
opportunity
are
misleading.
For
one
thing,
despite
claims to
the
contrary,
igher
education remainselit-
ist
in
Cuba
Thomas
et
a
1984:
p.
41).
Tests
of
political
loyalty
and
political
achievement are
applied
at all levels
of
the
educational
sys-
tem to determinewho has access to the best facilities and training.
Second,
the
quality
of
education has not
kept
pace
with
the
in-
crease
in
the
overall
quantity
of
educational
opportunity,
which,
as
noted
earlier,
were
already
relatively
great
before
1959.
To
the
con-
trary,
he
dogmatic,
politicized
characterof
education
has
impover-
activity
s evaluated
and
rewarded
exclusively
in
terms of
its contri-
bution
to
the
Revolution,
as
judged by
the
political
elite.
Intellectual
independence
and criticism
of
the
regime
are met with
official con-
tempt,
mass
humiliation,
and
various forms of
psychological
and
physical
repression.
The
most notorious
examples
are
those
of the
poets
Heberto Padilla and
Armando Valladaresand the dramatist
Anton
Arrufat,
ut
they
are
only
the
tip
of the
iceberg
(See
Ripoll,
1982).
Today
the vast
majority
(one
estimate is
95%)
of Cuban
writers
and creative
artistsare
in
exile. Mostare not
ex-Batistianos;
most
op-
posed Batista.Manywereactively nvolvedin the fightagainsthis re-
gime,
and
some even had
positions
in
the
Castro
government
n
the
early
years.
When the cultural
regimentation
and
dogmatism
became
intolerable,
hey
left.
Many
of these
exiles have
made,
and
are now
making,distinguished
contributions
n
the cultural
sphere.
One has
only
to
mention,
for
example,
the works
of
a
Carlos
Franqui,
a
Cabrera
nfante,
or
a dozen
distinguished
social
scientists.On the is-
land
itself,
however,
he
picture
is
very
different.
As
Thomas
and his
colleagues report:
In
1964,
in a
famous interview n
Paris,
novelist
Alejo Carpentier
was asked
why
he
had
not
written a novel
about the
Cuban Revolu-
tion.
He
answered that
unfortunatley
he had
been raised
and
educat-
ed
long
before
the Revolution
and the
burden
of
creating
newrevolu-
tionary
novels would have to fall on the
shoulders
of a
younger
generation.
'Twenty
ears
from
now,'
he
affirmed,
we will be
able to
read the
literaryproduction
of the new
Cuba.'Those
20
years
have
elapsed.
Tragically,
he Cuban revolution cannot offer a
single
nota-
ble
novelist,
a
famous
poet,
a
penetrating
essayist,
not even a
fresh
contributionto Marxistanalysis... Censorshipand fear havesmoth-
ered
creativity
n
Cuba.What s left on the
island
is
merely
the
inces-
sant
voice of official
propaganda
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42-43).
The
situation
would seem
to
be better
at the level of
mass edu-
cation.
However,
as
is often the
case,
impressive
figures regarding
aggregate
gains
in
educational
opportunity
are
misleading.
For
one
thing,
despite
claims to
the
contrary,
igher
education remainselit-
ist
in
Cuba
Thomas
et
a
1984:
p.
41).
Tests
of
political
loyalty
and
political
achievement are
applied
at all levels
of
the
educational
sys-
tem to determinewho has access to the best facilities and training.
Second,
the
quality
of
education has not
kept
pace
with
the
in-
crease
in
the
overall
quantity
of
educational
opportunity,
which,
as
noted
earlier,
were
already
relatively
great
before
1959.
To
the
con-
trary,
he
dogmatic,
politicized
characterof
education
has
impover-
83333
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/capitalist-cuban-case-pdf 27/35
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD
AFFAIRS
ished its
quality,
which is
now inferior
not
only
to what it was before
1959
but
is also inferior o its
counterparts
oday
in
democraticcoun-
tries such as CostaRica.Whenthe liberalU.S.
Congressman
Stephen
Solarz
(New York)
visited
Cuba
in
1978,
he
met with a
group
of
16
students at
the
University
of Havana.
According
to
journalist
Strobe
Talbott,
he
studentswere
impressive
in
delivering
set
pieces
con-
sistent
with
current
government
policy,
but
on
subjects
where the
government's
ine was not
yet clearly
defined,
students and
teachers
alike were
intellectually
ncapacitated.
At
the
end,
...
Solarz hanked
(his
hosts)
for a
revealing
demonstrationof 'democraticcentralism'
at work. The students seemed unawareof his irony (Talbott,1978:
31).
Scholarlyanalyses
of Cubaneducation confirm
this
journalistic
impression. According
to a
very sympathetic
study
of
The
Enter-
prise
of
History
n
Socialist Cuba:
As
long
as
problems persist
in
Cuba
(and
they
do
persist),
as
long
as
the
security
of the Revolution s
challenged
from
without,
the
emphasis
will
continue to
fall
on
the exhortation to
revolutionary
duty
and
patriotic
sacrifice.
Appreciation
of the
present,
together
with a recognition of the achievements of the Revolution,require
awarenessof
a certain version
of
the
past.
It is this central
task
that
Cuban
historiography
s
given.
It
is with the old
past
that the new
present
is
compared,
a
comparison
thatseeks to underscore
the vices
of
capitalism
and
the
virtues
of
socialism. The recent
literaturehas
examined the
nature
of
capitalism
in
prerevolutionary
Cuba,
an in-
quiry
that
begins
with
the
Spanish conquest
and
emphasizes
exploi-
tation,
corruption,
and
oppression
in
the
old
regime
-
in
short,
a
chronicle of how
truly
bad
the old
days
were.
The achievements
ofthe
Revolution,
by implication,
are
thereby
et
off
in
relief-
accomplish-
ments never to be taken for
granted
(Perez, 1985: 4;
emphases
added).
At
the level
of
secondary
education,
Cuban
officials
themselves
have
conceded
publicly
various
shortcomings
in
quality:
shoddy
constructionand
durability
of school
buildings
and
facilities,
rising
dropout
rates,
increases
in
cheating
on
the
part
of students and
teachers
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42).
The Militarizationof Cuban Society
Regimentation
nd
politicization
of
education
and
culture
have
parallels
in the militarization
of
society,
which,
in
turn,
has both in-
ternal
and external
aspects.
Militarization
f Cuban
society
is
partly
rooted
in
the
guerrilla
experience
that defeated
Batista.
Concepts
developed
and habits
ished its
quality,
which is
now inferior
not
only
to what it was before
1959
but
is also inferior o its
counterparts
oday
in
democraticcoun-
tries such as CostaRica.Whenthe liberalU.S.
Congressman
Stephen
Solarz
(New York)
visited
Cuba
in
1978,
he
met with a
group
of
16
students at
the
University
of Havana.
According
to
journalist
Strobe
Talbott,
he
studentswere
impressive
in
delivering
set
pieces
con-
sistent
with
current
government
policy,
but
on
subjects
where the
government's
ine was not
yet clearly
defined,
students and
teachers
alike were
intellectually
ncapacitated.
At
the
end,
...
Solarz hanked
(his
hosts)
for a
revealing
demonstrationof 'democraticcentralism'
at work. The students seemed unawareof his irony (Talbott,1978:
31).
Scholarlyanalyses
of Cubaneducation confirm
this
journalistic
impression. According
to a
very sympathetic
study
of
The
Enter-
prise
of
History
n
Socialist Cuba:
As
long
as
problems persist
in
Cuba
(and
they
do
persist),
as
long
as
the
security
of the Revolution s
challenged
from
without,
the
emphasis
will
continue to
fall
on
the exhortation to
revolutionary
duty
and
patriotic
sacrifice.
Appreciation
of the
present,
together
with a recognition of the achievements of the Revolution,require
awarenessof
a certain version
of
the
past.
It is this central
task
that
Cuban
historiography
s
given.
It
is with the old
past
that the new
present
is
compared,
a
comparison
thatseeks to underscore
the vices
of
capitalism
and
the
virtues
of
socialism. The recent
literaturehas
examined the
nature
of
capitalism
in
prerevolutionary
Cuba,
an in-
quiry
that
begins
with
the
Spanish conquest
and
emphasizes
exploi-
tation,
corruption,
and
oppression
in
the
old
regime
-
in
short,
a
chronicle of how
truly
bad
the old
days
were.
The achievements
ofthe
Revolution,
by implication,
are
thereby
et
off
in
relief-
accomplish-
ments never to be taken for
granted
(Perez, 1985: 4;
emphases
added).
At
the level
of
secondary
education,
Cuban
officials
themselves
have
conceded
publicly
various
shortcomings
in
quality:
shoddy
constructionand
durability
of school
buildings
and
facilities,
rising
dropout
rates,
increases
in
cheating
on
the
part
of students and
teachers
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42).
The Militarizationof Cuban Society
Regimentation
nd
politicization
of
education
and
culture
have
parallels
in the militarization
of
society,
which,
in
turn,
has both in-
ternal
and external
aspects.
Militarization
f Cuban
society
is
partly
rooted
in
the
guerrilla
experience
that defeated
Batista.
Concepts
developed
and habits
ished its
quality,
which is
now inferior
not
only
to what it was before
1959
but
is also inferior o its
counterparts
oday
in
democraticcoun-
tries such as CostaRica.Whenthe liberalU.S.
Congressman
Stephen
Solarz
(New York)
visited
Cuba
in
1978,
he
met with a
group
of
16
students at
the
University
of Havana.
According
to
journalist
Strobe
Talbott,
he
studentswere
impressive
in
delivering
set
pieces
con-
sistent
with
current
government
policy,
but
on
subjects
where the
government's
ine was not
yet clearly
defined,
students and
teachers
alike were
intellectually
ncapacitated.
At
the
end,
...
Solarz hanked
(his
hosts)
for a
revealing
demonstrationof 'democraticcentralism'
at work. The students seemed unawareof his irony (Talbott,1978:
31).
Scholarlyanalyses
of Cubaneducation confirm
this
journalistic
impression. According
to a
very sympathetic
study
of
The
Enter-
prise
of
History
n
Socialist Cuba:
As
long
as
problems persist
in
Cuba
(and
they
do
persist),
as
long
as
the
security
of the Revolution s
challenged
from
without,
the
emphasis
will
continue to
fall
on
the exhortation to
revolutionary
duty
and
patriotic
sacrifice.
Appreciation
of the
present,
together
with a recognition of the achievements of the Revolution,require
awarenessof
a certain version
of
the
past.
It is this central
task
that
Cuban
historiography
s
given.
It
is with the old
past
that the new
present
is
compared,
a
comparison
thatseeks to underscore
the vices
of
capitalism
and
the
virtues
of
socialism. The recent
literaturehas
examined the
nature
of
capitalism
in
prerevolutionary
Cuba,
an in-
quiry
that
begins
with
the
Spanish conquest
and
emphasizes
exploi-
tation,
corruption,
and
oppression
in
the
old
regime
-
in
short,
a
chronicle of how
truly
bad
the old
days
were.
The achievements
ofthe
Revolution,
by implication,
are
thereby
et
off
in
relief-
accomplish-
ments never to be taken for
granted
(Perez, 1985: 4;
emphases
added).
At
the level
of
secondary
education,
Cuban
officials
themselves
have
conceded
publicly
various
shortcomings
in
quality:
shoddy
constructionand
durability
of school
buildings
and
facilities,
rising
dropout
rates,
increases
in
cheating
on
the
part
of students and
teachers
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42).
The Militarizationof Cuban Society
Regimentation
nd
politicization
of
education
and
culture
have
parallels
in the militarization
of
society,
which,
in
turn,
has both in-
ternal
and external
aspects.
Militarization
f Cuban
society
is
partly
rooted
in
the
guerrilla
experience
that defeated
Batista.
Concepts
developed
and habits
ished its
quality,
which is
now inferior
not
only
to what it was before
1959
but
is also inferior o its
counterparts
oday
in
democraticcoun-
tries such as CostaRica.Whenthe liberalU.S.
Congressman
Stephen
Solarz
(New York)
visited
Cuba
in
1978,
he
met with a
group
of
16
students at
the
University
of Havana.
According
to
journalist
Strobe
Talbott,
he
studentswere
impressive
in
delivering
set
pieces
con-
sistent
with
current
government
policy,
but
on
subjects
where the
government's
ine was not
yet clearly
defined,
students and
teachers
alike were
intellectually
ncapacitated.
At
the
end,
...
Solarz hanked
(his
hosts)
for a
revealing
demonstrationof 'democraticcentralism'
at work. The students seemed unawareof his irony (Talbott,1978:
31).
Scholarlyanalyses
of Cubaneducation confirm
this
journalistic
impression. According
to a
very sympathetic
study
of
The
Enter-
prise
of
History
n
Socialist Cuba:
As
long
as
problems persist
in
Cuba
(and
they
do
persist),
as
long
as
the
security
of the Revolution s
challenged
from
without,
the
emphasis
will
continue to
fall
on
the exhortation to
revolutionary
duty
and
patriotic
sacrifice.
Appreciation
of the
present,
together
with a recognition of the achievements of the Revolution,require
awarenessof
a certain version
of
the
past.
It is this central
task
that
Cuban
historiography
s
given.
It
is with the old
past
that the new
present
is
compared,
a
comparison
thatseeks to underscore
the vices
of
capitalism
and
the
virtues
of
socialism. The recent
literaturehas
examined the
nature
of
capitalism
in
prerevolutionary
Cuba,
an in-
quiry
that
begins
with
the
Spanish conquest
and
emphasizes
exploi-
tation,
corruption,
and
oppression
in
the
old
regime
-
in
short,
a
chronicle of how
truly
bad
the old
days
were.
The achievements
ofthe
Revolution,
by implication,
are
thereby
et
off
in
relief-
accomplish-
ments never to be taken for
granted
(Perez, 1985: 4;
emphases
added).
At
the level
of
secondary
education,
Cuban
officials
themselves
have
conceded
publicly
various
shortcomings
in
quality:
shoddy
constructionand
durability
of school
buildings
and
facilities,
rising
dropout
rates,
increases
in
cheating
on
the
part
of students and
teachers
(Thomas
et
al,
1984:
42).
The Militarizationof Cuban Society
Regimentation
nd
politicization
of
education
and
culture
have
parallels
in the militarization
of
society,
which,
in
turn,
has both in-
ternal
and external
aspects.
Militarization
f Cuban
society
is
partly
rooted
in
the
guerrilla
experience
that defeated
Batista.
Concepts
developed
and habits
84444
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8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
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PACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
forged
during
those
years
continue to affect
Cuba,
only they
are now
reinforced and
supplemented by
the
penetration
of
numerous as-
pects
of
the Soviet
model into Cuban
political organizations
and
pro-
cesses. For
example,
in
1980,13
out
of16
members of the
PoliticalBu-
reau
of
the PCC
had been
early guerrilla
ollowers of Fidel and
Raul
Castro
Thomas
etal,
1984:15).
Regular
rmedforces of Cubaare
the
largest
in
all of
Latin
America
with the
possible exception
of
Brazil,
a
country
with
13
times as
many
nhabitants nd
74
times as
much ter-
ritory.
Even
f
Cuba
eels its defense needs are
greater
han does
Bra-
zil,
this
huge
disparity
is
still
notable. There are now
between
200,000 and375,000 membersin Cuba's egulararmed orces.Inad-
dition,
there
are
another
100,000
to
500,000
men
and women in
the
militia,
several thousand
border
guards,
10-15,000
state
securitypo-
lice,
a Youth
Labor
Army
f
100,000,
and severalhundred
thousand
members
of the
military
reserves
(See
del
Aguila,
1985:
160-161;
Thomas
etal,
1984:
57;
Dominguez,
1978:
346-50;
Fagen,
1978a:
77).
If
one adds
to
this the
para-military
spects
of
the
CDRs
and other
mass
organizations,
one
sees
that
virtually
he entire
population
is
militarized
n
one
way
or another.
ndeed,
Castro
has
stated
that,
n-
stead
of a
vote,
he would offer
a
gun
to
every
citizen,
and
he has
said
many
times
that
he
had
created an armed
camp
in his
nation
(Thom-
as et
al,
1984:
57).
All
this
is a far
cry
indeed from the
47,812
poorly-
trained,
ineffective
troops
of Batista's
rmy,navy,
and reserve
forces
at their
greatest
strength (Dominguez,
1978:
346-47)
It is
these facts
that
have
led Thomas
to
say
that,
n
Cuba,
the
emphasis
on war and
weapons,
on
the
importance
of
fighting,
borderson the
psychopath-
ic
(1984:
784).
Foreign
and
Military
Policies
The
subject
of
Cuban
foreign
policy
before
1959
is
complex.
U.S.
government
influence
was
enormous
at
times,
as
the
history
of
the
PlattAmendmentand
many
aspects
of U.S.relationswith
the
gov-
ernments
of Grau
San
Martinand
Fulgencio
Batista
attest. U.S.
pri-
vate interests
also were
very
influential
in
Cuba.
In
these
respects,
among
others,
Cuban
politics
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
United
States. On the other hand, the pluralisticcharacterof U.S.govern-
ment
institutions,
and of its
public-private
relations,
diluted and
complicated
U.S.
influence and
provided political
and
economic
space
or
maneuvering
both within
Cuba and
in
Cuba's
oreign
policy.
The
character
f Soviet nstitutions
and,
therefore,
of Soviet
n-
fluence
on
Cuba,
are
very
different.
Today
Cuba
s much more
tightly
forged
during
those
years
continue to affect
Cuba,
only they
are now
reinforced and
supplemented by
the
penetration
of
numerous as-
pects
of
the Soviet
model into Cuban
political organizations
and
pro-
cesses. For
example,
in
1980,13
out
of16
members of the
PoliticalBu-
reau
of
the PCC
had been
early guerrilla
ollowers of Fidel and
Raul
Castro
Thomas
etal,
1984:15).
Regular
rmedforces of Cubaare
the
largest
in
all of
Latin
America
with the
possible exception
of
Brazil,
a
country
with
13
times as
many
nhabitants nd
74
times as
much ter-
ritory.
Even
f
Cuba
eels its defense needs are
greater
han does
Bra-
zil,
this
huge
disparity
is
still
notable. There are now
between
200,000 and375,000 membersin Cuba's egulararmed orces.Inad-
dition,
there
are
another
100,000
to
500,000
men
and women in
the
militia,
several thousand
border
guards,
10-15,000
state
securitypo-
lice,
a Youth
Labor
Army
f
100,000,
and severalhundred
thousand
members
of the
military
reserves
(See
del
Aguila,
1985:
160-161;
Thomas
etal,
1984:
57;
Dominguez,
1978:
346-50;
Fagen,
1978a:
77).
If
one adds
to
this the
para-military
spects
of
the
CDRs
and other
mass
organizations,
one
sees
that
virtually
he entire
population
is
militarized
n
one
way
or another.
ndeed,
Castro
has
stated
that,
n-
stead
of a
vote,
he would offer
a
gun
to
every
citizen,
and
he has
said
many
times
that
he
had
created an armed
camp
in his
nation
(Thom-
as et
al,
1984:
57).
All
this
is a far
cry
indeed from the
47,812
poorly-
trained,
ineffective
troops
of Batista's
rmy,navy,
and reserve
forces
at their
greatest
strength (Dominguez,
1978:
346-47)
It is
these facts
that
have
led Thomas
to
say
that,
n
Cuba,
the
emphasis
on war and
weapons,
on
the
importance
of
fighting,
borderson the
psychopath-
ic
(1984:
784).
Foreign
and
Military
Policies
The
subject
of
Cuban
foreign
policy
before
1959
is
complex.
U.S.
government
influence
was
enormous
at
times,
as
the
history
of
the
PlattAmendmentand
many
aspects
of U.S.relationswith
the
gov-
ernments
of Grau
San
Martinand
Fulgencio
Batista
attest. U.S.
pri-
vate interests
also were
very
influential
in
Cuba.
In
these
respects,
among
others,
Cuban
politics
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
United
States. On the other hand, the pluralisticcharacterof U.S.govern-
ment
institutions,
and of its
public-private
relations,
diluted and
complicated
U.S.
influence and
provided political
and
economic
space
or
maneuvering
both within
Cuba and
in
Cuba's
oreign
policy.
The
character
f Soviet nstitutions
and,
therefore,
of Soviet
n-
fluence
on
Cuba,
are
very
different.
Today
Cuba
s much more
tightly
forged
during
those
years
continue to affect
Cuba,
only they
are now
reinforced and
supplemented by
the
penetration
of
numerous as-
pects
of
the Soviet
model into Cuban
political organizations
and
pro-
cesses. For
example,
in
1980,13
out
of16
members of the
PoliticalBu-
reau
of
the PCC
had been
early guerrilla
ollowers of Fidel and
Raul
Castro
Thomas
etal,
1984:15).
Regular
rmedforces of Cubaare
the
largest
in
all of
Latin
America
with the
possible exception
of
Brazil,
a
country
with
13
times as
many
nhabitants nd
74
times as
much ter-
ritory.
Even
f
Cuba
eels its defense needs are
greater
han does
Bra-
zil,
this
huge
disparity
is
still
notable. There are now
between
200,000 and375,000 membersin Cuba's egulararmed orces.Inad-
dition,
there
are
another
100,000
to
500,000
men
and women in
the
militia,
several thousand
border
guards,
10-15,000
state
securitypo-
lice,
a Youth
Labor
Army
f
100,000,
and severalhundred
thousand
members
of the
military
reserves
(See
del
Aguila,
1985:
160-161;
Thomas
etal,
1984:
57;
Dominguez,
1978:
346-50;
Fagen,
1978a:
77).
If
one adds
to
this the
para-military
spects
of
the
CDRs
and other
mass
organizations,
one
sees
that
virtually
he entire
population
is
militarized
n
one
way
or another.
ndeed,
Castro
has
stated
that,
n-
stead
of a
vote,
he would offer
a
gun
to
every
citizen,
and
he has
said
many
times
that
he
had
created an armed
camp
in his
nation
(Thom-
as et
al,
1984:
57).
All
this
is a far
cry
indeed from the
47,812
poorly-
trained,
ineffective
troops
of Batista's
rmy,navy,
and reserve
forces
at their
greatest
strength (Dominguez,
1978:
346-47)
It is
these facts
that
have
led Thomas
to
say
that,
n
Cuba,
the
emphasis
on war and
weapons,
on
the
importance
of
fighting,
borderson the
psychopath-
ic
(1984:
784).
Foreign
and
Military
Policies
The
subject
of
Cuban
foreign
policy
before
1959
is
complex.
U.S.
government
influence
was
enormous
at
times,
as
the
history
of
the
PlattAmendmentand
many
aspects
of U.S.relationswith
the
gov-
ernments
of Grau
San
Martinand
Fulgencio
Batista
attest. U.S.
pri-
vate interests
also were
very
influential
in
Cuba.
In
these
respects,
among
others,
Cuban
politics
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
United
States. On the other hand, the pluralisticcharacterof U.S.govern-
ment
institutions,
and of its
public-private
relations,
diluted and
complicated
U.S.
influence and
provided political
and
economic
space
or
maneuvering
both within
Cuba and
in
Cuba's
oreign
policy.
The
character
f Soviet nstitutions
and,
therefore,
of Soviet
n-
fluence
on
Cuba,
are
very
different.
Today
Cuba
s much more
tightly
forged
during
those
years
continue to affect
Cuba,
only they
are now
reinforced and
supplemented by
the
penetration
of
numerous as-
pects
of
the Soviet
model into Cuban
political organizations
and
pro-
cesses. For
example,
in
1980,13
out
of16
members of the
PoliticalBu-
reau
of
the PCC
had been
early guerrilla
ollowers of Fidel and
Raul
Castro
Thomas
etal,
1984:15).
Regular
rmedforces of Cubaare
the
largest
in
all of
Latin
America
with the
possible exception
of
Brazil,
a
country
with
13
times as
many
nhabitants nd
74
times as
much ter-
ritory.
Even
f
Cuba
eels its defense needs are
greater
han does
Bra-
zil,
this
huge
disparity
is
still
notable. There are now
between
200,000 and375,000 membersin Cuba's egulararmed orces.Inad-
dition,
there
are
another
100,000
to
500,000
men
and women in
the
militia,
several thousand
border
guards,
10-15,000
state
securitypo-
lice,
a Youth
Labor
Army
f
100,000,
and severalhundred
thousand
members
of the
military
reserves
(See
del
Aguila,
1985:
160-161;
Thomas
etal,
1984:
57;
Dominguez,
1978:
346-50;
Fagen,
1978a:
77).
If
one adds
to
this the
para-military
spects
of
the
CDRs
and other
mass
organizations,
one
sees
that
virtually
he entire
population
is
militarized
n
one
way
or another.
ndeed,
Castro
has
stated
that,
n-
stead
of a
vote,
he would offer
a
gun
to
every
citizen,
and
he has
said
many
times
that
he
had
created an armed
camp
in his
nation
(Thom-
as et
al,
1984:
57).
All
this
is a far
cry
indeed from the
47,812
poorly-
trained,
ineffective
troops
of Batista's
rmy,navy,
and reserve
forces
at their
greatest
strength (Dominguez,
1978:
346-47)
It is
these facts
that
have
led Thomas
to
say
that,
n
Cuba,
the
emphasis
on war and
weapons,
on
the
importance
of
fighting,
borderson the
psychopath-
ic
(1984:
784).
Foreign
and
Military
Policies
The
subject
of
Cuban
foreign
policy
before
1959
is
complex.
U.S.
government
influence
was
enormous
at
times,
as
the
history
of
the
PlattAmendmentand
many
aspects
of U.S.relationswith
the
gov-
ernments
of Grau
San
Martinand
Fulgencio
Batista
attest. U.S.
pri-
vate interests
also were
very
influential
in
Cuba.
In
these
respects,
among
others,
Cuban
politics
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
United
States. On the other hand, the pluralisticcharacterof U.S.govern-
ment
institutions,
and of its
public-private
relations,
diluted and
complicated
U.S.
influence and
provided political
and
economic
space
or
maneuvering
both within
Cuba and
in
Cuba's
oreign
policy.
The
character
f Soviet nstitutions
and,
therefore,
of Soviet
n-
fluence
on
Cuba,
are
very
different.
Today
Cuba
s much more
tightly
85555
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JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
OURNAL
OF INTERAMERICANSTUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
tied
to the Soviet
government_
n its
foreign
and domestic
policies
than it ever was
to the
United
States
government.
In
fact,
the
majorconstrainton Soviet influence is its
physical
distance from Cuba.
This
leaves both
the
USSRand
Cubasomewhat
vulnerable.Ironical-
ly,physical
distance is one
of
the factors
dependencia
thinkers
reject
as
relevant
o
dependency
because
it is
not,
per
se,
an
aspect
of their
touchstone
distinction between
capitalism
and
socialism.
Soviet
nfluence was
insignificant
at the
beginning
of
the Revo-
lution.
It
became
important
only
about
18
months
after
Castro
came
to
power
in
January
959
(Blasier,
1983:
100-103).
Through
most
of
the 1960sthe relationshipgrew,but there were also majordifferenc-
es between
the
Sovietand
Cuban
governments
on domestic and
for-
eign
policies.
The Cubans veered from one
extreme to
another
in
their
economic
policies
and favored
nsurrectionary
iolence
against
established
governments
in
LatinAmerican countries. The Soviets
opposed
both these tendencies. In the
1970s,
however,
differences
declined between the Cuban and Soviet
governments
in
both
do-
mestic and
foreign policy
areas.
Domestically,
since
1970
the
Cuban
polity,
economy,
and
society
have
increasingly
been
reorganized
along
Soviet lines. In the international
sphere,
particularly
ince
1968,
the
Cuban
government
has
accepted
the Soviet
government
as
its
senior
partner
n
foreign
policy.
Thus,
Cuba
has
supported
Sovi-
et
policy
in
Czechoslovakia
(1968),
Afghanistan
(1979),
Poland
(1981),
Angola
(1979),
Ethiopia
1979)
Nicaragua
1979),
and
El
Sal-
vador
(1979).
The Cubanshave
been
an
effective
sponsor
of Soviet
policies
in
Africaand
Central
Americaand have served as active
sup-
porters
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement
of
Third World
countries.
Theyhave also sided with the USSRagainstthe People'sRepublicof
China
(PRC).
Since the late
1960s
there has
been
no
important
oreign policy
question
on
which the
Cubanshave
publicly
challenged
the Soviet
Union.
On
the
contrary,
he
Cubans
have followed
the
Soviet ead
as
loyally
as
any
East
European country
(perhaps
more
loyally
than
most)
even
on issues as distastefulas
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and
Poland.
If
privatedisagreements
or
qualifications
exist,
they
are
not
expressed
publicly.
The scale and scope of Cuban nvolvementwith Sovietforeign
and
militarypolicies
are
astonishing
for a
country
of
10
million
peo-
ple
which never
imagined,
let alone
implemented,
such levels
of
militaryactivity
n
the
context of
capitalist
dependency.
Cubanmili-
taryoperations
n
Africa
and the
Middle East
exploded
in
magnitude
tied
to the Soviet
government_
n its
foreign
and domestic
policies
than it ever was
to the
United
States
government.
In
fact,
the
majorconstrainton Soviet influence is its
physical
distance from Cuba.
This
leaves both
the
USSRand
Cubasomewhat
vulnerable.Ironical-
ly,physical
distance is one
of
the factors
dependencia
thinkers
reject
as
relevant
o
dependency
because
it is
not,
per
se,
an
aspect
of their
touchstone
distinction between
capitalism
and
socialism.
Soviet
nfluence was
insignificant
at the
beginning
of
the Revo-
lution.
It
became
important
only
about
18
months
after
Castro
came
to
power
in
January
959
(Blasier,
1983:
100-103).
Through
most
of
the 1960sthe relationshipgrew,but there were also majordifferenc-
es between
the
Sovietand
Cuban
governments
on domestic and
for-
eign
policies.
The Cubans veered from one
extreme to
another
in
their
economic
policies
and favored
nsurrectionary
iolence
against
established
governments
in
LatinAmerican countries. The Soviets
opposed
both these tendencies. In the
1970s,
however,
differences
declined between the Cuban and Soviet
governments
in
both
do-
mestic and
foreign policy
areas.
Domestically,
since
1970
the
Cuban
polity,
economy,
and
society
have
increasingly
been
reorganized
along
Soviet lines. In the international
sphere,
particularly
ince
1968,
the
Cuban
government
has
accepted
the Soviet
government
as
its
senior
partner
n
foreign
policy.
Thus,
Cuba
has
supported
Sovi-
et
policy
in
Czechoslovakia
(1968),
Afghanistan
(1979),
Poland
(1981),
Angola
(1979),
Ethiopia
1979)
Nicaragua
1979),
and
El
Sal-
vador
(1979).
The Cubanshave
been
an
effective
sponsor
of Soviet
policies
in
Africaand
Central
Americaand have served as active
sup-
porters
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement
of
Third World
countries.
Theyhave also sided with the USSRagainstthe People'sRepublicof
China
(PRC).
Since the late
1960s
there has
been
no
important
oreign policy
question
on
which the
Cubanshave
publicly
challenged
the Soviet
Union.
On
the
contrary,
he
Cubans
have followed
the
Soviet ead
as
loyally
as
any
East
European country
(perhaps
more
loyally
than
most)
even
on issues as distastefulas
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and
Poland.
If
privatedisagreements
or
qualifications
exist,
they
are
not
expressed
publicly.
The scale and scope of Cuban nvolvementwith Sovietforeign
and
militarypolicies
are
astonishing
for a
country
of
10
million
peo-
ple
which never
imagined,
let alone
implemented,
such levels
of
militaryactivity
n
the
context of
capitalist
dependency.
Cubanmili-
taryoperations
n
Africa
and the
Middle East
exploded
in
magnitude
tied
to the Soviet
government_
n its
foreign
and domestic
policies
than it ever was
to the
United
States
government.
In
fact,
the
majorconstrainton Soviet influence is its
physical
distance from Cuba.
This
leaves both
the
USSRand
Cubasomewhat
vulnerable.Ironical-
ly,physical
distance is one
of
the factors
dependencia
thinkers
reject
as
relevant
o
dependency
because
it is
not,
per
se,
an
aspect
of their
touchstone
distinction between
capitalism
and
socialism.
Soviet
nfluence was
insignificant
at the
beginning
of
the Revo-
lution.
It
became
important
only
about
18
months
after
Castro
came
to
power
in
January
959
(Blasier,
1983:
100-103).
Through
most
of
the 1960sthe relationshipgrew,but there were also majordifferenc-
es between
the
Sovietand
Cuban
governments
on domestic and
for-
eign
policies.
The Cubans veered from one
extreme to
another
in
their
economic
policies
and favored
nsurrectionary
iolence
against
established
governments
in
LatinAmerican countries. The Soviets
opposed
both these tendencies. In the
1970s,
however,
differences
declined between the Cuban and Soviet
governments
in
both
do-
mestic and
foreign policy
areas.
Domestically,
since
1970
the
Cuban
polity,
economy,
and
society
have
increasingly
been
reorganized
along
Soviet lines. In the international
sphere,
particularly
ince
1968,
the
Cuban
government
has
accepted
the Soviet
government
as
its
senior
partner
n
foreign
policy.
Thus,
Cuba
has
supported
Sovi-
et
policy
in
Czechoslovakia
(1968),
Afghanistan
(1979),
Poland
(1981),
Angola
(1979),
Ethiopia
1979)
Nicaragua
1979),
and
El
Sal-
vador
(1979).
The Cubanshave
been
an
effective
sponsor
of Soviet
policies
in
Africaand
Central
Americaand have served as active
sup-
porters
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement
of
Third World
countries.
Theyhave also sided with the USSRagainstthe People'sRepublicof
China
(PRC).
Since the late
1960s
there has
been
no
important
oreign policy
question
on
which the
Cubanshave
publicly
challenged
the Soviet
Union.
On
the
contrary,
he
Cubans
have followed
the
Soviet ead
as
loyally
as
any
East
European country
(perhaps
more
loyally
than
most)
even
on issues as distastefulas
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and
Poland.
If
privatedisagreements
or
qualifications
exist,
they
are
not
expressed
publicly.
The scale and scope of Cuban nvolvementwith Sovietforeign
and
militarypolicies
are
astonishing
for a
country
of
10
million
peo-
ple
which never
imagined,
let alone
implemented,
such levels
of
militaryactivity
n
the
context of
capitalist
dependency.
Cubanmili-
taryoperations
n
Africa
and the
Middle East
exploded
in
magnitude
tied
to the Soviet
government_
n its
foreign
and domestic
policies
than it ever was
to the
United
States
government.
In
fact,
the
majorconstrainton Soviet influence is its
physical
distance from Cuba.
This
leaves both
the
USSRand
Cubasomewhat
vulnerable.Ironical-
ly,physical
distance is one
of
the factors
dependencia
thinkers
reject
as
relevant
o
dependency
because
it is
not,
per
se,
an
aspect
of their
touchstone
distinction between
capitalism
and
socialism.
Soviet
nfluence was
insignificant
at the
beginning
of
the Revo-
lution.
It
became
important
only
about
18
months
after
Castro
came
to
power
in
January
959
(Blasier,
1983:
100-103).
Through
most
of
the 1960sthe relationshipgrew,but there were also majordifferenc-
es between
the
Sovietand
Cuban
governments
on domestic and
for-
eign
policies.
The Cubans veered from one
extreme to
another
in
their
economic
policies
and favored
nsurrectionary
iolence
against
established
governments
in
LatinAmerican countries. The Soviets
opposed
both these tendencies. In the
1970s,
however,
differences
declined between the Cuban and Soviet
governments
in
both
do-
mestic and
foreign policy
areas.
Domestically,
since
1970
the
Cuban
polity,
economy,
and
society
have
increasingly
been
reorganized
along
Soviet lines. In the international
sphere,
particularly
ince
1968,
the
Cuban
government
has
accepted
the Soviet
government
as
its
senior
partner
n
foreign
policy.
Thus,
Cuba
has
supported
Sovi-
et
policy
in
Czechoslovakia
(1968),
Afghanistan
(1979),
Poland
(1981),
Angola
(1979),
Ethiopia
1979)
Nicaragua
1979),
and
El
Sal-
vador
(1979).
The Cubanshave
been
an
effective
sponsor
of Soviet
policies
in
Africaand
Central
Americaand have served as active
sup-
porters
in
the
Non-Aligned
Movement
of
Third World
countries.
Theyhave also sided with the USSRagainstthe People'sRepublicof
China
(PRC).
Since the late
1960s
there has
been
no
important
oreign policy
question
on
which the
Cubanshave
publicly
challenged
the Soviet
Union.
On
the
contrary,
he
Cubans
have followed
the
Soviet ead
as
loyally
as
any
East
European country
(perhaps
more
loyally
than
most)
even
on issues as distastefulas
Czechoslovakia,
Afghanistan,
and
Poland.
If
privatedisagreements
or
qualifications
exist,
they
are
not
expressed
publicly.
The scale and scope of Cuban nvolvementwith Sovietforeign
and
militarypolicies
are
astonishing
for a
country
of
10
million
peo-
ple
which never
imagined,
let alone
implemented,
such levels
of
militaryactivity
n
the
context of
capitalist
dependency.
Cubanmili-
taryoperations
n
Africa
and the
Middle East
exploded
in
magnitude
86666
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PACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA- CAPITALISTVS.
SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
during
the
collaborative
phase
of
Cuban-Soviet
relations,
which
began
in
the late
1960s
and
which is still
going
on. The
highest
total
numberof Cuban
roops
and
military
advisers
n
those
regions,
at
any
time
in
the
1960s,
was an estimated
750-1,000
in
1966.
By1976
it
had
increased to
an
estimated
16-19,000,
and
by
1978
to an
estimated
38-
39,000 (Blasier,
1983:112).
Cuban forces
abroad
in the late
1970s
accounted
for
two-thirds
of the
military
and technical
personnel
stationed
by
all
Communist
states
in
the Third
World
exceeding
Soviet
troops
in
Afghanistan
and
Vietnamese forces
in
SoutheastAsia. In
addition
to
troops,
Cuba
dispatchedtechnicians, advisers,and constructionsworkers o Alge-
ria,
Iraq,
Jamaica,
Libya,Mozambique,Nicaragua,
Vietnam,
and Gre-
nada n the
late
1970s
and
early1980s
(Thomas
etal, 1984:12;
ee
also
Mesa-Lago,
981:
50-53;
and
del
Aguila,
1984:125).
In
1978
Cubahad not
only
about
35,000
military
roops
and ad-
visers
in
Angola
and
Ethiopia
but 200
in
Libya,
000
in
Mozambique,
300-400
in
South
Yemen,
100-150
n
Guinea
Bissau,
50
in
Tanzania,
20
in
Iraq,
and
15-60
in
Zambia
(Blasier,
1983:112).
A
fewyears
later,
in
1981-83,
Cuba's
verseas
militarypresence
continued at the
same
level in most of the foregoingcountries (except for Guinea-Bissau,
where it
dropped
to
50)
although
it
increased to
3,000
in
Libya,
1,000
in
Mozambique,
2,200
in
Iraq,
and 800
in
South
Yemen. In
ad-
dition there
were
170
Cuban
military personnel
in
Algeria
and
2-4,000
in
Nicaragua.
Another
22-25,000
economic
technicians
were
operating
n
these countries
(del
Aguila,
1984:125).
According
to
Fidel
Castro,
more
than
100,000
members
of
the Cuban
armed
forces
had served
in
Africa
by
the
end
of
1980.
In
1982
Cuba had
about
70,000
military
roops,
military
advisers,
and civilian
advisers
in 23 countriesaroundthe world (Thomas et al, 1984:12).
Not
only militarypersonnel
but
weapons
capabilities
ncreased
very
rapidlyduring
this
period.
In
1981
here-were
about
2,400
Soviet
military
advisers
n
Cuba
o
provide
training
and
support-for
he
mili-
taryequipment
that had flowed into
Cubasince
1975
(in
additionto
several thousand
Soviet civilian
advisors).
Cuba's
ground
and air
forces,
nearly
all
provided
by
the
Soviets,
ncluded
200
MIG
ighters
and
50
other
kinds of
combat
aircraft;
8
combat
helicopters;
650
tanks;1,500 anti-aircraft uns; and dozens of militarytransportair-
craft,
including
at least
7
long-range jets
each
capable
of
carrying
150-200
combat
equipped troops
(Cirincione
and
Hunter,
1984:
175).
In
short,
he
military
has
been,
by
far,
he most
dynamic
ector
of the
Cuban
economy
for at least a
decade. The
Soviets have
paid
during
the
collaborative
phase
of
Cuban-Soviet
relations,
which
began
in
the late
1960s
and
which is still
going
on. The
highest
total
numberof Cuban
roops
and
military
advisers
n
those
regions,
at
any
time
in
the
1960s,
was an estimated
750-1,000
in
1966.
By1976
it
had
increased to
an
estimated
16-19,000,
and
by
1978
to an
estimated
38-
39,000 (Blasier,
1983:112).
Cuban forces
abroad
in the late
1970s
accounted
for
two-thirds
of the
military
and technical
personnel
stationed
by
all
Communist
states
in
the Third
World
exceeding
Soviet
troops
in
Afghanistan
and
Vietnamese forces
in
SoutheastAsia. In
addition
to
troops,
Cuba
dispatchedtechnicians, advisers,and constructionsworkers o Alge-
ria,
Iraq,
Jamaica,
Libya,Mozambique,Nicaragua,
Vietnam,
and Gre-
nada n the
late
1970s
and
early1980s
(Thomas
etal, 1984:12;
ee
also
Mesa-Lago,
981:
50-53;
and
del
Aguila,
1984:125).
In
1978
Cubahad not
only
about
35,000
military
roops
and ad-
visers
in
Angola
and
Ethiopia
but 200
in
Libya,
000
in
Mozambique,
300-400
in
South
Yemen,
100-150
n
Guinea
Bissau,
50
in
Tanzania,
20
in
Iraq,
and
15-60
in
Zambia
(Blasier,
1983:112).
A
fewyears
later,
in
1981-83,
Cuba's
verseas
militarypresence
continued at the
same
level in most of the foregoingcountries (except for Guinea-Bissau,
where it
dropped
to
50)
although
it
increased to
3,000
in
Libya,
1,000
in
Mozambique,
2,200
in
Iraq,
and 800
in
South
Yemen. In
ad-
dition there
were
170
Cuban
military personnel
in
Algeria
and
2-4,000
in
Nicaragua.
Another
22-25,000
economic
technicians
were
operating
n
these countries
(del
Aguila,
1984:125).
According
to
Fidel
Castro,
more
than
100,000
members
of
the Cuban
armed
forces
had served
in
Africa
by
the
end
of
1980.
In
1982
Cuba had
about
70,000
military
roops,
military
advisers,
and civilian
advisers
in 23 countriesaroundthe world (Thomas et al, 1984:12).
Not
only militarypersonnel
but
weapons
capabilities
ncreased
very
rapidlyduring
this
period.
In
1981
here-were
about
2,400
Soviet
military
advisers
n
Cuba
o
provide
training
and
support-for
he
mili-
taryequipment
that had flowed into
Cubasince
1975
(in
additionto
several thousand
Soviet civilian
advisors).
Cuba's
ground
and air
forces,
nearly
all
provided
by
the
Soviets,
ncluded
200
MIG
ighters
and
50
other
kinds of
combat
aircraft;
8
combat
helicopters;
650
tanks;1,500 anti-aircraft uns; and dozens of militarytransportair-
craft,
including
at least
7
long-range jets
each
capable
of
carrying
150-200
combat
equipped troops
(Cirincione
and
Hunter,
1984:
175).
In
short,
he
military
has
been,
by
far,
he most
dynamic
ector
of the
Cuban
economy
for at least a
decade. The
Soviets have
paid
during
the
collaborative
phase
of
Cuban-Soviet
relations,
which
began
in
the late
1960s
and
which is still
going
on. The
highest
total
numberof Cuban
roops
and
military
advisers
n
those
regions,
at
any
time
in
the
1960s,
was an estimated
750-1,000
in
1966.
By1976
it
had
increased to
an
estimated
16-19,000,
and
by
1978
to an
estimated
38-
39,000 (Blasier,
1983:112).
Cuban forces
abroad
in the late
1970s
accounted
for
two-thirds
of the
military
and technical
personnel
stationed
by
all
Communist
states
in
the Third
World
exceeding
Soviet
troops
in
Afghanistan
and
Vietnamese forces
in
SoutheastAsia. In
addition
to
troops,
Cuba
dispatchedtechnicians, advisers,and constructionsworkers o Alge-
ria,
Iraq,
Jamaica,
Libya,Mozambique,Nicaragua,
Vietnam,
and Gre-
nada n the
late
1970s
and
early1980s
(Thomas
etal, 1984:12;
ee
also
Mesa-Lago,
981:
50-53;
and
del
Aguila,
1984:125).
In
1978
Cubahad not
only
about
35,000
military
roops
and ad-
visers
in
Angola
and
Ethiopia
but 200
in
Libya,
000
in
Mozambique,
300-400
in
South
Yemen,
100-150
n
Guinea
Bissau,
50
in
Tanzania,
20
in
Iraq,
and
15-60
in
Zambia
(Blasier,
1983:112).
A
fewyears
later,
in
1981-83,
Cuba's
verseas
militarypresence
continued at the
same
level in most of the foregoingcountries (except for Guinea-Bissau,
where it
dropped
to
50)
although
it
increased to
3,000
in
Libya,
1,000
in
Mozambique,
2,200
in
Iraq,
and 800
in
South
Yemen. In
ad-
dition there
were
170
Cuban
military personnel
in
Algeria
and
2-4,000
in
Nicaragua.
Another
22-25,000
economic
technicians
were
operating
n
these countries
(del
Aguila,
1984:125).
According
to
Fidel
Castro,
more
than
100,000
members
of
the Cuban
armed
forces
had served
in
Africa
by
the
end
of
1980.
In
1982
Cuba had
about
70,000
military
roops,
military
advisers,
and civilian
advisers
in 23 countriesaroundthe world (Thomas et al, 1984:12).
Not
only militarypersonnel
but
weapons
capabilities
ncreased
very
rapidlyduring
this
period.
In
1981
here-were
about
2,400
Soviet
military
advisers
n
Cuba
o
provide
training
and
support-for
he
mili-
taryequipment
that had flowed into
Cubasince
1975
(in
additionto
several thousand
Soviet civilian
advisors).
Cuba's
ground
and air
forces,
nearly
all
provided
by
the
Soviets,
ncluded
200
MIG
ighters
and
50
other
kinds of
combat
aircraft;
8
combat
helicopters;
650
tanks;1,500 anti-aircraft uns; and dozens of militarytransportair-
craft,
including
at least
7
long-range jets
each
capable
of
carrying
150-200
combat
equipped troops
(Cirincione
and
Hunter,
1984:
175).
In
short,
he
military
has
been,
by
far,
he most
dynamic
ector
of the
Cuban
economy
for at least a
decade. The
Soviets have
paid
during
the
collaborative
phase
of
Cuban-Soviet
relations,
which
began
in
the late
1960s
and
which is still
going
on. The
highest
total
numberof Cuban
roops
and
military
advisers
n
those
regions,
at
any
time
in
the
1960s,
was an estimated
750-1,000
in
1966.
By1976
it
had
increased to
an
estimated
16-19,000,
and
by
1978
to an
estimated
38-
39,000 (Blasier,
1983:112).
Cuban forces
abroad
in the late
1970s
accounted
for
two-thirds
of the
military
and technical
personnel
stationed
by
all
Communist
states
in
the Third
World
exceeding
Soviet
troops
in
Afghanistan
and
Vietnamese forces
in
SoutheastAsia. In
addition
to
troops,
Cuba
dispatchedtechnicians, advisers,and constructionsworkers o Alge-
ria,
Iraq,
Jamaica,
Libya,Mozambique,Nicaragua,
Vietnam,
and Gre-
nada n the
late
1970s
and
early1980s
(Thomas
etal, 1984:12;
ee
also
Mesa-Lago,
981:
50-53;
and
del
Aguila,
1984:125).
In
1978
Cubahad not
only
about
35,000
military
roops
and ad-
visers
in
Angola
and
Ethiopia
but 200
in
Libya,
000
in
Mozambique,
300-400
in
South
Yemen,
100-150
n
Guinea
Bissau,
50
in
Tanzania,
20
in
Iraq,
and
15-60
in
Zambia
(Blasier,
1983:112).
A
fewyears
later,
in
1981-83,
Cuba's
verseas
militarypresence
continued at the
same
level in most of the foregoingcountries (except for Guinea-Bissau,
where it
dropped
to
50)
although
it
increased to
3,000
in
Libya,
1,000
in
Mozambique,
2,200
in
Iraq,
and 800
in
South
Yemen. In
ad-
dition there
were
170
Cuban
military personnel
in
Algeria
and
2-4,000
in
Nicaragua.
Another
22-25,000
economic
technicians
were
operating
n
these countries
(del
Aguila,
1984:125).
According
to
Fidel
Castro,
more
than
100,000
members
of
the Cuban
armed
forces
had served
in
Africa
by
the
end
of
1980.
In
1982
Cuba had
about
70,000
military
roops,
military
advisers,
and civilian
advisers
in 23 countriesaroundthe world (Thomas et al, 1984:12).
Not
only militarypersonnel
but
weapons
capabilities
ncreased
very
rapidlyduring
this
period.
In
1981
here-were
about
2,400
Soviet
military
advisers
n
Cuba
o
provide
training
and
support-for
he
mili-
taryequipment
that had flowed into
Cubasince
1975
(in
additionto
several thousand
Soviet civilian
advisors).
Cuba's
ground
and air
forces,
nearly
all
provided
by
the
Soviets,
ncluded
200
MIG
ighters
and
50
other
kinds of
combat
aircraft;
8
combat
helicopters;
650
tanks;1,500 anti-aircraft uns; and dozens of militarytransportair-
craft,
including
at least
7
long-range jets
each
capable
of
carrying
150-200
combat
equipped troops
(Cirincione
and
Hunter,
1984:
175).
In
short,
he
military
has
been,
by
far,
he most
dynamic
ector
of the
Cuban
economy
for at least a
decade. The
Soviets have
paid
87777
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS
most of the
economic
costs
in
this sector.
One
of the main
arguments
of
dependencia
writers
s
that
foreign capital
is concentrated
n
the
most
dynamic
sectors of
the
associated-dependent
countries,
and
therefore hat
foreign capital
s more influential
han mere
aggregate
investments
would
suggest. By
this
logic
of
dynamic-sector
naly-
sis the
Soviet role
in
Cuba
is
greater
than
U.S.
capital
ever
was in
Cuba.
Many
commentators
maintain hat Cuba's
oreign
policy
reflects
Cuba's
own
interests.
However,
t is not
plausible
that a
country
of
Cuba's
ize,
location and
precarious
economy
would,
in its
own
in-
terests, have 70,000 troops and militaryadvisers in 23 countries
around
the
world,
mostly
in
Africa
and
the
Middle
East,
where the
troops
are
Cuban
but the
officers and the uniformsare Russian.
It is
also
argued
that
this
foreign military
nvolvement
s
popular
n
Cuba.
Butwhat does
popular
mean in
Cuba,
where dissent
is
counterrev-
olutionary
and
antinational,
where the media and
the means of
pro-
duction
are
state-controlled,
and where a
strong
apparatus
of
politi-
cal
mobilizationand
vigilance
s in
place?
If
it is so
popular
nd
in
Cuba's
nterests,
why
are data
on
casualties
unreported
in
Cuba?
the deadburied outside Cuba? nd the wounded
kept
outof the
pub-
lic
eye?
(Leiken,1981:100;
Pastor,
983:191).
Why,despite
intense
po-
litical
pressures
and
safeguards
against
release
of
information
on the
subject,
is
there still evidence
of resistance
to the
African wars
among
the
managerial
elite?
of insubordination
among
some
troops ?
nd
of
widespreadunhappiness
among
the Cuban
people
concerning
compulsory
military
service?
(Dominguez,
1978:
355).
CONCLUSION
THIS
PAPER
OES NOT
maintain hat Cuban
Revolutionary
nstitu-
tions and
policies
totally
replicate
Soviet
models and
preferences.
Neither
did
pre-1959
Cuba
respond automatically
o influences
from
the United
States.The
paper
does
reject,
however,
the
proposition
that Cuba's
domestic
development
and
foreign
relations under so-
cialism
have been autonomous and
nonexploitative
and
puts
fortha
verydifferenthypothesis,namely,thata bi-pealliance of Cubanand
Soviet elites
is
systematically
dominating
and
exploiting
the
Cuban
people
for its own ends.4
This
conclusion
conflicts
sharply
with that of
dependencia
au-
thors
regarding
he character
and
consequences
of socialist
depen-
most of the
economic
costs
in
this sector.
One
of the main
arguments
of
dependencia
writers
s
that
foreign capital
is concentrated
n
the
most
dynamic
sectors of
the
associated-dependent
countries,
and
therefore hat
foreign capital
s more influential
han mere
aggregate
investments
would
suggest. By
this
logic
of
dynamic-sector
naly-
sis the
Soviet role
in
Cuba
is
greater
than
U.S.
capital
ever
was in
Cuba.
Many
commentators
maintain hat Cuba's
oreign
policy
reflects
Cuba's
own
interests.
However,
t is not
plausible
that a
country
of
Cuba's
ize,
location and
precarious
economy
would,
in its
own
in-
terests, have 70,000 troops and militaryadvisers in 23 countries
around
the
world,
mostly
in
Africa
and
the
Middle
East,
where the
troops
are
Cuban
but the
officers and the uniformsare Russian.
It is
also
argued
that
this
foreign military
nvolvement
s
popular
n
Cuba.
Butwhat does
popular
mean in
Cuba,
where dissent
is
counterrev-
olutionary
and
antinational,
where the media and
the means of
pro-
duction
are
state-controlled,
and where a
strong
apparatus
of
politi-
cal
mobilizationand
vigilance
s in
place?
If
it is so
popular
nd
in
Cuba's
nterests,
why
are data
on
casualties
unreported
in
Cuba?
the deadburied outside Cuba? nd the wounded
kept
outof the
pub-
lic
eye?
(Leiken,1981:100;
Pastor,
983:191).
Why,despite
intense
po-
litical
pressures
and
safeguards
against
release
of
information
on the
subject,
is
there still evidence
of resistance
to the
African wars
among
the
managerial
elite?
of insubordination
among
some
troops ?
nd
of
widespreadunhappiness
among
the Cuban
people
concerning
compulsory
military
service?
(Dominguez,
1978:
355).
CONCLUSION
THIS
PAPER
OES NOT
maintain hat Cuban
Revolutionary
nstitu-
tions and
policies
totally
replicate
Soviet
models and
preferences.
Neither
did
pre-1959
Cuba
respond automatically
o influences
from
the United
States.The
paper
does
reject,
however,
the
proposition
that Cuba's
domestic
development
and
foreign
relations under so-
cialism
have been autonomous and
nonexploitative
and
puts
fortha
verydifferenthypothesis,namely,thata bi-pealliance of Cubanand
Soviet elites
is
systematically
dominating
and
exploiting
the
Cuban
people
for its own ends.4
This
conclusion
conflicts
sharply
with that of
dependencia
au-
thors
regarding
he character
and
consequences
of socialist
depen-
most of the
economic
costs
in
this sector.
One
of the main
arguments
of
dependencia
writers
s
that
foreign capital
is concentrated
n
the
most
dynamic
sectors of
the
associated-dependent
countries,
and
therefore hat
foreign capital
s more influential
han mere
aggregate
investments
would
suggest. By
this
logic
of
dynamic-sector
naly-
sis the
Soviet role
in
Cuba
is
greater
than
U.S.
capital
ever
was in
Cuba.
Many
commentators
maintain hat Cuba's
oreign
policy
reflects
Cuba's
own
interests.
However,
t is not
plausible
that a
country
of
Cuba's
ize,
location and
precarious
economy
would,
in its
own
in-
terests, have 70,000 troops and militaryadvisers in 23 countries
around
the
world,
mostly
in
Africa
and
the
Middle
East,
where the
troops
are
Cuban
but the
officers and the uniformsare Russian.
It is
also
argued
that
this
foreign military
nvolvement
s
popular
n
Cuba.
Butwhat does
popular
mean in
Cuba,
where dissent
is
counterrev-
olutionary
and
antinational,
where the media and
the means of
pro-
duction
are
state-controlled,
and where a
strong
apparatus
of
politi-
cal
mobilizationand
vigilance
s in
place?
If
it is so
popular
nd
in
Cuba's
nterests,
why
are data
on
casualties
unreported
in
Cuba?
the deadburied outside Cuba? nd the wounded
kept
outof the
pub-
lic
eye?
(Leiken,1981:100;
Pastor,
983:191).
Why,despite
intense
po-
litical
pressures
and
safeguards
against
release
of
information
on the
subject,
is
there still evidence
of resistance
to the
African wars
among
the
managerial
elite?
of insubordination
among
some
troops ?
nd
of
widespreadunhappiness
among
the Cuban
people
concerning
compulsory
military
service?
(Dominguez,
1978:
355).
CONCLUSION
THIS
PAPER
OES NOT
maintain hat Cuban
Revolutionary
nstitu-
tions and
policies
totally
replicate
Soviet
models and
preferences.
Neither
did
pre-1959
Cuba
respond automatically
o influences
from
the United
States.The
paper
does
reject,
however,
the
proposition
that Cuba's
domestic
development
and
foreign
relations under so-
cialism
have been autonomous and
nonexploitative
and
puts
fortha
verydifferenthypothesis,namely,thata bi-pealliance of Cubanand
Soviet elites
is
systematically
dominating
and
exploiting
the
Cuban
people
for its own ends.4
This
conclusion
conflicts
sharply
with that of
dependencia
au-
thors
regarding
he character
and
consequences
of socialist
depen-
most of the
economic
costs
in
this sector.
One
of the main
arguments
of
dependencia
writers
s
that
foreign capital
is concentrated
n
the
most
dynamic
sectors of
the
associated-dependent
countries,
and
therefore hat
foreign capital
s more influential
han mere
aggregate
investments
would
suggest. By
this
logic
of
dynamic-sector
naly-
sis the
Soviet role
in
Cuba
is
greater
than
U.S.
capital
ever
was in
Cuba.
Many
commentators
maintain hat Cuba's
oreign
policy
reflects
Cuba's
own
interests.
However,
t is not
plausible
that a
country
of
Cuba's
ize,
location and
precarious
economy
would,
in its
own
in-
terests, have 70,000 troops and militaryadvisers in 23 countries
around
the
world,
mostly
in
Africa
and
the
Middle
East,
where the
troops
are
Cuban
but the
officers and the uniformsare Russian.
It is
also
argued
that
this
foreign military
nvolvement
s
popular
n
Cuba.
Butwhat does
popular
mean in
Cuba,
where dissent
is
counterrev-
olutionary
and
antinational,
where the media and
the means of
pro-
duction
are
state-controlled,
and where a
strong
apparatus
of
politi-
cal
mobilizationand
vigilance
s in
place?
If
it is so
popular
nd
in
Cuba's
nterests,
why
are data
on
casualties
unreported
in
Cuba?
the deadburied outside Cuba? nd the wounded
kept
outof the
pub-
lic
eye?
(Leiken,1981:100;
Pastor,
983:191).
Why,despite
intense
po-
litical
pressures
and
safeguards
against
release
of
information
on the
subject,
is
there still evidence
of resistance
to the
African wars
among
the
managerial
elite?
of insubordination
among
some
troops ?
nd
of
widespreadunhappiness
among
the Cuban
people
concerning
compulsory
military
service?
(Dominguez,
1978:
355).
CONCLUSION
THIS
PAPER
OES NOT
maintain hat Cuban
Revolutionary
nstitu-
tions and
policies
totally
replicate
Soviet
models and
preferences.
Neither
did
pre-1959
Cuba
respond automatically
o influences
from
the United
States.The
paper
does
reject,
however,
the
proposition
that Cuba's
domestic
development
and
foreign
relations under so-
cialism
have been autonomous and
nonexploitative
and
puts
fortha
verydifferenthypothesis,namely,thata bi-pealliance of Cubanand
Soviet elites
is
systematically
dominating
and
exploiting
the
Cuban
people
for its own ends.4
This
conclusion
conflicts
sharply
with that of
dependencia
au-
thors
regarding
he character
and
consequences
of socialist
depen-
88888
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PACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCYACKENHAM:CUBA - CAPITALISTVS. SOCIALIST DEPENDENCY
dency.
These authors
frequently
call for
studies of concrete
situa-
tions
of
capitalistdependency
and
occasionally
have made
such
studies,
but
they
never
study
concrete situationsof socialist
depen-
dency.
It
is
hoped
that
this
examination of
specific
features
and
mechanisms of
a
socialist
dependency
will
contribute
to
the com-
parative
analysis
of
capitalist
and socialist
dependency.
Barriers o
such
comparativeanalysis
are
many.
They
include
not
only
the
intellectual stricturesof
Marxism
but also numerous so-
ciological,
historical,
and
political
obstacles.
These barriers
make
it
difficultfor
most scholars
writing
about LatinAmericaeven to think
of analyzingsocialist cases in anythinglike the same criticalspirit
routinely
applied
to
capitalist
cases. Critical
analyses
of
capitalist
cases are not
necessarily perceived
as
containing
an
anti-capitalist
bias,
critical
analyses
of socialist cases
are
often
perceived
as
anti-socialist
er
se.
The
first is
considered
permissible;
the
sec-
ond
is
not.
These barriers o
objective
criticism
go
back at least to
the Viet-
nam Warand to
taboos
generated during
the
era
of
Joseph
McCarthy
in the
United States. Some roots extend even farther
back.
In
the
1930s
George
Orwell discovered to
his
sorrow hatthe
intelligentsia
could
not
conceive
of
directing
upon
Russia
anything
ike
the same
stringency
of criticism
they
used on their own nation.
Later,
n
Cata-
lonia Orwell
learned
that,
while the
Communist-controlled
overn-
ment was
filling
up
the
jails
with
themost
devoted
fighters
or
Span-
ish
freedom,
men who
had
given
up everything
for
the
cause,
he
intelligentsia
who
controlled the Western
press
did not
know,
and re-
fused to
know,
because
they
were committed not to the fact
but to
the abstraction Trilling,1952:xvii, xxii).
It is
time to
consider not the abstractionbut the
fact
of
socialist
dependency.
If
real-world ases of
capitalism
are
compared
to
ideal-
world cases of
socialism,
the
socialist case will
always
look
better.
The
same criterianeed
to
be
applied
to both.
A
genuine
comparison
does
not
necessarily
lead to a
particular
et of conclusions
and
opin-
ions about the relative merits of the
two
kinds
of
dependent
situa-
tions,
but it
does allow
the debate
to
take
place
on
more
realistic
grounds
and thus to facilitatea
more
valid
appraisal
of human
well-
being
in
dependent
countries.
dency.
These authors
frequently
call for
studies of concrete
situa-
tions
of
capitalistdependency
and
occasionally
have made
such
studies,
but
they
never
study
concrete situationsof socialist
depen-
dency.
It
is
hoped
that
this
examination of
specific
features
and
mechanisms of
a
socialist
dependency
will
contribute
to
the com-
parative
analysis
of
capitalist
and socialist
dependency.
Barriers o
such
comparativeanalysis
are
many.
They
include
not
only
the
intellectual stricturesof
Marxism
but also numerous so-
ciological,
historical,
and
political
obstacles.
These barriers
make
it
difficultfor
most scholars
writing
about LatinAmericaeven to think
of analyzingsocialist cases in anythinglike the same criticalspirit
routinely
applied
to
capitalist
cases. Critical
analyses
of
capitalist
cases are not
necessarily perceived
as
containing
an
anti-capitalist
bias,
critical
analyses
of socialist cases
are
often
perceived
as
anti-socialist
er
se.
The
first is
considered
permissible;
the
sec-
ond
is
not.
These barriers o
objective
criticism
go
back at least to
the Viet-
nam Warand to
taboos
generated during
the
era
of
Joseph
McCarthy
in the
United States. Some roots extend even farther
back.
In
the
1930s
George
Orwell discovered to
his
sorrow hatthe
intelligentsia
could
not
conceive
of
directing
upon
Russia
anything
ike
the same
stringency
of criticism
they
used on their own nation.
Later,
n
Cata-
lonia Orwell
learned
that,
while the
Communist-controlled
overn-
ment was
filling
up
the
jails
with
themost
devoted
fighters
or
Span-
ish
freedom,
men who
had
given
up everything
for
the
cause,
he
intelligentsia
who
controlled the Western
press
did not
know,
and re-
fused to
know,
because
they
were committed not to the fact
but to
the abstraction Trilling,1952:xvii, xxii).
It is
time to
consider not the abstractionbut the
fact
of
socialist
dependency.
If
real-world ases of
capitalism
are
compared
to
ideal-
world cases of
socialism,
the
socialist case will
always
look
better.
The
same criterianeed
to
be
applied
to both.
A
genuine
comparison
does
not
necessarily
lead to a
particular
et of conclusions
and
opin-
ions about the relative merits of the
two
kinds
of
dependent
situa-
tions,
but it
does allow
the debate
to
take
place
on
more
realistic
grounds
and thus to facilitatea
more
valid
appraisal
of human
well-
being
in
dependent
countries.
dency.
These authors
frequently
call for
studies of concrete
situa-
tions
of
capitalistdependency
and
occasionally
have made
such
studies,
but
they
never
study
concrete situationsof socialist
depen-
dency.
It
is
hoped
that
this
examination of
specific
features
and
mechanisms of
a
socialist
dependency
will
contribute
to
the com-
parative
analysis
of
capitalist
and socialist
dependency.
Barriers o
such
comparativeanalysis
are
many.
They
include
not
only
the
intellectual stricturesof
Marxism
but also numerous so-
ciological,
historical,
and
political
obstacles.
These barriers
make
it
difficultfor
most scholars
writing
about LatinAmericaeven to think
of analyzingsocialist cases in anythinglike the same criticalspirit
routinely
applied
to
capitalist
cases. Critical
analyses
of
capitalist
cases are not
necessarily perceived
as
containing
an
anti-capitalist
bias,
critical
analyses
of socialist cases
are
often
perceived
as
anti-socialist
er
se.
The
first is
considered
permissible;
the
sec-
ond
is
not.
These barriers o
objective
criticism
go
back at least to
the Viet-
nam Warand to
taboos
generated during
the
era
of
Joseph
McCarthy
in the
United States. Some roots extend even farther
back.
In
the
1930s
George
Orwell discovered to
his
sorrow hatthe
intelligentsia
could
not
conceive
of
directing
upon
Russia
anything
ike
the same
stringency
of criticism
they
used on their own nation.
Later,
n
Cata-
lonia Orwell
learned
that,
while the
Communist-controlled
overn-
ment was
filling
up
the
jails
with
themost
devoted
fighters
or
Span-
ish
freedom,
men who
had
given
up everything
for
the
cause,
he
intelligentsia
who
controlled the Western
press
did not
know,
and re-
fused to
know,
because
they
were committed not to the fact
but to
the abstraction Trilling,1952:xvii, xxii).
It is
time to
consider not the abstractionbut the
fact
of
socialist
dependency.
If
real-world ases of
capitalism
are
compared
to
ideal-
world cases of
socialism,
the
socialist case will
always
look
better.
The
same criterianeed
to
be
applied
to both.
A
genuine
comparison
does
not
necessarily
lead to a
particular
et of conclusions
and
opin-
ions about the relative merits of the
two
kinds
of
dependent
situa-
tions,
but it
does allow
the debate
to
take
place
on
more
realistic
grounds
and thus to facilitatea
more
valid
appraisal
of human
well-
being
in
dependent
countries.
dency.
These authors
frequently
call for
studies of concrete
situa-
tions
of
capitalistdependency
and
occasionally
have made
such
studies,
but
they
never
study
concrete situationsof socialist
depen-
dency.
It
is
hoped
that
this
examination of
specific
features
and
mechanisms of
a
socialist
dependency
will
contribute
to
the com-
parative
analysis
of
capitalist
and socialist
dependency.
Barriers o
such
comparativeanalysis
are
many.
They
include
not
only
the
intellectual stricturesof
Marxism
but also numerous so-
ciological,
historical,
and
political
obstacles.
These barriers
make
it
difficultfor
most scholars
writing
about LatinAmericaeven to think
of analyzingsocialist cases in anythinglike the same criticalspirit
routinely
applied
to
capitalist
cases. Critical
analyses
of
capitalist
cases are not
necessarily perceived
as
containing
an
anti-capitalist
bias,
critical
analyses
of socialist cases
are
often
perceived
as
anti-socialist
er
se.
The
first is
considered
permissible;
the
sec-
ond
is
not.
These barriers o
objective
criticism
go
back at least to
the Viet-
nam Warand to
taboos
generated during
the
era
of
Joseph
McCarthy
in the
United States. Some roots extend even farther
back.
In
the
1930s
George
Orwell discovered to
his
sorrow hatthe
intelligentsia
could
not
conceive
of
directing
upon
Russia
anything
ike
the same
stringency
of criticism
they
used on their own nation.
Later,
n
Cata-
lonia Orwell
learned
that,
while the
Communist-controlled
overn-
ment was
filling
up
the
jails
with
themost
devoted
fighters
or
Span-
ish
freedom,
men who
had
given
up everything
for
the
cause,
he
intelligentsia
who
controlled the Western
press
did not
know,
and re-
fused to
know,
because
they
were committed not to the fact
but to
the abstraction Trilling,1952:xvii, xxii).
It is
time to
consider not the abstractionbut the
fact
of
socialist
dependency.
If
real-world ases of
capitalism
are
compared
to
ideal-
world cases of
socialism,
the
socialist case will
always
look
better.
The
same criterianeed
to
be
applied
to both.
A
genuine
comparison
does
not
necessarily
lead to a
particular
et of conclusions
and
opin-
ions about the relative merits of the
two
kinds
of
dependent
situa-
tions,
but it
does allow
the debate
to
take
place
on
more
realistic
grounds
and thus to facilitatea
more
valid
appraisal
of human
well-
being
in
dependent
countries.
89999
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JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
JOURNAL
OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
NOTES
1.
The
concept
of the
tri-pealliance,comprised
of
foreignprivatecapi-
tal,
national
privatecapital,
and
national
public
or state
capital,
is elaborat-
ed
in
Cardoso
(1973b);
Evans
(1979);
and
Cardoso
and Faletto
(1979).
2.
On
the
tri-pe
alliance see
note
1
above
and
the
accompanying
text.
Whereasthe
tri-pe
alliance in
capitalist
cases is
comprised
of
foreign
pri-
vate
capital,
national
privatecapital,
and national
public
or state
capital,
he
bi-pe
alliance
in socialist cases is
comprised
of
foreign
state elites and
na-
tional
state elites.
In
socialist
cases,
of
course,
privatecapitalists
are
nonex-
istent or
insignificant.
3.
Two
million
is
the estimate of
Jorge Domfnguez
as cited
by
Maidique(1983:31). One million is the estimate of Skidmoreand Smith
(1984: 284).
4.
On
the
concept
of
a
bi-pe
alliance,
see notes
1 and 2
above and the
accompanying
texts.
REFERENCES
BLASIER,
.
(1983)
The
Giant's
Rival:The USSRand
LatinAmerica.Pitts-
burgh,
PA:
University
of
Pittsburgh
Press.
BRUNDENIUS,
D.
(1984)
Revolutionary
Cuba:
The
Challenge
of
Economic
Growthwith Equity.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.
CARDOSO,
E
(1977)
The
Consumption
of
Dependency Theory
in
the
United
States.
Latin
AmericanResearchReview
12,
3:
7-24.
(1973a)
Cuba:
Lesson or
Symbol?:'pp.
1-9
in
D. Barkin and
N.
Manitzas
eds.)
Cuba:
The
Logic
of the Revolution.
Andover,
MA:
Warner
ModularPublications
Inc.,
Module
267.
(1973b)
'Associated-Dependent
Development:' pp.
142-176
in
A.
Stepan
(ed.)
Authoritarian razil.
New
Haven,
CT:
Yale
University
Press.
CARDOSO,
E and
E.
FALETTO
1979)
Dependency
and
Development
in
LatinAmerica.Berkeley,CA:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
CIRINCIONE,
.,
and L.
HUNTER
1984)
Military
Threats,
Actualand
Po-
tential,
pp.
173-192
n R. Leiken
(ed.)
Central
America:
Anatomy
of a
Conflict.
New
York,
NY:
Pergamon
Press.
del
AGUILA,
.
(1984)
CUBA:
DILEMMAS
F
A
REVOLUTION.
oulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
DOMINGUEZ,J.
1978)
Cuba:Order
and Revolution.
Cambridge,
MA:Har-
vard
University
Press.
DUNCAN,
WR.
(1985)
The Soviet Union
and
Cuba:
Interests and Influ-
ence. New
York,
NY:
Praeger
Publishers.
ERISMAN,
.
(1985)
Cuba's
nternationalRelations:The
Anatomy
of
a
Na-
tionalistic
Foreign
Policy.
Boulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
EVANS,
.
(1979)
Dependent Development:
The Alliance of
Multinational,
State,
and Local
Capital
n Brazil. Princeton
University
Press.
NOTES
1.
The
concept
of the
tri-pealliance,comprised
of
foreignprivatecapi-
tal,
national
privatecapital,
and
national
public
or state
capital,
is elaborat-
ed
in
Cardoso
(1973b);
Evans
(1979);
and
Cardoso
and Faletto
(1979).
2.
On
the
tri-pe
alliance see
note
1
above
and
the
accompanying
text.
Whereasthe
tri-pe
alliance in
capitalist
cases is
comprised
of
foreign
pri-
vate
capital,
national
privatecapital,
and national
public
or state
capital,
he
bi-pe
alliance
in socialist cases is
comprised
of
foreign
state elites and
na-
tional
state elites.
In
socialist
cases,
of
course,
privatecapitalists
are
nonex-
istent or
insignificant.
3.
Two
million
is
the estimate of
Jorge Domfnguez
as cited
by
Maidique(1983:31). One million is the estimate of Skidmoreand Smith
(1984: 284).
4.
On
the
concept
of
a
bi-pe
alliance,
see notes
1 and 2
above and the
accompanying
texts.
REFERENCES
BLASIER,
.
(1983)
The
Giant's
Rival:The USSRand
LatinAmerica.Pitts-
burgh,
PA:
University
of
Pittsburgh
Press.
BRUNDENIUS,
D.
(1984)
Revolutionary
Cuba:
The
Challenge
of
Economic
Growthwith Equity.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.
CARDOSO,
E
(1977)
The
Consumption
of
Dependency Theory
in
the
United
States.
Latin
AmericanResearchReview
12,
3:
7-24.
(1973a)
Cuba:
Lesson or
Symbol?:'pp.
1-9
in
D. Barkin and
N.
Manitzas
eds.)
Cuba:
The
Logic
of the Revolution.
Andover,
MA:
Warner
ModularPublications
Inc.,
Module
267.
(1973b)
'Associated-Dependent
Development:' pp.
142-176
in
A.
Stepan
(ed.)
Authoritarian razil.
New
Haven,
CT:
Yale
University
Press.
CARDOSO,
E and
E.
FALETTO
1979)
Dependency
and
Development
in
LatinAmerica.Berkeley,CA:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
CIRINCIONE,
.,
and L.
HUNTER
1984)
Military
Threats,
Actualand
Po-
tential,
pp.
173-192
n R. Leiken
(ed.)
Central
America:
Anatomy
of a
Conflict.
New
York,
NY:
Pergamon
Press.
del
AGUILA,
.
(1984)
CUBA:
DILEMMAS
F
A
REVOLUTION.
oulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
DOMINGUEZ,J.
1978)
Cuba:Order
and Revolution.
Cambridge,
MA:Har-
vard
University
Press.
DUNCAN,
WR.
(1985)
The Soviet Union
and
Cuba:
Interests and Influ-
ence. New
York,
NY:
Praeger
Publishers.
ERISMAN,
.
(1985)
Cuba's
nternationalRelations:The
Anatomy
of
a
Na-
tionalistic
Foreign
Policy.
Boulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
EVANS,
.
(1979)
Dependent Development:
The Alliance of
Multinational,
State,
and Local
Capital
n Brazil. Princeton
University
Press.
NOTES
1.
The
concept
of the
tri-pealliance,comprised
of
foreignprivatecapi-
tal,
national
privatecapital,
and
national
public
or state
capital,
is elaborat-
ed
in
Cardoso
(1973b);
Evans
(1979);
and
Cardoso
and Faletto
(1979).
2.
On
the
tri-pe
alliance see
note
1
above
and
the
accompanying
text.
Whereasthe
tri-pe
alliance in
capitalist
cases is
comprised
of
foreign
pri-
vate
capital,
national
privatecapital,
and national
public
or state
capital,
he
bi-pe
alliance
in socialist cases is
comprised
of
foreign
state elites and
na-
tional
state elites.
In
socialist
cases,
of
course,
privatecapitalists
are
nonex-
istent or
insignificant.
3.
Two
million
is
the estimate of
Jorge Domfnguez
as cited
by
Maidique(1983:31). One million is the estimate of Skidmoreand Smith
(1984: 284).
4.
On
the
concept
of
a
bi-pe
alliance,
see notes
1 and 2
above and the
accompanying
texts.
REFERENCES
BLASIER,
.
(1983)
The
Giant's
Rival:The USSRand
LatinAmerica.Pitts-
burgh,
PA:
University
of
Pittsburgh
Press.
BRUNDENIUS,
D.
(1984)
Revolutionary
Cuba:
The
Challenge
of
Economic
Growthwith Equity.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.
CARDOSO,
E
(1977)
The
Consumption
of
Dependency Theory
in
the
United
States.
Latin
AmericanResearchReview
12,
3:
7-24.
(1973a)
Cuba:
Lesson or
Symbol?:'pp.
1-9
in
D. Barkin and
N.
Manitzas
eds.)
Cuba:
The
Logic
of the Revolution.
Andover,
MA:
Warner
ModularPublications
Inc.,
Module
267.
(1973b)
'Associated-Dependent
Development:' pp.
142-176
in
A.
Stepan
(ed.)
Authoritarian razil.
New
Haven,
CT:
Yale
University
Press.
CARDOSO,
E and
E.
FALETTO
1979)
Dependency
and
Development
in
LatinAmerica.Berkeley,CA:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
CIRINCIONE,
.,
and L.
HUNTER
1984)
Military
Threats,
Actualand
Po-
tential,
pp.
173-192
n R. Leiken
(ed.)
Central
America:
Anatomy
of a
Conflict.
New
York,
NY:
Pergamon
Press.
del
AGUILA,
.
(1984)
CUBA:
DILEMMAS
F
A
REVOLUTION.
oulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
DOMINGUEZ,J.
1978)
Cuba:Order
and Revolution.
Cambridge,
MA:Har-
vard
University
Press.
DUNCAN,
WR.
(1985)
The Soviet Union
and
Cuba:
Interests and Influ-
ence. New
York,
NY:
Praeger
Publishers.
ERISMAN,
.
(1985)
Cuba's
nternationalRelations:The
Anatomy
of
a
Na-
tionalistic
Foreign
Policy.
Boulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
EVANS,
.
(1979)
Dependent Development:
The Alliance of
Multinational,
State,
and Local
Capital
n Brazil. Princeton
University
Press.
NOTES
1.
The
concept
of the
tri-pealliance,comprised
of
foreignprivatecapi-
tal,
national
privatecapital,
and
national
public
or state
capital,
is elaborat-
ed
in
Cardoso
(1973b);
Evans
(1979);
and
Cardoso
and Faletto
(1979).
2.
On
the
tri-pe
alliance see
note
1
above
and
the
accompanying
text.
Whereasthe
tri-pe
alliance in
capitalist
cases is
comprised
of
foreign
pri-
vate
capital,
national
privatecapital,
and national
public
or state
capital,
he
bi-pe
alliance
in socialist cases is
comprised
of
foreign
state elites and
na-
tional
state elites.
In
socialist
cases,
of
course,
privatecapitalists
are
nonex-
istent or
insignificant.
3.
Two
million
is
the estimate of
Jorge Domfnguez
as cited
by
Maidique(1983:31). One million is the estimate of Skidmoreand Smith
(1984: 284).
4.
On
the
concept
of
a
bi-pe
alliance,
see notes
1 and 2
above and the
accompanying
texts.
REFERENCES
BLASIER,
.
(1983)
The
Giant's
Rival:The USSRand
LatinAmerica.Pitts-
burgh,
PA:
University
of
Pittsburgh
Press.
BRUNDENIUS,
D.
(1984)
Revolutionary
Cuba:
The
Challenge
of
Economic
Growthwith Equity.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.
CARDOSO,
E
(1977)
The
Consumption
of
Dependency Theory
in
the
United
States.
Latin
AmericanResearchReview
12,
3:
7-24.
(1973a)
Cuba:
Lesson or
Symbol?:'pp.
1-9
in
D. Barkin and
N.
Manitzas
eds.)
Cuba:
The
Logic
of the Revolution.
Andover,
MA:
Warner
ModularPublications
Inc.,
Module
267.
(1973b)
'Associated-Dependent
Development:' pp.
142-176
in
A.
Stepan
(ed.)
Authoritarian razil.
New
Haven,
CT:
Yale
University
Press.
CARDOSO,
E and
E.
FALETTO
1979)
Dependency
and
Development
in
LatinAmerica.Berkeley,CA:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
CIRINCIONE,
.,
and L.
HUNTER
1984)
Military
Threats,
Actualand
Po-
tential,
pp.
173-192
n R. Leiken
(ed.)
Central
America:
Anatomy
of a
Conflict.
New
York,
NY:
Pergamon
Press.
del
AGUILA,
.
(1984)
CUBA:
DILEMMAS
F
A
REVOLUTION.
oulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
DOMINGUEZ,J.
1978)
Cuba:Order
and Revolution.
Cambridge,
MA:Har-
vard
University
Press.
DUNCAN,
WR.
(1985)
The Soviet Union
and
Cuba:
Interests and Influ-
ence. New
York,
NY:
Praeger
Publishers.
ERISMAN,
.
(1985)
Cuba's
nternationalRelations:The
Anatomy
of
a
Na-
tionalistic
Foreign
Policy.
Boulder,
CO:
Westview
Press.
EVANS,
.
(1979)
Dependent Development:
The Alliance of
Multinational,
State,
and Local
Capital
n Brazil. Princeton
University
Press.
90000
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/capitalist-cuban-case-pdf 34/35
PACKENHAM:
CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
ACKENHAM:
CUBA
-
CAPITALIST
VS. SOCIALIST
DEPENDENCY
FAGEN,
R.
(1978a)
Cuba nd the Soviet Union '
The
Wilson
Quarterly
2,1
(Winter):
69-78.
(1978b)
'A
Funny
Thing
Happened
on the
Way
to
the
Market:
Thoughts
on
Extending
Dependency
Ideas. International
Organization
32,1
(Winter:
287-300.
GONZALEZ,
.
(1974)
Cuba Under Castro:The
Limits
of Charisma.Bos-
ton:
Houghton
Mifflin.
GRIECO,
.
(1982)
Between
Dependency
and
Autonomy.
nternational
Organization
36,
3
(Summer):
609-632.
HALEBSKY,
.,
andJ.KIRK
eds.)
(1985)
Cuba:
Twenty-five
Years
of
Revolu-
tion,1959-1984.NewYork,NY:PraegerPublishers.
JOHNSON,
L.
(1965)
U.S.
Business
Investments
in
Cuba and the
Rise
of
Castro.
WorldPolitics
17,
3
(April):
440-59.
KAUFMAN,
.
(1976)
The
Superpowers
and their
Spheres
of
Influence.
New
York,
NY:
St.
Martins'
Press.
LEIKENR.
(1981)
EasternWinds
in
Latin America
Foreign
Policy
42
(Spring):
94-113.
LEOGRANDE,
W
(1979)
Cuban
Dependency:
A
Comparison
of
Pre-Revo-
lutionary
and
Post-Revolutionary
nternational
Economic
Relations '
Cuban Studies9, 2 (July):1-28.
LEONTIEV,
(1971)
The
Troublewith
Cuban Socialism. The New
York
Review
of Books
(7
January):
19-23.
LOCKWOOD,
.
(1970)
Introduction o 'This
Shame
Will
be Welcome
... :'
A
Speech
by
Fidel
Castro.
he
NewYorkReviewof Books
(24
Sep-
tember):
18-20.
MAIDIQUE,
M.
(1983)
Fidel'sPlantation.
The Stanford
Magazine
11,
4:
26-32.
MESA-LAGO,
.
(1981)
The
Economyof SocialistCuba;ATwo-DecadeAp-
praisal.Albuquerque,
NM:
University
of New
Mexico Press.
PASTOR,
.
(1983)
Cuba nd the Soviet
Union:
Does
CubaAct
Alone?,
p.
191-209
n B.
Levine
(ed.)
The New
Cuban Presence
in
the
Caribbean.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
PEREZ,
L.
(1985)
Toward New
Future,
Froma New
Past:The
Enterprise
of
History
n
Socialist
Cuba. Cuban Studies
15,1
(Winter):
1-13.
RIPOLL,
C.
(1982)
The
Cuban
Scene: Censors
and
Dissenters.
Partisan
Review
48,
4:1-16
(reprinted
by
the
Cuban-American
National
Founda-
tion,Washington,DC).
SKIDMORE,
.E.and PH. SMITH
1984)
Modern
LatinAmerica.
NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press.
STREET,J.
nd
D.JAMES
eds.) (1979)
TechnologyProgress
n Latin
Ameri-
ca.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
FAGEN,
R.
(1978a)
Cuba nd the Soviet Union '
The
Wilson
Quarterly
2,1
(Winter):
69-78.
(1978b)
'A
Funny
Thing
Happened
on the
Way
to
the
Market:
Thoughts
on
Extending
Dependency
Ideas. International
Organization
32,1
(Winter:
287-300.
GONZALEZ,
.
(1974)
Cuba Under Castro:The
Limits
of Charisma.Bos-
ton:
Houghton
Mifflin.
GRIECO,
.
(1982)
Between
Dependency
and
Autonomy.
nternational
Organization
36,
3
(Summer):
609-632.
HALEBSKY,
.,
andJ.KIRK
eds.)
(1985)
Cuba:
Twenty-five
Years
of
Revolu-
tion,1959-1984.NewYork,NY:PraegerPublishers.
JOHNSON,
L.
(1965)
U.S.
Business
Investments
in
Cuba and the
Rise
of
Castro.
WorldPolitics
17,
3
(April):
440-59.
KAUFMAN,
.
(1976)
The
Superpowers
and their
Spheres
of
Influence.
New
York,
NY:
St.
Martins'
Press.
LEIKENR.
(1981)
EasternWinds
in
Latin America
Foreign
Policy
42
(Spring):
94-113.
LEOGRANDE,
W
(1979)
Cuban
Dependency:
A
Comparison
of
Pre-Revo-
lutionary
and
Post-Revolutionary
nternational
Economic
Relations '
Cuban Studies9, 2 (July):1-28.
LEONTIEV,
(1971)
The
Troublewith
Cuban Socialism. The New
York
Review
of Books
(7
January):
19-23.
LOCKWOOD,
.
(1970)
Introduction o 'This
Shame
Will
be Welcome
... :'
A
Speech
by
Fidel
Castro.
he
NewYorkReviewof Books
(24
Sep-
tember):
18-20.
MAIDIQUE,
M.
(1983)
Fidel'sPlantation.
The Stanford
Magazine
11,
4:
26-32.
MESA-LAGO,
.
(1981)
The
Economyof SocialistCuba;ATwo-DecadeAp-
praisal.Albuquerque,
NM:
University
of New
Mexico Press.
PASTOR,
.
(1983)
Cuba nd the Soviet
Union:
Does
CubaAct
Alone?,
p.
191-209
n B.
Levine
(ed.)
The New
Cuban Presence
in
the
Caribbean.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
PEREZ,
L.
(1985)
Toward New
Future,
Froma New
Past:The
Enterprise
of
History
n
Socialist
Cuba. Cuban Studies
15,1
(Winter):
1-13.
RIPOLL,
C.
(1982)
The
Cuban
Scene: Censors
and
Dissenters.
Partisan
Review
48,
4:1-16
(reprinted
by
the
Cuban-American
National
Founda-
tion,Washington,DC).
SKIDMORE,
.E.and PH. SMITH
1984)
Modern
LatinAmerica.
NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press.
STREET,J.
nd
D.JAMES
eds.) (1979)
TechnologyProgress
n Latin
Ameri-
ca.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
FAGEN,
R.
(1978a)
Cuba nd the Soviet Union '
The
Wilson
Quarterly
2,1
(Winter):
69-78.
(1978b)
'A
Funny
Thing
Happened
on the
Way
to
the
Market:
Thoughts
on
Extending
Dependency
Ideas. International
Organization
32,1
(Winter:
287-300.
GONZALEZ,
.
(1974)
Cuba Under Castro:The
Limits
of Charisma.Bos-
ton:
Houghton
Mifflin.
GRIECO,
.
(1982)
Between
Dependency
and
Autonomy.
nternational
Organization
36,
3
(Summer):
609-632.
HALEBSKY,
.,
andJ.KIRK
eds.)
(1985)
Cuba:
Twenty-five
Years
of
Revolu-
tion,1959-1984.NewYork,NY:PraegerPublishers.
JOHNSON,
L.
(1965)
U.S.
Business
Investments
in
Cuba and the
Rise
of
Castro.
WorldPolitics
17,
3
(April):
440-59.
KAUFMAN,
.
(1976)
The
Superpowers
and their
Spheres
of
Influence.
New
York,
NY:
St.
Martins'
Press.
LEIKENR.
(1981)
EasternWinds
in
Latin America
Foreign
Policy
42
(Spring):
94-113.
LEOGRANDE,
W
(1979)
Cuban
Dependency:
A
Comparison
of
Pre-Revo-
lutionary
and
Post-Revolutionary
nternational
Economic
Relations '
Cuban Studies9, 2 (July):1-28.
LEONTIEV,
(1971)
The
Troublewith
Cuban Socialism. The New
York
Review
of Books
(7
January):
19-23.
LOCKWOOD,
.
(1970)
Introduction o 'This
Shame
Will
be Welcome
... :'
A
Speech
by
Fidel
Castro.
he
NewYorkReviewof Books
(24
Sep-
tember):
18-20.
MAIDIQUE,
M.
(1983)
Fidel'sPlantation.
The Stanford
Magazine
11,
4:
26-32.
MESA-LAGO,
.
(1981)
The
Economyof SocialistCuba;ATwo-DecadeAp-
praisal.Albuquerque,
NM:
University
of New
Mexico Press.
PASTOR,
.
(1983)
Cuba nd the Soviet
Union:
Does
CubaAct
Alone?,
p.
191-209
n B.
Levine
(ed.)
The New
Cuban Presence
in
the
Caribbean.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
PEREZ,
L.
(1985)
Toward New
Future,
Froma New
Past:The
Enterprise
of
History
n
Socialist
Cuba. Cuban Studies
15,1
(Winter):
1-13.
RIPOLL,
C.
(1982)
The
Cuban
Scene: Censors
and
Dissenters.
Partisan
Review
48,
4:1-16
(reprinted
by
the
Cuban-American
National
Founda-
tion,Washington,DC).
SKIDMORE,
.E.and PH. SMITH
1984)
Modern
LatinAmerica.
NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press.
STREET,J.
nd
D.JAMES
eds.) (1979)
TechnologyProgress
n Latin
Ameri-
ca.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
FAGEN,
R.
(1978a)
Cuba nd the Soviet Union '
The
Wilson
Quarterly
2,1
(Winter):
69-78.
(1978b)
'A
Funny
Thing
Happened
on the
Way
to
the
Market:
Thoughts
on
Extending
Dependency
Ideas. International
Organization
32,1
(Winter:
287-300.
GONZALEZ,
.
(1974)
Cuba Under Castro:The
Limits
of Charisma.Bos-
ton:
Houghton
Mifflin.
GRIECO,
.
(1982)
Between
Dependency
and
Autonomy.
nternational
Organization
36,
3
(Summer):
609-632.
HALEBSKY,
.,
andJ.KIRK
eds.)
(1985)
Cuba:
Twenty-five
Years
of
Revolu-
tion,1959-1984.NewYork,NY:PraegerPublishers.
JOHNSON,
L.
(1965)
U.S.
Business
Investments
in
Cuba and the
Rise
of
Castro.
WorldPolitics
17,
3
(April):
440-59.
KAUFMAN,
.
(1976)
The
Superpowers
and their
Spheres
of
Influence.
New
York,
NY:
St.
Martins'
Press.
LEIKENR.
(1981)
EasternWinds
in
Latin America
Foreign
Policy
42
(Spring):
94-113.
LEOGRANDE,
W
(1979)
Cuban
Dependency:
A
Comparison
of
Pre-Revo-
lutionary
and
Post-Revolutionary
nternational
Economic
Relations '
Cuban Studies9, 2 (July):1-28.
LEONTIEV,
(1971)
The
Troublewith
Cuban Socialism. The New
York
Review
of Books
(7
January):
19-23.
LOCKWOOD,
.
(1970)
Introduction o 'This
Shame
Will
be Welcome
... :'
A
Speech
by
Fidel
Castro.
he
NewYorkReviewof Books
(24
Sep-
tember):
18-20.
MAIDIQUE,
M.
(1983)
Fidel'sPlantation.
The Stanford
Magazine
11,
4:
26-32.
MESA-LAGO,
.
(1981)
The
Economyof SocialistCuba;ATwo-DecadeAp-
praisal.Albuquerque,
NM:
University
of New
Mexico Press.
PASTOR,
.
(1983)
Cuba nd the Soviet
Union:
Does
CubaAct
Alone?,
p.
191-209
n B.
Levine
(ed.)
The New
Cuban Presence
in
the
Caribbean.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
PEREZ,
L.
(1985)
Toward New
Future,
Froma New
Past:The
Enterprise
of
History
n
Socialist
Cuba. Cuban Studies
15,1
(Winter):
1-13.
RIPOLL,
C.
(1982)
The
Cuban
Scene: Censors
and
Dissenters.
Partisan
Review
48,
4:1-16
(reprinted
by
the
Cuban-American
National
Founda-
tion,Washington,DC).
SKIDMORE,
.E.and PH. SMITH
1984)
Modern
LatinAmerica.
NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press.
STREET,J.
nd
D.JAMES
eds.) (1979)
TechnologyProgress
n Latin
Ameri-
ca.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
91111
This content downloaded from 189.253.128.242 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:42:28 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8/11/2019 Capitalist Cuban Case. PDF
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/capitalist-cuban-case-pdf 35/35
92
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
TALBOTT,
.
(1978a)
'A
Display
of
Group-Think
Time
Magazine
(26
June):
31.
(1978b)
Comrade idel WantsYou Time
Magazine
(10July):
36-39.
THOMAS,
H.
(1984)
Coping
with
Cuba,
p.
775-789
in I.
Horowitz
(ed.)
Cuban
Communism,
5th
edition. New
Brunswick,
NJ:
Transaction
Books.
(1977)
The
Cuban
Revolution.
New
York,
NY:
Harper
and Row.
(1971)
Cuba:
The
Pursuit
of Freedom.
NewYork,
NY:
Harper
and Row.
THOMAS,H., FAURIOL,G.,
and J. WEISS
(1984)
The Cuban Revolution:
Twenty-Five
Years
Later.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
TRILLING,.(1952) Introduction, p.v-xxiii n George Orwell'sHomage
to
Catalonia.
New
York,
NY:Harcourt
Brace
Jovanovich.
92
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
TALBOTT,
.
(1978a)
'A
Display
of
Group-Think
Time
Magazine
(26
June):
31.
(1978b)
Comrade idel WantsYou Time
Magazine
(10July):
36-39.
THOMAS,
H.
(1984)
Coping
with
Cuba,
p.
775-789
in I.
Horowitz
(ed.)
Cuban
Communism,
5th
edition. New
Brunswick,
NJ:
Transaction
Books.
(1977)
The
Cuban
Revolution.
New
York,
NY:
Harper
and Row.
(1971)
Cuba:
The
Pursuit
of Freedom.
NewYork,
NY:
Harper
and Row.
THOMAS,H., FAURIOL,G.,
and J. WEISS
(1984)
The Cuban Revolution:
Twenty-Five
Years
Later.
Boulder,
CO:WestviewPress.
TRILLING,.(1952) Introduction, p.v-xxiii n George Orwell'sHomage
to
Catalonia.
New
York,
NY:Harcourt
Brace
Jovanovich.
92
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND
WORLD
AFFAIRS
TALBOTT,
.
(1978a)
'A
Display
of
Group-Think
Time
Magazine
(26
June):
31.
(1978b)
Comrade idel WantsYou Time
Magazine
(10July):
36-39.
THOMAS,
H.
(1984)
Coping
with
Cuba,
p.
775-789
in I.
Horowitz
(ed.)
Cuban
Communism,
5th
edition. New
Brunswick,
NJ:
Transaction
Books.
(1977)
The
Cuban
Revolution.
New
York,
NY:
Harper
and Row.
(1971)
Cuba:
The
Pursuit
of Freedom.
NewYork,
NY:
Harper
and Row.
THOMAS,H., FAURIOL,G.,
and J. WEISS
(1984)
The Cuban Revolution:
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