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Riding the Web 2.0 Wave: Candidates on YouTube inthe 2007 Finnish National ElectionsTom Carlson a & Kim Strandberg a ba Department of Social Sciences , Åbo Akademi University ,b Swedish Institute for Social Research ,Published online: 11 Oct 2008.

To cite this article: Tom Carlson & Kim Strandberg (2008) Riding the Web 2.0 Wave: Candidates on YouTube in the 2007Finnish National Elections, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 5:2, 159-174, DOI: 10.1080/19331680802291475

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doi:10.1080/19331680802291475 159

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RESEARCH PAPERS

Riding the Web 2.0 Wave: Candidates on YouTube in the 2007 Finnish National Elections

Carlson and Strandberg Tom CarlsonKim Strandberg

ABSTRACT. This article seeks to expand the research on the adoption of social networkingWeb sites in electoral politics beyond the U.S. by exploring the use and impact of the YouTubevideo-sharing Web site in the 2007 Finnish national elections. Focusing on uploaded videosfeaturing candidates, the study shows that YouTube played a marginal role in the elections. Only6% of the candidates disseminated YouTube videos. Online, the videos did not generally attractmuch public interest. However, the study also demonstrates that YouTube gave a voice tocertain minor electoral players and ordinary citizens in the elections. The findings are comparedwith scholarly observations from the 2006 U.S. midterm elections—the first “YouTubeelections.”

KEYWORDS. Candidates, campaigning, elections, Finland, Internet, online politics, participatorymedia, Web 2.0, YouTube

Throughout history, election campaigns haveresponded to new modes of communication andutilized the latest in communications in order toachieve the goal of vote maximization on theelectoral arena (Esaiasson, 1991; Jamieson,1984; Norris, 2000). During the last decade, asthe World Wide Web has rapidly developedinto a widely used communication system, par-ties and candidates have increasingly employedWeb technologies in their campaigns. In fact,

Web sites have already become an establishedand integrated part of election campaign com-munication in many nations (Gibson, 2004;Kluver, Jankowski, Foot, & Schneider, 2007).However, the Web is not a static medium; it isin rapid motion. New Web tools are frequentlybeing developed, thus forcing campaign organi-zations to consider whether and how to adoptthe newest Web innovations and integrate theminto their online electoral strategies.1

Tom Carlson is Doctor of Political Science, Head of Research in Political Science at the Department ofSocial Sciences, Åbo Akademi University. His primary areas of research focus on political communication,in particular political advertising and Web campaigning.

Kim Strandberg is Doctor of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University and Researcher at the SwedishInstitute for Social Research in Finland. His research focuses on political uses of the Internet.

Address correspondence to: Tom Carlson, Åbo Akademi University, PB 311, FIN–65101 Vasa, Finland(E-mail: tcarlson@abo.fi).

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Currently, it is proposed that the Web is mov-ing into a new phase called Web 2.0. However,there is not yet a firm consensus about whatconstitutes Web 2.0 (Madden & Fox, 2006;O’Reilly, 2005). In technological terms, Web2.0 describes the Web as a user-driven platformproviding an architecture of participation(O’Reilly, 2005). Emphasizing the socialaspects of this new phase, we regard Web 2.0 as ashift from the Web as a publishing medium to aplatform for social participation and interactionbased around social networking activities andemphasizing online collaboration, communica-tion, and sharing among users. Today, there is agrowing range of “social software” that enablescitizens to create, distribute, share, and value-add to various digital content. Thisparticipatory Web includes blogs (enablingself-publishing and networking); wikis (built onuser collaboration on texts); file-sharing net-works; and sites for uploading, distributing, andsharing videos and photographs. As broadbandconnections have spread, a growing number ofcitizens use such Web 2.0 features. For exam-ple, in December 2005, 42% of broadbandusers in the U.S. (35% of all Web users) hadposted content online, and 26% of all Internetusers had shared their own artwork, photos, sto-ries, or videos online (Horrigan, 2006). More-over, among the 10 most popular Web sites inthe world at the moment, six sites can beregarded as Web 2.0 platforms.2

In the context of electoral politics, Web 2.0may devolve power to the citizens, facilitatinginteractive communication in horizontalnetworks and the distribution and sharing ofpolitical content (Castells, 2007). During the2006 U.S. midterm congressional electioncampaign, approximately 14 million Americansused the Web to contribute to political discus-sion and activity (Rainie, 2007). Specifically,23% of campaign Internet users (11% of Internetusers and 7% of the entire U.S. population) didat least one of the following things: posted theirown political commentary online; created polit-ical audio or video recordings; or forwarded orposted someone else’s political audio or videorecordings.

For campaign organizations, the participa-tory Web is the latest challenge. As often

regarding innovations in campaigning, cam-paigns in the U.S. have been the forerunners inpicking up and employing new Web trends,thus producing benchmarks that are lateradopted and adapted by campaigns elsewhere.In the 2004 U.S. presidential elections,campaign organizations responded to the blog-ging phenomenon (Kerbel & Bloom, 2005;Trammell, 2006). According to Trammell(2006, p. 142), the rapid adoption of blogs inthe campaign represented “a true turn towardengaging voters and interacting with them,”given that campaigns had earlier been quitereluctant to offer opportunities for online inter-activity to the voters. In the 2006 U.S. midtermelections, campaigns further integrated Web 2.0applications into their online strategies. In orderto tap into the popularity of social networkingsites, candidates promoted their campaigns onWeb 2.0 platforms such as YouTube, MySpace,and Facebook (Castells, 2007; Cornfield, 2006;Gueorguieva, in press; Keen, 2006; Williams &Gulati, 2007).

In particular, the employment of the enor-mously popular3 video-sharing site YouTube bycandidates, supporters, and average Americansduring the campaign was frequently featured inthe discourse of the 2006 election cycle(Gueorguieva, in press). The use of YouTubeeven led commentators to speak of the “You-Tube elections,” “YouTube politics,” and the“YouTube-ization of politics” (Fine, 2006;Gumbel, 2006; Lizza, 2006). In short, YouTube4

enables people to upload and view videosonline free of charge and, additionally, to com-ment on and link to uploaded videos. In upload-ing videos, candidates and supporters, however,ceded control over their messages, as viewerscould freely comment on the videos and sharelinks to the commented clips in various onlinenetworks. Moreover, YouTube became anuncontrolled channel for negative campaigning,as videos showing candidates’ lapses and gaffeswere uploaded, commented on, and spread(Gueorguieva, in press; Schatz, 2006; Wasserman,2006). Castells (2007), paying attention to,among other things, such political YouTubescandals, regards the 2006 campaign as a “turningpoint in the forms of media politics in theUnited States and probably in the world at

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large” (p. 255). However that may be, it iscertainly the case that various electoral actorsoutside the U.S. learned from the 2006 elec-tions and began to experiment with YouTubeduring election campaigns.

In this article, we focus on the use and role ofYouTube in the 2007 Finnish parliamentaryelections. Hereby, we seek to expand theresearch on the adoption of YouTube (and ofnew social networking platforms in general) inelectoral politics beyond the U.S. context.Given the novelty of the topic, and the scarcityof empirical research conducted hitherto, weaim to empirically explore the use and impactof YouTube in the 2007 Finnish campaign.Specifically, we focus on candidates on YouTube.As scholars have pointed out, it is likely thatexperimentation with new Web campaigningtools flourishes particularly on the candidatelevel (Gibson, 2004; Greer & LaPointe, 2003).In addition, focusing on the candidate levelmakes it possible to compare and contrast ourfindings from the Finnish case with scholarlyobservations from the 2006 U.S. midterm elec-tion campaign.

THE FINNISH CASE

Several circumstances make the Finnish caseinteresting to explore with regard to the use androle of YouTube in elections. First, as in theU.S., but in contrast to most other WesternEuropean countries, the electoral system inFinland is strongly oriented toward individualcandidates. In the Finnish system, using propor-tional representation in multimember districts,the voters cannot cast ballots according to partylists of candidates, but merely for unrankedindividual candidates representing parties orelectoral alliances. Predominantly, this systembrings about candidate-driven campaigns.Finnish candidates thus invest in personalcampaigns and usually have their own supportgroups to organize campaign activities, raisemoney, and generate publicity (Ruostetsaari &Mattila, 2002). In general, these loosely orga-nized groups operate relatively independent ofthe parties; the party organization functions as abackground resource and coordinator (Sundberg,

1995). As suggested by Greer and LaPointe(2003, p. 116), candidate-centered systems offera more flexible and diverse platform for candi-dates to innovate in how to engage voters, alsoon the Web. Indeed, YouTube campaigning wasadopted early by Finnish candidates fielded forthe March 2007 elections; the first videos wereuploaded in October 2006, that is, at the sametime that the campaign for the November mid-term election in the U.S. was still running.

Second, in Finland, and again contrary tomost other Western European countries, indi-vidual candidates can purchase as much adver-tising time as they want on national commercialtelevision channels. Hence, contenders withscarce financial resources—usually candidatesrunning for minor and fringe parties—may findit appealing to upload and cast their campaignvideos (including ads) on YouTube for free.

Third, there is actually a significant share ofcandidates representing small parties in thenational elections, since the Finnish multipartysystem is highly fragmented.5 Fourth, concern-ing broadband penetration, a prerequisite forwatching YouTube-videos online, Finland isranked seventh in the OECD, surpassing theU.S., which is ranked fifteenth (OECD, 2007).Finally, YouTube is highly popular in Finland;it is currently ranked third among the mostpopular Web sites.6

AREAS OF INQUIRY

We focus our empirical exploration on threemain areas of inquiry. First, we examine theextent and characteristics of videos featuringcandidates that were uploaded on YouTubeduring the campaign. In this context, we surveythe occurrence of videos portraying candidatesin a negative way (e.g., by showing candidates’gaffes). Second, we focus on the online impactof the uploaded candidate-related videos byexamining the number of video views, viewercomments, the number of links pointing to thevideos from other Web sites (including blogs),and clicks from these links. Third, we payattention to the candidates that opted forYouTube campaigning: What kind of candi-dates uploaded self-promotional videos on the

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site? Were there certain kinds of candidateswho did better than others in providing videosthat resulted in high online impact? Did theYouTube use by candidates have an impact onelectoral success? Before we explore theseareas, we will provide a backdrop for the explo-ration. In this backdrop, we first summarizeobservations on the use and role of YouTube inthe 2006 U.S. midterm elections. Thereafter,we theoretically discuss characteristics of initialadopters of new campaign tools.

BACKDROP OF THE STUDY

YouTube in the 2006 U.S. Elections

To date, only one scholarly study has empiri-cally and systematically examined candidates’use of participatory social networking sites inthe 2006 midterm elections. Williams andGulati (2007), focusing on the use of Facebook,report that relatively few candidates cam-paigned on YouTube, although the role of this sitein the elections received much press attention.According to their observations, 10% of the 130Senate candidates, and none of the 1,102 Housecandidates, created their own YouTube channelwhere they could post videos. However, severalcandidate-related videos—positive as well asnegative—were also uploaded by actors otherthan the candidates themselves or their officialcampaign organizations (Bryant, 2006a, 2006b;Gueorguieva, in press).

Campaigns turned to YouTube for severalreasons. In an article discussing the use andimpact of YouTube and MySpace in the 2006midterm elections, Gueorguieva (in press)points out that YouTube increased the ability ofcampaigns to use videos as an advertising tool.First, YouTube offered candidates a potentiallylarge reach, as the site attracts 20 millionunique users a month. In addition, the site’sreach is not limited to young, Web-savvy voters;user demographic data show that YouTube hasgained a cross-generational appeal (Gueorguieva,in press). Second, YouTube offered candidates—including less well-known candidates who haveless funding—a cost-effective alternative, asthe site provides free video dissemination.

Finally, on YouTube, campaigns could broad-cast highly controversial ads and messages,since the site, to date, is unregulated(Gueorguieva, in press). For example, the U.S.Federal Election Commission’s Internet rulesapply only to paid political advertising (“TheFirst YouTube,” 2006).

An additional cause to the rise in use ofYouTube in the 2006 elections was VirginiaSenator George Allen’s “macaca” incident thatdemonstrated the potential power of YouTubeearly on (Gueorguieva, in press; Lizza, 2006;Wasserman, 2006). In August, Allen, runningfor re-election, was captured on tape at a cam-paign event calling a student of Indian descent amacaca, a racial slur meaning monkey. Thestudent, working for the opposition campaign,taped Allen’s blunder and uploaded the clip onYouTube. The clip created a buzz in onlinecommunities and was soon picked up by themainstream news media. The resulting feedingfrenzy was considered to have contributed toAllen’s eventual defeat in the race. During the2006 campaign, gaffes by several candidateswere caught on tape and uploaded on YouTube,and from there the videos spread online(Gueorguieva, in press; Schatz, 2006).

YouTube also allowed other people besidescandidates and their campaign staff—ordinarycitizens such as opinionated enthusiasts unaffil-iated with parties or candidates—to broadcastunauthorized election-related material (Ewing,2006). Besides uploading videos, citizens couldalso comment on the videos on YouTube andcould reply to others’ comments. They couldalso send links to the videos—among others, clipsridiculing candidates—to other like-mindedpeople. Thus, YouTube eroded the candidates’attempts to control their campaign messagesand empowered citizens to affect campaignprocesses.

Beyond the videos showing candidates’gaffes, which attracted much attention, little isknown about the campaigns’ YouTube uploads.According to Ewing (2006), a common use ofYouTube was to reshow ads already broadcastedon television. This seems to be confirmed bycolumnist and blogger Steve Bryant’s nonsci-entific survey of the occurrence of videos onYouTube matching candidate name keywords

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(Bryant, 2006a, 2006b). According to Bryant,observing Senate candidates in the first 10states of the Union (referring, in alphabeticalorder, to Arizona through Massachusetts), tele-vision ads predominated. Apparently, in thecampaign, candidates were still finding ways toutilize YouTube. This, of course, is a still-ongoingprocess. Commentators have emphasized thatcandidates cannot just use YouTube as an infor-mation dump for traditional political advertising(Teinowitz, 2007). Rather, it is argued, cam-paigning on YouTube and other social networkingplatforms should be more about communicatingin authentic and compelling ways that haveviral power (Keen, 2006). A video with viralpower that creates viral buzz refers to a videowhose content achieves widespread popularityby word of mouth, usually by means of Internetsharing.

What about the impacts of YouTube in the2006 elections then? Beyond speculation onmore long-term and profound effects—forexample, the death of candidates’ spontaneitydue to the constant threat of being caught onvideo—little is yet known. Regarding the off-line impact on voters, the qualified guess byCornfield and Rainie (2006) is probablyaccurate:

Post-election research probably will con-firm the evidence from past campaigns.Online videos will have registered withsome voters. Yet for most, the politicalnews and information on television and innewspapers will have been more routinelypart of their lives. It is also likely that thegreatest impact of YouTube material willhave come through its amplification bythe parties and mainstream media. (p. 3)

Similarly, systematic empirical studies donot abound concerning the online impact ofthe videos. However, in Bryant’s (2006b)aforementioned survey of the occurrence ofcandidate-related YouTube videos in the elec-tions, figures for the number of video views andcomments are provided. Analyzing these fig-ures, we note that the number of views rangedconsiderably (from a low of 16 to a high of216,409, giving a median of 1,551 views). The

number of comments ranged between 0 and830, giving a median of 2 comments. Eventhough the survey is explorative and reportsimperfect data, the figures indicate that theelection-related YouTube did not in general—beyond the hype—attract large public interest.This may be problematic, especially for lessknown and underfunded candidates who hopethat YouTube may level the playing field. AsCornfield (2006) pointed out during thecampaign, “Allowing equal access to the play-ing field is one thing; winning (or even scoring)on that field is quite another” (p. 43). Thechallenge for campaigns is, Cornfield added,“to get the right people to enter the right searchterms and view the right videos at the righttimes” (ibid).

Early Adopters of YouTube Campaigning

The U.S. observations do not provide find-ings regarding the kinds of candidates whowere pioneers in YouTube campaigning. Sincethis is a question that we will address in theFinnish context, we will now theoreticallydiscuss the adoption of campaign innovationsby candidates.

In the general literature of the adoption anddiffusion of innovations, a central topic con-cerns the characteristics of different kinds ofadopters of an innovation. Rogers (1995) hasdistinguished between five categories ofadopters based on their time of adoption of theinnovation: innovators, early adopters, earlymajority, late majority, and laggards. Theseadopter types differ from each other in terms oftheir demographics and personalities. Rogers(1986, pp. 132–134) summarizes that earlyadopters of new media (comprising innovatorsand early adopters), compared with later adopt-ers, are more often young, male, and have ahigher socioeconomic status. Moreover, theventuresome initial adopters of new media haveless dogmatism and different communicationbehavior (e.g., more likely to utilize variousmass media channels) than the later adopters(Rogers, 1986, pp. 132–134). In this context,Agarwal, Ahuja, Carter, and Gans (1998) havedemonstrated that early adopters of informa-tion technology innovations possess a greater

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willingness to try out any new informationtechnology than later adopters. Tentatively,then, we will examine whether the Finnishcandidates uploading self-promotional videoson YouTube in the 2007 elections were dispro-portionately young, male, better educated (anindicator of socioeconomic status), and simulta-neously used other Web campaign innovations.

In addition, we need to consider adoptionfactors that are more political. Similarly to astudy by Williams and Gulati (2007) that exam-ined why some candidates were more likely tocampaign on Facebook in the 2006 U.S. mid-term elections, we find it relevant to pay atten-tion to electoral-related factors and attributes ofthe candidates’ constituencies. The electoral-related factors that we consider important arerelated to political resources: the size of thecandidate’s party and the incumbency status ofthe candidate. Regarding the attributes of thecandidates’ constituencies, we focus on theurbanization level of the constituency.

Regarding the size of the candidate’s party, ithas been suggested that, theoretically, smallparty candidates could be more inclined toadopt Web sites than major party candidates(e.g., Davis, 1999; Hill & Hughes, 1998).Through offering an affordable and fast com-munication channel, the Web seems suitable forcandidates who lack the resources to efficientlycampaign through traditional media. Empiri-cally, it is worth noting that research has mostlyshown that major party candidates havecampaign Web sites at a higher rate than candi-dates representing smaller parties (Gibson,2004; Greer & LaPointe, 2003; Strandberg,2006). As the costs of constructing andmaintaining Web sites have risen, less resource-ful candidates running for minor parties havelagged behind. Campaigning on YouTube andon other Web 2.0 platforms (e.g., blogs) may,however, be a case apart. First, uploadingvideos on YouTube is a cheap way to broadcastaudiovisual content for minor electoral playerswho find television ad-buying costly and whoseldom obtain news coverage on television.Second, if YouTube campaigning is more aboutproviding authenticity and intimacy, assuggested, the uploads do not need to consist ofexpensively produced spot ads. Third, as

YouTube videos are not covered by nationalelectoral campaign rules and content regula-tions applied to television broadcasting,YouTube may appeal to minor and fringe partycandidates who may have an offensive or con-troversial agenda.

Concerning candidate status, it has beenargued that challengers might feel more com-pelled to campaign online than incumbents.According to Kamarck (2003, p. 87), challeng-ers may “feel that they have to try harder andthus become more likely to adopt new technol-ogies.” Thus, they should be more prone to turnto alternative new ways of campaigning, as theylag behind the incumbents in terms of namerecognition, campaign leverage, and govern-mental resources (Davis, 1999; Gibson, 2004;Gibson & McAllister, 2006). Accordingly, weexpect this to be the case regarding YouTubecampaigning as well.

Finally, the urbanization level of the candi-dates’ constituencies might affect YouTubecampaigning by candidates. Basically, candi-dates running in highly urbanized constituenciesmight be more prone to promote themselves onYouTube, since the electorate’s access to anduse of the Internet tend to be high in such con-stituencies. Additionally, on a more speculativenote, urban people might be among the first topick up new trends, for instance, to useYouTube.

THE 2007 FINNISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Before turning to the empirical analysis, webriefly sketch the context of the 2007 Finnishparliamentary elections (see further Arter, 2007;Nurmi & Nurmi, 2007; Statistics Finland, 2007).In the elections, held on March 18, 2007, 200Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected tothe unicameral legislature from 14 multimemberconstituencies and one single-member district(the Åland Islands). The proportional electionsystem with open party lists requests that Finnsvote for a candidate and not a party. The totalnumber of candidates in the elections was2,004. In total, 18 parties nominated candidates;approximately two-thirds of the candidates

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were fielded by current parliamentary parties.The female proportion of candidates was39.9%. Of all candidates, 69% were aged 40 orover. In total, 169 incumbent candidates wererunning for re-election. Besides campaigningtraditionally off-line, a large share of the candi-dates had their own Web sites (62%) and blogs(34%) (Strandberg & Carlson, 2007). The voterturnout was 67.9%, the lowest since the 1939elections. Eight parties gained seats in the newparliament. The support for the three major partieswas quite even, capturing together approximately65% of the vote. Among the smaller parties, theGreen League and the populist True Finns weresuccessful in these elections.

METHODS AND DATA

The following empirical exploration isdivided into two parts covering our areas ofinquiry. In the first part, we analyze the gen-eral characteristics and the online impact of allvideos featuring Finnish parliamentary candi-dates found on YouTube on the last workingday prior to Election Day. In order to find allthe relevant videos, we consulted YouTube’ssearch tool using several election-relatedsearch terms. During this procedure, we foundthat the Finnish terms for “parliamentary elec-tions” (eduskuntavaalit) and “elections”(vaalit) correlated with all the other testedsearch terms.7 Using those two terms, weregistered a total of 295 videos in which candi-dates fielded for the elections appeared. First,the general characteristics of each video werecoded: the date when it had been uploaded, thelength of the video, and whether it portrayedthe featured candidate in a positive or negativelight. Second, we noted whether the uploaderallowed viewer comments. Third, in order toexamine the videos’ online impact, we noted,per video, the number of views, the number oflinks pointing to the videos from otherWeb sites (including blogs), the number ofclicks from these links, the number of usercomments, and the occurrence of negativecomments.

The second part of the analysis focuses onthe candidates who provided videos. In this

part, we exclude videos that were obviously notuploaded by candidates. Of course, we cannotbe fully assured that all included videos wereuploaded by candidates or their organizations.It is possible that ordinary citizens could haveuploaded unauthorized clips featuring candi-dates that they supported. However, after hav-ing thoroughly examined the video uploads andthe provided uploader information, it is ourstrong belief that the videos in question wereauthorized by the candidates and/or their cam-paign organizations.8 The analysis has fourfocus points. First, we observe the types of can-didates who opted for YouTube campaigning.Here, we examine the distribution of candidatespromoting themselves on YouTube accordingto the candidate-related characteristics dis-cussed earlier: that is, gender, age, education,size of the candidate’s party,9 incumbency sta-tus, constituency urbanization, and propensityto simultaneously use other Web innovations(indicated by the possession of a blog). In orderto establish these background characteristics forthe 1,997 candidates running for Parliament,10

we utilized publicly available data11 and infor-mation found on the candidates’ Web sites.Second, we apply a logistic regression modelfor the purpose of explaining candidates’ You-Tube presence in light of these characteristics.Third, we explore the connection between theonline impact of YouTube campaign videosand the characteristics of the candidates whoprovided them.

Fourth, we approach the question concerningwhether the use of YouTube by candidatesaffected their electoral success. In earlier studiesthat have assessed the impact of candidates’ Webcampaigning on electoral outcomes, vote share isregressed on Web site presence (Gibson &McAllister, 2006) or on the number of the candi-dates’ Facebook supporters (Williams & Gulati,2007), while controlling for a number of otherfactors hypothesized to affect vote share, includ-ing financial and political resources. We find thisapproach somewhat problematic. In our opinion,rigorously assessing the impact of YouTubecampaigning on electoral outcomes wouldrequire voter data: To what extent did the candi-dates’ YouTube videos affect the voters’decision to vote and their vote preference?

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Such data do not exist in Finnish electionresearch related to the 2007 elections. In theabsence of such data, we will neverthelessconduct a simple though crucial test of theimpact of YouTube on candidates’ electoralsuccess. The test consists of two steps. First, weexamine the portion of candidates whocampaigned on YouTube who gained a seat inthe parliament. Second, we compare thenumber of video views—a measure of voterexposure—between elected and non-electedcandidates who campaigned on YouTube. Ifonly a small share of the candidates whocampaigned on YouTube was elected, and ifthese candidates did not receive a larger amountof video views than the YouTube candidateswho did not gain a seat, then there is little needto further explore the relationship between thecandidates’ use of YouTube and their electoralsuccess.

FINDINGS

The YouTube Videos

Initially, we noted that almost all of the 295videos featuring candidates could be classifiedas self-promotional campaign material. Merelyfour clips portrayed the featured candidate in anegative way. One of these negative videosshowed the incumbent candidate, Petri Salo,filmed clandestinely by an ordinary citizen atan election event. The clip revealed Mr. Salo’sallegedly racist view of Somali immigrants: Ina private discussion with a voter, he called themdrug users and work-shy. The citizen, a youngstudent unaffiliated with any opposite cam-paign, distributed the video to a national televi-sion news show and, in addition, uploaded thematerial on YouTube. The incident created astir in the press and the public. As a result, itmade YouTube a recognized electoral factor,although the gaffe did not cost Mr. Salo his re-election. He, however, lost 2,769 votes com-pared to the previous election, a 30% decrease.According to Salo, the incident also reduced hischances of obtaining a ministerial post in thenew government (Purola, 2007). In the threeother negative videos, party leaders, running as

candidates, were portrayed negatively in differ-ent ways. Seemingly, none of these three clipswas uploaded by candidates, parties, or otherorganized interests.

As to the general characteristics of thevideos, we first noted that 41% of the videoswere less than one minute long and that 75% ofthe videos were under three minutes long. Anexamination of the videos’ titles revealed thatmerely 21% of the videos up to 30 seconds inlength were spot ads produced for televisionbroadcasting. Regarding opportunities forviewer interactivity, 90% of the videos allowedviewer comments. Thus, by and large, thecandidates riding the YouTube wave acceptedthe open and interactive nature of the newparticipatory Web.

When additionally examining the dates whenthe videos were uploaded (see Figure 1), wenote that the majority of the videos wereuploaded in the last few weeks before ElectionDay (the last day in week 11). The YouTubecampaign thus followed the dynamics ofmodern campaigning in Finland, where cam-paign activities peak in a late stage in order toinfluence the large group of late-decidingvoters.

Our final examination of the videos focuseson indicators of the clips’ online impact interms of number of views, number of linkspointing to the videos from other Web sites(including blogs), number of clicks from theselinks, and number of viewer comments added tothe videos. Descriptive statistics are displayedin Table 1. As the data distributions were highlyskewed from the normal distribution curve, themedian value and the interquartile range (IQR)are reported instead of the mean and standarddeviation for each examined feature.

Table 1 demonstrates that the videos did notreceive a lot of attention, taking into consider-ation that there were approximately 4 millionFinns eligible to vote in the elections. First, themedian of the number of views reveals that halfof the videos were viewed less than 382 times.What is more, the number of views does notequal the number of individual viewers; thereare certainly fewer viewers per video thanviews. This low interest in watching candidate-related videos is especially noteworthy seeing

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that the leading Finnish daily, HelsinginSanomat, published two large stories coveringYouTube campaigning by candidates prior tothe election. It is possible that the number ofviews would have been even smaller withoutthis news coverage.

Second, both the median value of externallinks pointing to the videos and the correspond-ing median number of viewer clicks from theselinks were extremely low (1 and 5 respec-tively). Even if there was a considerable rangein the number of clicks, 78% of the videoswere, so-to-say, externally clicked less than 100times. Thus, the videos did not in general createany online viral buzz. Third, looking at the vid-eos that allowed viewer comments, the pictureof a generally low impact is further confirmed;the median number of comments was actuallyzero and the highest number of comments onlya mere 96. Strikingly, 75% of the videos thatallowed viewer comments did not attract asingle comment, and 96% of the clips obtained

less than ten comments. Only 13% of the total424 comments were clearly negative (many ofthese negative comments were, however, out-right derisive).

A closer examination of the videos receiv-ing the most attention in terms of views,comments, and clicks from external linksreveals some interesting patterns. Among the10 most-viewed videos (accounting for 44%of all video views), eight clips promotedcandidates running for two small right-wingparties: the populist and nationalist party,True Finns, and the nationalist and radicalright-wing party, the Finnish People’s Blue-Whites. In six of these clips, the candidates(among them, the party leaders) made criticaland sometimes xenophobic statements aboutimmigrants and asylum seekers in Finnishsociety. The two remaining top-10 videos areboth clips that portray candidates in a nega-tive way. One is the previously mentionedcitizen-produced clip where an incumbent

FIGURE 1. Number of videos uploaded per week in 2007 prior to the election.

TABLE 1. The Online Impact of the Videos: Descriptive Statistics

Number Of: Sum Min Max Mdn IQR N

Views 326,645 9 40,778 382 762.25 286Links pointing to the videos 414 0 5 1 2.00 295Clicks from these links 30,630 0 6,969 5 90.00 295Comments 424 0 96 0 0.50 265

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candidate made comments about Somaliimmigrants. This clip was in fact the mostviewed among the 295 videos, having beenwatched 40,778 times. The other clip was alsoapparently filmed by a citizen, and shows theSocial Democrat party leader, Mr. EeroHeinäluoma, in a discussion with an indignantvoter at an outdoor election event. Beingaccused of having failed the voters, the partyleader appears dumbfounded and vague.

These 10 videos happened to be the mostcommented-on videos as well.12 Together the10 videos comprised 68% of all posted comments.The video that attracted the most views, the clipwhere a candidate slanders Somali immigrants,obtained the highest number of comments aswell (n = 96). Surprisingly, we noted that these10 videos did not receive a higher share ofnegative comments than the other videos allow-ing for comments, although they had a morecontroversial content: quite the reverse—theless-commented videos obtained a signifi-cantly higher share of negative comments(comparing 28% to 6%, p < .01 for a differenceof proportions test). Many of the viewers com-menting on the top-ranked videos seeminglyshared the controversial opinions expressed inthese clips.

The examination of the 10 videos with thehighest numbers of external link clicks(accounting for 48% of all clicks) yields lessclear patterns. We note, however, that thetop-10 list this time mostly contains videosother than the most viewed and commentedones. Specifically, the videos representedcandidates—among them three party leaders—from a wider segment of parties than above.Two of the clips also featured the leader ofthe Left Alliance Party’s youth organization,who had recently been featured frequently inthe news media when he was arrested in astreet riot. However, the clip with the highestnumber of external link clicks (6,969) was avideo featuring the party leader of the smallpopulist party, True Finns; this clip wasamong the 10 most viewed and commentedon videos. In sum, candidates with greatername recognition were more likely to attractviewers to their YouTube clips from externalsites.

The YouTube Candidates

We now turn our attention to the candidateswho uploaded videos on YouTube during thecampaign. In total, 120 candidates provided the291 self-promoting videos. Taking into accountthat we examined 1,997 candidates running forelection, campaigning on YouTube was clearlynot a main concern for most of the contenders:only 6% of the candidates published videos.The highest number of videos uploaded by eachcandidate was 24. However, 75% of the candi-dates campaigning on YouTube only uploadeda maximum of two clips (Mdn = 1; IQR = 2).What, then, characterized the initial adopters ofYouTube campaigning? Table 2 compares thedistribution of candidates who provided videosaccording to variables selected earlier.

The findings show that there are severalstatistically significant differences between thecandidate subgroups as to the share of candi-dates who uploaded videos. First, however, wenote that male candidates were not more inclinedto adopt YouTube-campaigning than femalecandidates. Regarding the other demographicalvariables, age and education, the statisticallysignificant differences are less than dramatic. Asomewhat larger share of the young candidates(aged 18–34) disseminated videos than theolder candidates. Additionally, a somewhatlarger share of highly educated candidates pro-vided videos, as compared to candidates with alower level of education. Concerning YouTubecampaigning regarding constituency urbaniza-tion, only a modest statistically significant dif-ference was found: Candidates running inhighly urbanized districts published videos to aslightly higher extent than those running insemi-urban or rural districts.

Regarding the impact of political resources,the differences are more distinct. A signifi-cantly larger share of candidates running for amajor or minor party rode the YouTube wavethan those representing fringe parties. The dif-ference between the share of incumbents andthe share of challenging candidates turning toYouTube is also relatively large and statisti-cally significant. Finally, candidates whohave their own blogs—an indicator of theirgeneral willingness to try out new campaigning

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techniques—uploaded videos to a larger extentthan candidates without blogs. In order to dis-tinguish the relative importance and indepen-dent effect of these candidate-related factors onYouTube campaigning, Table 3 presents alogistic regression model.

It should be noted that the model onlyexplains a small amount of the variance in hav-ing YouTube videos (R2 = .12). Obviously,future research should consider other factors,too. That said, the model by and large confirmsthe central findings of Table 2. Thus, runningfor a major or minor party and having a personalblog are the strongest predictors of YouTubecampaigning. Incumbency also has quite a

strong independent effect. By comparison, theimportance of demographic factors and constit-uency urbanization is weaker. The youngestcandidates (aged 18 to 35) are more likely toupload videos than the older candidates. Run-ning in an urban constituency does have someindependent bearing on YouTube campaigning.Being male is now a statistically significantpredictor, although the bivariate analysis didnot show any significant gender differences inYouTube presence. This is most likely due tothe fact that three-quarters of the 219 missingcases excluded from the regression model weremale candidates lacking YouTube videos.Finally, the model does not confirm any inde-pendent impact for education.

Next, we examine the relationship betweenthe candidates’ characteristics and the onlineimpact of their uploaded material. Specifically,we examine the net number of non-negativeviewer comments (∑ positive or neutral com-ments – ∑ negative comments), the number of

TABLE 2. Candidates Campaigning on YouTube According to Candidate-Related

Variables (Percentage of Candidates Having Uploaded at Least One Video)

Variables % N

GenderMale 6.2 1,199Female 5.8 798

Age**18–34 9.0 45835–49 6.0 63650 and older 4.5 902

Education*Tertiary 8.2 731Secondary 5.6 912Primary 3.7 135

Party size***Major 8.0 688Minor 6.9 841Fringe 1.5 468

Status***Incumbent 12.4 169Challenger 5.4 1,828

Blog possession***Yes 12.1 669No 2.9 1,328

Constituency urbanization**Low (< 79%) 4.4 705Medium (80–89%) 5.6 702High (90–100%) 8.5 590

Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01: *p < .05 (Pearson’s chi-squaretest).Constituency urbanization = the proportion (%) living inurban settlements of the residents in the constituency inwhich the candidate runs (Source: Statistics Finland).

TABLE 3. Predicting the Candidates’ Use of YouTube: Logistic Regression

B S.E. Exp(B) Sig.

Gender .415 .207 1.515 .045Age

18–34 .549 .261 1.732 .03635–50 .013 .250 1.013 .958

EducationTertiary .248 .492 1.281 .614Secondary .051 .491 1.053 .917

Party sizeMajor 1.277 .499 3.588 .010Minor 1.229 .487 3.416 .012

Status .738 .281 2.091 .009Blog 1.077 .219 2.936 .000Constituency urbanization .041 .012 1.041 .000Constant −8.437

Note. The dependent variable: 0 = Candidate does nothave a video, 1 = Candidate has at least one video. Predictors:Gender: Male (1); Female (0). Age: reference category (0)= 50 years or older. Education: reference category (0) =Primary education. Party size: reference category (0):fringe party. Status: 1 = Incumbent; 0 = Challenger. Blog:1 = Candidate has a blog; 0 = Candidate does not have ablog. Constituency urbanization = the proportion (%) livingin urban settlements of the residents in the constituency inwhich the candidate runs. Nagelkerke R2 = .120; % correct= 93.5; N = 1,778.

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clicks from Web sites linking to the videos, andthe number of video views. In Table 4, wedisplay, due to the skewed data distributions,the median and the interquartile range for eachof these indicators according to the differentcandidate subgroups. The non-parametricKruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of varianceby mean ranks is applied in order to statisticallytest subgroup differences.

As to obtained comments, Table 4 showsthat the compared candidate groups do not dif-fer. Regarding clicks and views, one is struckby the very wide IQRs, indicating that there isconsiderable individual variation within thegroups. As a result, only one statistically signif-icant difference between the compared groupswas found. Concerning views, the candidateswho have blogs had a higher mean rank thanthe candidates lacking blogs (Kruskal-Wallis Htest, p = .018), suggesting that the videos of the

bloggers were more popular than the clips pub-lished by non-blogging candidates. Interest-ingly, neither the size of the candidates’ partynor their status generally influenced the onlineimpact of the candidates’ uploaded videos.Seemingly, the earlier observation that some ofthe most viewed and commented videos wereof candidates running for small populist andright-wing parties has more to do with the con-troversial content and the position of the indi-vidual candidate in question, some of thembeing leaders of their party.

In addition, three statistical trends (p < .10)detected in Table 4 are noteworthy. Comparingmean ranks, these trends suggest that male can-didates’ videos were more watched than femalecandidates’ clips (p = .058); that videos distrib-uted by young candidates were viewed morethan older candidates’ uploads (p = .063); andthat videos published by candidates running in

TABLE 4. Number of Comments, External Link Clicks, and Views According to Candidate-Related Variables: Median and Interquartile Range (IQR)

Comments Clicks Views N

Mdn IQR Mdn IQR Mdn IQR

GenderMale 0.00 1.00 4.50 214.75 493.00† 1942.00 74Female 0.00 0.00 0.50 34.25 382.50† 768.50 46

Age18–34 0.00 1.00 8.00 269.00 586.00† 2585.50 4135 and older 0.00 1.00 1.00 97.00 392.00† 817.00 79

EducationTertiary 0.00 0.00 1.00 100.50 419.00 839.75 60Non-tertiary 0.00 0.00 3.00 213.00 503.50 1799.00 51

Party sizeMajor 0.00 0.00 8.00 196.00 459.00 821.00 55Minor 0.00 1.00 1.00 73.50 419.00 1189.25 58Fringe 0.00 1.00 22.00 30.00 552.00 2844.00 7

StatusIncumbent 0.00 0.00 8.00 122.50 378.00 809.00 21Challenger 0.00 0.00 1.00 180.00 465.00 1082.00 99

BloggerYes 0.00 1.00 4.00 136.50 552.00* 980.50 81No 0.00 0.00 0.00 220.00 241.00* 662.00 39

Constituency urbanizationLow 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.00 382.00† 638.00 31Medium 0.00 0.00 0.50 217.75 400.50† 1109.75 39High 0.00 1.00 8.00 223.25 695.00† 1352.50 50

Note. *p < .05; †p < .10 (Kruskal-Wallis H test).

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urban constituencies were more popular thanthe material uploaded by candidates competingin less urban constituencies (p = .098). It is,however, uncertain whether these tendenciesare actually due to candidate factors per se. Thecandidate characteristics in question (i.e., male,young, and urban) might possibly be a reflec-tion of the typical Finnish YouTube user; theseusers may prefer viewing videos presenting thiskind of candidate. Alternatively, candidateswho are young, male, urban, and who have ablog may have a greater interest in new Webapplications and may have more resources tocreate more appealing video content, whichattracts more views.

In bringing our analysis to a close, we finallyexplore whether YouTube use by candidatesappeared to have any immediate impact onelectoral success. The result of our test seem-ingly points in a negative direction. First, only asmall share (21%) of the 120 candidates cam-paigning on YouTube gained a seat in the newparliament. Second, their success was hardlydependent on their YouTube presence: a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test comparingthe number of video views between the electedcandidates (n = 25; Mdn = 570, IQR = 926) andthe non-elected candidates (n = 95, Mdn = 413,IQR = 956) did not reveal a statistical signifi-cance (p = .392). Of course, it should berepeated that our test does not attempt to assessthe potential indirect electoral effects of havinga YouTube video.

CONCLUSIONS

The most obvious conclusion of this study isthat the use and role of YouTube in the 2007Finnish elections was marginal. First, very fewcandidates rode this Web 2.0 wave: Only 6% ofthem disseminated their campaign messages onYouTube. Second, the candidate-related videosdid not generally attract much interest online.With some notable exceptions, most of the vid-eos failed to attract large numbers of views andcomments. Neither did the Finnish videospresenting candidates in most cases create anysignificant viral buzz: Few links pointed to thevideos from other Web sites and blogs, and few

viewers had clicked from these links. Since theuploaded material generally failed to create anonline impact to any large extent, the off-lineimpact was probably virtually non-existent.This conclusion is supported by our test of thedirect impact of YouTube campaigning on thecandidates’ electoral success.

The Finnish YouTube campaign does not,however, stand out as more insignificant thanthe American candidates’ YouTube endeavorsin the 2006 midterm election. Also in the U.S.,relatively few candidates turned to YouTube,and judging from the available median numbersof views and obtained comments, their videoswere generally unsuccessful. Notably though,the Finnish candidates, seemingly to a lesserdegree than their American counterparts, optedfor uploading television ads: Few of the Finnishvideos were 30-second spot ads.

Looking beyond the general picture of YouTubecampaigning as a minor phenomenon in the2007 Finnish elections, our exploration hasgenerated some intriguing findings that meritspecial attention. First, Finland had its ownmacaca case on YouTube. The covertly filmedclip wherein an incumbent candidate, MP PetriSalo, slandered Somali immigrants became themost viewed and commented on candidate-related video on YouTube during the campaign.Importantly, as the gaffe was captured by a studentnot working for any opposition campaign, itdemonstrated the potential for ordinary peopleto affect the campaign agenda and to have avoice in campaigns through YouTube.

Still, the Salo case, in accordance with SenatorGeorge Allen’s macaca case in the U.S., alsodemonstrated the crucial role of mainstreamnews media in creating and amplifying the off-line impact of YouTube material. Most cer-tainly, it was the traditional news coverage ofthese taped incidents and the resulting publicstir that complicated the re-elections of Saloand Allen, not the online videos and buzz perse. In this context, it should also be noted thatboth the U.S. and the Finnish YouTube cam-paigns indicate that online videos have moreleverage if they feature gaffes or similar nega-tive discrediting content rather than positiveself-promotion content. This in turn suggeststhat candidates running in an election system

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based on proportional representation in multi-member districts, as in Finland, have compara-bly less to gain from negative YouTubecampaigning. Whereas a loss of votes for theopposing candidate in a first-past-the-post elec-tion race indirectly favors the other candidate,as in the U.S., the lost votes of an opposing can-didate in a proportional system would mostlikely only transfer to another candidate fromthe opposing party instead of to a differentparty altogether.

Second, eight of the ten most viewed andcommented on videos featured candidates run-ning for small right-wing and populist parties.A majority of these videos included racial orxenophobic discourse. In Finland, anti-immigrantissues have always been marginal themes onthe political agenda, and the radical right hasusually been more or less excluded from politi-cal debates by the mainstream parties (Kestilä,2006). This being the case, our analysis sug-gests that candidates representing small right-wing and populist parties regarded YouTube asa new alternative channel for broadcasting theirmessages and reaching out to a wider public.Arguably, such YouTube material can provideinsights into more subterranean topics in thecampaign. The interesting observation here,however, is not only that these candidates usedYouTube for disseminating controversial mes-sages, but also that these videos were amongthe most viewed and commented on clips.Obviously, their supporters found the way tothe new channel and also provided commentson the videos. Such commentary may thus pro-vide a picture of sentiments of certain groups ofvoters.

Third, the findings shed some light upon thequestion concerning whether YouTube levelsthe playing field for less known and under-funded candidates. Although some of the clipspresenting candidates of small populist andright-wing parties were among the most popu-lar videos, it should be emphasized that fringeparty candidates in general were not dispropor-tionately likely to turn to YouTube or toachieve high numbers of video viewers andcomments. That said, there are also findingsthat suggest that the playing field was leveledon YouTube. Minor party candidates were as

likely as major party candidates to upload mate-rial, and the videos of major party candidatesdid not generally attract more views, clicks, orcomments than the clips of minor and fringeparty candidates. On another note, incumbentswere more prone to use YouTube than chal-lengers. This was unexpected, seeing that chal-lengers, lagging behind incumbents in terms ofresources and name recognition, are consideredto seize every new opportunity to catch votes.Possibly, the Finnish election system, based onproportional representation in multimemberdistricts, explains this: Many candidates arefielded only in order to fill out the party’s slateof candidates and add some votes to the partytotal; consequently, they do not campaignwholeheartedly. Additionally, we note thatsome characteristics that generally differentiateearlier from later adopters were applicable inthe case of YouTube adoption by candidates.Being male, young, running in an urban constit-uency, and having a blog were significant inexplaining the candidates’ willingness to ridethe YouTube wave. Interestingly, these factorsalso influenced the number of video views.Whether this is due to the candidates’ familiar-ity with Web 2.0 techniques or a reflection ofFinnish YouTube users’ demographical compo-sition remains to be empirically explored.

Finally, what role might Web 2.0 applica-tions such as YouTube have in future electioncampaigns? Obviously, the cross-linking ofsuch platforms, Web sites, and blogs is a steptoward remedying a major problem with onlinepolitics; that is, how to guide uninterested peo-ple to political online content. Still, the margin-ality, fragmentation, and peculiarity of Web 2.0sites, as demonstrated with YouTube here,leave many doubts concerning the penetrationamong the wider public. For campaigns, video-sharing sites may remain as yet another channelfor reaching already converted voters in a tradi-tional top-down model. However, Web sitesthat facilitate the sharing of political material,as YouTube, hold some interesting promises ofdown-top communication. As shown in thisarticle—and more recently in the 2007YouTube/CNN presidential primary debates inthe U.S., where citizens could ask the candi-dates questions through videos submitted on

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YouTube—the new technology makes it easierfor citizens to produce and disseminate politicalinformation and thereby play a role in postmod-ern election campaigns.

NOTES

1. The authors have created a dataset that includesinformation necessary to replicate the empirical resultspresented in this article. This dataset will be available onrequest from Tom Carlson (e-mail: tcarlson@abo.fi). Thisset includes the original data, details on computer pro-grams, and descriptions of how to reproduce the numericalresults presented here.

2. YouTube (a video-sharing site); MySpace, Face-book, Orkut, and Hi5 (social networking and communitysites); Wikipedia (a user-collaborative encyclopedia).Source: Alexa’s Web site traffic ranking, retrievedDecember 12, 2007, from http://www.alexa.com.

3. As of June 2006, 100 million videos were viewedeach day on YouTube, and more than 65,000 new videoswere uploaded every day (Reuters, 2006).

4. http://www.youtube.com5. The core consists of three parties, the Social Dem-

ocratic Party, the Centre Party, and the National CoalitionParty. These capture the majority of the votes (usuallyaround 60%–70%) in national parliamentary elections.Besides these major parties, there is a group of minor par-ties and numerous fringe parties.

6. Source: Alexa’s site traffic ranking, retrievedDecember 12, 2007, from http://www.alexa.com. The fivehighest ranked sites are, in descending order: Google.fi,IRC-Galleria (a Finnish social networking site), YouTube,Google.com, and Facebook.

7. We assumed that candidates running for the SwedishPeople’s Party would use Finnish search terms, too, consider-ing the party’s explicit bilingual campaigning strategies.

8. This is also supported by the fact that 63% of theuploads included a link to the official campaign site of thecandidate in question.

9. A categorization by Norris (2003, p. 28) is usedhere: Major parties are those with more than 20% of allseats in the national parliament; minor parties are thosewith more than 3% but less than 20% of the seats; fringeparties are those that lack at least 3% of the elected mem-bers of the parliament.

10. The seven candidates nominated in the deviantsingle-member constituency of the autonomous ÅlandIslands are excluded; the campaigns of these candidateshave not been examined in this study.

11. The official candidate listings provided on the electionWeb site of the Finnish Ministry of Justice proved useful. Inaddition, the Finnish broadcasting company’s (Yleisradio)Web site was consulted due to its extensive election section.

12. There was a strong positive correlation betweenthe number of views and the number of comments in ourdata (Pearson’s r = .895, p < .001).

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