cartels portrayed 1.6.09
DESCRIPTION
Original data on modern (1990-2008), international, price-fixing cartels and the antitrust penalties imposed on them around the world.TRANSCRIPT
CARTELS & ANTITRUSTPORTRAYED:
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS, 1990-2008
John M. Connor,Purdue University
[email protected] 20, 2008
Introduction• The purpose of the following 80 charts is to illustrate the size and
economic impacts of the modern international cartel movement and the enforcement responses of the world’s antitrust authorities and national courts.
• The data employed encompass 495 private hard-core cartels that were subject to government or private legal actions (i.e., formal investigations, damages suits, fines, or consent decrees) between J 1990 d N b 2008 E h t l h d ti i tJanuary 1990 and November 2008. Each cartel had participants with headquarters in two or more nations.
• All monetary data are expressed in nominal U.S. dollars using exchange rates during the cartel’s life or on the day a legal action was announced.
• A special effort is made to create charts that illustrate trends in cartel dimensions and antitrust decisions.
OUTLINE
• Part 1: Number, Size, and Industries• Part 2: Cartel Detection• Part 3: Internal Structures of Cartels• Part 4: Corporate fines and Settlements
SLIDES
4-1113-2324-3031-54• Part 4: Corporate fines and Settlements
• Part 5: Individual Sanctions• Part 6: Market Effects and Damages• Sources
55-6766-7980
PART 1
• Numbers and sizes of cartels and their participants.
• Industry characteristics
Numbers of Cartels
• Between Jan. 1990 and Nov. 2008, there were 495 formal investigations (raids, grand juries, class actions filed, et sim.) of suspected international cartels.
• Incomplete information is available on 96 (19%)• Incomplete information is available on 96 (19%) because no adverse government decisions and no private settlements were made public.
• Cases against 31 (6%) cartels were closed without sanctions because of insufficient evidence of a violation; these presumptive “non-cartels” are omitted from most slides.
Numbers of Corporate Cartelists
• At least 5900 companies in total
• About 2900 ultimate parent companies known by name and location*
• Ab 3000 i i li d b• About 3000 more companies implicated, but are anonymous
• Almost 2400 have been fined*
* Some double counting of recidivists
Numbers of Cartel Executives Fined or Imprisoned
• At least 373 individual, named executives have been penalized
• Hundreds more were guilty but given immunityimmunity
• Thousands more were guilty but not prosecuted
Total Known Affected Sales by International Cartels Is $16.6 Trillion
5
6
7
8
0
1
2
3
4
EC EU NCAs US Other
$ Trillion Nominal
“EC” is cartels convicted by the Eur. Commission
Huge Increases in Known Affected Salesby International Cartels, 1990-2008
10
12
14
16
0
2
4
6
8
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
$ Trillion
Note: in $2008 dollars, sales are at least treble the nominal (current) dollars shown.
Estimated Affected Sales of Some Recent (2005-08)International Cartels
Cartel Name and Type Sales ($ billion)
Airlines, passenger, fuel surcharge ,Global 1,164.0
Diamonds, rough gem quality, Global 303.2
Bank cards' fees, US 285.0
Airlines, cargo, fuel surcharge , Global 264.9
Insurance brokerage fees, US & UK 145.0
LCDs (Liquid Crystal Displays), TFP type, Global 131.0
Telecom, mobile services 2, Korea 96.0
Cleaning products, home and personal, EU 74.1
Tobacco products, UK 43.5
GENERAL CARTEL INDUSTRIES
• 17 agricultural or mining raw materials
• 202 intermediate industrial materials
• 21 industrial capital goods
•• 32 undifferentiated consumer goods
• 37 differentiated consumer goods
• 155 business or consumer services
LEADING CARTEL INDUSTRIES
ConstructionTransport services
Cement, graphite, glassDistribution
Food & Tobacco Mfg.Organic Chemicals
No.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Paper & printingBanking & Insurance
Telecom servicesMetals
Inorganic ChemicalsRubber & plastic
MachineryInstruments & Misc.
Other services
Number of cartels 1990-2008
Part 2: DETECTION
International Cartels Are Now Being Assaulted on All Fronts
• Indictments in the US and Canada peaked in the late 1990s (with the 16 vitamins cartels playing a major role).
• The EC’s cases are rising, but without • g,settlements the rise in numbers is small.
• The EU’s National Competition Authorities (NCAs) are now the biggest prosecutors.
• Asia (=Korea) is becoming a cartel tiger.• Of late, So. Africa and Brazil are active also.
Rate of Discovery Are Eight Times Higher in 2005-08
30
40
5049.3
ed p
er y
ear
0
10
20
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
6.2
Year of Discovery of All International Cartels
Num
ber d
etec
te
Rates of Discovery of Global CartelsAre Rising Slowly
5
6
7
8
9
8.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Number per year
1.6
“Global” cartels affected prices in two or more continents
Rates of Discovery by the European Commission Rise Steadily
4
5
6
1.82.4
3.6
5.5
0
1
2
3
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
cartels
Cartel Detections by the EU’s NCAs Surpass All Others since 2000
12
14
16
18
20
0
2
4
6
8
10
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Detections
Cartel Detections by the US and Canada Are Stalled
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Detections
Asian Anti-Cartel Enforcement (Especially Korea) Is Accelerating
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Detections
Cartel Detections in Africa and Latin America Are Modest but Significant
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Detections
Despite Heavier International Cartel Penalties, More Companies Are
Becoming Cartelists
More than 2400 instances of corporate participation have been identified, and at least 1620 have been fined during 1990-2008.
Number of Corporate Cartelists Is Rising
1500
2000
ate
part
icip
atio
ns
0
500
1000
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Num
ber o
f cor
pora
Year cartel was detected
Part 3:Internal Structures of Cartels
Number of Companies per Cartel Steady
8
10
12
orpo
ratio
n/ca
rtel
0
2
4
6
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Aver
age
Num
ber
of c
o
Number of Companies in Cartels, 1990-2008 Total
15
20
0
5
10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
percent
Number of corporate participants
Duration of All International Cartels Falling
102
83
63
100
150
ave
rage
6357
0
50
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07
Mon
ths
on
Duration of Global-Scope International Cartels
141
8072
84100
150
vera
ge
72
0
50
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07
Mon
ths
on a
v
Note: Global cartels operated in multiple continents
Duration of Regional Cartels
72 7383
100
150
vera
ge
72 7359
0
50
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07
Mon
ths
on a
v
Regional cartels operated in one jurisdiction
Duration of International Cartels in Asia
65
100
150
vera
ge
24
65
31
50
0
50
1990-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07
Mon
ths
on a
v
PART 4
• Cartel fines and private settlements are about equal and exceed $60 billion combined.
• The undisputed leader in fines – the DOJ – has been overtaken by other authoritiesbeen overtaken by other authorities.
• EC fines exceeded the DOJ’s after 1999.
• Over 4300 companies investigated
• Over 1500 companies penalized
• Over 370 executives fined or imprisoned
Penalties on International CartelsTotal $ 61.2 Billion (1990-2008)
20
25
30
35
0
5
10
15
20
Govt. Fines Private Settlements
USD
Penalties on International Cartels Are Surging
30
35
40
45
50
0
5
10
15
20
25
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
$ Billion
Government Fines Imposed on International Cartels Total $ 32.9 Billion
10
12
14
16
18
0
2
4
6
8
10
EC NCAs Other US Canada
$ Billion
Penalties Are Rising in All Jurisdictions
2005 0810
15
20
25
1990-94Billi
on
1990-941995-99
2000-042005-08
05 1995-99
2000-04
2005-08
$
Number of Corporations Fined, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
50
60
70
80
0
10
20
30
40
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Domestic
Intl
International Cartel Fines Collected, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
700800900
1000110012001300
Total $5.4 billion
n
0100200300400500600700
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year First Member of Cartel Is Fined
$ M
illio
n
International Cartel Fines/Total Collected, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
500
600
700
800
0
100
200
300
400
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Fiscal years (DOJ) and calendar years do not match
Perc
ent
International Cartel Fines/Total Collected, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1990-2008
100
120
140
160
nt
0
20
40
60
80
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Fiscal years (DOJ) and calendar years (Intl.) do not match: FIX?
Perc
en
Number of Cartel Decisions, European Commission, 1990-2008
8
10
12
14
16
Total 90
cisi
ons
0
2
4
6
8
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year of Decision
Num
ber o
f Dec
Number of Companies in European Commission Decisions, 1990-2008
50
60
70
80Total 598 Firms
mpa
nies
0
10
20
30
40
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Year of Decision
Num
ber o
f Com
Number of Adverse Decisions about Intl. Cartels, EC and DOJ, 1990-2008
10
12
14
16
0
2
4
6
8
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
EC
DOJ
[Add individual cases for US]
Intl. Cartel Fines Collected, European Commission, 1990-2008
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Total $15.6 billion
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
$ Mil.
Year of Decision
International Cartel Fines Collected, EC and DOJ Compared, 1990-2008
2500
3000
3500
4000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
EC
DOJ
Year First Member of Cartel Is Fined
Intl. Cartel Fines Collected by NCAs(EU’s National Authorities) 1990-2008
800
1000
1200
1400
Total $6.2 billion
0
200
400
600
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
$ Mil.
Year of Decision
Intl. Cartel Settlements in the US1990-2008
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Total $26.4 billion
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
$ Mil.
Year of Major Settlement
Total International Cartel Penalties, EU and U.S. Compared, 1990-2008
8000
10000
12000
US total $32 billionEU total $22 billion
0
2000
4000
6000
1990
1995
1996
1997
1998
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
all EU
all US
$ m
illio
n
Other Government Fines on International Cartels Exceed $5 Billion
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
on
0
500
1000
1500
2000
US AGs Korea Africa Latin America
Other Asia Oceania
$ M
illio
Most Private Cartel Settlements Are with Direct Buyers in the US
20
25
30
n
0
5
10
15
US Direct US Indirect Canada Other
$ Bi
llion
Over 4300 Companies Investigated
1500
2000
2500
nes
0
500
1000
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Num
ber o
f Fi
At Least 94 Amnesties for International Cartels Granted
43
37
mne
stie
s
9
2 2
US EU Canada EU States Asia
Num
ber o
f Am
Corporate Cartelists Are from 57 Nations
Lat America
E. Europe
Asia
W. Europe
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
US & Canada
Africa
Oceanea
Lat. AmericaNations
NUMBER OF NATIONS
Corporate Penalties Are Mostly Paid by W. European Companies
6.7
11.0
36.2
Asia
US & Canada
W. Europe
0.05
0.11
0.2
0.38
Australia
E. Europe
Lat. America
Africa
$ Billion
Note : Western European international cartelists account for 66.3% of the total.
Most Penalized Corporations Are Headquartered in Western Europe
BritishDutch
JapaneseItalian
FrenchGerman
US
0 50 100 150 200 250
SwedishHungarian
SpanishBelgian
SwissKoreanBritish
NB : Western European cartelists account for 61.8% of the total of 1511.
Corporate Headquarters of Non-European Penalized Firms
217
251
Asia
US & Canada
Number of Companies
16
18
50
44
Australia
Africa
Lat. America
E. Europe
NB : Non-Western European cartelists account for 38.2% of the total of 1511.
PART 5: Individual Sanctions
• DOJ prison sentences are more severe
• Fines on executives are insignificant
Number of Executives Penalized by Nationality, International Cartels
UKEgyptJapan
AustraliaGermany
US
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
France Canada
NetherlandsSo. Korea
IsraelUK
NB : Totals 374, including a few anonymous cartelists.
Number of Executives Charged and Penalized by the DOJ per Year
50
60
70
80
90
CHARGED
FINED
0
10
20
30
40
50
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
PRISON
Poly. (CHARGED)
Poly. (FINED)
Poly. (PRISON)
Proportion of Charged PersonsFined or Imprisoned by DOJ
60
80
100
t % FINED
0
20
40
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Perc
ent
% PRISON
Poly. (% FINED)
Poly. (% PRISON)
Proportion Fined/Charged, Individual Price Fixers, US, 1990-2008
60
70
80
90
0
10
20
30
40
50
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
All Cartels
International
PERC
ENT
Proportion Imprisoned/Charged, Individual Price Fixers, US, 1990-2008
50
60
70
80
0
10
20
30
40
50
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
All Cartels
International
PERC
ENT
Mean US Prison Sentences for All Price Fixers, 1990-2008
20
25
30
35
ER P
ERSO
N
0
5
10
15
1990s Avg.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(NB: 2008 Workforce Stats due out early 2009)
MO
NTH
PE
Mean Length, US Prison Sentences for All Price Fixers, 1990-2008
20
25
30
35
PER
PERS
ON
0
5
10
15
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
MO
NTH
S P
Mean Length, US Prison Sentences for International Price Fixers, 1990-2008
25
30
35
40
45
PER
PERS
ON
0
5
10
15
20
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
NB: The median of 104 international cases is 10 months (2008 has partial data)
MO
NTH
S P
Average US Fines/Person for Price Fixers, 1990-2008
1000
10000
PER
PERS
ON
1
10
100
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All Cartels
International
LOG
of $
‘000
Mean US Fines/Person for Price Fixers, 1990-2008
500
600
700
800
900
ERSO
N
0
100
200
300
400
500
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
All Cartels
International
$ ‘0
00 P
ER P
E
Note: The median 1990-2008 international fine is $100,000
Mean US Prison Days/Person for Price Fixers, 1990-2008
400
500
600
700
RSO
N
0
100
200
300
400
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
All Cartels
International
DAY
S PE
R PE
R
Mean US Fines/Person for Price Fixers, 1990-2008
500
600
700
800
900
ERSO
N
0
100
200
300
400
500
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
All Cartels
International
$ ‘0
00 P
ER P
E
Note: The median 1990-2008 international fine is $100,000
Part 6Market Effects and Damages
• Data on price effects are incomplete
Mean Penalties on Global Cartels, Relative to Affected Sales, 1990-2008 (%)
20
25
30
35
Sale
s (%
)
0
5
10
15
20
EU US Canada Private World
Median
Mean
Pena
lties
/Aff
ecte
d S
Severity of EU and US Median Penalties, Non-Global Cartels (%)
12
14
16
18
20
Sale
s (%
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
EU
US DOJ
Private
Pena
lties
/Aff
ecte
d S
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties
Severity of EU, US & CanadianMean Fines, Global Cartels
20
25
30
ed S
ales
(%)
EU
0
5
10
15
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Fine
s /A
ffec
te EU
US
Canada
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties
Severity of Median Private Settlements, Global Cartels
10
12
14
16
18
20
cted
Sal
es (%
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Pena
ltie
s/A
ffec Private
Avg. US&EU
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties
EU, US & Canada: Severity of Median Fines, Global Cartels
12
14
16
18
20
cted
Sal
es (%
)
EU
0
2
4
6
8
10
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Pena
ltie
s/A
ffec
EU
US
Private US
NB. Excludes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties
Severity of Mean Private Settlements, Global Cartels
25
30
35
40
45
fect
ed S
ales
(%)
P i t
0
5
10
15
20
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Sett
lem
ents
/Aff Private
Avg. US+EU
NB. Includes consent decrees, warnings, other zero dollar penalties
EU, US & Canada: Severity of Mean Fines, Global Cartels
20
25
30
ed S
ales
(%)
EU
0
5
10
15
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Fine
s /A
ffec
te EU
US
Canada
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties
Severity of Median Private Settlements, Global Cartels
15
20
25
cted
Sal
es (%
)
0
5
10
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Pena
ltie
s/A
ffec Private
Avg. US&EU
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties
EU, US & Canada: Severity of Median Fines, Global Cartels
10
12
14
16
18
ed S
ales
(%)
EU
0
2
4
6
8
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Fine
s/A
ffec
te
EU
US
Canada
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties
Mean Private Settlement Intensities, Global Cartels (%)
25
30
35
40
45
Aff
ecte
d Sa
les
P i t
0
5
10
15
20
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Sett
lem
ents
/A Private
Avg. US+EU
NB. Excludes all zero-dollar penalties
MEDIAN LAGS: From Investigation to First Sanction, All Cartels, 1990-2008
21.56
33.336.41
19.79
30
40
hs 21.5619.79
0
10
20
US DOJ Canada EC Other Govt.
Mon
t
Excludes secret investigations
MEDIAN LAGS: From Investigation to First Sanction, Global Cartels, 1990-2008
37.75
32.58
23.7625
30
35
40
hs
18.98
0
5
10
15
20
US DOJ Canada EC Other Govt.
Mon
t
Excludes secret investigations
MEDIAN INVESTIGATION LENGTH, US DOJ, 1990-2008
17.15
32.82
20.9820
25
30
35
hs
8.57
17.15
0
5
10
15
20
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08
Mon
t
Year the first cartelist was fined
Transparency of International Cartel Investigations, 1990-2008
61%57%
73%68%
100%
now
n Be
fore
Dec
isio
ns
0%
50%
U.S. DOJ Canada EC Other EuropeShar
e of
Inve
stig
atio
ns K
n
Sources
• John M. Connor. Private International Cartels: Full Data. [The PICs spreadsheet, first created about 1998, is continuously updated. As of November 2008, the combined (Full Data) spreadsheet was a file of 4.75MB and consisted of 3767 observations of 498 cartels and 4090 cartelists (companies and individual participants) with 810,000 cells of data. There are also 13 back-up spreadsheets.]
• John M Connor DOJ Cartel Enforcement 1990-2007 [A spreadsheet created• John M. Connor. DOJ Cartel Enforcement 1990 2007. [A spreadsheet created late 2007 and completed in early 2008. Contains annual budgets, activities, and enforcement actions with respect to cartels.]
• John M. Connor and Gustav Helmers. Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels: Working Paper 07-01. Washington, DC: American Antitrust Institute (January 2007). [http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/567.pdf]
• John M. Connor. Cartel Amnesties Granted: Worldwide Whistleblowers SSRN Working Paper (October 2008). [at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285469]