Cartesian Composites

Hoffman, Paul David, 1952-

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 37, Number 2, April 1999,pp. 251-270 (Article)

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Cartesian Composites P A U L H O F F M A N

TOWARDS THE END OF A PAPER in which I a rgued that Descartes thinks a h u m a n being is a genuine unity, I invited o ther commenta to rs to come to Descartes 's defense by account ing for his apparent ly cont radic tory claims that a h u m a n being is an ens per se and that it is an ens per accidens. 1 These claims seem to be contradictory, because in saying that a h u m a n being is an ens per se, Descartes appears to be asserting that a h u m a n being is genuine ly one, and in saying that a h u m a n being is an ens per accidens, he appears to assert that a h u m a n being is not genuinely one, but instead is a mere heap or aggregate. In the ensu ing eleven years no one has taken up my invitation, except to argue that I was mistaken in claiming that Descartes thinks a h u m a n being has per se unity in any robust sense.~

In this paper I will take up the challenge myself, having noticed a similarity between Descartes's account o f the unity of composi te substances and his account of composite figures having true and immutable natures. After show- ing how he can consistently maintain that a h u m a n being is both an ens per se

and ens per accidens in roughly the same way he can consistently maintain that composite figures both do and do no t have true and immutable natures, I will try to respond to criticisms of my claim that he thinks of a h u m a n being as a substance or an ens per se.

Let me begin with an analysis and compar ison of two passages f rom the Objections and Replies. In the first, f rom the Replies to the First Objections, Descartes

"The Unity of Descartes's Man," The Philosophical Review, 95 (1986) : 368-369 . See Vere Chappell, "L 'Homme Cart6sien," in Jean-Marie Beyssade and Jean-Luc Marion,

eds., Descartes: objecter et r~pondre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 4o3 - 26; Stephen Voss, "The End of Anthropology," in John Cott ingham, ed., Reason, Will, and Sensation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), z73-3o6; and Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism: SomethingOld, Some- thing New (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), Chap. 5. Rozemond agrees that Descartes assents to both assertions but her strategy of reconciliation is to argue that Descartes means something weak and innocuous in asserting that a h u m a n being is an ens per se (157, n. 34). Chappell and Voss maintain that Descartes does not assent to the assertion that a h u m a n being is a n ens per se.

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252 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 2 A P R I L 1 9 9 9

d i s c u s s e s c o m p o s i t e f i g u r e s . I n t h e s e c o n d , f r o m t h e Replies to the Four th Objec-

tions, D e s c a r t e s d i s c u s s e s c o m p o s i t e s u b s t a n c e s .

Next , to r e m o v e the o the r par t o f the difficulty, it shou ld be n o t e d that those ideas which do no t conta in t rue and i m m u t a b l e natures , bu t conta in only ones which are fictit ious and c o m p o s e d by the intel lect , can be d iv ided by the same intel lect , n o t only t h rough abstract ion, but t h rough a c lear and dis t inct opera t ion , so that any ideas which the intel lect canno t so divide were u n d o u b t e d l y no t c o m p o s e d by it. As, for example , w h e n I th ink o f a w i n g e d horse, o r an actually exis t ing lion, o r a t r iangle inscr ibed in a square, I easily u n d e r s t a n d that I can also in oppos i t ion th ink o f a horse wi thou t wings, a non-ex is t ing lion, a t r iangle w i thou t a square , and so on; f r o m which it fol lows that these do no t have t rue and i m m u t a b l e natures . But i f I th ink o f a t r iangle o r a square (I do no t speak h e r e o f a lion o r horse because the i r na tu res are no t c lear ly e v i d e n t to us), then cer ta inly wha teve r I a p p r e h e n d as c o n t a i n e d in the idea o f a t r iangle , as that its th ree angles are equa l to two r ight angles, etc., I will t ruly af f i rm o f the t r iangle , and o f the square wha teve r is f o u n d in the idea o f the square. For even if I can u n d e r s t a n d a t r iangle, abstract ing f rom the fact that its angles shou ld equa l two r ight angles, I c a n n o t never the less deny that o f it by a c lear and dis t inct opera t ion , that is, correc t ly u n d e r - s tanding this is wha t ! say. F u r t h e r m o r e , i f I cons ider a t r iangle inscr ibed in a square , no t in o r d e r to a t t r ibute to the square those things which per ta in only to the t r iangle or to the t r iangle those things which per ta in to the square, bu t in o r d e r to e x a m i n e only those things which arise f r o m the con junc t ion o f the two, then its na tu re will be no less t rue and immutab l e than the square o r t r iangle a lone, and it will be p e r m i t t e d to af f i rm that the square is no t less than twice the t r iangle inscr ibed in it and similar th ings which per ta in to the na tu re o f this compos i t e f igure. (AT VI I 117-8 ; CSM II 83-4).~

I am no t unaware that some substances are c o m m o n l y called ' i ncomple te . ' Bu t i f they are said to be i ncomple t e because they canno t exist per se alone , I confess that it seems con t rad ic to ry to me that they shou ld be substances, that is, th ings subsist ing per se and at the same t ime incomple te , that is, unab le to subsist per se. But in a n o t h e r sense they can be said to be i ncomple t e substances, name ly such that insofar as they are substances, they have no th ing incomple te , but only insofar as they are r e f e r r e d to some o t h e r substance, with which they compose s o m e t h i n g one per se.

T h u s a hand is an i ncomple t e substance w h e n it is r e f e r r e d to the whole body o f which it is a par t ; bu t it is a comple t e substance w h e n it is cons ide red alone. A n d in ju s t the same way m i n d and body are i n c o m p l e t e substances w h e n they are r e f e r r e d to the man which they compose ; but, cons ide red alone, they are comple te . (AT VI I 222; CSM II 156-7 )

3 The abbreviations to editions of Descartes's works are as follows: AT: Oeuvres de Descartes, Vols. I-XII and Supplement, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897-x9a3). CSM: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vols. I and II, translated by John Cottinghain, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). CSMK: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. III, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). A translation is my own if it differs from the English source cited.

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I n the f i rs t pa s sage D e s c a r t e s m i g h t r e a d i l y s e e m to c o n t r a d i c t h imse l f .4 I n t he f irst h a l f o f t he p a s s a g e he e x p l a i n s his tes t f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i d e a s c o n t a i n - i ng t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e s f r o m t h o s e t h a t c o n t a i n n a t u r e s t h a t a r e m e r e l y f ic t i t ious a n d c o m p o s e d by t h e in t e l l ec t . I f an i d e a can b e d i v i d e d b y a c l ea r a n d d i s t i nc t o p e r a t i o n o f t he in t e l l ec t , it d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e . I f an i d e a c a n n o t be d i v i d e d by a c l e a r a n d d i s t i n c t o p e r a - t ion , b u t m e r e l y by a b s t r a c t i o n , i t d o e s c o n t a i n a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e . D e s c a r t e s says t ha t t r i a n g l e s pass th is test , b u t t r i a n g l e s i n s c r i b e d in s q u a r e s d o no t . I n t he s e c o n d h a l f o f t he p a s s a g e h e t u r n s a r o u n d a n d asse r t s t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f a t r i a n g l e i n s c r i b e d in a s q u a r e is n o less t r u e a n d i m m u t a b l e t h a n t h a t o f t he s q u a r e a l o n e o r t he t r i a n g l e a l o n e .

So in t he s a m e p a r a g r a p h D e s c a r t e s a s se r t s b o t h t ha t t h e n a t u r e o f a t r i a n - g le i n s c r i b e d in a s q u a r e is t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e a n d t h a t it is no t . H e a v o i d s c o n t r a d i c t i o n in t he o n l y way poss ib l e , w h i c h is to r e l a t iv i ze t he n o t i o n o f h a v i n g a t r u e a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e . H e says t h a t i f we c o n s i d e r a t r i a n g l e i n s c r i b e d in a s q u a r e in o r d e r to e x a m i n e t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r i se f r o m t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f t h e two, a n d n o t to a t t r i b u t e to o n e o f t he f i gu re s w h a t b e l o n g s to t he o t h e r , t h e n its n a t u r e will be t r u e a n d i m m u t a b l e . T h i s l a n g u a g e sug- ges ts two c a n d i d a t e s fo r t ha t to w h i c h a c o m p o s i t e ' s h a v i n g a t r u e a n d i m m u t a - b le n a t u r e is b e i n g r e l a t iv i zed , b u t fo r o u r p u r p o s e s we n e e d n o t w o r r y a b o u t t he d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m . Fi rs t , h e m i g h t be r e l a t i v i z i n g its h a v i n g a t r u e a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e to d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s we have in t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e c o m p o s i t e : it has a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e r e l a t i ve to o u r e x a m i n i n g it w i th t h e a i m o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h p r o p e r t i e s a r i se f r o m the c o n j u n c t i o n o f its c o n s t i t u e n t s a n d i t does n o t have a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e r e l a t i ve to o u r e x a m i n i n g it w i th the a im o f a t t r i b u t i n g p r o p e r t i e s to a n y o f its c o n s t i t u e n t s a lone . S e c o n d , he m i g h t be r e l a t i v i z i n g a c o m p o s i t e ' s h a v i n g a t r u e a n d i m m u - t ab le n a t u r e to d i f f e r e n t sets o f p r o p e r t i e s : it ha s a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e r e l a t ive to t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a r i se o n l y f r o m t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f its c o n s t i t u - en t s a n d it d o e s n o t have a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e r e l a t ive to t h o s e p r o p e r - t ies t h a t a r i se f r o m any o f t he c o n s t i t u e n t s a lone .5

T h a t D e s c a r t e s w o u l d a p p e a l to such a r e l a t i v i z a t i o n s t r ikes m e as a p l a u s i - b le r e s p o n s e to an obv ious o b j e c t i o n o n e m i g h t have a b o u t his c r i t e r i o n in t h e F i f th M e d i t a t i o n fo r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h i n g s h a v i n g t r u e a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e s . H e c la ims t h e r e t ha t t he m a r k o f t h i n g s h a v i n g t r u e a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e s is t h a t we can d e m o n s t r a t e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e m t h a t we d i d n o t p r e v i o u s l y r e c o g -

4Anthony Kenny, Descartes (New York: Random House, x968), 154. 5Here I am going somewhat beyond a literal reading of the text. The most literal reading of

the passage would be that a composite figure does not have a true and immutable nature relative to those properties belonging to one figure that we attribute to the other.

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nize and that once recognized we cannot deny (AT VII 64; CSM II 45). The obvious objection to this criterion is that the composi t ion of things typically generates new propert ies that are not immediately recognizable. So, for exam- ple, we might not immediately recognize all the proper t ies that arise f r o m the composi t ion of a horse and wings or even f rom the composi t ion o f a lion and existence. But this would imply, given the Fifth Meditation criterion, that a winged horse and an existent lion have true and immutable natures, cont rary to what appears to be Descartes's intent ion in the Fifth Meditation. 6

Rather than abandon his Fifth Meditation cri terion for having a true and immutable nature in light of this conflict, Descartes's s trategy in the Replies to

the First Objections is to relativize the not ion of having a true and immutable nature. So Descartes can allow that a winged horse and an existent lion do have true and immutable natures relative to the considerat ion o f new p rope r - ties genera ted by the composi t ion of a horse and wings and by the composi t ion of a lion and existence. One might object that this strategy unde rmines his principal aim in in t roducing the not ion of true and immutab le natures, which is to g r o u n d his ontological a rgument . I f we grant that an existent lion has a true and immutable nature, we should be able to infer with certainty that there is an existent lion in the same way we can infer that God exists.

I think Descartes can block this inference. Accord ing to the relativized account, an existent lion does not have a true and immutable nature with respect to the propert ies of being a lion and existence because those proper t ies are separable. It has a true and immutable nature only with respect to any new propert ies F genera ted by their composi t ion that we canno t deny of an existent lion once they are recognized. So we can infer with certainty that an existent lion is F once we recognize that we canno t separate the idea o f F f rom the idea of existent lion, but that does not entitle us to infer that a lion exists.

It is my thesis that just as Descartes can assert wi thout contradic t ing himself that a figure which is a composite of two figures each of which has a true and immutable nature both does and does not have a true and immutable nature, so he can assert wi thout contradict ing himself that a composi te of two sub- stances each of which is complete is both an ens per se (or has per se unity) and an ens per accidens. To do so will require him once again to relativize the relevant notions, but, as we will see, this relativization has a different structure.

One impor tan t piece of evidence in suppor t of my claim that there are impor tant similarities in Descartes 's accounts o f composi te substances and composite figures is that he uses almost the same separability test to de te rmine

~This sort of objection is discussed by Margaret Wilson, Descartes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 171-3, and Walter Edelberg, "The Fifth Meditation," The Philosophical Review 99 (199~ 493-533.

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which ideas contain natures that are not true and immutable that he uses to determine whether substances are really distinct. In the case of natures, if the idea of AB can be divided into the idea of A and the idea of B not merely by abstraction but by a clear arid distinct operat ion, then AB does not have a true and immutable nature. In the case o f substances, if the idea of A can be clearly and distinctly conceived apar t f rom B, not merely by abstraction, but by exclu- sion, and vice versa, then A and B are really distinct substances (AT IV 12o; CSMK 236 ). Descartes's account o f the distinction between abstraction and exclusion is as follows. To conceive o f A wi thout B by abstraction is to think o f A without thinking of B; when we think of A and B toge ther we see a connec- tion between them (AT I I I 4 2 o - a ; CSMK 188). To conceive o f A wi thout B by exclusion is to be able to deny A of B while thinking of both A and B (AT I I I 474 -6 ; CSMK 2o1-2) .

Let me turn now to an examinat ion o f the second passage quo ted above, the one that concerns substances. Descartes 's agenda as he describes it in the first pa rag raph is to explain how there can be such a thing as an incomple te substance, given that such a not ion appears to be contradictory. He grants that the not ion o f an incomplete substance is contradic tory if what we mean by calling something "incomplete" is that it c anno t exist per se alone, because a substance is that which can subsist per se. An incomple te substance would then be something that both can and cannot subsist per se. (To subsist per se, as unders tood by both Descartes and Aquinas, is to exist wi thout a subject.7) But if by calling something "incomplete" we mean that it is referred to a n o t h e r substance with which it constitutes someth ing that is one per se, then there is no contradict ion in calling something an incomplete substance.

In the second pa ragraph he relativizes the not ion o f incompleteness. He says that something can be a complete substance when considered alone and an incomplete substance when it is refer red to a whole o f which it is a part. T h e whole, according to the first pa ragraph , is one per se. So Descartes 's idea here is that someth ing which can subsist per se, and hence is a complete substance when considered alone, can still be an incomplete substance if it is par t o f a whole that is one per se.

Descartes's first example to illustrate this claim is a hand. He says a hand is a complete substance when considered alone and an incomplete substance when referred to the whole body of which it is a part. This implies, given his accounts o f what it is to be a comple te substance and what it is to be an

7Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, Q1. Descartes equates being able to exist apart from a subject with being a substance (AT VII 434; CSM II ~93), which, as we have just seen, he identifies with being able to subsist per set

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i n c o m p l e t e subs t ance , t ha t h e t h i n k s t ha t a h a n d can subs i s t per se a n d a lso t h a t the h u m a n b o d y is o n e per se.

His s e c o n d e x a m p l e is t h e o n e o f spec ia l c o n c e r n to us. H e says t h a t t h e m i n d a n d b o d y a re i n c o m p l e t e s u b s t a n c e s w h e n r e f e r r e d to t h e h u m a n b e i n g w h i c h t h e y c o m p o s e , b u t c o n s i d e r e d a l o n e t h e y a r e c o m p l e t e . T h e s e two p a r a - g r a p h s c o n s t i t u t e t he m o s t i m p o r t a n t p a s s a g e in t he e n t i r e C a r t e s i a n c o r p u s in s u p p o r t o f m y c l a im tha t D e s c a r t e s t h i n k s t h e h u m a n b e i n g is a n ens per se.

W h i l e I r e f e r r e d to t h e m in m y e a r l i e r p a p e r , I d i d n o t g ive t h e m a p p r o p r i a t e e m p h a s i s .

T h e r e a r e t h r e e r e a s o n s w h y t h e s e two p a r a g r a p h s d e s e r v e g r e a t a t t e n t i o n . Fi rs t , it is t he o n l y p l a c e in his p u b l i s h e d w o r k s w h e r e D e s c a r t e s c o m m i t s h i m s e l f to t he v iew t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is o n e per se. a H a v i n g sa id in t he f irst p a r a g r a p h t h a t a s u b s t a n c e is i n c o m p l e t e w h e n it is r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g e lse wi th w h i c h i t c o m p o s e s s o m e t h i n g o n e per se, his a s s e r t i o n in t he s e c o n d p a r a - g r a p h t h a t t he m i n d a n d b o d y a r e i n c o m p l e t e w h e n r e f e r r e d to t h e h u m a n b e i n g en ta i l s t ha t a h u m a n b e i n g is o n e per se.9

L e t m e e x p l a i n this p o i n t m o r e f o r m a l l y . I r e a d D e s c a r t e s as a s s e r t i n g in t h e f irst p a r a g r a p h t h a t a n y s u b s t a n c e s A a n d B c o m p o s i n g C a r e i n c o m p l e t e w h e n r e f e r r e d to C o n l y i f C is o n e per se. His s u b s e q u e n t a s s e r t i o n in t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h t h a t m i n d a n d b o d y a r e i n c o m p l e t e w h e n r e f e r r e d to t he m a n w h i c h t h e y c o m p o s e thus en ta i l s t h a t a m a n is o n e per se. 1~

S e c o n d , t he se p a r a g r a p h s w e r e p u b l i s h e d j u s t a f ew m o n t h s p r i o r to Des- ca r t e s ' s two le t t e r s to R e g i u s in w h i c h he asse r t s t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is an ensper

se a n d also an ens per accidens. O t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e t e n d e d to d i s c o u n t t he l e t t e r s to R e g i u s o n the g r o u n d s t h a t D e s c a r t e s was s i m p l y t r y i n g to a v o i d c o n t r o v e r s y wi th the a u t h o r i t i e s a t U t r e c h t . B u t s ince D e s c a r t e s h a d a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d h i m s e l f in his r e p l y to A r n a u l d to a h n o s t e x a c t l y t he s a m e v iew he u r g e s u p o n Reg ius , his r e m a r k s to R e g i u s m u s t be t r e a t e d wi th t he s a m e r e s p e c t a n d s e r i o u s n e s s t ha t a r e typ ica l ly g r a n t e d to h is r e p l y to A r n a u l d .

T h e t h i r d s i gn i f i c an t f e a t u r e o f t h e s e p a r a g r a p h s is t h e c o m p a r i s o n o f t he m i n d to the h a n d . I t n e e d s to be e m p h a s i z e d t h a t D e s c a r t e s ' s m i n d is a c o m - p l e t e s u b s t a n c e in the s a m e sense t h a t a h a n d is. T o say t h a t t he m i n d can subs i s t per se s h o u l d n o t be t a k e n , as i t a l m o s t a lways is, to m e a n a n y t h i n g s t r o n g e r t h a n w h a t it m e a n s to say t h a t a h a n d can subs i s t per se. T h e v i t a l ly

s I believe that Descartes is using the terms "unum per se" and "ens per se" as equivalent. 9There is a slight infelicity of expression. In defining what it is to be an incomplete substance,

Descartes speaks of the substance as being incomplete insofar as it is referred to the other parts with which it composes the whole. But in his two examples he speaks of the substance as being incomplete insofar as it is referred not to the other parts but to the whole which it composes with the other parts.

1o I have been helped by e-mail correspondence with Vere Chappell on this point.

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i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n fo r u n d e r s t a n d i n g Desca r t e s is tha t his n o t i o n o f w h a t it is to be a c o m p l e t e subs t ance is v e r y weak , m u c h w e a k e r t h a n is c o m m o n l y a t t r i b u t e d to h i m . " W h e n D e s c a r t e s asserts t h a t the m i n d is a c o m p l e t e sub- s t ance he is r e a d as u s ing the t e r m " s u b s t a n c e " in the s a m e sense t h a t A r i s t o t l e d id w h e n Ar i s to t l e said tha t a h u m a n b e i n g is a subs tance . B u t Ar i s to t l e d id n o t t h i n k a h a n d is a subs t ance in t he s a m e sense t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is, a n d this passage m a k e s it c l e a r t ha t it is a s e r ious m i s t ake to t h i n k tha t D e s c a r t e s t h o u g h t a m i n d is a s u b s t a n c e in t h a t s t r o n g sense . A n A r i s t o t e l i a n h u m a n b e i n g is n o t i n c o m p l e t e in r e l a t i o n to a n y t h i n g else, b u t a C a r t e s i a n m i n d is. '2

Le t m e t u r n n o w to Desca r t e s ' s two le t te rs to Reg ius . In t he first l e t t e r he a d m o n i s h e s R e g i u s fo r a s s e r t i n g in his c o n t r o v e r s y wi th V o e t i u s t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is an ens p e r accidens a n d he p r o p o s e s a r e m e d y :

In your theses you say that a human being is an ensper accidens. You could scarcely have said anything more objectionable and provocative. The best way I can see to remedy this is for you to say that in your ninth thesis you considered the whole human being in relation to the parts of which he is composed, and in your tenth thesis you considered the parts in relation to the whole. Say too that in your ninth you said that a human being comes into being per accidens out of body and soul in order to indicate that it can be said in a sense to be accidental for the body to be jo ined to the soul, and for the soul to be jo ined to the body, since the body can exist without the soul and the soul can exist without the body. For the term 'accident' means anything which can be present or absent without its possessor ceasing to ex i s t - - though perhaps some accidents, consid- ered in themselves, may be substances, as clothing is an accident with respect to a human being. Tell them that in spite of this you did not say that a human being is an ens per accidens, and you showed sufficiently, in your tenth thesis, that you unders tood it to be an ens per se. For there you said that the body and the soul, by their very nature,':2 are incomplete substances; and it follows from their being incomplete that what they constitute is an ens per se. That something which is an ens per se may yet come into being per accidens is shown by the fact that mice are genera ted or come into being, per accidens from dirt, and yet they are ent iaperse . (AT III 46o; CSMK 2oo)

Desca r t e s ' s p r o p o s e d r e m e d y has two e l e m e n t s . T h e first e l e m e n t is to re la t iv ize . H e advises R e g i u s to say tha t in t h e n i n t h thesis w h e n he r e f e r r e d to the h u m a n b e i n g as an ens p e r acc idens he was c o n s i d e r i n g the w h o l e h u m a n

~' I believe that this notion captures the sort of causal and modal independence Descartes requires of created substances. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to make the complete argument here, this passage is one of the crucial pieces of evidence I would cite in support of my interpretation.

'~ It is commonly recognized that Descartes thinks a mind is incomplete in relation to God (AT VII 5 t, CSM II 35), but my point here is that Descartes thinks it is incomplete in relation to something other than God.

'~ The Latin that I have rendered as "by their very nature" is ratione ipsius. This is rendered in CSMK as "in relation to the whole human being" and by Genevieve Rodis-Lewis as "par rapport ~t lui [l'homme] ," Lettres d Regius et Remarques sur l'explication de l'esprit humain (Paris: Vrin, 1959), 67. Their translations seem implausible.

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b e i n g in r e l a t ion to its par t s a n d in the t e n t h thesis he was c o n s i d e r i n g the par t s in r e l a t i on to the whole . T h e s e c o n d e l e m e n t is to d i s t i ngu i s h b e t w e e n b e i n g an ens per accidens a n d b e i n g m a d e per accidens. H e advises Reg ius to d e n y tha t the h u m a n b e i n g is an ens per accidens a n d to say i n s t e a d tha t it is m a d e per

accidens. H e cla ims tha t s o m e t h i n g tha t is m a d e per accidens can still be an ensper

se. I n the s econd le t te r to Regius , Descar tes says tha t he u n d e r s t a n d s tha t Reg ius m e a n t s o m e t h i n g i n n o c u o u s w h e n he said t ha t a h u m a n b e i n g is an ens

per accidens, b u t tha t he was u s i n g it in a d i f f e r e n t sense f r o m tha t u s e d by the Scholast ics so tha t the d i spu te b e t w e e n Reg ius a n d the Scholast ics is m e r e l y verba l :

when you said that a human being is an ensper accidens I know that you meant only what everyone else admits, that a human being is made up of two things which are really distinct. But the expression ens per accidens is not used in that sense by the scholastics. Therefore, if you cannot use the explanation which I suggested in a previous l e t t e r - - and I see that in your latest paper you have departed from it in some degree, and not altogether avoided the hazards- - then it is much better to admit openly that you misun- derstood this scholastic expression than to try unsuccessfully to cover the matter up. You should say that fundamental ly you agree with the others and that your disagree- ment with them was merely verbal. And whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you should give out that you believe that a h u m a n being is a true ens per se, and not an ens per accidens, and that the mind is uni ted in a real and substantial m a n n e r to the body. You must say that they are united not by position or disposition as you assert in your last pape r - - fo r this too is open to objection and, in my opinion, quite u n t r u e - - but by a true mode of union, as everyone agrees, though nobody explains what this amounts to, and so you need not do so either. (AT III 492-3 ; CSMK 2o6)

Never the less , in the rest o f the le t te r Descar tes dra f t s a r e s p o n s e for Regius , whe re he makes it c lear tha t he th inks it is a p p r o p r i a t e to r e fe r to a h u m a n b e i n g as an ens per accidens, p r o v i d e d we u n d e r s t a n d tha t e x p r e s s i o n in the a p p r o p r i a t e l y re la t iv ized sense:

We affirm that human beings are made up of body and soul, not by the mere presence or proximity of one to the other, but by a true substantial union. (For this there is indeed a natural requirement, on the bodily side, of an appropriate posit ioning and a r rangement of the various parts; but nevertheless the un ion is different from mere position and shape and the other purely corporeal modes, since it relates not just to the body but also to the soul, which is incorporeal.) The idiom which we used is perhaps unusual, but we think it is sufficiently apt to express what we meant. When we said that a human being is an ens per accidens, we meant this only in relation to its parts, the soul and the body; we meant that for each of these parts it is in a m a n n e r accidental for it to be jo ined to the other, because each can subsist apart, and what can be present or absent without the subject ceasing to exist is called an accident. But if a hum a n being is considered in himself as a whole, we say of course that he is a single ens per se, and not per accidens; because the un ion which joins a human body and soul to each other is not accidental to a human being, but essential, since a h u m a n being without it is not a human being. (AT III 5o8; CSMK ~o9)

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The picture that emerges f rom these two letters is this. T h e relativization o f the notions of being an ens p e r accidens in the letters to Regius is the comple- ment of the earlier relativization of the not ion of completeness in the reply to Arnauld. W h e n the parts o f a composite are complete (when considered) in themselves because they can subsist by themselves, the composi te is an ens p e r

accidens (when considered) in relation to those parts. '4 In both the reply to Arnau ld and the letters to Regius, it appears that the not ion of the parts being complete in themselves is the fundamen ta l not ion and the not ion of the whole being an ens p e r accidens is defined by means o f it.

Similarly the relativization of the not ion o f being an ens p e r se in the letters to Regius is the complemen t o f the relativization o f the not ion o f incomplete- ness in the reply to Arnauld. I f the composi te whole is an ens p e r se (considered) in itself, then its parts are incomplete (considered) in relation to the whole. However , there are some subtle but revealing variations in the reply to Arnau ld and the letters to Regius which have to do with the o rder of explana- tion. Tha t is, there are different accounts o f which not ion is f undamen ta l and which is der iva t ive- - tha t of the parts being incomplete or that of the whole being an ens p e r se. In the first letter to Regius, Descartes suggests that the fundamenta l not ion is that of the parts being incomplete in their very nature , f rom which it follows that the whole which they compose is an ens p e r se. In the reply to Arnau ld the explanation seems to go the o ther way: since what body and mind constitute is one p e r se, it follows that they are incomplete in relation to it. In the second letter to Regius it appears that the fundamen ta l not ion is that of the un ion of the parts being essential to the composi te whole, f rom which it is inferred that the whole is an ens p e r se.

At stake here is what Descartes thinks justifies the claim that a h u m a n being is an ens p e r se. Is it just something Descartes thinks we should take for g ran ted as I a rgued in the earlier paper and as is suggested by the reply to Arnauld? Do we start instead with the idea that the un ion of mind and body is essential to the whole, as is suggested by the second letter to Regius? Or do we start with the idea that mind and body do not have na tures that are complete in them- selves, as is suggested by the first letter to Regius?

I will not try to settle just yet the issue o f whe ther Descartes thinks one of these not ions is more fundamenta l than the others, t hough my view will emerge. However, it is wor th not ing now that if the not ion o f the parts being

~4I put the phrase "when considered" in parentheses here to indicate that in the first letter to Regius we find the same ambiguity we found earlier in the Replies to theFirst Objections and in the Replies to theFourth Objections as to whether the relativization is metaphysical or instead has to do with our different perspectives or purposes. I'm inclined to dismiss this ambiguity as insignificant because I believe that Descartes thinks that differences in our consideration are the reflection of metaphysical facts.

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incomplete in their nature is fundamen ta l and the not ion of being an ens per se

is defined in terms of it, then it follows that the incompleteness o f the par t is not defined by its relation to the whole. Ins tead Descartes is using two distinct notions of incompleteness that are de te rmined solely by considerat ion o f the part. In one sense of incompleteness, a par t is incomplete if and only if it cannot subsist per se (considered) alone. In the o ther sense of incompleteness, a part is incomplete if and only if considered by itself alone its na ture is not complete.

Tha t Descartes would say that mind and body are incomplete in their nature, a l though they are complete in the sense that they can subsist by themselves, resonates with his compar i son in the reply to Arnau ld o f the mind with the hand and reinforces the claim that he has a very weak not ion of what it is to be a complete substance at work in the real distinction argu- ment. A substance that is complete in the sense that it can subsist per se, such as a hand, need not be complete in its nature. A n d so it does not follow f rom the fact that mind has a nature that de termines a comple te substance, that is, something that can subsist per se, that the mind is comple te in its nature. T h a t the not ion o f completeness at stake in the real distinction a r g u m e n t is a very weak not ion is b rough t out nicely in ano the r passage later in the reply to Arnauld :

Now someone who says that a man's arm is a substance that is really distinct from the rest of his body does not thereby deny that the arm belongs to the nature of the whole man. And saying that the arm belongs to the nature of the whole man does not give rise to the suspicion that it cannot subsist per se. (AT VII 228; CSM II 16o)

Descartes's point here is that a thing 's being able to subsist per se does no t entail that it is not part of the nature of a whole. I f someth ing is par t of the na ture of a whole, and we take this to mean that it is a fact about the nature o f the par t that the par t is part of the nature o f the whole (as seems true of an a rm or a hand), then it seems perfectly plausible to say that its na ture is incomplete (even though it is complete in the sense of being able to subsist per se). This point will be discussed more fully below.

How does the relativization that enables Descartes to assert wi thout contra- diction that a composi te substance is both an ens per se and an ens per accidens

compare to the relativization that allows him to assert wi thout contradict ion that a composi te figure both contains and does no t contain a true and immuta- ble nature? Let me ment ion two differences. First, the relativization per ta in ing to figures is in regard to different sets o f proper t ies (or to ou r considerat ion of different sets of properties), but the relativization per ta ining to composi te substances is not in regard to different sets o f propert ies. It is interesting, however, that later, in the Principles Descartes does draw a distinction that

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would enable him to relativize the not ion o f being an ens p e r se in exactly the same way he relativizes the not ion o f conta ining a true and immutable nature. He distinguishes those characteristics that arise f rom the mind alone and f rom the body alone f rom those that arise f rom the un ion of mind and body, namely, appetites like h u n g e r and thirst, passions that do not consist in though t alone, and sensations (AT V I I I A 23; CSM I 2o9). T h u s he migh t have said that a h u m a n being is an ens p e r se in relation to those characteristics (or when considered for the purposes of examin ing those characteristics) that arise f rom the union of mind and body.

Second, Descartes does no t in t roduce a not ion applicable to the parts of a composite figure having a true and immutable na ture that cor responds to the not ion of incompleteness that pertains to the parts of a composi te substance having p e r se unity. Tha t is, once Descartes points out that a triangle inscribed in a square has a true and immutable nature, he does no t also assert that there is a sense in which the natures of a triangle and a square are incomplete. But there seems to be no obstacle to such a notion. It seems perfectly plausible to say that the nature of a triangle is incomplete in relation to the na ture o f a triangle inscribed in a square.

Wha t is the significance o f these differences? My intuit ion is this. I t seems to me that given Descartes's purpose in in t roduc ing the not ion o f true and immutable n a t u r e s - - t o provide an ontological g r o u n d i n g for the certainty o f our inferences about which characteristics we can attr ibute to t h i n g s - - h e can allow that every composi te has a true and immutable nature. But given his purpose in in t roducing the not ion of having p e r se u n i t y - - t o provide an ac- count of which composites are truly one and which are mere a g g r e g a t e s - - h e might not want to allow that every composi te o f things comple te in the sense that it can subsist per se has p e r se unity. I f he were to relativize the not ion of an ens p e r se to (consideration of) the proper t ies that arise f rom the un ion of the parts, then it would seem to me to follow that every composi te of substances would be an ens p e r se. It is wor th not ing that Descartes 's account o f the p e r se

unity o f a h u m a n being in the second letter to Regius provides some evidence that Descartes was willing to allow that every composi te whose parts can subsist per se is an ens p e r se. It seems true of every composi te whole that the un ion of the parts is essential to it. We will re turn to this issue below.

We are now in a position to respond to objections to my claim that Des- cartes believes a h u m a n being has p e r se unity. Marleen R o z e m o n d argues that even though Descartes says that a h u m a n being is an ens p e r se because mind and body are incomplete, he does no t mean what his Scholastic predecessors meant in saying that soul and body are incomplete. She offers three related reasons in suppor t of this assertion. First, in contrast to the Scholastics, Des- cartes thinks that mind and body are complete when considered on their

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own.15 S e c o n d , t h e Scho las t i c s t h o u g h t t h a t sou l a n d b o d y a r e i n c o m p l e t e by t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e , t h a t it is p a r t o f t h e i r e s s e n c e to b e l o n g to a c o m p o s i t e , w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s d o e s not.16 T h i r d , u n l i k e t he Scho las t i c s , D e s c a r t e s d o e s n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e m i n d has an a p t i t u d e fo r u n i o n w i th t he b o d y in t he sense t h a t t he Scho las t i c s t h o u g h t it d id . ' 7 R o z e m o n d c o n c l u d e s f r o m t h e fac t t h a t Des- ca r t es d o e s n o t t h i n k tha t m i n d a n d b o d y a re i n c o m p l e t e in t he a p p r o p r i a t e Scho las t i c sense , he d o e s n o t r ea l l y t h i n k t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g has p e r se u n i t y in a n y r o b u s t sense .

O n e o f t he key p a s s a g e s she ci tes in s u p p o r t o f h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f D e s c a r t e s ' s f i rs t l e t t e r to R e g i u s :

I t may be objected that it is not accidental to the h u m a n body that it should be j o ined to the soul, but its very nature; since, when a body has all the dispositions requi red to receive the soul, without which it is not a human body, it cannot be without a miracle that the soul is not uni ted to it. And also that it is not accidental to the soul to be j o ined to the body. All these things should not be denied in every respect, so that the theolo- gians are not again offended. But it must be r e sponded nevertheless that those things can be said to be accidental because, when we consider the body alone we simply perceive nothing in it because of which it desires to be uni ted to the soul; jus t as we perceive nothing in the soul because of which it must be uni ted with the body; and for this reason I said a little earlier that it is in some sense accidental, but not absolutely accidental. (AT III 46o-1 ; CSMK 2oo)

She p l a c e s spec i a l e m p h a s i s o n the fac t t h a t D e s c a r t e s says, " W h e n we c o n s i d e r the b o d y a l o n e we s i m p l y p e r c e i v e n o t h i n g in i t b e c a u s e o f w h i c h i t d e s i r e s to be u n i t e d to the soul ; j u s t as we p e r c e i v e n o t h i n g in t he sou l b e c a u s e o f w h i c h it m u s t be u n i t e d wi th the b o d y . ''18

T h e f irst p o i n t I w a n t to m a k e in r e s p o n s e is t ha t i t is fa lse t ha t all t he l e a d i n g Scho las t i c s d e n i e d t ha t the sou l is c o m p l e t e w h e n c o n s i d e r e d o n its own. A q u i n a s h i m s e l f asser t s in his Ques t ions on the S o u l t h a t t he sou l subs is t s p e r

se b e c a u s e i t has a p e r se o p e r a t i o n , a n d m o r e o v e r , in r e s p o n s e to t he o b j e c t i o n t ha t t he sou l is u n i t e d to the b o d y a c c i d e n t a l l y , he c o n c e d e s t h a t t he sou l has c o m p l e t e b e i n g . ' 9 A q u i n a s also says t h a t t h e sou l s e p a r a t e d f r o m the b o d y has p e r f e c t b e i n g 3 ~ T h e n o t i o n s o f b e i n g c o m p l e t e a n d p e r f e c t w e r e a p p a r e n t l y u s e d i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y by A q u i n a s , as t h e y w e r e by Reg ius . 2' T h u s D e s c a r t e s is r ea l ly e n d o r s i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l y T h o m i s t i c v iews in c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e m i n d is a

'5Rozernond, op. cit., 156. 16 Ibid., 179. 17Ibid., 183. ,8 Ibid., 1"8o. 'gAquinas, Questions on the Soul, Q1, adl. 2~ Summa Theologica, IaIIae Q4, a5, ad2. �9 ~i See Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reaction to Cartesian Philosophy I 6 3 7 - z 6 5 o

(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 199"~), lo 5, n. 57-

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complete thing in the sense o f being capable o f subsisting p e r se. Descartes, like Aquinas, is what we might call a subsistence dualist. 22

The second point is that while R o z e m o n d is r ight to emphasize Descartes 's assertion in the reply to Arnau ld that it is no t p roper ly of the essence of mind that it be uni ted to the body (AT VII 219; CSM II 155), he might no t mean by this anything inconsistent with his endo r s emen t o f Regius's assertion that the mind is an incomplete substance by its very nature. Let me elaborate by build- ing on some helpful te rminology that R o z e m o n d has used in cor respondence . We can distinguish between i) the nature or essence o f A d e m a n d i n g un ion with B and ii) the nature or essence o f A calling for un ion with B. I f the na ture of A demands un ion with B, then it is impossible for A to exist wi thout being uni ted to B. I f the nature o f A only calls for un ion with B but does not d e m a n d it, then it is natural or p rope r for A to be uni ted to B but A can still exist without being uni ted to B. R o z e m o n d maintains that in asserting that it is not proper ly o f the essence o f the mind that it be uni ted to the body Descartes's point is that the nature o f the mind does no t call for un ion with the body, which she thinks is inconsistent with the mind being incomplete in its very nature on account o f its relation to the body.

By drawing a fur ther distinction between a weaker and a s t ronger sense of calling for union I think Descartes can be de fended against the charge o f in- consistency or insincerity in asserting that it is not p roper ly o f the essence o f the mind that it be uni ted to the body while endors ing Regius 's view that the mind is incomplete by its very nature. The distinction between the s t rong and weak senses is as follows. The na ture of A calls for un ion with B in the s t rong sense if A cannot be defined without reference to B. The nature of A calls for union with B in the weak sense i fA can be defined wi thout B. I cannot think of any non-controversial examples to illustrate this distinction, so let me instead rely on different hypothetical views someone might take who thinks that a hand does not demand un ion with the whole body. One might maintain that even though a hand does not d e m a n d union with the whole body, it still cannot be defined independent ly o f a h u m a n body. Alternatively, one migh t maintain that even though it is natural and p rope r for a hand to be uni ted to a h u m a n body, not only does it no t d e m a n d un ion with a h u m a n body but it can be defined independent ly of the h u m a n body.

When Descartes asserts that it is not proper ly o f the essence o f the mind that it be uni ted to the body, he is surely implying at the very least that the

~This label is from Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy, a ~ (1995) : 5 z~ although I am using it differently. She advocates the traditional view that Descartes's dualism is stronger than Aquinas's dualism and uses the label "subsistence dualism" as a higher level genus, which includes both views. I am using it to refer to Aquinas's weaker sort of dualism.

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m i n d does n o t d e m a n d u n i o n wi th the body . I t also seems l ikely t ha t he m e a n s to imp ly t ha t the m i n d can be d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the h u m a n body. So it seems r igh t tha t Descar tes t h inks the m i n d does n o t call fo r u n i o n wi th the body in the s t r o n g sense. B u t t he r e is still r o o m for Descar tes to m a i n t a i n tha t the m i n d does call for u n i o n wi th the b o d y in the weak sense , in o t h e r words , he can still m a i n t a i n tha t it is n a t u r a l o r p r o p e r for the m i n d to be u n i t e d to the body. A n d if tha t is w h a t Descar tes m e a n s w h e n he e n d o r s e s Reg ius ' s view tha t the m i n d is i n c o m p l e t e by its very n a t u r e , t h e n his r e m a r k s are n o t i ncons i s - tent . ( In the passage R o z e m o n d q u o t e s f r o m the first l e t te r to Regius , Des- cartes g r a n t s for the sake o f a v o i d i n g c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t the soul by its ve ry n a t u r e is u n i t e d to the body a n d tha t it can exist a p a r t f r o m the b o d y o n l y by a miracle . Th i s sugges ts a poss ib le f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two sorts o f de- m a n d . T h e n a t u r e of A m i g h t d e m a n d , u n i o n wi th B if it is imposs ib l e for A to exist w i t h o u t b e i n g u n i t e d to B or it m i g h t d e m a n d ~ u n i o n wi th B if it c a n exist w i t h o u t b e i n g u n i t e d to B on ly by a mirac le . Descar tes a p p a r e n t l y is p r e p a r e d to concede for the sake of a v o i d i n g con t rove r s y tha t the m i n d d e m a n d s ~ u n i o n with the body, even t h o u g h he h i m s e l f t h inks tha t the m i n d does n o t d e m a n d , u n i o n wi th the body. T o say tha t the m i n d d e m a n d s ~ u n i o n wi th the b o d y a m o u n t s to saying tha t it calls for u n i o n wi th the body.)

H e r e aga in I t h i n k Descar tes ' s views are s imi la r to those of A q u i n a s . S ince A q u i n a s also th inks tha t the fact tha t the soul can exist a pa r t f r o m the b o d y gives it c o m p l e t e be ing , he can ' t t h i n k the soul d e m a n d s , u n i o n wi th the body . Never the less , like Descar tes he still t h inks tha t the soul r e m a i n s i n c o m p l e t e in a n o t h e r sense. I t is n o t an i n d i v i d u a l in the g e n u s o f s u b s t a n c e because it does n o t have t h r o u g h i tself the c o m p l e t e n a t u r e of a species33 T o be sure , Des- cartes does n o t talk of c o m p l e t e species in the way tha t A q u i n a s does. H o w - ever, A q u i n a s , like Descartes , also c o m p a r e s the soul to the h a n d to i l lus t ra te the sense in which the soul is i n c o m p l e t e . A q u i n a s m a i n t a i n s tha t the h a n d is a subs t ance because it subsists p e r se in the weak sense o f n o t i n h e r i n g in a n y t h i n g in the way tha t an acc iden t o r ma te r i a l f o r m does34 B u t n e i t h e r the soul n o r

23Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, Ql, adx. 24The key passages are Questions on the Soul, Q1, Response, and Summa Theologica Ia Q75, a2,

ad ~ & ad2. Descartes's account of the per se subsistence of a hand does not line up exactly with that of Aquinas. Descartes thinks that a hand calls for union with the whole human body, but it does not demand, union with the whole body. However, Aquinas seems to think that even though a hand subsists per se, it still, unlike the soul, demands, union with the whole body because once a hand is separated from the rest of the body and hence from the soul it ceases to be a hand in the strict sense. We might well side with Aquinas here in thinking that a severed hand is not a hand in the strict sense and is only potentially a hand if it is capable of being reattached. However, I don't think we want to go so far as to say that a severed hand, because it differs in its being, is numerically distinct from the hand we had before it was severed, because this would force us to say that a hand that is successfully reattached is numerically distinct from the hand we used to have. So I think our intuitions are closer to Descartes's.

C A R T E S I A N C O M P O S I T E S 265 the h a n d subsists per se in the s t rong sense because they are parts and do not have a complete species t h rough themselves. So the situation is that Aquinas and Descartes both compare the soul to the hand to illustrate how the soul subsists per se in one sense of the term, but Aquinas provides a theoretical s tructure missing in Desca r t e s - - the not ion o f having a complete spec ies - - to explain the sense in which the soul and the hand are incomplete . T h a t is, the reason why the nature o f the soul calls for un ion with the body is that the soul does not have th rough itself the complete nature o f some species. Wha t should we make of this difference?25

One response would be to infer that Descartes must be making implicit use of the not ion of complete species to justify his ag reemen t with Aquinas. T h a t is, Descartes must also think that a h u m a n being has a complete species in a way that the mind does not to back up his claim that the mind is incomplete in its nature. This would imply that Descartes thinks a h u m a n being is a more robust substance than a mind, because it is complete in a way that a mind is not. I t would also have the fu r the r implication that when he says that a h u m a n being is an ens per se he would mean someth ing s t ronger than when he says that a mind is an ensperse, for a mind is an ensperseonly in the weak sense that it can exist apart f rom a subject.

Even on this first response there would remain some impor t an t differences between the views of Descartes and Aquinas. In asserting that the soul does not have the complete nature of a species Aquinas seems to be asserting that the soul calls for un ion with the body in the s t rong sense, that the soul cannot be defined independent ly o f the body. But Descartes at most would seem to be commit ted to the view that the soul calls for un ion with the body in the weak sense. In o ther words, Descartes's view would be that a h u m a n being has a complete species in the way a mind fails to because it is natural and p r o p e r for a mind to be uni ted to something else, whereas it is not natural and p r o p e r for a h u m a n being to be uni ted to someth ing else.

A second response would be the o p p o s i t e - - t o deny that Descartes is mak- ing use of a not ion of complete species. Certainly there is reason to think that Descartes's physics involves the rejection o f the not ion of complete species as it pertains to bodies. One can easily read him as supposing that bodies can be c o m p o u n d e d without limit into larger and larger bodies that still coun t as individual substances (AT V I I I A 5 3 - 4 ; CSM I ~33). So one migh t try to argue that Descartes thinks that someth ing can be incomple te in relat ion to a whole that is an ensper se, even if that whole does not have a na ture that is complete in its species. This would imply that the whole in relation to which the parts are incomplete need no t be more robust in its being than the parts themselves. And in this respect there would be a significant po in t o f dissimilarity between

25I would like to thank John Carriero for pressing me on this question.

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Descartes and A q u i n a s - - f o r Aquinas does think that a h u m a n being is more robust in its being than a soul precisely because a h u m a n being does have a nature that is complete in its species and a soul does not. But so long as Descartes is read as holding that a h u m a n being is no less a substance than a soul, then I would argue that their views are more similar than dissimilar.

I f this is Descartes's view, then it would seem that he cannot be using the not ion of the parts being incomplete in their na ture as fundamenta l , No th ing in his physics suggests that any body calls for un ion with any o ther body. Ins tead he must be starting the o ther way round. T h a t is, instead of def ining the completeness of the whole in terms of the incompleteness o f the parts, he would have to be defining the incompleteness o f the parts in relation to the whole. So we identify certain bodies as complete , for example, planets, and infer f rom this that their parts are incomplete in relation to them. Fur the r - more, this second response suggests that Descartes does not use the not ion o f an ens per se to mean anything s t ronger than the weak not ion o f being able to exist apar t f rom a subject. Thus, any aggregate o f substances would be an ens

pe~ se.

Both of these responses have meri t even t hough they pull in opposi te directions. T h e y reflect what I consider to be a deep tension in Descartes 's phi losophy that arises, on one side, f rom his a t t empt to preserve the c o m m o n - sense Aristotelian concept ion o f a h u m a n being, and, on the o ther side, f rom the implications of his new account of body. I f we emphasize the first line o f thought , then a h u m a n being is a more robust substance than a mind because it is not incomplete with respect to anyth ing else, and not every aggregate o f substances is a composi te ens pe se. I f we emphasize the second line o f thought , then a h u m a n being, while still a substance, need be no more robust a sub- stance than a mind, and all aggregates of substances would be entia per se.

The third point in response to R o z e m o n d is that she is no t justified in discounting the passage (that had not before caught my attention) in which Descartes in defending Regius asserts that he did not deny that the mind and body have a natural apti tude to substantial union:

they [the proponents of the thesis that the union of mind and body arises per accidens] did not deny the substantial union by which mind and body are conjoined nor a natural aptitude of each part to that union, as was clear from the fact that immediately after- wards they added: "those substances are called incomplete by reason of the composite which arises from their union." (AT VII 585) ~6

She discounts this passage on the g r o u n d that since Descartes supports his view that they did not deny the natural apt i tude for un ion by point ing to the

~6I'm using Rozemond's translation from op. cit., 161.

C A R T E S I A N C O M P O S I T E S 267 claim tha t m i n d a n d b o d y are i n c o m p l e t e , w h e t h e r he rea l ly agrees wi th the Scholast ics d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r they have the s a m e a c c o u n t o f i n c o m p l e t e - ness. She m a i n t a i n s tha t they do not , b e c a u s e she a rgues tha t Desca r t e s t h inks m i n d a n d b o d y are i n c o m p l e t e on ly in the sense tha t b o t h are n e e d e d to cons t i tu t e a h u m a n be ing . She bases he r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Descar tes ' s a c c o u n t of i n c o m p l e t e n e s s o n the s e c o n d le t te r to Regius , w h e r e , as we have a l r e a d y seen, Descar tes asserts tha t a m a n c o n s i d e r e d in h i m s e l f has per se u n i t y be c a us e the u n i o n of m i n d a n d b o d y is essen t ia l to the man.27

I agree tha t the a c c o u n t o f per se u n i t y in the s e c o n d le t te r to Reg ius does n o t p rov ide e v i d e n c e in favor of the m o r e r o b u s t a c c o u n t of i n c o m p l e t e n e s s I have a t t r i b u t e d to Descartes . I t does n o t fol low f r o m the c la im tha t the u n i o n of m i n d a n d b o d y is essent ia l to the m a n tha t m i n d a n d b o d y are i n c o m p l e t e in the i r n a t u r e . H o w e v e r , this passage does n o t conf l ic t wi th the passage f r o m the first le t te r to Regius , wh ich R o z e m o n d does n o t take in to a c c o u n t , in which Descar tes does asser t tha t m i n d a n d b o d y by the i r ve ry n a t u r e are i n c o m p l e t e subs tances . I f Descar tes bel ieves m i n d a n d b o d y are i n c o m p l e t e subs t ances by the i r n a t u r e , he m i g h t well be l ieve tha t they have a n a t u r a l a p t i t u d e to be u n i t e d , even if t he i r n a t u r e s do n o t d e m a n d , t ha t they be u n i t e d . A g a i n this s o u n d s very m u c h like A q u i n a s ' s a c c o u n t of the soul.

Final ly, the fact tha t Descar tes does n o t t h i n k the b o d y has a des i re to be u n i t e d to the soul s h o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u e d as e v i d e n c e tha t he th inks it has n o a p t i t u d e to be u n i t e d to the soul. Desires are o n e th ing , n a t u r a l a p t i t u d e s a n o t h e r .

Ve re C h a p p e l l a rgues tha t a h u m a n b e i n g c a n n o t be an ens per se, be c a us e Descar tes says tha t m i n d a n d b o d y are o n e a n d the same t h i n g on ly by a u n i t y of c o m p o s i t i o n a n d n o t by a u n i t y of n a t u r e . ~a

Notice that if we have different ideas of two things, there are two ways in which they can be taken to be one and the same thing: either in virtue of the uni ty or identity of their nature, or else merely in respect of unity of composition. For example, the ideas which we have of shape and of motion are not the same, nor are our ideas of under - standing and volition, nor are those of bones and flesh, nor are those of thought and of an extended thing. But nevertheless we clearly perceive that the same substance which is such that it is capable of taking on a shape is also such that it is capable of being moved, and hence that which has shape and that which is mobile are one and the same in virtue of a unity of nature. Similarly, the thing that unders tands and the thing that wills are one and the same in virtue of a unity of nature. But our perception is different in the case of the thing that we consider under the form of bone and that which we consider under the form of flesh; and hence we cannot take them as one and the same thing in virtue of a unity of nature but can regard them as the same only in respect of unity of composit ion--i .e, in so far as it is one and the same animal which has bones

27 Ibid., 157. ~SChappell, op. cir., 422.

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and flesh. But now the question is whether we perceive that a th inking thing and an ex tended thing are one and the same by a unity of nature . Tha t is to say, do we find between thought and extension the same kind of affinity or connect ion that we find between shape and motion, or unders tand ing and volition? Alternatively, when they are said to be 'one and the same' is this not ra ther in respect of unity of composi t ion, in so far as they are found in the same man, jus t as bones and flesh are found in the same animal? The lat ter view is the one I maintain, since I observe a dist inction or difference in every respect between the nature of an ex tended thing and that of a th inking thing, which is no less than that to be found between bones and flesh. (AT VII 423-4 ; CSM II 285-6)

My r e s p o n s e to th is o b j e c t i o n is t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n fo l lows o n l y o n a c o n t r o v e r - sial u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t D e s c a r t e s m e a n s by a u n i t y o f n a t u r e . I f in d e n y i n g t h a t m i n d a n d b o d y a re o n e by a u n i t y o f n a t u r e , D e s c a r t e s w e r e d e n y i n g t h a t the n a t u r e s o f m i n d a n d b o d y can b e u n i t e d o r j o i n e d , t h e n the c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d fo l low. I t w o u l d fo l l ow b e c a u s e t h e c o n d i t i o n fo r t h e per se u n i t y o f a c o m p o s i t e C c o n s t i t u t e d by A a n d B is t h a t A a n d B a r e i n c o m p l e t e in t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e , w h i c h sugges t s t h a t t he n a t u r e s o f A a n d B c a n b e u n i t e d o r j o i n e d . B u t I d o n ' t t h i n k this is w h a t D e s c a r t e s m e a n s in d e n y i n g t h a t m i n d a n d b o d y a re o n e by a u n i t y o f n a t u r e . I t h i n k his p o i n t is i n s t e a d t h a t m i n d a n d b o d y d o n o t have the s a m e n a t u r e . A n d t h e r e is n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n in a s s e r t i n g b o t h t ha t A a n d B d o n o t have the s a m e n a t u r e a n d t h a t A a n d B a r e i n c o m p l e t e in t h e i r n a t u r e s . O n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g D e s c a r t e s can c o n s i s t e n t l y a s se r t b o t h t ha t m i n d a n d b o d y a r e n o t o n e a n d the s a m e by a u n i t y o f n a t u r e a n d t ha t a h u m a n b e i n g is an ens per se.

O n c e a g a i n D e s c a r t e s ' s e x a m p l e s a r e h e l p f u l . T h e e x a m p l e s o f t h i n g s t h a t have a u n i t y o f n a t u r e a r e all m o d e s o f t h e s a m e a t t r i b u t e . T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t to have a u n i t y o f n a t u r e is to have the s a m e n a t u r e . H i s e x a m p l e o f a u n i t y o f c o m p o s i t i o n is an a n i m a l c o m p o s e d o f f lesh a n d b o n e s . By i n v i t i n g us to s u p p o s e t ha t an a n i m a l is a u n i t y o f c o m p o s i t i o n , D e s c a r t e s is t h e r e b y i n v i t i n g us to s u p p o s e t h a t f lesh a n d b o n e s d o n o t have t h e s a m e n a t u r e . O f c o u r s e , th is is n o t s o m e t h i n g h e be l ieves , s ince h e t h i n k s all e x t e n d e d t h i n g s have the s a m e n a t u r e . B u t s ince f lesh a n d b o n e s a r e i n c o m p l e t e in t he s a m e sense t h a t a h a n d o r a r m is i n c o m p l e t e , the e x a m p l e se rves to i l l u s t r a t e t h e p o i n t t h a t t h i n g s we s u p p o s e to have d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e s can still b e i n c o m p l e t e a n d h e n c e can cons t i - tu te s o m e t h i n g t ha t is an ens per se.

C h a p p e l l a lso ob jec t s t ha t a h u m a n b e i n g c a n n o t be an i n d i v i d u a l sub - s t ance b e c a u s e Desca r t e s is c o m m i t t e d to t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t e v e r y f in i t e sub - s t ance has exac t ly o n e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e o r e s sence39 T h i s p r i n c i p l e a lso p l a y s a f u n d a m e n t a l r o l e in R o z e m o n d ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f De s c a r t e s , f o r she m a i n - ta ins t h a t it is the c ruc i a l p r e m i s e in D e s c a r t e s ' s a r g u m e n t fo r t he r ea l d i s t i nc -

29 Ibid., 470.

C A R T E S I A N C O M P O S I T E S 269 t ion b e t w e e n m i n d a n d body .so O n c e we see t h a t t h o u g h t is a p r i n c i p a l a t t r i - b u t e a n d t h a t e x t e n s i o n is a p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e , i t fo l lows t h a t m i n d a n d b o d y a r e d i s t i n c t subs t ances .

D e s c a r t e s d o e s a p p e a r to e n d o r s e such a p r i n c i p l e in a p r o m i n e n t p a s s a g e in t he Principles, P a r t I:

53. To each substance there belongs one principal at tr ibute; in the case of mind, this is thought, and in the case of body it is extension. A substance may indeed be known th rough any a t t r ibute at all; bu t each substance has one principal p roper ty which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its o ther proper t ies are referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and dep th constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the na ture of th inking substance. (AT VI I IA 25; CSM I 21o)

N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is m y c o n v i c t i o n t ha t it is o n e o f t h e m o s t s e r i o u s m i s t a k e s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y C a r t e s i a n s c h o l a r s h i p t h a t th is p a s s a g e is t a k e n to e n d o r s e t he p r i n c i p l e tha t n o s u b s t a n c e can h a v e m o r e t h a n o n e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e . T h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is ca l l ed i n to q u e s t i o n b y a f u l l e r e x p l a n a t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e s in t h e Comments on a Certain Broadsheet:

As for the attr ibutes which consti tute the natures of things, it cannot be said that those which are different, and such that the concept of the one is not contained in the concept of the other, are present together in one and the same subject; for that would be equivalent to saying that one and the same subject has two different n a t u r e s - - a statement that implies a contradict ion, at least when it is a question of a simple subject (as in the present case) ra ther than a composi te one. (AT VII IB 349-5o ; CSM I 298 )

H e r e D e s c a r t e s m a k e s i t c l e a r t ha t b e be l i eves even a s i m p l e s u b j e c t can have two o r m o r e a t t r i b u t e s o f t he so r t t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e n a t u r e s o f th ings . T h i s can h a p p e n w h e n the c o n c e p t o f o n e is c o n t a i n e d in t he c o n c e p t o f t he o t h e r . So it c a n ' t be a bas ic m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t n o s i m p l e s u b j e c t can have m o r e t h a n o n e a t t r i b u t e o f the so r t t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t he n a t u r e s o f th ings . T h e t r ue m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e is t h a t n o s i m p l e s u b j e c t c a n h a v e m o r e t h a n o n e a t t r i b u t e o f the sor t t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t he n a t u r e s o f t h i n g s w h e n t h e i r c o n c e p t s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t . 3 ' M o r e o v e r , th is p a s s a g e m a k e s i t c l e a r t h a t D e s c a r t e s t h i n k s i t is t rue on ly o f s i m p l e sub j ec t s t h a t t h e y can have o n l y o n e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e c o n c e i v e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s . C o m p o s i t e s u b j e c t s c a n have m o r e t h a n o n e such p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e , a n d 1 see n o g o o d r e a s o n fo r t h i n k i n g t h a t such a c o m p o s i t e s u b j e c t is n o t a s u b s t a n c e , p r o v i d e d t h a t i t ha s per se u n i t y o f t he so r t a n a l y z e d in th is p a p e r .

3~ op. cit., Chap. a. 3, This is why the real distinction proof is not completed merely by showing that thought and

extension are attributes. It needs to be shown further that neither thought nor extension is contained in the concept of the other.

27 ~ J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 2 A P R I L 1 9 9 9

I n c l a i m i n g t ha t t he Principles p a s s a g e is s u p e r s e d e d by the Comments pas - sage, I a m n o t c l a i m i n g t ha t t h e two p a s s a g e s c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d . I t h i n k t h a t the Principles p a s s a g e re f lec t s D e s c a r t e s ' s v iew t h a t as a m a t t e r o f fac t t he s i m p l e s u b s t a n c e s c r e a t e d by G o d have o n e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e . T h e m i s t a k e is to r e a d i t as i m p l y i n g t h a t i t is s o m e s o r t o f m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o s i m p l e s u b s t a n c e t ha t has m o r e t h a n o n e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e . I n d e e d I a m t e m p t e d to a s c r i be to Desca r t e s t h e v iew t h a t G o d is a s i m p l e s u b s t a n c e w i th m o r e t h a n o n e p r i n c i p a l a t t r i b u t e , n o n e o f w h i c h can be c o n c e i v e d i n d e p e n - d e n t l y o f the o the r s .

In c o n c l u s i o n , I have t r i e d to e x p l a i n a n d d e f e n d D e s c a r t e s ' s s t r a t e g y o f r e l a t i v i za t i on to j u s t i f y s e e m i n g l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y a s se r t i ons : t h a t a t r i a n g l e in- s c r i bed in a s q u a r e b o t h d o e s a n d d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a t r ue a n d i m m u t a b l e n a t u r e , t h a t t he m i n d is b o t h c o m p l e t e a n d i n c o m p l e t e , a n d t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is b o t h an ensper accidens a n d an ensper se. T h e fac t t h a t D e s c a r t e s a p p l i e s this s t r a t e g y in all t h r e e o f t he se cases r e q u i r e s us to t ake i t se r ious ly . T h e m o s t s ign i f i can t r e su l t is t ha t D e s c a r t e s ' s a c c o u n t o f t h e sense in w h i c h sou l is c o m - p l e t e a n d the sense in w h i c h i t is i n c o m p l e t e is v e r y s i m i l a r to t h a t o f A q u i n a s . A soul is c o m p l e t e in t h e s a m e sense t ha t a h a n d is c o m p l e t e a n d it is i n c o m - p l e t e in t he s a m e sense t ha t a h a n d is i n c o m p l e t e . A n d the s o l u t i o n to m y w o r r y o f s eve ra l yea r s ago is t ha t in s a y i n g t h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is an ens per ttccidens, D e s c a r t e s is n o t d e n y i n g t h a t i t is a n ens per se, b u t r a t h e r a s s e r t i n g t h e f a m i l i a r Scho las t i c v iew tha t it can have c o n s t i t u e n t s t ha t can subs i s t per se.:~ ~

University of California, Riverside

3~An earlier version of this paper was presented at The Third California Conference in Early Modern Philosophy at UCI,June "7, 1997, organized by Alan Nelson. I would like to thank Larry Nolan, who was the commentator, and others who participated in the conference, especially Ed McCann and Calvin Normore. I would also like to thank John Carriero, Vere Chappell, Marleen Rozemond, and the anonymous referees for the Journal for their extremely valuable comments on previous drafts.