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Neo-Ottomanism as Expression of Liberal Islam in the ForeignPolicy of Turkey in the 21st Century

Lecture at Casa Arabe, Madrid, February 26, 2008

Preface

In November of 2002 a very important shift has occurred in the political life of Turkey. Amoderate Islamic party called Adalet ve Kalkinma (or AK for short that signifies purityand cleanliness in Turkish) came to power. As the result of the election victory AbdullahGul (the President of Turkey and a former leader of the banned Refah Party) becamePrime Minister. Meanwhile, the current Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan remained theleader of the AKP and was involved in all executive decisions of the new government.Tayip Erdogan, a former Refah mayor of Istanbul, was banned from taking politicaloffice because he was earlier arrested and jailed for public reading a poem that wasdeemed anti-Constitutional by the Kemalist establishment.

Since Europe itself has consolidated after the Maastricht Treaty into the post-nationalstate, the Europeanization dynamic in Turkey acquired three distinct interpretations. Theorthodox Kemalists (consistent nationalists) interpreted the verities of Kemalist vision asreproduction and introduction into Turkish life of innovations generated by Europe.European Romantics, i.e. Kemalists, which tend to hyperbolize the Great Leaders legacyand fix Ataturks ideas as some absolute, set as a goal the full membership in the EU in1987. The third ideology, which came to be known as Neo-Ottomanism, articulates adifferent paradigm, viz. that Turkey needs the European institutions not in order to jointhe mythical Paradise of Europe, but enhance the countrys standing in the more naturallocus, i.e. Muslim world.

Introduction

The goal of this article is to explore the meaning(s) and geopolitical implications of theNeo-Ottomanism as a particular expression the Islamic Liberalism.

One of the basic determinants of the Turkish foreign policy of the last 15 years was anambition to become a moderator and also a curator or facilitator of interactions in theadjacent regions, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East. By doing so, theTurkish powers that be articulated their vision for Turkey playing the role that theOttoman Empire used to perform in the region. This new direction of Turkish foreignpolicy contradicts the spirit of Ataturk, the Republics founder, who postulated thatTurkey should refrain from any Grand Designs in its foreign policy, but ratherconcentrates its resources on the project of national development within the boundaries ofAnatolia. Ataturk indicated that the only Grand Design or vocation for Turkey is theprocess of Europeanization.

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But firstly, I would like to elucidate the impact of Kemalism and Cold War legacy on thecontemporary domestic and foreign policy in Turkey.

Ideological Contradictions of Kemalism

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, there was a discord between themembership in the Western imperialist alliance and the Kemalist ideologicalcommitment to national liberation struggle and developmentalism, i.e. independencefrom Western capital. In domestic political struggle this manifested in a contradiction inthe leftist Kemalist mentality: their statism and their strong dislike of common peoplewith conservative ideas gradually transformed them into defenders of the status quo.They interpreted the Kemalist principle of revolutionism as going against people'sconservative values as they saw them obstacles to developmentalism. In the absence ofcrucial links with people, they turned to the military as their solution and praised the roleof the military as a modernizer. Ironically, despite their anti-imperialist tone, theyborrowed the vocabulary of American modernization school and even translated some of

their work in Yon, an influential left-wing theoretical journal

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The assumed role theyattributed to the military, namely, the military as a force of transformation, was also a rolethat was sanctioned by the United States. The entire modernization discourse in theUnited States, occasionally developed and defended by right-wing Americanintellectuals, was based on the idea that for countries such as Turkey to develop, theprocess had to be top-down in the face of conservative resistance to change. In otherwords, in the modernization discourse, a discourse shared strongly by the Turkishpositivists, it was necessary to emancipate from the tradition in order to modernize.2

This contradictory view of populism and militarism also led to contradictory views onforeign policy. Totally ignoring the role or at least acquiescence of the West in manyThird World coups, including those in Turkey, they maintained militarism and anti-imperialism at the same time. Their anti-imperialist and socialist ideas became popularamong the leftists in the 1960s, in the context of the increasing tension between Turkeyand the United States on the Cyprus question. Interestingly the Cyprus question became atest issue that demanded a separation of socialist internationalism and nationalism.

Background of Turkish Foreign Policy

The main sources of the Turkish foreign policy are the historical experience of theOttoman Empire (the tradition of the balance of power); the nationalist Kemalistrevolution and creation of the Turkish republic (hence, isolationism); Western orientationexpressed in the policy of Europeanisation and modernization; the suspicion of foreignpowers and interests (the Sevres syndrome). Pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism also servedas one of the ideological sources of the modern Turkish foreign doctrine with reference to

1 See Fahrettin Altun, Kemalist BirModernleme Yorunlu Olarak Yon Dergisi," Turkiye Arl1atzrmalarzLiteratir Dergisi, 2, no. 1 (2004): 574.2 See the classic works of modernization school Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. a Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: University Press, 1961) and Daniel Lerner and David Riesman, ThePassing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

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The 1960 coup ushered in a new era in Turkish politics marked by periodic militaryinterventions, legalized through the Internal Service Act of the Turkish armed forces.However, the constitution that was prepared by the leftist academics hired by the juntawas the most democratic constitution ever enacted in Turkish history. The ensuingenvironment of freedom of expression led to a surge in intellectual activities. In this

context, Turkish foreign policy came to be discussed with unprecedented heat,particularly in the context of the Cyprus crisis. While demands for a military interventionamong the increasingly furious youth grew, the Inonu government faced the famousJohnson letter in 1964, warning the government that in case the Soviets might exploit theCyprus issue to intervene, the United States and other members of NA TO would not beobliged by their commitments to defend Turkey. The letter was shocking in both style andcontent and in the ensuing crisis, the Inonu government conceded 1965 elections to therising star of liberal conservative politics, Suleyman Demirel. While Suleyman Demirelbelieved in the importance of relations with the United States for economic developmentof Turkey, he also pursued a multidimensional foreign policy. He considered theimprovement of relations with the Soviet Union critical for development and secured

highly lucrative Soviet credits to build key industrial facilities. Since Prime MinisterDemirel did not actively pursued military confrontation over the Cyprus, the line adoptedby the Army and nationalist military circles, he was deposed in the 1971 coup.

In fact, the military in Turkey stepped in to protect a fragile secular democracy fromIslamist tendencies in 1960 and radical militancy in 1980.5 When the 12 September 1980military coup took place, it enjoyed a high degree of popularity in the context of thesetroubles. The United States supported both the coup and the economic team led by TurgutOza1 that implemented key liberalization reforms. Ozal swept the 1983 elections toestablish his decade-long political supremacy in which he continued to implementeconomic reforms and also embarked upon a process of political liberalization. In this,Ozal's primary goal was to secure American support in the context of perceived decreasein Turkish geopolitical significance as the Cold War system rapidly crumbled. The latePresident Turgut Ozals (prime minister, 1983-1989, president, 1989-1993) outstandingpolitical skills and active personal involvement in shaping Turkish foreign policy allowedhim to impose civilian control over this sphere.6 Hence Ozal saw that Turkey had toredefine its traditional foreign policy to fit the requirements of this change and to seek anew geopolitical role in the post-Soviet era through new initiatives such as theestablishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative and the revitalization ofEconomic Cooperation Organization that linked Turkey to Iran, Pakistan and CentralAsian republics. Qzal's political tenure practically ended After his death in April of 1993,Turkish politics again entered the phase of domestic turbulence, while Turkish ForeignMinistry lost interest in pursuit of the dynamic policy vis--vis the Turkic republics, inparticular Azerbaijan.

5 It was said that the deposed Prime Minister Menderes has built more mosques than schools and restoredArabic Ezan (the Muslim call to prayers) earlier translated into Turkish under the Kemalist program ofTurkification of the 1930s.George Haddad, op. cit., p.118. See also Stephen Kinzers comments on the roleof military in Turkey, op. cit., p.16.6See Stehen Kinzer, op. cit., p.14. Then Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay resigned in protest against Ozalscommitment to support the Allies military action against the Saddam regime in 1991. See for detailsNicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled(Woodstock: Overlook Press, 1997) pp.219-224;

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The end of the Cold War produced a double effect on the global or systemic level. Threeseminal events mould the contemporary Turkish foreign policy. They are the break-up ofthe Soviet Union, the two Gulf Wars in the Middle East and new concerns related to

Turkish drive to enter the European Union. The Soviet threat affecting directly theWestern Europe disappeared, which has eliminated the need for the American nuclearumbrella. This put into question the viability and raison detre of NATO on the Continent.Since NATO had been created as the transatlantic alliance aimed at providing security forthe Western Europe during the Cold War. The function of Turkey as a part of the Northerntier of NATO became a source of debate among European members of NATO. At thesame time, the collapse of the Communist bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet empire,unleashed the submerged ethno-national conflicts, which have been frozen since the endthe First World War and its aftermath. The ghost of the Sevres treaty came to haunt theTurkish foreign policy establishment again. Secessionist movements and the search forself-determination by ethnic minorities proliferated in many parts of the world, including

Turkey itself. In the case of Turkish Republic the revived ethno-nationalism manifested inthe Kurdish search for a greater autonomy.

After the end of Cold War, when the Western security burdens were alleviated by thecollapse of the Soviet military power, Turkey had to reinvent itself and find a new role inthe Western security architecture. The support for the American-led coalition in the GulfWar II assured that the Turkey geographical location would figure prominently in thestrategic calculations of American policy makers in the New World Order. The Arab-Israeli Peace process opened prospects for normalization of relations with Israel, ademocratic state in possession of advanced military and civilian technology, which sharesa historical suspicion towards Arabs and possesses the strongest army in the Middle East.

The break-up of the Soviet Union in the end of 1991 also created unexpected foreignpolicy possibilities for Turkey in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. Thesementioned three regions were tied to Turkey by history, language, ethnicity and religion.These newly independent states revived the sceptre of Pan-Turkic ambitions especiallyamong Turkish nationalists affiliated with the Milliyetci Hareket Party. But the drasticchange in the international environment engendered also new threats as well. Ofparticular concern for Turkey were also the external conflicts in Middle East, theCaucasus and in the South-eastern Europe. The more porous borders of Iran andAfghanistan brought a threat to the Turkish secular regime. The inter-ethnic conflicts inthe Caucasus and Balkans produced instability in the Turkish neighbourhood, the arousalof Kurdish ethno-nationalism created internal threat to the integrity of the Republic. More

activist Turkey was also perceived as expansionist (by Russia, Iran and Greece) in itspolicy toward the Black Sea region and the Caspian basin.

When the Adalet ve Kalkinma (Justice and Development) party won the November2002 general elections, the Erdogans party gained 365 seats in the parliament and wassupported by 35% of the voters. The party avoided the direct confrontation with theUnited States and declared as its main goal entrance into the European Union. In fact, the

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new Turkish government was able to convince the United States to pressurize theEuropean capitals and Brussels to expedite the process of Turkish integration into Europein exchange for its cooperation on Iraq. But this attempt failed to convince the Europeanleaders at the summit in Copenhagen and the decision was postponed until 2004.Eventually, by the vote of Turkish parliament March 3rd, 2003, Turkey denied Americans

their deployment for the coming military campaign in Iraq. The disappointments with theWestern allies led Turkey to seek an alternative direction in its foreign and domesticpolitics. Meanwhile the Russian vector of Turkish foreign policy began to dominate,especially after the start of construction of the critical for Turkey the Blue Stream naturalgas project in 2002. However, the search for the Kizil Elma (or the Great Idea or theDoctrine) of Turkish foreign policy by the new moderate Islamist government continued.A substantial part of Turkish political elite, including senior members of AKP, wereconvinced that in the post-Cold War era Turkey needs to return home, i.e. to fortify itsposition in the Middle East, improve its historical links with the newly-independentTurkic states and find the accommodation with its Russian neighbor. The Turkishobserver Kivanc Galip Over argues, [Recent] events demonstrated that positions of

Turkey in the West will depend on the degree of Turkish influence in the East. TheEurasian future of Turkish foreign policy was confirmed by the high level trip to Russiaand the Turkic states undertaken by Erdogan after his electoral victory in the spring of2003. The Kemalist establishment seconded this direction of Erdogans policy as wasobvious from the support by Ahmet Necdet Sezers former Foreign Affairs Chief AdviserTacan Ildem. But the critical input into the new thinking of AKP was made by the chiefforeign policy advisor Ambassador Ahmet Davutoglu. A former academic and thinker,who devoted his career to the study of foundations of Islamic civilization and geopolitics,Davutoglu published his book Stratejik Derinlik in 1993. In his book, Davutogluadvanced a concept of the strategic depth to guide the foreign policy of RecepErdogans government. This concept is eponymous with the title of Davutoglus book.The origins of this doctrine can be traced to Ozals neo Ottomanism, the muliti-dimensional foreign policy of the Erbakans government and Davutoglus innovativeapproach to geopolitics. The main thesis of this doctrine is that the strategic depth ispredicated on geographical depth and historical depth. So Turkey, as a result of itshistorical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses a great geographical depth. Accordingto Davutoglu, This geographical depth places Turkey right at the center of manygeopolitical areas of influence. The strategic depth doctrine calls for an activistengagement with all regional systems in the Turkeys neighbourhood.

New Turkish Elite as the Carrier of the Neo-Ottomanist Ideology

The Strategic Depth Doctrine was embedded in the new discourse of the neo-Ottomanismas its legitimizing ideology. Neo-Ottomanism is at the core of the AKP problem-freeforeign policy. But it would a gross oversimplification to attribute the watershed inTurkish politics to specific personalities. This new trend, the neo-Ottomansim, is areflection of profound social transformation and the Zeitgeist of changing Turkishsociety. Actually, it is the culmination of new ideological innovations that emerged duringthe period of Turgut Ozals leadership. I would argue that the Neo-Ottomanism is theideology of new Turkish elite, which began to form in the Central Anatolia in the end of

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the 1980s. This elite originates primarily from representatives of the conservative andreligious lower class, i.e. urban residents and rural population. As a result of upwardsocial mobility promoted by Ozals economic reform and migration to the major cities,especially Istanbul, the rise of new entrepreneurial middle class was imminent. Forexample, the population of Keysari, the stronghold of the Islamic Calvinists, has grown

ten times over fifty years from 65 thousands to six hundred thousands. The new elite as aresult of education and urbanization brought new (or rather the old conservative )attitudes and ideas into political discourse. Their views widely diverged from the classicalKemalism espoused by the Anakaras establishment. The new elites ideology tingedwith the imperial nostalgia emphasizes the role of small business, laissez-faire economicsand the state nonintervention combined with the conservative values in Turkish society.The Anatolian Tigers, a group of thriving religiously conservative businessmen,popularized the ideology, which liberally uses quotations from the Quran and claims thatthe Prophet blessed commerce and development in general. This movement, acquired thesobriquet Islamic Calvinism. (See Insight Turkey, July-September, 2005.) Adherents ofthis ideology use the discourse of the Protestant ethics of the religious merit of work and

the necessity to save, blessings the worldly ascetism and advanced education. Theserepresentatives of the lower middle class from the Central Anatolia formed their ownunion Islamic entrepreneurs, MUSIAD, that propagates this religious connection betweenIslam and the values of the free market. In fact, MUSIAD membership constitutes animportant, possibly crucial, support for AKP in local and national elections. An importantcontribution to this ideological trend was made by Huner encan, the author of a brochuretitledHomo Islamicus or A Muslim in Business Life . Other infliuential among the TurkishCalvinists is the Nurculus or Fetullahcis, the followers of Said Nursi (1876-1960), whoadmonished his adherents to study Western science, modern technology, withoutabandoning the traditional Islamic values.

The Main Aspects of the Neo-Ottomanism

This ideology, while placing less emphasis on nationalism than the traditional Kemalistdoctrine, stresses the Muslim solidarity and the transnational concept of Ummah. Thenational spirit can be described as pride of Turkish Muslim for its heritage and traditionof craftsmanship and hard work. The Turkish people feels emboldened to lead otherMuslims nations on the path to the Western standard of living, representative democracyand modernity. These broad concepts summarize the spirit of Neo-Ottomanism. Thepoliticians, represented by the inner circle of AKP, who embraced this ideology, have along-term global agenda. These politicians implement this program with zeal, dedicationand sophistication. None of these practitioners proclaim the slogans about the restorationof the Empire or the new great empire like their northern big neighbor. Erdogan andGul are extremely bright, sober-minded and agile politicians. The current Turkishleadership realizes that in the immediate future, Turkey is incapable of projecting itspower in the whole Ottoman neighborhood. The mid-term goal is to earn domestic andinternational legitimacy by joining the EU, tentative attempts to strengthen the D-8(which includes that includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria,Pakistan, and Turkey) and the leadership in the OIC. The Turkish leadership undertakesefforts to become the arbiter and mediator of many regional conflicts in the Balkans

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(Kosovo, Bosnia, etc.), the Caucasus (Chechnya, the Nagorno-Karabagh, South Ossetia,Abkhazia and Ajaria), the Middle East (the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syrian-Israelinegotiations) trough participation in inter-governmental organizations (OSCE, BSEO,CEO) and membership in the North Atlantic Alliance as well as the UN-sponsoredAlliance of Civilizations. The participation in these structures allows Turkey a lot of

flexibility and prestige.

But the membership in the European Union remains the golden prize of all internationalefforts by Turkey. The candidate status in the EU provides the international credibility toTurkish foreign policy initiatives in all the above regions. The EU continues changing ofmilestones for the membership and criticizing Turkey for numerous failures to satisfy allCopenhagen criteria. In the meantime, this dynamic situation in reality suits both theEuropean Union and Turkey. As a full NATO member, Turkey carved out itself a niche asa key go-between between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine and the West. In otherwords, Turkey gradually becomes an assertive power on the periphery of the EuropeanUnion. In a foreseeable future Turkey will grow into an ascending power that combines

Islam with robust market economy. This power has a great potential to expand its sphereof influence even without full membership in the EU.

In the meantime, military attempted to thwart the re-election of AKP in the spring of2007 through mechanism of so-called e-coup detat, by posting a warning on TurkishArmys website about the internal threat to the Republic from Islamists. The politicaland economic deprivation of Kurdish population in southeastern provinces of Turkeygained a more positive attention of the Turkish government and some concerted effortswere made to alleviate these problems. While, during the recent 2007 elections AKPattracted almost 50% of Turkish Kurdish voters in the South East, the generals cast asuspicious eye on Erdogans conciliatory stance towards the Kurds. The military andnationalist political circles pressurized Erdogan to pursue the policy of retaliation andreprisals against PKK, based in Kandil Mountains of Iraq and its Turkish supporters inthe frontier area. The possibility of military incursion in Northern Iraq (Kurdistan) willcertainly negatively affect Turkeys prospects of entering the European Union soon.Recently France, one of the leading powers in the European Union, put Turkey on thespot. As Frances Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated in Istanbul on November 3,2003: "I warn them not to cross the border... I want to avoid a destabilization inside adestabilized country." Kouchner warned that an incursion "will blow up the whole areainside Turkey and inside Iraq", adding: "This is very risky... a little incident can starteverything."7

Foreign Policy Initiatives under the AKP

One of important goals of the Erdogans government is to preclude further intervention ofthe United States in the Middle Eastern affairs. In particular Turkey objects along withEuropean Union countries to the American Greater Middle East Initiative. In order toaccomplish this Turkey calls upon her neighbors to undertake political and economicreforms themselves. Foreign Minister Gul warned Arab countries in an interview with an

7Kurdish Observeronline, November 3, 2007; available at http://www.kurdistanobserver.com/.

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London Arab-language daily Al-Hayat said, "If we don't take the reins ... and prefer tocover up and ignore them (our problems), then others [the United States] will try to solvethem their way and interfere in our affairs."48 He criticized potential American approachto solving problems in the region:And this interference will take place in the wrongway because they don't understand our sensitivities, our habits, our cultures and our

social structure."

In particular Turkey extended new diplomatic efforts in bringing peaceful resolution tothe Syrian-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Turkish leadership calls upon Turkeyhas undertaken bold steps to mediate regional conflicts in the Middle East. The newTurkish government demonstrated its willingness to reconcile with the Muslim world. Inparticular, the Erdogan government took an activist approach in its relations with Turkishneighbors to the east (Iran) and south (Iraq, Syria), while the bi-lateral relations withIsrael entered a cooler period. The war in Iraq served as a political moment for Turkishnew foreign policy. Turkish commentator observed, "Iraq is becoming a unifying factorin the region. Turkish diplomacy is trying to mobilize public opinion in the region now.

This gives Turkey the opportunity to play the role of a regional power."

The Iraq War

The first important test of Turkish dynamism, inspired by the new spirit in Turkishforeign policy, was crisis in Iraq in the winter of 2003. The possibility of war in Iraq andits dismemberment raised a scepter of creation of an independent Kurdish state inNorthern Iraq and separatist demands among the Turkish Kurds. Turkey pursued allavenues to prevent this occurrence.

The Turkish activism in the post-war Iraq brought Turks on a collision course with U.S.interests. In particular, the contention erupted about the fate of Mosul and Kirkukprovince. These two provinces in the northern Iraq are predominantly populated byKurds. The crux of this issue is the presence of major Iraqi oil fields of Mosul and Kirkukprovinces, which could potentially provide an economic foundation for a Kurdishautonomous entity

Relations with Syria

After coming to power, the AKP initiated diplomatic offensive to reach newunderstanding with Syrian government, among other Arab countries.62 Over the last twoyears the relations between the two countries drastically improved. The two countriessigned a significant number of bi-lateral agreements in the Sixth Turkish SyrianProtocol, which covers economic sphere, duty-free trade, tourism and educationalexchange in Ankara in July of 2003. 63 In December 2003 Turkish parliamentarydelegation visited Syria to re-start bi-lateral dialogue on the contentious issue of Hatayprovince and terrorism.64 This exchange was followed by a state visit by PresidentBashar Assad in January of 2004. In was the first visit to Turkey by Syrian head of statein 57 years.

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New Activism in Foreign Policy Towards Iran

The Erdogan administration also attempted to open a new era in Turkish-Iranianrelations. In July 2004 Prime Minister Erdogan visited Teheran and signed agreementabout deliveries of Iranian gas to Europe through the Turkish territory. In response to

American diplomatic warnings, the Turkish Prime Minister said, "Just as all othercountries in the world develop relations with their neighbors, so too will Turkey developits relations with its neighbors. And it is determined about this."70 In broad reference tothe Strategic Depth doctrine he added at press conference in Teheran, "Before we cameto power, we promised that we would develop relations with our neighbors and includedthis in our action plan. We did not make any discrimination among our neighbors. Theregional peace will be set up in this way. Just like how all the worlds' countries developrelations with their neighbors, Turkey will also develop its relations with its neighbors. Itis determined about this."

Mediation of Regional Conflicts

Israeli-Syrian track.

The AK Party government gave a new impetus to Turkish efforts to mediate conflictbetween Syria and Israel. During the first summit in January 2004 between Erdogan andBashar Assad Israel used the good offices of Prime Minster Erdogan to pass a message tothe Syrian leader. Prime Minster Erdogan personally got involved in the diplomaticeffort. After the Bashar Assads visit he met Israeli ambassador to Ankara Pnhas Aviviand relayed that , "Syrian President Bashar Assad said he is serious in his intention torenew peace talks with Israel, and intends taking all the necessary steps to reach a peaceagreement in the Middle East." Furthermore, Israel itself might be very interested inTurkey intercession with Syria. With reference to am emerging reality in the post-SaddamMiddle East, a former Israeli Prime Minister Bejnamin Netaniahu commented onprospects of the Syrian track: "I think there is the opportunity today to explore possiblecontacts with Syria.

Israeli-Palestinian track

When the AK party came to power in Ankara the attitude toward the plight ofPalestinians in the West bank and Gaza became a prominent factor in Turkish foreignpolicy and this inevitably affected Turkish-Israeli ties. Initially Prime Minister Erdogandelayed his visit to Israel for indefinite period in the spring of 2003. Foreign MinisterAbdullah Gul suggested upgrading diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority toan ambassadorial level. But a drastic deterioration of relations occurred in May of 2004as a result of extreme Israeli military actions in Gaza which numerous civilian deaths.Erdogan expressed open criticism of the Israeli policies and he called Israel a 'terrorist'state. He also temporarily recalled the Ankara ambassador in Israel to express his protest.However, both economic and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel continues.Turkey and Israel signed a multi-million water deal for 20 years. Turkey has boughtUS$3 billion worth of Israeli weapons since 1996. In May of 2004 contract to build three

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natural gas-based power plants by Turkish companies worth $800 million was signed byPrime Minister Erdogan.

The Turks anger was provoked by rising tension with Kurds along the Iraqi-Turkishborder and by the debate in the American Congress about the Turkish genocide of the

Armenians in 1915Turkish youths attacked Kurdish shops. These events reanimate the Sevres Syndrome.8

So, if Turkey feels the need to set up a solid buffer zone along its border with northernIraq to contain the Kurds and swoop in with troops when it sees fit, there is little theUnited States can do to stop it.The same argument was taking place in Turkey following the 1991 Gulf War, when theIraqi Kurds were granted autonomy. Soon enough, Turkey in 1995 sent 35,000 troops intonorthern Iraq to crush Kurdish rebels and squash Iraqi Kurdish aspirations forindependence. The same episode is repeating itself today, as Iraqi Kurdistan has madestrides in attracting foreign investment and extending its autonomy since the 2003 U.S.invasion of Iraq. Turkey opposed the invasion by refusing U.S. access to Turkish military

bases, and now is threatening to set up roadblocks along the U.S. military's logistics chaininto Iraq and upset Washington's relations with the Kurds.

The current diplomatic impasse with the United States is another indicator of profoundtectonic shift in Turkish foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey'sneighborhood -- and its relationship with Washington -- has drastically changed. Attemptsto become a Central Asian or European power have failed, and the Turks are looking indifferent directions for opportunities. The Iraq war has proven that U.S. and Turkishsecurity concerns are no longer in lockstep, leading Turkey to re-evaluate its alliance withthe United States.

Turkey no longer is a weak economic power and is not as reliant on the United States forits security. Turkey's rapid economic growth and its strong military tradition are creatingthe conditions for Ankara to pull itself out of its post-World War I insularity and extenditself in the region once again. As a result, Turkey's foreign policy no longer needs to tieitself to the United States, and Ankara can afford to make bold moves concerning issues-- whether those issues relate to the Kurds, Armenians or Greeks -- without losing toomuch sleep over any follow-on damage to its relationship with the United States. If theUnited States is going to act as the destabilizing force in the region through creating amajor upheaval in Iraq, Turkey must at the very least attempt to take control of thesituations within its old sphere of influence.

But this does not mean Turkey can make a clean break from the United States either, atleast not any time in the near future. Turkey's growth is still fragile and needs more timeto become consolidated. Turkey also faces resistance in every direction that it pushes,from Greece in the Balkans, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East and Russia in the

8 This takes us back to a pivotal point in Turkish history: the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which sealed thedissolution of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the victorious European powers drew up a treaty todismember the Ottoman Empire by ceding territory to Greece (including the key northern shore of theDardanelles), giving Armenia more territory than it could manage and creating the conditions for anindependent Kurdish state.

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Caucasus. Turkey's current position puts it into a geopolitical context where Iran is risingto Turkey's southeast and a resurgent Russia is bearing down on the Caucasus and evenhinting at returning its naval fleet to the Mediterranean. In the near term, a major power isneeded in Iraq to keep the Iranians at bay, and the Turks would prefer that the Americansdo the heavy lifting on this since Iraq already is in disarray. Meanwhile, Turkey will

move forward with its grand strategy of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. U.S. authoritieshave agreed to share intelligence about positions of Kurdish rebels with Turkey, possiblyenabling the Turkish military to carry out limited assaults.

"The United States has declared the PKK as the common enemy. The struggle against thisenemy will be maintained until it is eliminated," Erdogan told lawmakers in ParliamentTuesday.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan in his political vision is a true revolutionary whointends to rollback the Kemalist order that dominated Turkey for seventy years. In fact,the social and recently constitutional reforms unleashed by him earned him the title of thesilent revolutionary. Turkish popular press incidentally dubbed him the Fatih afterTurkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union in 2004. Hismain political goal is to gradually remove secularism or (as Turks call it Laiklik orlaicism) from the political agenda. But his program of revolution is to be achievedthrough constitutional reform, rather than other means. After the AKP victory, Erdoganmade a claim the party of the government is conservative democratic party. But earlier

on, he made number of widely quoted remarks about the secular order in Turkey. I willquote just two of them: Democracy is just a tram, but Islam is our destination. And Iwill make them [Turkish public] to swallow the bitter pill of {Islam]. The theme socialand ideological revolution is reflected in the Erdogans choice for Republics presidentand a close political ally Abdullah Gul. In his speech Gul highlighted the AKPgovernment's economic and political reforms and referred to them as a "silentrevolution." He concluded that that the silent revolution in Turkey is not finished. Inaddition, he noted the stabilization of Turkish markets and praised the far-sightedapproach to Turkish economic reform. With regard to foreign policy, he said that Turkeyis pursuing a multi-dimensional approach based on problem solving and the goal ofEuropean Union membership remains a high priority.

On tactical level, Recep Erdogan needs to appease the generals in order to remain in his

seat and quiet the popular wave of nationalism and anti-Americanism that gripped the

Turkish citizens The muscle flexing and putting the mantle of the Ottoman arbiter is a

part of larger tectonic change in Turkish foreign policy and the part-and-parcel of the new

role Turkey desires to assume in the Middle East. The incursion will precipitate might

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serve as a new challenge to the United Statess policy in the Middle East by its less and

less reliable ally. Upgrading of relations with Iran, which has a pariah status among

Western powers and the decision to build a major gas pipeline in the face of American

opposition , is indicative of this new spirit Turkey, seeks patronage over the Iraqi

Kurdistan in the long run. The American diplomacy continues to pursue its policy of

engagement with Turkey but at the same time is aware that current political of Turkey is

at logger-heads with long-term interests of the United States.

Turkey is pursuing the role of regional linchpin and attempts to replace the United States

as the main mediator in all major conflicts in the area: Israeli-Arab conflict, Israeli-Syrian

conflicts and Iran-Israeli confrontation over the Iranian nuclear program. The big

questions remains whether Turkey has wherewithal to fulfill this grandiose vision.

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