8/13/2019 Case Analysis 16

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The tug master could not see the officer-in-

charge on the tanker’s deck and had no direct

communication with him. On the tug’s bridge,

the chief engineer was controlling the towing

 winch and he started to pay out the tow rope

as he saw the tanker take up the slack in the

messenger line. As the eye of the tow rope

approached the panama eye, the tug master 

noticed the crew on the tanker had stopped

removing the ‘fire-wire’ from the bitts

intended for the tow rope. He was unable to

see that this was because the messenger line

had become taut on the inboard side of the

bitts. Concerned that his tow rope would be

damaged if placed on the same bitts as a wire,

he told the chief engineer not to give out toomuch line. He then used his loud hailer to tell

the tanker’s crew to remove the ‘fire-wire’ and,

at about the same time, the chief engineer 

stopped veering the tow rope.

Nobody on board the tanker heard the tug’s

loud hailer. The crew immediately near the

bitts saw the messenger line become very 

tight, and stepped back. Shortly after, the

messenger line parted between the panama

eye and the bitts. The officer-in-charge,

standing in the line of recoil further aft, was hit

across the legs by the parting messenger line.

He suffered fractures to both legs, his collar-

bone and his wrist, and needed immediate

blood transfusion on arrival in hospital.

Fortunately, operations on his legs weresuccessful and both were saved.

The Lessons

1. This accident was a consequence of some

very poor seamanship practices. No

matter how concerned you are aboutdamage to your tow rope, you must

never stop paying out the line without

warning. In this case, putting the tow

rope on top of the ‘fire-wire’ would not

have caused any immediate damage, and

the tug master could have instructed, via

the tanker’s bridge, that the ‘fire-wire’ be

removed from the bitts before he tookthe strain.

2. It was discovered after the accident that

there were 16 turns on the drum end; far

too many. Three or four turns are all

that are recommended, and the line must

be tended so that it can be allowed to

surge if load suddenly comes on the line.Using a drum end as a winch, and

expecting the controller to react quickly

enough to stop heaving or pay out the

line, is highly dangerous.

3. It is very poor practice to place a rope

and wire on the same bitts. The loads

exerted by modern tugs through their

tow ropes can be enormous, and the

towing eye must therefore be as low

down the bitts as possible. Do not be lazy

if a ‘fire-wire’ or other wire is normally

stored on the bitts, and try to leave halfof the turns on.

4. Consider the line of recoil when deciding

where to stand. Thinking about the

problem beforehand will enable

dangerous positions to be highlighted,

and hopefully avoided.

5. Good communication is key to safe

operations on board ship. In this

accident, there was no communication

between the tug and the aft deck of the

tanker. It is essential the officer-in-

charge on deck establishes basic

communications with the tug, via hand

signals if necessary, to keep control ofoperations.

6. The officer-in-charge on deck must

monitor and manage his mooring team

effectively. Becoming physically involved

in operations detracts from overseeing

them and ensuring the safety of all

personnel, including the supervisor.