case digest civ pro 2.docx

8/12/2019 Case Digest Civ pro 2.docx

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SALAO, RAUL DOMINIC B. CIVIL PROCEDURE

JD201 ATTY. NARSOLIS

IFC SERVICE LEASING and ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION vs. VENANCIONERA, G.R. No. L-21720 January 30, 1967

FACTS:

The writ of possession was issued by lower court on February 26,

1963, on the ex parte application of the Venancio Nera. Aappellee filed

with the sheriff's office in Quezon City a verified petition for the

extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. After notice and publication, the

property was sold to Venancio Nera as the highest bidder. However, the

period of redemption expired without the property being redeemed.

On March 6, 1963, appellant asked for a reconsideration of the order

granting the writ of possession. The court denied the motion for failure of

appellant to serve a copy on the appellee.

On March 26, 1963, appellant filed another motion, an ex

parte application to set aside the writ of possession and the auction sale,

on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ and that

the price at which the mortgaged property was sold was grossly

inadequate. The motion was denied.

Appellant contends that the jurisdiction of the lower court to issue a

writ of possession is limited only to the duration of the period of

redemption and that after the expiration of that period; the mortgagee's

remedy is an ordinary action for recovery of possession. In support of this


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proposition, appellant cites the following provisions of Act No. 3135, as

amended by Act No. 4118.

Appellant also invokes Luna vs. Encarnacion, 91 Phil. 531 (1952) inwhich it was held that in case of refusal of the mortgagor to surrender the

possession of the property sold by the Sheriff the remedy of the purchaser

is to bring an ordinary action for recovery of possession, instead of merely

asking for a writ of possession, in order to give the mortgagor the

opportunity to be heard not only regarding possession but also regarding

the obligation covered by the mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate

mortgages, a regular action must be instituted in order to secure

possession of the property sold

HELD:

Supreme Court held that the contention of appellant is without merit.

The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 is Section 6 which provides that:

in cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made, redemption

shall be governed by the provisions of sections 464 to 466, inclusive,

of the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as these are not inconsistentwith the provisions of this Act."

Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by

Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which in


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turn were replaced by Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the

Revised Rules of Court. Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court

expressly states that:

"If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the

sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and

possession of the property.. The possession of the property shall be

given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the officer unless a

third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment

debtor."

The Court referred their decision in Tan Soo Huat vs. Ongwico, 63

Phil. 746, 749 (1936),

There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a

sheriff's sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and

independent suit for possession after the one-year period forredemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriff's final

certificate of sale. There is neither legal ground nor reason of public

policy precluding the court from ordering the sheriff in this case to

yield possession of the property purchased at public auction where it

appears that the judgment debtor is the one in possession thereof

and no rights of third persons are involved.

Moreover, if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 the court has the

power, on the ex parte application of the purchaser, to issue a writ of

possession during the period of redemption, there is no reason why it


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should not also have the same power after the expiration of that period,

especially where, as in this case, a new title has already been issued in the

name of the purchaser.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,

without pronouncement as to costs.


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MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN vs. HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA and ERLINDAFRANCISCO, G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989

FACTS:

The expropriation suit involved in this certiorariproceeding was

commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Bian, Laguna filed in the

Regional Trial Court of Laguna and City of San Pablo, presided over by

respondent Judge Jose Mar Garcia. The complaint named as Erlinda

Francisco the owner of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Bian with

an aggregate area of about eleven and a half (11-1/2) hectares. The land

sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a

modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of

the Sangguniang Bayan of Bian approved on April 11, 1983.

One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco. She filed a Motion to

Dismiss dated August 26, 1983, on the following grounds;

(a) The allegations of the complaint are vague and conjectural;

(b) The complaint violates the constitutional limitations of law and

jurisprudence on eminent domain;

(c) It is oppressive;

(d) It is barred by prior decision and disposition on the subject

matter; and


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(e) It states no cause of action.

Now, her motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67

of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Defenses and objections within the time specified in the

summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present

in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all

of his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to

take his property for the use or purpose specified in the

complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented

are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the

plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the court with the

proof of service.

Her motion to dismiss was thus actually a pleading, taking the place

of an answer in an ordinary civil action. It was not an ordinary motiongoverned by Rule 15, or a motion to dismiss within the contemplation of

Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

On October 23, 1983, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession

in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.

On February 3, 1984, Erlinda Francisco filed a Motion for SeparateTrial, invoking Section 2, Rule 31. Erlinda Francisco contended that the

Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a rezoning of the lots

in question, it was premature for it to file a case for expropriation. The


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Court granted the motion. By Order dated March 2, 1984, it directed that a

separate trial be held for defendant.

At the separate trial, the Fiscal, in representation of the Municipalitycalled the Trial Court's attention to the irregularity of allowing Erlinda

Francisco to present her evidence ahead of the plaintiff. He argued that the

motion to dismiss was an answer, and its filing did not mean that the order

of presentation of evidence will be reversed, but the usual procedure

should be followed and the evidence adduced should be deemed evidence

only for the motion for reconsideration of the writ of possession.

Nevertheless, at the hearing of March 5, and March 26, 1984, the

Court directed Erlinda Francisco to commence the presentation of

evidence. Erlinda Francisco presented the testimony of Atty. Josue L.

Jorvina, Jr. and certain exhibits the Land Use Map of the Municipality of

Bian, the Locational Clearance and Development Permit issued by the

H.S.R.C. in favor of Erlinda Francisco c/o Ferlins Realty & Development

Corporation, and Executive Order No. 648 and Letter of Instruction No.

729, etc.

Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an Order dated July 24,

1984 dismissing the complaint as against Erlinda Francisco, and amending

the Writ of Possession dated October 18, 1983 so as to exclude therefromand from its force and effects said defendant and her property

The Municipality filed on August 17, 1984 a Motion for

Reconsideration. The appellant set its motion for reconsideration for


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hearing on August 28, 1984 after furnishing Francisco's counsel with copy

thereof The Court however re-scheduled the hearing more than two (2)

months later, on November 20, 1984. Why the hearing was reset to such a

remote date is not explained.

On September 13, 1984, Francisco filed an Ex-Parte Motion for

Execution and/or Finality of Order, contending that the Order of July 27,

1984 had become final and executory on August 12, 1984 for failure of the

Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the

reglementary period, fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the finalorder appealed from.

On October 10, 1984, the Court issued an Order declaring the

Municipality's motion for reconsideration dated August 15, 1984 to have

been filed out of time. It drew attention to the fact that notice of its Order

of July 24, 1984 was served on plaintiff Municipality on July 27, 1984, but

its motion for reconsideration was not presented until August 17, 1984,

beyond the fifteen-day period for appeal prescribed by law. And on

October 15, 1985, the judge give order directing the issuance of

(1) A writ of execution of the Order of July 24, 1984, and

(2) A certificate of finality of said order.

The Municipality attempted to have the respondent Court reconsider

both and Orders of October 10, and October 15, 1984. To this end it

submitted a motion contending that:


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1) Multiple appeals are allowed by law in actions of eminent domain,

and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15) days;

2) Moreover, the grant of a separate trial at Francisco's instance hadgiven rise ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became

available;

3) It was wrong for the Trial Court to have acted ex-parte on the

motion for execution, the motion being litigable in character; and

4) It (the Municipality) was denied due process when the Court, afterreceiving Francisco's evidence and admitting her exhibits, immediately

resolved the case on the merits as regards Francisco, without setting the

case for further hearing for reception of evidence for the plaintiff.

The motion was denied, by Order dated October 18, 1984. Hence,

the special civil action of certiorariat bar.

ISSUE:

Whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of

the Rules of Court is a case wherein multiple appeals are allowed, as

regards which the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days,instead of

fifteen (15) days

Whether or not the Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss filed

by one of the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a motion to

dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the sequence of trial


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in order and hear and determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter

dismiss the expropriation suit as against the movant

HELD:

The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in

actions for partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law,

the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days

counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15)

days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of

Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b)of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in appeals in special

proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other

cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be

thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.

The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17,

1984 was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid

down by law therefore and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled

otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had

become final and executory.

As already observed, the Municipality's complaint for expropriation

impleaded eleven (11) defendants. A separate trial was held on motion ofone of them, Erlinda Francisco, it appearing that she had asserted a

defense personal and peculiar to her, and inapplicable to the other

defendants, supra. Subsequently, and on the basis of the evidence

presented by her, the Trial Court promulgated a separate Order dismissing


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the action as to her, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of

Court reading as follows:

Sec. 4. Several judgments in an action against severaldefendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper,

render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the

action to proceed against the others.

It is now claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such a

separate, final order or judgment had given rise ipso factoto a situation

where multiple appeals became available. The Municipality is right.

In the case at bar, where a single complaint was filed against several

defendants having individual, separate interests, and a separate trial was

held relative to one of said defendants after which a final order or

judgment was rendered on the merits of the plaintiff s claim against that

particular defendant, it is obvious that in the event of an appeal from thatseparate judgment, the original record cannot and should not be sent up to

the appellate tribunal. The record will have to stay with the trial court

because it will still try the case as regards the other defendants. As the rule

above quoted settles, in an action against several defendants, the court

may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or

more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. In lieu ofthe original record, a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared

and transmitted to the appellate court. More than one appeal being

permitted in this case, therefore, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30)


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days, a record of appeal being required as provided by the Implementing

Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, supra.

Erlinda Francisco filed a motion to dismiss intraverse of theaverments of the Municipality's complaint for expropriation. That motion to

dismiss was in fact the indicated responsive pleading to the complaint, in

lieu of an answer.

Now, the Trial Court conducted a separate trial to determine whether

or not, as alleged by Francisco in her motion to dismiss, she had a vested

right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the HRSC,

making the expropriation suit premature. While such a separate trial was

not improper in the premises, and was not put at issue by the Municipality,

the latter did protest against the Trial Court's (a) reversing the order of

trial and receiving first, the evidence of defendant Francisco, and (b)

subsequently rendering its order sustaining Francisco's defense and

dismissing the action as to her, solely on the basis of said Francisco's

evidence and without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to present its own

evidence on the issue. The Trial Court was clearly wrong on both counts.

The Court will have to sustain the Municipality on these points.

Nothing in the record reveals any valid cause to reverse the order of

trial. What the Trial Court might have had in mind was the provision ofSection 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allowing any of the grounds for

dismissal in Rule 16 to be pleaded as an affirmative defense and

authorizing the holding of a preliminary hearing thereon as if a motion to

dismiss had been filed. Assuming this to be the fact, the reception of


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Francisco's evidence first was wrong, because obviously, her asserted

objection or defense that the locational clearance issued in her favor by the

HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit was not a ground for

dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove the Municipality's

lack of cause of action but lack of cause of action is not a ground for

dismissal of an action under Rule 16. The ground is the failure of the

complaint to state a cause of action, which is obviously not the same as

plaintiff's not having a cause of action.

Nothing in the record, moreover, discloses any circumstances fromwhich a waiver by the Municipality of the right to present contrary proofs

may be inferred. So, in deciding the issue without according the

Municipality that right to present contrary evidence, the Trial Court had

effectively denied the Municipality due process and thus incurred in another

reversible error.

Wherefore, the challenged Order issued by Judge Garcia is annulled

and set aside, and the case is remanded to the Trial Court for the reception

of the evidence of the plaintiff Municipality of Bian as against defendant

Erlinda Francisco.


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GEORGIA T. ESTEL vs. RECAREDO P. DIEGO, SR. and RECAREDO R.DIEGO, JR., G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012

FACTS:

The present petition originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry,

Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order

filed by respondents Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr.

before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City, Misamis

Oriental. Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered into a

contract of sale with petitioner. After receiving the amount of P17, 000.00

as downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical and material

possession of the subject property to respondents. Respondents had been

in possession of the subject lot since then and that petitioner never

disturbed the respondents with respect to their possession of the said

property. Around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner, together

with her two grown-up sons and five other persons, uprooted the fence

surrounding the disputed lot, after which they entered its premises and

then cut and destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Respondent

Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident. Respondents prayed for the

restoration of their possession, for the issuance of a permanent injunction

against petitioner as well as payment of damages, attorney's fees and

costs of suit.


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On July 26, 1995, the MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining

Order against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf.

In petitioners Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and

Counterclaims, she denied the material allegations in the Complaint

contending that respondents were never in physical, actual, public, adverse

and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot. Full possession and

absolute ownership of the disputed parcel of land, with all improvements

thereon, had always been that of petitioner and her daughter. The

agreement she entered with the wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.

for the sale of the subject lot had been nullify. She even offered to returnthe amount she received from respondents, but the latter refused to accept

the same and instead offered an additional amount of P12, 000.00 as part

of the purchase price but she also refused to accept their offer. The subject

of the deed of sale between petitioner and respondents and what has been

delivered to respondents was actually Lot 16 which is adjacent to the

disputed Lot 19.On February 16, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision favorable to

the plaintiffs.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City. On

October 7, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the assailed

Decision of the MTCC. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the

Court of Appeals. On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its Decisionwhich affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, but the CA denied it.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not MTCC did acquired jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the said complaint

Whether or not MTCC did acquired jurisdiction over the case for

failure of respondents to specifically allege facts constitutive of forcible

entry

Whether or not the complaint states cause of action because the

verification and certificate of non-forum shopping accompanying the

complaint are defective and, as such, the complaint should be treated as

an unsigned pleading.

HELD:

The Supreme Court does not agree. A review of the records shows

that petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer

filed with the MTCC. The Court of Appeals correctly held that even if the

geographical location of the subject property was not alleged in theComplaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same in her

Affirmative Defense, and even actively participated in the proceedings

before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue in her

appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising the

said issue in the CA or before this Court.

In any case, since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one forforcible entry, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is, thus,

upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,

as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as


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Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry

and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial

Courts. Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question

whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute

is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the

exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue

was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the

part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both

parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that itwas only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information

was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure

technicality.

As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts constitutive of

forcible entry, it is settled that in actions for forcible entry, two allegations

are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction. First, theplaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second,

he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the

means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court,

namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

In the present case, it is clear that respondents sufficiently alleged in

their Complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry, as theyexplicitly claimed that they had prior physical possession of the subject

property since its purchase from petitioner, who voluntarily delivered the

same to them. They also particularly described in their complaint how


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petitioner, together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached

upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the same.

Respondents' complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting

and conspiring with other persons, without respondents' knowledge and

consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of

their land and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding

the subject lot, as well as cut the trees and nipa palms planted thereon.

Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior

possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is

necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have toinstitute a state of war. No other proof is necessary.

Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again

notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even granting that

this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court finds that

there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright

dismissal of respondents' complaint as there is compliance with therequirement regarding verification. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,

as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC provides:

Sec. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by

law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or

accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read thepleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his

personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to

be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief


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or uponknowledge, information and belief or lacks a proper verification,

shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the

instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the

allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when

matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true

and correct.

As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of

respondents Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified

therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any othercourt or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is

pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking

that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been

filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This,

notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial

compliance on the part of respondents.It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification

against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed

of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions

regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its

mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed

with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not therebyinterdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable

circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case.


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Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition. Hence, the

decision of the CA is affirmed.


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HEIRS OF AGAPITO T. OLARTE AND ANGELA A. OLARTE, NAMELY NORMAOLARTE-DINEROS, ARMANDO A. OLARTE, YOLANDA OLARTE-MONTECER

AND RENATO A. OLARTE, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), MARIANO M.

PINEDA, AS GENERAL MANAGER, THE MANAGER, DISTRICT I, NCR,

EDUARDO TIMBANG AND DEMETRIO OCAMPO, [G.R. No. 177995 : June

15, 2011]

FACTS:

Subject of the instant case is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 12,

Block 2 of the Tramo-Singalong Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP) located

at 2131 F. Muoz St., San Andres, Malate, Manila. The property used to be

owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR), but was later turned over

to the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Petitioners, siblings Armando Olarte, Norma Olarte-Dineros, Yolanda

Olarte-Montecer and Renato A. Olarte, claim that their parents started

occupying the subject property in 1943 by virtue of a lease contract with

the PNR and constructed a two-storey residential house. Petitioners furtherallege that they were born and raised during their parents' occupancy of

the subject property.


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On November 3, 1965, the Board of Liquidators under the Office of

the President (OP) awarded a Certificate of Priority to their father.

Their parents passed away in 1981 and 1984. Petitioner Norma

Olarte-Dineros was then designated as administrator of the residential

house and the subject parcel of land. In 1985, the two-storey residential

house was declared in the name of their father for taxation purposes. In

the same year, petitioners leased out a portion of the residential house to

respondents Eduardo Timbang and Demetrio Ocampo. Thereafter, Yolanda

left for Saudi Arabia to work while Norma lived with her husband in

Pangarap Village, Caloocan City.

In 1987, the NHA conducted a Census Tagging Operation in the area

where the subject property is located.

In 1988, Ocampo was judicially ejected from the premises by

petitioners for nonpayment of rentals.

On April 30, 1997, the NHA issued a Resolution resolving a conflict of

claims between petitioners and respondents Timbang and Ocampo over

the subject property favorable to the Eduardo Timbang and Demetrio

Ocampo.

Twenty-six (26) days later, or on July 21, 1997, petitioners filed an

Appeal and Memorandum on Appeal with the Office of the President.

On November 29, 2002, the OP, thru Deputy Executive Secretary

Arthur P. Autea, issued a Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal for being

filed out of time and for lack of merit.


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mistake of the NHA itself. Petitioners add that there was grave abuse of

discretion on the NHA's part for completely disregarding the facts as laid

down by petitioners, and for relying on its census tagging to favor

respondents Timbang and Ocampo.

By Resolution dated June 27, 2003, however, the OP denied

petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Thus, on September 15, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari

with the CA assailing the OP's rulings.

In a Resolution dated September 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the

petition for certiorari outright on the grounds that the certification of non-

forum shopping was signed by only two of the four petitioners and that

they erroneously availed of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 instead

of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended. Petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal of their petition,

but the same was denied by the CA.

The case was thereafter elevated to this Supreme Court via a petition

for review on certiorari.

On June 21, 2005, The Supreme Court rendered a Decision reversing

and setting aside the September 19, 2003 and August 19, 2004 CA

Resolutions and remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings.

However, since the issues involved are factual in nature, the Supreme

Court ruled that such issues are best addressed to the CA, which has the

power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform


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any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling

within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant

and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

Upon remand, however, the CA again dismissed the petition

sustaining the OP's ruling. Petitioners again brought the case before

Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NHA acted in grave abuse of discretion in blaming

the petitioners for filing their appeal late because they relied on the

erroneous pronouncement in the NHA resolution

Whethere or not petitioners are disqualified to be awardees of the

said property

HELD:

In the first issue, Supreme Court held that the right to appeal is not a

natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and

may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisionsof the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the

requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.


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primary basis for determining beneficiaries within ZIP Project

sites.Paragraph V, on the other hand, lays down the rules on beneficiary

selection and lot allocation:

V. BENEFICIARY SELECTION AND LOT ALLOCATION

1. The official ZIP census and tagging shall be the primary basis fordetermining potential program beneficiaries and structures or

dwelling units in the project area.

2. Issuance of ZIP tag number in no way constitutes a guarantee forZIP lot allocation.

3.Absentee censused households and all uncensused households areautomatically disqualified from lot allocation.

4. Only those households included in the ZIP census and who, inaddition, qualify under the provisions of the Code of Policies, are the

beneficiaries of the Zonal Improvement Program.

5.A qualified censused-household is entitled to only one residential lotwithin the ZIP project areas of Metro Manila.

6. Documentation supporting lot allocation shall be made in the name ofthe qualified household head.

7.An Awards and Arbitration Committee (AAC) shall be set up in eachZIP project area to be composed of representative each from the

Authority, the local government, the barangay and the community.

The AAC shall determine lot allocation amongst qualified


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beneficiaries, arbitrate in matters of claims and disputes, and

safeguard the rights of all residents in ZIP project areas by any legal

means it may consider appropriate. All decisions of the AAC shall be

subject to review and approval of the General Manager of the

Authority, the local Mayors, and finally the Governor of the

Metropolitan Manila Commission.[23]

The declaration of policy in the Code of Policies stated that an absentee

or uncensused structure owner was disqualified from owning a lot within

the ZIP zones. The Code of Policies shows the following persons to beautomatically disqualified as beneficiaries of the project, namely:

(1) Absentee censused household-censused household that vacates a

duly tagged structure or dwelling unit and leaves the project area for a

continuous period for at least six months without written notice to the

NHA and the local government unit;

(2) Uncensused household-household that is not registered in the officialZIP census;

(3) Absentee structure owner- any individual who owns a structure or

dwelling unit in a ZIP project area and who has not occupied it prior to

the official closure of the Census; and

(4) Uncensused structure owner-any person who owns a structure or

dwelling unit not registered in the official ZIP census.[25](Emphasissupplied.)


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persons which the ZIP intended to benefit. That petitioners were the

descendants of the persons who built the residential house does not mean

that the lot on which it stood would automatically be awarded to them.

Petitioners cannot anchor their rights on the Certificate of Priority

awarded to their parents. As correctly argued by the OSG, petitioners are

deemed to have abandoned whatever right they may have over the

property by virtue of the Certificate of Priority, when they chose not to

reside on the subject property and found by NHA as not census residents

within the project area.

In sum, the Supreme Court finds that petitioners' appeal to the OPconsidered timely filed, and find the same to be without merit.

Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari is denied.

case digest civ pro 2.docx

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