case digests 12

8/13/2019 Case Digests 12

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Name: Jabe Tecson Gica

July 12, 2013 Friday

TITLE: EBRALINAGVS.DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OFCEBU

CITATIN: 2!1 "C#A !$%

&ATE: &ECE'(E# 2%, 1%%!

FACT":

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and

consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents

acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

Respondents ordered expulsion of ! "S and #S students of $anta%an,

Pinamungajan, &aracar, Taburan and 'sturias in &ebu.

Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing

the national anthem and recite the (Panatang Ma)aba%an* re+uired b% R' -.

The% are /ehovah0s 1itnesses believing that b% doing these is religious

worship2devotion a)in to idolatr% against their teachings. The% contend that to

compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official

control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of #erona

et al v. Secretar% of 3ducation.

#erona doctrine provides that we are a s%stem of separation of the church and

state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn0t involve an%

religious ceremon%. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed b% the &onstitution

does not mean exception from non4discriminator% laws li)e the saluting of flag and

singing national anthem.

This exemption disrupts school discipline and demorali5es the teachings of civic

consciousness and duties of citi5enship.

I"")E:

1hether or not the freedom of religion has been violated6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

7reedom of religion is a fundamental right of highest priorit%. The - fold aspect of

right to religious worship is8

.9 7reedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.

-.9 7reedom to act on one0s belief regulated and translated to external acts.


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The onl% limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present

danger to public safet%, morals, health and interests where State has right to

prevent.

The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified. The :; %r old

previous #3Rn the case at bar, the Students expelled were onl% standing +uietl%

during ceremonies. $% observing the ceremonies +uietl%, it doesn0t present an%

danger so evil and imminent to justif% their expulsion.

1hat the petitioner0s re+uest is the exemption from flag ceremonies and not

exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students b% reason of their

religious beliefs is also a violation of a citi5en0s right to free education. The non4

observance of the flag ceremon% does not totall% constitute ignorance of patriotism

and civic consciousness. ?ove for countr% and admiration for national heroes, civic

consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore,

expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified.

The petition for &ertiorari and Prohibition was granted and the expulsion was

annulled.


3/46

TITLE: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND HSBCVSJ"E O. VERA

CITATIN: $! -*IL !$ G# N L./!$!&ATE: NE'(E# 1$, 1%3

FACT":

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the "ong)ong and Shanghai

$an)ing &orporation, are respectivel% the plaintiff and the offended part%, and the

respondent herein Mariano &u @njieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case

entitled (The People of the Philippine >slands vs. Mariano &u @njieng, et al.*,

&ourt of 7irst >nstance of Manila, on /anuar% !, A:B, rendered a judgment of

conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano &u @njieng to indeterminate penalt%.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed b% the

herein respondent Mariano &u @njieng, before the trial court, under the provisions

of 'ct =o. B-- of the defunct Philippine ?egislature. The &7> of Manila, /udge Pedro

Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the >nsular Probation

nstance of Manila, seventh branch, /udge /ose


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the provincial boards with the power to ma)e said law effective or otherwise in their

respective or otherwise in their respective provinces.

I"")E:

1hether or not 'ct no. B-- constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

"ecion 11 o4 Ac No /221constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of

legislative authorit% to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional

and void.

The power to ma)e laws G the legislative power G is vested in a bicameral

?egislature b% the /ones ?aw Esec. -9 and in a unicameral =ational 'ssembl% b% the

&onstitution E'ct. V>, sec. , &onstitution of the Philippines9. The Philippine

?egislature or the =ational 'ssembl% ma% not escape its duties and responsibilities

b% delegating that power to an% other bod% or authorit%. The rule, however, which

forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. >t admits of

exceptions.

The case before us does not fall under an% of the exceptions.

The challenged section of 'ct =o. B-- in section which reads as follows8

This 'ct shall appl% onl% in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards

have provided for the salar% of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now

provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed b% the

Secretar% of /ustice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation n testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or

not, it is usual to in+uire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and

provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the

judgment of an% other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

7or the purpose of Probation 'ct, the provincial boards ma% be regarded as

administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the 'ct should ta)e


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effect in their respective provinces. The% are the agents or delegates of the

legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to

administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the

rule which should be here adopted. 'n examination of a variet% of cases on

delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at

variance but, it can be broadl% asserted that the rationale revolves around the

presence or absence of a standard or rule of action G or the sufficienc% thereof G in

the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. >n some cases,

it is held that the standard is sufficientF in others that is insufficientF and in still

others that it is entirel% lac)ing. 's a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and

hence invalid if it does not la% down an% rule or definite standard b% which the

administrative officer or board ma% be guided in the exercise of the discretionar%

powers delegated to it.

>n the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of

their discretionar% power to determine whether or not the Probation 'ct shall appl%

in their respective provinces6 1hat standards are fixed b% the 'ct6 1e do not find

an% and none has been pointed to us b% the respondents. The probation 'ct does

not, b% the force of an% of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards

an% standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionar% power. 1hat is granted,

if we ma% use the language of /ustice &ardo5o in the recent case of Schecter, supra,

is a (roving commission* which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrar%

discretion. $% section if the 'ct, the legislature does not seemingl% on its own

authorit% extend the benefits of the Probation 'ct to the provinces but in realit%

leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. >n other

words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for

themselves, whether the Probation ?aw shall appl% to their provinces or not at all.

The applicabilit% and application of the Probation 'ct are entirel% placed in the

hands of the provincial boards. >f the provincial board does not wish to have the 'ct

applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed

amount for the salar% of a probation officer. The plain language of the 'ct is notsusceptible of an% other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of

legislative power to the provincial boards.


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TITLE: THE UNITED STATESVS.ANG TANG HO

CITATIN: /3 -*IL 1 G# N 1122

&ATE: FE(#)A#5 2, 1%22

FACT":


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Ec9 To fix, from time to time the +uantities of pala% rice, or corn that a compan% or

individual ma% ac+uire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant

ma% demand.

S3&. -. >t shall be unlawful to destro%, limit, prevent or in an% other manner obstructthe production or milling of pala%, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices

thereofF to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this 'ctF . . .

Section : defines what shall constitute a monopol% or hoarding of pala%, rice or corn

within the meaning of this 'ct, but does not specif% the price of rice or define an%

basic for fixing the price.

S3&. B. The violations of an% of the provisions of this 'ct or of the regulations,

orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished b% a

fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or b% imprisonment for not more than

two %ears, or both, in the discretion of the court8 Provided, That in the case of

companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminall% liable.

S3&. C. 't an% time that the #overnor4#eneral, with the consent of the &ouncil of

State, shall consider that the public interest re+uires the application of the

provisions of this 'ct, he shall so declare b% proclamation, and an% provisions of

other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporaril% suspended.

Pursuant to this 'ct, on the st of 'ugust AA, the #overnor #eneral issued

3xecutive


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T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

This +uestion involves an anal%sis and construction of 'ct =o. -!!, in so far as it

authori5es the #overnor4#eneral to fix the price at which rice should be sold. >t will

be noted that section authori5es the #overnor4#eneral, with the consent of the

&ouncil of State, for an% cause resulting in an extraordinar% rise in the price of

pala%, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporar% rules and emergenc%

measures for carr%ing out the purposes of the 'ct. $% its ver% terms, the

promulgation of temporar% rules and emergenc% measures is left to the discretion

of the #overnor4#eneral. The ?egislature does not underta)e to specif% or define

under what conditions or for what reasons the #overnor4#eneral shall issue the

proclamation, but sa%s that it ma% be issued (for an% cause,* and leaves the

+uestion as to what is (an% cause* to the discretion of the #overnor4#eneral. The

'ct also sa%s8 (7or an% cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinar% rise in

the price of pala%, rice or corn.*

The ?egislature does not specif% or define what is (an extraordinar% rise.* That is

also left to the discretion of the #overnor4#eneral. The 'ct also sa%s that the

#overnor4#eneral, (with the consent of the &ouncil of State,* is authori5ed to issue

and promulgate (temporar% rules and emergenc% measures for carr%ing out the

purposes of this 'ct.* >t does not specif% or define what is a temporar% rule or anemergenc% measure, or how long such temporar% rules or emergenc% measures

shall remain in force and effect, or when the% shall ta)e effect. That is to sa%, the

?egislature itself has not in an% manner specified or defined an% basis for the order,

but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the #overnor4#eneral to sa%

what is or what is not (a cause,* and what is or what is not (an extraordinar% rise in

the price of rice,* and as to what is a temporar% rule or an emergenc% measure for

the carr%ing out the purposes of the 'ct.

@nder this state of facts, if the law is valid and the #overnor4#eneral issues a

proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, an% dealer who,

with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.

There ma% not have been an% cause, and the price ma% not have beenextraordinar%, and there ma% not have been an emergenc%, but, if the #overnor4

#eneral found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is

sold at an% higher price, the seller commits a crime.


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' law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the

legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of

the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and

substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which ma% be left to ta)e

effect in futuro, if necessar%, upon the ascertainment of an% prescribed fact or

event.

The law sa%s that the #overnor4#eneral ma% fix (the maximum sale price that the

industrial or merchant ma% demand.* The law is a general law and not a local or

special law.

The proclamation underta)es to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and

different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine >slands, and

delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial

treasurers and their deputies. "ere, then, %ou would have a delegation of legislative

power to the #overnor4#eneral, and a delegation b% him of that power to provincial

treasurers and their deputies, who (are hereb% directed to communicate with, and

execute all instructions emanating from the Hirector of &ommerce and >ndustr%, for

the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their

respective localities.* The issuance of the proclamation b% the #overnor4#eneral

was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub

delegation of that power.

1hen 'ct =o. -!! is anal%5ed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the

#overnor4#eneral which constitutes the crime. 1ithout that proclamation, it was no

crime to sell rice at an% price. >n other words, the ?egislature left it to the sole

discretion of the #overnor4#eneral to sa% what was and what was not (an% cause*

for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not (an extraordinar% rise in the

price of pala%, rice or corn,* and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price

at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or +ualit%, also to sa% whether

a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be

enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.

The ?egislature did not specif% or define what was (an% cause,* or what was (an

extraordinar% rise in the price of rice, pala% or corn,* =either did it specif% or define

the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. >n the absence of the


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proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,

because the #overnor4#eneral issued the proclamation.

The act or proclamation does not sa% an%thing about the different grades or

+ualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale (of one ganta of rice at

the price of eight% centavos EP;.!;9 which is a price greater than that fixed b%

3xecutive order =o. :.*

'ct =o. -!!, in so far as it underta)es to authori5e the #overnor4#eneral in his

discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to ma)e the sale of

rice in violation of the price of rice, and to ma)e the sale of rice in violation of the

proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

TITLE: EASTERN SHIPPING LINESVS POEA


11/46

CITATIN: 1$$ "C#A !33 G# N $$33

&ATE: CT(E# 1, 1%

FACT":

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of PA-,;;;.;; b% the

Philippine


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I"")E:

1hether or not the issuance of Memorandum &ircular =o. - is a violation of non4

delegation of powers6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

The Supreme &ourt held that there was valid delegation of powers.

>n +uestioning the validit% of the memorandum circular, 3astern Shipping ?inescontended that P


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comprehend. Speciali5ation even in legislation has become necessar%. Too man% of

the problems attendant upon present4da% underta)ings, the legislature ma% not

have the competence to provide the re+uired direct and efficacious, not to sa%,

specific solutions. These solutions ma%, however, be expected from its delegates,

who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are

particularl% applicable to administrative bodies. 1ith the proliferation of speciali5ed

activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found itmore and more necessar% to entrust to administrative agencies the authorit% to

issue rules to carr% out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the

(power of subordinate legislation.*

1ith this power, administrative bodies ma% implement the broad policies laid down

in statute b% (filling in* the details which the &ongress ma% not have the

opportunit% or competence to provide. Memorandum &ircular =o. - is one such

administrative regulation.


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TITLE: ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (FORMERLY AASJAS6 VS. THEHONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

CITATIN: G# N 1$0!$&ATE: "E-TE'(E# 1, 200!

FACT":

Motions for Reconsideration filed b% petitioners, '$'K'H' #uro part% ?ist of the &onstitution when the Senate introduced amendments not

connected with V'T. Petitioners 3scudero, et al., also reiterate that R.'. =o. A::C

stand4 b% authorit% to the 3xecutive to increase the V'T rate, especiall% on account

of the recommendator% power granted to the Secretar% of 7inance, constitutes

undue delegation of legislative power.

The% submit that the recommendator% power given to the Secretar% of 7inance withregard to the occurrence of either of two events using the #ross Homestic Product

E#HP9 as a benchmar) necessaril% and inherentl% re+uired extended anal%sis and

evaluation, as well as polic% ma)ing. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that

the input tax is a propert% or a propert% right.Petitioners also contend that even if


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the right to credit the input V'T is merel% a statutor% privilege, it has alread%

evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

I"")E:

1hether or not the R.'. =o. A::C or the Vat Reform 'ct is constitutional6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

The &ourt is not persuaded. Aricle I, "ecion 2/of the &onstitution provides

that 'll appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authori5ing increase of the public

debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusivel% in the

"ouse of Representatives, but the Senate ma% propose or concur with

amendments.

The &ourt reiterates that in ma)ing his recommendation to the President on the

existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretar% of 7inance is not acting as

the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. "e is acting as the agent of

the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its

expressed will is to ta)e effect. The Secretar% of 7inance becomes the means or tool

b% which legislative polic% is determined and implemented, considering that he

possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader

perspective to properl% evaluate them.

"is function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information

and verif% if an% of the two conditions laid out b% &ongress is present. >n the same

breath, the &ourt reiterates its finding that it is not a propert% or a propert% right,

and a V'T4registered person entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere

statutor% privilege. 's the &ourt stated in its Hecision, the right to credit the input

tax is a mere creation of law. More importantl%, the assailed provisions of R.'.

=o. A::C alread% involve legislative polic% and wisdom. So long as there is a public

end for which R.'. =o. A::C was passed, the means through which such end shall

be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional

bounds.


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The Motions for Reconsideration were &ENIE& 7IT* FINALIT5. The

temporar% restraining order issued b% the &ourt was LIFTE&.

TITLE: EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS.THE AUDITOR GENERAL

CITATIN: G# N L.232! &ATE:

&ECE'(E# 2/, 1%$!

Facs:

This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminar% injunction

instituted b% 3mmanuel Pelae5, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpa%er,

against the 'uditor #eneral, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and

agents, from passing in audit an% expenditure of public funds in implementation

of the 3


17/46

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that

said Section ! has been impliedl% repealed b% Republic 'ct =o. -:C; and

constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the

contrar% view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper

parties G referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in +uestion G

have been impleaded. Subse+uentl%, the ma%ors of several municipalities adversel%

affected b% the aforementioned executive orders G because the latter have ta)en

awa% from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions G

intervened in the case.

>n AB, the President, pursuant to Section ! of the Revised 'dministrative &ode

issued 3xecutive


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"ecion 10 816 o4 Aricle IIof our fundamental law ordains8

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or

offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as ma% be

provided b% law, and ta)e care that the laws be faithfull% executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to

interfere in the exercise of such discretion as ma% be vested b% law in the officers of

the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well

as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied b% the &onstitution to the

3xecutive, insofar as local governments are concerned. 1ith respect to the latter,

the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authorit% than that of chec)ing

whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as

provided b% statutor% enactments. "ence, the President cannot interfere with local

governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their

authorit%. "e ma% not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or

refused to pass, even if it had thereb% violated a dut% imposed thereto b% law,

although he ma% see to it that the corresponding provincial officials ta)e

appropriate disciplinar% action therefore. =either ma% he vote, set aside or annul an

ordinance passed b% said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how

patentl% unwise it ma% be.

"e ma% not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipalit% or ta)e an%

disciplinar% action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the

corresponding provincial board. @pon the other hand if the President could create a

municipalit%, he could, in effect, remove an% of its officials, b% creating a new

municipalit% and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides,

for his office would thereb% become vacant.Thus, b% merel% brandishing the power

to create a new municipalit% Eif he had it9, without actuall% creating it, he could

compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereb%, in effect, exercising over

them the power of control denied to him b% the &onstitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments,

bureaus or offices implies no more than the authorit% to assume directl% the

functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion b% its officials.

Manifestl%, such control does not include the authorit% either to abolish an

executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. 's a conse+uence, the


19/46

alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessaril%

connote the exercise b% him of an authorit% even greater than that of control which

he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. >n other words, Section

! of the Revised 'dministrative &ode does not merel% fail to compl% with the

constitutional mandate above +uoted. >nstead of giving the President less power

over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments,

bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, b%

conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he

has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

The 3xecutive


20/46

s%stem of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and >ncentives

7und E7und9 and a Revenue Performance 3valuation $oard E$oard9. >t covers all

officials and emplo%ees of the $>R and the $


21/46

the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the chec)s and

balances inherent in a democratic s%stem of government. >t ma% in fact even

enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over4accumulation of power in

the executive branch.

"owever, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment Jbe%ond the

legislative sphere,J the &onstitution imposes two basic and related constraints on

&ongress.

'n% action or step be%ond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed

b% the &onstitution. ?egislative vetoes fall in this class ?egislative veto is a

statutor% provision re+uiring the President or an administrative agenc% to present

the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to &ongress which, b%

itself or through a committee formed b% it, retains a JrightJ or JpowerJ to approve or

disapprove such regulations before the% ta)e effect. 's such, a legislative veto in

the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward4turning

delegation designed to attach a congressional leash Eother than through scrutin%

and investigation9 to an agenc% to which &ongress has b% law initiall% delegated

broad powers. >t radicall% changes the design or structure of the &onstitutionIs

diagram of power as it entrusts to &ongress a direct role in enforcing, appl%ing or

implementing its own laws.

The petition was -A#TIALL5 G#ANTE& Section - of R' A:: creating a /oint

&ongressional


22/46

CITATIN: 32 "C#A 1 G# L.1$/

&ATE: "E-TE'(E# 1/, 1%$1

FACT":

Petitioners re+uest that respondent officials be prevented from implementing

Republic 'ct :;B; that apportions representative districts in this countr%. >t is

unconstitutional and void, the% allege, because8 Ea9 it was passed b% the "ouse of

Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the

Members at least three calendar da%s prior to its passageF Eb9 it was approved more

than three %ears after the return of the last census of our populationF and Ec9 it

apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several

provinces.

'dmitting some allegations but den%ing others, the respondents aver the% were

merel% compl%ing with their duties under the statute, which the% presume and

allege to be constitutional. The respondent =ational Treasurer further avers that

petitioners have no personalit% to bring this actionF that a dul% certified cop% of the

law creates the presumption of its having been passed in accordance with the

re+uirements of the &onstitution Edistribution of printed bills included9F that the

Hirector of the &ensus submitted an official report on the population of the

Philippines in =ovember, A;, which report became the basis of the billF and thatthe 'ct complies with the principle of proportional representation prescribed b% the

&onstitution.

Petitioners are four members of the "ouse of Representatives from =egros


23/46

The respondents claim in their defense that a statute ma% not be nullified upon

evidence of failure to print, because Jit is conclusivel% presumed that the details of

legislative procedure leading to the enrollment that are prescribed b% the

&onstitution have been complied with b% the ?egislature.J The% further claim that

the certificates of the Secretar% of the "ouse are inadmissible, in view of the

conclusive Eenrolled4bill9 presumption, which in several instances have been applied

b% the courts. >n further support of their contention, Sec. ::E-9 of 'ct A; might be

cited.

The respondents aver the% were merel% compl%ing with their duties under the

statute, which the% presume and allege to be constitutional. Respondent

=ational Treasurer further avers that petitioners have no personalit% to bring this

actionF that a dul% certified cop% of the law creates the presumption of its having

been passed in accordance with the re+uirements of the &onstitution Edistribution

of printed bills included9F that the Hirector of the &ensus submitted an official report

on the population of the Philippines in =ovember A;, which report became the

basis of the billF and that the 'ct complies with the principle of proportional

representation prescribed b% the &onstitution.

I"")E:

1hether or not R' :;B; violates the principle of proportional representative

stipulated in the &onstitution6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

Republic 'ct =o. :;B; that gave provinces with less number of inhabitants more

representative districts than those with bigger population is declared invalid

because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed b% the

&onstitution.

The &onstitution directs that the one hundred twent% Members of the "ouse

of Representatives Jshall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearl% as

ma% be according to the number of their respective inhabitants.J'fter hearing the

parties and considering their memoranda, The &ourt issued are solution, stating

that R' :;B; violates the &onstitution in several wa%s namel%8Ea9 it gave &ebu

seven members, while Ri5al with a bigger number of inhabitants got four onl%F Eb9 it


24/46

gave Manila four members, while &otabato with a bigger population got three onl%

JThe constitutionalit% of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning

delegates for the house of delegates is a judicial +uestion for the courts, although

the statute is an exercise of political power.J

TITLE: BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT

(BANAT!VS.COMELEC

CITATIN: G# N 1%21

&ATE: A-#IL 21, 200%

FACT":

$aranga% 'ssociation for =ational 'dvancement and Transparenc% E$'='T9

filed before the &ommission on 3lections E&f not, can major political partiesparticipate in the part%4list elections6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:


25/46

=either the &onstitution nor R' CAB mandates the filling up of the entire

-;O allocation of part%4list representatives found in the &onstitution. The

&onstitution, in paragraph , Sec of 'rt V>, left the determination of the

number of the members of the "ouse of Representatives to &ongress. The

-;O allocation of part%4list representatives is merel% a ceilingF part%4list

representatives cannot be more then -;O of the members of the "ouse of

Representatives.

=o. 1e rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the

continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the

additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec Eb9 of R' CAB is

unconstitutional.

This &ourt finds that the two percent threshold ma)es it mathematicall%

impossible to achieve the maximum number of available part%4list seats

when the available part%4list seat exceeds ;.

The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution ofthe additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that

-;O of the members of the "ouse of Representatives shall consist of part%4

list representatives. 1e therefore stri)e down the two percent threshold onl%

in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second

clause of Sec Eb9 of R' CAB. The two percent threshold presents an

unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec E-9, 'rt V> of the

&onstitution and prevents the attainment of (the4broadest possible

representation of part%, sectoral or group interests in the "ouse of

Representatives.*

=o. =either the &onstitution nor R' CAB prohibits major political parties from

participating in the part%4list s%stem.


26/46

TITLE: AKO BICOL" ET ALVS.COMELEC

CITATIN: G# N 203$$

&ATE: A-#IL 2, 2013

FACT":

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic 'ct =o. CAB ER.'. =o. CAB9 and &=, ''$, '>, '?K'S'=, #@'RH/'=, PPP, and P$$9 were not able to secure a mandator%

injunction from this &ourt. The &


27/46

that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the : Ma% -;: part%4list

elections have continuall% complied with the re+uirements of R.'. =o. CAB and 'ng

$agong $a%ani4t was held that the &


28/46

E9 The "ouse of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two

hundred and fift% members, unless otherwise fixed b% law, who shall be

elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and

the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,

and those who, as provided b% law, shall be elected through a part%4list

s%stem of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organi5ations.

E-9 The part%4list representatives shall constitute twent% per centum of the

total number of representatives including those under the part% list. 7or three

consecutive terms after the ratification of this &onstitution, one4half of the

seats allocated to part%4list representatives shall be filled, as provided b% law,

b% selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenouscultural communities, women, %outh, and such other sectors as ma% be

provided b% law, except the religious sector.

"ecions and , Aricle I9.C

Sec. C. =o votes cast in favor of a political part%, organi5ation, or coalition shall be

valid, except for those registered under the part%4list s%stem as provided in this

&onstitution.

Sec. !. Political parties, or organi5ations or coalitions registered under the part%4list

s%stem, shall not be represented in the voters0 registration boards, boards of

election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. "owever, the%

shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

&ommissioner &hristian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the part%4list s%stem,

stressed that Je ;ary.lis sysem is no synonymous


29/46

TITLE: MARCOSVS.COMELEC

CITATIN: G# N 11%%$

&ATE: "E-TE'(E# 1, 1%%!

FACT":

>melda, a little over ! %ears old, in or about A:!, established her domicile in

Tacloban, ?e%te where she studied and graduated high school in the "ol% >nfant

'cadem% from A:! to ABA. She then pursued her college degree, education, in

St. Paul0s &ollege now Hivine 1ord @niversit% also in Tacloban. Subse+uentl%, she

taught in ?e%te &hinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during A- to

wor) with her cousin, the late spea)er Haniel Romualde5 in his office in the "ouse

of Representatives. >n AB, she married late President 7erdinand Marcos when he

was still a &ongressman of >locos =orte and was registered there as a voter. 1hen

Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in AA, the% lived together in San /uan, Ri5al

where she registered as a voter. >n A, when Marcos won presidenc%, the% lived


30/46

in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as

member of the $atasang Pambansa and #overnor of Metro Manila during AC!.

>melda Romualde54Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the

7irst Histrict of ?e%te for the AA 3lections. &irilo Ro% Montejo, the incumbent

Representative of the 7irst Histrict of ?e%te and also a candidate for the same

position, filed a (Petition for &ancellation and His+ualificationJ with the &ommission

on 3lections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional re+uirement for

residenc%. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months

under residenc%, which she sought to rectif% b% adding the words Jsince childhoodJ

in her 'mended2&orrected &ertificate of &andidac% filed on March -A, AA and that

Jshe has alwa%s maintained Tacloban &it% as her domicile or residence. She arrived

at the seven months residenc% due to the fact that she became a resident of the

Municipalit% of Tolosa in said months.

I"")E:

1hether petitioner has satisfied the %ear residenc% re+uirement to be eligible in

running as representative of the 7irst Histrict of ?e%te6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

Residence is used s%non%mousl% with domicile for election purposes. The court are

in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner0s claim of legal residence or domicile in

the 7irst Histrict of ?e%te despite her own declaration of C months residenc% in the

district for the following reasons8

. ' minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became >melda0s domicile of

origin b% operation of law when her father brought them to ?e%teF

-. Homicile of origin is onl% lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile,

a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new

one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. >n the absence and concurrenceof all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

:. ' wife does not automaticall% gain the husband0s domicile because the term

(residence* in &ivil ?aw does not mean the same thing in Political ?aw. 1hen


31/46

>melda married late President Marcos in AB, she )ept her domicile of origin and

merel% gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

B. 'ssuming that >melda gained a new domicile after her marriage and ac+uired

right to choose a new one onl% after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon

returning to the countr% clearl% indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of

origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence

certificate in AA- in Tacloban, ?e%te while living in her brother0s house, an act,

which supports the domiciliar% intention clearl% manifested. She even )ept close

ties b% establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthda%s and other

important milestones.

"aving determined that petitioner possesses the necessar% residence +ualifications

to run for a seat in the "ouse of Representatives in the 7irst Histrict of ?e%te, the

&H3. Respondent &


32/46

Second ?egislative Histrict of Ma)ati &it%. >n his certificate of candidac%, '+uino

stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district E-!B 'mapola &or.

'dalla Sts., Palm Village, Ma)ati9 for ; months.

Move Ma)ati, a registered political part%, and Mateo $edon, &hairman of ?'K'S4

=@&H4@MHP of $aranga% &embo, Ma)ati &it%, filed a petition to dis+ualif% '+uino on

the ground that the latter lac)ed the residence +ualification as a candidate for

congressman which under Section , 'rticle V> of the A!C &onstitution, should be

for a period not less than one %ear preceding the EMa% !, AA9 da% of the election.

7aced with a petition for dis+ualification, '+uino amended the entr% on his

residenc% in his certificate of candidac% to %ear and : da%s. The &ommission on

3lections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on Ma% and allowed

'+uino to run in the election of ! Ma%. '+uino, with :!,BC votes, won against

'ugusto S%juco with :,A; votes.

Move Ma)ati filed a motion of reconsideration with the &omelec, to which, on Ma%

, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of '+uino until the

&ommission resolved the issue.


33/46

The framers intended the word (residence* to have the same meaning of

domicile.

The place (where a part% actuall% or constructivel% has his permanent

home,* where he, no matter where he ma% be found at an% given time,

eventuall% intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the

&onstitution refers when it spea)s of residence for the purposes of election

law.The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the

conditions and needs of the communit% from ta)ing advantage of favorable

circumstances existing in that communit% for electoral gain.

1hile there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a

given area for meeting election law re+uirements, this defeats the essence of

representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most

cogni5ant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate

falls short of the period of residenc% mandated b% law for him to +ualif%.

'+uino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running

in.

The S& agreed with the &omelec0s contention that '+uino should prove that

he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.

The &onstitution re+uires a person running for a post in the "R one %ear ofresidenc% prior to the elections in the district in which he see)s election to.

'+uino0s certificate of candidac% in a previous EMa% , AA-9 election

indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San /ose,

&oncepcion, Tarlac for more than - %ears prior to that election. "is birth

certificate indicated that &onception as his birthplace and his &


34/46

bench. To successfull% effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an

actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of

abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and

definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

'+uino was thus rightfull% dis+ualified b% the &ommission on 3lections due to

his lac) of one %ear residence in the district.

>nstant petition dismissed.


35/46

TITLE: SEMAVS.COMELEC

CITATIN: G# N 1!%

&ATE: J)L5 1$, 200

FACT":

The Province of Maguindanao is part of 'RMM. &otabato &it% is part of the province

of Maguindanao but it is not part or 'RMM because &otabato &it% voted against its

inclusion in a plebiscite held in A!A. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The

stlegislative district comprises of &otabato &it% and ! other municipalities.

' law ER' A;B9 was passed amending 'RMM0s


36/46

I"")E:

1hether or not R' A;B is unconstitutional6

1hether or not 'RMM can create validl% ?#@s6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

R' A;B is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed b%

"ecion 10, Aricle 9of the &onstitution, which provides8

Sec. ;. =o province, cit%, municipalit%, or baranga% ma% be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundar% substantiall% altered except in accordance with

the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval b% a

majorit% of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directl% affected.

Thus, the creation of an% of the four local government units province, cit%,

municipalit% or baranga% must compl% with three conditions. 7irst, the creation of a

local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the ?ocal #overnment &ode.

Second, such creation must not conflict with an% provision of the &onstitution. Third,

there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authorit% in the

&onstitution for &ongress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the

power to create local government units. "owever, under its plenar% legislative

powers, &ongress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local

government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises

with an% provision of the &onstitution. >n fact, &ongress has delegated to provincial

boards, and cit% and municipal councils, the power to create baranga%s within their

jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the ?ocal

#overnment &ode, and the plebiscite re+uirement in Section ;, 'rticle D of the

&onstitution. "ence, 'RMM cannot validl% create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

=ote that in order to create a cit% there must be at least a population of at least

-;), and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in

the "


37/46

validl% create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative

district. $ut this can never be legall% possible because the creation of legislative

districts is vested solel% in &ongress. 't most, what 'RMM can create are baranga%s

not cities and provinces.

TITLE: AVELINOVS.CUENCO

CITATIN: 3 -*IL 1

&ATE: CT(E# 2, 1%$0

FACT":


38/46

thereafter. 'velino then filed a +uo warranto proceeding before the S& to declare

him as the rightful Senate President.

I"")E:

1hether or not the Supreme &ourt can ta)e cogni5ance of the case6

T*E C)#T+" #)LING:

$% a vote of to B, the Supreme &ourt held that the% cannot ta)e cogni5ance of the

case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the

controvers% and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own

president, which power should not be interfered with, nor ta)en over, b% the

judiciar%.

The S& should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer

affects onl% the Senators themselves who are at libert% at an% time to choose their

officers, change or reinstate them. 'n%wa%, if, as the petition must impl% to be

acceptable, the majorit% of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remed% lies

in the Senate Session "all G not in the Supreme &ourt.

Supposed the S& can ta)e cogni5ance of the case, what will be the resolution6

There is unanimit% in the view that the session under Senator 'rran5 was a

continuation of the morning session and that a minorit% of ten senators E'velino et

al9 ma% not, b% leaving the "all, prevent the other E&uenco et al9 twelve senators

from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer

might be different had the resolution been approved onl% b% ten or less.

Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen.

&onfesor was in the @S'. The second session is a continuation of the morning

session as evidenced b% the minutes entered into the journal. There were -:

senators considered to be in session that time Eincluding Soto, excluding &onfesor9.

"ence, twelve senators constitute a majorit% of the Senate of twent% three

senators. 1hen the &onstitution declares that a majorit% of (each "ouse* shall

constitute a +uorum, (the "ouse* does not mean (all* the members. 3ven a

majorit% of all the members constitute (the "ouse*.


39/46

There is a difference between a majorit% of (all the members of the "ouse* and a

majorit% of (the "ouse*, the latter re+uiring less number than the first. Therefore an

absolute majorit% E-9 of all the members of the Senate less one E-:9, constitutes

constitutional majorit% of the Senate for the purpose of a +uorum. 7urthermore,

even if the twelve did not constitute a +uorum, the% could have ordered the arrest

of one, at least, of the absent membersF if one had been so arrested, there would be

no doubt uorum then, and Senator &uenco would have been elected just the same

inasmuch as there would be eleven for &uenco, one against and one abstained.

'velino and his group E senators in all9 insist that the Supreme &ourt ta)e

cogni5ance of the case and that the% are willing to bind themselves to the decision

of the S& whether it be right or wrong. 'velino contends that there is no

constitutional +uorum when &uenco was elected president. There are -B senators inall. Two are absentee senatorsF one being confined and the other abroad but this

does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majorit% which if

mathematicall% construed is F in this case - Ehalf of -B9 plus or : =


40/46

TITLE: OSME$AVS PENDATUM

CITATIN: 10% -*IL $3 G# No L.11//&ATE: cober 2, 1%$0

FACT":


41/46

President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause wh%

the "ouse should not punish him.

The petition attached a cop% of "ouse Resolution =o. A, where it was stated that

Sergio


42/46

The respondents filed their answer where the% challenged the jurisdiction of this

&ourt to entertain the petition, defended the power of &ongress to discipline its

members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that &ongress

having ended its session, the &ommittee had thereb% ceased to exist.

'fter the new resolution,


43/46

the Philippine Senate, in 'pril ABA, suspended a senator for one %ear. =eedless to

add, the Rules of Philippine "ouse of Representatives provide that the

parliamentar% practices of the &ongress of the @nited States shall appl% in a

supplementar% manner to its proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner8 the "ouse ma% no longer ta)e action

against him, because after his speech it had ta)en up other business. Respondents

answer that Resolution =o. A was unanimousl% approved b% the "ouse, that such

approval amounted to a suspension of the "ouse Rules, which according to

standard parliamentar% practice ma% done b% unanimous consent. #ranted that the

"ouse ma% suspend the operation of its Rules, it ma% not, however, affect past acts

or renew its rights to ta)e action which had alread% lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of

actions and ma)ing them applicable to actions that had lapsed. 't an% rate, courts

are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the bod%

adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentar% usage will not invalidate

the action ta)en b% a deliberative bod% when the re+uired number of members

have agreed to a particular measure. The following is +uoted from a reported

decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee8

The rule here invo)ed is one of parliamentar% procedure, and it is uniforml% held

that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modif%, or waive their

own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderl% con duct of business, and as

securit% against hast% action. E&ertain 'merican cases9

>n the case of &ongressman Stanber% of


44/46

This was due to the theor% of separation of powers fastidiousl% observed b% this.

3ach department, it has been said, had exclusive cogni5ance of matters within its

jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. E'ngara vs. 3lectoral

&ommission.9

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to

intervene in what are exclusivel% legislative functions. Thus, where the stated

Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action

or revise even a most arbitrar% or unfair decision.

&lifford vs. 7rench4 several senators who had been expelled b% the State Senate of

&alifornia for having ta)en a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel

reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to

ma)e defense, besides falsit% of the charges of briber%. The Supreme &ourt of

&alifornia declined to interfere8

@nder our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even

the most arbitrar% and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the

&onstitution. 3ver% legislative bod% in which is vested the general legislative power

of the state has the implied power to expel a member for an% cause which it ma%

deem sufficient.

>n "iss. vs. $arlett, it was said that this power is inherent in ever% legislative bod%F

that it is necessar% to the to enable the bod% Ito perform its high functions, and is

necessar% to the safet% of the stateF That it is a power of self4protection, and that

the legislative bod% must necessaril% be the sole judge of the exigenc% which ma%

justif% and re+uire its exercise. #iven the exercise of the power committed to it, the

senate is supreme. 'n attempt b% this court to direct or control the legislature, or

either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise

legislative functions, which it is expressl% forbidden to do.

The &ourt merel% refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions

which it is our special dut% to maintain. >ndeed, in the interest of comit%, we found

the "ouse of Representatives of the @nited States ta)ing the position upon at least

two occasions.

PetitionerIs principal argument against the "ouseIs power to suspend is the

'lejandrino precedent. >n A-B, Senator 'lejandrino was, b% resolution of Senate,

suspended from office for - months because he had assaulted another member of

that $od%. The Senator challenged the validit% of the resolution. 'lthough this &ourt


45/46

held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the

Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to sa% the Senate had no

power to adopt the resolution because suspension for - months amounted to

removal, and the /ones ?aw gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive

member, li)e Senator 'lejandrino.

The /ones ?aw specificall% provided that Jeach house ma% punish its members for

disorderl% behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two4thirds votes, expel an

elective member. The /ones ?aw empowered the #overnor #eneral to appoint

Senators. 'lejandrino was one.

The opinion in that case stated that Jsuspension deprives the electoral district of

representation without that district being afforded an% means b% which to fill that

vacanc%.J $ut that remar) should be understood to refer particularl% to the

appointive senator who was then the affected part%.

=ow the &ongress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign

nation, except as restricted b% the &onstitution. >n the 'lejandrino case, the &ourt

reached the conclusion that the /ones ?aw did not give the Senate the power it then

exercisedGthe power of suspension for one %ear. =ow. the &ongress has the

inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the &onstitution did not impair.

The ?egislative power of the Philippine &ongress is plenar%, limited b% the

RepublicIs &onstitution. So that an% power deemed to be legislative b% usage or

tradition, is necessaril% possessed b% the Philippine &ongress, unless the

&onstitution provides otherwise. >n an% event, petitionerIs argument as to the

deprivation of the districtIs representation can not be weight%, becuase deliberative

bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.

=ow come +uestions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent

the Special &ommittee from acting tin pursuance of "ouse Resolution =o. A.

$ecause no preliminar% injunction had been issued, the &ommittee performed its

tas), reported to the "ouse, and the latter approved the suspension order. The

"ouse had closed it session, and the &ommittee has ceased to exist as such. >t

would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or

academic.


46/46

case digests 12

Documents