MARTINEZ VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament[3]directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. After the Death of their parents, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila.[6]He also discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said deed of sale.[7] The spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. The matter was referred to thebarangayfor conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. They appended the certification to file action executed by thebarangaychairman to the complaint. In his Rodolfos Answer[13]Rodolfo alleged,inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest effort for an amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached.The spouses Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged that earnest efforts toward a settlement had been made, but that the same proved futile.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST EFFORTS WERE, IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE

RULING: THE CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE CIVIL CODE.[19]Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.Under Article 150 of the Family Code, petitioner Lucila Martinez had no familial relations with the respondent, being a mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the respondent; hence, there was no need for the petitioners[21]to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code.Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.

The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in theKatarungang Pambarangay, and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in thebarangaychairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.[25]The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification to file action by thebarangaychairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the Family Code.

BLARDONY, JR. v. COSCOLLUELA, JR

FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private respondent separated. The wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties. The husband, in his answer, admitted that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability to agree upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." The husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508. Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. The latters motion for reconsideration of that order was denied by the court on February 20, 1985. Hence, this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction: virtual 1aw library

ISSUE: WON REFERRAL TO THE LUPON WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR FILING THE CASE AT BAR; WON THE CONDITION PRECEDENT WAS JURISDICTIONAL

RULING: While the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal properties. The complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and . . ."

BONIFACIO LAW OFFICE VS BELLOSILLO

FACTS: Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr.Of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. Complainant assails the Order referring the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the verified complaint as. The ANSWER of respondent judge denying the charges leveled against him and alleging the following arguments:a.In all cases where there is failure of settlement of mediation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, it is necessary that the Pangkat be constituted by the parties from the Lupon members in order that they may have a second opportunity to amicably settle their dispute.It is a mandatory duty of the Barangay Chairman to set the meeting of the parties for the constitution of the Pangkat upon failure of parties to amicably settle otherwise there is no compliance with the requirements of P.D. 1508, now Sec. 412, 1991 Local Government Code.In the case of complainant, it appears from the records thereof that there was premature issuance of the Certificate to File Action considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the said certificate was issued.ISSUE: WON THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAWRULING: NO. If mediation or conciliation efforts before thePunong Barangayproved unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410-{b}, Revised RuleKatarungang PambarangayLaw; Sec. 1,c,[1], Rule III,Katarungang PambarangayRules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before thePunong Barangay(3rdpar. Sec. 8,a, Rule VI,Katarungang PambarangayRules), thePunong Barangayshall not cause the issuance of this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute thePangkatbefore whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.CHAVEZ VS CAFACTS: Chavez (lessor) and Trillana (lessee) entered into a contract of lease[4]whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond. The contract provided that lessee shall undertake all construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from the lessor.A powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Lessee did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, he was informed by abarangaycouncilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond. Lessee found out that the repairs were at the instance of lessor who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.Lessee filed a complaint before the Office of theBarangay. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by lessor, the ouster of his personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by lessor despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. The Kasunduan was not complied with. Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the Kasunduan, lessee filed a complaint on February 7, 1997 against petitioner before the RTC a civil action praying for award of damages in his favor. ISSUES: WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of theBarangayCaptain WON respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in theRevised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.RULING: TheRevised Katarungang Pambarangay Lawprovides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by thePunong Barangaywhich is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.[21]However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of theCivil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417[22]itself which provides that the amicable settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word may clearly makes the procedure provided in theRevised Katarungang PambarangayLaw directory[23]or merely optional in nature.Although theKasunduanexecuted by petitioner and respondent before the Office of theBarangayCaptainhad the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the RevisedKatarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

DOMINGO VS ROSERO

FACTS: The petitioner filed an action for declaration of ownership with damages against the private respondent, the spouses Leonilo Bercasio and Candida dela Torre. In the complaint, the petitioner that his residence and postal address is at 660 T. Solit Street, Pateros, Metro Manila, while the respondents are residents of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Pacasao, Camarines Sur. did.The private respondents-defendants filed their answer (with counterclaim)3to the complaint. After filing their answer, the private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint against them on the sole ground that the petitioner allegedly failed to comply with the provisions of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508 which require conciliation. The petitioner-movant arguing that the case does not come within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508 inasmuch as the parties thereto reside in different provinces. Alternatively, the petitioner insisted that even granting that there was indeed a need to submit the case first before the barangay court, the private respondents' failure to seasonably raise that ground in a motion to dismiss before they filed their answer, or in their answer itself, constitutes a waiver of the said ground.ISSUE: WON THE CASE WAS DISMISSABLE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A CONDITION PRECEDENT; WON THE CASE IS COGNIZABLE BY THE LUPON

RULING: The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; andThe Katarungang Pambarangay Law, it is crystal clear that only disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality, or residents of adjoining barangays located in two different municipalities, are within the jurisdiction of the barangay court.The private respondents submit that the subject dispute between them and the petitioner is cognizable by the barangay Lupon. They premise their contention on the allegation that at the time the petitioner filed his complaint, he was temporarily residing in Barangay Sto. Domingo, in Pacasao, Camarines Sur.10 Residence in a barangay within the same municipality if only transient or temporary is not enough to vest jurisdiction upon the barangay Lupon.The requirement of submission or referral to the Lupong Tagapayapa under P.D. 1508 is merely a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court12and not jurisdictional.13 The failure of the private respondents to raise timely this ground in a motion to dismiss filed before their answer to the complaint, or in their answer, constitutes a waiver thereof.15

HAROLD VS ALIBA

FACTS: Harold engaged the services Aliba, a geodetic engineer, to conduct a relocation survey and to execute a consolidation-subdivision of their properties. After completing his work,Alibafailed to return the certificates of title of the said properties for more than one year, despite repeated demands to return them.Harold later discovered thatAlibamade it appear that she had sold the lot to him forP80,000and had her certificates of title cancelled and transferred to him.Harold also found out that the alleged deed of sale was the document thatAlibacaused Harold and her husband to sign in January 1994.Thinking that she can no longer recover her property, Harold asked for the payment of the fair market value of her property but to no avail.The dispute between Harold andAlibawas referred toPunongBarangayLimsonOgasand theLupongTagapamayapa.During theJune 8, 1994barangayconciliation proceedings, the parties herein agreed thatAlibawill pay an additional amount ofP75,000to the initialP500,000Alibahad already given to Harold.In the same proceedings,AlibatenderedP70,000, which Harold accepted. as agreed upon,Alibatendered the remainingP5,000to Harold to complete their amicable settlement.Unfortunately, Harold refused to accept the same, saying thatP5,000is not enough and insisted on the elevation of the case to the court.[6]Thus, a certification to file action[7]was issued by the Office of theLupongTagapamayapaonJune 29, 1994.Immediately thereafter, Harold filed a Complaint[8]againstAlibabefore the Municipal Trial Court. In his Answer,[9]Alibaprayed for the dismissal of the complaint, considering that he had already been absolutely released from any obligation to Harold and that what remains to be done is merely the completion of the amicable settlement of the partiesISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ACT OF NOT ACCCEPTING THE REMAINING BALANCE BEING PROFFERED BY RESPONDENT AND HER INSISTENCE THAT THE CASE BE INSTEAD ELEVATED TO THE COURTS DURING THE SECOND DAY OF HEARING SHOULD NOT ALSO BE CONSIDERED A REPUDIATION OF SAID AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREOFRULING: From the facts on record it is evident that the parties herein entered into an amicable settlement, or more specifically, a compromise agreement, during the saidbarangayconciliation proceedings. By reason of her unconditional acceptance of the offer and theP70,000tendered to her, Harold had already effectively waived whatever claims she might have againstAlibaregarding the subject lot.Moreover, she is likewise barred from pursuing her case againstAlibaunder the principle ofestoppelnow.The issue concerning the alleged non-compliance of the amicable settlement pursuant to the mandate of Section 411[22]of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) arose because there was no formal document denominated as Amicable Settlement signed by the parties.However, we agree with the similar holdings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC that the requirements under Section 411 of the LGC had been substantially complied with.The minutes of thebarangay conciliation proceedings readily disclose the terms agreed upon by the parties for the settlement of their dispute, and that the acknowledgment receipt, which was written in a language known to the parties, signed by them, attested to by theLuponChairman, and witnessed by severalbarangayofficials, serves as an indubitable proof of the amicable settlement and of the substantial compliance of its terms by respondentAliba.Moreover, even without the minutes of the meeting and the acknowledgment receipt, the amicable settlement, or more specifically the compromise agreement, entered into by the parties is undeniably valid, considering that a compromise agreement is a consensual contract, and as such, it is perfected upon the meeting of' the minds of the parties to the contractHarolds refusal to accept the remainingP5,000thatAlibahad tendered cannot constitute an effective repudiation of the questioned amicable settlement, considering that the reason for her refusal to accept the said amount or alleged repudiation of the assailed amicable settlement is not one of the grounds for repudiation clearly specified under Section 418[25]of the LGC.As borne out by the records, her refusal to accept the same was based on the alleged insufficiency of the remainingP5,000as settlement for the lot, without any reference to vitiation of her consent by any fraud, violence or intimidation onAlibaspart.LUMBUAN VS RONQUILLO

FACTS: Lumbuan is the registered owner ofLotshe leased it to respondent Ronquillo. The parties also agreed that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent for the succeeding two years,and the leased premises will be used exclusively for the respondents fastfood business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioners prior written consent. While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood business, he later used the premises as residence without the petitioners prior written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent ofP500/month starting 1996 andP1,000/month in 1997 to the present.Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises.The petitioner referred the matter to theBarangayChairmans office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement.TheBarangayChairman then issued aCertificate to File Action despite not undergoing conciliation before the Pangkat that was not constituted.[6] The petitioner filed against the respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer. The appellate court dismissed the complaint as it was prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in thebarangaylevel had not been complied with.ISSUE: WON THE ACTION WAS DISMISSABLE FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY LEVEL RULING: Here, theLupon/PangkatChairman andLupon/PangkatSecretary signed theCertificate to File Actionstating that no settlement was reached by the parties.While admittedly nopangkatwas constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of theBarangayChairman for possible settlement.The efforts of theBarangayChairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached.Although nopangkatwas formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law.It is noteworthy that under theaforequotedprovision, the confrontation before theLuponChairman or thepangkatis sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.[17]This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that theBarangayChairman shall constitute apangkatif he fails in his mediation efforts.MAGNO VS JACOBA

FACTS: Complainant had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to the barangay captain. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objected to respondents appearance but elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.Respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of thePunong Barangay,instead of before theLupong Tagapamayapa,and heard byPunong BarangayBonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegialLuponor a conciliation panel known aspangkat. Respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client inkatarungan pambarangayproceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

ISSUE: WON A LAWYER ACTING AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT ALLOWED

RULING: Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subjectKatarungang Pambarangay, provides: Section 415.Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangayproceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties inkatarungan pambarangayconciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative.

As to her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote herSumbongwith the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs theLupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

MONTOYA VS ESCAYO

FACTS: The private respondents were all formerly employed as salesgirls in the petitioner's store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store," in Bacolod City. On different dates, they separately filed complaints for the collection of sums of money against the petitioner for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and service leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and attorney's fees. , the petitioner-employer moved for the dismissal of the complaints, claiming that among others, the private respondents failed to refer the dispute to the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the certification required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE; WON THE ACTION WAS DISMISSABLE

RULING: The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other government offices are not applicable to labor cases.Article 226 thereof grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over the conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances, or problems in the regional offices of the Department of Labor and Employment. It is the said Bureau and its divisions, and not the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa, which are vested by law withoriginal andexclusiveauthority to conduct conciliation and mediation proceedings on labor controversies before their endorsement to the appropriate Labor Arbiter for adjudication. Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts would defeat the very salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the proper court or office to decide it finally, the position taken by the petitioner would only duplicate the conciliation proceedings and unduly delay the disposition of the labor case.

AGBAYANI VS BELEN

FACTS: Nullification is sought by petitioners of the Order of respondent Judge dismissing the civil action instituted by said petitioners against private respondents and other persons for quieting of title and damages involving three (3) parcels of land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan.2The Court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss "on the ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired jurisdiction to try the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to submit the controversy to conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their complaint with the Court.

ISSUE: Whether the "precondition," i.e., the prior submission of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation, should apply to actions affecting real property situated in one city or municipality although the parties actually reside in barangays which are located in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each other.

RULING: The "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority. The Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other."13In such a situation, where the Lupon is without jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting real property or interest therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at an altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing venue) that "disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule onvenueprescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3;"14but obviously, the rule on venue is utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay Lupon does not, in the first place, have any jurisdictionSince the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or jurisdiction of the Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different cities and municipalities (and not in adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing disputes concerning real property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to comply with the "precondition" of first referring their dispute with private respondents to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement before instituting their suit in court.

PANG-ET VS DAO-AS

FACTS: This is an Action[4]for recovery of possession of real property. During the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Lupon for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of theKatarungangPambarangayLaw.[5]Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.[6]Thereafter, theLuponissued a Certification to File Action on26 February 1995due to the refusal of theManacnesspouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court.On8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.An Order was issued by the MCTC on7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for conciliation by theLuponand ordering theLuponto render an Arbitration Award thereon.In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award.Petitioner then filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the Arbitration Award.On the other hand,FlorentinaManacnesfiled a Motion with the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.The MCTC deniedFlorentinaManacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that since themovantfailed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period provided for under theKatarungangPambarangayLaw, the arbitration award has become final andexecutory.Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award.On31 August 1995, the then incumbentPunongBarangayofDagdagissued a Notice of Execution of the Award. Said Notice of Execution was never implemented.

ISSUE: WON ARBITRATION AWARD IS MANDATORY FOR DISPUTES THAT HAVE UNDERGONE ARBITRATION IN THE BRGY; WON THE PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THEIR AGREEMENT TO REFER TO ARBITRATION DURING THE PTC

RULING: NO. NOT MANDATORY.The object of theKatarungangPambarangayLawis the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties.[15] Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy during thebarangayproceedings before theLuponor thePangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in the courts[16]in the event that no true compromise is reached.The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under theKatarungangPambarangayLawis the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by theLuponor thePangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of a court.[17]Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under theKatarungangPambarangayLaw, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to theLupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for arbitrationuntilan arbitration award is rendered by theLupon.What is compulsory under theKatarungangPambarangayLawis that there be a confrontation between the partiesbefore theLuponChairman or thePangkatand that a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to by theLuponorPangkatChairman, before a case falling within the authority of theLuponmay be instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication.

What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was the remand of the case to theLupon ng Tagapamayapafor conciliation proceedings and not the actual amicable settlement of the case.As stated earlier, the parties may only be compelled to appear before theLupon ng Tagapamayapafor the necessary confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.

PASCUAL VS. PASCUAL

FACTS: Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale. Respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss[3]on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,[4]she contending that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court. Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, theluponwould have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real propertyRespondent submits, on the other hand, That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers, respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of thelupon, being a substitute, for Sagario, becomes the real party-in-interest.

ISSUE: WON THE LUPON HAVE THE JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTE

RULING: Since the plaintiff-herein petitioner,the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local luponhas no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

SAN MIGUEL VILLAGE VS PUNDOGAR

FACTS: Petitioner, a duly accredited private school located, entered into a contract of services with private respondent Christina Trio. Under that contract, Christina Trio would teach at the petitioner School during the schoolyear .The contract also provided that any party desiring to terminate the contract before its scheduled expiration, would give the other party at least one month notice of termination in writing. Sometime in August 1985, while the contract was in full force and effect, and during a final examination period, private respondent suddenly stopped teaching at the petitioner School, without giving notice of termination. Petitioner School immediately sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain and the commencement of conciliation proceedings, This attempt failed because private respondent could not be contacted. A Certificate to File Action, signed by the Barangay Captain of Barangay. Private respondent having failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, the petitioner School moved to declare her in default. The trial court granted the motion, declared private respondent in default. The judge rendered a judgment by default against the respondent.Private respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the trial court, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to render its decision for failure of petitioner to go through the mandatory conciliation procedure. Judge Pundogar granted the relief sought, holding that the Regional Trial Court in rendering the decision, acted without jurisdiction "over the parties and the subject matter of the action"1for failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of P. D. No. 1508.ISSUE: WON THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQ OF PD 1508 IS JURISDICTIONAL; WON THE REQUIREMENTS OF PD 1508 OF CONFRONTATION BEFORE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION HAS BEEN SATISFIED DESPITE THE LACK OF CONFRONTATIONRULING: that failure of a plaintiff to comply with the requirements of P.D. No. 1508 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court that tried the action. Failure of a plaintiff to go through the conciliation procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects the sufficiency, or the maturity or ripeness of the plaintiffs cause of action and the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but rather for want of cause of action or for prematurity.If the defendant in an action fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice to appear before theLupon, the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 must be regarded as having been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the requirements of the statute by her own refusal or failure to appear before theLuponand then later to assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up the very ground of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508.In any event, the alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the procedural requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a timely manner, that is, at the first available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal basis for dismissal of the complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in other words, in a timely motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that defense produces the effect of waiver of such defense. In the instant case, private respondent was declared in default and that default order was never set aside. Accordingly, private respondent must be held to have waived whatever right she may have had to raise the defense of failure to comply with the compulsory conciliation procedure under P.D. No. 1508.SANTOS VS LUMBAOFACTS: On two separate occasions during her lifetime, the petitioners predecessor sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother. After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present.As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao. Respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter[8]to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao.Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages[9]before the RTCPetitoners prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay LawISSUE: Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.RULING: .Non-compliance with the said condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.[16]Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it.Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao.It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the courts jurisdiction.UNIVERSAL ROBINA VS HEIRS OF TEVESFACTS: Andres Abanto's heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Andres Abanto and Simultaneous Sale.[2]In this document, Abanto's heirs adjudicated unto themselves the two lots and sold the (a)unregisteredlot of 193,789 square meters to the United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO), and(b) theregisteredlot covered by TCT No. H-37 to Angel M. Teves, for a total sum of P115,000.00.The sale was not registered.[3] Out of respect for his uncle Ignacio Montenegro, who was UPSUMCO's founder and president, Teves verbally allowed UPSUMCO to use the lot covered by TCT No. H-37 for pier and loading facilities, free of charge,subjectto the condition that UPSUMCO shall shoulder the payment of real property taxes and that its occupation shall be co-terminus with its corporate existence.[4]UPSUMCO then built a guesthouse and pier facilities on the property.[5] UPSUMCOs properties were acquired by the Philippine National Bank (PNB).Later, PNB transferred the same properties to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in turn, sold the same to the Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO). URSUMCO then took possession of UPSUMCOs properties,includingTeves' lot covered by TCT No. H-37. Upon learning of URSUMCO's acquisition of his lot, Teves formally asked the corporation to turn over to him possession thereof or the corresponding rentals.He stated in his demand letters that he merely allowed UPSUMCO to use his property until its corporate dissolution; and that it was not mortgaged by UPSUMCO with the PNB and, therefore, not included among the foreclosed properties acquired by URSUMCO.[6]Teves filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dumaguete City, Branch 43, a complaint for recovery of possession of real property with damages against URSUMCO

ISSUE: Whether the complaint should have been dismissed for lack ofbarangayconciliation.RULING: NO. Being a corporation, petitioner cannot be impleaded as a party to abarangayconciliation proceeding.Section 1, Rule VI of theKatarungang PambarangayRules implementing theKatarungang PambarangayLaw[28]provides:"Section 1.Parties. - Only individuals shall be parties to these proceedings either as complainants or respondents.No complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entitiesshall be filed, received or acted upon."

VERCIDE VS HERNANDEZ

FACTS: This is a complaint filed against Judge Hernandez, charging her with grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros for recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality, while complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.In support of her order, respondent cited P.D. No. 1508, 3 of which provides:Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

ISSUE: WON THE JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE CASERULING: "SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together theparties actually residing in the same city or municipalityfor amicable settlement of all disputes

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing inthe samecity or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing inthe samebarangay" or in "different barangays withinthe samecity or municipality" unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays ofdifferentcities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.Recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays.

SECTION 2.Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of proceedings for amicable settlement under these rulesexcept the following enumerated cases:(f)Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto to agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinaryprovisoand should operate as such.

VIDAL VS ESCUETA

FACTS: When Abelardo Escueta died intestate onDecember 3, 1994, he was survived by his widow Remedios Escueta and their six children, including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta and her brother Herman O. Escueta.Part of his estate was a parcel of land located at No. 14 Sierra Madre corner Kanlaon Streets, Barangay Highway Hills,MandaluyongCity, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (77083) - 27568, and the house thereon. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate over the property. They also executed a special power of attorney authorizing Ma. Teresa Escueta to sell the said property.[4]Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before theLupon.Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable Settlement,[9]where they agreed that (a) the owners of the property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents therein (lessee and sub-lessees) starting May 1999, with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property on or before December 1999; (b) time was the essence of the agreement, and that consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property on or before December 1999, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court order to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the property.[10]The amicable settlement was attested byPangkatChairman Jose Acong.The parties did not repudiate the amicable settlement within ten days from the execution thereof. Neither did any of the parties file any petition to repudiate the settlement.Five sub-lessees remained in the property, and requested Escueta for extensions to vacate the property.Escueta agreed, but despite the lapse of the extensions granted them, the five sub-lessees refused to vacate the property.Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through thePunong Barangayas provided for in the amicable settlement.Neither did she file a motionwith thePunong Barangayfor the enforcement of the settlement. Instead, she filed onMay 12, 2000, a verified Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sub-lessees with the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution.

ISSUE: WON THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION WAS PREMATURELY AND IMPROPERLY FILED

RULING: TheKatarungang PambarangayImplementing Rules and Regulations, Rule VII, Section 2 provides:SECTION 2.Modes of Execution. -The amicable settlement orarbitration award may be enforced by execution by theLuponwithin six [6] months fromdate of the settlement or date of receipt of the award or from the datethe obligation stipulated in the settlement or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and demandable.After the lapse of such time, the settlement or award may be enforced by the appropriate local trial court pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court .An amicable settlement reached in a case referred by the Court having jurisdiction over the case to theLuponshall be enforced by execution by the said court. (Underlining supplied).In this case, there is no question that the petitioners were obliged under the settlement to vacate the premises in January 2000. The time line in Section 417 should be construed to mean that if the obligation in the settlement to beenforced is due and demandable on the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted from the date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due and demandable on a date other than the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted from the date the obligation becomes due and demandable.The petitioners are estopped from assailing the amicable settlement on the ground of deceit and fraud.First. The petitioners failed to repudiate the settlement within the period therefor.Second. The petitioners werebenefited by the amicable settlement.They were allowed to remain in the propertywithout any rentals therefor until December 1998.They were even granted extensions to continue in possession of the property.It was only when the respondent filed the motion for execution that the petitioners alleged for the first time that the respondents deceived them into executing the amicable settlement.[38]ZAMORA VS HEIRS OF IZQIERDO

FACTS: Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units They agreed on the following: the rental isP3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease wherein the rental was increased fromP3,000.00 toP3,600.00 per month.[3]However, petitioners refused to sign it.In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children (two of whom have their own families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment unit. However, they refused to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.Petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a written consent from the owner is required for such installation, she requested respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein.This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of thePunong BarangayofBarangay16, Sona 2,District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against Anita PunzalanDespite severalbarangayconciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their dispute amicably. Hence, theBarangayChairman issued a Certification to File ActionRespondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners.[6]Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss[7]the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to thebarangayfor conciliation.First, they alleged that thebarangayCertification to File Action is fatally defective because it pertains to another dispute,i.e., the refusal by respondents attorney-in-fact to give her written consent to petitioners request for installation of water facilities in the premises. And,second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before theLupong Tagapamayapa,thePunong Barangay (asLuponChairman), did not constitute thePangkat ng Tagapagkasundobefore whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter 7(Katarungang Pambarangay),Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160[8](otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991)ISSUE: WON THE ACTION WAS DISMISSABLERULING: While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig, this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings. Minutes would show that other issues were also discussed such as the violation of the terms of the lease.Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the filing of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to settle their differences amicably.[20]Here, while thePangkatwas not constituted, however, the parties metnine (9) timesat the Office of theBarangayChairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.[22]