case digests in succession - i. general provisions

7/28/2019 Case Digests in SUCCESSION - I. General Provisions

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Case Digests in SUCCESSION

I. General ProvisionsA. Transfer of property, rights and obligation Art. 774, 776, 7281. G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.

EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

Preliminaries:

The case is a petition for review before the SC on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the

reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal of the

petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 regarding the

petitioners money or debt claim against the respondents.

Facts:

Sometime in 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) entered into two successive loan agreement with the

respondents father which Edmund and his father Ephraim were signatory to a promissory note in favor of the FCCC for the

purchase of (3) three Agricultural All-Purposed Diesel tractors. The second one having a Continuing Guaranty Agreement.

Sometime in February 1981, respondents father died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate

proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City appointing Edmund, as one of the heirs, as the special administrator of

the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister

Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take

possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to

assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

Sometime in 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and UnionSavings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union

Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters were sent by the petitioner to Edmund for the settlement of his account with the petitioner but Edmund

failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money

against the respondents, before the RTC of Makati City and summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for

Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his

return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

In her answer Florence Ariola alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering

that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;

hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.

The RTC in its decision favoring the respondents stated that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the

probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being

claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently

executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said

agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid

partition until after the will has been probated. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the

trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.

On its appeal to the CA, petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in

Article 774 of the Civil Code, there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs

partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. The petitioner also points outthat the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as

such was beyond the ambit of the said will.

The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the

promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon.

Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses

that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.

The CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court thus the petitioner filed an appeal before the SC.

Issue:


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Whether or not the petitioner can hold the respondents liable on the obligation of their deceased father being the successor

of the property, rights and obligation of the decedent without probate of a will of the decedent?

Held:

The Court held that, in testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been

probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice

thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The

authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance

with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

The Court also stressed that, it is well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the

properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties

to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate

and to avoid prejudice to other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.

The Court in perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide betweenthemselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness

corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. " The assumptionof liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their

respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume

the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed,

the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force

and effect.

The Court in determining whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding without a probate

proceeding, the Court ruled in the negative.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim

Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the

Revised Rules of Court.

The SC denied the petition.

2. G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased,vs.LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant.

Preliminaries:

Before the Court is an appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing

its claim against the Estate of K. H. Hemady.

Facts:

K. H. Hemady before his demise entered a suretyship agreement with Luzon Surety Co. Inc., herein claimaint-appellant,

as solidary guarantor on twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct

principal, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different

creditors.

Stipulated in the suretyship agreement, among others, is that the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times

to indemnify the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and against any and alldamages, losses, and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or

incur. It stipulated that, It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the principal upon his default,

or to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly

and severally, a primary one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence

of such default.

Upon the death of Hemady the court assigned an administratrix of his estate thereafter the Luzon Surety Co. had filed a

claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements.

The administratrix contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in

the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. The TrialCourt believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should be


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noted that a new requirement has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is integrity. As correctly

pointed out by the Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of

Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss therefore, may occur after

Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor. Thus, the lower

court dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co. stating that whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are not

chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.

Issue:

Whether or not the obligation left by the guarantor upon his death is not chargeable to his estate based on the

extinguishment of his qualification?

Held:

The Court held that the reasoning presented by the lower court and the administratrix is untenable. The Court said

under the Civil Code, Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case

where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by

provision of law.

The Court further stressed that, while in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their

decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these

heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil

Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide.

ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the

extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by

his will or by operation of law.

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not

extinguished by his death.

Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to thesuccessors.

The Court also stressed that, of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or

guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that hispeculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal

inducement for the contract.

The Court further explains the three exceptions to intransmissibility of obligations of the decedent to his heirs orassigns as according to Art. 1311 of the Civil Code.

First is the Nature of the Undertaking. In the case at bar the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does

not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for thecontract. In the instant case what is expected is that the debt or reimbursement be made by the guarantor or surety

himself or by someone else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.

The second exception is by The Stipulations of the Contracts. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this

intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable

from the provisions of the contract.

The third exception is by Provision of Law. The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article

1311 exists when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference to those cases where

the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300),parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article

1830) and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered

intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by

provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,

therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate.

The Courts conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event,

the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement.

The order appealed from was reversed.


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3. G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Preliminaries:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila dismissing the action for legal redemption filed by plaintiff-

appellant.

Facts:

Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, with his five other siblings

as co-owners, Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, Jose V. Ramirez, Jose E. Ramirez, Rita de Ramirez, and Jose Ma. Ramirez.

On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was instituted to settle his estate,

that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament,wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela M.Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending up

to the present on account of the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine

Islands was appointed judicial administrator.

On December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz

property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. On

the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as judicial

administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with

that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bankcashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie

Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed

the corresponding action for legal redemption.

After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto, trial was held, after which

the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem

the property and that, if ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal redemptions

provided by the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not plaintiff-appellant, being a testamentary or voluntary heir, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez?

Held:

The Court held that the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption. As testamentary heir

of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her

predecessor in the Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the

rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of

succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the decedent.

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by

his death. (659)

ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the death of the

testator, and transmits it to his heirs.

Thus, plaintiff-appellant is entitled to redemption as according to Articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,

which read as follows:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other-co-owners

or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall

pay only a reasonable one.


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Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the

share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)

ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the

notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be

accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written

notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

4. G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002MAGLASANGvs.

THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN

FACTS:

On February 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of

Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita

Cabatingan on January 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land; (b) NicolasCabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land; and (c) Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of land. These deeds of donation contain

similar provisions, to wit:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these

presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings

and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the

event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of

no further force and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)

On May 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents (Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan) filed an action forAnnulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds

of donation executed. Heirs allege, inter alia, that petitioners, fraudulently caused the donations and that the documents are

void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that

these are donations mortis causa.

RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not following the requisite forms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a donation mortis causa without conforming to the requisites of solemnities of wills and testament is a valid

transfer of property rights?

HELD:

The Court held that the donation is a donation mortis causa and considering that the disputed donations are donation mortis

causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance

with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following requisites:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by

the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and

subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign,as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered

correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed

the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the

presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the

presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public

shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.


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B. Obligations limited to the value of inheritance Art. 7741. G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,vs.

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES,and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.

Preliminaries:

The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the IAC affirming the decision of CIF

ordering the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual

value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental.

Facts:

Aniceto Yanes, respondents ascendants, left a parcel of land intestate known as Lot 773 and 823 of the cadastral survey of

Murcia, Negros Occidental. Aniceto was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents

were grandchildren of Aniceto. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other

portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the

children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the provinceto settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to

peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their

share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in

possession of Lot 773.

Lot 773 was subdivided into Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. The said lots was then sold to Monico Fuentebella Jr. After

Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his

wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority

to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. By virtue of a court order granting said motion, on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella

sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado andJesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de

Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots

773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be

made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be

delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.

During the pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo

Siason. On February 21, 1968 the Yaneses filed an action for the recovery of real property with damages. Named defendants

therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros

Occidental. Respondents pray for the return/delivery of possession of Lot 773 and if, delivery thereof could not be effected,

or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum

of P45,000.00.

In its decision, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was

then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses

were negligent in their failure to place a notice oflis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to

protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value

of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval.

Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to

Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are liable as to the extent of the value of their inheritance?

Held:

The Court held, such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general

transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent

provisions of the Civil Code state:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the

value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by

operation of law.


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Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his

death.

Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and

obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The

heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's

transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is

of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary

estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the

estate.

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

2. G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Preliminaries: Intransmissibility of an obligation to an heir by rights of representation of their father who died leaving noproperties behind and before their grandfather.

The case is for a review of the decision of the CIF of Occidental Negros ordering herein defendants-appellants to pay

plaintiffs-appellees the amount of P1,500.00 chargeable to the inheritance of the defendants from their grandfather by rights

of representation of their father who died leaving no properties behind and before their grandfather.

Facts:

In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, ofwhich relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it

seems that the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed,

acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the

plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) for value

received. But was only able to P500.00.

Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who are the

other defendants. On March 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died living no properties to transfer to his heirs, and, still later, that is,

on December 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death,

administration proceedings of said properties were instituted, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased

Eusebio Quitco.

Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and

appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935, filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note

for payment.

On November1933, the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as

Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked

for the reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the order denying the said petition no appeal

was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise to this case.

Issue:

Whether or not an obligation is transmissible to an heir by rights of representation of their father who died leaving noproperties behind and before their grandfather?

Held:

The Court held, as to the assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court erred in holding that the properties

inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and

obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property, while it is true that under the provisions of

articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children represents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his

grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations

contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure

referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only

answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in


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representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they

did not inherit anything.

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from the complaint.

3. G.R. No. 171035 August 24, 2009WILLIAM ONG GENATO, Petitioner,vs.

BENJAMIN BAYHON, MELANIE BAYHON, BENJAMIN BAYHON, JR., BRENDA BAYHON, ALINA BAYHON-CAMPOS, IRENEBAYHON-TOLOSA, and the minor GINO BAYHON, as represented herein by his natural mother as guardian-ad-litem,JESUSITA M. BAYHON, Respondents.

Preliminaries: The death of a person does not extinguish his obligation.

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals and Resolution denying the

petitioners motion for reconsideration. This is a consolidated case stemming from two civil cases filed before the Regional

Trial Court for the payment of a debt by the respondent.

Facts:

Respondent Benjamin Bayhon obtained a loan from the petitioner amounting to P1,000,000.00 to be paid monthly with 5%

interest. That respondent executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner to cover the loan which was

conditioned upon the personal assurance of the petitioner that the said instrument is only a private memorandum of

indebtedness and that it would neither be notarized nor enforced according to its tenor. During the proceeding for the

reconstitution of said real estate property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 87 petitioner filed an Answer in Intervention

in the said proceeding and attached a copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering said lot. Respondent assailed the dacion en

pago as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who had died 3 years earlier, had executed it.

In separate case petitioner filed an action for specific performance, before the RTC, Quezon City. In his Complaint, petitioner

alleged that respondent failed to pay the loan and executed on October 21, 1989 a dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner.

The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

Petitioner further averred that despite demands, respondent refused to execute the requisite documents to transfer to him

the ownership of the lot subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner prayed, inter alia, for the court to order the respondent to

execute the final deed of sale and transfer of possession of the said lot.

In the decision of the lower court, it stated that the dacion en pago was novated by the payments made by the respondent

and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was void considering that respondents wife was already dead during the

execution of the deed.

On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the CA held that the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void.

The appellate court ruled that at the time the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were executed, the wife of

respondent Benjamin Bayhon was already dead. Thus, she could not have participated in the execution of the two

documents. The appellate court struck down both the dacion en pago and the real estate mortgage as being simulated or

fictitious contracts pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

During the appeal, respondent Benjamin Bayhon died.

The Court of Appeals held further that while the principal obligation is valid, the death of respondent Benjamin Bayhon

extinguished it. The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left by the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs of the decedent can be ordered to pay the debt left by the deceased?

Held:

The Court held, with regards to the dacion en pago, the Court affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the subject dacionen pago is a simulated or fictitious contract, and hence void. The evidence shows that at the time it was allegedly signed by

the wife of the respondent, his wife was already dead. This finding of fact cannot be reversed.

With regards to the appellate court extinguishing the obligation of respondent, as a general rule, obligations derived from a

contract are transmissible. According to Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their

assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their

nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the

decedent.

The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. While

he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance

may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied.


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The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the obligation to pay the principal loan and

interest contracted by the deceased Benjamin Bayhon subsists against his estate.

C. Transfer either through will or operation of law Art. 774D. Transmissible rights and obligations1. G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents theminors, petitioners,vs.

LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIANTAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra,respondents.

Preliminaries: Transmissibility of rights of a compulsory heir to his heirs.

Facts:

Sometime in March 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano

Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

In August 1975, the defendants filed motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,

therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the

plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the

petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot

be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

Counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the

Rules of Court. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation

praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court

denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for

reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of

the Rules of Court but the same was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not rights are transmissible to his heir upon the death of the decedent?

Held:

The Court held, Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of

the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his

property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by

the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to

the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in themeven before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished by her

death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation

and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their

substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the

causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the

injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is

to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of

the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principallyproperty and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death.

2. G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.

Preliminaries: Transmissibility of rights of acknowledge natural child.

From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance

of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya.


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Facts:

Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899. Paula Conde, as

the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of

November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession and was appointed as administrator for the said

estate. Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came

forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased and filed an

action at the CIF for an intestate proceeding and he be declared the administrator and sole heir of the estate of the deceased

to the exclusion of Paula Conde. Paula Conde in her answer acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that

she considered that her right was superior to his.

The trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court on its decision said that the

administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano

Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance

of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property

of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya.

Not satisfied with the decision of the CIF, defendant filed an appeal on the judgment before the SC alleging that the finding

that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child,

as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles

135 and 137 of the Civil Code is misplaced.

Issue:

Whether or not a right of an acknowledge natural child can be transmitted to his heir even after the death of the natural

father?

Held:

The Court held, basing its decision on Art. 137 which states that, the actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can

be instituted onlyduring the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: 1. If the father or mother died during

the maturity of the child, in which case the lattermay institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its

maturity. 2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in which the

child is expressly acknowledged. In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the discovery of such

instrument.

In the case at bar, the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be

transmitted to his mother or heir.

The judgment appealed from in all its parts was reversed.

3. G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner,vs.

OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent.

Preliminaries:

This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dismissing the case filed by the petitioner representing her

deceased mother who instituted this action for reconveyance of a parcel of lot that action was dismissed upon the death of

the original petitioner.

Facts:

Sometime in October 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a Complaint against her son,

defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages.

Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired

a parcel of land located at Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila, that the said lot was registered in her name and was registered at the

Register of Deeds of Manila, that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by

appellee and the latters wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973, that the said

deed was executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void, that she, with the help of

her husbands relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem, that despite repeated pleas and demands, appellee refused to

reconvey to her the said property and because of this she filed a complaint against appellee before the office of the Barangay

having jurisdiction over the subject property and since the matter was unsettled, the barangay issued a certification to file

action in court, now the subject of controversy.

After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996. Through a Manifestation,

Memoracions counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidencedby a certificate thereof.


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For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs reconveyance action is a personal action

which does not survive a partys death which was then granted without prejudice to the prosecution thereof in the proper

estate proceedings.

Memoracions son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the services of Atty. Neri for the

plaintiff. Simultaneously, Atty. Neri filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. However, the said motion was

subsequently denied. And then he appealed the said decision to the CA but likewise denied the appeal. Hence, this appeal to

the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not an action which affects primarily and principally property and property rights is a transmissible right and

survives the death of the original plaintiff?

Held:

The Court in is decision states that, the criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner as

elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, the question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and

the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally

property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not

survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or

petitioner. In another case, the SC held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one

relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner.

Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner

Memoracion Z. Cruz.

4. G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,vs.

SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.

Preliminaries:

The case is about an action for the annulment of Contract of Sale executed between NHA and Francisca considering that

when the decedent there still exists an unpaid obligation arising from a Contract to Sell of the property in question.

Facts:

The property in question in this case is a real estate property located in San Pedro, Laguna, which was awarded by the then

Land Tenure Administration (LTA) thru a Contract to Sell to Margarita Herrera. Margarita had two children namely Francisca

and Beatriz, who predeceased her and the mother of herein private respondent. The sale transaction between Margarita and

LTA was transferred to DAR and then to NHA. During her later years in life Margarita executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay

stating therein her real estate property, which she is paying continuously, and other property which shall be passed on to her

legal heirs upon her death.

Francisca, on the basis of the said document, executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining

relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late

Margarita Herrera.

Private respondent filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of

Laguna and declared the Deed as null and void.

But during trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with

the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother.

Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.

The NHA granted the application made by Francisca on the basis the Salaysay which the NHA said in its decision that

Margarita waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor of the Francisca. And when

Francisca died the property in question was transferred to her legal heirs.

Private respondent then filed an appeal to the Office of the President on the decision of the NHA but the appeal was denied.

Aggrieved by the decision private respondent filed an appeal in the SC.

Issue:


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Whether or not transmissible rights can be transferred even without probate of a will?

Held:

The Court held that the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed is in the form of will which must follow the requisites of wills and

solemnities. Clearly stated in the document is that rights over the property in question can only be transferred upon the

death of the decedent and does forms part of her estate. Considering that said estate is not yet fully paid, the debt incurred

can be chargeable to her estate in a probate proceeding which the NHA should have done.

Therefore the sale between NHA and Francisca is null and void.

When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document

commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking

buhay" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her

estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of thevalue of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or byoperation of law.

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away.

Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due

course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all

her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed

properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.

Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able

to properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing

Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor

revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are

transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by

operation of law.

E. Succession occurs at the time of death Art 7771. G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA,Jr., defendants-appellants.

Preliminaries:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of

Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion,

Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan.

Facts:

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation.

Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died

in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession

and enjoyment.

In her defense, defendant claims that petitioner lost her property rights over the land in dispute when she and her husband

executed in public document, during their separation, relinquishing her of her rights over the land in dispute.

Issue:

Whether or not a written agreement between husband and wife conditioned upon their separation can relinquish ones

property rights?

Held:

The Court held, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the timepassed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs


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4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley.

5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or otherwise disposed of for a period

of ten (10) years after my death, and that the same be handled and managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof

to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and

that he be directed that the same be used only for the education of my brother's children and their descendants.

6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be given to the above mentioned Matthew Hanley to be

disposed of in the way he thinks most advantageous.

8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a

son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.

Plaintiff alleged that the imposition of tax on the estate of the decedent should only be after 10 years as when the real

property of the decedent had been transferred ownership to the assigned heir as stipulated in his will.

Issue:

Whether or not the property of the deceased ancestor is immediately succeeded by the heirs?

Held:

The Court held, according to article 657 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the

moment of his death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ". . . the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the

deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the

ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death."

The tax therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death.

The authentication of a will implies its due execution but once probated and allowed the transmission is effective as of the

death of the testator in accordance with article 657 of the Civil Code. Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of

the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedent's death.

4. G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA,and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA,ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.

Facts:

Sometine in May 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties

located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom hemarried on July 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.

Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour, Teodora Riofero, petitioner, and

their three children as co-petitioner.

Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed

an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the

decedent located in Dagupan City and was able to register them in the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City. Respondents also

found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing

a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.

On December 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before theRegional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr.

be issued to him.

Petitioners filed theirAnswerto the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested

deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that

the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his

name. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the

Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator is theissue in this case?


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Held:

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the

estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession

are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that

the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death

to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has

not yet been appointed.

The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the

deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which anadministrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedingsfor the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances,the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator

appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do

nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

case digests in succession - i. general provisions

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