SIBAL v. VALDEZG.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927Johnson,J.Doctrine:A crop raised on leased premises belongs to the lessee and in no sense forms part of the immovable.Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase personal property should be understood to include ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence. A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.Facts:Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property hence not subject to redemption.Issue:1. Whether or not the sugar cane is to be classified as personal property2. Whether or not future crops to be harvested can be considered a valid object of saleHeld:1. No. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment creditors.Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase personal property should be understood to include ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.2. Yes. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and then title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence (Emerson vs. European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387; Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep., 63.).A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.

Mananzala vs Court of AppealsGR 115101, March 2, 1998Facts: Petitioner Fidela Mananzala owned a parcel of land located in Quezon City, and in actual possession of the land since 1955 by virtue of a conditional sale made in herfavor by the PHHC, now NHA. 1960, however, the PHHC awarded the land to Nestorand Elisea Mercado. Petitioner contested the award in court. She claimed precedence not only in actual occupation of the land but also in application for its purchase. Her right to the land was upheld the courts. In 1984, petitioner paid in full the price of the land. The NHA therefore executed a deed of sale in her favor on January 14, 1985.Private respondent Corazon Aranez brought an action for specific performance against petitioner to enforce a alleged deed of sale covering the same lot in 1960. The contract stipulated that title to the land shall be transferred to private respondent within 30 days after full payment of the purchase price by petitioner to the PHHC.Private respondent alleged that petitioner refused, despite repeated demands made by her, to comply with the stipulation in their contract. Petitioner denied selling the land to private respondent. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Although finding petitioner's signature on the deed to be genuine, it nevertheless ruled that there was no perfected contract of sale because petitioner never really intended to sell the land. Furthermore, the trial court also found the alleged contract to be null and void because, at the time of the sale, petitionerwas not yet the owner thereof.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the signature ofthe petitioner on the deed of sale which the NBI found to be genuine. The notarization ofthe deed gave rise to the presumption of its regularity.The Court of Appeals further held that petitioner could validly sell the land even before the actual award to her pursuant toArt. 1461 of the Civil Code, which provides that things having a potential existence maybe the object of a contract of sale.Issue: Whether or not the contract between petitioner and private respondent is validand bindingHeld: Yes.The SC affirmed the CAs decisionThe petitioner's contention that the sale to private respondent is void because it was made within one year after the title to the property was issued in the name of petitioner, while raised by petitioner in her answer in the trial court, was not passed upon and she did not urge it anymore except now. As already noted, the trial court based its decision on its finding that the sale was void on the ground that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties. When its decision was appealed, petitioner did not urge her original defenses to uphold the decision in herfavor. She merely relied on the ruling of the trial court.The appellate court, in reversing the trial court, simply considered the issues raised by the trial court's decision, namely, whether petitioner's signature on the deed was a forgery, whether there was a meeting of the minds of the parties, and whether there could be a sale of future property. The question whether the sale was void because it was made within the one-year period ofprohibition to petitioner as awardee was never briefed or in any way argued below. Forall intents and purposes, therefore, petitioner waived this ground and cannot now urge itas ground for reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Heirs of Severina San Miguel vs CA In 1974, Respondent, Dominador San Miguel, filed a petition with the CFI to issue title over lots in dispute which was a parcel of land originally claimed by Severina San Miguel August 22, 1978, Severina filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for review of the decision alleging that the land registration proceedings were fraudulently concealed by Dominador from her. The registration procceddings by Dominador San Miguel was declared null and void upon petition of Severina San Miguel who was succeeded by her heirs. In 1987, the TCT for the land was issued in the names of petitioner. From 1990-1991, several writs of possession were returned unsatisfied. (For the land to be transferred in the name of Severinas heirs.) To solve this problem, the heirs of Severina did not pursue the writs of possession and demolition, and instead entered into a compromise with Dominador. According to the compromise, the heirs were to sell the land for P1.5M with the TCT conditioned upon the purchase of another lot, which was not yet titled, at an additional sum of P300K. It was agreed that the 300K shall be fulfilled by Dominado 2 months from the date of the execution of sale, which is August 1993. 3 months after, Dominador filed a complaint with the trial court a motion to deliver the owners copy of TCT, and admitted that he did not pay the P300K for the reason that the petitioner failed to adduced proof of ownership. In time, petitioners opposed stressing the condition in the compromise agreement. Since Dominador, et al. have not paid the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00), then they were justified in withholding release of the certificate of title. Ruling of RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. The respondent vendors are ordered to surrender to the petitioners vendees.Ruling of CA: The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the appeal, and affirming the decision of the trial court.Issue of this Case: Whether or not respondent shall be compelled to pay the P300K despite the petitioners lack of evidence of ownership. Ruling of SC: SC held in the negative. The respondent cannot be compelled to pay the P300k deposit. Severinas heirs anchor their claim on thecompromise agreement, stressing on their freedom to stipulate and the binding effect of contracts.This argument is misplaced.The Civil Codeprovides:Under Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract.Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. True, in contracts of sale, the vendor need not possess title to the thing sold at the perfection of the contract.However, the vendor must possess title and must be able to transfer title at the time of delivery.In a contract of sale, title only passes to the vendee upon full payment of the stipulated consideration, or upon delivery of the thing sold.

In relation to the case: Under the facts of the case, Severinas heirs are not in a position to transfer title.Without passing on the question of who actually owned the land, SC noted that there is no proof of ownership in favor of Severinas heirs. In fact, it is a certain Emiliano Eugenio, who holds a tax declaration over the said land in his name. Though tax declarations do not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land. To insist that Dominador pay the price of the untitled lot, would result in Severinas Heirs unjust enrichment. The essence of a sale is the transfer of title or an agreement to transfer it for a price actually paid or promise. If the sellers cant deliver the object of the sale to the buyer, such contract may be deemed inoperative. Severinas heirs insist that delivery of the certificate of title is predicated on a condition - payment of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to cover the sale of.SC said that it is not meritorious. Article 1183 also provides that: Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible, that part thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid.

Hence, the non-payment of the P300k is not a valid justification for refusal to deliver the certificate of title. Besides, it was noted that the certificate of title covering the land in question were fully paid for by Dominador, et al.Therefore, Severinas heirs are bound to deliver the certificate of title covering the lots.

CONCHITA NOOL and GAUDENCIO ALMOJERAvs.CAGR No. 116635July 24, 1997

Facts:One lot formerly owned by Victorio Nool has an area of 1 hectare. Another lot previously owned by Francisco Nool has an area of 3.0880 hectares. Spouses (plaintiffs)Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera alleged that they are the owners of the subject lands. They are in dire need of money, they obtained a loan DBP , secured by a real estate mortgage on said parcels of land, which were still registered in the names of Victorino and Francisco Nool, at the time, Since the plaintiffs failed to pay the said loan, the mortgage was foreclosed; that within the period of redemption, the plaintiffs contacted Anacleto Nool for the latter to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP, which the latter did; and as a result, the titles of the 2 parcels of land in question were transferred to Anacleto; that as part of their arrangement or understanding, Anacleto agreed to buy from Conchita the 2 parcels of land , for a total price of P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which price was paid to Conchita, and upon payment of the balance of P14,000.00, the plaintiffs were to regain possession of the 2 hectares of land, which amounts spouses Anacleto Nool and Emilia Nebre failed to pay.Anacleto Nool signed the private writing, agreeing to return subject lands when plaintiffs have the money to redeem the same; defendant Anacleto having been made to believe, then, that his sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem the said properties.Issue:Is the purchase of the subject lands to Anacleto valid?Held:Nono dat quod non habet, No one can give what he does not have; Contract of repurchase inoperative thus void.

Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches us that a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer. No one can give what he does not have nono dat quod non habet. In the present case, there is no allegation at all that petitioners were authorized by DBP to sell the property to the private respondents. Further, the contract of repurchase that the parties entered into presupposes that petitioners could repurchase the property that they sold to private respondents. As petitioners sold nothing, it follows that they can also repurchase nothing. In this light, the contract of repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void.

QUIJADA VS. CA- Resolutory Condition in Donations

When a person donates land to another on a condition. The condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.

FACTS:Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad Quijada. Trinidad and her siblings executed a deed of donation of a two-hectare lot in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon (Agusan del Sur), exclusively for the purpose of constructing the proposed provincial high school. However, possession remained with Trinidad. She subsequently sold the two hectares on two separate occasions to Regalado Mondejar, who sold it to different persons. Eventually, the Municipality, failing to construct the high school, reverted ownership to the donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession and ownership. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE:Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive condition or a resolutory conditionWhether the sale was valid

RULING:When the donation was accepted, the ownership was transferred to the school, only subject to a condition that a school must be constructed over the lot. Since ownership was transferred, and failure to fulfill the condition reverts the ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.

(Not really a discussion in Property) When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to Mondejar, she was not the owner of the land. Petitioners also did not sleep on their rights to recover the possession and ownership over the property since they immediately filed the action when the municipality passed the resolution, reverting the ownership of land to the donors. However, a sale being a consensual contract, it can be perfected upon meeting of the minds, and completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of sale. Even when Trinidad was not the owner when the sale was perfected, tradition through delivery is only important upon the consummation stage. Such transfer of ownership through actual or constructive delivery only happened when the lands reverted back to petitioners. Art 1434 is applicable, stating that seller's "title passes by operation if law to the buyer," and therefore making the sale valid. The donated lots cannot be considered outside the commerce of man, since nowhere in the law states that properties owned by municipality would be as such.

Bagnas v. CAFacts:Hilario Mateum died on March 11, 1964, single, without ascendants or descendants, and survived only by petitioners who are his collateral relatives. He left no will, no debts, and an estate consisting of 29 parcels of land in Kawit and Imus, 10 of which are involved in this controversy. On April 3, 1964, respondents who are also collateral relatives of the deceased, but more remote, registered 2 deeds of sale purportedly executed by Mateum in their favor. The considerations were P1.00 and services rendered, being rendered, and to be rendered for my benefit. On the strength of the deeds, respondents were able to secure title over the 10 parcels of land. On May 22, 1964, petitioners commenced a suit against respondents, seeking annulment of the deeds of sale a fictitious, fraudulent or falsified or, alternatively, as donations void for want of acceptance in public instrument. Respondents contend that the sales were made for valuable considerations, and attacked the legal standing of the petitioners as being mere collateral heirs.Issues:(1) Whether petitioners have the legal standing to sue

(2) Whether the sale is void for want of considerationHeld:

(1) The law as it is now no longer deems contracts with a false cause, or which are absolutely simulated or fictitious, merely voidable, but declares them void, i.e., inexistent ("nulo") unless it is shown that they are supported by another true and lawful cause or consideration. A logical consequence of that change is the juridical status of contracts without, or with a false, cause is that conveyances of property affected with such a vice cannot operate to divest and transfer ownership, even if unimpugned. If afterwards the transferor dies the property descends to his heirs, and without regard to the manner in which they are called to the succession, said heirs may bring an action to recover the property from the purported transferee. As pointed out, such an action is not founded on fraud, but on the premise that the property never leaves the estate of the transferor and is transmitted upon his death to heirs, who would labor under no incapacity to maintain the action from the mere fact that they may be only collateral relatives and bound neither principally or subsidiarily under the deed or contract of conveyance.

(2) Upon the consideration alone that the apparent gross, not to say enormous, disproportion between the stipulated price (in each deed) of P l.00 plus unspecified and unquantified services and the undisputably valuable real estate allegedly sold worth at least P10,500.00 going only by assessments for tax purposes which, it is well-known, are notoriously low indicators of actual value plainly and unquestionably demonstrates that they state a false and fictitious consideration, and no other true and lawful cause having been shown, the Court finds both said deeds, insofar as they purport to be sales, not merely voidable, but voidab initio.Neither can the validity of said conveyances be defended on the theory that their truecausais the liberality of the transferor and they may be considered in reality donationsbecause the law also prescribes that donations of immovable property, to be valid, must be madeand acceptedin a public instrument, and it is not denied by the respondents that there has been no such acceptance which they claim is not required. The transfers in question being void, it follows as a necessary consequence and conformably to the concurring opinion inArmentia,with which the Court fully agrees, that the properties purportedly conveyed remained part of the estate of Hilario Mateum, said transfers notwithstanding, recoverable by his intestate heirs, the petitioners herein, whose status as such is not challenged.

Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

Facts:Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate onJune 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate.According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:Whether or not the sale was void

Ruling:No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donatin, or some other act or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.