case studies -israel

8/13/2019 Case Studies -Israel

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The Role of Politics in Regional Inequality: The Israeli CaseAuthor(s): Yehuda GradusSource: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp.388-403Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of American GeographersStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2562728 .

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The Role of Politics in RegionalInequality: The Israeli CaseYehuda Gradus

Department of Geography and Institute or Desert Research, Ben-Gurion University f theNegev, Beer-Sheva, Israel 84105

Abstract. Most studies of spatial disparities deal with conventional measurable socioeconomicvariables. Political aspects have been neglected in explaining regional inequalities. The purposeof the present Israeli case study is to demonstrate empirically that a prerequisite for effectivestudies of regional inequality s a clear understanding of the political structure. srael, with tshighly entralized unitary olitical system, ried to execute a national policy of balanced regionaldevelopment but failed to realize that spatial integration s a process of diffusing olitical powers

as well as allocating socioeconomic resources. It is argued that if tensions caused by spatialdisparities are to be reduced, a new political organization must develop out of a synthesisbetween the old nonspatial, functional organization of politics and the new desire of a post-statehood generation for more participation on a territorial asis.

Key Words: core-periphery, ecentralization, development geography, ethnicity, srael, politicalgeography, regional development, regional inequality, egional representation, erritorial olitics.

RECENT research has drawn attention touneven regional development and spatial

disparities (Coates, Johnston, and Knox 1977;Smith 1979; Fuchs and Demko 1979; Enders1980). Most of these studies focus on con-ventional socioeconomic variables such asincome, employment, health, housing, edu-cation, growth, and migration, but they ne-glect political explanations and analyses ofspatial organization of political power.Studies of power relations in space and theirimpact on regional development have beenprimarily theoretical, with almost no verifica-tion through empirical case studies. Empiri-cal social scientists have given only limitedserious consideration to the spatial organiza-tion of power perhaps in part because politi-cal variables are often difficult to measure.Sharpe, a political scientist, states, for ex-ample, that analysis of the spatial variationof power in his discipline has been treated as"an aberration that would not have occurred'but for the accident of geography,' almost asif all politics could exist on the head of apin" (Sharpe 1979, 18)

The emerging field of political geography

Annals f the Association f American eographers, 3(3), 1983, pp. 388-403? Copyright 983 byAssociation f American eographers

recently has concentrated on electoral geog-raphy and voting behavior (e.g., Minghi andRumley 1978; Taylor and Johnston 1979);Chisholm 1974; Honey 1976; Gudgin andTaylor 1979; O'Loughlin 1982; Johnston1982). However, the political aspect of re-gional development and power relations inspace have been neglected in explaining re-gional inequalities.

Studies of regional inequalities in Israelhave tended to follow the same trend; theyhave adopted a quantitative positivist ap-proach, emphasizing economic and socialfactors while putting little emphasis on therole of political organization of space on re-gional development. It is especially surprisingin the Israeli case, where politics play amajor role in public policy making and na-tional planning is critically shaped by its po-litical environment.

Regional development policies in Israelhave failed to achieve their goals of balanceddevelopment. Studies conducted to date haveindicated a consistently widening gap be-tween the center and the development re-gions on the territorial periphery, despite de-

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Politics in Regional Inequality 391

peripheral regions, but average wages on theperiphery have been lower than those paid inthe center. Because of limited opportunitiesin these industries, skilled workers often mi-

grate to the center. This spatial division oflabor and "deskilling" of the periphery inhib-its the emergence of a more diversified socialstructure, which should be an important re-gional development policy goal.

Interregional migration between the periph-ery and the center, which usually reflectssocial and economic inequalities, was in-vestigated by Shachar and Lipshitz (1980),who were seeking a better understanding ofgovernmental population-dispersal policies.

They emphasized the impact of the highnegative migration balance on the periph-eral regions and the need for increasingthe attractiveness of these areas for potentialmigrants from the core.

Territorial budget allocation is a major con-sideration in many regional inequalitystudies. Any attempt to regionalize the na-tional budget may cause political controversyby making explicit previously ignored spatialimbalances in the distribution of resources.

Reichman (1973) and Reichman and Hasson(1976) raised this issue in their studies of theallocation of Israel's national budget. On thebasis of the limited data available, the authorsbelieved that several governmental depart-ments, specifically those handling welfareand social matters, displayed a regional biasagainst peripheral regions in the allocation offunds. The authors proposed that the budgetbe allocated not only by sectors, but also byregion, to insure a better and more efficientimplementation of the national policy of re-gional development.

Hasson (1981) adopted a radical perspec-tive on uneven development in Israel. Ac-cording to his analysis, the socioeconomicdisparities among Israeli social classes havebeen translated into core-periphery an-tagonisms. Geographically, these social con-flicts exist at all levels-national, regional,and intraurban. Hasson's analysis is the onlystudy that refers, though briefly, to spatio-political disparities in Israel.

Most of these authors focused upon thedistribution of socioeconomic activities. Theyfailed to realize that the process of regionaldevelopment and spatial integration is politi-cal as well. Regional development should not

refer only to changes in a region's socioeco-nomic structure; it should be concerned alsowith political issues, such as representationand participation in decision making regard-

ing regional matters. Socioeconomic policiescannot be separated either from the institu-tions that generate them or from the instru-ments of their implementation. As Freidmann(1973) states, "the system of territorial powerhas a direct bearing on the spatial integrationof the nation. It will determine the direc-tionality of basic control processes betweencore and peripheral regions and, in this way,influence the flow and composition of in-vestment, the diffusion of innovation, and the

volume and direction of migration. For thesereasons, it must be regarded as a major vari-able in the formulation of a national policy"(Friedmann 1973, 180).

The Political Organization of Space

An analysis of the political organization ofspace should take place within the broadercontext of the history, politics, and organiza-

tion of the country as a whole. Israel providesthe opportunity to examine two related pro-cesses: (1) the emergence of a powerful cen-tral government lacking almost any spatialorganizational dimension, combined with thecreation of a social/ethnic periphery thatlacks representation in the center, and (2) theupsurge of regional and ethnic conscious-ness among the peripheral populations inpermanent conflict with central domination.Together, these processes cause continuousprotest and growing discontent in the strug-gle to gain access to political power.-

Historical Background

The founders of the State of Israel createdand institutionalized a highly centralized,unitary political system lacking any spatialdimension (Horowitz and Lissak 1977). In hisimportant historical analysis, Elazar (1977,1978) explained the basic reasons for thiscentralization. "The pre-state Israeli founderswere for the most part socialists imbued with19th century socialist ideologies as thesewere expressed in the circles of central andEastern Europe. Because of this, the social



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and political organizations were oriented to-ward a cooperative, rather than an indi-vidualistic model" (Elazar 1977, 48). They im-ported from Europe what they believed to be

the most distinctive ideas and institutionsfrom their homelands and with appropriateadaptations transplanted them to their newland as part of their effort o build a new andbetter ociety. It causes the development of a"bureaucratic political culture which im-plicitly ccepts the concept of a reified tateexisting independently of its citizens andwhich views political organization as essen-tially centralized, hierarchical, and bureau-cratic in character." (Elazar 1977, 48).

The lack of a territorial imension in poli-tics is explained by the fact that "Jewishcommunities all over the world and in thepre-state period were organized on ideologi-cal lines. The constituent units were not ter-ritorially ased, but consisted of transterrito-rial parties or 'movements' that functioned asall-encompassing civil societies, providingtheir members with virtually ll the domesticand local services normally provided by gov-ernments" (Elazar 1978, 4). Party ontrol was

so stro ng that the post-1 48 imm grants, fromdeveloping countries, who tripled the popu-lation of the state, were settled, employed,educated, and politically absorbed on thebasis of the "party key" through which therelative strength of the various parties wasmaintained. Parties in Israel retain control ofsports, health nsurance, medical facilities nd,to some extent, banking. It would be difficultto find a voluntary ssociation in Israel todaynot supported by state funds, obtainedthrough the good offices of a political party(Marx 1975). Even Landsmanshaften (immi-grant ssociations), often organized for ocialactivities, are allied with political parties(Eisenstadt 1954).

The Political System

The central government, made up of a co-alition of parties, determines the degree ofpower it will delegate to various local bodies.Policy decisions are made at the center andimplemented by local authorities that haveonly marginal discretionary powers. The cen-tral government maintains control over poli-tics at the lower levels mainly by budgetary

control. It assesses and collects taxes andreallocates them to local authorities. Thispractice, of course, affords central govern-ment considerable leverage in its efforts o

dominate local politics. Government depart-ments sometimes view local bodies very muchas administrative rms of the central govern-ment. Israel emerges as the country with thestrongest governmental involvement in thedetailed operation of the economy among allWestern-type democratic states (Akzin andDror 1966). Political activity-actions directedat shaping government decisions and publicpolicy-is therefore dominant characteristicof economic activity. Atradition f localism is

absent. Following independence in 1948, Is-rael maintained only the centralized govern-ment system inherited from he British man-date (1917-48), discarding an already highlydeveloped regional governmental system(Sheffer 1978).

The external threat to the existence of thestate was often used as justification tolegitimize the highly centralized system. Thisjustification was reinforced by the small sizeof Israel's territory s well as the necessity to

integrate the various ethnic groups.The center-down system gave governmen-tal offices and party headquarters tight con-trol over local affairs, particularly n the newtowns established on the periphery mmedi-ately after the mass immigration period(1951-55). These towns were established inunpopulated isolated frontier reas in accor-dance with the national policy of populationdispersal. The population of the new townsconsisted of new immigrants, mainly from de-

veloping countries of the Middle East andNorth Africa. Often called Orientals, Sephar-dis, or Eastern Jews, these settlers for themost part lacked professional training, nde-pendent resources, or access to politicalpower. The relatively homogenous socioeco-nomic and ethnic areas thus created on theperiphery f the state were entirely ependentupon the central government for almost ev-erything hey needed, including the provisionof housing, employment, health, education,and other public services. During the first wodecades of statehood, govern mental institu-tions in these towns were managed mainly byveteran European Jews (often called Ash-kenazim), who had migrated during the pre-state period. Some were members of agri-



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394 Gradus

distribution of political power among thecountry's regions. In particular, the study fo-cuses upon the spatial distribution of Knessetmembers (MKs), the supreme power in Israeli

political life, in order to determine how wellvarious areas of the country are representedin its legislature and to examine the relation-ship between regional inequalities of politicalpower and regional socioeconomic dispari-ties. Membership in the Knesset is used as themeasure of political power because it is a rep-resentational variable that can be conve-niently measured.4 A complete picture of thedispersion of political power would requireconsideration of the politicians in the party

machines, the senior bureaucrats in the gov-ernment ministries and labor unions, andmany other decision makers in the majoreconomic and political groups of Israeli soci-ety. Nevertheless, it is assumed that to a greatextent, this important variable reflects thecentralization pattern and the tendencies ofthe spatial organization of power.

The level of representation of the variousparts of the country in the legislature can beindicated by the ratio of the number of MKs

who reside in a region to the number of rep-resentatives expected on the basis of that re-gion's electoral strength.5 Fifteen study units6are used to examine the extent of regionalrepresentation (see Figure 1). The analysisdeals with the period 1961-1981, or the Fifththrough the Tenth Knesset. The populationdistribution and the basic party alignmentscrystalized and stabilized only at the be-ginning of the 1960s, thus the choice of thisperiod. In the 1950s, the distribution of

population was still undergoing a process ofcontinual change. The peripheral regions, inparticular the south, were first characterizedby sparse populations, but these later ab-sorbed a large portion of the mass-immigra-tion waves.

Table 1 presents the average level of repre-sentation in the Knesset of the various areasof the country during the study period. Therepresentation index is determined by divid-ing the expected number of representatives ina region by the number of MKs living in thatregion. A representation index of less thanunity indicates underrepresentation; a valuegreater than unity indicates overrepresenta-tion. The indices in Table 1 suggest that re-gional representation in Israel is conspicu-

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ously uneven, with Jerusalem, el-Aviv, ndYizreel being overrepresented nd other re-gions underrepresented. nly Ramat-Gan,with ts 11 seats, is represented ccordingto its electoral strength.

The overrepresentation of the Yizreel ruralregion is undoubtedly the result of historical



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Table 1. Regional Representation in the Knesset(Average for 1961 -1981)

Index ofRegion Expected Observed Representation

Jerusalem 10 23 2.3Tel-Aviv 23 42 1.9Yizreel 6 8 1.3Ramat-Gan 11 11 1.0Sharon 5 4 0.7Safed-Kinneret 4 2 0.6Akko 6 3 0.5Rehovot 6 3 0.5Haifa 16 8 0.5Beer-Sheva 6 3 0.5Ramle 3 2 0.4Holon 7 3 0.4Petah-Tiqva 8 3 0.4Hadera 4 2 0.4Ashqelon 5 2 0.3

Total Seats 120 120

Source: ISRAEL CentralBureau of Statistics, arious publications f population y subdistrict; nd results f theKnesset lections 965-1981.

and ideological factors, an expression of theextension of the elite center of the longtimedominating labor parties in the kibbutzim.The Yizreel Valley was the first and largest

area settled with kibbutzim of the Labor-Zionist movement, and until recently that waswhere the political power centers of this sec-tor were found. On average, one-third of theMKs in the period 1961-1981 resided in Tel-Aviv, and more than one-sixth lived inJerusalem. Thus Jerusalem had a representa-tion of more than twice its electoral strength,and Tel-Aviv had a representation of almostdouble its electoral strength (Table 1).

Are interregional disparities in Knesset rep-

resentation decreasing or growing? Theindex R has been used to examine this trend.7This index can vary between 0 and 100: 100indicates full regional equality in Knesset rep-resentation, and as the coefficient declinesfrom 100 the regional inequality increases.

It is evident from Table 2 that regional in-equality in Knesset representation increasedduring the 1960s and 1970s, although the rateof increase slowed in the 1970s. The policy ofpopulation dispersal led to a significant dropin the relative voting strength of the centralregions and a rise in that of the peripheralregions. For example, the relative electoralstrength of the Tel-Aviv region declined from28 seats in 1961 to 17 seats in 1981. Theelectoral power of the southern periphery

(Beer-Sheva and Ashquelon regions) rosecorrespondingly from 8 seats to 14. Despitethis change, there was no significant de-crease in the number of MKs recruited from

the center, and the increase in the number ofrepresentatives from the southern peripherydoes not correspond to the significant growthin the electoral power of this area. It is tooearly to conclude whether the slight im-provement of regional representation in themost recent election (1981) is the beginningof a new trend toward more equal repre-sentation.

The continued decline of the socialist laborparties and the rise of the Likud parties of thecenter right s a major reason for he decreasein peripheral representation. A relativelygreater portion of the representatives of theLabor bloc come from development towns onthe periphery. Conversely, to a large extent,representatives of the Likud center-rightcapitalistic bloc are from the big cities.8 Re-cruitment of Knesset candidates has beenbased mainly on ideological and interest-group considerations identified y the central

Table 2. Trends in Regional Inequality ofMKRepresentation: 1961-1981

Year 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981R 75 74 68 68 66 67



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party leadership9 (Czudnowski 1977). Manypeople are alienated by the lack of territorialconsideration. Nothing is more frustratingthan being rendered powerless by the very

ones who claim their power by virtue of beingyour representatives.The ability of representatives to get benefits

for their constituencies is well illustrated inthe literature (Johnston 1979). Rewardingconstituents for their past or expected votes,widely known as "pork barrel" politics, ispracticed in many countries. Even limited re-gional representation may sometimes holdthe balance of power, which, in the bargain-ing process, enables profit and resources to

be attracted to their regions. The underrepre-sentation of peripheral regions makes porkbarreling less likely in Israel and contributesto the widening gap between the core and theperiphery.

Ethnic Upsurgence and Regionalism

For a while the periphery was passive andsubject to central control and manipulation

without receiving any transfer of power. Agradual awakening has emerged, however,from a sense of frustration, powerlessness,and lack of influence. In the early 1960s pres-sure mounted for greater autonomy, alongwith demands for greater access to politicalpower. This authority/dependency conflictwas aggravated by the ethnic and cultural dif-ferences between the prestate core group ofEuropean origin and the post-state non-European groups on the national periphery.

In a Western-style state system such as Is-rael's, gaining access to political power is adifficult task for those on the newly formedperiphery. To facilitate efficient and effectivepolitical decisions in a modern state, politicalcentralization is thought to be inevitable (Tar-row 1978; Hilhorst 1980). A periphery can de-fend its political autonomy only so long as itsucceeds in preserving its political institu-tions; however, Israel's founders never estab-lished powerful local or regional politicalinstitutions. The few local and regional institu-tions that do exist in Israel are virtually pow-erless. The budgets of most municipalities areallocated by the center, and the functionalbranches of the central government aresometimes much more powerful within the

municipal boundaries than are the mayorsand their councils. The six regional districtsand the fourteen subdistricts exist mainly forstatistical purposes and have minor opera-

tional functions; these units, too, are func-tionally controlled by the center through theMinistry of the Interior.

Israel's centralized system has weakenedthe ties of the core with the grassroots in theperiphery. The territorial dispersion of manyoriental immigrants into peripheral com-munities helped create a sense of ethnicperipheral solidarity against the central,European-origin core.

The protest against outside domination and

central-party patronage was expressed in avariety of ways during the 1960s. A process ofsubstituting the outside functionaries withlocal leaders started gradually, with some de-gree of success. Local leaders assumedmediating roles between the powerful centerand the local communities. In some cases,new local ethnic parties, unattached to thecentralized national parties, won municipalelections (Lissak 1969). During the 1970s themajority of the electorate in the new towns on

the periphery shifted their support from theLabor Party to the opposition right-wingLikud Party (see Table 3). This was anothermethod of protest and rebellion against thelongtime dominant Labor Party. Likud, nowin power, has, despite its non-Socialist orienta-tion, increasingly become the party of the so-cially disaffected oriental inhabitants of theperiphery. Five years of Labor opposition(since 1977) have failed to wipe out thatparty's "establishment" image in the eyes of

the post-state, non-European Jewish popula-tion. In the 1981 election the massive supportfor the Likud Party and the anti-Labor senti-ment among these peripheral segmentsreinforced this protest. Citizens of theperiphery still bear a terrible grudge againstthe once-reigning Labor establishment forhaving "dumped" them in remote isolatedtowns far from the center, and for long yearsof "benign neglect."

There are those in Israel who distinguishbetween "the government" and "the estab-lishment." Even though the Labor Party is nolonger the government, it is still perceived bymany as the establishment because it ownsand controls, mainly through the labor unionsand the kibbutz movement, a large portion of



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Table 3. Shift of Voters to the Likud Parties in Towns on the Periphery, 965-1981

Northern Percentage Oriental, Percentage Vote for Likud to the Knesset Elections

Periphery Towns Average 1970-80 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981

Afula 68 19 25 30 44 54Akko 78 19 22 29 40 48Bet-shean 92 12 18 30 46 57Hazor 95 24 17 34 46 57Karmiel 45 16 32 42 44Maalot 91 6 18 19 28 41Migdal Haemeq 78 26 30 33 45 49Nazareth Illit 42 9 17 24 37 40Qiryat-shemona 85 19 20 27 45 57Shelomi 96 9 12 19 34 49Tiberias 87 20 24 43 45 56Zefat 72 28 28 30 42 51

SouthernPeriphery ownsArad 33 15 22 32 40 41Beer-sheva 70 20 22 32 43 49Dimona 88 15 19 29 44 61Mizpe-ramon 81 9 21 30 27 47Eilat 70 28 29 39 54 53Netivot 96 13 17 21 38 43Ofaqim 94 13 16 24 38 43Qiryat-gat 78 17 19 38 47 49Sederot 88 9 16 15 37 42Yeroham 93 7 14 24 43 57

National 55 22 23 30 33 38

Source: srael Central ureau f Statistics, arious ublications f he demographic haracteristics f he population;and results f the Knesset lections.

Israel's agricultural and manufacturing in-dustries, as well as important public servicessuch as health. This multiple control isprimarily n the hands of the Ashkenzim, orJews of European origin.

The irony n this situation is that the Likudtends to represent mainly he interests of themiddle and upper classes. It is a coalitionformed from nationalists and representativesof the bourgeoisie, representing Israeli pri-vate landowners and industrialists. Theirleadership in the Knesset is mainly of Euro-pean origin and resides in the center. In con-trast, the Labor Party's ideology defends theinterests of the working and lower-middleclasses and gives the periphery more repre-sentation in the Knesset. It made little differ-ence that in the Tenth Knesset a third ofLabor's 47 newly elected MKs and only 10percent of Likud's 48 were Orientals. Labor'sOrientals were seen as being co-opted by theestablishment (Peretz and Smooha 1981).

The regional problem s strongly ssociated

with the European/non-European conflictwithin Israeli Jewish society. There is a closelink between ethnicity and class, which has ageographical and political expression as well.Some people even refer to the ethnic re-surgence as the "Oriental Revolt." Intensifi-cation of regionalism is evident by an impres-sive growth of local newspapers to the pointof serious competition with the nationalpress. The mass media system is national andcentrally controlled, and for many years it wastotally oblivious to events in the periphery. Itcovered primarily international and nationalevents, while the periphery was rarely givenregular coverage. Regionalism has acceler-ated the growth of regional newspapers. It is agrass-roots phenomenon developing to fillthe social, economic, and political needs of aregion (Caspi 1980). All Israeli radio and tele-vision are controlled from the center and, todate, government has blocked all attempts forestablishment of private regional stations.

Another expression of regionalism is the



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increasing number of questions being ad-dressed to ministers n the Knesset on localand regional issues, mainly by MKs residingin the towns on the periphery (Lavi 1978).

Even though they do not represent regions ina formal sense, they tend to represent thegrowing problems of the periphery. Someeven open offices in the towns to deal withthe growing demand for regional representa-tion in the center. Apparently, hese MKs areseeking broader political support in their ownparty by expressing their sensitivity nd loy-alty to the areas in which they ive.

The mounting pressure and the increasingrecognition of the need to change the exist-

ing centralized system has brought paltry re-sults. The party-list lectoral system for thelocal municipal elections was modified in1978 to provide for the direct election ofmayors independent of their city councils.The contest in these elections has been basedmainly on local issues and personalitiesrather than on party ideology or nationalproblems. Mayors are the only independentlyelected officials n Israel. This departure rep-resents a step toward more decentralization.On the national and regional levels, however,the political system is barely responding tothe mounting pressure.

Another factor contributing to the emer-gence of regionalism may be the political andideological disputes over Israel's futureboundaries and questions concerning theallocation of resources to the various regions,including the controversial new settlementsin the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. How-ever, this hypothesis should be tested withmore empirical evidence.

Elazar (1977, 1978) explains the emergenceof regionalism as a consequence of the clashbetween the original ideological, functional,and centralized basis of Israeli civil societyand the new demands of a post-statehoodgeneration for more decentralization and citi-zen participation n decisions. Although he isnot referring o the ethnic upsurgence, he be-lieves that Israel is moving from an ideologi-cal to a territorial emocracy. The degree ofcommitment o ideologies of the pre-state pe-riod has decreased, while the importance ofterritorial units as the basis for organizingpower has increased. So far, however, here hasbeen almost no major response from hecentralcore to this major shift n Israeli society.

Development From Above in aFragmented Periphery

Regionaldevelopment nd planning n Is-

rael is a direct reflection f the political r-ganization f the country s a whole and isstructured o fulfill hecentralized ims. n heexisting unctional op-down egional devel-opment approach, therefore, nteractionamong the various planning ctivities n aregional evel is limited nd uncoordinated.Each ministry oncerned with regional de-velopment as set up its own district or de-velopment. very gency determines ts ownscale of priorities nd distributes ts budgets

and human resources among the develop-ment operations accordingly. Because thefunctional ecision makers n the core areremote rom he peripheral egions, he deci-sions reached are often unrealistic r irrele-vant o the problems nvolved.

The inability f the central government odeal with ocal and regional ssues has beenespecially prominent n the huge military e-deployment n the Negev, which s a result fthe peace treaty with Egypt. he absence ofregional dministrative nd political nstitu-tions has prevented n effective se of thispotentially valuable redeployment for re-vitalizing he region's depressed owns. n hisannual report 1981), he State Comptroller fIsraelpointed ut that ery ew ttempts eremade to involve Negevresidents r their ep-resentatives n planning heir owns and re-gion.Herecommended he provision f moreinformation nd interaction etween he mil-itary unctional uthorities nd the leadersand residents f the region concerning hefuture lans of the Negev.

Regional development policies in theNorthern alilee periphery re not very iffer-ent from hose in the Negev. n his study fthis region, Menuhin 1980) identified 12functionally ifferent epartments hat dealwith development, nd he stressed the vari-ous conflicting bjectives f these agencies.He stated hat here s an absence of generalcomprehensive trategy nd argued that aterritorial overnmental uthority s essentialfor uture evelopment f the region.10

Asa result f he center-down evelopmentapproach, nformal, oluntary, nd nonpoliti-cal regional rganizations, uch as the NegevCommittee nd the Galilee Council, have



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been formed. The members of these coalitionsare primarily city mayors, heads of town andregional councils, and directors of industrialfirms and institutes. These interest groups aretrying to promote the affairs of their regionand gain protection from outside domination(Gradus and Stern 1980; Menuhin 1980).

Planners from the Ministry of the Interiorhave recently proposed the establishment ofregional governments (Giron 1976; Brutzkus1980). It is not surprising that these proposalsemanate from professionals in the Ministryresponsible for coordination on the regionallevel. They have recommended the formationof elected district councils with authority for

planning and executing policies with inde-pendent budgets, which would both reducethe centralistic dependence and increasecoordination at the regional operational level.These intermediate regional governmentunits could, in their view, also serve as a basisfor Knesset electoral districts, which wouldconsolidate the prevailing regionalistic feel-ings and support policies of regional integration.

However, the political organization of theterritorial periphery remains fragmented,

making it easier than ever for the core todominate and control these areas. For exam-ple, the rural kibbutzim and moshavim arehighly organized units, which maintain directcontact with the core through their cen-tralized federation in the core. Their interac-tion with the new towns in their own region isvery limited, as they have formed their ownself-contained and exclusive regional coun-cil. In contrast, the towns are not collec-tively organized as are the kibbutzim and

moshavim, and a high degree of dependenceon government officials prevails in the urbanenvironment of the periphery. In certain cases,hostility has developed between the veteran,European, and highly organized members ofthese collective rural settlements and thenon-European, post-independent citizens ofthe towns. The rural sector is perceived by thetown inhabitant as part of the European laborestablishment. The European Zionist socialistideologies have always exhibited a marked

rural bias. The ideal was to revitalize theJewish people by returning to the land and tofarming (Cohen 1977). National authoritiesencouraged the rural sector while ignoringthe needs of the population of the new townson the periphery for many years.

Any ttempt o establish an elected regionalgovernment in Israel must bring the variousideological sectors into consideration forpromoting intraregional cooperation and re-duction of disparaties.

Summary andConclusions

Israel, with its highly centralized unitarypolitical system, tried to pursue and executea national policy of balanced regional devel-opment, failing o realize that spatial integra-tion is a process of diffusing political power

as well as allocating socioeconomic re-sources. Despite the expressed egalitarianideology of the government and its regional-integration policies, the gap between theaffluent ore and the relatively mpoverishedperiphery is growing. Spatial policies thatseek to alter socioeconomic distributionwithout altering the basic political structureare doomed to failure. It is not enough todisperse people and economic activities toachieve balanced regional development;

authority nd power must also be dispersed.Otherwise, a core-periphery conflict willprevail.

Reducing spatial disparities with raditionalpolicy instruments such as economic sub-sidies and incentives is not sufficient. f theaim of governments s to redress some of theimbalances between strong and weak re-gions, it is necessary to transfer authorityfrom national functional organization to localand regional territorial odies; even in a small

state such as Israel, the center cannot be ev-erywhere. Central government cannot trulyunderstand the uniqueness of a local situa-tion and respond adequately to various re-gional and local demands.

Although top-down organization in Israelhas played an invaluable pioneering role inthe etablishment of the state, the country'scontemporary economic, social, and politicalneeds require a reversal of Israel's traditionalpolicies. The old centralizing effort ecessaryto achieve independent and sustained unity sno longer pertinent; n the contrary, here s agrowing demand for decision making frombelow based on participation on a geograph-ical division. To reduce tension within sraelisociety, a new political organization must de-



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400 Gradus

velop out of a synthesis between the oldfunctional dimension and the new territorialdimension. However, Israel's policy makersare preoccupied with issues of foreign policyand national security. They leave few re-sources and little political energy for innova-tion in domestic programs. Whether theemerging ethnoregionalism and core-periph-ery conflict are sufficiently powerful to causea change in the existing system remains anopen question.

The political organization of space in acountry reflects its ideological and politicalstructure as a whole. Therefore, a prerequi-site for effective studies of regional inequalityis a clear understanding of a country's politi-cal structure. It is hoped that the presentstudy has shown the importance of politicalanalysis in development geography and willencourage further research on the subject.

Acknowledgments

This paper was completed while the author was avisiting scholar at the Graduate School of Ar-

chitecture and Urban Planning, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles. Thanks are extended toJohn Friedmann, Ed Soja, Martin Wachs, and ClydeWeaver for their detailed comments on earlierdrafts. Thanks are also extended to my colleaguesand friends in Israel for their comments andsuggestions, especially S. Hasson, N. Kliot,S. Krakover, F. Lezin, A. Lev-Ari,A. Meir, . Schnell,E. Stern, and S. Waterman. Finally, am grateful othe anonymous reviewers of this article for theirvaluable comments. All views and opinions ex-pressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at

the International Seminar on Contemporary Prob-lems in Political Geography, Haifa, Israel in 1982and also at the International Seminar on RegionalDevelopment, Belo-Horizonte, Brazil in 1982.

Notes

1. The present study deals only with core-periphery relationships among the Jewishpopulation in Israel. An analysis of theJewish-Arab elationship within srael and withthe Arabs in the territories ccupied after 1967

would require another comprehensive study.2. About 80 percent of the Jewish population intowns located in the Negev and Galilee are ofnon-European descent (including the secondgeneration). A high proportion of the non-European Jews also reside in poor neighbor-hoods at the outskirts f the veteran towns and

the metropolitan areas, causing a similar con-flict n these regions as well.

3. The Knesset, which literally means assembly, isIsrael's parliament, onsisting of 120 members.

4. There are arguments against this assumption.Centering on the hypothesis that MKs rep-resent a party deology and not necessarily ageographical region, some may point to exam-ples of MKs who are active in regional affairsthat are not necessarily in their own places ofresidence. There are even a few examples tosuggest that it s not only the number of repre-sentatives from given region that determinesthe extent to which the interests of that regionare represented, but also the status and powerof the representatives.

5. The number of seats each region would receivewas calculated on the basis of the number ofeligible voters in the region divided by the quo-tient per seat, obtained by dividing the total ofeligible voters in the country by the number ofseats in the Knesset. The analysis includes onlythe MKs and their places of residence at thebeginning of each four-year erm.

6. The 15 study units are not functional regionsnor are they political entities. They are derivedfrom the existing statistical division of thecountry into subdistricts. The availability ofdata at the subdistrict evel dictates, to a cer-tain extent, the choice of the geographicalstudy unit. n two instances I deviate from his

framework: Because of its large population,the Tel-Aviv subdistrict is divided into threestudy units-Tel Aviv, Ramat-Gan, and Holon.On the other hand, the subdistricts of Safedand Kinneret, because of their slight electoralweight, are combined into a single electoraldistrict tudy unit.

7. R is obtained by the formula:

R E jX E )

where

R = percentage of the population receivingregional presentation in the Knesset,

Rj = number of MKs from region i,RjK = number of MKs to which region i is en-

titled by its electoral strength,Ej= the percentage of eligible voters in re-

gion i out of the total number of eligiblevoters in the country.

In cases of overrepresentation, where the

number of Knesset members from a region isgreater than the number to which it s entitled,the ratio R/RiK is considered to be equal tounity.

8. MKs who are members of kibbutzim on theperiphery end to represent the core more thantheir own territorial eriphery.



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Politics n Regional nequality 401

9. Some degree of attention to the regional di-mension arose in the Labor Party during the1960s as a result of a change in the method ofnominating candidates to the Knesset. Thelocal chapters of the party could propose halfof the candidates to the final ist. However, thecentral committee of the party put national fig-ures in a safe place at the head of the list,whereas the local representatives were usuallyallocated places near the bottom of the list.Nevertheless, this change in method increasedfor a while the number of parliamentariansfrom he periphery, ut not at a rate commen-surate with their electoral power (Brichta1977). Measuring the extent of regional repre-sentation at the party evel reveals that on theaverage the Labor bloc is the most sensitive inthe existing electoral system to regional repre-sentation and the Religious bloc is the leastsensitive. The Likud center-right loc is inter-mediate between these two blocs (Gradus andEiny 1982).

10. During the 1950s and 1960s, the governmentadopted in various cases, a territorially nte-grated approach to regional development,mainly or new frontier reas. The most famouscases were the Lakhish and Arad regional au-thorities. Since the mid-1960s, however, thisapproach has been completely abandoned de-spite the fact that the two experiences gener-ally had been considered a success (Weitz 1971).

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