case study lifespan
TRANSCRIPT
ANH Company Profile
LifeSpan, Inc., a Minneapolis based, not-for-profit corporation, was
the parent holding company of a diversified health services corporation
consisting of three hospitals including Abbott Northwestern Hospital (ANH),
a nursing home, a major rehabilitation center, two product and equipment
corporations, a home heath services corporation, and a foundation. The
operating revenues for LifeSpan and its combined affiliate organizations
were $211 million in 1985. LifeSpan’s net income has increased by over
25% to 9.8 million in 1985 from $7.8 million in 1984.
Abbott Northwestern, an 800-bed hospital in South Minneapolis, was
the largest private hospital in Minneapolis/St. Paul, with a high market
share in many key medical services. ANH had seven “Centers of Excellence”
– cardiovascular, neurosciences, rehabilitation, cancer, perinatal, low back,
and behavioral medicine. Its cardiovascular program provided truly
comprehensive services, from diagnostic through heart replacement. In
1985, ANH performed nearly 1,000 open heart surgeries – more than any
hospital in the area. The cardiovascular program at ANH was viewed as the
premier hospital in the upper Midwest and served portions of the five-state
area.
ANH’s patients could be classified into inpatient and outpatient
categories. Inpatients were admitted to the hospital by a physician and
were resident in one of the hospital’s beds. Outpatients used the services of
the hospital without being admitted. The latter include both former
inpatients who required follow-up treatment and patients referred by their
private physicians to have day surgery or laboratory or diagnostic tests
performed.
HealthCare Industry in the US
The health care industry was among the largest in the US and in 1985
National health expenditure had grown to $425 billion. Health care
expenses as a percentage of Gross National Product accounted for as much
as 10.7%.
National health expenditures were divided into the following
categories: personal health care, program administration, government
public health activities, noncommercial research, and construction of
medical facilities. Personal healthcare is the biggest category of health care
expenditure accounting for approximately 88% of total industry
expenditures. In 1985, $371.4 billion was spent on personal healthcare and
of which $166.7 billion went to hospital care.
The Government which was the main third party payer had spent
$174.8 billion in 1985 and the amount was 44% of all healthcare
expenditures. The Medicare program had spent $70.5 billion in 1985.
Together the Medicare are Medicaid financed 29% of the healthcare
expenditures in 1985 and was expected to pay $110 billion in benefits to 48
million people. The other major third-party payer: the private health
insurance industry paid $113.5 billion in medical benefits in 1985.
Third party payments accounted for 71.6% of the U.S. health care
expenditures, and balance 28.4% was borne by consumers paying directly
for health services. However the share of direct payments accounted for
26.3% of physician’s service expenditures, but for only 9.3% of hospital care
expenditures.
Expenditure on hospital care had increased from $52.4 billion in 1975
to $166.7 billion in 1985 a growth rate of 13% a year. In 1985 there were
6,148 hospitals with about 1.3 million beds. Industry observers generally
agreed that the supply of beds exceeded the demand by as much as 20%.
The 67% bed-occupancy rate of hospitals in 1984 supported this contention.
The expanding role of Health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
represented one of the significant changes occurring in health care. HMOs
were priced competitively. They provided no iincentive to a physician for
doing extra procedures to argument his or her fee. The number of HMOs in
the U.S. grew from 39 in 1971 to 431 in 1985, with 16.7 million people
enrolled in those 431 HMO plans.
By 1980s the supply of physicians had increased substantially, and
there was no dearth of specialists.
The Minneapolis/St. Paul Heath Care Market
The twin cities had one of the most fiercely competitive health care
marketplaces in the U.S. with as many as 26 hospitals and 6 HMOs. During
1980-85, HMOs in the area had experienced an annual growth of 80%,
reaching a level of 865,000 members. In 1985 HMOs controlled 41% of the
Twin Cities marketplace, compared with just 11% on a national basis. This
dominance by HMOs had caused the inpatient market to shrink. During the
five-year period 1980-84 hospital utilization had declined by approximately
29%.
As inpatient days declined, many hospitals had lower occupancy rates.
To survive with HMOs, hospitals were undertaking cost containment
measures and changing practice patterns-shifting more care to an
outpatient basis. During 1981-85 ANH’s outpatient surgery volume
increased from 13% to 44% of all surgical procedures performed at the
hospital.
Despite the fact that total admissions and inpatient days were
declining, the number of physicians was increasing. The result was decline
in the admissions per physician. Consequently, the Twin cities began
witnessing intense rivalry between doctors. Competitive pressures were
transferring the industry and pushing hospitals, HMOs, and doctors into a
struggle.
General Marketing at ANH
ANH has adopted three methods to increase the market share of
ANH. These methods were to:
a. Give incentives to potential healthy customers to visit the
hospital. This would get future patients in touch with ANH. Since
most of the hospitalization decision was being by patients this was
critical.
b. Find potential customers which had no designated primary
physicians and recommend one of the in-house physicians to the
customer.
c. Made sure that the patients got satisfactory experience at ANH
with the human touch and the dignity patients rightfully deserved.
The positive feelings about ANH created in patients would make them
select ANH again. ANH’s image will be helped with positive word-of-
mouth, a powerful often neglected tool in marketing.
ANH’s employees exhibited a warm, tender and caring attitude when
they came in contact with patients. For example, ANH provided valet
parking for elderly and disabled patients and patients for one-day surgery
were welcomed by few members of senior management.
ANH was running no-profit hotel-like facility for out of town
patients and their families. The hotel provided clean, comfortable, and
secure rooms adjacent to hospital at fair rates. This was one of the reasons
nonlocal patients picked ANH if they came to Minneapolis for treatment.
Product Management at ANH
ANH treated each of the medical service, such as cardiology,
radiology, neurology, cancer, chemical dependency and emergency
services, as product or department. To give more focus these as products
ANH started product management and hired product managers for the
following products: neurology, urology, orthopedics, low back and chemical
dependency. The managers’ aim was to increase the market share of their
respective products. They interacted with specialty physicians, made sales
calls to HMOs and Medicare and talked to patients. They also ran special
programs to promote their products and set the pricing. The compensation
for these managers consisted of base salary and bonus if preset targets
were reached.
The ANH management felt that product management process was
successful since other departments without product managers were asking
for one. The emergency department was asking one and was telling the
management that if their department gets product manager then more
patients will use them with average contribution margin of $40 each
patient.
ANH also had seven “Centers of Excellence” –cardiovascular,
neurosciences, rehabilitation, cancer, prenatal, lock back, and behavioral
medicine. This level of expertise made ANH reputable in the five upper
Midwest states and showed ANH’s commitment in managing each of these
product lines.
Pricing
In general, ANH was facing pricing pressures from Medicare, HMOs
and lower prices offered by the competitors. Since most of the ANH prices
were higher than its competitors and still maintained a good market share,
it showed that ANH was somewhat successful in marketing. The impact of
ANH’s fee structure on its financial performance was directly affected by
the mix of payments methods used by patients. We felt ANH was able to
charge more for better quality offered at its centers of excellence.
The outpatients were more profitable compared to the inpatients. The
former offered average contribution of $85 on $200 revenue (42.5%)
compared to $700 contribution on $6000 from the latter (11.7%).
Distribution
At ANH, physicians were considered to be the most important part.
The physicians performed almost same function as retailers do for the
manufacturers. The physicians were responsible for 70% of health care
spending at ANH. One of the challenges ANH faced was that some of the
physicians considered ANH’s marketing tactics repugnant. ANH had around
400 active physicians who brought at least 30 patients a year to the
hospital, or in total at least 12,000 patients. 85% of ANH’s patients were
routed by these active physicians.
ANH also created policies in support of its physicians. One policy was
the physician-referral system where ANH referred those patients who did
not have any physicians to active physicians. To control these referrals,
physicians were evaluated objectively. Another policy was ANH’s Medical
Staff Development Program. Under this program, ANH helped five groups of
physicians to establish full-service suburban clinics in underserved areas.
Basically ANH was increasing its presence and adding more channels to its
distribution. ANH linked primary physicians and hospitals in rural areas
with tertiary care support, teaching and consultation as needed.
Communications
Traditionally ANH relied on the physicians to relay its messages to
patients. But in recent years ANH was communicating directly to the end
consumers. ANH utilized its centennial celebration to advertise its name
and services to the public using radio, television, newspapers, and
billboards. It was verified that after the advertisement there was significant
increase in ANH’s names recognition. Riding on this success, ANH spent
$405,900 in 1984 in advertising since repeat messages were known to
impact consumer behavior.
Medformation
ANH instituted call to action communications program with the
launch of Medformation program. The Medformation was set up as
community telephone line providing health care information and referrals to
various programs, services, and physicians affiliated with ANH. The
telephone numbers differed for different categories of services.
Medformation made easier for consumers to call ANH for their any health
needs.
Medformation was advertised in two leading local newspapers;
90% of the insertions were quarter page ads on weekdays, and cost $700
per insertion. The rest were full page ads on weekdays and cost $7,000 per
insertion. In 1985 a total of 28,667 calls were received with heaviest call
volume on the day of the ad insertion.
Medformation was managed by marketing manager with a staff of
two information specialists and one registered nurse. Two additional nurses
were available as need basis. The fixed cost of having phone lines and staff
was $175,000.
Medformation received 2,338 physician referral calls out of which
70% or 1637 contacted the doctor. Of that 25% or 410 came to hospital.
These patients contributed $132,020 to bottom line. (See Exhibit 1.)
Exhibit 1: Medformation’s Known Contribution Margins
(Approximate)
Patient Types Patient
Counts
Contribution
Margin
Total CM per patient types
10% inpatient of
1637
164 $700 $114,800
10% outpatient of
1637
164 $85 $ 13,940
5% Emergency of
1637
82 $40 $ 3,280
25% of 1637 410 Total CM $ 132,020
For quit-smoking Medformation telephone line, there were 655
calls. And 393 patients joined the quit-smoking program ANH offered. With
contribution margin ranging from $60 to $120, the net contribution from
these patients were in the range from $23,580 to $47,160. For discussion
sake, taking average, we find that quit smoking program contributed
$35,370.
Physician referrals and quit-smoking each contributed $132,020
and $35,370 respectively. Their total contribution was $167,390. This
amount almost covered the fixed cost of the Medformation program. So the
contributions of four other remaining programs added to ANH bottom line
100%.
The Medformation program was well liked at ANH as the overall
response to the program had far exceeded the management’s expectations.
There was a sharp improvement in consumer perception of ANH as per
surveys. Another proof that the program was something was given when
hospital from New York called buy the advertisement used by ANH for
$120,000. ANH director cleverly declined the offer and was contemplating
to professionally develop ANH’s marketing materials into package to be
sold to other hospitals.
WomenCare
ANH created a WomenCare program to take care of women only
specific health care need that went beyond regular obstetrics/gynecology
services. The program provided a total range of services for women seeking
wellness, fitness, weight control, aging, and behavioral and reproductive
guidance.
In the inaugural day, over 2,500 women attended the event paying
$100 each. And throughout the rest of the year, there were 12 timely
seminars on various subjects. On average 120 patients attended with fee
ranging from $100 to $200 each per woman.
Exhibit 2: Women Care’s Approximate Min/Max Contribution
Margins
Attendees Contribution
Margin
Total
Contribution
Min
Total
Contribution
Max
Inaugural
Day
2500 $60 $150,000 $150,000
Other
Seminars
1400
(average)
$60 to $120 $86400 $172,800
Averaging other seminars contribution, we get $129,600
contribution and combining it with inaugural day’s contribution; we get
total of $279,600 contribution from WomenCare programs. (See Exhibit 2.)
Conclusions about Marketing Program
How can we say that the marketing programs at ANH were
successful? One key figure is the increase in revenues. The revenues in
1985 were $211 million compared to 150 million in 1984, a 40% increase.
The net profits jumped by 25.6% to $9.8 million from $7.8 for the same
period.
How this compares to prior period 1984 and 1983? From 1983 to
1984 the revenue increased from $135 million to $150 million, an 11%
increase and revenues were up from $4.8 to $7.8 million a 62% increase.
(See Exhibit 3.)
Exhibit 3: Increase in Sales and Profits from 1984 to 1985
Year Sales in
millions
% Increase in
Sales
Profit % Increase in Profit
1983 $ 135 - $ 4.8 -
1984 $ 150 11% $ 7.8 62%
1985 $ 211 40% $ 9.8 25.6%
It was in 1983 the centennial campaigned was launched. In 1984,
based on centennial’s success, $405,900 was spent in advertising. The sales
jump of 40% can be attributed to the advertising, where when advertising
was not done there was only 11% increase in revenues.
Another indication of ANH’s market success is that its bed occupancy
market share in Minneapolis was increasing for last two years and it had
become 18.8% with 71.2% bed occupancy, which was highest in all the
Minneapolis hospitals. ANH also performed 1000 open heart surgeries. That
going by ANH’s list price should have generated $5 million in contribution
margin. This fact has some contribution from the marketing of the excellent
surgery procedures and first rate physicians to surrounding area, as for a
patient heart surgery was one of the riskiest.
The consumers showed increase satisfaction with ANH services.
Consumer surveys showed that ANH was perceived highest in the hospitals
providing best medical care category.
The marketing aided by advertising had launched two successful
programs Medformation and Woman Care. The former was generating
$167,390 and latter $279,600. It was important to carry on this programs
and advertisement was necessary in this endeavor. These two programs
were also in accordance to the hospital’s marketing philosophy of reaching
out to as many patients as possible and treat them as humanly as possible
given the chance.
Another area of concern was that around 30% of ANH’s patients came
from outside the seven-county Metropolitan area. It meant that there was
lot of potential in targeting the area within the Metropolitan area. There
was some belief among consumers that the hospital was in bad
neighborhood. Evidently there was some work to be done in to clear the bad
perception.
In 1982 ANH did a survey of 1,800 consumers and 400 physicians.
There were some key findings from the survey. First thing was that it was
patients who were deciding on which hospital to choose from. Most of the
patients believed that all hospitals provided services which were equal in
terms of quality. University of Minnesota was in high esteem. 67% of
patients did not recognize the ANH. Less than 10% of consumers had very
clear perception of what ANH was. And those who used ANH were very
satisfied. In light these findings ANH had already embarked on the
advertisement path. There was evidence that it was successful. The current
situation was prodding ANH to keep continuing on same path with more
zeal. The need of the hour was that ANH’s exposure to the patients
increase, so that the patients choose ANH while making decisions about
which hospital to use. The fact that ANH provided top notch quality service
should also be told to patients so that the patients could choose hospitals
judiciously; at least they should know the hospital names where the quality
was the norm.
ANH had no TV exposure. And the budget required allotment of
budgeting dollars for TV advertisements. Since TV was increasing becoming
more powerful media and families were increasingly spending more time in
front of TV, it was important to reach these TV watching segment of the
population.
ANH was thinking about packaging its advertisements and selling
them to other hospitals for $100,000 or so. If the marketing budget is
expanded and approved, it will allow ANH to gain further experience in
medical advertisement which will later make such packages more attractive
and lucrative. ANH was member of VHA an association of 650 hospitals.
And if ANH’s advertisement success story was shared with VHA then more
hospitals were expected to come forward to buy the package. Even 5% or
33 hospitals buying the package would generate $3.3 in additional
revenues.
We looked at the Medformation call volume data and performed linear
regression analysis for all six types of calls. We found that for Weight Loss,
Quit Smoking and Physician Referral the call volume was in linear
relationship to the advertisements done in a particular month. (See
Appendix: Regression Analysis for Medformation Calls)
For Weight Loss the linear model was
y=12.6 + 36x (where y is predicted number of calls, x is
number of advertisements)
The linear equation for Quit Smoking Medformation program was:
y=1.55 + 28.9x (where y is predicted number of calls, x is
number of advertisements)
And the third linear equation for Physician Referral calls was
y=122.5 + 16.6x(where y is predicted number of calls, x is
number of advertisements)
This is in one way expected, since Weight loss and smoking
problems are pre- existing and so are patients without physicians are.
But calls response for Cancer, Medical Information and Others were
not linear. Further analysis needs to be done to model these calls. But
we have some evidence in hand that as we spend more advertisement
dollars, the call volumes for the first three categories are going to go
up. Since we also know the contribution margins for these kinds of
calls, the model can be extended to give dollar return in terms of
advertisement dollars spend. These models give us more
understanding and foresight on how the purposed budget of $1.25
million for fiscal year 1986, a jump of $533,000 compared to previous
year, was going to create consumer response the ANH was striving
for.
In conclusion, we have one hand evidence of success, then there
was need to continue the successful programs and there were
pending tasks to improve the hospital’s perception. This could only be
possible if the expanded advertisement budget was approved.
Ethics in Medical Profession
The ethics in medical profession walks on very thin line. First there is
conflict of interest among the key players in the industry. Hospitals want to
give good care. Patients want to receive good care. But who pays for it? The
parties who make payments Medicare and HMOs are always negotiating
with the hospitals about lowering the rates they pay. This creates pressure
in hospitals to cut costs and in that process patient is left not so well taken
care for. If after surgery, patient needs say four days of rest and supervision
in hospital, the HMOs will push for two day stay. The hospitals generally
accept the will of their paymasters and release the patient in just two days.
The other side of same argument is that if hospital keeps a patient
more than it is required then it is also unethical, here the aim of the hospital
becomes to generate more revenue.
Hospitals charge different rate to a patient who pays directly and to a
patient whose bills are paid by third party. The third party gets discount
rate for the volume of patients they get to the hospitals whereas the patient
coming alone does not. For the patient, he or she is taken advantage for, for
he or she has no recourse other than to get the treatment at whatever
prices hospital might charge. There are lots of patients who have gone
bankrupt because the direct billing is too high.
ANH was trying to help patients with Medformation. The patients
when looking at Medformation advertisement might get the impression that
the Medoformation is going to provide free information in regards to their
heath issues. But it was a marketing ploy. And it is kind of unethical, since it
was all marketing effort to get ANH in touch with its future potential
customers. That in itself was not bad because ANH was known to provide
good quality health care, but a caveat here, at higher prices. Once
mindshare is won among customers, one gets capability to charge little
higher prices. Some of the ANH’s physicians didn’t agree to this practice.