casellas habeas corpus raymond molina noticel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Joseph Raymond Molina

Petitioner [s],

VS.

The People Of Puerto RicoRespondent[s],

))))))))))/

Case No.:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BYA PERSON UNDERSTATE CUSTODY

COMES NOW Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

and files the instant petition to overturn and vacate a sentence in the state court that

is contrary to the United States Constitution.

PRELIMINARTY STATEMENT

1. The name of the Court that entered the judgment is the Superior court

of Puerto Rico in San Juan, Puerto Rico, under criminal case No. K 1C

2008G0028. Imposing a sentence of five years and six months of

incarceration, with a suspended incarceration sentence. This case is filed

pursuant to Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973)1 and Carafas

v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)2.

2. The date of Judgment was February 13, 2009 Writ of certiorari was denied

January 27, 2012, by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, a motion for

reconsideration was denied on March 30, 2012.

3. The time of judgment of conviction was Five years and Six months

(suspended)3. The sentencing Judge was Hon. Abelardo Bermudez (now and

appellate Judge).

4. The nature of the offence convicted Art. 122 (third degree) was violation of

Criminal Code. Article 122 requires aggression against a person the renders

permanent damage, but not requires medical attention, or specialized

professional treatment ambulatory would be guilty of a crime in the fourth

degree. Aggravated to third degree. This is to say that the Government must

prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina was

the aggressor. The evidence at trial and admitted clearly showed the victim

was the aggressor.

5. The sentence was for on count of Article 122 in the Third Degree

1 Restraints imposed on petitioner who was released on his own recognizance constitute "custody" within themeaning of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Pp. 411 U. S. 348-353.2 Though the federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant be "in custody" when the habeas corpusapplication is filed, the relief that may be granted is not limited to discharging the applicant from physical custody,the statute providing that "the court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243.Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574 (1960), overruled. Pp. 391 U. S. 238-240.33

6. There are no future sentences to be serve after completion of the five years

and six months.

FACTS UPON WHY THE SENTENCE MUST BE VACATED

7. The appearing petitioner submits that the facts as specified here support the

following:

The evidence in admitted (video tape) when looked in light most

favorable to the People of Puerto Rico is insufficient to show that

Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina Young was the aggressor as

required by the Art. 122 of the Puerto Rico penal Code.

The waiver of jury trial was done involuntary because of the

presiding judge apparent conflicts of interest with the alleged victim

Mr. Carlos Romero Barceló. These facts were learned after the trial

and conviction.

The prosecutor’s statements were unconstitutional and not relevant to

the issues at trial and prejudiced the decision, even after the court

attempted to distance itself, it nonetheless followed the pleading of

the prosecutor.

THE FACTS

8. On Super Tuesday March 8th 2008 (national primary elections) petitioner

entered the café known as Pelayo to have dinner at Pelayo. There, alleged

victim form Governor, Commissioner Resident and mayor of San Juan

Puerto Rico, Mr. Carlos Romero Barceló, was having drinks with

approximately seven to eight political followers. See Petitioner entering the

restaurant. (Photo admitted into evidence stipulated by the parties. There his

followers invited Petitioner to sit and chat over the political scenario of

March 8, 2008. After cordial introduction, a conversation ensues regarding

the Super Tuesday Democratic Primaries. There, allege victim Carlos

Romero Barceló instigated conversations regarding Republican participant

and former president George W. Bush.

9. The issue of the bias of the presiding Trial Judge, The

Honorable Abelardo Bermudez, as well as this judge’s meeting

exparte with the alleged victim of the case, former Governor

Carlos Romero Barceló, was presented to the Apellate Court

refused to consider the motion or remand to the Court of First

Instance.

10. Furthermore, the prosecutor of the case, Mr. Cesar Mercado

Santaella, employed polarizing xenophobic and irrelevant political

arguments in order to plead for a guilty charge in his closing

arguments. His statements constituted a violation of the

Petitioner’s due process and unduly influenced the judge to make

a decision based on political considerations as opposed to the facts

of the case.

11. Objections to the Prosecutor’s behavior were made by Trial

Counsel during the closing arguments and sentencing of the case

at the First District Court of Puerto Rico. While Judge Bermudez

attempted to distance de Court from the inappropriate statements

made by the Prosecutor, he nevertheless ruled in favor of the

prosecution, finding Petitioner guilty.

12. The waiver of jury trial was discovered to have been made

unknowingly by the Petitioner, and submitted to the Appellate

Court on April 27, 2011 with the motion to Appellate Court and

was not heard by the Appellate Court.

13. The issue of the vagueness of the federal constitutionality

statue was not raised previously and is being presented to the

Court for the first time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

14. This case raises exceptionally important questions

concerning the administration of justice by the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico through politically appointed justices. The

proceedings related to the case of the People of Puerto Rico versus

Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina were corrupted by the alleged

victim’s political manipulation of the presiding trial judge. For

this case, Superior Court Judge Abelardo Bermudez was

specifically appointed by the Court to hear the case of the People

of Puerto Rico versus Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina. The

Petitioner was President of a mortgage banking firm (Golden

Mortgage Bankers) and the alleged victim was Carlos Romero

Barceló, a former Governor, Resident Commissioner, and Mayor of

the Capital City, San Juan. The Trial commenced on the first

week of October, 2008. The alleged victim Carlos Romero Barceló

testified on October 9, 2008 before then Superior Judge Abelardo

Bermudez.

15. On April 25, 2011 the internationally acclaimed golfer, Mr.

Juan A Rodriguez (“Chi Chi” Rodriguez), witnessed the alleged

victim Carlos Romero Barceló entering the residence of his

neighbor, Mr. Pedro Rivera Casiano. Mr. Rodriguez also witnessed

Judge Abelardo Bermudez entering the residence of Mr. Pedro

Rivera Casiano, where he met with alleged victim Carlos Romero

Barceló. See sworn declaration of Juan A. Rodriguez. On the date

of the meeting between the alleged victim and Judge Abelardo

Bermudez -April 25, 2011- the trial of People of Puerto Rico versus

Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina was still proceeding under the

jurisdiction of Judge Bermudez.

16. Petitioner was charge with violation of Art. 122 33 L.P.R.A. §

4750 aggravated battery in the third degree. The First District

Court of San Juan sentenced Petitioner to a five year term of

incarceration with a suspended sentence.

17. Following the conclusion of the trial, the lead prosecutor in

the case, Mr. Cesar Mercado Santaella, was promoted to Superior

Court Judge. Additionally, Superior Court judge Abelardo

Bermudez was appointed as an appellate justice while the appeal

of the case was pending at the Appellate Court of Puerto Rico.

18. An affidavit with the sworn testimony of Mr. Juan (“Chi

Chi”) Rodriguez was submitted to the Appellate Court for

consideration before rendering its ruling. The Appellate Court

refused to consider the affidavit or to send the case back to the

Superior Court. See declaration of Ms. Rosa Ward, Appellate

Counsel.

19. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico refused to address the

Constitutional violations submitted on appeal and certiorari.

20. Superior Court Judge Abelardo Bermudez’ s fraternization

with the alleged victim while the trial was proceeding under his

jurisdiction represents a flagrant violation of the legal protections

guaranteed to the Petitioner by the U.S. Constitution, whose case

was clearly not conducted with any semblance of due process.

21. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s closing statements in the trial

are tantamount to prosecutorial misconduct rendering the trial

unfair on the basis of both the prosecution and trial judge’s

conduct during of the case.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

22. Significant issues are at stake in this case relating to the

preservation of a citizen’s right to have a fair trial in the State

Court of Puerto Rico, The appearance of impropriety projected by

the meeting of a trail judge with the alleged victim of a case which

he is serving as the presiding judge undermines the respect,

confidence and trust that the American judicial system merits and

instead disgraces this very system.

23. The prosecutors closing statement were not in any way

related to the actual facts surrounding the confrontation in

question but instead employed manipulative political rhetoric that

had no place in a courtroom. The Prosecutor declared that former

“President Bush is an abuser and a coward” and that “now comes

this Miracle [Petitioner] from another place to pretend to tell us

what we have to think and pretend to tell us what we have to say”.

Now Petitioner “comes from another place [United States] to us,

and pretends to tell us what I have to think in my country [Puerto

Rico] and pretend to tell us Puerto Rican what we have to say, for

what reason?s With what rights? Is this individual to come and

tell me what I have to say in my country [Puerto Rico]? no that

same liberty that he has to express his opinion I have them too?

“If he want to come to Puerto Rico to hit an ex-governor and brag

about it, why doesn’t he go to CUBA and punch FIDEL to see

what is going to happen”.

ISUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

24. The probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or

decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.

BASIC PRINCIPLE

25. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment

(applicable to the federal government) and the Fourteenth

Amendment (applicable to the states) provide that the government

shall not take a person’s life, liberty, or property without due

process of law. Due process contemplates fair process/procedure,

which requires at least an opportunity to present objections to the

proposed action to a fair, neutral decision maker (not necessarily a

judge).

FAIR, NEUTRAL DECISION MAKER- JUDGE BIAS-

26. The Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself

when he has actual bias (e.g. he has a direct, personal,

substantial, pecuniary interest in a case) or when there is merely

a serious risk of actual bias. A serious risk of actual bias exists

when “under realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and

human weakness,” the judge’s interest poses such a risk of actual

bias or prejudice that it must be forbidden. Caperton v. A.T.

Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).

27. In respect to this case the undisputed fact is that Superior

Court Judge Adalberto Bermudez was looking to be promoted to

Appellate Justice and the appellate appointment took place on the

Saturday afternoon in a closed section of the Puerto Rican Senate,

after the trial and while pending appellate review.

28. Even when a judge does not have any direct, personal,

substantial, pecuniary interest in case, of kind requiring his or her

disqualification at common law, there are circumstances in which

probability of actual bias on part of judge is too high to be

constitutionally tolerable. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.

556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (U.S.W.Va.,2009). In deciding

whether probability of actual bias on the part of judge is too high

to be constitutionally tolerable, the court's inquiry is objective one,

that asks not whether judge is actually, subjectively biased, but

whether average judge in judge's position is likely to be neutral, or

whether there is unconstitutional potential for bias. In lieu of

exclusive reliance on personal inquiry by judge, or on appellate

review of judge's determination respecting actual bias, the Due

Process Clause is implemented, in area of judicial recusal, by

objective standards which do not require proof of actual bias; in

defining these standards, court asks whether, under a realistic

appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the

interest in question poses such a risk of actual bias or

prejudgment that practice must be forbidden if guarantee of due

process is to be adequately implemented. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.

29. There is serious risk of actual bias, based on objective and

reasonable perceptions, when person with personal stake in

particular case had significant and disproportionate influence in

the appointment of the judge to a case by raising funds or by

directing the judge's election campaign when the case is pending

or imminent. This is the case at bar. Former Mayor of San Juan,

Governor and Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barceló

maintains his seat as Vice-President of the powerful New

Progressive Party of Puerto Rico and has numerous lobbying

contracts that leverage his significant political influence.

30. Due process may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no

actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh scales of

justice equally between contending parties. U.S.C.A.

Const.Amend. 14. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct.

2252 (2009).

31. This Honorable Court has held that“[e]very procedure which

would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to

forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or

which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true

between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process

of law.” 273 U. S ., at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437. In Ward v. Monroeville,

409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267. This is the case at bar.

In the case at hand, Mr. Juan “Chi Chi” Rodriguez witnessed

former governor and alleged victim Carlos Romero Barceló

meeting with the trial judge at the time the trial was occurring on

or about October 9, 2008.

32. Similarly, the Court has also reasoned that no man is

permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome,”

id., at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, this Court noted that the circumstances

of the case and the prior relationship required recusal. The judge's

prior relationship with the defendant, as well as the information

acquired from the prior proceeding, was critical. In reiterating

that the rule that “a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings

should be [tried] before a judge other than the one reviled by the

contemnor,” Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466, 91

S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532, rests on the relationship between the

judge and the defendant, id., at 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, the Court noted

that the objective inquiry is not whether the judge is actually

biased, but whether the average judge in his position is likely to

be neutral or there is an unconstitutional “ ‘potential for bias,’ ”

id., at 466, 91 S.Ct.

33. The objective standards implementing the Due Process

Clause do not require proof of actual bias, this Court does not

question Justice the trial judge subjective findings of impartiality

or propriety. The Court need not determine whether there was

actual bias. Rather, the question is whether, “under a realistic

appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the

interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the

practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be

adequately implemented.” Withrow, 421 U.S., at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456.

499. Pp. 2261 – 2262.

IITHE PROSECUTOR’S XENOPHOBIC CLOSING

ARGUMENT WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

34. The Prosecutors failed to argue the evidence and the

elements of the crime charged and moved on to politically charged,

xenophobic arguments that were unconstitutional and

discriminatory.

35. The Prosecutors argument that Petitioner came from

another place, [the United States] cuts the fundamental principle

of equal protection under the law and substantive due process

guaranteed by the U.S Constitution Fifth, Six and Fourteenth

Amendments. Prosecutor Mercardo argued that the Petitioner

“comes from another place [United States] to us, and pretends to

tell us what I have to think in my country [Puerto Rico] and

pretend to tell us Puerto Ricans what we have to say, for what

reason? With what rights? And “If he want to come to Puerto Rico

to hit an ex-governor and brag about it, why does he go to CUBA

and punch FIDEL to see what is going to happen”.

36. Here, the prosecutors abandoned the due process of arguing

the evidence [and admitted security video tape] and the elements

of the crime charged and instead became an advocate for the

alleged victim and his political views. The prosecutors' closing

arguments vouched for the government's case and improperly

blurred the distinction between witness and advocate U.S. v.

Hermanek 289 F.3d 1076, 1084 (C.A.9 (Cal.),2002). United States

v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding prosecutor’s

reference to African-Americans as “bad people” and calling

attention to fact that defendants were not locals was improper).

37. Ordinarily, legitimate arguments based on competent

evidence in the case are not rendered improper by the fact that

they incidentally stir the sympathies and prejudices of the jury.

Thus, such comments do not constitute error where they are

within the permissible bounds of fair comment and are not in fact

inflammatory to the extent of constituting misconduct by the

prosecuting attorney. On the other hand, comments calculated to

unduly create, arouse, or inflame the jurors' sympathies,

prejudices, fears, or passions to the arguments which diminish the

presumption of innocence are forbidden detriments of the accused

are improper. Stein Closing Arguments § 1:17 (2011-2012 ed.)

prosecutor Mercado’s’ statements were made in closing arguments

because of his personal knowledge that Petitioner is a Cuban

American, born in the State of Georgia, who was part of the U.S.-

supported Bay of Pigs invasion into Cuba in 1961, as part of the

2506 Brigade, and who spent time in Communist Cuban jails as a

war prisoner. None of these facts were ever made part of the

evidence at trial, because Petitioner did not testify at trial and

instead elected to have the restaurant security videotape,

admitted into evidence, to serve as the primary evidence at trial.

38. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: “inappropriate

statements by a prosecuting attorney–particularly during closing

argument–may warrant reversal. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637 (1974), the Court held that in federal habeas actions,

“improper jury argument by the state does not present a claim of

constitutional magnitude unless it is so prejudicial that the

petitioner’s trial was fundamentally unfair within the meaning of

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”. Northern

Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992)

(finding prosecutor’s comments regarding defendant’s future

dangerousness improper prosecutorial conduct at guilt phase

where evidence against defendant not strong).

39. The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations has

been made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth

Amendment (see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.s. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019; Klopfer v.

North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1; Pointer

v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923; Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; and In re

Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682), provides

specified standards for ‘all criminal prosecutions.’ Theses

standards were ignored and dismissed in all respect by the

prosecutor, who today sits on the bench of the Superior Court of

Puerto Rico.

40. The prosecutor is a state official his action in closing

argument is within the aspect of a fair trial, which is implicit in

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which

the States are bound. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93

S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,

86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,

85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81

S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.

IIITHE WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL WAS MADE

UNKNOWINGLY AND INVOLUNTARY DUE TOPRESIDING JUDGE INVOLVEMENT WITH ALLEGED

VICTIM

41. The defendant waived the right to a jury trial without

knowing that Mr. Juan “Chichi” Rodriguez has sworn to have seen

the presiding judge meeting with the alleged victim while the case

was proceeding before him as finder of fact.

42. For the waiver of a constitutional right to be valid it must be

made knowingly and intelligently. Here, neither the defendant nor

trial counsel was aware of the exparte socialization of the trial

judge and juror with the alleged victim a former governor,

Senator, And Resident Commissioner.

43. A defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial must be made

knowingly and voluntarily, joined in by the prosecutor and

accepted by the court. Here, little can be argued about the

knowledge of the defendant and his counsel as to the gathering

that individual Juan “ChiChi” Rodriguez swears to have

witnessed at his golf community in Guayama, Puerto Rico. The

Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. In this case, the trier

of fact, the trial judge, was meeting exparte with the ex-governor

while the trial was proceeding under his jurisdiction.

44. Furthermore, the primary evidence of the trial was the

videotape from the security camera of the restaurant, which

clearly shows that the alleged victim is the aggressor. The alleged

victim is the first to rise from his chair and reach across the table

to where Petitioner was sitting, and he is the first to make a

physical contact with the Petitioner. In light of this evidence it is

impossible to see how the trial judge was impartial in this ruling.

The evidence speaks for its self, it is the alleged victim who

instigates, initiates and makes the first assault and battery.

IVPETITIONER WAS CHARGED WITH A SENTENCING

ENHANCEMENT BUT NEVER CHARGED OR CONVICTEDOF THE CRIME OF BATTERY IT SELF

45. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico statute is overbroad

because it sweeps within its ambit not solely activity that is

subject to government control, but also includes within its

prohibition the practice of a protected constitutional right, that

the statement “any means” ignores defendant’s the right to defend

and protect himself from an attack, or through the exercise of non-

criminal conduct such as negligence. The statute ignores the

means rea or intent to commit the battery.

46. Puerto Rico criminal code 33 L.P.R.A. § 4749 defines Simple

Battery as: “Any person who “illegally through any means or form

inflicts injury to the bodily integrity of another” shall incur a

misdemeanor”. The Petitioners submits that the words “illegally

and any means or form” is overly vague and excessively broad

because includes within its prohibition the practice of a protected

constitutional right and included conduct that is not prohibited by

statute, ordinance or code.

47. Pursuant to the charge of 33 L.P.R.A. § 4750, if the battery

described in § 4749 of this title defines aggravated causes as an

“injury that does not leave permanent harm, but requires medical

attention, specialized professional outpatient treatment”, shall

incur a fourth degree felony.

48. A statute is impermissibly vague if it either (1) “fails to

provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

understand what conduct it prohibits” or (2) “authorizes or even

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v.

Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597

(2000).

49. The constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely

related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of

mens rea. In contrast to previously disapproved statutes that

merely set out the subjective effects of conduct and imposed

penalties for causing that injury, see, e.g., Coates v. City of

Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214

(1971) (finding ordinance prohibiting conduct “annoying to

persons passing by” unconstitutionally vague), this statute

required the government to prove that Shrader both intended to

cause his victims serious harm and did in fact do so. See Bowker,

372 F.3d at 381–82 (relying on the connection between the

“requirement that a perpetrator intend to harass a victim” and the

“concrete harm requirement” to conclude that § 2261A was not

vague). .” U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter

Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973).

50. Under Puerto Rico’s civil code 33 .L.P.R.A. § 3022(17), an

“illegal act” is defined as “any act in contravention with any

statute, regulation or code”. Thus, the term “illegal act” does not

define the means rea but submits an act against any statue, code

or regulation as the substitute for means rea. In the instant case,

Petitioner was not charge with violating any another statute, code

or regulation. He was simply charged and convicted with violation

of 33 L.P.R.A. § 4750 an aggravation of battery which does not

define what is the intentional conduct is to be or the act that is

punished but the result of the act which could be in form of

negligence or self-defense. The charged and convicted statute

merely penalizes the act [a sentencing statute] with the intent to

be harm as an aggravating factor to a sentence. The illegal act as

defined by code 33 L.P.R.A § 3022 (17) “Illegal Act” was never

charged against the Petitioner by the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico nor was a judgment of guilt ever entered by the Superior

Court of Puerto Rico for any “Illegal Act” to mean a violation of

statute, ordinance or code.

51. Hence, the Conviction should be overturned as violative of

Petitioners substantive due process and procedural due process,

because the alleged underlying crime -the “Illegal Act”- was not

charged or a sentence of guilt entered as against any “Illegal Act”

in violation of statute, code, or ordinance.

52. The vagueness doctrine, which is one aspect of the due

process requirement of notice, holds that a law is facially invalid if

persons of "common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its

meaning and differ as to its application." Petitioner was never

placed on notice [or charged] with which “Illegal Act” was

committed and which statute, ordinance or code was violated.

Procedural due process is the right of the Petitioner to be given

notice of the “illegal act” [statute, ordinance or code] violated and

an opportunity to be heard and submit proof of the contrary that

negates the charge of violation of statute, ordinance or code.

Absence of a conviction for an illegal act (not charged by the State)

the conviction for violation of 33 L.P.R.A. § 4750 cannot be

sustained within the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution

applicable to Puerto Rico through the Fourteenth Amendment.

WHEREFORE the appearing Petitioner respectfully prays for this

Honorable Court to grant the Petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Respectfully Submitted,

July 11, 2012Ricardo Izurieta Ortega

Ricardo Izurieta Ortega, Esq.USDC-PR # 124205

Attorneys & Counselors at Law421 Muñoz Rivera Ave

Midtown Bldg. Ste. PH 1005San Juan, P.R.00918

Tel (787)531-9419Fax (787)767-4926

Email: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

casellas habeas corpus raymond molina noticel

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