La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. et al. v. Ramos et al. 27 January 2004 Parties Petitioners: LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents: VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES) , INC. Background: Nature and Case History 25 July 1987 EO 279 authorized DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000. 00) 3 March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law 30 March 1995 Government entered FTAA with WMCP 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato . 9 April 1995 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA 7942 took effect 20 December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO 96-40 10 January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demanding DENR to stop implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction (denied) claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the assailed Constitutionality of RA 7942 [1], of DENR Administrative Order 96-40 [2], and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement entered into on 30 March 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines) , Inc.. 23 January 2001 Manifestation of respondents that WMCP is no longer foreign-owned as WMC has sold 100% of its equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is

60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamed as Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation. 18 December 2001 DENR approved the transfer and registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from WMCP. Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since the question of validity of the FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius. FACTS OF THE CASE -Stated in case history- ISSUE/S Preliminary Issue: Standing of Petitioners 1WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before President Aquinos legislative powers expired with the convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect after which. 2WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to above stated laws is invalid Ratio Decidendi Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the FTAA. Since the petition if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned whether or not petitioners are real parties of interest to the contract/agreement. 1NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws effectivity date lies beyond the expiration of the Presidents legislative power is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the president held such power. It does not run counter to EO 200 requiring laws to have 15 days after publication requirement before its effectivity since EO 200 also provides unless it is otherwise provided, EO 279 having stated its own effectivity as shall take effect immediately. In addition, the 15-day post-publication requirement was for the information of the public and does not in any way affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was published on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987. 2Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.[3]

The Constitution provides for four modes by which the States may explore, develop, and Utilize Natural Resources (1) State may directly undertake such activities (2) State may enter into co-production, joint-venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations (60% Filipino owned) (3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens (4) For the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporation for technical or financial assistance. The framers of this Constitution expressly omitted the phrase service contracts that was provided for in the 1973 Constitution which allowed foreign companies to manage and operate mining activities and replaced it with technical or financial assistance only. RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP allows for the management and operation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Although counsel for respondents claim that technical is a very broad term that may cover the management and operation of such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to limit the utilization of the natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos. DECISION Petition Granted. Certain provisions of RA 7942 are declared null and void. So are all provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. Appendix: [1] Philippine Mining Act of 1995 [2] Implementing Rules and Regulations pursuant to RA 7942 issued by the DENR [3] Cont. Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 4 Const. Art. XII Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such

agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical of financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. Chavez vs PEA GR 133250, July 9, 2002 Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay and to construct Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. . The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution? Ruling: Under CA No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. The transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Amended JVA violates Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and is therefore declared null and void ab initio. Chavez vs PEA G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003 Facts: Petitioner asked to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at a price higher than negotiated price. The private entity somehow managed to deceive the government to sell the reclaimed lands without public bidding in patent violation of the Government Auditing Code. The Senate Committees established the clear, indisputable and unalterable fact that the sale of the public lands is grossly and unconscionably undervalued based on official documents submitted by the proper government agencies during the Senate investigation. Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution? Ruling: The bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 78% of the total area is still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands is in violation of Sec. 2 Article XII of the constitution. USERO vs, CA G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005 Property Law FACTS: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion. The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the

Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the creek between the lots. ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part of public domain Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC) provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any individual. Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo [G.R. No. 24950. March 25, 1926.] Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being thepurchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 sq. m., and the other on CalleAldiguer consisting of 59 sq. m., which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. The CFI Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to pay the Tantoco the amount so claimed, plus the interest. Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which thesheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations onMabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao. After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a fewdays before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the municipality. By order of 12 August 1925, the Court declared the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the municipality null and void, thereby dissolving the said attachment. Fromthis order Tantoco has appealed by bill of exceptions. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from with costs against Tantoco. HELD: Property of public domain applies to municipal property for public use; both not within the commerce of man The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga 22 SCRA 1334 Facts Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50 providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were identified and the price were fixed thereof. An allotment for its payment was authorized by the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the Province of its properties without just compensation and due process. Issue: Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional? HELD: The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the properties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use remain as patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga. With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039 cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties. G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972 RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY OF MANILA, respondents-appellees. FACTS: City of Manila owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of Manila, containing an area of 9689.80 sqm. On various dates in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land.

When the last sale was effected August 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue of the land 7490.10 sam was issued in the name of City of Manila. On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the land under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of selling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill was then passed by Congress and approved by President, and became Republic Act 4118, converting the land from communal property to disposable and alienable land of State. To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver the Citys TCT 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land Authority. The request was granted with the knowledge and consent of City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of Land Authority. City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and Register of Deeds from implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional. Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its property without due process of law and payment of just compensation. Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is a communal land, or a portion of public domain owned by State; that the land has not been used by City of Manila for any public purpose; that it was originally a communal land not because it was needed in connection with its organisation as a municipality but rather for the common use of its inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the usufruct over said land and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of City of Manila nor divert the State of its paramount title. Issue: Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila. Held: The land is public property. As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in the possession of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use. When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds

(the land was originally given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people. The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognised the paramount title of the State over its land when it requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as patrimonial property for selling. There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO, ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA PONGCO, respondents. In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer: 1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned, with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters, which lots are among those covered and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan,

2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half () share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided one-half () share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda and Lucila Pongco; 3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid; 4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned; 5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for attomey's fees; and to pay the cost of suit. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence presented to substantiate the same. SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo) The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this Court in G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent judge, on July 27, 1982, issued an order, to wit: Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14, 1982 in G. R. No. L-59938 and; Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution dated July 23, 1983; Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion. (p. 10, Rollo) Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and effect. On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states: It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds to meet its judgment obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C, Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are therefor hereby ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao against said municipality. In like manner, the municipal authorities of San Miguel, Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal possession of the property already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of execution. Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order by the Office

of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within which to submit their written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo) When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance thereof. Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B. Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a), provides: SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. Local government financial affairs, transactions, and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder: (a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. xxx xxx xxx Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect. Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment: (a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for the purpose; (b) By selling the property levied upon; (c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and

(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise, directed by judgment or order of the court. The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982, granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27, 1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982, directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution. Government v. Cabangis53 Phil. 112 FACTS:A certain lots were formerly a part of a large parcelof land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimantsand appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wearaway, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until theyear 1901 when the said lots became completely submergedin water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of VitasEstuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all thesand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the lowlands which were completely covered with water,surrounding that belonging to the Philippine ManufacturingCompany, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, thesubject matter of this proceeding. Issue: Whether or not the lots in question are of propertyof public dominion. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the lots in questionhaving disappeared on account of the gradual erosion due tothe ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such astate until they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling indone by the Government, they are public land in the sensethat neither the herein claimants-appellees nor theirpredecessors did anything to prevent their destruction.