cases for judicial review

CONSTI I: JUDICIAL REVIEW 2010

ANGARA vs ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS:

Angara filed an election protest case against the Electoral Commission. He assailed the power of the Electoral Commission to take cognizance of the election protest with regards to the absence of an express provision in the 1935 Constitution which grants the Electoral Commission the POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS regarding the PROCEDURE OF HEARING ELECTION PROTESTS filed before it.

ISSUE:

WON the ELECTORAL COMMISSION has the power to promulgate its own rules and regulations?

HELD:

YES. The electoral commission is an INDEPENDENT, IMPARTIAL and NON-PARTISAN TRIBUNAL.

The power to determine election contests previously held by the national assembly was transferred to the electoral commission. Thus, it has been given the exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of election contest.

Hence, its power to proceed with the hearing of election contests may not be assailed.

BONDOC V PINEDA

FACTS:

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).

July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition

Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.

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Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

March 4, 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25.

March 13, 1991 – Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.

March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.

The term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; and 4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

ISSUEWON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party

HELD

Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.

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The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.

Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Ratio: The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may not be interfered with by the House.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.

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YNOT vs IAC

FACTS:

The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A.

ISSUE:

WON the phrase MAY SEE FIT is a valid condition for the delegation of legislative power.

HELD:

The phrase MAY SEE FIT is a general word. It can have many interpretation and opportunity for abuse. We may ask what are the standards, criteria or limitations that those officers should set when they make the distribution. However, there is none given in the provision. Thus, only the officers named here can choose the grantee according to their own discretion as they may seem fit to receive.

Apparently, there is a problem in the delegation of legislative powers in this case. This is because of the fact that the officers mentioned here are given unlimited discretion in the distribution of the property arbitrarily taken.

Francisco v HRET

Ratio Decidendi:

[1] “Initiating an impeachment” means filing of the impeachment complaint and acting upon it by the House of Representatives.

[2] More than one impeachment complaint cannot be filed against the same person within the same year.

Art XI Sec 1 - Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Art XI Sec 2 -The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Art XI Sec 3

(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

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(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines , but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC. November 10, 2003

FACTS:

Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution – Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.

November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by 11th Congress

Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is

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sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.

July 2002 – House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund

June 2003 – Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen

à House Committee on Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance

October 2003 – Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives

ISSUES:

1. WON issue is justiciable.

2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12th Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid

HELD:

1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review.

o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic importance. o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been filed and the 2001 rules had been

promulgated and enforced. o Lis mota

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(1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12 th

Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and

(2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

o Judicial Restraint – not an option because the Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.

2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

o Interpretation of the term “initiate” – takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear.

o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI – once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another complaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year.

o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules , impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated:

1. if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or

2. once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or

3. by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House.

These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

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MIRASOL vs C.A.

FACTS:

Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. They were financed by the PNB in their sugar production venture for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loaning scheme. Thus, the petioners signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.

In Nov 1974, Marcos issued PD No 579. It authorizes the Phil. Exchange Co Inc. to purchase sugar allocated for export to US and other foreign markets. Also, it directed that whatever profit PHILEX will gain from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government after expenses have been deducted.

The petioners whi believe that they are still profiting in their business asked PNB for an accounting of their proceeds from their sugar exports. However, PNB ignored the request and petitioners continued to avail other loans. Eventually, Mirasols has an unpaid overdrawn account of 1,513,347.78.

Therefore, Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB with the RTC of Bacolod City.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the solicitor general where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for resolution of the trial court.

2. WON PD 579 and subsequent issuances are unconstitutional.

HELD:

1. YES. The RTC have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, PD or EO. The Constitution vests the power of JUDICIAL REVIEW or POWER TO DECLARE A LAW, TREATY, INTERNATIONAL or EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, PD, EO, INSTRUCTION, ORDINANCE or REGULATION in all regional trial courts.

2. YES. Petitioners contend that PD no 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners are asking the court to exercise its power of judicial review.

REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1. There must be an actual case.2. The question before the court must be ripe.3. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge.4. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.5. The issue of constitutionality must be lis mota of the case.

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PACU vs SECRETARY of EDUCATION

FACTS:

The petitioning colleges and universities requested that Act No. 2706 (An Act Making the Inspection and Recognition of private Schools and Colleges Obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction) as amended be declared unconstitutional. They asserted that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed in the Constitution.

They also refer to Sec 3 of the Act which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education.

The solicitor general, however, points out that none of the petitioning colleges has its own cause to present this case. All of them actually have their permits to operate. Furthermore, the do not assert that the Secretary of Education may harm them by withdrawing or pending their permits to operate.

ISSUE:

WON there exist an actual case or controversy.

HELD:

NO. there is no actual case or controversy here which is the first requisite for the judicial review.

Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest.

MONTECLAROS vs COMELEC

FACTS:

SK is a youth organization originally established by PD NO 684 as the Kabataang Barangay. The KB was composed of all residents whose age is less than 18 years old, without specifying the minimum age.

The local government of 1991 renamed KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths at least 15 years bit not more than 21.

RA 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May 1996 and mandated the COMELEC to supervise the conduct of SK elections. Comelec issued resolution Nos 4713 and 4714.

On feb 18, 02 Antoinette Monteclaros sent a letter to the comelec demanding that SK election should be pursued on May 6, 2002.

The comelec chairman wrote a letter to the speaker of the house and senate president about the status of pending bills of brgy and sk elections. It was stated that the SK elections will be in Nov 2002.

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March 6, 2002 – Hor passed their bills postponing the sk elections and held it on July 15, 2002. Moreover, they also lowered the membership age in the sk to at least 15 but not more than 18.

ISSUES:

WON the HoR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they intended to postpone the sk elections?

WON the HoR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they lowered the membership age in the sk to at least 15 but not more than 18.

HELD:

No.

JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1. IS THERE A CONTROVERSY OR ACTUAL CASE?- No controversy. RA No 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 02 a date acceptable

to petitioners.- A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law.

2. IS THERE A PERSONAL OR SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST?- NO. they have no personal and substantial interest to the case. According tio the case,

they must show that he has been or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which e is lawfully entitled.

- Petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in July 15, 02 SK elections.

- The postponement of the elections was made in good faith.

SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.

Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.

PARTIES

Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)

o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forceso There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation had ceased.

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Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers

o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens

o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law

o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President

Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives

o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affectedo Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a

usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2 Sen. Pimentel

o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no constitutional basis

Solicitor-General

o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration

ISSUES

1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties

2. WON petitioners have legal standing

3. WON issuances of the President are valid

HELD

1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.

-Justiciable even if moot

- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury, then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)

- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. People’s organization status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)

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- SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation

2. Presidential issuances are valid

Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers:

1.calling out power

2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus

3.power to declare martial law.

-2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora)

- It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers

- US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office

- President’s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers

- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.

- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson)

- President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without factual basis.

- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law.

MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC

Facts:

* Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. 7854 “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”

* Petitioners held that Section 2 is unconstitutional because it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions in violation of Section 10 Article X of the Constitution and Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government

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* Petitioners claimed that Section 51 attempts to alter the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution. They alleged that this favors the incumbent Mayor, Jejomar Binay, as this will allow him to run again and restart the terms allowed for him.

* Petitioners contends that Section 52 is unconstitutional because it sought to increase the legislative district of Makati only by special law, this increase was not expressed in the title of thebill, and the addition of another legislative district is not in accordance with Section 5(3) Article VI of the Constitution in relation to the population survey

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the requisites for a judicial review are present in the case (lis mota, actual controversy, locus standi and ripeness?)

2. Whether or not there was actual controversy in the case?

Court found no merit in the Petition. Case is dismissed.

Ratio (Legal Reasoning/ Justification)

1. Section 2 of RA 7854 did not change the present territory of Makati and left the resolution of territorial boundaries to the court to decide by virtue of the then existing boundary dispute between Makati and Taguig which was under court litigation.

It is not unconstitutional because Congress had a legitimate reason for not delineating Makati’s territory by metes and bounds.

2. The basis for assailing the constitutionality of Section 51 of RA 7854 is premised on contingent events i.e. if Mayor Binay will run again, if he will seek a re-election, etc. There is, therefore, no actual controversy, laid down by the petitioners but merely hypothetical issues which have yet to happen. Petitioners are also not the proper parties to raise the abstract issue as they are residents of Taguig (except Mariano, Jr.) They are also asking for declaratory relief where the Court has no jurisdiction since resolution of the boundary dispute is dependent on the outcome of the litigation.

3. Section 52 is not unconstitutional because:

1) Constitution did not prevent Congress from creating another legislative district where the law demands so, such as when population has exceeded 250,000 in a certain area

2) the Constitution provides that should the population increase to more than 250,000, a legislative district is entitled to more than one representative

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3) the creation of an additional legislative district does not need one title in the assailed law, Court upheld a liberal interpretation of the “one title-one subject” rule where a general title can encompass the provisions related to the title.

JOYA v. PCGG

FACTS:

The petitioners prayed for the restraining order seeking to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on Jan 11, 1991 by Chriestie’s of New York of the Old Master’s paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank. These paintings and silverwares were alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marco, his relatives and cronies.

ISSUE:

Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.

HELD:

NO.

1. The question must be raised by the proper party.o Legal standing means personal and substantial interest in the case such that the

party has sustained or will stain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

o Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

o Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth, they have legal personality to restrain respondents. They also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general view.

o Devoid of merit – lack basis in fact and in law.o The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or

corporation or the members thereof.o Thus, the petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question

their alleged unauthorized disposition.

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o Taxpayer suit – if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of invalidating the constitution by misapplication of such funds.

2. Actual controversy o Petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court.o However, this case was found out to be moot and academic.

*petition dismissed.

Oposa v. Factoran

Facts:

Petitioners, minors represented by their parents, filed a complaint in the RTC; it was a taxpayer’s class suit representing themselves, the countless multitudes, and future generations of those who are entitled to the benefits of the country’s virgin tropical forests.

The plaintiff’s complaint was specified as follows: that a balanced and healthful ecology in the Philippines is evidenced by 54% forest cover and 46% everything else.

Twenty five years ago, tropical virgin forests amounted to 53% of our land area but in 1987, satellite images showed that only four percent of the land was covered by forests. Recent surveys, in the meantime, show that only 2.8% of the country’s land area is composed of tropical virgin rainforests.

Public records reveal that at the present rate of deforestation, the Philippine Islands will be bereft of national resources after the end of the decade, if not earlier. Plaintiffs assert their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and claim that they are entitled to protection of this right by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.

The complaint was filed against Factoran, then head of the DENR; it would order the DENR to cancel all existing timber licensing agreements (TLAs) in the country, and cease and desist from accepting, processing, renewing, and approving TLAs. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the judge stated that the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs) cannot be done because it would not allow due process.

The amended petition to the SC repeated its earlier right to a sound environment, and added that

(a) TLAs were not contracts and even if they were considered protected by the non-impairment clause, the State may still revoke such agreements when public interest demands it; and

(b) in granting more TLAs to cover more areas of land than what is available is an act constituting grave abuse of discretion, and is therefore subject to judicial scrutiny.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:

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(1) WON petitioners have standing.

The petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature”. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

(2) Is there a specific right violated that would serve the petitioner’s cause of action?

Yes. Sec. 16, Article II of the Constitution provides the right. A cause of action is therefore present but as far as cancellation of TLA’s is concerned, there is a need to implead the guarantees of the same for they are indispensable parties.

(3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they protected by the non-impairment clause?

No. Even if a law is passed mandating cancellation/modification of the TLAs, the same cannot be stigmatized as a violation of non-impairment clause because it is within the State’s exercise of police power to protect its ecology.

KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR.

FACTS

Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction, to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" between PCSO and PGMC in connection with on-line lottery system a.k.a. "lotto".

1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company in Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO and organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).

2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement in the RFP ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least 60% of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.

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3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. (This was preceded by complaints from the Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)

4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system. Announcement was published in Manila Times, PDI, and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.

5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to “lotto” at the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993

6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that despite the opposition, Malacanang will push through with operation of lotto, that it is actually PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning corporate bidders merely lessors.

7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who informed KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be transmitted before the end of the month. However on the same date, an agreement denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by PCSO and PGMC.

8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacañang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.

PETITIONERS' CLAIM

Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."

And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."

The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended.

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Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.

Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems.

RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS

Private respondent PGMC asserts that:(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with

PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGM.

Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought." Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership where there is "community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." They further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility

They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review."

Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUES

Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi.

Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42, which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association, or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign."

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HELD

1. NO. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'

The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The consequence of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion.

2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the least will be conducting lotteries “ in collaboration or association” and in the most “in joint vernture” with PGMC. The manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are indespensible to the operation of the on-line lottery system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.

By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise.

It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences

Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties.

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(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. Association means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks. )

The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks."

KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO

FACTS

As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."

On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)

Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169, § (B) )

The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3)

In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million.

A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground as

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the Contract of Leases nullified in the first case. Petitioners seek the declaration of the amended ELA as null and void.

The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they question the petitioners' standing to bring suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens."

Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case". and therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.

Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the employment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. (§5)]

The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (§12)

ISSUES

1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?

2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the “law of the case”, thus precluding respondents from assailing the legal standing of petitioners?

3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies be readily invoked by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., self-executing)?

HELD

Ratio

1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in that case is concerned. Parties may be the same but cases are not.

2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-executing.

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Specific Reasoning

1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.

Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. 1 The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest."

Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they are the real party in interest. They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the PCSO would directly injure or affect their rights.

2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.

The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided.

It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.

Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960))

3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of contract law. More specifically, the question is whether petitioners have legal right which has been violated.

1

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IBP v. Zamora

Facts:

IBP alleged that Erap, in ordering the military deployed in Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion because:

(a) no emergency existed, and thus no military deployment was warranted; and

(b) through Letters of Instruction formulated by the head of the national police, the joint exercise of ‘Task Force Tulungan’ (as visibility patrols) conducted by the marines and the PNP was a violation of civilian supremacy because the task of law enforcement was civilian in nature.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:

(1) WON the IBP has standing.

No. They failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. “Upholding the rule of law and the constitution” is not sufficient to clothe it with standing. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.

(2) WON the President’s decision is subject to judicial review.

Yes. When the President calls out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, the Court cannot question the wisdom or substitute its own. However, it can still conduct an examination on whether such a decision was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether or not it was exercised constituting grave abuse of discretion.

In lieu of such a decision made by the President, it is incumbent for the petitioners to show that the decision was without factual basis. No evidence of such nature was adduced.

(3) WON grave abuse of discretion was committed in calling out the military when no emergency existed.

In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:

“More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of

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maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.”

(4) WON in deploying the marines, the President violated the civilian supremacy clause.

IBP contends that with the said agreement, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized and is thus in violation of Sec. 3, Article II of the Constitution.

Court rules that there is no breach. The joint exercise merely constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement; military participation in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed as evidenced by the LOI. Furthermore, leadership is vested in the PNP, a civilian institution, and their assigned role specifically gives them the responsibility of directing and managing the deployment of the marines.

There is no incursion of the military because the marines weren’t incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP - the marines, in effect, merely provided assistance in these visibility patrols; hence, such deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

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