Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

 GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

Facts:Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui.   The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice. 

Issue:Whether or not the sale was void

Ruling:No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation. 

Its finding was based on Article 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that: 

Art. 1471.  If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.[21]

 

The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil Code to

conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was

based on a mere assumption when the law requires positive proof. 

 

The respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of any evidence, that the simulated sales of

the properties were intended by the deceased to be a donation to him.  Thus, the Court holds that the two-storey

residential house, two-storey residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate of the late spouses

Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling the petitioners to a four-fifths (4/5) share thereof.

 

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.  The assailed Decision dated December 27, 1996 of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42993 is herebyAFFIRMED.

In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller

the Court had already denied a claim  for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered intoNeither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis ofunjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the  prohibition  is  to  conserve  the  national  patrimony and  it  is  this  policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect (Willem Beumer Vs. Avelina Amores, G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012).

 

MULLER v. MULLER Supreme Court : First DivisionPetitioners:ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER  Respondents:HELMUT MULLER  G.R No.149615, Date:August 29, 2006 Ponente:YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FC 91CASE:YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution dated August 13,2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. FACTS:Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germanyon September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided tomove and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house inGermany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo propertywas registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouseseventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City.On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolutecommunity of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties betweenthem and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired bygratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.Thus –  “However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouseduring the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively tothe petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in thiscountry cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of theConstitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property.” Respondent appealed tothe Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court’sDecision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, andnot acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trustfor the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.ISSUE:

Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as the costs for the construction of the house? HELD:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller toreimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of 

P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denyingreconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partitionof the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED. DISCUSSION:Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence,they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is theconservation of the national patrimony.In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution,"natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to publicagricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conservingagricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselveswho may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is includedin Article XIII, and it reads as follows:"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak intoaliens’ hands.It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictlyagricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health andvacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, inappellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservativespirit of the Constitution is beyond question.Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof tothis Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of lawin view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditarysuccession,respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust isallowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allowcircumvention of the constitutional prohibition.Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewisemisplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectlywhich, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comesinto equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on theground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futileexercise on respondent’s part.

To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Phil. Carpet Manufacturing Corp. Vs. Tagyamon

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)Decision1 dated July 7, 2009 

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners with full backwages less the amounts they received as separation pays. In case reinstatement would no longer be feasible because the positions previously held no longer exist, the private respondent shall pay them backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pays equal to one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In addition, the private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the petitioners moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each.

The Facts

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered in the Philippines engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs.4 Respondents were its regular and permanent employees, but were affected by petitioner’s retrenchment and voluntary retirement programs.

On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon,5 Luna,6 Badayos,7 Dela Cruz,8 and Comandao9 received a uniformly worded Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:

This is to inform you that in view of a slump in the market demand for our products due to the un-competitiveness of our price, the company is constrained to reduce the number of its workforce. The long-term effects of September 11 and the war in the Middle East have greatly affected the viability of our business and we are left with no recourse but to reorganize and downsize our organizational structure.

We wish to inform you that we are implementing a retrenchment program in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations.

In this connection, we regret to advise you that you are one of those affected by the said exercise, and your employment shall be terminated effective at the close of working hours on April 15, 2004.

Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation pay as mandated by law. You will no longer be required to report for work during the 30-day notice period in order to give you more time to look for alternative employment. However, you will be paid the salary corresponding to the said period. We shall process your clearance and other documents and you may claim the payables due you on March 31, 2004.

Thank you for your services and good luck to your future endeavors.10

As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissed effective March 31, 2004, together with fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in demand.11 PCMC, however, claimed that they availed of the company’s voluntary retirement program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.12

Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC’s decision to terminate their employment, respondents filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio Lim and Mr. David Lim. These cases were later consolidated. Respondents primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s decision inPhilippine Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case),13 as to the validity of the company’s retrenchment program. They further explained that PCMC did not, in fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and subsequent to their termination.14 They also insisted that their acceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case.15

PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the services of respondents being a necessary management prerogative. It pointed out that as an employer, it had no obligation to keep in its employ more workers than are necessary for the operation of his business. Thus, there was an authorized cause for dismissal. Petitioners also stressed that respondents belatedly filed their complaint as they allowed almost three years to pass making the principle of laches applicable. Considering that respondents accepted their separation pay and voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle of estoppel on the part of respondents to question their separation from the service. Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC emphasized that they were not dismissed from employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired from employment to take advantage of the company’s program.16

On August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA) Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.17 The LA found no flaw in respondents’ termination as they voluntarily opted to retire and were subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then regularized, terminated from employment and were paid separation benefits.18 In view of respondents’ belated filing of the complaint, the LA concluded that such action is a mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to collect more money, taking advantage of the 2006 Supreme Court decision.19

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA decision.20 In addition to the LA ratiocination, the NLRC emphasized the application of the principle of laches for respondents’ inaction for an unreasonable period.

Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It stressed that said principle cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period.21 Citing the Court’s decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the doctrine of stare decisis,  in view of the similar factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao, Nemis and Marcos, while acknowledging their voluntary resignation, the CA found the same not a bar to the illegal dismissal case because they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC was losing money.22 With the foregoing findings, the CA ordered that respondents be reinstated with full backwages less the amounts they received as separation pay. In case of impossibility of reinstatement, the CA ordered PCMC to pay respondents backwages and in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one month pay or ½ month pay for every year of service whichever is higher, plus moral damages.23

ISSUES:

a) Res Judicata should not be followed if to follow it is to perpetuate error (Philippine Trust Co., and Smith Bell & Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, 36 (1933). The (Supreme) Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality (Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406)

b) Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. Waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of the laborer’s claims are legitimate and should be respected by the Court as the law between the parties (Gamogamo vs. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp., G.R. No. 141707, May 2, 2002; Alcasero vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 129) Where the persons making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as valid and binding undertaking (Periquet vs. NLRC, 186 SCRA 724 [1990]; Magsalin vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. National Organization of Working Men (N.O.W.M.], G.R. No. 148492, May 2, 2003).24

RULING OF THE COURT:

x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law."32

An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants’ rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 114633 of the Civil Code. Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches may be applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.35

As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal because the employees’ consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities.  The circumstances show that petitioner’s misrepresentation led its employees, specifically respondents herein, to believe that the company was suffering losses which necessitated the implementation of the voluntary retirement and retrenchment programs, and eventually the execution of the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim. The amounts already received by respondents as consideration for signing the releases and quitclaims, however, should be deducted from their respective monetary awards.  Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, et al. v. Ignacio B. Tagyamon, et al., G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013.

Comandao), the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondentis hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners with full backwages less theamounts they received as separation pays. In case reinstatement would nolonger be feasible because the positions previously held no longer exist,the private respondent shall pay them backwages plus, in lieu ofreinstatement, separation pays equal to one (1) month pay, or one-half(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In addition,the private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the petitioners moraldamages in the amount of P20,000.00 each.SO ORDERED.3 The FactsPetitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC ) is acorporation registered in the Philippines engaged in the business ofmanufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs.4 Respondents were itsregular and permanent employees, but were affected by petitioner’sretrenchment and voluntary retirement programs.On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon,5 received a uniformly worded Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:This is to inform you that in view of a slump in the market demandfor our products due to the un-competitiveness of our price, the companyis constrained to reduce the number of its workforce. The long-termeffects of September 11 and the war in the Middle East have greatlyaffected the viability of our business and we are left with no recourse butto reorganize and downsize our organizational structure.3Decision 3 G.R. No. 191475We wish to inform you that we are implementing a retrenchment program in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code of thePhilippines, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations.In this connection, we regret to advise you that you are one ofthose affected by the said exercise, and your employment shall beterminated effective at the close of working hours on April 15,

2004.Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation pay as mandated bylaw. You will no longer be required to report for work during the 30-daynotice period in order to give you more time to look for alternativeemployment. However, you will be paid the salary corresponding to thesaid period. We shall process your clearance and other documents and youmay claim the payables due you on March 31, 2004.Thank you for your services and good luck to your futureendeavors.10 As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissedeffective March 31, 2004, together with fifteen (15) other employees on theground of lack of market/slump in demand.11 PCMC, however, claimed thatthey availed of the company’s voluntary retirement program and, in fact,voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, andQuitclaim.12 Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC’s decision to terminatetheir employment, respondents filed separate complaints for illegal dismissalagainst PCMC, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio Limand Mr. David Lim. These cases were later consolidated. Respondents primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Philippine Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case),13 asto the validity of the company’s retrenchment program. They furtherexplained that PCMC did not, in fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior toand subsequent to their termination.14 They also insisted that theiracceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 7, 2009 and Resolution dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 105236 are AFFIRMED.

1. A court is a tribunal, often a governmental institution, with the authority to adjudicate legal disputes between parties and carry out the administration of justice in civil, criminal, and administrative matters in accordance with the rule of law.

 II.                Quasi-judicial Power and the Philippine Legal System

In general, administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as

determined by proper governmental organs.[15] Administrative power flows from executive power of the

Government and is therefore held by the President and delegated to his officials and the corresponding employees

of administrative agencies who are empowered to act and implement the law within its prescribed limits. Corollary

to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance

of general peace and public order.

 As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more

administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned

to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the

legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-

judicial powers in what is now not unquestionably called the fourth department of the government.[16]

 A.     Quasi-judicial Power of Administrative Agencies

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power held by certain administrative agencies to hear

and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the

standards laid down by the law in enforcing and administering the same.[17]

A quasi-judicial agency has been defined as “an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which

affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.”[18] Essentially, a quasi-judicial

agency is one which exercises a discretion that is essentially judicial in character but is not a tribunal within the

judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense.[19]

The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is

essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or

reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.  In carrying out

their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the

existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action

and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[20]

It has been said that “the very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial

powers.”[21] This is not necessarily true, for a broad and haphazard appreciation of the said dictum would have

the effect of vesting the entire executive branch, with all its bureaus and instrumentalities, with quasi-judicial

power, despite the actual delineation of the powers vested in such agencies by Congress. Numerous cases have

already drawn a distinction between mere exercise of administrative power and quasi-judicial discretion.

The very essence of this adjudicatory power is not simply the coupling of the faculty of receiving evidence and

making conclusions of fact therefrom but rather the inclusion of the faculty of applying the law to such conclusions.

Judicial or quasi-judicial function involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the

contending parties are with respect to the matter in controversy.[22] In other words, the tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function must be clothed with power and authority to pass judgment or render

a decision on the controversy by construing and applying the laws to that end.[23]

Thus, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals[24]and Santos v. Go,[25]the Supreme Court held that the Department of Justice

(DOJ) is not a quasi-judicial agency or its public prosecutors, strictly, quasi-judicial officers.[26] It has likewise

been held that the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) does not possess adjudicatory or quasi-

judicial powers as provided by the Labor Code and Executive Order No. 126.[27] Where the law intended that an

administrative agency is limited to performing investigations or fact-finding functions, the agency cannot exercise

quasi-judicial functions.[28]

In general, the quantum of quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in its

enabling act. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends

largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.[29] Nonetheless, a

grant of jurisdiction on quasi-judicial agencies necessarily includes such implied powers that can be inferred or are

implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication.[30] Thus, it has been held that the

issuance of an ex parte cease and desist order is the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the

authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to

enforce or execute the judgments it renders, unless the law provides otherwise.[31]

Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that the grant of adjudicatory powers is in the nature of a limited and

special jurisdiction; that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the agency’s competence

and field of expertise.[32] The rationale for such rule is rooted in the principle of separation of powers. The

investiture of quasi-judicial powers on a quasi-judicial agency does not put such agency at par with the regular

courts of justice. In conferring such adjudicatory powers and functions on an administrative agency, the legislature

could not have intended to provide it with all the vast powers inherent in a regular court of justice.[33]Thus, it has

been held that a quasi-judicial agency has no authority to issue a writ of certiorari.[34]

 B.     Due Process before Quasi-Judicial Agencies

Considering the very nature of quasi-judicial power touches upon fundamental and proprietary freedoms and

rights, it is significant to note the malleable standard of due process that has emerged in proceedings before

administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial power. The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”[35] or an “opportunity to be heard”.

[36] Indubitably, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords

paramount importance to justice and fairness.[37] The seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial

Relations[38] provides for seven (7) “cardinal rights” in justiciable cases before administrative tribunals. These

rights have been summarized, as follows:

1)       The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2)       The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3)       The decision must have something to support itself.

4)       The evidence must be substantial.

5)       The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record

and disclosed to the parties affected.

6)       The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and

facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7)       The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties

to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.[39]

These standards laid down in Ang Tibay provide a more concrete framework of due process that takes further the

words of Daniel Webster of due process as requiring that “a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds

upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”[40]This right to procedural due process is “absolute” in the

sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions.[41] Insofar as administrative

proceedings are concerned, the central element of fairness is essential.[42] This principle of procedural due

process has been explained, as follows:

At its most basic, procedural due process is about fairness in the mode of procedure to be followed.  It is not a novel

concept, but one that traces its roots in the common law principle of natural justice.

Natural justice connotes the requirement that administrative tribunals, when reaching a decision, must do so with

procedural fairness. If they err, the superior courts will step in to quash the decision by certiorari or prevent the

error by a writ of prohibition. The requirement was initially applied in a purely judicial context, but was

subsequently extended to executive regulatory fact-finding, as the administrative powers of the English justices of

the peace were transferred to administrative bodies that were required to adopt some of the procedures

reminiscent of those used in a courtroom. Natural justice was comprised of two main sub-rules:audi alteram

partem – that a person must know the case against him and be given an opportunity to answer it; and nemo judex

in sua cause debe esse – the rule against bias.[43]

The rule on procedural due process as applied to quasi-judicial agencies is synthesized in contemporary

jurisprudence, particularly in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections:[44]

The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stageof the proceedings. 

The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a

reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all

instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a

hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.

The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a

hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at thedeliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the

evidence presented during the hearing.  These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the

case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the

totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted

by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on

substantial evidence.

Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further

complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional

requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.   As a

component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the “duty to give reason” to enable the affected

person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public

scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.[45]

The jurisprudential force of the aforementioned principles are beyond doubt, having been time and again upheld

by the Supreme Court in cases too numerous to mention. It must be pointed out, however, that the devil is in the

details. Ever present is that lurking pitfall for the infringement of due process through prevailing administrative

procedures promulgated by every administrative agency and the available recourses therefrom under our existing

framework of law. That every administrative agency has rule-making powers to promulgate rules of procedure for

proceedings before it is indubitable. Nonetheless, it appears that most, if not every administrative agency in

existence, has saw it fit to exercise such power to its hilt which has resulted in the promulgation of rules of

procedure as numerous as there are administrative agencies in existence. While most rules generally follow the

sketch of due process as it is interpreted by the judiciary, every administrative issuance possesses a distinctive

variance therefrom.  These variances are presumably dictated by the technical niceties and nuances of the object or

phenomenon subject of administrative regulation. Such provisions laid down by the agency concerned, however,

has the effect of determining the overall manner by which a party is to be given an opportunity to be heard.

1. court of justice - a tribunal that is presided over by a magistrate or by one or more judges who administer justice according to the laws

quasi-judicial

adj1. (Law) denoting or relating to powers and functions similar to those of a judge, such as those exercised by an arbitrator,administrative tribunal, etcCollins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

qua•si-ju•di•cialadj.

pertaining to or exercising powers or functions that resemble those of a court or a judge: a quasi-judicial agency.[1830–40]

R.P. vs. Asuncion

GR. No. 108208

Facts:

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows:

On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.

On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an Information 2 charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable motive, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on his thorax, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to law.

Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts." The principal issue in this case is whether the term "regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it does not while the respondent Judge and the intervenor-respondent hold otherwise.

Section 46 reads as follows:

Sec. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial:Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.

There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in the course of the latter's mission. On the other hand, the private respondent asserts in his Comment that he "shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful defense of his life." 57 Petitioner ignored this claim in its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to be proved and its assertion in the Comment does not cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier, of the information

Issue:

whether the offense charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, and

(1) If he determines that the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, DIRECTING the respondent Judge to forthwith transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it; or

(2) If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the challenged Orders of 24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992, to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224, and to render judgment thereon.

 

PICHAY Vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY(2012)ODES no power to try and decide cases’ E.O. No. 13 empowering it isunconstitutional FACTS On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issuedExecutive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring itsfunctions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative andAdjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of theLocal Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbentmembers of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, SusanaDumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, whicharose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-FiveThousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by ExecutiveSecretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents tosubmit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliancetherewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelammanifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of gravemisconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", anddocketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of theOmbudsman.ISSUE Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrativeoffice a quasi-judicial function through and E.O. and not through legislativeenactment by Congress.HELD  NO.The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the ExecutiveDepartment under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out areorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is anexpress grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292(the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of theExecutive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structureof the Office of the President."The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring needof every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economyand efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of theExecutive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of thePresident must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President inthe manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, theOffice of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasissupplied)Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to adivision specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislativeauthority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power toreorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper byabolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions fromone unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, thePresident's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the PresidentProper but still within the Office of thePresident is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from theOffice of the President to Departments or gencies, and vice versa.The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial notonly as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touchesupon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actionsundertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When thePAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10

 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC havenow been transferred, is an office within the Office of the PresidentProper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the PresidentProper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferringits functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.What actions does reorganization include? The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate andDistinct Office.The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additionaland distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunctanti-graft body were

simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existingoffice within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization requiredno more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of theODESLA through the establishment of a third division – the Investigativeand Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could take on theadditional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existingstructure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of  personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.T h e I A D - O D E S L A   i s a f a c t - f i n d i n g   a n d r e c o m m e n d a t o r y b o d y n o t v e s t e d   w i t h   q u a s i -j u d i c i a l   p o w e r s .while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to theconduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints againstall presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report andrecommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding andrecommendatory body to the President, not having the power tosettlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v.Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. ThePhilippine Truth Commission:Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicialfunction of a court of justice, or even a quasi- judicial agency or office. Thefunction of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of acontroversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factualconclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determinedauthoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach uponthe Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of thecomplaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of theOmbudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal casescognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only inthe exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time,take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existenceof probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation,the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain sountil acted upon by the President.Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform itsduties as an impartial tribunal, contending that both the IAD-ODESLA andrespondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The meresuspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partialitycannot be presumed. Petitioner must present substantial proof to show thatthe lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of theinvestigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's

 duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justifyits nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed todischarge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which ISindubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority toreorganize the Office of the President

BIRAOGO VS PTC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO

vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B.

FUA, SR.

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY

FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of

graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and

accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,

Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as

it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can

do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena

powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding

body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our

courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They

argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and

appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.

1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve

economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was

hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-

judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987

Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials

and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of

the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of

control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed

and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.

No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a

mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it

is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s

jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable

purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and

to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling

for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity

of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such

that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of

constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very

lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as

members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his

office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution

in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their

mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct

injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is

governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the

name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in

assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he

is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order

and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such

that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s

assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the

Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their

seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President

are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President

granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from

the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad

hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that

he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement

of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There

is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to

specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has

provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that

would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety

in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative

function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause

for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the

performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent

transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987

Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights

conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated

individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a

state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a

statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause

permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has

four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to

rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth

commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during

the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its

own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection

clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a

vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate

all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in

accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not

conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar

as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

 Summary: Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (GR 100150, 5 January1994)Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights[GR 100150, 5 January 1994]En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concurFacts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an ExecutiveOfficer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, wassent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the North Edsa VendorsAssociation, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July1990) within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo,et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang SinumpaangSalaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, CarlitoAbelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to beaddressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores,and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directingSimon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of thevendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. Onthe basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocularinspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls,sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement offinancial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materialsand food under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from furtherdemolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." Amotion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion todismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al.filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning theextent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further hearing andinvestigating CHR Case 90—1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."Issue:  Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to desist” against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.’sstalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHRorder.Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on HumanRights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involvingcivil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent thatthe delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe

 cases of human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatmentof prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagingsand hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likelybeen meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorilymaking a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit toresolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall withinthe authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that whatare sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, theland adjoins the

North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy nationalhighway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxicalthat a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its isnot, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, theCourt not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia ofFermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights"intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt itsoperational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance withthe Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "tocite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordancewith the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedureessential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercisedagainst persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, orwho decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (asemantic interplay for a restraining order) herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds froman adjudicative power that it does not possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commissionon Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legalaid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not beconstrued to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it thatwere the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by theConstitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aidservices' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ ofpreliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rightsviolations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ ofpreliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within hisdistrict], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is anancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rightsand interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."

CD Simon, Jr. vs. CHR

 Edit  0   1 …

Topic: Personal Dignity and Human Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTSG.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS:On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist  from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the  investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS:  On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official.  The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in

question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. 

 Title : HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMANRIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO,AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO

ESBER,Citation : G.R. No. 96681December 2, 1991Ponente : NARVASA, J.Facts :800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure ofpublic authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from theirclasses, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary ofEducation served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure toheed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School wereadministratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 andtemporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachersstaged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carinodecreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and delCastillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of thestriking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime,the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain thatwhile they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement asteachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with itearlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continuedhearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should nothave been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violationof their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.” Issue:Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involvedHeld:

  The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was notmeant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicatemuch less take over the functions of the latter.The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that itmay investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rightsviolations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened tothe judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function ofreceiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factualconclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factualconclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally anddefinitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, torepeat, the Commission does not have.The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate allforms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its owninitiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedureas it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules ofCourt. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunityfrom prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidenceis necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or inextending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hearand determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not toadjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understoodand quite distinct meanings.

JURISDICTIONthe official power to make legal decisions and judgments."federal courts had no jurisdiction over the case"synonyms:

authority, control, power, dominion, rule, administration, command, sway,leadership, sovereignty, hegemony"an area under French jurisdiction"

the extent of the power to make legal decisions and judgments."the claim will be within the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal"

a system of law courts; a judicature.plural noun: jurisdictions"in some jurisdictions there is a mandatory death sentence for murder"

Power or right of a legal or political agency to exercise its authority over a person, subject matter, or territory. Jurisdiction over a person relates to the authority to try him or her as a defendant. Jurisdiction over a subject matter relates to authority derived from the country's constitution or laws to consider a particular case. Jurisdiction over a territory relates to the geographic area over which a court has the authority to decide cases. Concurrent jurisdiction exists where two courts have simultaneous responsibility for the same case.

EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IS TO APPLY WHETHER ACT OF THE JUDGE TO DECIDE THE CASE OR IN FILING OF A CASE IS JURISDICTIONAL. THE RIGHT PLACE AND COURT WHEREIN WE FILE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION.

ANTONINO VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY GR. NO. 185663

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution[2] dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145.

Facts :

  Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been leasing a residential property located

at Makati City and owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su).  Under the governing lease contract, Antonino

was accorded with the right of first refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the subject property.[3]

 

          On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking Agreement[4] where Su agreed

to sell to Antonino the subject property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement as to who between

them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended.[5] 

 

On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,

for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages.  The complaint was

raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-802.[6]  Later that same day, Antonino filed an amended

complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell to her the subject property.[7]

 

In an Order[8] dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of

improper venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antonino’s complaint is

one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed

in the court of the place where any of the parties resides.  Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila,

respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.  Specifically:

 The instant case is an action for specific performance with damages, a personal action,

which may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides (Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court).  Records show that plaintiff is a resident of 706 Acacia Avenue, Ayala AlabangVillage, Muntinlupa City while defendant is a resident of 550 Sto. Cristo St., Binondo, Manila.  Hence, the instant case should have been filed in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff.  Contrary to the claim of plaintiff, the alleged written agreements presented by the plaintiff in her Amended Complaint do not contain any stipulation as to the venue of actions.  x x x[9]

  

The RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Antonino’s complaint in view of her failure to

pay the correct amount of docket fees.  Citing Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10] the RTC

ruled that:

 Anent the non-payment of filing fees on the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that no

new assessment was made when the Amended Complaint was filed since there [were] no additional

damages prayed for.  The Manchester decision has been recently relaxed as to allow additional payment of the necessary fees if the Honorable Court so orders an assessment thereof.

 The Court is not persuaded. The Amended Complaint, which the Court notes to have been filed at 4:00 o’clock in the

afternoon or few hours after the initial complaint was filed, further prays that judgment be rendered “ordering defendant to sell his property located at 1623 Cypress, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004 and ordering defendant to desist from selling his property to  any other party other than plaintiff.”, which makes the instant case also an action for Specific Performance in addition to the claim for Damages.  However, the value of the described property was not stated in the prayer and no docket fees were paid.  Thus, following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, the instant case is hereby dismissed.[11]

 Issue: 

  The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the propriety of Antonino’s use of the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.

Ruling: 

          Antonino’s cause of action is premised on her claim that there has already been a perfected contract of sale by

virtue of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with his obligations as

seller.  However, by claiming the existence of a perfected contract of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired

title to the subject property.  She does not allege otherwise and tacitly acknowledges Su’s title to the subject

property by asking for the consummation of the sale.

 

That there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged sale does not confer to Antonino title to

the subject property.  Ownership is transferred when there is actual or constructive delivery and the thing is

considered delivered when it is placed in the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is made through a

public instrument and the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred.[36]  In other words, Antonino’s

complaint is not in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject property is not at issue.

 

          Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real property does not make Antonino’s complaint real in

nature in the absence of a contrary claim of title.  After a contract of sale is perfected, the right of the parties to

reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation, arises – the vendee may require the vendor to compel the

transfer the title to the object of the sale[37] and the vendor may require the payment of the purchase price.[38]  The

action to cause the consummation of a sale does not involve an adverse claim of ownership as the vendor’s title is

recognized and the vendor is simply being asked to perform an act, specifically, the transfer of such title by any of

the recognized modes of delivery.  Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong venue sufficed for the

dismissal thereof, it would be superfluous to discuss if Antonino’s non-payment of the correct docket fees likewise

warranted it.

 

At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her complaint, such had already become final and

executory and will not be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less, proved that there was

extrinsic fraud.  Moreover, annulment of the assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as

an appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antonino’s fault.  Litigation should end and terminate

sometime and somewhere.  It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a

judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[39]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated May

26, 2008 and Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are

hereby AFFIRMED.

 

Spouses Abrenica Vs. Law Firm of Abrenica

The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420[1] decided by this Court on 22 September 2006. For brevity, we quote the relevant facts narrated in that case:

Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (“the firm”).

In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was SEC Case No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997.

The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, held that:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948

1.         Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of the amounts he received as profits from the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount of ₱4,524,000.00;

2.         Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the said amount of ₱4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum from the time he received the same and converted the same to his own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and  

3.         To pay the costs of suit.

CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959

1.         Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the amounts he received under the retainer agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of ₱320,000.00.

2.         Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount received by him under the Retainer Agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta

Land Corporation in the amount of ₱320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum from June 1998 until fully paid;

3.         Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his cash advance in the amount of ₱25,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision becomes final; and

4.         To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid the required appeal fees.

Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution  pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.

On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC[2] prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as the correct mode of appeal from the trial court’s decisions on intra-corporate disputes.  

Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents’ motion for execution.

On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show cause why it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said Order. Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed Resolution dated June 29, 2005 x x x.

x x x                                        x x x                                        x x x

The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its August 23, 2005 Resolution.

Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on the ground that the appeal filed by petitioner was the wrong remedy. For that reason, we held as follows:[3]

Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even if these were timely filed. In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision because the proper mode of appeal should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. x x x.

x x x                            x x x                            x x x

Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. “Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve

no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.” In the instant case, the trial court's decision became final and executory on January 3, 2005. Respondents had already acquired a vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which should not be disturbed any longer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 29, 2005 and August 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 denying admission of petitioner’s Petition for Review are AFFIRMED.

Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April 2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final and executory.[4]

Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTC’s Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42948 and Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the following grounds:

I.                   The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.

II.                The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their respective position[s].

III.             The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership transaction.

IV.             The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible.

V.                The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was ₱3 million and not ₱8 million.

VI.             The lower court erred in ruling that petitioner’s retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction.

VII.          The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners’ permissive counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents.

VIII.       The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it acted without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction. [5]

We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.

On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution[6] dismissing the Petition.  First, it reasoned that the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioners.[7]Considering that the dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy under Rule 47 was no longer available.

Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and the appreciation by the trial court of the evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial court did not mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event, petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2 May 2007, but the CA had by then already issued the 26 April 2007 Resolution dismissing the Petition.

On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and executory.[8]

Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA dated 25 May 2007[9] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of extrinsic fraud into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679.  The following were the grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:

A.    Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the Consolidated Decision x x x based on the following badges of fraud and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:

I.       The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims, as it relied purely on the gist of what its personnel did as regards the transcript of stenographic notes the latter [sic] in collusion with the respondents.

II.    The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to prove their respective positions by relying totally on what was presented to it by its personnel who drafted the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the respondents.

III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.

IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible as against the petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnesses for the same reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.

V.    The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was ₱3 million and not ₱8 million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.

VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioner’s retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.

VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners’ permissive counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents also for the same reasons as the above.

B.     As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full knowledge of its incapacity[,] rendered/promulgated the assailed Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction.[10] (Underscoring in the original.)

On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution[11] dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719, which held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the following:

x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained the prayer for the annulment of the subject consolidated Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as the present annulment of judgment case.

x x x                            x x x                            x x x

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

x x x                                        x x x                                        x x x

x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the parties, what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (as in this case), the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject ofan appeal (Republic vs. “G” Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration[12] on 28 August 2007.

While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion[13] with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the manner of distribution of the firm’s assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal was the correct remedy.

On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim [14] also with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she[15] and her stepchildren[16] owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.

Accordingly, the RTC scheduled[17] a hearing on the motion.  On 17 October 2007, however, petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents.[18]

Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of the property covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable settlement of the money judgment.[19]

Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the second assailed Resolution[20] denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for filing was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in the motion were merely recycled and rehashed propositions, which had already been dispensed with.

Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by the RTC. That issue arose from the Order [21]  given by the trial court to petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take cognizance of the Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the dismissal of their appeal despite this Court’s explanation in G.R. No. 169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and insisted that the remedy they had undertaken was correct.  

Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation of the merits of the case. They raise in the present Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of Judgment (including the Amended Petition) quoted above.

Next, they assert that petitioner Joena’s right to due process was also violated when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.

Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, since 27 August 2007 was a holiday. Therefore, they had until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.

Since then, it appears that a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the sum of ₱5 million for the property covered by TCT No. 216818.

On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners filed a Complaint[22] with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein respondents and Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City. [23] Petitioners sought the nullification of the sheriff’s sale on execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch 226, as well as the payment of damages.  They alleged that the process of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully, and in violation of their right to due process.

On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents and/or their agents, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No. 216818.[24]

The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted respondents to file a Motion[25] before us to cite for contempt petitioner spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was on the ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City, while the present case was also still pending.

Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226 an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.[26] That Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution[27] issued on 10 November 2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari[28] under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.

Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (T.R.O.)[29] after Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five days from receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised in the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.

 

Our Ruling

Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for Reconsideration.

We DENY petitioners’ claims.

The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer available to them, because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed.

It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.

In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,[30] we said:

It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party claim or any other remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was no longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her claim.

Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990).

After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998.[31] In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties – in particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table – were owned by the latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannot be sustained.

Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a  spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property.  Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.

We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.

Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum shopping when the latter filed Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case was still pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon,[32] we explained forum shopping in this wise:

Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping —

(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or

(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open,” or

(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same from the original court.

Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff in executing the judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case questions the merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959.  These cases have different causes of action. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are AFFIRMED.