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5/18/2018 CasesforSucc-slidepdf.com http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cases-for-succ 1/58 G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990 LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs. !E !ONORA"LE #NERMED#AE A$ELLAE %OUR and &E'U' YANE', E'EL#A  YANE', ANON#O YANE', RO'AR#O YANE', and #LUM#NADO YANE', respondents.  FERNAN, C.J.:  This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate ppellate Court dated ugust !", "#$! in C% &.'. C o. *+++ entitled -esus /anes et al. v. Dr. 'odolfo 0iason et al.- afrming the decision dated ul1 $, "#23 of the Court of First Instance of egros 4ccidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pa1 5ointl1 and severall1 the private respondents the sum of 67,777.77 representing the actual value of 8ots os. 22!% and 22!%9 of the cadastral surve1 of urcia, egros 4ccidental and reversing the su;5ect decision insofar as it awarded the sums of 6,777.77, 6*,777.77 and 6,777.77 as actual damages, moral damages and attorne1<s fees, respectivel1 and (;) the resolution of said appellate court dated a1 !7, "#$3, den1ing the motion for reconsideration of its decision.  The real properties involved are two parcels of land identi=ed as 8ot 22!% and 8ot 22!%9 which were originall1 known as 8ot 22! of the cadastral surve1 of urcia, egros 4ccidental. 8ot 22!, with an area of "*+,*3# s>uare meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of niceto /anes under 4riginal Certi=cate of Title o. '4%3$*$ ($$73) issued on 4cto;er #, "#"2 ;1 the 'egister of Deeds of 4ccidental egros (?@h. ). niceto /anes was survived ;1 his children, 'u=no, Felipe and Teodora. Aerein private respondents, ?stelita, Iluminado and esus, are the children of 'u=no who died in "#+ while the other private respondents, ntonio and 'osario /anes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived ;1 her child, ovita (ovito) li;. 1  It is not clear wh1 the latter is not included as a part1 in this case. niceto left his children 8ots 22! and $!. Teodora cultivated onl1 three hectares of 8ot $! as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twent1%four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots ;ut it is esta;lished that 'u=no and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the out;reak of Borld Bar II. ccording to ?stelita, from the -apanese time up to peace time-, the1 did not visit the parcels of land in >uestion ;ut -after li;eration-, when her ;rother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato 0antiago, Fuente;ella (6uentevella) and lvare were in possession of 8ot 22!. ( It is on record that on a1 "#, "#!$, Fortunato D. 0antiago was issued Transfer Certi=cate of  Title o. 'F +#3 (#2#2) covering 8ot 22!% with an area of !2,$"$ s>uare meters. 3  TCT o. 'F +#3 descri;es 8ot 22!% as a portion of 8ot 22! of the cadastral surve1 of urcia and as originall1 registered under 4CT o. $$73.  The ;igger portion of 8ot 22! with an area of ""$,$!" s>uare meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. 0antiago on 0eptem;er +, "#!$ nder TCT o. 'T%+#* ($"# ). ) 0aid transfer certi=cate of title also contains a certi=cation to the eEect that 8ot 22!%9 was originall1 registered under 4CT o. $$73. 4n a1 !7, "#**, 0antiago sold 8ots 22!% and 22!%9 to onico 9. Fuente;ella, r. in consideration of the sum of 62,777.77. 5  Conse>uentl1, on Fe;ruar1 7, "#*+, TCT os. T% "##" and T%"## were issued in Fuente;ella<s name. 6 fter Fuente;ella<s death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratri@ thereof (rsenia '. da. de Fuente;ella, his wife) =led in 0pecial 6roceedings o. 3!2! in the Court of First Instance of egros 4ccidental, a motion re>uesting authorit1 to sell 8ots 22!% and 22!%9. 7  91 virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8  on arch 3, "#*$, rsenia da. de Fuente;ella sold said lots for 6+,777.77 to 'osendo lvare. 9  Aence, on pril ", "#*$ TCT os. T%!"+* and T%!"++ covering 8ots 22!% and 22!%9 were respectivel1 issued to 'osendo lvare. 10  Two 1ears later or on a1 +, "#+7, Teodora /anes and the children of her ;rother 'u=no, namel1, ?stelita, Iluminado and esus, =led in the Court of First Instance of egros

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G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents. FERNAN, C.J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. 16It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner: A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed,B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED. 29The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said decision reads:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.SO ORDERED. 32Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33The petition is devoid of merit.As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.xxx xxx xxxPetitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant. D E C I S I O NREYES, J. B. L., J.:Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing its claim against the Estate of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause of action.The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity agreements, all contained the following stipulations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryPremiums. As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines Currency, in advance as premium there of for every __________ months or fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.Indemnity. The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or any extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any of them; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay, reimburse and make good to the COMPANY, its successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount involved in the litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorneys fees, but in no case less than P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the payment thereof under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement for the purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which may be granted under this indemnity agreement.Interest on amount paid by the Company. Any and all sums of money so paid by the company shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not paid, will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as the capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or not.x x x x x x x x xWaiver. It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question which may arise between them by reason of this document and which has to be submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity agreement is hereby likewise waived.x x x x x x x x xOur Liability Hereunder. It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the principal upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such default. (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate, the lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) that whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the reasoning of the court below ran as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThe administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary integrity. As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the personality, character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and renounced by the security company. The security company has not demanded from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of first mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company, no real property was mentioned in the list of properties mortgaged which appears at the back of the indemnity agreement. (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryUnder the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).x x x x x x x x xThe principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythey take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y obligaciones; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryle excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la transmision, como elemento natural a toda relacion juridica, salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es menester el pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus herederos.Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se quiere, es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir ms all de las personas que les dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycuando no se quiera esto, se impone una estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the companys faith and confidence in the financial stability of the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand if that be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryART. 2057. If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be guarantor.From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary it is his right, not his duty; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe may waive it if he chooses, and hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is incompatible with the trial courts stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latters undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15 Pla., 553; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryMaxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves vs. Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryErnst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)For Defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand it is urged that the rule does not apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code.Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estates liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Suretys claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal was erroneous.Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law. Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.The antecedent facts are as follows:On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,4 this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer13 and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.15The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.17The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.18In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.IV.RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.V.THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.1a\^/phi1.netAccording to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.The petition is bereft of merit.The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.ntAt the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.21In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated:In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.22This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31 This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision: [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs. G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees, vs.TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja,appellant. .G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee, vs.JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja,plaintiff-appellee, vs.JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.REYES, J.B.L., J.:pOf these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja, 1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:A G R E E M E N TTHIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and betweenThe heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,A N DThe heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.W I T N E S S E T HTHAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronillawith a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedentleft no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. 4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following clause:III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his heredit