Balus vs. Balus

G.R. No. 168970

January 15, 2010

Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On

January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained

from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged

property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for that

purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after

the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank.

Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246

square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted

knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they

intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject

property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the

Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile,

petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against

petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new

owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to

them.

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed

property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties

had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA ruled that

when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period

and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank,

their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even

after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was

eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.

Held: The court is not persuaded.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject

property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was

mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on

October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on

January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title

was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the

Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the

inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the

time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In

the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows

that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his

heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from

their father.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-

ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement

where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned

by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same.

Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in

common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a

sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or

interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership,

an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

Union Bank v. Santibanez

452 SCRA 228 | Abu

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered

into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one

(1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a

promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On

Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of

Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a

Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.

Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special

administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,

Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between

themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence.

Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor

respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was

executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities

to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5,

1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund

and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one

intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on

his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the

loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement

signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;

hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.

Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and

Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint

agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.

In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money

from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She

points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate

proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother

Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate,

the heirs or third parties.

ISSUE:

- W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate

estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending.

- W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was

void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.

- W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.

HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of

the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of

properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation

and distribution of the estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has

been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which

reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall

be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund

and Florence, my children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent

which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may

acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition

involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and

Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its

execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will

covering the said tractors.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the

late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with

Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This

requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or

administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine

whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the

speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the

distributees, legatees, or heirs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability

incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and

the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and

his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may

only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing

guaranty.

VITUG vs CA

188 SCRA 755

FACTS: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two

wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A. naming private respondent

Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In said decision, the court upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte

as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s estate with her (Mrs. Vitug’s) widower, petitioner Romarico

G. Vitug, pending probate.

Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of

stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate, plus

interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the CA the alleged advances were spent

for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and “increment thereto.”

Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn were

conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for

reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and

for “concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a

survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.

The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.

On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa

which “did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,”

and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the

provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?

HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied

in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated

person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his

death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies

subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on,

Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to

deliver one party’s separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to

be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take

effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it

involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership,

as held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation” and that it is no “cloak” to circumvent the law on

conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property,

say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an

“and/or” account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038,

they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it

in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter

has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of

the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets

left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it

forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

[Case Digest!] Mercado vs. Santos

This case may be assigned in Wills and Succession.

FACTS:

Facts re: probate proceedings in blue. Facts re: criminal case for forgery/falsification in red.

[May 28, 1931] Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his

deceased wife, Ines Basa, with the Pampanga CFI.

[June 31, 1931] The will was admitted to probate.

[October 27, 1932] Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of

San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against Mercado for falsification/forgery of the will

probated. Mercado was arrested. The complaint was subsequently dismissed at the instance of

de Leon herself.

[March 2, 1933] Same intervenor charged Mercado with the same offense, this time in the

justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. Mercado was arrested again. The complaint

was likewise dismissed, again at de Leon’s instance.

[February 2, 1934] Same banana as on March 2, 1933. Upon due investigation, the case was

dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified has already been probated

and that there was no evidence that Mercado had forged the signature of the testatrix but that,

on the contrary, satisfactory evidence was presented that established the authenticity of said

signature.

[April 11, 1934] Rosario Basa de Leon and other intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the

probate proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and to close the

proceedings. This motion was denied, having been filed ex parte.

[May 9, 1934] The provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation of the criminal case for forgery

before the Pampanga CFI. The motion was granted, and for the fourth time, Mercado was

arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year…

[May 24, 1934] A second motion to reopen and close probate proceedings was filed, this time

with notice to the adverse party. Same was denied.

[February 18, 1935] … until the CFI ordered the forgery case to be tried on the merits.

[July 26, 1935] Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the

probate court’s order of denial.

[c. 1936~37] Mercado moved to dismiss the case, claiming again that the will alleged to have

been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is

conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The CFI overruled the motion.

Mercado thus filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of

Appeals, which promptly denied same.

HENCE, THIS PETITION.

ISSUE:

1. WON the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal prosecution for the alleged

forgery of said will.

RULING:

Applicable law: Code of Civil Procedure (then governing the law on wills)

Sec. 306 provides, as re: the effect of judgments: in case of a judgment/order in respect

to the probate of a will, such judgment/order is conclusive upon the the will.

Sec. 333 establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by

the Code to be conclusive.

Sec. 625 provides, as re: conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate will: “… the

allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its

due execution.”

Basis for PH law on wills (particularly Sec. 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure) — Statutes of [the

US state of] Vermont.

Decisions of the Supreme Court of Vermont re: effect of probate of a will are of

persuasive authority in PH.

Says the Vermont SC in Missionary Society vs. Eells: “The probate of a will by the

probate court having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as to its due

execution against the whole world.”

In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a criminal

action will not lie against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a

court of competent jurisdiction.

Disposition: Mercado is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed; CA judgment

is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Cruz v. Villasor Digest

Cruz v. Villasor

G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However,

the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit,

misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without

the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance

with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.

Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is

substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary

public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.

The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he

cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot

serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in

front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one

will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such

situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a

function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be

interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own

act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which

is to minimize fraud.

Taboada vs. Rosal GR L-36033. November 5, 1982

FACTS – Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Dorotea perez.

The will consisted of two pages, the first page containing all the testamentary dispositions of the

testator and was signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand

margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page consisted of the attestation clause and the

acknowledgment was signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three witnesses and at the left

hand margin by the testatrix. The trial court disallowed the will for want of formality in its execution

because the will was signed at the bottom of the page solely by the testatrix, while the three witnesses

only signed at the left hand margin of the page. The judge opined that compliance with the formalities

of the law required that the witnesses also sign at the end of the will because the witnesses attest not

only the will itself but the signature of the testatrix. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE – Was the object of attestation and subscription fully when the instrumental witnesses signed at

the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions?

HELD –

(SHORT RULING)

On certiorari, the Supreme Court held a) that the objects of attestation and subscription were fully met

and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole

page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly

identified by a subscribing witness to be the same will executed by the testatrix; and b) that the failure

of the attestation clause to state the number of pages used in writing the will would have been a fatal

defect were it not for the fact that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by

the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.

(LONG RULING [VERBATIM])

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the

testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express

direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the

testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing

the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done

which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a

fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the

purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill,

269 SW 2d 911).

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not

only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as

embodied in the attestation clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms

should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90

Phil. 444, 449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the

provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their

execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with

sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and

improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern

tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code Commission, p.

103).

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the

instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary

dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang

to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the

questioned order.

Roxas vs De Jesus

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge

Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the

deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No.

81503 case was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. He then delivered to the

lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook

belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-will

addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R.

de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected

although it is not written by a lawyer.

testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel

Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their

deceased mother

They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in which the

holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by

their mother

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the

purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because (a) it was not executed in accordance with

law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper

pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended

the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.

August 24, 1973 - Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic w/c he

found to have been duly executed in accordance with law

Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a MR stating that the will was not dated as required by Article 810

of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and

year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.

December 10, 1973 – Judge disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word

"dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year

ISSUE: WON the date "FEB./61” on the will is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code

HELD: We agree with the petitioner.

The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil

Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the

present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will

should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should

prevail.

Respondent Luz Henson says the will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in

that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent further contends

that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes

prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are strictly construed.

RULING OF SC:

the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud

and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege

If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility

of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate

Court found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wills

and Testaments

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its

execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue

influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established the Will should be allowed under

the principle of substantial compliance

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and

the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is

reinstated

Paz Samaniego-Celada v. Lucia Abena G.R. No. 145545, June 30, 2008

Facts: Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while

respondent was the decedent's lifelong companion since 1929.Margarita died single and without any

ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was

survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza

Samaniego, and petitioner. Margarita executed a will where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided

share of a real property to respondent, Isabelo Abena and Amanda Abena. Margarita also left all her

personal properties to respondent. Pet filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate.

Respondent filed a pet for probate of the will. The RTC rendered a decision declareing the will of

Margarita probated and respondent as the sole executor of the will. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with

the formalities required by law

(3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in

not issuing letters of administration to petitioner.

Ruling: --> Issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 1. Anent the contestants'

submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is

composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because

the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the

attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the

considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not

material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively

lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of

some of the pages.

The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument

consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position

of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of

the Civil Code. The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the testator

were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the signature on the first page is

allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding

pages. After examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the

oppositors. The picture presented as evidence shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the

presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first

signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987. 2. Petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory

heirs of the decedent under Article 887[15] of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her

properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the

decedent's estate.