cases on negotiable instruments law

8/12/2019 Cases on Negotiable Instruments Law

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G.R. No. L-22405 June 30, 1971

PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. MAURICIO A. SORIANO, ET AL., defendant-appellees.

Marcial Esposo for plaintiff-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Attorney Concepcion

Torrijos-Agapinan for defendants-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

An appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaint filed by the Philippine

Education Co., Inc. against Mauricio A. Soriano, Enrico Palomar and Rafael Contreras.

On April 18, 1958 Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office ten (10) money orders of P200.00each payable to E.P. Montinola withaddress at Lucena, Quezon. After the postal teller had made out moneyordersnumbered 124685, 124687-124695, Montinola offered to pay for them with a private checks were not generallyaccepted in payment of money orders, the teller advised him to see the Chief of the Money Order Division, but instead ofdoing so, Montinola managed to leave building with his own check and the ten(10) money orders without the knowledge o

the teller.

On the same date, April 18, 1958, upon discovery of the disappearance of the unpaid money orders, an urgent messagewas sent to all postmasters, and the following day notice was likewise served upon all banks, instructing them not to payanyone of the money orders aforesaid if presented for payment. The Bank of America received a copy of said notice threedays later.

On April 23, 1958 one of the above-mentioned money orders numbered 124688 was received by appellant as part of itssales receipts. The following day it deposited the same with the Bank of America, and one day thereafter the latter clearedit with the Bureau of Posts and received from the latter its face value of P200.00.

On September 27, 1961, appellee Mauricio A. Soriano, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office, actingfor and in behalf of his co-appellee, Postmaster Enrico Palomar, notified the Bank of America that money order No.

124688 attached to his letter had been found to have been irregularly issued and that, in view thereof, the amount itrepresented had been deducted from the bank's clearing account. For its part, on August 2 of the same year, the Bank o

America debited appellant's account with the same amount and gave it advice thereof by means of a debit memo.

On October 12, 1961 appellant requested the Postmaster General to reconsider the action taken by his office deductingthe sum of P200.00 from the clearing account of the Bank of America, but his request was denied. So was appellant'ssubsequent request that the matter be referred to the Secretary of Justice for advice. Thereafter, appellant elevated thematter to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, but the latter sustained the actions taken by the posta

officers.

In connection with the events set forth above, Montinola was charged with theft in the Court of First Instance of Manila

(Criminal Case No. 43866) but after trial he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

On January 8, 1962 appellant filed an action against appellees in the Municipal Court of Manila praying for judgment asfollows:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that after hearing defendants be ordered:

(a) To countermand the notice given to the Bank of America on September 27, 1961, deducting from the said Bank'sclearing account the sum of P200.00 represented by postal money order No. 124688, or in the alternative indemnify theplaintiff in the same amount with interest at 8-!% per annum from September 27, 1961, which is the rate of interest being

paid by plaintiff on its overdraft account;


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(b) To pay to the plaintiff out of their own personal funds, jointly and severally, actual and moral damages in the amount ofP1,000.00 or in such amount as will be proved and/or determined by this Honorable Court: exemplary damages in the

amount of P1,000.00, attorney's fees of P1,000.00, and the costs of action.

Plaintiff also prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable.

On November 17, 1962, after the parties had submitted the stipulation of facts reproduced at pages 12 to 15 of theRecord on Appeal, the above-named court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to countermand the notice given to the Bank oAmerica on September 27, 1961, deducting from said Bank's clearing account the sum of P200.00 representing theamount of postal money order No. 124688, or in the alternative, to indemnify the plaintiff in the said sum of P200.00 withinterest thereon at the rate of 8-!% per annum from September 27, 1961 until fully paid; without any pronouncement asto cost and attorney's fees.

The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila where, after the parties had resubmitted the same

stipulation of facts, the appealed decision dismissing the complaint, with costs, was rendered.

The first, second and fifth assignments of error discussed in appellant's brief are related to the other and will therefore bediscussed jointly. They raise this main issue: that the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument; that itsnature as such is not in anyway affected by the letter dated October 26, 1948 signed by the Director of Posts andaddressed to all banks with a clearing account with the Post Office, and that money orders, once issued, create a

contractual relationship of debtor and creditor, respectively, between the government, on the one hand, and the remitterspayees or endorses, on the other.

It is not disputed that our postal statutes were patterned after statutes in force in the United States. For this reason, oursare generally construed in accordance with the construction given in the United States to their own postal statutes, in theabsence of any special reason justifying a departure from this policy or practice. The weight of authority in the UnitedStates is that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments (Bolognesi vs. U.S. 189 Fed. 395; U.S. vs. StockDrawers National Bank, 30 Fed. 912), the reason behind this rule being that, in establishing and operating a postal moneyorder system, the government is not engaging in commercial transactions but merely exercises a governmental power for

the public benefit.

It is to be noted in this connection that some of the restrictions imposed upon money orders by postal laws andregulations are inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, such laws and regulations usually

provide for not more than one endorsement; payment of money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances(49 C.J. 1153).

Of particular application to the postal money order in question are the conditions laid down in the letter of the Director ofPosts of October 26, 1948 (Exhibit 3) to the Bank of America for the redemption of postal money orders received by itfrom its depositors. Among others, the condition is imposed that "in cases of adverse claim, the money order or moneyorders involved will be returned to you (the bank) and the, corresponding amount will have to be refunded to thePostmaster, Manila, who reserves the right to deduct the value thereof from any amount due you if such step is deemednecessary." The conditions thus imposed in order to enable the bank to continue enjoying the facilities theretofore enjoyedby its depositors, were accepted by the Bank of America. The latter is therefore bound by them. That it is so is clearlyreferred from the fact that, upon receiving advice that the amount represented by the money order in question had been

deducted from its clearing account with the Manila Post Office, it did not file any protest against such action.

Moreover, not being a party to the understanding existing between the postal officers, on the one hand, and the Bank ofAmerica, on the other, appellant has no right to assail the terms and conditions thereof on the ground that the letter settingforth the terms and conditions aforesaid is void because it was not issued by a Department Head in accordance with Sec.79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code. In reality, however, said legal provision does not apply to the letter in questionbecause it does not provide for a department regulation but merely sets down certain conditions upon the privilegegranted to the Bank of Amrica to accept and pay postal money orders presented for payment at the Manila Post Office.Such being the case, it is clear that the Director of Posts had ample authority to issue it pursuant to Sec. 1190 of theRevised Administrative Code.

In view of the foregoing, We do not find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in the third and fourth assignments of


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error.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part

_____________________________________________________

G.R. No. 97753 August 10, 1992

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,respondents.

Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for petitioners.

Nepomuceno, Hofilea & Guingona for private.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorariimpugns and seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated by respondent court onMarch 8, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23615

1affirming with modifications, the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court oManila, Branch XLII,

2which dismissed the complaint filed therein by herein petitioner against respondent bank.

The undisputed background of this case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by respondent court, appears o

record:

1. On various dates, defendant, a commercial banking institution, through its Sucat Branch issued 280 certificates of timedeposit (CTDs) in favor of one Angel dela Cruz who deposited with herein defendant the aggregate amount oP1,120,000.00, as follows: (Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts and Statement of Issues, Original Records, p. 207;

Defendant's Exhibits 1 to 280);

CTDCTDDatesSerial Nos.QuantityAmount

22 Feb. 82 90101 to 90120 20 P80,000 26 Feb. 82 74602 to 74691 90 360,000 2 Mar. 82 74701 to 74740 40 160,000 4Mar. 82 90127 to 90146 20 80,000 5 Mar. 82 74797 to 94800 4 16,000 5 Mar. 82 89965 to 89986 22 88,000 5 Mar. 8270147 to 90150 4 16,000 8 Mar. 82 90001 to 90020 20 80,000 9 Mar. 82 90023 to 90050 28 112,000 9 Mar. 82 89991 to90000 10 40,000 9 Mar. 82 90251 to 90272 22 88,000 Total 280 P1,120,000 ===== ========

2. Angel dela Cruz delivered the said certificates of time (CTDs) to herein plaintiff in connection with his purchased of fue

products from the latter (Original Record, p. 208).

3. Sometime in March 1982, Angel dela Cruz informed Mr. Timoteo Tiangco, the Sucat Branch Manger, that he lost all thecertificates of time deposit in dispute. Mr. Tiangco advised said depositor to execute and submit a notarized Affidavit ofLoss, as required by defendant bank's procedure, if he desired replacement of said lost CTDs (TSN, February 9, 1987,

pp. 48-50).

4. On March 18, 1982, Angel dela Cruz executed and delivered to defendant bank the required Affidavit of Loss(Defendant's Exhibit 281). On the basis of said affidavit of loss, 280 replacement CTDs were issued in favor of said


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depositor (Defendant's Exhibits 282-561).

5. On March 25, 1982, Angel dela Cruz negotiated and obtained a loan from defendant bank in the amount of EightHundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P875,000.00). On the same date, said depositor executed a notarized Deed oAssignment of Time Deposit (Exhibit 562) which stated, among others, that he (de la Cruz) surrenders to defendant bank"full control of the indicated time deposits from and after date" of the assignment and further authorizes said bank to pre-terminate, set-off and "apply the said time deposits to the payment of whatever amount or amounts may be due" on the

loan upon its maturity (TSN, February 9, 1987, pp. 60-62).

6. Sometime in November, 1982, Mr. Aranas, Credit Manager of plaintiff Caltex (Phils.) Inc., went to the defendant bank'sSucat branch and presented for verification the CTDs declared lost by Angel dela Cruz alleging that the same weredelivered to herein plaintiff "as security for purchases made with Caltex Philippines, Inc." by said depositor (TSN

February 9, 1987, pp. 54-68).

7. On November 26, 1982, defendant received a letter (Defendant's Exhibit 563) from herein plaintiff formally informing itof its possession of the CTDs in question and of its decision to pre-terminate the same.

8. On December 8, 1982, plaintiff was requested by herein defendant to furnish the former "a copy of the documentevidencing the guarantee agreement with Mr. Angel dela Cruz" as well as "the details of Mr. Angel dela Cruz" obligationagainst which plaintiff proposed to apply the time deposits (Defendant's Exhibit 564).

9. No copy of the requested documents was furnished herein defendant.

10. Accordingly, defendant bank rejected the plaintiff's demand and claim for payment of the value of the CTDs in a letterdated February 7, 1983 (Defendant's Exhibit 566).

11. In April 1983, the loan of Angel dela Cruz with the defendant bank matured and fell due and on August 5, 1983, thelatter set-off and applied the time deposits in question to the payment of the matured loan (TSN, February 9, 1987, pp.130-131).

12. In view of the foregoing, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, praying that defendant bank be ordered to pay it theaggregate value of the certificates of time deposit of P1,120,000.00 plus accrued interest and compounded interes

therein at 16%per annum, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.

After trial, the court a quorendered its decision dismissing the instant complaint.3

On appeal, as earlier stated, respondent court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, hence this petitionwherein petitioner faults respondent court in ruling (1) that the subject certificates of deposit are non-negotiable despitebeing clearly negotiable instruments; (2) that petitioner did not become a holder in due course of the said certificates ofdeposit; and (3) in disregarding the pertinent provisions of the Code of Commerce relating to lost instruments payable to

bearer.4

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

A sample text of the certificates of time deposit is reproduced below to provide a better understanding of the issues

involved in this recourse.

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY6778 Ayala Ave., Makati No. 90101 Metro Manila, Philippines SUCATOFFICEP 4,000.00 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT Rate 16%

Date of Maturity FEB. 23, 1984 FEB 22, 1982, 19____

This is to Certify that B E A R E R has deposited in this Bank the sum of PESOS: FOUR THOUSAND ONLY, SECURITYBANK SUCAT OFFICE P4,000 & 00 CTS Pesos, Philippine Currency, repayable to said depositor 731 days. after date

upon presentation and surrender of this certificate, with interest at the rate of 16% per centper annum.

(Sgd. Illegible) (Sgd. Illegible)


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AUTHORIZED SIGNATURES5

Respondent court ruled that the CTDs in question are non-negotiable instruments, nationalizing as follows:

. . . While it may be true that the word "bearer" appears rather boldly in the CTDs issued, it is important to note that afterthe word "BEARER" stamped on the space provided supposedly for the name of the depositor, the words "has deposited"a certain amount follows. The document further provides that the amount deposited shall be "repayable to said depositor"

on the period indicated. Therefore, the text of the instrument(s) themselves manifest with clarity that they are payable, notto whoever purports to be the "bearer" but only to the specified person indicated therein, the depositor. In effect, theappellee bank acknowledges its depositor Angel dela Cruz as the person who made the deposit and further engages itself

to pay said depositor the amount indicated thereon at the stipulated date.6

We disagree with these findings and conclusions, and hereby hold that the CTDs in question are negotiable instruments.Section 1 Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, enumerates the requisites for an instrument

to become negotiable, viz:

(a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;

(b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money;

(c) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;

(d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and

(e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonablecertainty.

The CTDs in question undoubtedly meet the requirements of the law for negotiability. The parties' bone of contention iswith regard to requisite (d) set forth above. It is noted that Mr. Timoteo P. Tiangco, Security Bank's Branch Manager wayback in 1982, testified in open court that the depositor reffered to in the CTDs is no other than Mr. Angel de la Cruz.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Calida:

q In other words Mr. Witness, you are saying that per books of the bank, the depositor referred (sic) in these certificates

states that it was Angel dela Cruz?

witness:

a Yes, your Honor, and we have the record to show that Angel dela Cruz was the one who cause ( sic) the amount.

Atty. Calida:

q And no other person or entity or company, Mr. Witness?

witness:

a None, your Honor.7

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Calida:


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q Mr. Witness, who is the depositor identified in all of these certificates of time deposit insofar as the bank is concerned?

witness:

a Angel dela Cruz is the depositor. 8

xxx xxx xxx

On this score, the accepted rule is that the negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument is determined from the

writing, that is, from the face of the instrument itself.9 In the construction of a bill or note, the intention of the parties is tocontrol, if it can be legally ascertained.

10While the writing may be read in the light of surrounding circumstances in orderto more perfectly understand the intent and meaning of the parties, yet as they have constituted the writing to be the onlyoutward and visible expression of their meaning, no other words are to be added to it or substituted in its stead. The dutyof the court in such case is to ascertain, not what the parties may have secretly intended as contradistinguished from whattheir words express, but what is the meaning of the words they have used. What the parties meant must be determined by

what they said.11

Contrary to what respondent court held, the CTDs are negotiable instruments. The documents provide that the amountsdeposited shall be repayable to the depositor. And who, according to the document, is the depositor? It is the "bearer.The documents do not say that the depositor is Angel de la Cruz and that the amounts deposited are repayablespecifically to him. Rather, the amounts are to be repayable to the bearer of the documents or, for that matter, whosoever

may be the bearer at the time of presentment.

If it was really the intention of respondent bank to pay the amount to Angel de la Cruz only, it could have with facility soexpressed that fact in clear and categorical terms in the documents, instead of having the word "BEARER" stamped onthe space provided for the name of the depositor in each CTD. On the wordings of the documents, therefore, the amountsdeposited are repayable to whoever may be the bearer thereof. Thus, petitioner's aforesaid witness merely declared thaAngel de la Cruz is the depositor "insofar as the bank is concerned," but obviously other parties not privy to thetransaction between them would not be in a position to know that the depositor is not the bearer stated in the CTDsHence, the situation would require any party dealing with the CTDs to go behind the plain import of what is written thereonto unravel the agreement of the parties thereto through facts aliunde.This need for resort to extrinsic evidence is what issought to be avoided by the Negotiable Instruments Law and calls for the application of the elementary rule that theinterpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

12

The next query is whether petitioner can rightfully recover on the CTDs. This time, the answer is in the negative. The

records reveal that Angel de la Cruz, whom petitioner chose not to implead in this suit for reasons of its own, delivered theCTDs amounting to P1,120,000.00 to petitioner without informing respondent bank thereof at any time. Unfortunately forpetitioner, although the CTDs are bearer instruments, a valid negotiation thereof for the true purpose and agreementbetween it and De la Cruz, as ultimately ascertained, requires both delivery and indorsement. For, although petitionerseeks to deflect this fact, the CTDs were in reality delivered to it as a security for De la Cruz' purchases of its fueproducts. Any doubt as to whether the CTDs were delivered as payment for the fuel products or as a security has beendissipated and resolved in favor of the latter by petitioner's own authorized and responsible representative himself.

In a letter dated November 26, 1982 addressed to respondent Security Bank, J.Q. Aranas, Jr., Caltex Credit Managerwrote: ". . . These certificates of deposit were negotiated to us by Mr. Angel dela Cruz to guarantee his purchases of fueproducts" (Emphasis ours.)

13 This admission is conclusive upon petitioner, its protestations notwithstanding. Under thedoctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot bedenied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

14 A party may not go back on his own acts and

representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. 15 In the law of evidence, whenever a party hasby his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and toact upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.16

If it were true that the CTDs were delivered as payment and not as security, petitioner's credit manager could have easilysaid so, instead of using the words "to guarantee" in the letter aforequoted. Besides, when respondent bank, as defendantin the court below, moved for a bill of particularity therein

17praying, among others, that petitioner, as plaintiff, be requiredto aver with sufficient definiteness or particularity (a) the due date or dates of payment of the alleged indebtedness oAngel de la Cruz to plaintiff and (b) whether or not it issued a receipt showing that the CTDs were delivered to it by De la


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Cruz aspayment of the latter's alleged indebtedness to it, plaintiff corporation opposed the motion.18Had it produced the

receipt prayed for, it could have proved, if such truly was the fact, that the CTDs were delivered as payment and not assecurity. Having opposed the motion, petitioner now labors under the presumption that evidence willfully suppressedwould be adverse if produced.

19

Under the foregoing circumstances, this disquisition in Intergrated Realty Corporation, et al. vs. Philippine National Bank

et al.20is apropos:

. . . Adverting again to the Court's pronouncements in Lopez, supra, we quote therefrom:

The character of the transaction between the parties is to be determined by their intention, regardless of what languagewas used or what the form of the transfer was. If it was intended to secure the payment of money, it must be construed asa pledge; but if there was some other intention, it is not a pledge. However, even though a transfer, if regarded by itself,appears to have been absolute, its object and character might still be qualified and explained by contemporaneous writingdeclaring it to have been a deposit of the property as collateral security. It has been said that a transfer of property by thedebtor to a creditor, even if sufficient on its face to make an absolute conveyance, should be treated as a pledge if thedebt continues in inexistence and is not discharged by the transfer, and that accordingly the use of the terms ordinarilyimporting conveyance of absolute ownership will not be given that effect in such a transaction if they are also commonlyused in pledges and mortgages and therefore do not unqualifiedly indicate a transfer of absolute ownership, in the

absence of clear and unambiguous language or other circumstances excluding an intent to pledge.

Petitioner's insistence that the CTDs were negotiated to it begs the question. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, an

instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transfereethe holder thereof,

21and a holder may be the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer

thereof.22In the present case, however, there was no negotiation in the sense of a transfer of the legal title to the CTDs in

favor of petitioner in which situation, for obvious reasons, mere delivery of the bearer CTDs would have sufficed. Here, thedelivery thereof only as security for the purchases of Angel de la Cruz (and we even disregard the fact that the amouninvolved was not disclosed) could at the most constitute petitioner only as a holder for value by reason of his lienAccordingly, a negotiation for such purpose cannot be effected by mere delivery of the instrument since, necessarily, theterms thereof and the subsequent disposition of such security, in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation

must be contractually provided for.

The pertinent law on this point is that where the holder has a lien on the instrument arising from contract, he is deemed aholder for value to the extent of his lien.

23As such holder of collateral security, he would be a pledgee but therequirements therefor and the effects thereof, not being provided for by the Negotiable Instruments Law, shall be

governed by the Civil Code provisions on pledge of incorporeal rights,24

which inceptively provide:

Art. 2095. Incorporeal rights, evidenced by negotiable instruments, . . . may also be pledged. The instrument proving the

right pledged shall be delivered to the creditor, and if negotiable, must be indorsed.

Art. 2096. A pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of thepledge do not appear in a public instrument.

Aside from the fact that the CTDs were only delivered but not indorsed, the factual findings of respondent court quoted athe start of this opinion show that petitioner failed to produce any document evidencing any contract of pledge orguarantee agreement between it and Angel de la Cruz.

25 Consequently, the mere delivery of the CTDs did not legallyvest in petitioner any right effective against and binding upon respondent bank. The requirement under Article 2096aforementioned is not a mere rule of adjective law prescribing the mode whereby proof may be made of the date of a

pledge contract, but a rule of substantive law prescribing a condition without which the execution of a pledge contractcannot affect third persons adversely.

26

On the other hand, the assignment of the CTDs made by Angel de la Cruz in favor of respondent bank was embodied in a

public instrument.27With regard to this other mode of transfer, the Civil Code specifically declares:

Art. 1625. An assignment of credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a

public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real property.

Respondent bank duly complied with this statutory requirement. Contrarily, petitioner, whether as purchaser, assignee or


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lien holder of the CTDs, neither proved the amount of its credit or the extent of its lien nor the execution of any publicinstrument which could affect or bind private respondent. Necessarily, therefore, as between petitioner and responden

bank, the latter has definitely the better right over the CTDs in question.

Finally, petitioner faults respondent court for refusing to delve into the question of whether or not private respondentobserved the requirements of the law in the case of lost negotiable instruments and the issuance of replacement

certificates therefor, on the ground that petitioner failed to raised that issue in the lower court.28

On this matter, we uphold respondent court's finding that the aspect of alleged negligence of private respondent was no

included in the stipulation of the parties and in the statement of issues submitted by them to the trial court.29

The issuesagreed upon by them for resolution in this case are:

1. Whether or not the CTDs as worded are negotiable instruments.

2. Whether or not defendant could legally apply the amount covered by the CTDs against the depositor's loan by virtue o

the assignment (Annex "C").

3. Whether or not there was legal compensation or set off involving the amount covered by the CTDs and the depositor's

outstanding account with defendant, if any.

4. Whether or not plaintiff could compel defendant to preterminate the CTDs before the maturity date provided therein.

5. Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the CTDs.

6. Whether or not the parties can recover damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses from each other.

As respondent court correctly observed, with appropriate citation of some doctrinal authorities, the foregoing enumerationdoes not include the issue of negligence on the part of respondent bank. An issue raised for the first time on appeal andnot raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.

30Questions raised on appeal must be withinthe issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time onappeal.

31

Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raisedThus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues of law and

fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matters. The determinationof issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.

32

To accept petitioner's suggestion that respondent bank's supposed negligence may be considered encompassed by theissues on its right to preterminate and receive the proceeds of the CTDs would be tantamount to saying that petitionercould raise on appeal any issue. We agree with private respondent that the broad ultimate issue of petitioner's entitlementto the proceeds of the questioned certificates can be premised on a multitude of other legal reasons and causes of action,of which respondent bank's supposed negligence is only one. Hence, petitioner's submission, if accepted, would render a

pre-trial delimitation of issues a useless exercise.33

Still, even assuming arguendothat said issue of negligence was raised in the court below, petitioner still cannot have theodds in its favor. A close scrutiny of the provisions of the Code of Commerce laying down the rules to be followed in caseof lost instruments payable to bearer, which it invokes, will reveal that said provisions, even assuming their applicability to

the CTDs in the case at bar, are merely permissive and not mandatory. The very first article cited by petitioner speaks foritself.

Art 548. The dispossessed owner, no matter for what cause it may be, may apply to the judge or court of competenjurisdiction, asking that the principal, interest or dividends due or about to become due, be not paid a third person, as wel

as in order to prevent the ownership of the instrument that a duplicate be issued him. (Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary on the part of the


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"dispossessed owner" to apply to the judge or court of competent jurisdiction for the issuance of a duplicate of the lostinstrument. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretional.

34The word "may

is usually permissive, not mandatory.35It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. 36

Moreover, as correctly analyzed by private respondent,37Articles 548 to 558 of the Code of Commerce, on which

petitioner seeks to anchor respondent bank's supposed negligence, merely established, on the one hand, a right orecourse in favor of a dispossessed owner or holder of a bearer instrument so that he may obtain a duplicate of the same,and, on the other, an option in favor of the party liable thereon who, for some valid ground, may elect to refuse to issue areplacement of the instrument. Significantly, none of the provisions cited by petitioner categorically restricts or prohibits

the issuance a duplicate or replacement instrument sans compliance with the procedure outlined therein, and noneestablishes a mandatory precedent requirement therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the modified premises above set forth, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is herebyAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88866 February 18, 1991

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GOLDEN SAVINGS & LOANASSOCIATION, INC., LUCIA CASTILLO, MAGNO CASTILLO and GLORIA CASTILLO, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for Magno and Lucia Castillo.

Agapito S. Fajardo and Jaime M. Cabiles for respondent Golden Savings & Loan Association, Inc.

CRUZ, J.:p

This case, for all its seeming complexity, turns on a simple question of negligence. The facts, pruned of all non-essentials,are easily told.

The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. is a commercial bank with branches throughout the Philippines and even abroad.Golden Savings and Loan Association was, at the time these events happened, operating in Calapan, Mindoro, with the

other private respondents as its principal officers.

In January 1979, a certain Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited over a period of twomonths 38 treasury warrants with a total value of P1,755,228.37. They were all drawn by the Philippine Fish MarketingAuthority and purportedly signed by its General Manager and countersigned by its Auditor. Six of these were directly


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payable to Gomez while the others appeared to have been indorsed by their respective payees, followed by Gomez as

second indorser.1

On various dates between June 25 and July 16, 1979, all these warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo asCashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings Account No. 2498 in the Metrobank branch in Calapan, MindoroThey were then sent for clearing by the branch office to the principal office of Metrobank, which forwarded them to the

Bureau of Treasury for special clearing.2

More than two weeks after the deposits, Gloria Castillo went to the Calapan branch several times to ask whether the

warrants had been cleared. She was told to wait. Accordingly, Gomez was meanwhile not allowed to withdraw from hisaccount. Later, however, "exasperated" over Gloria's repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a "valuedclient," the petitioner says it finally decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from the proceeds of the warrants.

3The

first withdrawal was made on July 9, 1979, in the amount of P508,000.00, the second on July 13, 1979, in the amount of

P310,000.00, and the third on July 16, 1979, in the amount of P150,000.00. The total withdrawal was P968.000.00.4

In turn, Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own account, eventually collectingthe total amount of P1,167,500.00 from the proceeds of the apparently cleared warrants. The last withdrawal was made

on July 16, 1979.

On July 21, 1979, Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau ofTreasury on July 19, 1979, and demanded the refund by Golden Savings of the amount it had previously withdrawn, tomake up the deficit in its account.

The demand was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings in the Regional Trial Court of Mindoro.5 After trial

judgment was rendered in favor of Golden Savings, which, however, filed a motion for reconsideration even as Metrobankfiled its notice of appeal. On November 4, 1986, the lower court modified its decision thus:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff;

2. Dissolving and lifting the writ of attachment of the properties of defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc

and defendant Spouses Magno Castillo and Lucia Castillo;

3. Directing the plaintiff to reverse its action of debiting Savings Account No. 2498 of the sum of P1,754,089.00 and toreinstate and credit to such account such amount existing before the debit was made including the amount ofP812,033.37 in favor of defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc. and thereafter, to allow defendant Golden

Savings and Loan Association, Inc. to withdraw the amount outstanding thereon before the debit;

4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc. attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation in the amount of P200,000.00.

5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant Spouses Magno Castillo and Lucia Castillo attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation in the amount of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the respondent court, 6the decision was affirmed, prompting Metrobank to file this petition for review on thefollowing grounds:

1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in disregarding and failing to apply the clear contractual terms and conditions onthe deposit slips allowing Metrobank to charge back any amount erroneously credited.

(a) Metrobank's right to charge back is not limited to instances where the checks or treasury warrants are forged o

unauthorized.

(b) Until such time as Metrobank is actually paid, its obligation is that of a mere collecting agent which cannot be held


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liable for its failure to collect on the warrants.

2. Under the lower court's decision, affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, Metrobank is made to pay for warrants

already dishonored, thereby perpetuating the fraud committed by Eduardo Gomez.

3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that as between Metrobank and Golden Savings, the latter shouldbear the loss.

4. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the treasury warrants involved in this case are not negotiable

instruments.

The petition has no merit.

From the above undisputed facts, it would appear to the Court that Metrobank was indeed negligent in giving GoldenSavings the impression that the treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez towithdraw the proceeds thereof from his account with it. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have allowedthe withdrawals; with such assurance, there was no reason not to allow the withdrawal. Indeed, Golden Savings mighteven have incurred liability for its refusal to return the money that to all appearances belonged to the depositor, who could

therefore withdraw it any time and for any reason he saw fit.

It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden Savings deposited them to its account withMetrobank. Golden Savings had no clearing facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the validity of thewarrants through its own services. The proceeds of the warrants were withheld from Gomez until Metrobank allowedGolden Savings itself to withdraw them from its own deposit.

7It was only when Metrobank gave the go-signal that Gomez

was finally allowed by Golden Savings to withdraw them from his own account.

The argument of Metrobank that Golden Savings should have exercised more care in checking the personacircumstances of Gomez before accepting his deposit does not hold water. It was Gomez who was entrusting thewarrants, not Golden Savings that was extending him a loan; and moreover, the treasury warrants were subject toclearing, pending which the depositor could not withdraw its proceeds. There was no question of Gomez's identity or ofthe genuineness of his signature as checked by Golden Savings. In fact, the treasury warrants were dishonored allegedlybecause of the forgery of the signatures of the drawers, not of Gomez as payee or indorser. Under the circumstances, it isclear that Golden Savings acted with due care and diligence and cannot be faulted for the withdrawals it allowed Gomez

to make.

By contrast, Metrobank exhibited extraordinary carelessness. The amount involved was not trifling more than one anda half million pesos (and this was 1979). There was no reason why it should not have waited until the treasury warrantshad been cleared; it would not have lost a single centavo by waiting. Yet, despite the lack of such clearance andnotwithstanding that it had not received a single centavo from the proceeds of the treasury warrants, as it now repeatedlystresses it allowed Golden Savings to withdraw not once, not twice, but thrice from the uncleared treasury

warrants in the total amount of P968,000.00

Its reason? It was "exasperated" over the persistent inquiries of Gloria Castillo about the clearance and it also wanted to"accommodate" a valued client. It "presumed" that the warrants had been cleared simply because of "the lapse of oneweek."

8For a bank with its long experience, this explanation is unbelievably naive.

And now, to gloss over its carelessness, Metrobank would invoke the conditions printed on the dorsal side of the deposit

slips through which the treasury warrants were deposited by Golden Savings with its Calapan branch. The conditions readas follows:

Kindly note that in receiving items on deposit, the bank obligates itself only as the depositor's collecting agent, assumingno responsibility beyond care in selecting correspondents, and until such time as actual payment shall have come intopossession of this bank, the right is reserved to charge back to the depositor's account any amount previously credited,whether or not such item is returned. This also applies to checks drawn on local banks and bankers and their branches aswell as on this bank, which are unpaid due toinsufficiency of funds, forgery, unauthorized overdraft or any other reason(Emphasis supplied.)

According to Metrobank, the said conditions clearly show that it was acting only as a collecting agent for Golden Savings


12/24

and give it the right to "charge back to the depositor's account any amount previously credited, whether or not such item isreturned. This also applies to checks ". . . which are unpaid due to insufficiency of funds, forgery, unauthorized overdraftof any other reason." It is claimed that the said conditions are in the nature of contractual stipulations and became bindingon Golden Savings when Gloria Castillo, as its Cashier, signed the deposit slips.

Doubt may be expressed about the binding force of the conditions, considering that they have apparently been imposedby the bank unilaterally, without the consent of the depositor. Indeed, it could be argued that the depositor, in signing thedeposit slip, does so only to identify himself and not to agree to the conditions set forth in the given permit at the back ofthe deposit slip. We do not have to rule on this matter at this time. At any rate, the Court feels that even if the deposit slip

were considered a contract, the petitioner could still not validly disclaim responsibility thereunder in the light of thecircumstances of this case.

In stressing that it was acting only as a collecting agent for Golden Savings, Metrobank seems to be suggesting that as amere agent it cannot be liable to the principal. This is not exactly true. On the contrary, Article 1909 of the Civil Code

clearly provides that

Art. 1909. The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall be judged 'with more or less

rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation.

The negligence of Metrobank has been sufficiently established. To repeat for emphasis, it was the clearance given by itthat assured Golden Savings it was already safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds of the treasury warrants hehad deposited Metrobank misled Golden Savings. There may have been no express clearance, as Metrobank insists

(although this is refuted by Golden Savings) but in any case that clearance could be implied from its allowing GoldenSavings to withdraw from its account not only once or even twice but three times. The total withdrawal was in excess of itsoriginal balance before the treasury warrants were deposited, which only added to its belief that the treasury warrants hadindeed been cleared.

Metrobank's argument that it may recover the disputed amount if the warrants are not paid for any reason is noacceptable. Any reason does not mean no reason at all. Otherwise, there would have been no need at all for GoldenSavings to deposit the treasury warrants with it for clearance. There would have been no need for it to wait until thewarrants had been cleared before paying the proceeds thereof to Gomez. Such a condition, if interpreted in the way thepetitioner suggests, is not binding for being arbitrary and unconscionable. And it becomes more so in the case at bawhen it is considered that the supposed dishonor of the warrants was not communicated to Golden Savings before it

made its own payment to Gomez.

The belated notification aggravated the petitioner's earlier negligence in giving express or at least implied clearance to thetreasury warrants and allowing payments therefrom to Golden Savings. But that is not all. On top of this, the supposedreason for the dishonor, to wit, the forgery of the signatures of the general manager and the auditor of the drawercorporation, has not been established.

9This was the finding of the lower courts which we see no reason to disturb. And

as we said in MWSS v. Court of Appeals:10

Forgery cannot be presumed (Siasat, et al. v. IAC, et al., 139 SCRA 238). It must be established by clear, positive andconvincing evidence. This was not done in the present case.

A no less important consideration is the circumstance that the treasury warrants in question are not negotiableinstruments. Clearly stamped on their face is the word "non-negotiable." Moreover, and this is of equal significance, it is

indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501.

The following sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law, especially the underscored parts, are pertinent:

Sec. 1. Form of negotiable instruments. An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements:

(a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;

(b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money;

(c) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;


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(d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and

(e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable

certainty.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. When promise is unconditional. An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of

this Act though coupled with

(a) An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to be debited with

the amount; or

(b) A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument judgment.

But an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional.

The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promiseto pay "not unconditional" and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. There should be no question that the exceptionon Section 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is applicable in the case at bar. This conclusion conforms to Abubakar vs.Auditor General

11where the Court held:

The petitioner argues that he is a holder in good faith and for value of a negotiable instrument and is entitled to the rightsand privileges of a holder in due course, free from defenses. But this treasury warrant is not within the scope of thenegotiable instrument law. For one thing, the document bearing on its face the words "payable from the appropriation fofood administration, is actually an Order for payment out of "a particular fund," and is not unconditional and does not fulfilone of the essential requirements of a negotiable instrument (Sec. 3 last sentence and section [1(b)] of the Negotiable

Instruments Law).

Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were "genuineand in all respects what they purport to be," in accordance with Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The simplereason is that this law is not applicable to the non-negotiable treasury warrants. The indorsement was made by GloriaCastillo not for the purpose of guaranteeing the genuineness of the warrants but merely to deposit them with Metrobankfor clearing. It was in fact Metrobank that made the guarantee when it stamped on the back of the warrants: "All prior

indorsement and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., Calapan Branch."

The petitioner lays heavy stress on Jai Alai Corporation v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,12

but we feel this case isinapplicable to the present controversy. That case involved checks whereas this case involves treasury warrants. GoldenSavings never represented that the warrants were negotiable but signed them only for the purpose of depositing them forclearance. Also, the fact of forgery was proved in that case but not in the case before us. Finally, the Court found the JaAlai Corporation negligent in accepting the checks without question from one Antonio Ramirez notwithstanding that thepayee was the Inter-Island Gas Services, Inc. and it did not appear that he was authorized to indorse it. No similar

negligence can be imputed to Golden Savings.

We find the challenged decision to be basically correct. However, we will have to amend it insofar as it directs thepetitioner to credit Golden Savings with the full amount of the treasury checks deposited to its account.

The total value of the 32 treasury warrants dishonored was P1,754,089.00, from which Gomez was allowed to withdrawP1,167,500.00 before Golden Savings was notified of the dishonor. The amount he has withdrawn must be charged not toGolden Savings but to Metrobank, which must bear the consequences of its own negligence. But the balance ofP586,589.00 should be debited to Golden Savings, as obviously Gomez can no longer be permitted to withdraw thisamount from his deposit because of the dishonor of the warrants. Gomez has in fact disappeared. To also credit thebalance to Golden Savings would unduly enrich it at the expense of Metrobank, let alone the fact that it has already beeninformed of the dishonor of the treasury warrants.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that Paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion othe judgment of the lower court shall be reworded as follows:


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3. Debiting Savings Account No. 2498 in the sum of P586,589.00 only and thereafter allowing defendant Golden Savings

& Loan Association, Inc. to withdraw the amount outstanding thereon, if any, after the debit.

SO ORDERED

________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 89252 May 24, 1993

RAUL SESBREO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION AND PILIPINASBANK, respondents.

Salva, Villanueva & Associates for Delta Motors Corporation.

Reyes, Salazar & Associates for Pilipinas Bank.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 9 February 1981, petitioner Raul Sesbreo made a money market placement in the amount of P300,000.00 with thePhilippine Underwriters Finance Corporation ("Philfinance"), Cebu Branch; the placement, with a term of thirty-two (32)days, would mature on 13 March 1981, Philfinance, also on 9 February 1981, issued the following documents to

petitioner:

(a) the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale, "without recourse," No. 20496 of one (1) Delta Motors Corporation PromissoryNote ("DMC PN") No. 2731 for a term of 32 days at 17.0%per annum;

(b) the Certificate of securities Delivery Receipt No. 16587 indicating the sale of DMC PN No. 2731 to petitioner, with thenotation that the said security was in custodianship of Pilipinas Bank, as per Denominated Custodian Receipt ("DCR") No

10805 dated 9 February 1981; and

(c) post-dated checks payable on 13 March 1981 (i.e., the maturity date of petitioner's investment), with petitioner as

payee, Philfinance as drawer, and Insular Bank of Asia and America as drawee, in the total amount of P304,533.33.

On 13 March 1981, petitioner sought to encash the postdated checks issued by Philfinance. However, the checks were

dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

On 26 March 1981, Philfinance delivered to petitioner the DCR No. 10805 issued by private respondent Pilipinas Bank("Pilipinas"). It reads as follows:

PILIPINAS BANK Makati Stock Exchange Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila

February 9, 1981 VALUE DATE

TO Raul Sesbreo


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April 6, 1981 MATURITY DATE

NO. 10805

DENOMINATED CUSTODIAN RECEIPT

This confirms that as a duly Custodian Bank, and upon instruction of PHILIPPINE UNDERWRITES FINANCE

CORPORATION, we have in our custody the following securities to you [sic] the extent herein indicated.

SERIAL MAT. FACE ISSUED REGISTERED AMOUNT NUMBER DATE VALUE BY HOLDER PAYEE

2731 4-6-81 2,300,833.34 DMC PHIL. 307,933.33 UNDERWRITERS FINANCE CORP.

We further certify that these securities may be inspected by you or your duly authorized representative at any time during

regular banking hours.

Upon your written instructions we shall undertake physical delivery of the above securities fully assigned to you shouldthis Denominated Custodianship Receipt remain outstanding in your favor thirty (30) days after its maturity.

PILIPINAS BANK (By Elizabeth De Villa Illegible Signature)1

On 2 April 1981, petitioner approached Ms. Elizabeth de Villa of private respondent Pilipinas, Makati Branch, and handedher a demand letter informing the bank that his placement with Philfinance in the amount reflected in the DCR No. 10805had remained unpaid and outstanding, and that he in effect was asking for the physical delivery of the underlyingpromissory note. Petitioner then examined the original of the DMC PN No. 2731 and found: that the security had beenissued on 10 April 1980; that it would mature on 6 April 1981; that it had a face value of P2,300,833.33, with thePhilfinance as "payee" and private respondent Delta Motors Corporation ("Delta") as "maker;" and that on face of thepromissory note was stamped "NON NEGOTIABLE." Pilipinas did not deliver the Note, nor any certificate of participation

in respect thereof, to petitioner.

Petitioner later made similar demand letters, dated 3 July 1981 and 3 August 1981, 2

again asking private respondenPilipinas for physical delivery of the original of DMC PN No. 2731. Pilipinas allegedly referred all of petitioner's demandletters to Philfinance for written instructions, as has been supposedly agreed upon in "Securities CustodianshipAgreement" between Pilipinas and Philfinance. Philfinance did not provide the appropriate instructions; Pilipinas neve

released DMC PN No. 2731, nor any other instrument in respect thereof, to petitioner.

Petitioner also made a written demand on 14 July 19813upon private respondent Delta for the partial satisfaction of DMC

PN No. 2731, explaining that Philfinance, as payee thereof, had assigned to him said Note to the extent of P307,933.33.Delta, however, denied any liability to petitioner on the promissory note, and explained in turn that it had previouslyagreed with Philfinance to offset its DMC PN No. 2731 (along with DMC PN No. 2730) against Philfinance PN No. 143-A

issued in favor of Delta.

In the meantime, Philfinance, on 18 June 1981, was placed under the joint management of the Securities and exchangecommission ("SEC") and the Central Bank. Pilipinas delivered to the SEC DMC PN No. 2731, which to date apparently

remains in the custody of the SEC.4

As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed on 28 September 1982 an action fodamages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Cebu City, Branch 21, against private respondents Delta and Pilipinas.5

The trial court, in a decision dated 5 August 1987, dismissed the complaint and counterclaims for lack of merit and for lackof cause of action, with costs against petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15195. In a Decision dated 21 March 1989, the

Court of Appeals denied the appeal and held:6

Be that as it may, from the evidence on record, if there is anyone that appears liable for the travails of plaintiff-appellant, it

is Philfinance. As correctly observed by the trial court:


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This act of Philfinance in accepting the investment of plaintiff and charging it against DMC PN No. 2731 when its entireface value was already obligated or earmarked for set-off or compensation is difficult to comprehend and may have beenmotivated with bad faith. Philfinance, therefore, is solely and legally obligated to return the investment of plaintiff, togetherwith its earnings, and to answer all the damages plaintiff has suffered incident thereto. Unfortunately for plaintiffPhilfinance was not impleaded as one of the defendants in this case at bar; hence, this Court is without jurisdiction topronounce judgement against it. (p. 11, Decision)

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in toto. Cost agains

plaintiff-appellant.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above Decision, without success.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

After consideration of the allegations contained and issues raised in the pleadings, the Court resolved to give due course

to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.7

Petitioner reiterates the assignment of errors he directed at the trial court decision, and contends that respondent court ofAppeals gravely erred: (i) in concluding that he cannot recover from private respondent Delta his assigned portion of DMCPN No. 2731; (ii) in failing to hold private respondent Pilipinas solidarily liable on the DMC PN No. 2731 in view of theprovisions stipulated in DCR No. 10805 issued in favor r of petitioner, and (iii) in refusing to pierce the veil of corporateentity between Philfinance, and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas, considering that the three (3) entities belong to

the "Silverio Group of Companies" under the leadership of Mr. Ricardo Silverio, Sr. 8

There are at least two (2) sets of relationships which we need to address: firstly, the relationship of petitioner vis-a-visDelta; secondly, the relationship of petitioner in respect of Pilipinas. Actually, of course, there is a third relationship that isof critical importance: the relationship of petitioner and Philfinance. However, since Philfinance has not been impleaded inthis case, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the person of Philfinance. It is,consequently, not necessary for present purposes to deal with this third relationship, except to the extent it necessarily

impinges upon or intersects the first and second relationships.

I.

We consider first the relationship between petitioner and Delta.

The Court of appeals in effect held that petitioner acquired no rights vis-a-vis Delta in respect of the Delta promissory note(DMC PN No. 2731) which Philfinance sold "without recourse" to petitioner, to the extent of P304,533.33. The Court o

Appeals said on this point:

Nor could plaintiff-appellant have acquired any right over DMC PN No. 2731 as the same is "non-negotiable" as stampedon its face (Exhibit "6"), negotiation being defined as the transfer of an instrument from one person to another so as toconstitute the transferee the holder of the instrument (Sec. 30, Negotiable Instruments Law). A person not a holder cannot

sue on the instrument in his own name and cannot demand or receive payment (Section 51, id.)9

Petitioner admits that DMC PN No. 2731 was non-negotiable but contends that the Note had been validly transferred, inpart to him by assignment and that as a result of such transfer, Delta as debtor-maker of the Note, was obligated to pay

petitioner the portion of that Note assigned to him by the payee Philfinance.

Delta, however, disputes petitioner's contention and argues:

(1) that DMC PN No. 2731 was not intended to be negotiated or otherwise transferred by Philfinance as manifested by theword "non-negotiable" stamp across the face of the Note

10and because maker Delta and payee Philfinance intended tha

this Note would be offset against the outstanding obligation of Philfinance represented by Philfinance PN No. 143-A

issued to Delta as payee;

(2) that the assignment of DMC PN No. 2731 by Philfinance was without Delta's consent, if not against its instructions;

and


17/24

(3) assuming (arguendoonly) that the partial assignment in favor of petitioner was valid, petitioner took the Note subject to

the defenses available to Delta, in particular, the offsetting of DMC PN No. 2731 against Philfinance PN No. 143-A.11

We consider Delta's arguments seriatim.

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the negotiation of a negotiable instrument must be distinguished from theassignmentor transferof an instrument whether that be negotiable or non-negotiable. Only an instrument qualifying as anegotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiatedeither by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, orby delivery alone where the negotiable instrument is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument may, however, instead o

being negotiated, also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation as distinguished fromassignment of a negotiable instrument are, of course, different. A non-negotiable instrument may, obviously, not benegotiated; but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in

the face of the instrument:

The words "not negotiable,"stamped on the face of the bill of lading, did not destroy its assignability, but the sole effecwas to exempt the bill from the statutory provisions relative thereto, and a bill, though not negotiable, may be transferred

by assignment; the assignee taking subject to the equities between the original parties.12

(Emphasis added)

DMC PN No. 2731, while marked "non-negotiable," was not at the same time stamped "non-transferable" or "nonassignable." It contained no stipulation which prohibited Philfinance from assigning or transferring, in whole or in part, thaNote.

Delta adduced the "Letter of Agreement" which it had entered into with Philfinance and which should be quoted in full:

April 10, 1980

Philippine Underwriters Finance Corp. Benavidez St., Makati, Metro Manila.

Attention: Mr. Alfredo O. Banaria SVP-Treasurer

GENTLEMEN:

This refers to our outstanding placement of P4,601,666.67 as evidenced by your Promissory Note No. 143-A, dated Apri

10, 1980, to mature on April 6, 1981.

As agreed upon, we enclose our non-negotiable Promissory Note No. 2730 and 2731 for P2,000,000.00 each, dated Apri10, 1980, to be offsetted [sic] against your PN No. 143-A upon co-terminal maturity.

Please deliver the proceeds of our PNs to our representative, Mr. Eric Castillo.

Very Truly Yours,

(Sgd.) Florencio B. Biagan Senior Vice President13

We find nothing in his "Letter of Agreement" which can be reasonably construed as a prohibition upon Philfinanceassigning or transferring all or part of DMC PN No. 2731, before the maturity thereof. It is scarcely necessary to add that,

even had this "Letter of Agreement" set forth an explicit prohibition of transfer upon Philfinance, such a prohibition cannotbe invoked against an assignee or transferee of the Note who parted with valuable consideration in good faith and withounotice of such prohibition. It is not disputed that petitioner was such an assignee or transferee. Our conclusion on thispoint is reinforced by the fact that what Philfinance and Delta were doing by their exchange of their promissory notes wasthis: Delta invested, by making a money market placement with Philfinance, approximately P4,600,000.00 on 10 Apri1980; but promptly, on the same day, borrowed back the bulk of that placement, i.e., P4,000,000.00, by issuing its two (2)promissory notes: DMC PN No. 2730 and DMC PN No. 2731, both also dated 10 April 1980. Thus, Philfinance was left

with not P4,600,000.00 but only P600,000.00 in cash and the two (2) Delta promissory notes.

AproposDelta's complaint that the partial assignment by Philfinance of DMC PN No. 2731 had been effected without theconsent of Delta, we note that such consent was not necessary for the validity and enforceability of the assignment in


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favor of petitioner. 14

Delta's argument that Philfinance's sale or assignment of part of its rights to DMC PN No. 2731constituted conventional subrogation, which required its (Delta's) consent, is quite mistaken. Conventional subrogation,which in the first place is never lightly inferred,

15must be clearly established by the unequivocal terms of the substituting

obligation or by the evident incompatibility of the new and old obligations on every point.16

Nothing of the sort is present inthe instant case.

It is in fact difficult to be impressed with Delta's complaint, since it released its DMC PN No. 2731 to Philfinance, an entityengaged in the business of buying and selling debt instruments and other securities, and more generally, in money marketransactions. In Perez v. Court of Appeals,

17 the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Herrera, made the following

important statement:

There is another aspect to this case. What is involved here is a money market transaction. As defined by Lawrence Smith"the money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments (involving large amounts) wherelenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle manor a dealer in the open market." Itinvolves "commercial papers" which are instruments "evidencing indebtness of any person or entity. . ., which are issued,endorsed, sold or transferred or in any manner conveyed to another person or entity, with or without recourse". Thefundamental function of the money market device in its operation is to match and bring together in a most impersonamanner both the "fund users" and the "fund suppliers." The money market is an "impersonal market", free from personaconsiderations. "The market mechanism is intended to provide quick mobility of money and securities."

The impersonal character of the money market device overlooks the individuals or entities concerned. The issuer of acommercial paper in the money market necessarily knows in advance that it would be expenditiously transacted and

transferred to any investor/lender without need of notice to said issuer. In practice, no notification is given to the borroweror issuer of commercial paper of the sale or transfer to the investor.

xxx xxx xxx

There is need to individuate a money market transaction, a relatively novel institution in the Philippine commercial sceneIt has been intended to facilitate the flow and acquisition of capital on an impersonal basis.And as specifically required byPresidential Decree No. 678, the investing public must be given adequate and effective protection in availing of the creditof a borrower in the commercial paper market.

18(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

We turn to Delta's arguments concerning alleged compensation or offsetting between DMC PN No. 2731 and PhilfinancePN No. 143-A. It is important to note that at the time Philfinance sold part of its rights under DMC PN No. 2731 topetitioner on 9 February 1981, no compensation had as yet taken place and indeed none could have taken place.The

essential requirements of compensation are listed in the Civil Code as follows:

Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;

(2) That both debts consists in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also ofthe same quality if the latter has been stated;

(3) That the two debts are due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in

due time to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)

On 9 February 1981, neither DMC PN No. 2731 nor Philfinance PN No. 143-A was due. This was explicitly recognized byDelta in its 10 April 1980 "Letter of Agreement" with Philfinance, where Delta acknowledged that the relevant promissory

notes were "to be offsetted (sic) against [Philfinance] PN No. 143-A upon co-terminal maturity."

As noted, the assignment to petitioner was made on 9 February 1981 or from forty-nine (49) days before the "co-terminamaturity" date, that is to say, before any compensation had taken place. Further, the assignment to petitioner would have


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prevented compensation had taken place between Philfinance and Delta, to the extent of P304,533.33, because uponexecution of the assignment in favor of petitioner, Philfinance and Delta would have ceased to be creditors and debtors ofeach other in their own right to the extent of the amount assigned by Philfinance to petitioner. Thus, we conclude that theassignment effected by Philfinance in favor of petitioner was a valid one and that petitioner accordingly became owner ofDMC PN No. 2731 to the extent of the portion thereof assigned to him.

The record shows, however, that petitioner notified Delta of the fact of the assignment to him only on 14 July 1981,19

thais, after the maturity not only of the money market placement made by petitioner but also of both DMC PN No. 2731 andPhilfinance PN No. 143-A. In other words,petitioner notified Delta of his rights as assignee after compensation had taken

place by operation of law because the offsetting instruments had both reached maturity. It is a firmly settled doctrine thathe rights of an assignee are not any greater that the rights of the assignor, since the assignee is merely substituted in theplace of the assignor

20and that the assignee acquires his rights subject to the equities i.e., the defenses which the

debtor could have set up against the original assignor before notice of the assignment was given to the debtor. Article1285 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 1285. The debtor who has consented to the assignment of rights made by a creditor in favor of a third person, cannoset up against the assignee the compensation which would pertain to him against the assignor, unless the assignor was

notified by the debtor at the time he gave his consent, that he reserved his right to the compensation.

If the creditor communicated the cession to him but the debtor did not consent thereto, the latter may set up the

compensation of debtsprevious to the cession, but not of subsequent ones.

If the assignmentis made without the knowledge of the debtor, he may set up the compensation of all credits prior to thesame and also later ones until he had knowledge of the assignment. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1626 of the same code states that: "the debtor who, before having knowledge of the assignment, pays his creditorshall be released from the obligation." In Sison v.Yap-Tico,

21the Court explained that:

[n]o man is bound to remain a debtor; he may pay to him with whom he contacted to pay; and if he pay before notice thathis debt has been assigned, the law holds him exonerated, for the reason that it is the duty of the person who has

acquired a title by transfer to demand payment of the debt, to give his debt or notice.22

At the time that Delta was first put to notice of the assignment in petitioner's favor on 14 July 1981, DMC PN No. 2731 hadalready been discharged by compensation. Since the assignor Philfinance could not have then compelled payment anewby Delta of DMC PN No. 2731, petitioner, as assignee of Philfinance, is similarly disabled from collecting from Delta the

portion of the Note assigned to him.

It bears some emphasis that petitioner could have notified Delta of the assignment or sale was effected on 9 February1981. He could have notified Delta as soon as his money market placement matured on 13 March 1981 without paymentthereof being made by Philfinance; at that time, compensation had yet to set in and discharge DMC PN No. 2731. Againpetitioner could have notified Delta on 26 March 1981 when petitioner received from Philfinance the DenominatedCustodianship Receipt ("DCR") No. 10805 issued by private respondent Pilipinas in favor of petitioner. Petitioner could, infine, have notified Delta at any time before the maturity date of DMC PN No. 2731. Because petitioner failed to do so, andbecause the record is bare of any indication that Philfinance had itself notified Delta of the assignment to petitioner, theCourt is compelled to uphold the defense of compensation raised by private respondent Delta. Of course, Philfinanceremains liable to petitioner under the terms of the assignment made by Philfinance to petitioner.

II.

We turn now to the relationship between petitioner and private respondent Pilipinas. Petitioner contends that Pilipinasbecame solidarily liable with Philfinance and Delta when Pilipinas issued DCR No. 10805 with the following words:

Upon your written instruction, we [Pilipinas] shall undertakephysical delivery of the above securitiesfully assigned to you

.23

The Court is not persuaded. We find nothing in the DCR that establishes an obligation on the part of Pilipinas to paypetitioner the amount of P307,933.33 nor any assumption of liability in solidumwith Philfinance and Delta under DMC PN

No. 2731. We read the DCR as a confirmation on the part of Pilipinas that:


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(1) it has in its custody, as duly constituted custodian bank, DMC PN No. 2731 of a certain face value, to mature on 6 Apri

1981 and payable to the order of Philfinance;

(2) Pilipinas was, from and after said date of the assignment by Philfinance to petitioner (9 February 1981), holding thaNote on behalf and for the benefit of petitioner, at least to the extent it had been assigned to petitioner by payee

Philfinance;24

(3) petitioner may inspect the Note either "personally or by authorized representative", at any time during regular bankhours; and

(4) upon written instructions of petitioner, Pilipinas would physically deliver the DMC PN No. 2731 (or a participationtherein to the extent of P307,933.33)"should this Denominated Custodianship receipt remain outstanding in [petitioner's]

favor thirty (30) days after its maturity."

Thus, we find nothing written in printers ink on the DCR which could reasonably be read as converting Pilipinas into anobligor under the terms of DMC PN No. 2731 assigned to petitioner, either upon maturity thereof or any other time. Wenote that both in his complaint and in his testimony before the trial court, petitioner referred merely to the obligation ofprivate respondent Pilipinas to effect the physical delivery to him of DMC PN No. 2731.

25Accordingly, petitioner's theory

that Pilipinas had assumed a solidary obligation to pay the amount represented by a portion of the Note assigned to himby Philfinance, appears to be a new theory constructed only after the trial court had ruled against him. The solidary liabilitythat petitioner seeks to impute Pilipinas cannot, however, be lightly inferred. Under article 1207 of the Civil Code, "there isa solidary liability only when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity," The record here exhibits no

express assumption of solidary liability vis-a-vispetitioner, on the part of Pilipinas. Petitioner has not pointed to us to anylaw which imposed such liability upon Pilipinas nor has petitioner argued that the very nature of the custodianshipassumed by private respondent Pilipinas necessarily implies solidary liability under the securities, custody of which wastaken by Pilipinas. Accordingly, we are unable to hold Pilipinas solidarily liable with Philfinance and private responden

Delta under DMC PN No. 2731.

We do not, however, mean to suggest that Pilipinas has no responsibility and liability in respect of petitioner under theterms of the DCR. To the contrary, we find, after prolonged analysis and deliberation, that private respondent Pilipinashad breached its undertaking under the DCR to petitioner Sesbreo.

We believe and so hold that a contract of deposit was constituted by the act of Philfinance in designating Pilipinas ascustodian or depositary bank. The depositor was initially Philfinance; the obligation of the depository was owed, however,to petitioner Sesbreo as beneficiary of the custodianship or depository agreement. We do not consider that this is a

simple case of a stipulationpour autri. The custodianship or depositary agreement was established as an integral part ofthe money market transaction entered into by petitioner with Philfinance. Petitioner bought a portion of DMC PN No. 2731;Philfinance as assignor-vendor deposited that Note with Pilipinas in order that the thing sold would be placed outside thecontrol of the vendor. Indeed, the constituting of the depositary or custodianship agreement was equivalent to constructivedelivery of the Note (to the extent it had been sold or assigned to petitioner) to petitioner. It will be seen that custodianshipagreements are designed to facilitate transactions in the money market by providing a basis for confidence on the part othe investors or placers that the instruments bought by them are effectively taken out of the pocket, as it were, of thevendors and placed safely beyond their reach, that those instruments will be there available to the placers of funds shouldthey have need of them. The depositary in a contract of deposit is obliged to return the security or the thing depositedupon demand of the depositor (or, in the presented case, of the beneficiary) of the contract, even though a term for suchreturn may have been established in the said contract.

26 Accordingly, any stipulation in the contract of deposit o

custodianship that runs counter to the fundamental purpose of that agreement or which was not brought to the notice ofand accepted by the placer-beneficiary, cannot be enforced as against such beneficiary-placer.

We believe that the position taken above is supported by considerations of public policy. If there is any party that needsthe equalizing protection of the law in money market transactions, it is the members of the general public whom placetheir savings in such market for the purpose of generating interest revenues.

27The custodian bank, if it is not related

either in terms of equity ownership or management control to the borrower of the funds, or the commercial paper dealer, isnormally a preferred or traditional banker of such borrower or dealer (here, Philfinance). The custodian bank would haveevery incentive to protect the interest of its client the borrower or dealer as against the placer of funds. The providers ofsuch funds must be safeguarded from the impact of stipulations privately made between the borrowers or dealers and the

custodian banks, and disclosed to fund-providers only after trouble has erupted.

In the case at bar, the custodian-depositary bank Pilipinas refused to deliver the security deposited with it when petitioner


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first demanded physical delivery thereof on 2 April 1981. We must again note, in this connection, that on 2 April 1981DMC PN No. 2731 had notyet matured and therefore, compensation or offsetting against Philfinance PN No. 143-A hadnotyet taken place. Instead of complying with the demand of the petitioner, Pilipinas purported to require and await theinstructions of Philfinance, in obvious contravention of its undertaking under the DCR to effect physical delivery of theNote upon receipt of "written instructions" frompetitioner Sesbreo. The ostensible term written into the DCR (i.e., "shouldthis [DCR] remain outstanding in your favor thirty [30] days after its maturity") was not a defense against petitioner'sdemand for physical surrender of the Note on at least three grounds: firstly, such term was never brought to the attentionof petitioner Sesbreo at the time the money market placement with Philfinance was made; secondly, such term runscounter to the very purpose of the custodianship or depositary agreement as an integral part of a money markettransaction; and thirdly, it is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 1988 of the Civil Code noted above. Indeed, inprinciple, petitioner became entitled to demand physical delivery of the Note held by Pilipinas as soon as petitioner's

money market placement matured on 13 March 1981 without payment from Philfinance.

We conclude, therefore, that private respondent Pilipinas must respond to petitioner for damages sustained by arising outof its breach of duty. By failing to deliver the Note to the petitioner as depositor-beneficiary of the thing deposited, Pilipinaseffectively and unlawfully deprived petitioner of the Note deposited with it. Whether or not Pilipinas itself benefitted fromsuch conversion or unlawful deprivation inflicted upon petitioner, is of no moment for present purposes. Prima facie, thedamages suffered by petitioner consisted of P304,533.33, the portion of the DMC PN No. 2731 assigned to petitioner butlost by him by reason of discharge of the Note by compensation, plus legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum

containing from 14 March 1981.

The conclusion we have reached is, of course, without prejudice to such right of reimbursement as Pilipinas may have vis

a-visPhilfinance.

III.

The third principal contention of petitioner that Philfinance and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas should be

treated as one corporate entity need not detain us for long.

In the first place, as already noted, jurisdiction over the person of Philfinance was never acquired either by the trial courtnor by the respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner similarly did not seek to implead Philfinance in the Petition before us.

Secondly, it is not disputed that Philfinance and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas have been organized as separatecorporate entities. Petitioner asks us to pierce their separate corporate entities, but has been able only to cite thepresence of a common Director Mr. Ricardo Silverio, Sr., sitting on the Board of Directors of all three (3) companies

Petitioner has neither alleged nor proved that one or another of the three (3) concededly related companies used theother two (2) as mere alter egosor that the corporate affairs of the other two (2) were administered and managed for thebenefit of one. There is simply not enough evidence of record to justify disregarding the separate corporate personalities

of delta and Pilipinas and to hold them liable for any assumed or undetermined liability of Philfinance to petitioner.28

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15195dated 21 march 1989 and 17 July 1989, respectively, are hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE, to the extent that suchDecision and Resolution had dismissed petitioner's complaint against Pilipinas Bank. Private respondent Pilipinas bank ishereby ORDERED to indemnify petitioner for damages in the amount of P304,533.33, plus legal interest thereon at therate of six percent (6%)per annum counted from 2 April 1981. As so modified, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 113236 March 5, 2001


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FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUZONDEVELOPMENT BANK,respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision 1 dated December 29, 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29546, whichaffirmed the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113 in Civil Case No. PQ-7854-P, dismissingFirestone's complaint for damages.

The facts of this case, adopted by the CA and based on findings by the trial court, are as follows:

. . . [D]efendant is a banking corporation. It operates under a certificate of authority issued by the Central Bank of thePhilippines, and among its activities, accepts savings and time deposits. Said defendant had as one of its clientdepositors the Fojas-Arca Enterprises Company ("Fojas-Arca" for brevity). Fojas-Arca maintaining a special savingsaccount with the defendant, the latter authorized an

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