FLORESCA vs Philex Mining

SC Cannot Legislate – Exception Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life. Justice Gutierrez dissentingNo civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,  expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.  The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993Facts:  The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents. The latter demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The RTC ruled for the private respondents. The CA affirmed said decision. Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.In Export Processing Zone Authority (“EPZA”) vs. Dulay, etc. et al.,  the Court held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby declared

Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases. 

Issue: Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive, application.Held:  There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute:The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar

cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that “when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . .

An otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts.  A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties. The appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision. The instant petition is dismissed.

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

Ponente: CRUZFACTS:Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother.  Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.ISSUE:Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.HELD:YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will

Tanada vs Tuvera

146 scra 446Publication – Presidential Proclamations etc – What “unless otherwise

provided” means in Article 2 of the Civil CodeWith the Supreme Court’s decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise provided” pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL

CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is

much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

Tenchavez vs EscanoTITLE: Tenchavez vs. EscanoCITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.  The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry.  A

certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.  Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.  However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.  Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.  She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.  Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children.  She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.  Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.  Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.  The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.  In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.  A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.  Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. 

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Aznar vs Garcia 7 scra 95

Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict RuleEdward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Board of Commissioners vs Dela Rosa197 scra 863

Processual PresumptionOn July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian.ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.HELD: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.

PCI vs Escolin

56 scra 266Nationality Principle

Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.HELD: The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.