Mutuc vs. COMELEC

Mutuc vs. COMELEC

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. NO. L-32717November 26, 1970

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.

ISSUE:Whether jingles falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.

RULING:

For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for distribution.

Republic vs Migrino

GR 89483, August 30, 1990Facts:Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Ret.Lt.Tecson was required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence. Private respondent was unable to produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No.3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3)that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No.3019. The Board opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition. The court judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this petition.Issues:WON PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent

Ruling:No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the term subordinate as used inE.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O.Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr.(G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980)

Ponente: AQUINO

FACTS:

Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

HELD:

NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial courts dismissal was affirmed.

RATIO:

The lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Vera vs Cuevas

Facts:Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.