caspian project 17

contents

06. editorial

08. statisticallY aHead- contextuallY BeHind

RuSSIA’S CASPIAN FLOTILLA OuTFLANkS THE uS MILITARYEVAN THOMSEN

11. strategic Patience Paid off

RuSSIAN REgIONAL HEgEMONY IN THE CASPIANLAuRA gARRIDO

16. WHat russia’s Presence in sYria trulY reveals

AN ENTANgLEMENT OF ENEMIESDR. MATTHEw CROSSTON, NENAD DRCA

20. Putin’s PossiBle liBYan Pivot

JOHN CODY MOSBEY

23. a tangled afgHani WeB

IS RuSSIA COMINg BACk IN?STEPHEN SARTY

28. turkisH dileMMa

PROBLEMS IN BEINg A gREATER CASPIAN FORCE?JEANETTE "JJ" HARPER

31. kazakHstan’s urBan develoPMent

struggles WitH Mono-cities

SAMANTHA BRLETICH

35. trust, but VerifYCountering the CritiCs of the JCPoA

AAron gooD

39. A DisturbiNg DOubLe stANDArDA huMAn rights CritiCisM of the JCPoA

AnDY DeAhn

44. the iVOrY tOwer AND the JCPOAexPerts sounD off with guArDeD oPtiMisM

sArA DYson

47. NeO-reALisM AND irAN’s NuCLeAr issue AntonY CLeMent

petra poseGateJa palkoluisa monteironina laVrenteVaGaBriela pasCholati Do amaralBruCe aDrianCetroy BaXterGreGory BrewstaCey Cottoneantony ClementanDy DeahnnenaD DrCa sara DysonJareD s. eastonJeffery fishellaura GarriDoorhan Gafarliaaron GooDamy hanlonJeanette "JJ" harper

Jonathan hartnerBrian huGhesVlaDislaV lermontoVpaula malottmeGan munozelena m.norBerto morales rosataylor morseJohn CoDy mosBeysarah nolDerJoshua pattersonDayna riCeJessiCa reeDGreGory rouDyBushstephen sartyDmitrii seltserrakesh krishnan simhaeVan thomsenDianne a. ValDezChristopher white

the CAsPiAN PrOJeCtbi-weeKLY DigitAL eDitiON

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

Dimitris GiannakopoulosModern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chiefDr. matthew CrosstonThe Caspian Project, Director

authors

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

http://moderndiplomacy.eu/

Trust is one of those concepts in in-ternational relations that can beboth amorphous and essential.Every single conflict situation in the

world today is unlikely to achieve progresswithout it and yet almost universally everyparty to a conflict defines the term in differentways. Analysts and observers bemoan the ne-cessity of establishing trust in global affairs, yetthemselves rarely come to agreement on whichactions are best for establishing trust and whichbehaviors are the most anathema to its blos-soming. This issue of the Caspian Project exam-ines the trust dilemma in the region and findsit to be as frustratingly complex as anywhereelse in the world.

Indeed, the greater Caspian region should be-come an exemplar test case for the examinationof trust. Whether they are dilemmas of religion,economics, energy, political systems, diplo-matic affairs, ethnic dissension, or proxy wars,this region today is home to all of it in one de-gree or another.

The edition’s contributors expose forus most of these problems: from thecomplex interplay of multiple sides inSyria to Turkey’s political designs so asto compensate for internal problemsto the various academic and Arab an-alysts interpreting the JCPOA to vari-ous political philosophies competingeverywhere from Libya to Iran. All ofthese wildly diverse topics end up in-fluencing or being influenced byCaspian littorals.

What this edition successfully crafts forour devoted readers is a strongersense of how far-reaching the rele-vance is for Caspian states: not just thelittorals’ own reach beyond their im-mediate spheres of personal influencebut how other major states and globalpowers all have issues and intereststhat touch upon the very livelihoodand lifeblood of the region. In the end,we come to learn that the key is to notpush a single definition of trust or onecommon parameter to describe it.Adaptability and flexibility seem to bekeys so that all of the promises and po-tential innate to relationships built ontrust become a long-term foundationfor peace and prosperity across allsides. One thing is certain after read-ing the pieces herein: without trustthere cannot be nor ever will be adawning of a new day.

FEARs OF A NEw DAwN: ThE TRUsT IssUE

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

T

MODERN DIPLOMACY

STATISTICALLY AHEADCONTExTuALLY BEHIND

RuSSIA’S CASPIAN FLOTILLA OuTFLANkS THE uS MILITARY

EVAN THOMSEN

Evan Thomsen is a graduateof the International Security and Intelligence Studies

Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NEand is currently a Master’s student at the world-

renown Elliott School of International Affairsat The George Washington University

in Washington, DC. He has just joined with the EasternCongo Initiative as Strategic Partnerships Officer.

he past month has seen increasing ten-sions between Washington andMoscow over the Syria-Assad-DAESHnexus of seemingly perpetual conflict.

This tension has not been mitigated by the some-times-substantive but always-political interventionsin the region. While both the U.S. and Russia in-crease strategic bombing campaigns and deploy‘special advisors,’ neither have revealed anythingbeyond their strategic commitments. Until October7th, 2015, that is, when Russia launched 26 KalibrSS-N-30A cruise missiles from its recently upgradedand largely secret Caspian fleet.

T

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 17 07 /08

This display of power and capacity is not a windfallmoment that tilts the scales dramatically in Russia’sadvantage. I say this only to offer caution as new oremerging military technology and capabilities oftengo hand in hand with exaggeration. It is, however,a significant moment for Great Power Politics in theregion. The Caspian launch was no mere theatre actand will have implications far beyond military tac-tics.

The first point to deconstruct is the now obviousgap between Russia’s actual capabilities and theAmerican understanding or appreciation of thosecapabilities. Most of Russia’s naval assets in theCaspian are vessels under 1,000 tons. These havebeen often described as ‘patrol craft’ or ‘local craft’in U.S. military circles. Without meaning any disre-spect to the U.S. armed services - this is Navy-speakfor this is only the Russian coast guard and thereforenot a serious capability. This assertion has now beenhandily debunked, as Russia’s Caspian fleet hasquickly proven to be capable of advanced naval op-erations that extend over 1,500km beyond theCaspian Sea.

Russia did not use its forward-deployed aircraft toconduct this round of bombing. The targets of theCaspian strike (which were reported to be in theareas around Aleppo), could have been more cost-effectively struck with Russian aerial assets alreadydeployed and active in the conflict. Why then wasthe more difficult road taken? In a word - style. Thisstrike was meant to send a message - not to DEASH,not to Syrian opposition forces, but to the UnitedStates. Bryan Clark, who is a senior fellow with theCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, com-mented that “the Navy should feel embarrassedthat they let this happen.”

We should be reminded that war has many inputs,some of which are unquantifiable. While this ma-neuver was cavalier and technically unnecessary,morale on Russia’s southern front is at an all-timehigh as this display revealed not only a sense of par-ity in military might on the world stage, but in someways a competitive advantage.

The geographic and organizational challengeswhich Russia overcame are also significant. It is notjust technology and military will that sends a missile1,500km across three countries - but military coor-dination and regional strategic cooperation are alsorequired. The 26 missiles were not launched in avacuum, but amidst ongoing conflict, aerial bom-bardment, and Russian/Syrian ground combat op-erations. The Caspian naval strike, therefore, is notjust a testament to Russia’s naval modernizationproject, but to the nation’s ability to conduct com-plicated combined-arms operations and to organ-ize these efforts in an international theatre.

The past month, if taken as a snapshot in time,should not be held up singularly as evidence of aRussian military that matches U.S. capabilities - letalone as an event signifying a return to Cold Warconditions. Nevertheless, the relative change inpower dynamics and military capacity betweenRussia and the US, particularly in the conflict inSyria, is significant. It is this point, that of a relativechange in local power, where U.S. political rhetoriccan be more fully understood. While Washington in-creases pressure on Moscow over whom the aerialand naval strikes are targeting (e.g. the fact-fencingover whether Russia is targeting DAESH or simplyAssad’s direct enemies), I find it difficult to believethat the U.S. is singularly concerned over the gen-eral ethics of Russia’s engagement. It is here whereI agree with Bryan Clark, that the US military is em-barrassed that they allowed, and were unprepared,for Russia’s quick rise to local superiority in the Syr-ian arena.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

In the past two weeks alone the U.S. Senate andHouse Armed Services Committees have held sev-eral hearings related to the intent, readiness, andcapacity of the U.S. military - all with a heavy focuson naval positioning and operations. The primarytake-away from these hearings, given both Russianand Chinese modernization and regional opera-tionalizing, is that America is statistically ahead butcontextually behind. A related take-away is that theU.S. has a surplus of words and a deficit of actions.One highlight came from Defense Secretary Carterwhen he said, speaking on U.S. naval strategy, thatwe will go anywhere international law permits.While it may strike many observers as bemusedlyironic that the U.S. is both hinging and invoking in-ternational law as the basis of its strategic parame-ters, this statement points to an emerging theme -when it comes to the geostrategic hot spots, theU.S. chooses words while rivals choose actions.

Foreign policy is supposed to drive military innova-tion and evolution. However, sometimes that getsinverted and military innovation drives foreign pol-icy (e.g. we do because we can).

The past two decades, due to U.S. military hege-mony, American foreign policy had no real competi-tor. Consequently, the U.S. shaped its militarypredicated upon pax Americana, which created aforeign policy that encompassed everything. To putanother way, today America can’t geostrategicallysee the world’s trees for its own forest.

Meanwhile, U.S. competitors have crafted a morelimited and tailored foreign policy, one that bothadvances its military capabilities in a more focusedfashion and one that is flexible enough to adapt tomilitary innovation. Russia’s Caspian flotilla is an ex-ample of this - regionally designed and strategicallyrelevant. I expect that this will not be the last inno-vation-led foreign policy design the U.S. bears wit-ness to in the coming years. The U.S., both politicallyand militarily, will have to grapple with the fact thatvictory is neither granted nor guaranteed based onhegemony and that statistically ahead but contex-tually behind needs to be a moniker it quicklysheds, both in Washington and on the battlefield.


LAURA GARRIDO

Laura Garrido is currently finishingher Master’s degree in the International

Security and Intelligence Studies Programat Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska,

USA. Her primary research interestscover the post-Soviet space and the fight

against radical Islamism.

t has been almost one year since the IVCaspian Summit in Astrakhan, Russia, wherethe presidents of the five Caspian statessigned a political declaration that denied

any foreign military presence in the Caspian Sea. Byremoving any Western military influence in the re-gion, Russia will be able to maintain the regionalhegemony it considers its natural birthright. Examining how scholars have so far in generalviewed the Russian orchestration of this decision isboth important and enlightening and reveals a planthat has long been in the making.

I

MODERN DIPLOMACY

STRATEgIC PATIENCEPAID Off

RuSSIAN REgIONAL HEgEMONY IN THE CASPIAN


Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley (1999) studied Russia’sinfluence in the Caspian region and noted that thelittoral states were dependent on Russia for trade,energy supplies, military equipment and training,and internal and external security. Russia also ex-ploited its leverage and the weakness of the littoralstates to extract military and economic concessions,including basing rights, participation in energy proj-ects, and favorable decisions on pipeline routes.Menon, Fyodorov, and Nodia (1999) echoed thesefindings by stating that Russia maintained strongpolitical, economic, and military ties to several lit-toral states from a position of dominance.

Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley (1999) also predictedthat Russia would alter its policy toward the littoralstates to a more cooperative and less confronta-tional policy. They also added that because the lit-toral states saw Russia as a stabilizing force andfeared that Russian disengagement could worsenstability challenges within the region, they tendedto view Russia as the region’s peacekeeper.

As seen in the IV Caspian Summit, Russia was ableto capitalize on that history and nudge the littoralstates into agreeing to block foreign militaries fromthe Caspian region by acting as a supporter, protec-tor, and friend. Russia convinced the states that theirmilitaries were strong enough to defend them-selves only if they would have protection from theRussian military as well.Griffith (1998) also made predictions on Russia’s fu-ture motives toward the Caspian littorals. He dis-cussed Russia’s loss of power in the region after thecollapse of the Soviet Union as the chief factor be-hind its motives. The loss of power meant a loss ofcontrol over the republics that were once an impor-tant buffer zone between the USSR, Central Asia,and the Middle East. Also, Russia saw Western oilindustries in the Caspian region as a potentialsource of competition and threat to Russian eco-nomic hegemony and influence. Because of thesethreats, Griffith predicted that Russia would attemptto coerce the Caspian states into an economic-mil-itary-political union, which finally came to fullfruition during the IV Caspian Summit.

German (2014) discussed Russia’s views of a foreignmilitary presence in the Caspian region, especiallythe US and NATO, as a provocative step. Russia wasalways determined to contain the influence of ex-ternal actors and maintain the status quo in theCaspian Sea to ensure that its influence was noteroded. Abilov (2012) also commented on Russia’sdesire to contain American influence in the Caspianregion. The primary ambition of Russia was to pre-serve its regional power status and impose its po-litical and economic will. Russia also intended tocreate new regional and international forums inorder to maintain its sphere of influence there. Ger-man suggested the United States should try to de-velop its relations with the littoral states whileacknowledging the significance of Russia’s role inthe region, as well as the vulnerability Russia felt onits southern periphery if it was not the sole hege-monic power in the Caspian.

Thus, as we can see, Russia has been working togain trust with and influence over the littoral statesfor years. According to Chufrin (2001), Russia had al-ways strove to work with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,Kazakhstan, and Iran in order to stop or slow the in-exorable draw toward the West.

In promoting relations with Iran, Russia seemed tobe more successful, entering large-scale politicaland economic cooperation with the Islamic Repub-lic. Even though part of the nuclear agreement(JCPOA) between the United States and Iran is toforego nuclear weapons attainment, without anyforeign militaries in the Caspian, Russia might bewilling and able to illicitly provide Iran with the nec-essary materials and technology without Americanknowledge.

What ties all of these moves together in a discon-certing manner for the Caspian littorals, going backmore than fifteen years, is Russian hegemony andits global imposition of strategic interests. The an-nexation of Crimea in 2014 has many post-Sovietstates concerned about Russia’s future desires to re-claim Soviet territory which it feels is its birthright.Kistler (2014) discussed each of the post-Sovietstate’s concerns and pleas for help from NATO. Thedecision to block the US and NATO from theCaspian region makes foreign intervention againstany future possible Russian annexations much moredifficult.

Russia’s desire for dominance in the region fuels itsagenda to keep the littoral states politically depend-ent while building trust so as to instill a positiveglobal image and influence within its ‘near abroad.’This slow and steady strategy has culminated in thedecision to lock the United States, NATO, and anyother foreign military from the Caspian region,thereby allowing Russia to remain the dominant re-gional hegemon without firing a single shot or put-ting a single boot onto foreign territory. It wasimpressive geostrategy, if also unnerving to theWest.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

never miss an issue!newsstand.moderndiplomacy.eu

http://newsstand.moderndiplomacy.eu/

WhAt RussIA’s PREsENCE

MODERN DIPLOMACY

IN sYRIA tRuLY REvEALsDR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies

Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

thE CAsPIAN PROJECt 17 15 /16

NENAD DRCA

Nenad Drca is currently pursuing a Master’s degreein the International Security and Intelligence Studies

Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA.

ver the years America has made littleprogress in Iraq and Syria, somethingRussia is determined to change appar-ently. The Obama administration

maintains that a lasting political solution requiresMr. Assad’s departure, but facing Russian military in-volvement, Iranian ground troops, Hezbollah mili-tary units, many armed jihadists groups, and theworld’s worst humanitarian crisis, the United Statesis facing a very convoluted and unclear situationthat it seems unable to overcome on its own. NATOis concerned with the recent Russian creation of anA2/AD zone (anti access/area denial system) inSyria. This anti access/area denial strategy could severelyhinder the ability of the Western alliance to use itsmilitary assets in Syria. Moscow’s military moves inthe Middle East and its geopolitical positioningaround the globe strive to embarrass America’simage as a reliable and confident player when itcomes geopolitics and fighting terror. For the mostpart, this is just Russia employing a ‘turnabout is fairplay’ principle, after what it feels is American harass-ment of Russia on many fronts. What is clear, after asubtle analysis of the consequences of Russia’s en-trance into Syria, is an entanglement of enemiesthat might signal much more chaos before any sub-stantive coordination.

The new U.S. strategy against DAESH in Syria will bebacked by special operations forces in Erbil, North-ern Iraq, and meant to be strengthened by cooper-ation with the Iraqi military in retaking key cities,with expanded security assistance by Jordan andLebanon. This was done to counter the suddenRussian military expansion into the region. Iraqi Shi-ite politicians were calling for Russians to conductairstrikes against DAESH in Iraq as well. Followingintensive talks between Iraqi and U.S. officials, chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. JosephDunford, said the Iraqi government had promisedit would not request any Russian airstrikes or mili-tary support for operations against DAESH. TheUnited States is trying to engage in very demandingdiplomatic talks which include the foreign ministersof Russia and Iran, firm supporters of Assad, and na-tions such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which are op-posed to the Syrian Assad regime. Of course, itwould have been better if these diplomatic talkstook place earlier with more intensity, because it ishard to overestimate just how difficult getting all ofthese disparate players to cooperate at the negoti-ating table is.

The complexity of these current diplomatic talks isevident by the fact that are still no agreements toestablish areas of collaboration in various air cam-paigns or even to share intelligence and target in-formation in Syria. The lack of military anddiplomatic cooperation between Russia and theUnited States is pushing both sides to resort to ColdWar-style tactics of proxy war. In addition, Russiancooperation in the region with Iran could implyproxy conflict that could create tension with SaudiArabia, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait. The UnitedStates is walking a fine line by attempting to courtmultiple sides while ensuring certain relationshipsdo not escalate into something much worse. In-deed, it is proving quite difficult to wage war when‘allies’ do not agree on the ‘enemy.’

O

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Before Russia’s entrance, America’s Persian Gulf al-lies wanted to fight the Syrian government but re-fuse to attack radical Islamic groups. Turkey wasagainst the Syrian regime and DAESH but in realityit wanted to fight and weaken the Kurds, which sofar have been one of the few good American alliesand effective fighters against DAESH. Another U.S.ally, Israel, is cautiously observing the landscapeand seems to be ready to act if any threat material-izes against its interests. But other than that, Israelseems intent on remaining outside the fight. In allthis it is fair to describe the fight against DAESH notso much a coalition but as a competing potpourri:it is more chaos than coordination. Then Russia ar-rives with a lean but clear objective of assisting itsold Arab ally, Assad, while restoring its nationalprestige in the Middle East. Russia has received fullendorsement to stay in the region from both Syriaand Iran. A third party, Iraq, is considering the same.By comparison, U.S. diplomats are facing the verydifficult task of appeasing many different allieswhose demands seem non-negotiable and notcompatible with each other.

Asking Russia to stop its air campaign would playinto the propaganda that the U.S. is not interestedin defeating DAESH if someone else does it. If Rus-sia is allowed to weaken DAESH in Syria and Iraqthen that would be a major blow for the U.S. If theUnited States chooses to follow Turkey’s example ofarming certain militant groups, then the risk is thatit could find itself with a group of jihadists who areimpossible to control at the end of the conflict. Iron-ically, this is the original criticism Russia madeagainst the U.S. back when the first oppositiongroups fought against Assad. Another choice is tojoin Russia in its fight but that will make the U.S.look like it is endorsing a leader it has accused ofdictatorship and oppression. So far, America simplyseems incapable of cooperating openly with Russia,even with the terror fight.

Are there any real options for this conflict in termsof diplomatic negotiations and concessions? Real-istic electoral transition in Syria cannot take placewithout advanced talks and a lasting ceasefire, inaddition to international observers. Only the com-bined pressure from Russia and the United Statescan realistically force those conditions on Syria. Rus-sia can use massive debt to pressure Syria to complyand to promise economic relief once Assad is re-placed. The alternative for Moscow is to indefinitelysupport the Syrian regime and military. That couldbe something economically unpalatable to Putin.


In a show of good will, Europe and the U.S. couldsuspend their sanctions against Russia and encour-age Turkey to remind Russia of its plans to expandtrade there from $32 billion to $100 billion dollarsin the next five years. The EU can assure the Russiansthat they will support cutting the weapons flow tojihadist groups throughout the area that often in-clude Chechens. Reassurance from the EU andTurkey about stopping the weapons flow wouldmake Russia feel better about militant groups suchas Jaish Al-Muhajireen and Jaish Al Fatah, in addi-tion to DAESH, which all include Chechen fighters.Russia is worried that hardened Chechen jihadistswill always return from Middle East battlefields toSouthern Russia and launch terrorist attacks againstRussian citizens, something that has already playedout in the past with both the Afghanistan and Iraqconflicts.

These diplomatic discussions could potentiallybring some militants and government representa-tives into direct negotiations, which Geneva talkshave always failed to accomplish. To this end aidcould be provided only to non-Salafist militantswho promise a protection of religious minorities.The role of YPG (Kurdish People’s Protection Unit)will have to be carefully negotiated with Turkey. Inshort, there are far more questions than answers in-volving far more players than most Western mediareports seem to realize. This entanglement of ene-mies is far more complex than a simple reductionto Cold War proxies. Indeed, the world should beafraid when we look longingly at the prospect ofCold War proxy conflicts as an improvement overthe current state of affairs.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

JOHN CODY MOSBEY

John Cody Mosbey is consultant and instructor inCriminal Justice and Emergency Management.

He is also researcher and writer in various aspectsof conflict resolution, terrorism, homeland security,

and related criminal justice and national securityfields. Mr. Mosbey is completing his PhD research in

Russian Political Theology at Trinity College Dublin.

he bad cloud that portends a perfectstorm continues to build. Perhapsthe most serious development onthe near horizon is a possible Putin

pivot from Syria to Libya. It may be in the works- if it is, bad things are bound to happen.

There is no real and historic Russian desire for amere presence in Southwest Asia. Geopoliticalscholars, diplomats, and military thinkers whohave put forth such ideas have been rightly crit-icized but largely for the wrong reason.

T

tHe CasPian PRoJeCt 17 19 /20

Putin’s Possiblelibyan Pivot

The fact is that those who believe that Russia has areal and historic desire for a presence in SouthwestAsia and those who criticize those that do think thisare both wrong. Russia has no desire for a merepresence in Southwest Asia - Russia’s desire there isfor regional hegemony.

In what here must be a brief examination, it is im-portant to recall two historical developments: thefirst is the realization that for many Russia embodiesthe “Third Rome.” This is the idea that Moscow (i.e.Russia) is the inheritor of the mantle of Rome trans-ferred to it via Constantinople. As Rome was empire,as Byzantium was empire, so Russia is empire. Cou-pled with the concept of Third Rome is the accept-ance of Russia as the protector of the OrthodoxChurch (and the Christian Church collectively)throughout the lands previously under control ofthe Ottoman Empire.

It is noteworthy that the Russian Orthodox Church,through a spokesman, has stated that Russia’s pres-ence in Syria is historically consistent with the roleRussia “has always played in the Middle East.”Alexandr Dugin, an outspoken advocate of Russianexpansion who has been rather sensationallydubbed “Putin’s Rasputin,” has said that Russiashould recreate empire and looks to Southwest Asiafor Russia’s southern expansion.

Besides belief in Russia as the Third Rome, the sec-ond important historical position to recall is the as-sumption of Russia as “Protector of the PersianCrown.” Russian expansion southward is no newthing. After victories in the Russo-Persian Wars, Rus-sia was ceded a great deal of territory formerlyunder Persian control. The Czar was bestowed withthe title “Protector of the Persian Crown.” In defer-ence to Russia’s Eurasian outlook it should be notedthat historical titles, possessions, and interests aredeeply embedded in the long reachback of Russianmemory.

Russia views Southwest Asia geopolitically as a re-gion next door. This is a markedly different under-standing from European or American perceptionsof Southwest Asia as a much more distant region.When Russian understanding of close geographicalproximity and perceived historical duty to protectboth Christianity and Persia combine the result canhelp explain current Russian interest and involve-ment in the region.

Consider that Mr. Putin has reinvigorated Russia’shistorically important relationship with Iran andmoved boldly into Syria. Surely no one can be naiveenough to believe he will stop with these two worksin progress. Russia is energized for action and push-back to Russian initiatives has been minimal, inef-fective, or both.The US, the EU, and other concernednations and bodies must prepare for Russia’s nextmove - and it may well be another bold one. Knowl-edgeable persons inside European and US intelli-gence communities are seeing indications ofRussian intentions toward Libya begin to solidify.

MoDeRn DiPloMaCy

Mr. Putin has forwarded the notion that Russia hasa responsibility to bring stability to the de factofailed state of Syria by supporting the regime ofBashar al-Assad as the legal and legitimate govern-mental power of Syria. Putin claims that longer termpeace can best be achieved when the establishedgovernment and its adversaries can be brought tothe table, not when a state descends into totalchaos and there is not even the remnant of recog-nizable government left to negotiate with. This ishis position in Syria and it is a ready-made positionfor him to adopt in Libya.

Further consider the current Libyan situation. Gen-eral Khalifah Hafter, the commander of the Libyanarmed forces (such as they are), stated that hewould be loyal to Libya’s Tobruk-based House ofRepresentatives if they did not acquiesce to the Po-litical Accord put forward by Benardino Leon andbacked by Western governments and the UN. TheHouse of Representatives (Libya’s internationallyrecognized parliamentary body) rejected the Polit-ical Accord.

We will now see just how General Hafter will carryout his pledge to root out armed opposition, espe-cially in light of his claim that Russia has offered tosupport his efforts.

The unraveling of the UN sponsored Political Accordwas in part due to what the Libyan House of Repre-sentatives viewed as its unwarranted support forthe Salifist elements in Tripoli.

The alarm bells should be ringing. Russian and Libyacame close to closing a deal for a Russian base inLibya under Muammar Gaddafi. Of course to Libya,this would mean a real Russian presence in the formof arms; only this time armament at a level similarto the Russian arming of Syria. More importantly, asubstantial Russian presence in Libya and contin-ued lack of effective US pushback to Putin’s initia-tives combine to make the Mediterranean muchmore attractive and tractable to Moscow.

A perfect storm is now in the making. Russia andIran will continue to test US resolve to hold Iran instrict compliance with the Nuclear Deal through de-ployments such as the S300 missile system to Iran.No Syrian style red line will be strong enough tokeep Iran from unleashing the whirlwind if it con-tinues, with Russian help, to develop truly heavy-liftcapability for its ballistic missile program.

Russia is daily strengthening its foothold in Syriaand a Putin pivot off of that into Libya may prove tobe too much Russia and too little US in a regionRussian has long felt is rightfully in their sphere ofinfluence.

If conditions continue toward a perfect storm inSouthwest Asia, one must consider the prescienceof Alexandr Dugin’s claim that “We will have a newCold War, but maybe not so cold—maybe hot thistime.”

tHe CasPian PRoJeCt 17 21 /22

ith First Vice President Abdul RashidDostum’s visit to Moscow in searchof military support, and Russianconfirmation that it was seriously

considering such a request, the stakes just gotraised in the battle for Afghanistan. On the surface,both the request and willingness on Russia’s part toassist make perfect sense: Afghanistan is a nationvoid of any real industry and relies almost exclu-sively on international aid to continue the fightagainst the Taliban.

The impending withdrawal of US and NATO forceswould almost certainly ensure wide-spread desta-bilization inside Afghanistan and the Taliban could,once again, regain control of the state. Russia,meanwhile, has no interest in seeing the Pakistan-backed Taliban reestablish control of Afghanistanand incentivize radical groups within

A TANgLEDAfghANI

WEB

STEPHEN SARTY

Stephen Sarty is a graduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence

Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha,NE, USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived

and worked in the Middle East for the last 23 years.

W

Is RussIA COMINgBACk IN?

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Central Asia, which would then threaten Russia’sbroader interests in the region. So a more stableAfghanistan is vital to Russian security. But couldthis deal be that simple or are there far more com-plex forces at work in the background?

The current proposed agreement would have Rus-sia sending small arms, artillery, and Mi-35 choppersto Kabul. What Russia does NOT propose to send atthis time would be Russian soldiers. Loath to bepulled back into the quagmire that cost them over15,000 troops during their decade of fighting inAfghanistan in the 1980s, Russian officials have sofar ruled out that as an option. This then begs thequestion: how does Russia expect, if US and NATOtroops do proceed with a pull-out, that an infusionof weapons and ammunition could provide themeans by which the current Afghan leadershipmight secure the country?

Considering that the United States alone haspumped billions of dollars into Afghanistan sincethe start of its own campaign, it seems highly un-likely that this influx of Russian arms could fill thevoid left by the withdrawal of Western troops. Sowhat then are the real goals and objectives?

One possible plan could be that Russia simply ex-pects that the shipments of arms and munitionsinto the country effectively forces the US and NATOto remain in place. Given the highly-charged natureof American politics, especially during a presidentialelection cycle, any decision to remove US supportcould have devastating effects, especially if viewedby the American public as caving in the face of Russ-ian advances. This scenario is currently being playedout in Syria: already Republican leaders have char-acterized the Afghan leaders’ approach to Russia asa symbol of failed leadership by the White House.

ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 17 23 /24

As in Syria, it is easy to see a scenario that includesIran working in conjunction with Russia and otherlocal Afghan leaders to stabilize the region: Iran iscoming under increasing threat from DAESH forces.The door is also slightly open for Iran working withthe United States in some aspect as well. Becausethe two nations share the same end-state goal ofstability and economic development inAfghanistan, there is room for the two nations tocooperate, although the recent announcement byIran that it will not partner up with the US in Syriato fight DAESH could throw a monkey wrench intothis potentiality in Afghanistan.

That Afghanistan would turn to Russia at this timeis, however, indicative of a larger trend across theregion: with Russia underwriting an expansion ofIranian influence, increasing its own presence inSyria, creating a new intelligence-sharing cell in Jor-dan, and receiving the recent request by the IraqiPM for Russian assistance, it is only logical thatAfghanistan would also reach out for increased sup-port. For the Russians the decisions are almost no-brainers. Currently in Syria they are largely using theIranian-backed Shiite and Hezbollah militias alreadyin place. The same would be true, for the most part,inside Iraq. The upside for the Russians is huge: theyare able to shine the spotlight on what has been anincredibly schizophrenic Middle East strategy by theUnited States and, at the same time, put themselvesin place to become the dominant player in MiddleEastern geostrategic affairs.

For President Putin this is an enticing double play.All of this is also not lost on the Iranians: the Tehran-Moscow alliance has effectively outflanked SaudiArabia and the other Sunni-dominated countries ofthe GCC in terms of strategic outcome and influ-ence.

This likely represents the most desired solution forRussia: embarrassing the US while gaining greaterinfluence. It is unlikely that Russia has any vital in-terest in the internal struggles of Afghanistan andwould likely be willing to work with any regime aslong as it doesn’t pose a threat to Russia in the re-gion.

It is not inconceivable that Russia, Iran and other oldallies have also struck a deal to reconstitute theirearlier partnership and form a new “Northern Al-liance” so as to thwart the Pakistan-supported insur-gency in the Northern regions of Afghanistan. FirstVice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was aGeneral in the Soviet-backed Afghan army duringthe Soviet war in Afghanistan, was also a key mem-ber of the original Northern Alliance during the lat-ter part of the 1990s. Dostum is no stranger toMoscow-provided military aid as his own militia bat-talions received extensive financial and arms sup-port from the Russians in his battles against theMujahedin guerrillas. In such a scenario one couldsee aid received from Russia used by PresidentGhani and Vice President Dostum to secure Kabuland the Northern Provinces of the country and thenaim to see US/NATO forces remain in place to con-duct operations against the rising tide of DAESHfighters along with the Taliban fight.

For Iran, a stabilization of Afghanistan is vitally im-portant given its close cultural and religious ties.Iran has been attempting to increase its trade andinvestment interests there for a long time and, likeRussia, has an on-going national security interest inslowing the rampant drug-trafficking problem thatonly increased during the US-led occupation.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Regardless of the scenarios that ultimately play outin Afghanistan, the message from the Russians isclear: they are resolved to impress upon the worldthat the news of their global demise has beengreatly exaggerated. For Russia these moves alsoallow it to influence oil and gas pipeline routes soas to minimize competition with its own energysupplies into Europe and bring additional revenuethrough the sale of arms. Furthermore, the movesallow Russia to have a more direct impact on one ofthe biggest threats to its own Muslim-speaking re-gions: the spread of jihadism into sovereign Russia.

At a recent Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) summit in Kazakhstan last week, Vladimir Putinsaid the situation in Afghanistan was “close to criti-cal” and that terrorist groups were gaining more in-fluence and not hiding their plans for furtherexpansion toward Russia and the other CIS states.These moves go a long way toward addressingthose concerns. Indeed, the whirlwind of Russianstrategic positioning in 2015 has been surprisinglypowerful.

ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 17 25 /26

tuRkIsh DILEMMAPRObLEMs IN bEINg A gREAtER CAsPIAN FORCE?

MODERN DIPLOMACY

JEANETTE “JJ” HARPER

Jeanette “JJ” Harper is a graduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence

Studies program at Bellevue Universityin Omaha, NE, USA.

n the wake of Turkey’s recent election – sup-posedly fraught with corruption and fraud– and amid some of the worst violent out-breaks it has seen in years, many find them-

selves anxious over the country’s future. Thefighting between Turkey’s security forces and Kur-dish rebels has killed thousands of people. Eventhough claimed by the Islamic State terrorist organ-ization, two massive suicide bombings that oc-curred recently at a pro-Kurdish rally have increasedtensions between Turks and Kurds. The instability inneighboring Syria and Iraq, combined with therefugee crisis spilling into Europe, is making thingseven worse. To add insult to injury, Turkey’s econ-omy is slowing and its private sector is losing rev-enue from decreased tourism. All of this is whatleads to a refocused emphasis on Turkish interestsand the Greater Caspian region. While not one ofthe Caspian littorals, it seems likely that Turkey isgoing to remain a major player in the region be-cause of its own internal stresses. Whether thosestresses push its influence in a positive or negativedirection remains to be seen.


ITurkey is in all senses of the term a modern nation:it is an important member of NATO and would be amember of the European Union if opponents hadnot prevented it. Over time, it has cultivated impor-tant strategic alliances with neighbors in Asia andthe Middle East. These partnerships and Turkey’s ge-ographic position – a location that flanks manytroublesome regions – makes it a very importantally. It also seems to be the primary conduit for al-most all energy plans stemming from the Caspianregion and heading to Europe.

Its presence helps balance the more militantregimes found in the area and serves as an impor-tant site for NATO actions. The country has a strictsecular policy that has helped fend off more aggres-sive Islamic regimes. However, there are still manyTurks that would prefer a more Islamic identity forthe country. They believe a revival of the goldendays of the Ottoman dynasty is possible with Turkeyas the seat of a new Islamic caliphate. Yet there areothers that recognize that the fall of the empire wasa direct result of stagnant ideas and corrupt actions.

As a result of this conflicting debate, the nationfinds itself swaying back and forth between West-ern and Islamic culture. This is reflected in Turkey’sdealings with both its regional and internationalpartnerships.In the early years of the 20th century, as long asTurkey remained true to its plans of building a West-ernized society in matters of foreign policy, thecountry was considered an ally of Western nations.It was a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Mid-dle East. Despite its mistreatment of the Kurds, theresounding calls of pro-Islamic militants whopreached the need to turn away from the West, andthe subsequent postponement of EU membership,Turkey’s membership in NATO and intentions to jointhe European Economic Community were evidenceof its desires to become an important fixture for amodern global community. Even today, Turkey isconsidered an indispensable partner in dealing withthe misconduct of the Islamic State, the Syrian civilwar, Russian movement in the region, and the de-veloping migrant crisis.

Today, Turkey’s major interests have also shifted toinclude the changing geopolitics of Eurasia. TheCaspian region, an essential link between CentralAsia and Turkey, has grown in importance as asource of energy. Its relationships with Russia, Iran,Central Asia, and the Caucasus are opening up newopportunities for Turkey both politically and eco-nomically.

And while Turkey does stand to gain much politi-cally with these new relations, its policy has so farbeen almost solely motivated by economic devel-opment. Turkish leaders believe, however, that itsgains in terms of energy will not only help its owninternal development but will also serve to promotestability across the Greater Caspian, decreasing theincidents of rivalry and conflict in the region. Insome ways Turkey justifiably sees the Caspian as themost obvious foothold for itself and increasingglobal stature, especially as the tension increases inthe region between the United States and Russia.

While multilateralism and cooperation with theWest still largely dominate Turkish diplomacy inareas like the Caspian, there are concerns aboutTurkey’s relationship with Islamism and the MiddleEast and what that could do to the region if prob-lems emerge internally. Turkish President RecepTayyip Erdoğan, the head of Turkey’s Islamic Justiceand Development Party (AKP), is seen as the key tothe country’s political and economic stability – notonly for Turkey but also for the entire Middle East.Unfortunately, this latest election may have servedto undermine the secular social order and that keymay now be a negative one.

Disconcertingly, Erdoğan’s very character has beenbrought into question after the elections. Since therevival of Islamism in the Middle East and the eventsthat unfolded from the Arab Spring in 2011, Er-doğan has been caricatured as a tyrant with unri-valed executive powers that may be used to slowlyabolish some of the important gains Turkey hasmade over the decades. Worries about regressionabound. Erdoğan’s AK party, now the dominantSunni identity in the country, has been crackingdown on anyone that opposes it.

MODERN DIPLOMACY


With arrests, confiscations, and violence, Turkey’ssystem is starting to look like those found in Russia,Venezuela and other ‘democracies’ that have no tol-erance for dissidence or civil disobedience. Erdogan’s administration – not so long ago praisedas an example of a modern Islamic democracy - isquickly becoming one that appeals to Islamists whowish to wage war against what they see as a godlesssecular system imported by the West. While it wouldnot be fair to lump Turkey’s Islamists in with fanati-cal groups like DAESH it is important to recognizetheir potential to implement practices and rulesthat are so restrictive that they threaten to com-pletely overhaul Turkey’s legal and educational sys-tems. Because of Turkey’s importance in the region,this could mean further upsetting the regional bal-ance in the Middle East and possibly even theCaspian.

Most assuredly, Russia would stand against a risingTurkey in the Caspian region if radical Islamic ten-dencies were seen emerging within its political sys-tem at home.

While it may not yet be time to panic – due to a sig-nificant secular-nationalist Turkish population thatremains resistant to the rise of Islamism – the out-come of the recent events surrounding Turkey’s re-cent elections could have a serious impact onTurkey’s current system that promises to protecteveryday Turkish social rights and liberties. Theymay also facilitate negative global repercussions.Turkey’s rising importance in the greater Caspian re-gion has been slowly building for the last decade. Itwould be a shame to see ancient internal dilemmascause that progress to be postponed or destroyed.

KAzAKhstAN’s URbAN DEvELOPMENt stRUggLEs wIth MONO-CItIEs

SAMANTHA BRLETICH

Samantha Brletich is a current graduate studentstudying peace operations policy at George Mason

University, Arlington, VA. Ms. Brletich focuses onRussia and Central Asia focusing on extremism and

terrorism, regional relations, strategic relations,Kyrgyz and Western relations, and governance.

Ms. Brletich is an employee of the US Departmentof Defense.

s Kazakhstan strives to be one of themost 30 developed nations by 2050,Kazakhstan struggles with transform-ing its economic system, dealing with

regional issues including economic integration andterrorism, and with transforming Kazakhstan’s So-viet-era villages into modern day cities which willassist in Kazakhstan’s long-term development.Oneof the main nine concepts of the Kazakhstan Strat-egy 2050 is industrialization which is required to ex-ploit Kazakhstan’s natural gas and oil reserves.Industrialization and the implementation of SpecialEconomic Zones (SEZs) will attract foreign investorsboosting its economy and maintaining Kazakhstan’srelationships with companies and foreign nations.

A

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Kazakhstan, within the history and context of theSoviet Union, was a dumping ground for the SovietUnion’s unwanted persons and used as a nucleartesting ground (specifically Semipalatinsk, nowcalled Semey). Populations are scattered through-out Kazakhstan in large cities once populated byethnic Russians who left once the Soviet Union dis-integrated.

In Kazakhstan, a mono-city is defined by more than20% of the population working in one industry.Mono cities were part of the planned and central-ized economy and when Kazakhstan transitionedto a market economy and “many small and mediumsized cities gradually started to fall into decline,which was caused mainly by low competitivenessof local enterprises.” Mono-cities still remained.“Mono-cities” were the industrial and economicbackbone for municipalities. The mono-city is an ur-banization pattern still prevalent in Russia that isvulnerable to economic shocks. If the company orindustry falters or demand sharply drops for theproduct, the city experiences a sharp economicdownturn which results in the loss of wages, jobs,and decline in the condition of living increasing so-cial tensions and possibly violence. This was fearedin the mono-city of Temirtau in 2015.

As the national population rose, the population(s)of mono-cities declined by 4% during the last tenyears (2005-2015) and the elderly populations ofmono-cities exceeded 18% which increases theneed for pension funds, more healthcare and a de-clining population. In Kazakhstan, 9%-10% of thepopulation lives in 27 mono-cities in ten differentregions; ten mono-cities are in Karaganda Provincealone


Citing statistics from UNESCAP , the mono-citiesmake up 16.8% of the country’s urban population.Most of the mono-cities are have populationsbelow 50,000 with the exception of eight medium-sized cities with populations between 50,000-100,000, and four larger cities with populations over“100,000–Temirtau, Rudny, Zhanaozen, and Ekibas-tuzand one large city – Termirtau with populationabove 150,000.”

Workers at Temirtau, the location of Kazakhstan’slargest steelworks plant, were experiencing immi-nent wage cuts by 25% in July by the companyArcelorMittal Temirtau . This non-consensual wagedecrease violated the country’s Labor Code whichrecognized the order to be ineffective. ArcelorMittalTemirtau was in a similar situation in February 2015when the company had to pay wages as part of anagreement with Trade Union of Workers of Miningand Metallurgical Industries. The wages in Temirtauare impacted by Kazakhstan’s non-competitivenessin the steel industries and Russia’s 80% de-evalua-tion of the ruble according to Kazakh news agency, Tengrinews.

The mono-cities have been the subject of economicdiversification by the Kazakh government withinthe framework of State Program of Regional Devel-opment 2020. The mono-cities make modicum con-tributions to economy as the Kazakh economy isfocusing more on global services and natural gas.The State Program of Regional Development strivesto “ remove social stress in the mono and smallcities, to create the new centers of economicgrowth” Trade blocks are also causing Kazakhstaneconomic problems. The State Program on the De-velopment of Mono-cities for 2012-2020 is the firsturbanization program for mono-cities approved bythe government in May 2012. By the end of the2015, “141.3 billion KZT [(Kazakh tenge)] [will bespent] on this Program.”

The Development of Mono-cities Program has fourgoals as identified by the Eurasian Research Insti-tute based in Almaty, Kazakhstan: make the size ofthe mono-city proportionate to the size of the pop-ulation; diversify the economy with more SMEs; in-crease labor mobility in mono- cities; and attractinfrastructural development. The program is ex-pected to “increase industrial output by mono-citiesby 20%” and reduce poverty and the unemploy-ment rate. Increasing labor mobility would be diffi-cult because of the very nature of mono-citiesunless there is a transfer mechanism in place. Ac-cording to the second phase of the project, focusedon entrepreneurship and microloans , those who“willing and having the ability to start or expandtheir own business may participate in the secondphase” and will be executed through employmentcenters in the mono-cities. The Fund for FinancialSupport of Agriculture will also assist in the devel-opment of the mono-cities. The State Program onthe Development of Mono-cities plans to providemicroloans worth 1.4 billion tenge.

The four mono-cities of Zyryanovsk, Kurchatov (oneof the nuclear test sites, Semipalatinsk-21), Ridder(a mining site) and Serebryansk already have com-prehensive programs for future development. Infra-structure was supplied to the Central Asia state bythe Soviet Union but they are in disrepair. The infra-structure of the mono-cities should be provided bythe government. Foreign direct investment wouldalso increase infrastructure projects. An examplewould be China and its rejuvenation of the “SilkRoad.” Transfers from the national budget develop-ment of social and engineering infrastructure sup-plied mono-cities received 5.5 % of 43.0 billiontenge.With growth, the cities can begin to accom-modate more than just one single dominant indus-try. Services such as technology and manufacturingare increasing and it would be beneficial to themono-cities and the Kazakh government if thesetypes of services were introduced into a mono-city.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Economy stated that in2013 the budget of the State Program to DevelopMono-cities allocated 38.3 billion tenge “devoted tooperating costs, demolition of empty buildings, andalso on reconstruction and building of infrastruc-ture objects, [and to] support of small and mediumbusiness.” Renovation of the mono-cities wouldmake the mono-cities more modern, but fails to ad-dress their non-competitiveness.

The Government is already working with the UnitedNations Development Program and United NationsChildren’s Fund (UNICEF) to assess the status ofmono-cities and assist in development. The city ofUst-Kamenogorsk (or Oskemen) in Kazakhstansigned up for the UNICEF Program on making citieschild friendly by “ improvement of quality of life ofchildren by a way of providing social and legal guar-antees.” Their goal is stop and alleviate the urbanpoverty that mono-cities create. The governmenthas also begun geographic exploration near themono-cities directed by the Ministry for Investmentand Development in the Zhezkazgan, Satpayev, andUlytau regions. The people in mono-cities wouldbenefit from labor mobility or job placement pro-grams, or job transfer programs.

People outside of the mono-cities would benefitfrom working in the mono-cities. Exporting expertsfrom the economic hubs in the country would alsobe helpful. The government, as it increases its focuson the information technology sector, should createa technology park near or in the mono-cities whichrequires updated infrastructure. Education grantsand the ability to participate in state economic pro-grams would also assist families in breaking thecycle of poverty.

Privatization of the mono-cities would help solidifyKazakhstan’s transition to the market economy. An-other option would be to eliminate the urbaniza-tion pattern of mono-cities which privatizationwould achieve. This urbanization pattern is incon-gruent with Kazakhstan’s market economy. Under-standing that most of the industries arestate-owned in the mono-cities some industriesand new economic initiatives in the industrial townsbe backed by foreign investors. As Kazakhstanstruggles with de-evaluation of their currency, andamid reports of food prices rising , the economic sit-uation in the mono cities could become amplifiedfor the Kazakh government posing new challengesand raising new questions about the vitality ofthese cities.


The real question on everyone’s mindwith regard to the JCPOA is whether ornot Iran will honor its commitments.There are two differing philosophies to

this question. The first is that of the agreement’s crit-ics, who argue that Iran will act similarly to roguenations in the past and violate the agreement inhopes of attaining a nuclear arsenal. After all, a verysimilar agreement was made with Iraq, and the U.S.ultimately invaded the country in 2003 because ofwhat was viewed as violations to the agreement.Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to,among other things: allow international weaponsinspectors to oversee the destruction of his

AARON GOOD

Aaron Good is presently a graduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence

Studies Program at Bellevue University inOmaha, Nebraska, USA.

He is currently employed by theUS Department of Justice.

T

trust, but VerifY

MoDern DiPLoMACY

Countering the CritiCs of the JCPoA

weapons of mass destruction; not develop newweapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his bal-listic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilome-ters; stop support for terrorism and prevent terroristorganizations from operating within Iraq. Criticshave pointed to the failed compromise with Iraq asan indicator of the forthcoming conflict that willarise from the JCPOA. The breakdown of the Iraqi agreement is not thefirst time that the U.S. has been part of an arrange-ment that has gone south.On October 21, 1994 theU.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Frameworkafter North Korea announced its intention to with-draw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Similar to Iran’s recent commitments under theJCPOA, North Korea agreed to full compliance, in-cluding taking all steps deemed necessary by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to de-termine the extent to which North Korea divertedmaterial for weapons in the past and giving inspec-tors’ access to all nuclear facilities in the country.North Korea eventually violated this arrangement,withdrew from the NPT, and attained nuclearweapons capability. Critics of the JCPOA havepointed to these failed agreements to validate theirarguments. They are difficult to argue with as Iranand North Korea share some attributes, includingviolating international norms on nonproliferation,terrorism, and human rights.

Conversely, proponents of the JCPOA have arguedthat Iran has the right to peaceful nuclear energyand the right to address legitimate security con-cerns. It is no secret that Iran is trying to secure itsposition as a leader in the Middle East and theworld. Advocates of the JCPOA contend that, be-cause of its desire to emerge as a world power, Iranwill be more likely to abide by the rules of the agree-ment and enhance its security through diplomaticrelations with other world leaders. Additionally, en-thusiasts of the JCPOA reject the idea that the U.S.is being seduced by a deal that is similar to failedagreements of the past and argue that the JCPOAis not the North Korea deal. First and foremost, thefinal agreement with Iran is vastly more compre-hensive in terms of verification provisions and con-tains much stronger elements to deter cheating, aswell as more meaningful incentives to motivatecompliance than the Agreed Framework.

Second, advocates of the JCPOA point to the ad-vancement of North Korea’s nuclear program com-pared to Iran’s when an agreement was signed asanother essential difference: by the time the AgreedFramework was completed in 1994, North Koreawas already estimated to have produced more thanenough plutonium for a nuclear weapon.

the CAsPiAn ProJeCt 17 35 /36

George Perkovich explains, “by contrast, neither theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor anyintelligence agency has offered evidence that Iranhas acquired enough fissile material for a nuclearweapon [and] therefore, Iran cannot hide behind aputative agreement and weaponize material it al-ready possesses.” These two fundamental distinc-tions, coupled with advances in technicalcapabilities and the United States’ ability to adaptfrom former failed negotiations, give proponentsthe confidence to believe in the agreement’s valid-ity.Supposedly, the U.S. has three alternatives to theJCPOA in terms of resolving the threat posed by asecret nuclear program of Iran. The first and mostpopular alternative is for the U.S. to impose in-creased sanctions. For example, The American IsraelPublic Affairs Committee (AIPAC) explains that theU.S. must, “revive the policy that first brought aboutnegotiations—a combination of tough diplomacyand crippling sanctions [and] this time around mustnot settle for merely delaying ‘breakout’ time, butforge a deal that truly stops all of Iran’s pathways toa bomb.” Despite the committee’s enthusiasm fordeveloping an all-inclusive agreement that ensuresthat Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon, thereare a few flaws in the strategy to re-impose sanc-tions. The first and most obvious problem with this strat-egy is that the U.S. has already accepted the termsof the JCPOA and, arguably, is at the point of no re-turn. Congressman Jerrold Nadler correctly as-sesses, “The Europeans, Russia, and China, beingeager to resume business with Iran, having agreedto voluntary sanctions only in order to coerce Iraninto negotiating an agreement, and having reachedwhat they regard as a reasonable agreement onlyto have Congress pull the rug out from under them,would certainly not want to maintain their sanc-tions.”

Second, if Iran determined that the U.S. was not ad-hering to its obligations under the agreement, thenIran would have no incentive to allow IAEA inspec-tors into its facilities and it could begin enriching asmuch plutonium as it wished.

The second alternative would involve the boy-cotting of Iranian banks. The basic idea behind thisstrategy is for the U.S. to impose, more-or-less, sec-ondary sanctions in order to get Iran back to the ne-gotiating table. Jerrold Nadler explains, “We wouldtake on essentially the rest of the world, includingall our closest economic and diplomatic allies, and,by threatening to cut off their access to the Ameri-can economy through our banks.” In other words,the U.S. would not only try to influence Iran throughan economic boycott but the entire world.

If that sounds suspiciously like coercion, that’s be-cause it is. Unsurprisingly, there are several down-falls to this approach. Treasury Secretary Jack Lewsums it up best: “The countries we would have tocoerce are among the biggest economies in theworld [and] if we were to cut them off from theAmerican dollar and our financial system, we wouldset off extensive financial hemorrhaging, not just inour partner countries but in the United States aswell.” Another significant flaw in this approach is thefact that the rest of the world has the ability to callthe American bluff. Over forty percent of U.S. ex-ports go to these countries and American tradingpartners know that it will not shut down its exportsor cut off countries that hold nearly forty-seven per-cent of foreign-held U.S. treasuries. The third and final alternative to the JCPOA is directU.S. military intervention. As Jeffrey Goldberg ar-gued, “an Israeli strike could theoretically set backIran’s nuclear program, but only the U.S. has the mil-itary capabilities to set back the program in any-thing approaching a semi-permanent way.

MoDern DiPLoMACY

Many voices heard throughout the debate of Iran’spotential nuclear program have claimed that mili-tary action may be the only path available to theU.S. that would secure world stability. Besides theobvious consequences of military action includingthe loss of human life, there are some other issuesthat should cause the U.S. to pause.

In 2004, the Atlantic magazine conducted a wargame which simulated preparations for a U.S. as-sault on Iran and in doing so they arrived at a fewsobering conclusions. First, the U.S. governmenthad no way of knowing exactly how many sites Iranhad, how many it would be able to destroy, or howmuch time it would take to do so. Even worse, theU.S. had no way of predicting the long-term strate-gic impact of a strike. If these were the conclusionsthat this group came up with in 2004, when the U.S.had forces in neighboring Iraq, how much more

ineffective would an assault be in present day? It isalso important to note that even if the U.S. were suc-cessful in its endeavor to destroy Iranian nuclear fa-cilities, Iran would be more hostile towards the U.S.if it ever did achieve the production of a nuclearweapon down the road. And that as a goal wouldbe extremely likely if the U.S. violated Iranian sover-eignty and invaded.

Each of these strategies offers a different alternativeto resolving the conflict of a secret Iranian nuclearprogram. Unfortunately, each approach is evenmore unrealistic than the last. Currently, the U.S. hasvery little option but to embrace the terms of theJCPOA and to enforce those terms as rigidly as pos-sible. Skeptics may believe it is foolhardy to ‘trust’Iran, but in this case the old Reagan adage duringthe Cold War seems most appropriate: Trust, butverify.

the CAsPiAn ProJeCt 17 37 /38

ritics of capital punishment have longclaimed that the utilization of suchmeasures are inhumane and disregardcertain human rights. One state at the

center of this debate has been the United States.Since 1976, when the death penalty was re-enactedin the U.S., America has executed more than 1,400individuals, all of whom were convicted of widerange of highly evil crimes. However, when com-pared to the Caspian Five, this number is extremelysmall.

Across the Caspian one can observe a dire humanrights record. According to the 2015 Human RightsRisk Atlas, the five littoral nations can be catego-rized as holding an “extreme risk” or “high risk” ofcommitting human rights violations. These riskclassifications are based upon a scale of 1 to 10,where extreme risk is determined to be 0-2.5 andhigh risk is 2.5-5.0. Moreover, these classificationsare based upon certain criteria which include staterepression of assembly, speech, and religion; con-tinued conflict; judicial corruption; torture; execu-tions; and failing to uphold civil rights for workers.

A DIstuRbINgDOubLEstANDARD

ANDY DEAHN

Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduatewith a Bachelor of Science degree from Bellevue

University’s International Security and IntelligenceStudies program. He is currently employed as aDepartment of Defense contractor working as a

member of an intelligence analysis team throughoutvarious worldwide locations.

He had previously worked as Special Tactics-TacticalAir Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force

supporting Army Special Forces ground teamsas a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

C

A HuMAN RIgHts CRItICIsM Of tHE JCPOA

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Russia and Iran both are categorized as extreme,while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan arecategorized as high. Just to put it into perspectivethe United States currently is considered a ‘mediumrisk’ (5.0-7.5) country. This is due to human rightsviolations in the areas of criminal justice, immigra-tion, and national security—the criminal justice cri-teria include harsh sentencing and capitalpunishment.

In comparison, capital punishment has been out-lawed in Russia. However, the nation’s human rightssituation continues to deteriorate. This is becausethe state suppresses the media, internet, and civilsociety, while at the same time turns a blind eye tothe harassment of activists and corrupt legal andeconomic practices. Now, while capital punishmentmay be outlawed, Russia’s seemingly systemichuman rights violations on multiple levels earn itthe title of ‘extreme risk.’

Iran, on the other hand, is a nation currently at-tempting to gain international legitimacy and havea say in global political dialogue.

However, while Western powers, and more specifi-cally the United States, are attempting to engageIran, the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric compared to itsactions on human rights garners well-earned criti-cism.

Just one year ago Iran carried out the second high-est number of executions in the world, trailing justbehind China, who was the world’s leading execu-tioner per capita. Despite the election of PresidentHassan Rouhani in 2013—a moderate in the eyes ofmany—and the JCPOA nuclear deal being struckwith the United States, Iran’s human rights recordhas not improved. In fact, its record is now consid-ered to be the worst in the world. For example, be-tween January 2015 and September 2015, theIslamic Republic of Iran carried out public execu-tions by method of hanging on more than 694 in-dividuals, a statistic that a United Nations humanrights monitor has called the highest rate of execu-tions per capita within the country in the last 25years. The majority of these executions were due toa surge in drug-related crime, an offense that is pun-ishable by death within the Islamic Republic.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 17 39 /40

However, if the Iranian regime is content with rulingheavy-handedly over its own citizens and movingagainst their human rights to the point of becomingthe world’s leading executioner, how can Westernpowers trust the regime to not produce nuclearweapons or not act under false pretenses? Clearly,there seems to be a double-standard based uponcertain political or economic advantages asdeemed by the United States. And while it is not in-herently wrong to engage and participate in devel-opmental discourse, it is wrong to overlook whathistory has taught: evil deeds should not be dis-counted in an attempt to establish new positionswith so-called moderate officials. We do know thatunder the Rouhani presidency, Tehran has pledgedto become more moderate. But when dissecting thenation’s human rights score sheet, violations havebecome increasingly systemic.

Nevertheless, the passing of the nuclear agreementbetween the United States and Tehran was a legacy-building move on behalf of President Obama andone that may hold the potential to improve globalnuclear security and stability. But with the agree-ment acting as the sole motivator and center ofdiplomatic openings, it overlooks and arguablyeven dismisses human rights as an issue of impor-tance. This fact cannot help but allow the expansionof systemic abuse against human rights within Iran.Whether the JCPOA can be a positive facilitator toimprove that record remains to be seen, but this au-thor is highly skeptical.

(*) The opinions expressed in this article are not offeredas unemotional objective political commentary but asa liberal critique in the long and storied history ofhuman rights scholarship. The views expressed aresolely those of the author and not necessarily a reflec-tion of The Caspian Project, its other contributors, orModern Diplomacy in general.

In addition to drug crimes, which accounted for 69percent of all executions in the first half of 2015,Iranian law employs the death penalty for a varietyof offenses. These include threats toward the secu-rity of the state, any verbal or physical hostility to-wards God - also known as Moharebeh - and for anyinsults against the memory of Imam Khomeini andagainst the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.Moharebeh specifically has been frequently utilizedby prosecutors as a criminal charge against politicaldissenters, journalists, activists, and bloggers, ofwhich the Islamic Republic remains the one of theworld’s largest incarcerators. However, for a nationthat is attempting to gain both political and eco-nomic clout on the international stage, it still actsas a repressive government and uses wide statepowers as tools of control against its society.

So one must ask, when comparing internationalstandards for human rights, why is there not moreinternational outrage about the rate and number ofexecutions being conducted inside of Iran? Further-more, how is it that despite U.S. leadership’s knowl-edge of such dire reality for many Iranian citizensand political prisoners, America continued to pur-sue diplomatic openings that would remove sanc-tions and allow Iran to engage the globalcommunity freely? Does this not signify that theUnited States is undermining its own professed pri-oritization of human rights? For example, the inkhad not even dried on President Obama’s historicalnuclear agreement when in October 2015 UnitedStates citizen and Washington Post correspondentJason Rezaian was convicted of espionage in an Is-lamic court in Iran.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

“The strong do what they have to doand the weak acceptwhat they haveto accept”

Thucydides


SARA DYSON

Sara Dyson is a graduatestudent in the International

Security and IntelligenceStudies Program at Bellevue

University in Omaha,Nebraska, USA.

ThE IvORYTOwER

AND ThEJCPOA

MODERN DIPLOMACY

ust as the early scientists in the 1930s and40s spoke about the threat that nuclearweapons posed, today’s scholars and ex-perts have spoken out on the new Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action. Opinions have beenpolled and theories have been produced frommany experts and scholars in the US and around theworld. Although there is some degree of variancethe theme remains fairly constant – the JCPOA, al-though not perfect, is the best option the world cur-rently has at obtaining some degree of regionalstability in the Middle East.

Arab Scholars and Experts Discuss the JCPOA

The JCPOA is an historic agreement that provides avery new and unique opportunity to engage Iranand potentially eliminate regional tensions, im-prove international security, and address nuclearproliferation for the entire Middle East. Given thesignificance of the ramifications that the JCPOAcould bring to the future of the region, the BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs at Har-vard University engaged regional scholars and an-alysts on the ‘future of Iran’s role in the Middle Eastand Arab security.’ 15 leading regional expertsacross the Arab world (Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Yemen,Lebanon, Kuwait and Q’atar) were asked to sharetheir views on the implications of the JCPOA onIranian foreign policy in the Middle East andthroughout the Arab world and how the nuclearagreement will impact the structure of regional se-curity.

When asked to identify factors that explained whythe JCPOA was reached, the most common theoryamongst Arab scholars and experts was the impactof the sanctions on Iran and the Iranian people’s de-sire to have them lifted. Others also targeted Iran asthe catalyst for change by ‘allowing for successfulnegotiations.’ They identified the shift in Iranian for-eign policy with the election of President HasanRouhani, the generational gap between Iranian offi-cials and the public, and the military stalemate Iranfaced in regional conflicts as explanations for Iran’snewfound willingness to participate in nuclear ne-gotiations. Whether stated or implied, many foundthe deal to be either a ‘clear win’ for Iran or other-wise beneficial to it.

Many experts who discussed the implications of nu-clear agreement on regional nuclear proliferationbelieved that the JCPOA would ‘diminish the risk ofproliferation’ and ‘praised the settlement’ for thatreason and they were optimistic that the nucleardeal might advance the idea for ‘a WMD-free zone’in the Middle East and bring Israel’s nuclear pro-gram in line with Iran’s. Others, however, were notas optimistic and expressed concern that Iran wouldnot stick to the terms of the agreement and woulddrive towards nuclear weaponization and regionalproliferation. The overall sentiment amongst re-gional experts was that any Iranian nuclear programposes a ‘significant threat to the Arab world’ as it issimply an outlet for Iran’s projection of regionalpower.

J

ThE CASPIAN PROJECT 17 43 /44

US Scientists and International Relations Experts Weigh In

The JCPOA does not just have implications for Iranand the Middle East. The US was a key player in thenegotiations of the nuclear agreement and will con-tinue to play a leading role as the terms of theJCPOA are implemented. 29 Nobel laureates, nu-clear arms makers and former White House scienceadvisors (some of the nation’s top scientists) pro-vided contributory statements to President Obamaon the JCPOA. In a letter to the White House, these29 US scientists praised the agreement and usedsuch words as “innovative” and “stringent” to de-scribe the contents of the JCPOA. They congratu-lated President Obama for negotiating anagreement that ‘will advance the cause of peaceand security in the Middle East and serve as a guide-post for future nonproliferation agreements.’

An opinion poll conducted by The College ofWilliam and Mary found that there was a significantgap between the opinions of US international rela-tions (IR) experts and the American public. A largemajority of IR scholars, 80 percent in fact, believedthat the JCPOA will have a largely positive impacton regional stability and security in the Middle East,whereas only 43 percent of the US public believedthe same to be true. Additionally, IR scholars at In-diana University argued that although a deal withIran that lifts its economic sanctions in exchange for‘checking’ its nuclear capabilities is far from perfect,it is by far the best option for the US. They viewed itas a step toward restoring a positive and coopera-tive relationship between the US, EU, and Iran by al-leviating tensions between them.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

ThE CASPIAN PROJECT 17 45 /46

The biggest concern for those opposed to thedeal is that Iran will violate the terms of theagreement and pursue a nuclear weaponsprogram illicitly, but IR scholars in America feelthat the control the IAEA will have on Iran’s nu-clear development minimizes the likelihood ofIran ever actually producing a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear danger has now existed for decades.Before the first nuclear weapon was ever de-veloped or used, experts expressed their opin-ions about the graveness of the threat thatnuclear proliferation posed on global security.Today the world watched as the nuclear threatunfolded in the Middle East with Iran as thefocal point of regional and international con-cern. As the P5+1 negotiated the agreementsof a nuclear deal with Iran, scholars and ex-perts around the world provided their assess-ments and theories on the impact the JCPOAwould have on regional and global security.Nuclear experts, engineers, and scholars fromthe Arab world to the US responded with re-sounding optimism that the JCPOA was thebest option the US and EU had at achievingsome level of stability in the Middle East. Nu-clear proliferation is a very complex, globalissue. It will continue to prove a difficult taskto reach a balance between allowing Iran topursue a peaceful nuclear energy programand regional security in the Middle East, but itis clear that the Ivory Tower, both in the Westand the Arab world, is convinced that theterms of the JCPOA is a step in the right direc-tion.

ust before a professor delivered a lectureon the neo-realism theory of interna-tional relations, he screened a videoshowing the dropping of the nuclear

bomb at Hiroshima.Observing the nuclear bomb flying towards thecivilian area caused sudden panic among the stu-dents, before landing in the middle of innocentcivilians. The students silently watched the conse-quences of the nuclear bomb and remained so afterthe video ended.

NEO-REALIsM AND IRAN’s NuCLEAR IssuE

ANTONY CLEMENT

Antony Clement is currently a studentof the International Relations program

at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK J

MODERN DIPLOMACY

The professor then began to explain the concept ofneo-realism. The lecture was very engaging and af-terwards the students were asked to prepare for adebate on a topical article written by neo-realistKenneth Waltz (‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb’, For-eign Affairs, 2012) with the question being whetherIran should be allowed a nuclear weapon?

Firstly, those in favour questioned why Iran shouldbe excluded when Israel, Western countries andother Asian countries already possess nuclearweaponry? Another material question is why theWest accepted India’s nuclear programme despiteit being outside of the NPT? Therefore, Iran can le-gitimately acquire the same weaponry for its strate-gic, security and national interest, in deterring thenuclear threat of Israel in the West Asian region.

Further, those in favour of Kenneth Walt’s article ar-gued that “history shows that nuclear weaponswould balance and give peace to any region”. Waltdescribed the “nuclear deterrence between the USand the Soviet as being the reason for the longpeace during the cold war”. Let us apply this logicto the present situation. If Iran emerged as a nuclearpower, it would deter Israel in West Asia, resultingin a more peaceful region. However, Iran’s behav-iour at present reflects its insecurity and by exten-sion the prevalent vulnerability in the region. Sinceneorealism expresses that states are self-interest ori-ented actors, Iran would never act as self-destruc-tive state but as a responsible one if it had nuclearweaponry, knowing the impact of the nuclear casu-alty.

Moreover, it has the capability to maintain the nu-clear weaponry compared to the nuclear vulnera-bility of Pakistan.

Secondly, those against pointed out that if Iran ac-quired nuclear weapons, the tension in West Asiawould only increase. With many devastated statesin the region, should Iran acquire nuclear weaponry,Saudi Arabia would be forced to do likewise, seek-ing weaponry from Pakistan or China within a weekor month. This chain of events would mean therewould be an increased threat to Israel’s survival andthe security of the region. Moreover, this may trig-ger a move by a small, wealthy oil exporting countryto acquire a nuclear weapon. If bipolar was the safegame for peace during the cold war, the post-coldwar multi-polar would be the reason for the worldpresent disorder. Nuclear weapons in more handswould be more threatening to the region. Iran hasthreatened Israel on several occasions that it willwipe it off the map.

Another important factor to be aware of is the pos-sibility of Iran allows the nuclear weapons to fall intothe hands of terrorists or that it transfers nuclear se-crets to rogue states or to non-state actors. If suchevents occurred the proliferation of nuclearweapons would be unstoppable. The consequencesand damage would be immeasurable. This wouldnot only be a concern for West Asia security, but forthe security of the entire world. Hence, it can be ar-gued that there is no compelling reason for allow-ing Iran to attain nuclear weaponry.

THE CAsPIAN PROJECT 17 47 /48

Thirdly, the self-discipline of India as a nuclear state,in its exclusion from the NPT, is an example to fol-low. It did not produce a nuclear weapon by signingthe NPT like Iran. However, India’s request for a se-curity assurance from the western powers in the1960s against the nuclear threat of China was notanswered positively. Hence, India chose to walkdown an undesired path, contrary to the vision ofIndia’s founding father Mahatma Gandhi and thefirst Prime Minister Nehru. While India’s security wasput at risk by its nuclear neighbour China, India re-fused to sign the NPT. When India refused to signthe NPT, it was expected that India would beginstriving for nuclear weaponry. India did thereafteremerge as a minimum nuclear deterrent. Moreover,standing outside of the NPT, India has an impecca-ble track record with a non-proliferation past. So,with such striking differences between the twostates, the value of such a comparison was not sohigh during this debate.

Fourthly, if the world requires more experience ofthe effects of nuclear warfare than it observed in Hi-roshima and Nagasaki then it may have the oppor-tunity if the international community’s stance onIran’s claim for the nuclear bomb does not change.The oil fields will not recover if any nuclear bombwas dropped in West Asia.

There will be no redemption across the entire re-gion for the next five decades. A nuclear disasterwould destroy the entire Arab region. It would alsoaffect millions of expatriates and the global econ-omy would soon come to a stand-still without theoil flow from this region.

The present agreement with Iran has been seen asan achievement of the P5+1 joint effort. Althoughthis deal has several limitations, it is a better thanlaunching a military strike on Iran’s nuclear base.Iran cannot easily distract the P5+1. This agreementwith the P5+1gives a strong signal that any viola-tion of the agreement by the actor would result ina collective reaction by the P5+1. This would serveas a serious warning to Iran and to other reactionarystates which seek nuclear weaponry. This pathcould also serve as a direction to deal with theNorth Korea nuclear issue in the future.

However, the chaotic stance of the US Republicansis entirely misguided and ill advised. They are polit-ically correct, but diplomatically wrong. It may helpthem for the 2016 presidential election campaignbut not for their national security. One thing is quiteclear - if the US Congress continues to diverge onthis issue – there will be negative implications forUS non-proliferation initiatives globally.

Finally, the arguments on both sides of the debateare defended strongly. However, it is unlikely thatthe ‘yes’ group is in a strong position at the presentstage of Iran’s ambition to attain nuclear capacity.The ‘no’ group has the upper hand. The core reasonbehind this is that Iran’s claim is unjustifiable be-cause Iran has not demonstrated its responsibilityas a state in the region so far. Hence, Iran’s claim ofentitlement to nuclear weaponry did not convincethe majority of the students in the lecture hall.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

caspian project 17

Documents