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LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versusMARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY

FACTS: Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT

tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached him. A

misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the

two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment

that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad

was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor,

Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito

Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and

Prudent for the death of her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidads wife and against the

defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin . LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for

lack of merit. CA held LRTA and Roman liable, hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengersthrough the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees?

HELD:Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT

station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection

under a contractual relation. The appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for

the death of Navidad in failing to exercise.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very

cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to

provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so

long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the

contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or

injury to passengers (a) through the negligenceor wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers

or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could

have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is

presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger

is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees

and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to

force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident

occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the

presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that

negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify thevictim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high

diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the

safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services

of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier

is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.


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A. MAGSAYSAY INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANASTACIO AGAN, defendant-appellant.Facts: The SS "San Antonio", vessel ownedand operated by plaintiff, left Manila on

October 6, 1949, bound for Basco, Batanes,

vis Aparri, Cagayan, with general cargo

belonging to different shippers, among

them the defendant. The vessel reachedAparri on the 10th of that month, and after

a day's stopover in that port, weighed

anchor to proceed to Basco. But while still in

port, it ran aground at the mouth of the

Cagayan river, and, attempts to refloat it

under its own power having failed, plaintiff

have it refloated by the Luzon Stevedoring

Co. at an agreed compensation. Once

afloat the vessel returned to Manila to refuel

and then proceeded to Basco, the port of

destination. There the cargoes were

delivered to their respective owners or

consignees, who, with the exception of

defendant, made a deposit or signed a

bond to answer for their contribution to the

average.

On the theory that the expenses incurred in

floating the vessel constitute general

average to which both ship and cargo

should contribute, plaintiff brought the

present action in the CFI of Manila to make

defendant pay his contribution, which, as

determined by the average adjuster.

Defendant, in his answer, denies liability tohis amount, alleging, among other things,

that the stranding of the vessel was due to

the fault, negligence and lack of skill of its

master, that the expenses incurred in putting

it afloat did not constitute general average,

and that the liquidation of the average was

not made in accordance with law. After

trial, the lower court found for plaintiff and

rendered judgment against the defendant

for the amount of the claim, with legal

interests. From this judgment defendant had

appealed directly to SC.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EXPENSES INCURREDIN AFLOATING THE VESSEL CONSIDEREDGENERAL AVERAGE THAT SHOULD BE SHAREDBY THE CARGO OWNERES .

HELD: The trial court erred in allowing thegeneral average for floating a vessel

unintentionally stranded inside a port and at

the mouth of a river during a fine weather.

For the purposes of this assignment of error

we may well accept the finding below that

the stranding of plaintiff's vessel was due tothe sudden shifting of the sandbars at themouth of the river which the port pilot didnot anticipate. The standing may, therefore,be regarded as accidental, and thequestion is whether the expenses incurred in

floating a vessel so stranded should be

considered general average and shared by

the cargo owners.

The law on averages is contained in the

Code of Commerce. Under that law,

averages are classified into simple or

particular and general or gross. Generally

speaking, simple or particular averages

include all expenses and damages caused

to the vessel or cargo which have not

inured to the common benefit (Art. 809),

and are, therefore, to be borne only by the

owner of the property gave rise to same

(Art. 810); while general or gross averagesinclude "all the damages and expenseswhich are deliberately caused in order tosave the vessel, its cargo, or both at thesame time, from a real and known risk" (Art.

811). Being for the common benefit, grossaverages are to be borne by the owners ofthe articles saved (Art. 812).

In classifying averages into simple o

particular and general or gross and defining

each class, the Code (Art. 809 and 811) at

the same time enumerates certain specific

cases as coming specially under one or the

other denomination. Going over the specific

cases enumerated we find that, while the

expenses incurred in putting plaintiff's vessel

afloat may well come under number 2 ofarticle 809-which refers to expenses suffered

by the vessel "by reason of an accident of

the sea of the force majuere" and should

therefore be classified as particular

average, the said expenses do not fit into

any of the specific cases of general

average enumerated in article 811. No. 6 of

this article does mention "expenses caused


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in order to float a vessel," but it specificallyrefers to "a vessel intentionally stranded forthe purpose of saving it" and would have noapplication where, as in the present case,

the stranding was not intentional.

Let us now see whether the expenses here inquestion could come within the legal

concept of the general average. Tolentino,

in his commentaries on the Code of

Commerce, gives the following requisites for

general average:

First, there must be a common danger. Thismeans, that both the ship and the cargo,

after has been loaded, are subject to the

same danger, whether during the voyage,

or in the port of loading or unloading; that

the danger arises from the accidents of the

sea, dispositions of the authority, or faults of

men, provided that the circumstances

producing the peril should be ascertained

and imminent or may rationally be said to

be certain and imminent. This last

requirement exclude measures undertaken

against a distant peril.

Second, that for the common safety part ofthe vessel or of the cargo or both issacrificed deliberately.

Third, that from the expenses or damagescaused follows the successful saving of thevessel and cargo.

Fourth, that the expenses or damagesshould have been incurred or inflicted aftertaking proper legal steps and authority. (Vol.

1, 7th ed., p. 155.)

With respect to the first requisite, the

evidence does not disclose that the

expenses sought to be recovered from

defendant were incurred to save vessel andcargo from a common danger. The vessel

ran aground in fine weather inside the port

at the mouth of a river, a place described

as "very shallow". It would thus appear that

vessel and cargo were at the time in no

imminent danger or a danger which might

"rationally be sought to be certain and

imminent." It is, of course, conceivable that,

if left indefinitely at the mercy of the

elements, they would run the risk of being

destroyed. But as stated at the above

quotation, "this last requirement excludes

measures undertaken against a distant

peril." It is the deliverance from an

immediate, impending peril, by a commonsacrifice, that constitutes the essence of

general average. (The Columbian Insurance

Company of Alexandria vs. Ashby & Stribling

et al., 13 Peters 331; 10 L. Ed., 186). In the

present case there is no proof that the

vessel had to be put afloat to save it from

imminent danger. What does appear from

the testimony of plaintiff's manager is that

the vessel had to be salvaged in order to

enable it "to proceed to its port of

destination." But as was said in the case just

cited it is the safety of the property, and not

of the voyage, which constitutes the true

foundation of the general average.

As to the second requisite, we need only

repeat that the expenses in question were

not incurred for the common safety of vessel

and cargo, since they, or at least the cargo,

were not in imminent peril. The cargo could,

without need of expensive salvage

operation, have been unloaded by the

owners if they had been required to do so.

With respect to the third requisite, thesalvage operation, it is true, was a success.

But as the sacrifice was for the benefit of the

vessel to enable it to proceed to

destination and not for the purpose of

saving the cargo, the cargo owners are not

in law bound to contribute to the expenses.

The final requisite has not been proved, for it

does not appear that the expenses here in

question were incurred after following the

procedure laid down in article 813 et seq.

In conclusion we found that plaintiff notmade out a case for general average, withthe result that its claim for contributionagainst the defendant cannot be granted.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from isreversed and plaintiff's complaint ordereddismissed with costs.


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ZAMBOANGA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., and ZAMBOANGA RAPIDS COMPANY, INC. vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE MARIO DAGAMANUEL, represented by PASCUALA JULIAN DEPUNZALAN

FACTS: In the evening of 13 August 1955, the spouses Ramon and Josefina Dagamanuelboarded a bus at Manicahan, Zamboanga City, to attend a benefit dance at the Bunguiao

Elementary School, also in Zamboanga City, where Josefina was a public school teacher. Afterthe dance, the couple boarded the same bus to return to Manicahan. At around 1 a.m. of 14

August 1955, the bus (1955 TPU-1137), and driven by Valeriano Marcos, fell off the road and

pinned to death the said spouses and several other passengers.

Jose Mario Dagamanuel, the only child of the deceased spouses, through his maternal

grandmother as guardian ad-litem, Pascuala Julian de Punzalan, instituted an action against

Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. (Zamtanco) and the Zamboanga Rapids Co., Inc.

(Zambraco) for breach of contract of carriage, alleging that the accident was due to the fault

and negligence of the driver in operating the bus and due to the negligence of the companies

in their supervision of their driver. the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the three, jointly

and severally, to indemnify the private respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the court a

quo.

ISSUE: WHETHER BOTH SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE.

HELD: While it is true that according to previous decisions of the Supreme Court, transfer of acertificate of public convenience to operate a transportation service is not effective and

binding insofar as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in its relation to the public

is concerned, without the approval of the transfer by the Public Service Commission required by

the Public Service Act, and that in contemplation of law, the transferor of such certificate

continues to be the operator of the service as long as the transfer is not yet approved, and as

such operator, he is the one responsible jointly and severally with his driver for damages incurred

by passengers or third persons in consequence of injuries or deaths resulting from the operation

of such service, the Court does not find any need for applying these rulings to the present case

for the simple reason that in their respective third-party complaints, the companies bothadmitted separately that they are the owners of the bus involved in the incident in question andthat Valeriano Marcos, the driver of said bus at the time of said incident, was in their employ.

There is no application of the ruling in the previous cases to the present case. There, the

registered owners invariably sought to pass on liability to the actual operators on the pretext that

they had already sold or transferred their units to the latter, whereas in the present case, the

registered owner, the Zambraco, admits whatever liability it has and vigorously objects to any

finding that the actual operator, the Zamtranco, is also liable with it, claiming that as registered

owner, it alone should be adjudged liable. We would not inquire into the motive of the

Zambraco why instead of sharing whatever liability it has with the Zamtranco, it prefers to

shoulder it alone. But the fact stands out in bold relief that although still the registered owner at

the time of the accident, it had already sold the vehicle to Zamtranco and the latter was actuallyoperating it.

For the better protection of the public that both the owner of record and the actual operator, asheld by the Court in the past, should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver.


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Art 1755PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. IAC

Facts:Catalina Pascua with several others boarded the jeep owned by spouses Isidro Manguneand Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo bound for Carmen, Rosales,Pangasinan.

Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in anunbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which wasthen running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually

stopping on the western lane and was hit by the petitioner companys bus causing the death of

Catalina Pascua and two other passengers.

Issue:Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar?

Held:No, The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit betweenthe owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passengerdemands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would beinequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that theother driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor inbringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseenthe extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from beingliable. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to thepassengers of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when theaccident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming suchcalculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways.

The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of thecontract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract ofcarriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the

carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to thenegligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract tohis driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver

jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal insteadof merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds tothe driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.


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CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Sabena vs. Court of AppealsSabena Belgian World Airlines vs. CA(GR 104685, 14 March 1996)

FACTS:

Private respondent MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN was a passenger on board Flight SN 284 ofdefendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to Manila.She checked in her luggage which contained her valuables all amounting to $4,265.00, forwhich she was issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage was lefton board Flight SN 284. Upon Arrival in Manila, she learned that her luggage was missing andwas advised to accomplish and submit a property Irregularity Report which she submitted andfiled on the same day.

Upon follow up, it remained missing; thus, she filed her formal complaint with the office of FergeMassed, petitioners Local Manager, demanding immediate attention.

Two weeks later she was notified that her luggage was found. But unfortunately plaintiff wasinformed that the luggage was lost for the second time. She demanded payment but the airlinerefused to settle the claim.

The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Paula San Agustin. The appellate court affirmed in toto thetrial courts judgment.

Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondentshould be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite herawareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and thather flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage uponarrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a seasoned internationaltraveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flightticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability

of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to onlyUS$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding additionalcharges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, inchecking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites Section5(c), Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on 02 October1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, generally observed by International carriers,stating, among other things, that:

Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as

checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiablepapers, securities or other valuables.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the airline is negligent? Whether respondents negligence is the sole and

proximate of the loss?

HELD:

Yes.


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Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is demanded by the natureof an obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of theplace. When the source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or non-fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part of the obligor. Thisrule is not different in the case of common carriers in the carriage of goods which, indeed, arebound to observe not just the due diligence of a good father of a family but that of

extraordinary care in the vigilance over the goods. The appellate court has aptly observed:

x x x Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their business and by

reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in thevigilance over the goods transported by them. This extraordinary responsibility, according to Art.1736, lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and receivedby the carrier until they are delivered actually or constructively to the consignee or person whohas the right to receive them. Art. 1737 states that the common carriers duty to observe

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them remains in full force

and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit. And Art. 1735establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, commoncarriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove thatthey had observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

The above rules remain basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tortalthough noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also formingpart of the governing law. Petitioner is not thus entirely off track when it has likewise raised in itsdefense the tort doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the doctrinecannot, in this particular instance, support its case. Proximate cause is that which, in natural andcontinuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and withoutwhich the result would not have occurred.

The above findings, which certainly cannot be said to be without basis, foreclose whateverrights petitioner might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international aircarriers under the Warsaw Convention .

The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which

exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such defaulton his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to beequivalent to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of thecarrier acting within the scope of his employment.

The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of anairlines liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability.

( Loss of baggage twice shows gross negligence)


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Coastwise Lighterage Corporation v. CAFacts:Pag-asa Sales Inc. entered into a contract to transport molasses from the province of Negros to

Manila with Coastwise Lighterage Corporation (Coastwise for brevity), using the latter's dumbbarges. The barges were towed in tandem by the tugboat MT Marica, which is likewise ownedby Coastwise. Upon reaching Manila Bay, one of the barges, "Coastwise 9", struck an unknown

sunken object. The forward buoyancy compartment was damaged, and water gushed inthrough a hole "two inches wide and twenty-two inches long". As a consequence, the molassesat the cargo tanks were contaminated. Pag-asa filed a claim against Philippine GeneralInsurance Company, the insurer of its cargo. Philgen paid P700,000 for the value of the molasseslost.Philgen then filed an action against Coastwise to recover the money it paid, claiming to be

subrogated to the claims which the consignee may have against the carrier. Both the trial courtand the Court of Appeals ruled against Coastwise.Issues:(1) Whether Coastwise was transformed into a private carrier by virtue of the contract it entered

into with Pag-asa, and whether it exercised the required degree of diligence(2) Whether Philgen was subrogated into the rights of the consignee against the carrierHeld:(1) Pag-asa Sales, Inc. only leased three of petitioner's vessels, in order to carry cargo from one

point to another, but the possession, command mid navigation of the vessels remained withpetitioner Coastwise Lighterage. Coastwise Lighterage, by the contract of affreightment, was notconverted into a private carrier, but remained a common carrier and was still liable as such. Thelaw and jurisprudence on common carriers both hold that the mere proof of delivery of goods ingood order to a carrier and the subsequent arrival of the same goods at the place of destinationin bad order makes for a prima facie case against the carrier. It follows then that thepresumption of negligence that attaches to common carriers, once the goods it is sports are lost,destroyed or deteriorated, applies to the petitioner. This presumption, which is overcome only byproof of the exercise of extraordinary diligence, remained unrebutted in this case. Jesus R.Constantino, the patron of the vessel "Coastwise 9" admitted that he was not licensed. CoastwiseLighterage cannot safely claim to have exercised extraordinary diligence, by placing a person

whose navigational skills are questionable, at the helm of the vessel which eventually met thefateful accident. It may also logically, follow that a person without license to navigate, lacks not

just the skill to do so, but also the utmost familiarity with the usual and safe routes taken byseasoned and legally authorized ones. Had the patron been licensed he could be presumed tohave both the skill and the knowledge that would have prevented the vessel's hitting the sunkenderelict ship that lay on their way to Pier 18. As a common carrier, petitioner is liable for breachof the contract of carriage, having failed to overcome the presumption of negligence with theloss and destruction of goods it transported, by proof of its exercise of extraordinary diligence.(2) Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the

insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other thanthe assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured will be subrogated to the rights of theassured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay.

Payment by the insurer to the assured operated as an equitable assignment to the former of allremedies which the latter may have against the third party whose negligence or wrongful actcaused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, anyprivate of contract or upon written assignment of, claim. It accrues simply upon payment of theinsurance claim by the insurer.

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