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    Causes of the Franco-Prussian War

    Main article:Franco-Prussian WarThe causes of the Franco-Prussian War are deeply

    Map of the North German Confederation (red), the Southern

    German States (orange) andAlsace-Lorraine(pink).

    rooted in the events surrounding the German unifica-

    tion. In the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War (1866),Prussia had annexed numerous territories and formed theNorth German Confederation. This new power destabi-lized theEuropean balance of powerestablished by theCongress of Vienna(1815) after theNapoleonic Wars.Prussia then turned its attention towards the south of Ger-many, where it sought to expand its influence.

    France was strongly opposed to the annexation of theSouthern German States (Bavaria,Wurttemberg,BadenandHesse), which would have created a too powerfula country next to its border. In Prussia, a war againstFrance was deemed necessary to arouse German nation-

    alism in those States that would allow the unification ofa great German empire. This aim was epitomized byPrussian ChancellorOtto von Bismarck's quote: I knewthat a Franco-Prussian War must take place before aunited Germany was formed.[1] Bismarck also knew thatFrance should be regarded as the aggressor in the conflictto bring the Southern German States to side with Prussia,hence giving Germans numerical superiority.[2]

    However, the immediate cause of the war resides in thecandidacy of a Prussian princeto the throne of Spain,France feared encirclement by an alliance between Prus-sia and Spain. TheHohenzollernprinces candidacy was

    withdrawn under French diplomatic pressure, but Ottovon Bismarck goaded the French into declaring war byaltering a telegram sent byWilliam I. Releasing theEms

    Telegramto the public, Bismarck made it sound as ifthe king had treated the French envoy in a demeaningfashion. Six days later, France declared war on Prus-sia and Southern German States immediately sided withPrussia.[2]

    French EmperorNapoleon IIIand Prime MinistermileOllivier's eagerness to relieve France from internal polit-ical convulsions also contributed to Frances declarationof war on Prussia.[3]

    1 European wars and the balance

    of power: 18651866

    In October 1865,Napoleon III, ruler of France, met withPrussianPrime MinisterOtto von BismarckinBiarritz,France. It was there that the two men struck a dealFrance would not get involved in any future actions be-tween Prussia and Austria or ally herself with Austria ifPrussia did not allow Austria to claimVenetia. WhenAustria and Prussia met in May 1866, Bismarck honoredthe agreement made in Biarritz the previous year and re-fused to allow Austria to have Venetia. Austria then at-tempted to guarantee Italy Venetia if they remained neu-tral, but the two nations were unable to agree on a suit-able arrangement as an alliance formed earlier in the yearbound Italy to Prussia. Napoleon III then committed aserious blunder by agreeing with Austria in a treaty to ac-cept Venetia by allowing Austria to go to war with Prus-sia, a move which violated the agreement Napoleon hadmade with Bismarck.[4]

    AfterPrussiaemerged victorious over theAustrianarmyat the Battle of Kniggrtz (also known as Sadowa orSadov) in theAustro-Prussian War of 1866, negotia-tions were being held between Austria and Prussia inJuly and August of that year.[5] It was during that pe-riod that Napoleon III first discovered that a bladder stonewas causing him great pains, created from gonorrhealinfection.[6] His condition was so bad during those nego-tiations that he was forced to retire to Vichyto recuper-ate, removing himself from Paris. Although the emperorfavored neutrality as to not upset events, certain mem-bers of his circle thought it was an unwise move, consid-ering the opportunity to prevent Prussia from becomingtoo strong. One of these men, foreign ministerdouard

    Drouyn de Lhuys, convinced the emperor to plant 80,000men on the eastern border to convince Wilhelm I to main-tain the balance of power in Europe. Despite this im-

    1

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_I,_German_Emperorhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89douard_Drouyn_de_Lhuyshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89douard_Drouyn_de_Lhuyshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vichyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gonorrheahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bladder_stonehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Prussian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadov%C3%A1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_K%C3%B6niggr%C3%A4tzhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_Empirehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prussiahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venetia_(region)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biarritz,_Francehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biarritz,_Francehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarckhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prussianhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_IIIhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89mile_Ollivierhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89mile_Ollivierhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_IIIhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ems_Telegramhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ems_Telegramhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_I,_German_Emperorhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hohenzollernhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spainhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_of_Hohenzollern-Sigmaringenhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarckhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Duchy_of_Hessehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badenhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wurttemberghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Bavariahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleonic_Warshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Viennahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_balance_of_powerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_German_Confederationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Prussian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_unificationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_unificationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorrainehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War
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    2 1 EUROPEAN WARS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: 18651866

    Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Prussia

    portant victory, de Lhuys was subverted by several otherministers, and Napoleon III changed his mind, revertingto a position of neutrality. This change of heart wouldend up causing de Lhuys to ultimately lose his position.[7]

    Napoleon IIIs wifeEmpress Eugnie, who took an activepart throughout his rule, referred to this time much later

    as the critical date, the Empires fatal date; it was duringthese months of July and August that our fate was sealed!Of all that period, there is not a single fact, not a singledetail that has not remained in my mind.[8]

    Franz Josephof Austria accepted Bismarcks terms un-der thePeace of Prague. Using this to his advantage,Bismarck declared theGerman Confederationof 1815null and void, and created a new network of states un-der Prussian control. Frankfurt-am-Main, Hannover,Hesse-Kassel(or Hesse-Cassel), Holstein, Nassau, andSchleswig were annexed outright while Hesse-Darmstadt,Mecklenburg,Saxony, theThuringianduchies, as well as

    the cities ofBremen,Hamburg, andLbeckwere com-bined into a newNorth German Confederationthat gov-erned nominally and was actually controlled by Prussiaherself.[9]

    Bismarck was approached soon after the end of thewar by Napoleon IIIs ambassador to Prussia, VincentBenedetti. Benedetti brought with him a secret proposalby Napoleon III that France would approve of Bismarcksacquisition of the northern German states and their con-trol over the southern German states if Prussia remainedneutral while France annexed Belgium andLuxembourg.France had earlier guaranteed the independence of Bel-

    gium in theTreaty of Londonin 1839 as anindependentand perpetually neutral state, making the proposal a tacitagreement to break their promise. Bismarck was very

    Napoleon III, Emperor of the French

    surprised since he had already gained a powerful posi-tion in Europe by the armistice, and called Napoleon IIIsrequest among others later like 'an innkeepers bill' or awaiter asking for 'a tip'.He asked Benedetti to providethe proposal in writing, and the ambassador obliged hisrequest. This document was to be important to Bismarcklater on, to great effect.[10]

    The true views of Napoleon III on the subject of the bal-ance of power in Europe can be found in a state circularhanded to every diplomatic representative for France. Inthis paper dated September 1, 1866, the emperor saw thefuture of Europe after the Peace of Prague in this man-

    ner:

    Policy should rise superior to the narrow and

    mean prejudices of a former age. The Emperor

    does not believe that the greatness of a country

    depends upon the weakness of the nations which

    surround it, and he sees a true equilibrium only

    in the satisfied aspirations of the nations of Eu-

    rope. In this, he is faithful to old convictions and

    to the traditions of his race. Napoleon I fore-

    saw the changes which are now taking place on

    the continent of Europe. He had sown the seeds

    of new nationalities: in the Peninsula, when hecreated the Kingdom of Italy; and in Germany,

    when he abolished two hundred and fifty three

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_IIIhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_London_(1839)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luxembourghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vincent_Benedettihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vincent_Benedettihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_German_Confederationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%BCbeckhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamburghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bremenhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thuringianhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saxonyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecklenburghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Duchy_of_Hessehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schleswighttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nassau_(state)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holsteinhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electorate_of_Hessehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannoverhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt-am-Mainhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Confederationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Prague_(1866)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_Josephhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eug%C3%A9nie_de_Montijohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck
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    2.2 Bismarck and German nationalism 3

    separate states.[11]

    2 Domestic agenda in France and

    Prussia

    2.1 French prestige and politics

    Jules Favreof the Second Republic in 1865

    Main article:Second French Empire

    Frances position in Europe was now in danger of beingovershadowed by the emergence of a powerful Prussia,and France looked increasingly flat-footed following Bis-marcks successes. In addition, French ruler Napoleon

    III was on increasingly shaky ground in domestic pol-itics. Having successfully overthrown theSecond Re-publicand established the Bonapartist Second Empire,Napoleon III was confronted with ever more virulent de-mands for democratic reform from leading republicanssuch asJules Favre,[12] along with constant rumours ofimpendingrevolution. In addition, French aspirations inMexico had suffered a final defeat with the execution ofthe Austrian-born, French puppet EmperorMaximilian Iof Mexicoin 1867.[13]

    The French imperial government now looked to a diplo-matic success to stifle demands for a return to either a

    republic or a Bourbon monarchy. A war with Prussiaand resulting territorial gains in theRhinelandand laterLuxembourg and Belgium seemed the best hope to unite

    the French nation behind the Bonapartist dynasty. Withthe resulting prestige from a successful war, Napoleon IIIcould then safely suppress any lingering republicanor rev-olutionary sentiment behind reactionarynationalismandreturn France to the center of European politics.[14]

    2.2 Bismarck and German nationalism

    Prussia in turn was also beset with problems. While rev-olutionary fervour was far more muted than in France,Prussia had in 1866 acquired millions of new citizensas a result of the Austro-Prussian War,[15] which wasalso a civil war among German states. The remainingGerman kingdoms and principalities maintained a stead-fastlyparochialattitude towards Prussia and German uni-fication. The German princes insisted upon their inde-pendence and balked at any attempt to create a federal

    state that would be dominated by Berlin. Their suspi-cions were heightened by Prussias quick victory and sub-sequent annexations.[16] Before the war, only some Ger-mans, inspired by the recentunification of Italy, acceptedand supported what the princes began to realise, that Ger-many must unite in order to preserve the fruit of an even-tual victory.[17]

    Bismarck had an entirely different view after the war in1866: he was interested only in strengthening Prussiathrough the eyes of a staunch realist. Uniting Germanyappeared immaterial to him unless it improved Prussiasposition.[18] Bismarck had mentioned before the war the

    possibility of ceding territory along the Rhine to France,and Napoleon III, urged by his representatives in France,used these casual references by Bismarck to press formore of the territory that Prussia had received from Aus-tria. These discussions, leaked by Bismarck to the Ger-man states in the south, turned former enemies into alliesalmost overnight, receiving not only written guaranteesbut armies that would be under the control of Prussia.[19]

    3 Alliances and diplomacy

    3.1 German states

    Diplomatically and militarily, Napoleon III looked forsupport from Austria, Denmark, Bavaria, Baden, andWrttemberg, as all had recently lost wars against Prus-sia. However, Napoleon III failed to secure revanchistalliances from these states. Denmark had twice foughtPrussia during theFirstandSecond Wars of Schleswig(astalemate in the 184850, and a defeat in 1864 against aconfederation of North German states and Austria underthe leadership of Prussia), and was unwilling to confrontPrussia again. As part of the settlement of the Austro-

    Prussian War in 1866, secret treaties of mutual defensewere signed between Prussia and Bavaria, Baden, andWrttemberg. What made them especially significant

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_war_of_Schleswighttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_war_of_Schleswighttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_unificationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parochialismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Prussian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhinelandhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximilian_I_of_Mexicohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximilian_I_of_Mexicohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Favrehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_French_Empirehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_French_Republichttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_French_Republichttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_French_Empirehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Favre
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    4 3 ALLIANCES AND DIPLOMACY

    was that not only were they secret, giving Napoleon III afalse sense of security, but Bismarck had used NapoleonIIIs earlier demand of territory along the Rhine to drivethe southern German states into his arms. By thesetreaties, Prussia would defend all of the southern Ger-man states with its military power as long as their states

    joined the Northern Confederation in defense of Prussia.It was a bargain that would gravely threaten the Frenchempereurand his designs on restoring French pride.[20]

    3.2 Austria and Italy

    The Austrian ChancellorCount Friedrich Ferdinand vonBeustwas impatient to take his revenge on Bismarck forSadowa. As a preliminary step, the Ausgleichwith Hun-gary was rapidly concluded. Beust persuaded FrancisJoseph to accept Magyar demands which he had till thenrejected..[21] However, Austria would not support Franceunless Italy was part of the alliance. Victor EmmanuelIIand the Italian government wanted to support France,but Italian public opinion was bitterly opposed so longas Napoleon III kept a French garrison in Rome protect-ingPope Pius IX, thereby denying Italy the possessionof its capital (Rome had been declared capital of Italy inMarch 1861, when the first Italian Parliament had metin Turin). Napoleon III made various proposals for re-solving theRoman Question, but Pius IX rejected themall. Despite his previous support for Italian unification,Napoleon did not wish to press the issue for fear of an-gering Catholics in France. Raffaele De Cesare, an Italian

    journalist, political scientist, and author, noted that:

    The alliance, proposed twoyears before 1870, between France,Italy, and Austria, was never con-cluded because Napoleon III [...]would never consent to the occu-pation of Rome by Italy. [...] Hewished Austria to avenge Sadowa,either by taking part in a militaryaction, or by preventing South Ger-many from making common causewith Prussia. [...] If he could in-sure, through Austrian aid, the neu-trality of the South German Statesin a war against Prussia, he consid-ered himself sure of defeating thePrussian army, and thus would re-main arbiter of the European sit-uation. But when the war sud-denly broke out, before anythingwas concluded, the first unexpectedFrench defeats overthrew all pre-visions, and raised difficulties forAustria and Italy which prevented

    them from making common causewith France. Wrth and Sedan fol-lowed each other too closely. The

    Roman question was the stone tiedto Napoleons feet that draggedhim into the abyss. He never forgot,even in August 1870, a month be-fore Sedan, that he was a sovereignof a Catholic country, that he had

    been made Emperor, and was sup-ported by the votes of the conserva-tives and the influence of the clergy;and that it was his supreme dutynot to abandon the Pontiff. [...]For twenty years Napoleon III hadbeen the true sovereign of Rome,where he had many friends and re-lations [...] Without him the tem-poral power would never have beenreconstituted, nor, being reconsti-tuted, would have endured.[22]

    Another reason why Beustss desired revanche againstPrussia did not materialize was the fact that, in 1870, theHungarian Prime MinisterGyula Andrssywas vigor-ously opposed.[23]

    3.3 Russia

    TsarAlexander II of Russia

    In addition to the problems facing Napoleon III in ob-

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_II_of_Russiahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyula_Andr%C3%A1ssyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Questionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pope_Pius_IXhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Emmanuel_IIhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Emmanuel_IIhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Hungarian_Compromise_of_1867https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Count_Friedrich_Ferdinand_von_Beusthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Count_Friedrich_Ferdinand_von_Beust
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    5

    taining potential allies, Bismarck worked feverishly toisolate France from the other European powers. Since1863, Bismarck hadmade effortsto cultivate Russia, co-operating, amongst other things, in dealing withPolishinsurgents. This important move gained for Bismarck theneutrality of Russia if Prussia went to war, and it also pre-

    vented Austria from taking sides with France as Austriafully supported the Poles.[24] When Alexander II came toFrance on an official visit in 1867, he was at the receivingend of an unsuccessful assassination attempt by Polish-born Anton Berezovski while riding with Napoleon IIIand the Empress Eugenie. Tsar Alexander was very of-fended that not only the French courts had given Bere-zovski imprisonment instead of death but also the Frenchpress had sided with the Pole rather than Alexander. Thisexperience forever shattered his views of France and sawin the reaction his visit had received why his father haddespised the French.[25]

    In 1868, he held discussions with the Prussians, intend-ing to counter a possible Austrian alliance with NapoleonIII byFranz Joseph. If German forces were, for any rea-son, bogged down in the west, then Prussias eastern andsouthern flanks would have been highly vulnerable. Withhis usual skill, Bismarck moved carefully to sidestep thenightmare. The Russian government even went so far asto promise to send an army of 100,000 men against theAustrians if Austria joined France in a war against Prus-sia. Whilst atEmsin the crucial summer of 1870 Wil-helm I and Bismarck had meetings withTsar Alexander,also present in the spa town Alexander, though not nat-

    urally pro-German, became very comfortable with Prus-sian suggestions.[26]

    Bismarck also had talks at Ems with AlexanderMikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister,and was assured in mid-July, days before the Frenchdeclaration of war, that the agreement of 1868 stillheld: in the event of Austrian mobilisation, the Rus-sians confirmed that they would send 300,000 troops intoGalicia.[27] Bismarck now had all he wanted: a counter toAustria and the assurance of a one-front war.

    3.4 United Kingdom

    Bismarck then made Benedettis earlier draft public toThe Timesin London that demanded Belgium and Lux-embourg as the price for remaining neutral during theAustro-Prussian War. Sensitive to the threat of a majorpower controlling the strategically significantLow Coun-triesand the English Channel coastline, the United King-dom government in particular took a decidedly cool at-titude to these French demands, and the British peoplewere disturbed by this subversive attempt at going backon Napoleon IIIs word. Therefore, Britain as a nationdid nothing to aid France. The Prime Minister, William

    Gladstone, expressed his thoughts on the matter to QueenVictoria by writing to her thatYour majesty will, in com-mon with the world, have been shocked and startled.[28]

    Though it had enjoyed some time as the leading power ofcontinental Europe, the French Empire found itself dan-gerously isolated.

    4 Monarchial crises

    4.1 Luxembourg crisis

    Main article:Luxembourg Crisis

    The king of the Netherlands, William III, was underapersonal unionwithLuxembourgthat guaranteed itssovereignty. Napoleon III had taken note that the kinghad amassed certain personal debts that would make asale of Luxembourg to France possible. However, Lux-embourg lies astride one of the principal invasion routes

    an army would use to invade either France or Germanyfrom the other. The city of Luxembourgs fortificationswere considered the Gibraltar of the North and neitherside could tolerate the other controlling such a strategiclocation.

    The pressure on Bismarck to object not only came fromhis monarchWilliam I, but from Chief of Staff of thePrussian armyHelmuth von Moltke. Moltke had addi-tional reason to object: he desired war with France, stat-ing flatly, Nothing could be more welcome to us thanto have nowthe war that we must have.[29] Bismarckbalked at such talk about war. He refused to actually en-

    gage France on the basis that he firmly believed that Prus-sia would gain a far more decisive advantage by merelyopposing the sale and that Napoleon III could be thwarteddue to his fear of war with Prussia.[30]

    Assuming that Bismarck would not object, the Frenchgovernment was shocked to learn that instead Bismarck,Prussia and the North German Confederation werethreatening war should the sale be completed. NapoleonIII had let precious months peel away in trying to com-plete the transaction, allowing Bismarck time to rally sup-port to Prussias objection.[31] To mediate the dispute, theUnited Kingdom hosted theLondon Conference (1867)

    attended by all European great powers. It confirmed Lux-embourgs independence from the Netherlands and guar-anteed its independence from all other powers. War ap-peared to have been averted, at the cost of thwartingFrench desires.[32]

    4.2 Spanish throne

    TheSpanish thronehad been vacant since therevolutionof September 1868, and the Spanish offered thethrone to the German princeLeopold of Hohenzollern-

    Sigmaringen, a Catholic as well as a distant cousin ofKing Wilhelm of Prussia. Leopold and Wilhelm I wereboth uninterested, but the wily Bismarck was acutely

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold,_Prince_of_Hohenzollernhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold,_Prince_of_Hohenzollernhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glorious_Revolution_(Spain)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glorious_Revolution_(Spain)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Spanish_monarchshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_London,_1867https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_German_Confederationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helmuth_von_Moltke_the_Elderhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_I_of_Prussiahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luxembourghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_unionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_III_of_the_Netherlandshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luxembourg_Crisishttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Countrieshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Countrieshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galicia_(Central_Europe)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Mikhailovich_Gorchakovhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Mikhailovich_Gorchakovhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_II_of_Russiahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bad_Emshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_Joseph_I_of_Austriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_Uprisinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_Polandhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvensleben_Convention
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    6 4 MONARCHIAL CRISES

    interested, as it was an opportunity to once again bestNapoleon III. Bismarck persuaded Leopolds father to ac-cept the offer for his nation, and it was accepted insteadby Leopold himself in June 1870.[33]

    4.3 The Hohenzollern crisis and the EmsDispatch

    Wilhelm Iof Germany at his desk

    On 2 July 1870, "Marshall Prim [who held power in

    Spain] announced in Madrid that the Spanish governmenthad offered the crown of Spain to Prince Leopold of Ho-

    henzollern." [34] Fearing that a Hohenzollern king in Prus-sia and another one in Spain would put France into a two-front situation, France this time was determined to standup to the expansion of Prussian influence. Napoleon IIIat this time was suffering the most unbearable pain fromhis stones,[35] and the Empress Eugnie essentially wascharged with countering the designs of Prussia. She hada vital interest in the crisis as she was of Spanish bloodand a member of the royal line. The secretary of foreignaffairs, DucAntoine de Gramont, was directed by theEmpress to be the principal instrument by which Francewould press for war should Leopold ascend the throne.Gramont delivered a speech in front of the Chambre lg-islative, proclaiming that We shall know how to fulfill ourduty without hesitation and without weakness.The fatalmistake would soon come as a result of Gramonts inex-perience, for he counted on alliances that only existed inhis mind.[36]

    The French press immediately protested the

    prospect of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish

    throne, and on 6 July the new Foreign Minis-

    ter, the Duc de Gramont [...] told the Chamber

    that France would not permit Prince Leopoldto become King of Spain. [The French Pre-

    mier Emile] Ollivier added that he had no doubt

    that Prussia would yield in the face of French

    firmness, but that 'if war be necessary, the gov-

    ernment will not enter upon it without the con-

    sent of the Legislative Body.' Gramonts state-

    ment and Olliviers mention of war were greeted

    with great enthusiasm by the deputies, and in

    the public galleries the ladies rose to their feetand waved their handkerchiefs as they joined

    in the wild applause. Next day the Paris press

    called for war with Prussia, and on 8 July their

    language was even more violent. The govern-

    ment instructed [Comte Vincente] Benedetti, the

    French ambassador to Prussia, to demand that

    King William should publicly refuse his consent

    to Prince Leopolds acceptance of the throne of

    Spain.[34]

    On 11 July, Benedetti spoke to King William

    at the watering spa at Ems, and asked him torefuse his consent to Prince Leopolds candi-

    dature; Bismarck was on holiday at his estates

    in East Prussia. King William agreed to or-

    der Prince Leopold to withdraw. Ollivier an-

    nounced the Prussian surrender in the Chamber

    on 12 July and hailed it as a French triumph and

    a Prussian humiliation. Bismarck thought the

    same and considered resigning as Prime Min-

    ister. Gramont and Ollivier did not conceal

    their regret that the Prussians had given in; and

    the deputies and most of the press were disap-

    pointed that that there was to be no war. [...]

    Louis Napoleon sensed the public regret that

    there would be no war. 'The country will be dis-

    appointed,' he cabled to Ollivier on 12 July; 'but

    what can we do?' He was in complete agree-

    ment with the decision which was taken by the

    Cabinet on the same day to ask for further guar-

    antees from Prussia and to require King William

    to give an undertaking that he would never in

    the future allow Prince Leopold to accept the

    crown of Spain. When Benedetti confronted

    King William on the promenade at Ems on the

    afternoon of 13 July and asked him to give this

    undertaking, the King was annoyed, refused todo so, and walked away a little abruptly.[37]

    Following this direct confrontation, which had bypasseddiplomatic protocols, King Wilhelm then sent a messageto Berlinreporting this event with theFrenchambassador,and Bismarck shrewdly edited it to make itlike a red tagto the bullfor the French government.[38] The dispatchwas edited as follows (with the words sent inbold):

    Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order

    to demand from me, finally in a very importunate man-

    ner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once

    that I bound myself for all future time never again togive my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their

    candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agenor,_duc_de_Gramonthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_I_of_Germany
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    4.4 European public reaction 7

    Memorial stone to the Ems Dispatch inBad Ems

    neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this

    kind tout jamais. Naturally I told him that I had as yet

    received no news, and as he was earlier informed about

    Paris and Madrid than myself, he could clearly see that

    my government once more had no hand in the matter. His

    Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His

    Majestyhaving told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting

    news from the Prince, has decidedwith reference to theabove demand, upon the representation of Count Eulen-

    burg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again,but only to let him be informed through an aide-de-

    camp that his Majestyhad now received from the Prince

    confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already re-

    ceived from Paris, and had nothing further to say to

    the ambassador. His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency

    whether Benedettis fresh demand and its rejection shouldnot be at once communicated both to our ambassadors and

    to the press.[39]

    This dispatch made the encounter more heated than it re-ally was. Known as theEms Dispatch, it was released tothe press. It was designed to give the French the impres-sion that King Wilhelm I had insulted the French CountBenedetti, and to give the Prussian people the impres-sion that the Count had insulted the King. It succeeded

    in both of its aims- Gramont called it a blow in the faceof France, and the members of the French legislativebody spoke of taking immediate steps to safeguard theinterests, the security, and the honor of France.[40] On19 July 1870Le Sourd, the French Charg d'Affaires, de-livered Napoleons declaration of war at the Foreign Of-

    ficein Berlin.[41] According to the secret treaties signedwith Prussia and in response to popular opinion, Bavaria,Baden, and Wrttemberg mobilised their armies andjoined the war against France.[42]

    4.4 European public reaction

    At the outbreak of the war, European public opinionheavily favored the Germans. For example, many Italiansattempted to sign up as volunteers at thePrussian embassyinFlorence, and a Prussian diplomat visited GiuseppeGaribaldiinCaprera. After the fall of Napoleon III fol-lowing theBattle of Sedan, Bismarcks demand for thereturn of Alsace caused a dramatic shift in that sentiment,which was best exemplified by the reaction of Garibaldisoon after the revolution in Paris, who told the MovimentoofGenoaon 7 September 1870, Yesterday I said to you:war to the death to Bonaparte. Today I say to you: rescue

    the French Republic by every means.[43]

    5 See also

    FrenchGerman enmity

    6 References

    Baumont, Maurice. Gloires et tragdies de la IIIeRpublique. Hachette, 1956.

    Bresler, Fenton. Napoleon III: A Life. New York:Carroll & Graf, 1999.ISBN 0-7867-0660-0

    The Last Days of Papal Rome by Raffaele De Cesare(1909) London, Archibald Constable & Co.

    Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: TheGerman Invasion of France 18701871. New York:Routledge, 2001.ISBN 0-415-26671-8

    Jelavich, Barbara. Russia and the Formation of theRomanian National State, 1821-1878. CambridgeUniversity Press, 2004.

    Jerrold, Blanchard. The Life of Napoleon III. Long-mans, Green & Co.,1882.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Blanchard_Jerroldhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0415266718https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Howard_(historian)http://books.google.com/books?id=0XcpAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA449&dq=%2522the+last+days+of+papal+rome%2522https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0786706600https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French%E2%80%93German_enmityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genoahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sedanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caprerahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giuseppe_Garibaldihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giuseppe_Garibaldihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ems_Dispatchhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bad_Ems
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    8 7 NOTES

    Kleinschmidt, Arthur. Drei Jahrhunderte russischerGeschichte. J. Rde, 1898.

    Martin, Henri; Abby Langdon Alger. A PopularHistory of France from the First Revolution to the

    Present Time. D. Estes and C.E. Lauriat, 1882.

    Nolte, Frdrick. L'Europe militaire et diplomatiqueau dix-neuvime sicle, 1815-1884E. Plon, Nourritet ce, 1884.

    Radzinsky, Edvard. Alexander II: The Last GreatTsar. Simon and Schuster, 2005.

    Ridley, Jasper. Garibaldi. Viking Press, New York,1976.

    Ridley, Jasper. Napoleon III and Eugnie. VikingPress, New York, 1980.

    Robertson, Charles Grant. Bismarck. H. Holt andCo, 1919.

    Taithe, Bertrand. Citizenship and Wars: France inTurmoil 1870-1871. Routledge, 2001.

    Taylor, A.J.P. Bismarck: The Man and the States-man. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988. ISBN 0-241-11565-5

    Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: TheGerman Conquest of France in 1870-1871Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ISBN0-521-58436-1

    7 Notes

    [1] Otto von Bismarck (A.J. Butler, trans.), Bismarck: TheMan and the Statesman, vol. 2,page 58. Originally pub-lished in 1898; reprinted in 2007 by Cosimo Classics ofNew York, New York.

    [2] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/216971/Franco-German-War

    [3] Wawro, Geoffrey (2003). The Franco Prussian War.

    Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0-521-58436-4.[4] Taylor, A.J.P. (1988).Bismarck: The Man and the States-

    man. Hamish Hamilton. pp. 8083.ISBN 0-241-11565-5.

    [5] Jerrold, Blanchard (1882). The Life of Napoleon III.Longmans, Green & Co. p. 327.

    [6] Bresler, Fenton (1999). Napoleon III: A Life. Carroll &Graf. pp. 324325.

    [7] Jerrold(1883). pp. 327330

    [8] Bresler(1999). p. 340

    [9] Wawro, Geoffrey (2003).The Franco-Prussian War: TheGerman Conquest of France in 1870-1871. CambridgeUniversity Press. p. 16. ISBN 0-521-58436-1.

    [10] Bresler(1999). pp. 338339

    [11] Jerrold(1882) p. 332

    [12] Martin, Henri; Abby Langdon Alger (1882). A PopularHistory of France from the First Revolution to the Present

    Time. D. Estes and C.E. Lauriat. pp. 491492.

    [13] Bresler(1999), p. 345

    [14] Wawro(2003), p. 30

    [15] Wawro(2003), p. 17

    [16] Taylor(1988), pp. 84-85.

    [17] Taylor(1988), pp. 70-71.

    [18] Taylor(1988), pp. 86-87.

    [19] Taylor(1988), pp. 88-89.

    [20] Robertson, Charles Grant (1919).Bismarck. H. Holt and

    Co. pp. 220221.

    [21] Albertini, Luigi (1952). The Origins of the War of 1914,Volume I. Oxford University Press. p. 4.

    [22] De Cesare, Raffaele (1909). The Last Days of PapalRome. Archibald Constable & Co. pp. 439443.

    [23] Albertini, Luigi (1952). The Origins of the War of 1914,Volume I. Oxford University Press. p. 6.

    [24] Holt, Lucius Hudson; Alexander Wheeler (1917). TheHistory of Europe from 1862 to 1914: From the Accession

    of Bismarck to the Outbreak of the Great War. Macmillan.pp. 6970, 127.

    [25] Radzinsky, Edvard (2005). Alexander II: The Last GreatTsar. Simon and Schuster. p. 200.

    [26] Kleinschmidt, Arthur (1898). Drei Jahrhunderte russis-cher Geschichte. J. Rde. p. 425.

    [27] Jelavich, Barbara (2004). Russia and the Formation of theRomanian National State, 1821-1878. Cambridge Uni-versity Press. p. 202.

    [28] Bresler(1999), pp. 338-339.

    [29] Taylor(1988) pp. 104-105

    [30] Taylor(1988) pp. 107-108

    [31] Wawro(2003) pp. 22-23.

    [32] Taylor(1988) p. 106

    [33] Wawro(2003), p. 34.

    [34] Ridley (1980) p. 558

    [35] Bresler(1999), pp. 357-358.

    [36] Wawro(2003), pp. 35-36.

    [37] Ridley (1980) p. 561

    [38] Bresler(1999), p. 363

    [39] Bresler(1999), pp. 363-364.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-521-58436-1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-241-11565-5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-241-11565-5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-58436-4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/216971/Franco-German-Warhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/216971/Franco-German-Warhttp://books.google.com/books?id=xO_fCXolQd8C&pg=PA58#v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0521584361https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0521584361https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0241115655https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0241115655https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A._J._P._Taylorhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasper_Ridleyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasper_Ridleyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edvard_Radzinskyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Martin_(historian)
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    9

    [40] Bresler(1999), pp. 364-365.

    [41] Moritz Busch,Bismarck: Some secret pages from his his-tory, Macmillan, New York (1898) Vol. I, p. 37

    [42] Howard(1991), p. 60.

    [43] Ridley, Jasper (1976). Garibaldi. Viking Press. p. 602.

    8 External links

    http://petitsamisdelacommune.chez-alice.fr/

    Postcards from the Franco-German War 1870/71

    Texts and documents about German-French rela-tions and an essay on the Franco-German war

    http://www.deuframat.de/http://www.deuframat.de/http://www.deutsche-schutzgebiete.de/dfkrieg.htmhttp://petitsamisdelacommune.chez-alice.fr/
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    10 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

    9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

    9.1 Text

    Causes of the Franco-Prussian War Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_Franco-Prussian_War?oldid=672087355Contributors:Dogface, The Land, Lacrimosus, Rich Farmbrough, Julius.kusuma, Sherurcij, Axeman89, Rjwilmsi, Dcheng, Str1977, Russ-Bot, Victor falk, Melchoir, Jeff5102, Colonies Chris, Egsan Bacon, Iridescent, Murgh, Italus, Faizhaider, CommonsDelinker, DrKiernan,Halmstad, JohnVBoyle, Monsieurdl, Mild Bill Hiccup, Coewiddabikdik, Addbot, Milks Favorite Bot, Pietrow, Stormrider, Yobot, Frag-gle81, Schaengel, Irredeemableblogger, DITWIN GRIM, RjwilmsiBot, Ripchip Bot, Dewritech, Mmeijeri, Tolly4bolly, Sashhenka, BrigadePiron, Frietjes, Blaue Max, Zhmr, DavidLeighEllis, Monkbot and Anonymous: 21

    9.2 Images

    File:Commons-logo.svgSource:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svgLicense:? Contributors:? Originalartist:?

    File:Flag_of_Germany.svgSource:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/ba/Flag_of_Germany.svgLicense:PD Contributors:?Original artist:?

    File:Gedenkstein_Emser_Depesche.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/Gedenkstein_Emser_Depesche.jpgLicense:CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors:Own workOriginal artist:Holger Weinandt

    File:Jules_Favre_1865_Nadar.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/Jules_Favre_1865_Nadar.jpg Li-

    cense:Public domain Contributors:? Original artist:? File:Map-NDB.svgSource:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/Map-NDB.svgLicense:CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors:

    Based on map data of the IEG-Maps project (Andreas Kunz, B. Johnen and Joachim Robert Moeschl: University of Mainz) - http://www.ieg-maps.uni-mainz.de Original artist:User:52 Pickup

    File:Napoleon3.jpgSource:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e6/Napoleon3.jpgLicense:Public domain Contributors:? Original artist:?

    File:Otto_von_Bismarck.JPG Source:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e5/Otto_von_Bismarck.JPG License:Publicdomain Contributors:Evert A. Duykinck, A Portrait Gallery of Eminent Men and Women of Europe and America, with Biographies. NewYork: Johnson, Wilson and Company. http://www.jamessmithnoelcollection.org/images/otto%20von%20bismarck.jpg Original artist:Evert Duykinck

    File:Tsar_Alexander_II_-6.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/Tsar_Alexander_II_-6.jpg License:Public domain Contributors:This comes from my own collection and was scanned by me,Mrlopez2681Original artist:J. Bajetti

    File:Wikisource-logo.svgSource:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svgLicense:CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors:Rei-arturOriginal artist:Nicholas Moreau

    File:Wilhelm-I-Preuen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8c/Wilhelm-I-Preu%C3%9Fen.jpg License:Public domain Contributors:? Original artist:?

    9.3 Content license

    Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

    https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8c/Wilhelm-I-Preu%25C3%259Fen.jpghttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_4//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Rei-arturhttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svghttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_4//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Mrlopez2681https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/Tsar_Alexander_II_-6.jpghttp://www.jamessmithnoelcollection.org/images/otto%2520von%2520bismarck.jpghttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e5/Otto_von_Bismarck.JPGhttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e6/Napoleon3.jpghttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_4//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:52_Pickuphttp://www.ieg-maps.uni-mainz.de/http://www.ieg-maps.uni-mainz.de/https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/Map-NDB.svghttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/Jules_Favre_1865_Nadar.jpghttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_4//de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benutzer:Schaengelhttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/Gedenkstein_Emser_Depesche.jpghttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/Gedenkstein_Emser_Depesche.jpghttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/ba/Flag_of_Germany.svghttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_Franco-Prussian_War?oldid=672087355