t . f\'-1\ '• J.1.vi,~~~--~~-JJJL ~·--· ···~-~-----~~------~*-~-~·.·-···

~-h. 6eVlT""' -t '1 tJU ~

stand up for themselves~ The mandatesystem thus meant that natioss who were 's eolonies had to l()ok.ed.after the peopleín.their care; o be ánswerable to fhe League ofNatiortsfot théir actions. 'A' mándate toürtttíesg Palestíne, Iraq an.d Tra.nsjordan. (give11.io Britain) and Syria arn:l the

Lebanon to France) - were to beceme irrdependentJn the near future, Colonies that wereered to be less developed and therefore n.ot ready for irnmediq.te indepemlen~e were

'n1andates. These induded the Cameroons, Togoland and Tanganyika., and were also en to Britain and Ftante. Belgillrn also received a 'B' manda.te~

·· sparatlonsrrnany's 'war guílt' provided ju$titication for the Allied demanda for reparations, les wanted to rnake Gertnany payfor the material done to them duríngthe y also preposed to charge Germany for the fnture costs of pensiona to war wídows and

ar wounded, There wasJnuch argument between fue delegares at the coúférence on the whok issue of reparations. Althnugh ,l'lrance has ttaditionally been blamed fqr pushitJg for a hígh reparations sum, and thus stoppinga practical reparations deal, in fact moterecent aceounts ofthe negotíatiens at Versailles bla.me Brítain for malci.ng the most

Punishment ot war crlminals'fhe Treaty ofVersailles also called fot the extradition and trialof the Kaiser and oilier·war~tilllinals'; flowevef,.the Dutch government refused to hand overthe Kaiser and the

Allied ders found it diffi.cultto identify and find theIesser war criminals, Eventu;:i.Oy; a few rman rn:illtary commandets and su.bmarine captain.s were ttied by a Gertnan nlllitary

t at Leipzjg, aud: receíved fines or shortterrn:s of hnprisonment. These wer~

hat was the contemporaryresponse to the

.reaty of VersaiU.es?ead through the documents belowand then áddtess the. que.stionsin the·

THE OF WORLD

DocumentA

... thefutüre life of Europe was not their concern: its means oflivelihood was no: theír anxiety. Their preoccupations, good and bad alike, related to frontiefs and nauonaluie« to

enemy, to revenge, and to the shifting by the·victors·oftheír

unbearable financia/ burdens

Frotn John Mayard Keynes, The Eciinomic Ccmsequences of the Peace, 1919. Keynes was a British econotnist who worked at the l'reasury during World Wlll" I and was a chi~ negotiations prior to the Ireaty ofVetsailles, although heresigned from the füitish

Oocument.B

Now that we see [the terms] as a whole, we realise that they are much too stiff The real crime is the reparations and indemnity chapter, which is immoral and senseless ... There is not a single pers<>n among the younger people here who is not unhappy and disappointed with theterms. The only people who approve are the old fire-eatere .... If I were the Germans, I shouldn'tsign ítfor a moment.

.

Documen

'Maybe we should let ít stand

.

; ....

Documento

The las: time I had the of ad:dressingthe House upon this Treaty its main. had been settied: 1 veniured then to call it a 'stern but just Treaty'. 1 adhere to that description. The terrns are in many respecte, terrible term« to impose upon a ceuntry. deeds that it recudes. Terrible were the conseqµences tha: were inflicted upon the world. StíUmore terrible would have been the consequences had they succeeded. What do these. terms mean to Germany?Take the territorial terms. In so far as terrttories have been taken awayfrom Germany, i.t isa restoration. Alsace-Lorraine was forcíbly token from the land. to whidi its population were deeply attached. Is it an injustice to restare them to their country? Schleswig-Holstein, the meanest of the Hohenzollern frauds; robbing a small, poor, helpless country, and then retaining that land against the wishes ofthe populationfor 50 to 60 years. 1 am gJad the opportunityhas come far restoring Schleswig-Holstein. Poland, torn to bits to feed the carnívorous greed

entE

ay in the Hall of M.irrors of Veriailles the disgraceful Treaty is beingsigned. Do not forget

The German people will with unceasing labour pressforward to teconquer the place

newspaper, 19

'1

lsrns ofthe Treaty of Versailles5a11 see from the sources above, there was already criticism of the

esattl1e ~~ethatit was signed, not just from.the Germans but also

t became stronger in the 1920s, forcefully expressed

porary observers like Harold Nicolson and Norman H. Davies, and economist

"'"·"n°•nbythe Gerrnans, who felt that all countríes

of war in 1914. It was eipecially

1THE RESULTS OF WORLD

was able to play oh the resentment and anger feltby the German population towards the

Disarmamentclauses

These were hard for the Germansto accepLAn anny of 100,000 was small for a couhtry of Germany's size .. German.y was also very pro.ud of .its army. Germany's anger grewwhen, despite Wílsort?s call für disarmament in his Fourteen Points, efforts by the ·othet European powers to disann carne to n:othing infüe 1920s and l93Qs,

Reparations and fossof kftY r~soyr~sKeynes (see Documentá. above} led the .criticisms of the treaty in the area ofreparations.

solidaritg of Europe

destruc.tion of the eco¡iomic life of andby and prospetity of the Allies thems.elves? Not ohly could Germany

• pay the hµge reparatior1s bill, but by takifl.g away Germany's coal andJron resources1 ít also meant that Gertnany's econotny would be unableto recover, Keynes:.argued .thatthe real prohlem of the settlement lay not ini.ssues ofbcundaries 'but rather in questions offood,toal and co:tnmerce'. The fo.et that Germany was to face hyper~infiªti<>nin the e.arly

Territorial changes to satisfy the issue of se 1f~determination

On this is:sue, Germanyw<:1:s treated unfairly. Thus while the Danes were given the chancegiven al'ly sqch choite.Many were nowtul.ed by non-Historian W.H. Dawson claimed in 1933,inh.is hook Germany un4er the Treaty, thatGermany1s bctders'are litetallybleeding. From them oozes out thelífe-blood, physical,.spiritual and material of largepopi,dations.'

Remova! of coleniesWilsort?s reason für removing regions.like South-West 1\frka and Rwanda.,,Urundi. fromGerman adrninistration was to rernove them from the harsh nature ofGerman rule. action was: cle.arly }iypocriti<:al .• States th;,tt .received German rolonies- Smith Aftica Belgiu:tn,Jor example ~ couldnotthernselves

daim to be model colonial

'I'he faíll,¡re of the peacemakers to invite Gérma.ny to joiil the League of Natiol1s not only

ins:ulted Ge!many and added toits sense of grievance, butmade itlesslikely thllt the Leagtie

Alternative views of the Treaty of VersaiHesM<111y historianstake a different v-iew of the Treaty ofVersailles and its ímpact on the events of Euro pe a.fter 1910. In fact, itís now argued by many that the treaty was in fa.et 'telatively lenient'(NiaU Fergl:.lson) aml tbat, .given the huge problems·fadng the peacemakers, itwould have been diffkult for them to have. achíeved a mote sa.tisfactoty setilement.. The key arguments of histotians 1;uch as Sally Matks, Anthony Lentin, Alan Sharp and Ruth

ompared to the treaties that Germany had imposedon Bussia and Romanía earlier in 1918,

Treaty of Versailles was quite moderase: Germany's war aims were far-reaching and, shown in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, indicatethat Germanywould have sought

hugeareas of land from the Allies if it had won. Thus, the Allies can be seen to have exercised

considerable<restraint. The treaty deprived Germany of about 13.5 per cent of its territory

{much of this consisted of Alsace-Lorraine, which was returned to France), about 13 per

t of its economic productivity and just over 1 O per cent ofits population. In additíon, jtcan be argued that France deserved to he compensated for the destruction of so much

of i.ts Iand and industry. German land had not been invaded and its farmland and

industries

erefore remained intact,

11le treaty infact left Germany in a relatively strong position in the centre of Europe, Germany remained a dominant power in a weakened Europe. Not onlywas itphysically undamaged,it had gained strategic advantages, Russia remained weak and isolated at this time, andQentral Europe was fragmented. The peacemakers had created several new states in

dance with the principie of self-determination (see below), and thls was to create

a

r vacuum that would favour the expansíon of Germany in the future. Anthony

Lentin pointed out the problem here of creating a treaty that failed to weaken

Gennany, but at same time left it 'scourged, humíliated and resentful;

'Ihe huge reparations bill was net responsible for the economic crisis that. Germany faced in the early J 920s. In fact, the issue of banknotes by the German government was a major factor in using hyper-inflation, In addition, many economic historians have argued that

Germanyprevalent, and why is it so often cited as a key factor in the cause ofWorld War m

The

t issue is that while the treaty was not in itself exceptionally unfair, the Germans thought andthey directed all their efforts into persuadíng others of their case. German

aganda on this issue was very successful, and Britain and France were forced into

ral revisions of the treaty, while Germany evaded paying reparations or carrying out

the mament dauses.

second íssue is that the USA ami Britain lacked the will to enforce the terms of the

/. The coalition that put the treatytogether at Versailles soon collapsed. The USA

sed to ratify the treaty., and Britain, content with colonial gains and with strategic

and itime security from Germany, now wished to distance itself from many of the treaty's orial provisions. Liberal opiníon in the USA and Britain was infiuenced not

only by

an propaganda, but also by Keynes's arguments for allowing Germany to

recover mically.

ce was the only country that still feared for its security and which wanted to enforce

es in full. This factex.plains why France invaded the Ruhr in 1923 in order to

effecf (Tñe World a,nd Beyond, 2006).

guaranteed peace and the security o~· the treatystipulated that the troop$

THE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR 1

only be there for 15 years. In fact, the last Allied soldiers left in 1930, five years earlier than

The settlement of Eastern and South... EasternEuropeFour separate peace treaties were signed with Austria (Treaty of St Germain), Hurtgary

(Treaty ofTríanon), Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly) and Turkey (Treaty ofSevres, revised by the Treaty of Lausanne). Pollowing' the format of the Treaty of Versailles, allfour

countries were to disarrn, to pay reparati ons and to lose territory.

The Treaty of St Germain (1919)By the time the delegares met atVersailles, the peoples of Austria-Hungaryhad alrea.dy

broken away from the empire and were setting up their own states in accordance with the principie of self-determination. The conference had no choice but to agree to this

situation and suggest minor changes. Austria was separated from Hungary and reduced to a tinyland-locked state consisting of only 25 per cent of its pre-war area and20 per cent ofítspre-war population, It became a republic of seven million people, which manynicknamed

'the tadpole state' due to its shape and size. Other conditions of the Treaty of St

Germain were:0l Austria lost Bohemia and Moravia - wealthy industrial provinces - to the new state of

Czechoslovakia

111 Austria lost Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to a new state peopled by .Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, a state that became known as Yugoslavia

llí Poland gained Galicia<ll' Italy received the South Tyrol, Trentino and Istria.

The Treaty of Trianon (1920)Hungary had to recognizethe independence of the new states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Austria. In this treatyít lost75 per cent of its pre-war territory

and 66 per cent of its pre-war_population:'111 Slovakía and Ruthenia were gíven to Czechoslovakiaw. Croaría and Slovenia were given to Yugoslavia

l!l Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar were given to Rornania.

In addition, the Hungarian Army was limited to 35,000 men and Hungary had to

The Treaty ot Neuilly (1919)In the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria Iost tetritory to Greece and Yugoslavia. SignificaI1tly, it lost its Aegean toastline and therefore access to the Mediterranean. However, it was the only

.The Treaty ot Sevres (1920)· The disintegtatíbn of fhe Ottomart Empite had been long expected and both Britain andPrance hoped to make sorne gains in the regien. In the Treaty ofS~vres:<> Syria went to Prancé as a manda te

Palestine, Iraq, Transjordan and Cyprus went to GreatBritainEastern Thrace went to GteeceRhodes and the Dodecanese Islands went to Ita.lySmyrna was occúpied by the Greeks forfive-years ánd theaaplebiscitewas heldThe Straits (exít fronr t}ie Black Sea) were fübecome a deníilimhed Z<>ll~ athninistered pythe Leagµe of Natio11s, and Britain, Prance and Ita.ly were to keep troops in Turkey.

e treaty wasaccepted by Sultan Muhammad VI. Yet there fieree resentm.eIJ,tto the terms. The nationalistleaciér Mustapha Kemal leda National Assembly at Ankara

topledge

pf Chanak.. 11ded to attack the British s.olq~c;:r~·~· ·promise was·agreed upop,ho

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923)The provisions of the Treaty of Lausann.e ran as follows;@ Turkey regained Eastern Thrate, Sücyrna, sorne territory alortgthe Sytian bordet and

several Aegean isla.ndsTurkish soveteignty over the Sttaitswas recognized, but the area rernained demilitarized

·~ Foteign troops wete WithdtaWn froJ:ll Turl<ish territory

What were the eritlcisrns of the peace settlernents inEastern and South-Eastern Europe?It was very di¡ffi:cultto apply the principie of selfdetetrnination c(Jnsistently and fairly.

defensible border and because the new state Czt:cho¡¡lova.kia, needed a minerals and industty, itwasgiveitthe ex'"-Austrian Sudetenland1 which containedthree a:nd a half million Gerrnan speakers. The new Czechosfovakia set up on

cettain

"

lines therefore contained .ti.ve maín radal.groups: Czechs, Boles, Magyars, Ruthenians Gerfuanspeªker R<tcíl:ll prQbl{!nts were aj.so rife i11 the newYugoslavia., where at least a. dozen nationalitie.s within..its borders. 'Ihus the historian Alan Sharp writes that'the 191.9 minorities w-eté p.tobably mote discon:tented than those of 1914' (Modern HistoryReview, N'oveniber 1991).

ancLAustria su.ffered by 1922. Theweakm~ss ef these new st;1tes WM

to ere.ate a powe.r v:a.cuum in this partof Europe andGertnan dominatícn,

thus the area became an easy target

~ Hungary resented.the Ioss ofits terrltnries, partícu.larly Transylvania. Czeclíoslovakia,R;()tn'!11ia and Xug{)slav~alíiter formed the Líttle Entente, with the aim of p.rotec.ting oneanother fr.om any Hungarian attempt to regain controlover their tetritories.Turkeywas extreniely bitterabout the settlement, and this bitterness led t() a takeover by

;

!

D'Annunzío leader in ltaly's occ.upied Fiume witha supporters in thename ofltalian n<}.ti.011a1,ists, and in 1924 theYugpslavians gave Fim;ne

;Jlt was the impact of the war andthe ies by the early 1920s?

·al .issues~iht:mgh.'\y;tt~te:rn Europewas still familiar on the map irt l92D, this was notthe

case m'$a$tern E.urope, where no fewertban nine .new or revived states came intl) ezj:stell.cer

r-'.

slavia. Me<Jnwhilt\ Rl,lssia's gQVernment was new a Bolshevik dictatorship that was

uraging revolution abroad, The frontiers of new states thus becamethefrontiers of the pe.fecm whkh Russia was ex1:lµded. R.ussia was not invited to theVersailles Conferenee was not a member of the League of.Natíons until 1934.

e new Europe remained divided not only between the 'victors' and the 'defeated~ bm between those who wanted to maintain the peacesettlement and these who wa,nted to it revised, Not only Getn1any, but also Hungary and ltaly, were active in putsuing theits of getting the treatíes changed. Despite Wilson's hopes to the contrary, internationals' developed, such as thatformed by the Little Entente. The peacemakers had hoped

Íot an:d. encouraged democtaq in the new states, Yet the people in Central Burope had only

erience with autocraey, and governments were undermined by the rivalry between the

'fferent ethnic groups and by the economic problema that they faced,

ough Britain and France still had their empires.and continued theír same colonialdes, the. war saw the startofthe decline of these powers on theworld stage. The role

of eriea in the war had made it clear that Btitain and Ftance were going to find it

nomic issuesh~rve seen, the wat caused severe econemic disruption in. Europe. Germany

suffered ady badly, but all couritries>ofEurope faeed rising prices, 'the i:hlpact ofinflation ations whích had grown accustomed to stable príces anda reliable'

currency wass.• and was as much psyt:hological as econornic. The lost landmark of a

stable, which destroyed the wealth. of manybourgeoisoollapse of the currency rneant

farnilies. In GermaJ,ly, for example,

and South~Eastern Europe, the new fra.gmentation of the area.h.indered·e recovery. There was now serious disruption in what had been a free trade atea of rnillion inhabit<Jnts.,From 1919, each country tried to bl1H<f up its econ()my, which rce tompetition and high tariffs .. Atte:rnpts at economk coopetationfüundered

c:cess was wrecked by the Gr~t.Depr~s§iQl'l.. As note<l, only Af]lerka and Ja.pan

:'.etJ:'<ld~tional structuresin sótiety. Aéro5s.Europe, . 1914,lústmu ofits power

>JTidthe countty ofits atístoctacy completely. fo thetates were hroken up; many

govemments,sµch and distributedland outtothe peasants. In

1'111111

!HE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR 1 -~~·. ·--

France, standards of'health and welfarealso rose during thewar, thus.ímprevingthe lives ofthe poorest citizens. Measures were introdueed to i.mprove the health of'children. In

Britain, social legislatíon eontinued after the war with the Housing.Act of 1918, whidr snbsidízedthe building of'hceses, and the Unemploymertt Insurance Acts ef 1920 and 1921, whiehincreased benefits for unem.ployed workers an.d their-families,

After the war, women gained rights in society to which they had prevíously been denied. Such changes were reflectad in a growing fernale cenfidence and changas in fashion and

behavieur, In Britaín and.America the so-called 'flappers' wore plain, short dresses, had short hair, srnoked cígarettes and drank cocktails, This kind of behaviour would have

been considered unacseptable before the war. In Britain, sorne professions also epened up to women after the war; they could now train to become archítects and lawyets and were

allowed to serve on a jury.

The endof thewar also saw women gettingthevote in a number of countries;Russia in

1917, Austria and Britain.in 1918, Czechoslovakia, Germany, theNetherlands, Poland and

Swedenin 1919 and Ameriq¡. and Belgium in 1920. The role thatwomen played in the war

•

their work and to their more traditional roles in the

• Examine,;s hintlt is very easy wíth the s€cond essay questíon at the bottcm to be too \i~Úe br

general in your ansvvec The probíern with soci:al, politltaf and econornk effects is that it is hard'to makesweeping generaliz9~ions; theyvaried from country to tóuntryand riot ali were cau?ed by the: waronly. Yoúthúsneed to ensure tha.t y6ü gi\ie ve!)!

he causes of World War II are complex, and so we have divided the key themes into two

hapters. In this chapter we will look at the failure of collective security in preventing the outbreak of war, along with the impact of the Great Depression in Europe in the l 930s.

In the next chapterwe will look more specifically at Hitler's policies as a cause of war, and

the European powers responded to the threat that Nazi posed to

!

e faUure of 'ccllective security'e have seen, one ofWilson's Fourteen Points Ied to the creation of the League of911s, an otganizatior1 that sought to prevent another war breaking out between states.

he Lea~eoft¡a[~~n$Covenant] to the conventionai r, _which 'Wi~f1I'!!f4Sfºn¡V-inced, had been sustained by force. This had created a Srace .·~f;iC(Jl,f,tivities abroad. Now military power and expansionism

were. · ',~n;'l1/hich 'world pubfic opinion' rather than alliances

repla._ceq§)

a11enges. Altlíougliit was success w()rk colléctl:y~lythfough tJ:i~·

~¡.·

CAUSES OF WORLD WAR 11 IN EUROPE: THE FAILURE OF OOLLEOTIVE SECURITY '

Collective security and the League ot NatíonsThe principle of eollective security was theidea thatpeace could be presetved by countties acting tQgether- c-0llectively- to prevent one country attacki11g am:ither. Collectivesecµ(was to be made practkally possíble by the machínery of the Leagúe of Natiens, When there ·.was a dispute between cmmt;ries theywaµld refer the iSsue(s) to the League's

The Covenant of the League of NationsThe League met for the firsttime in Geneva in December 1920. Its key objective was to keep the peace and avoid roture conftict by advising on and settlíng international disputes. It also aímed to premote disarmarnent, supervise the mªndated territeries ªnd pr:om.ote international good will and soeperation thtough.its varíens otganizaüons

"

soci\tl and ecenomic.develepment, 'Ihe initial membershipstates.and 12 neutral states; however, by 1926 all ex-enemj'

ef'the League was 32 Alliedstates had jeined, The USSR

amendments made in 1924),which prescribed when and how the League was to • Artklesl~7 were concemed

withthememhershipAssembly, Council and Secretaríat,

and orgariization oftheLeague,

ofwa•• Artitles 1s~21 concerned treaty obligations and the League's e}t}'ectations of itll

memberstates,

Arüde 22 eoneemed the mandated térritoríes,Attide ~3 cencemed humanítarían issues such as labour conditions,the trafficking ofwornen. chíldren and dn1gs, health Issues and the affu¡¡ tra(ie,Artide 24 eoncerned the cornmissions,

••

•••

Deafing with international disputeslt was set clownin the Covenant that member states should refer theit disputes to one of followin ....

••

The JtistiArbittation (having a neutral pers.on or group of people listi;ning to and judging adispute)•

Ifmember states failed to refer their dispute to the League, or failed to follow itsrecommendations, the League could then impose economic si'j.nctions., the maintool for the League against aggtess<lts. In the aftetmath ofWotld War I, in whkh the econoi:uic blockade of GermanY had been effective, this economk weapon appe(lred to have the potential to be effective in fo.rdng compliance with füe Lea.gu.~'s decisions.

In theory, the League could call for milita:ry áction as a last resótt a.gainstan aggressot. Yet the Le~e did .not have it.s own armed forces, and in. re.Uity memberstates <lid no~ wantto put theit sovereign forces under international .con.trol. In addition, the

THE OF WORLD

DocumentA

... thefutüre life of Europe was not their concern: its means oflivelihood was no: theír anxiety. Their preoccupations, good and bad alike, related to frontiefs and nauonaluie« to

enemy, to revenge, and to the shifting by the·victors·oftheír

unbearable financia/ burdens

Frotn John Mayard Keynes, The Eciinomic Ccmsequences of the Peace, 1919. Keynes was a British econotnist who worked at the l'reasury during World Wlll" I and was a chi~ negotiations prior to the Ireaty ofVetsailles, although heresigned from the füitish

Oocument.B

Now that we see [the terms] as a whole, we realise that they are much too stiff The real crime is the reparations and indemnity chapter, which is immoral and senseless ... There is not a single pers<>n among the younger people here who is not unhappy and disappointed with theterms. The only people who approve are the old fire-eatere .... If I were the Germans, I shouldn'tsign ítfor a moment.

.

Documen

'Maybe we should let ít stand

.

; ....

Documento

The las: time I had the of ad:dressingthe House upon this Treaty its main. had been settied: 1 veniured then to call it a 'stern but just Treaty'. 1 adhere to that description. The terrns are in many respecte, terrible term« to impose upon a ceuntry. deeds that it recudes. Terrible were the conseqµences tha: were inflicted upon the world. StíUmore terrible would have been the consequences had they succeeded. What do these. terms mean to Germany?Take the territorial terms. In so far as terrttories have been taken awayfrom Germany, i.t isa restoration. Alsace-Lorraine was forcíbly token from the land. to whidi its population were deeply attached. Is it an injustice to restare them to their country? Schleswig-Holstein, the meanest of the Hohenzollern frauds; robbing a small, poor, helpless country, and then retaining that land against the wishes ofthe populationfor 50 to 60 years. 1 am gJad the opportunityhas come far restoring Schleswig-Holstein. Poland, torn to bits to feed the carnívorous greed

entE

ay in the Hall of M.irrors of Veriailles the disgraceful Treaty is beingsigned. Do not forget

The German people will with unceasing labour pressforward to teconquer the place

newspaper, 19

'1

lsrns ofthe Treaty of Versailles5a11 see from the sources above, there was already criticism of the

esattl1e ~~ethatit was signed, not just from.the Germans but also

t became stronger in the 1920s, forcefully expressed

porary observers like Harold Nicolson and Norman H. Davies, and economist

"'"·"n°•nbythe Gerrnans, who felt that all countríes

of war in 1914. It was eipecially

1THE RESULTS OF WORLD

was able to play oh the resentment and anger feltby the German population towards the

Disarmamentclauses

These were hard for the Germansto accepLAn anny of 100,000 was small for a couhtry of Germany's size .. German.y was also very pro.ud of .its army. Germany's anger grewwhen, despite Wílsort?s call für disarmament in his Fourteen Points, efforts by the ·othet European powers to disann carne to n:othing infüe 1920s and l93Qs,

Reparations and fossof kftY r~soyr~sKeynes (see Documentá. above} led the .criticisms of the treaty in the area ofreparations.

solidaritg of Europe

destruc.tion of the eco¡iomic life of andby and prospetity of the Allies thems.elves? Not ohly could Germany

• pay the hµge reparatior1s bill, but by takifl.g away Germany's coal andJron resources1 ít also meant that Gertnany's econotny would be unableto recover, Keynes:.argued .thatthe real prohlem of the settlement lay not ini.ssues ofbcundaries 'but rather in questions offood,toal and co:tnmerce'. The fo.et that Germany was to face hyper~infiªti<>nin the e.arly

Territorial changes to satisfy the issue of se 1f~determination

On this is:sue, Germanyw<:1:s treated unfairly. Thus while the Danes were given the chancegiven al'ly sqch choite.Many were nowtul.ed by non-Historian W.H. Dawson claimed in 1933,inh.is hook Germany un4er the Treaty, thatGermany1s bctders'are litetallybleeding. From them oozes out thelífe-blood, physical,.spiritual and material of largepopi,dations.'

Remova! of coleniesWilsort?s reason für removing regions.like South-West 1\frka and Rwanda.,,Urundi. fromGerman adrninistration was to rernove them from the harsh nature ofGerman rule. action was: cle.arly }iypocriti<:al .• States th;,tt .received German rolonies- Smith Aftica Belgiu:tn,Jor example ~ couldnotthernselves

daim to be model colonial

'I'he faíll,¡re of the peacemakers to invite Gérma.ny to joiil the League of Natiol1s not only

ins:ulted Ge!many and added toits sense of grievance, butmade itlesslikely thllt the Leagtie

Alternative views of the Treaty of VersaiHesM<111y historianstake a different v-iew of the Treaty ofVersailles and its ímpact on the events of Euro pe a.fter 1910. In fact, itís now argued by many that the treaty was in fa.et 'telatively lenient'(NiaU Fergl:.lson) aml tbat, .given the huge problems·fadng the peacemakers, itwould have been diffkult for them to have. achíeved a mote sa.tisfactoty setilement.. The key arguments of histotians 1;uch as Sally Matks, Anthony Lentin, Alan Sharp and Ruth

ompared to the treaties that Germany had imposedon Bussia and Romanía earlier in 1918,

Treaty of Versailles was quite moderase: Germany's war aims were far-reaching and, shown in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, indicatethat Germanywould have sought

hugeareas of land from the Allies if it had won. Thus, the Allies can be seen to have exercised

considerable<restraint. The treaty deprived Germany of about 13.5 per cent of its territory

{much of this consisted of Alsace-Lorraine, which was returned to France), about 13 per

t of its economic productivity and just over 1 O per cent ofits population. In additíon, jtcan be argued that France deserved to he compensated for the destruction of so much

of i.ts Iand and industry. German land had not been invaded and its farmland and

industries

erefore remained intact,

11le treaty infact left Germany in a relatively strong position in the centre of Europe, Germany remained a dominant power in a weakened Europe. Not onlywas itphysically undamaged,it had gained strategic advantages, Russia remained weak and isolated at this time, andQentral Europe was fragmented. The peacemakers had created several new states in

dance with the principie of self-determination (see below), and thls was to create

a

r vacuum that would favour the expansíon of Germany in the future. Anthony

Lentin pointed out the problem here of creating a treaty that failed to weaken

Gennany, but at same time left it 'scourged, humíliated and resentful;

'Ihe huge reparations bill was net responsible for the economic crisis that. Germany faced in the early J 920s. In fact, the issue of banknotes by the German government was a major factor in using hyper-inflation, In addition, many economic historians have argued that

Germanyprevalent, and why is it so often cited as a key factor in the cause ofWorld War m

The

t issue is that while the treaty was not in itself exceptionally unfair, the Germans thought andthey directed all their efforts into persuadíng others of their case. German

aganda on this issue was very successful, and Britain and France were forced into

ral revisions of the treaty, while Germany evaded paying reparations or carrying out

the mament dauses.

second íssue is that the USA ami Britain lacked the will to enforce the terms of the

/. The coalition that put the treatytogether at Versailles soon collapsed. The USA

sed to ratify the treaty., and Britain, content with colonial gains and with strategic

and itime security from Germany, now wished to distance itself from many of the treaty's orial provisions. Liberal opiníon in the USA and Britain was infiuenced not

only by

an propaganda, but also by Keynes's arguments for allowing Germany to

recover mically.

ce was the only country that still feared for its security and which wanted to enforce

es in full. This factex.plains why France invaded the Ruhr in 1923 in order to

effecf (Tñe World a,nd Beyond, 2006).

guaranteed peace and the security o~· the treatystipulated that the troop$

THE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR 1

only be there for 15 years. In fact, the last Allied soldiers left in 1930, five years earlier than

The settlement of Eastern and South... EasternEuropeFour separate peace treaties were signed with Austria (Treaty of St Germain), Hurtgary

(Treaty ofTríanon), Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly) and Turkey (Treaty ofSevres, revised by the Treaty of Lausanne). Pollowing' the format of the Treaty of Versailles, allfour

countries were to disarrn, to pay reparati ons and to lose territory.

The Treaty of St Germain (1919)By the time the delegares met atVersailles, the peoples of Austria-Hungaryhad alrea.dy

broken away from the empire and were setting up their own states in accordance with the principie of self-determination. The conference had no choice but to agree to this

situation and suggest minor changes. Austria was separated from Hungary and reduced to a tinyland-locked state consisting of only 25 per cent of its pre-war area and20 per cent ofítspre-war population, It became a republic of seven million people, which manynicknamed

'the tadpole state' due to its shape and size. Other conditions of the Treaty of St

Germain were:0l Austria lost Bohemia and Moravia - wealthy industrial provinces - to the new state of

Czechoslovakia

111 Austria lost Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to a new state peopled by .Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, a state that became known as Yugoslavia

llí Poland gained Galicia<ll' Italy received the South Tyrol, Trentino and Istria.

The Treaty of Trianon (1920)Hungary had to recognizethe independence of the new states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Austria. In this treatyít lost75 per cent of its pre-war territory

and 66 per cent of its pre-war_population:'111 Slovakía and Ruthenia were gíven to Czechoslovakiaw. Croaría and Slovenia were given to Yugoslavia

l!l Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar were given to Rornania.

In addition, the Hungarian Army was limited to 35,000 men and Hungary had to

The Treaty ot Neuilly (1919)In the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria Iost tetritory to Greece and Yugoslavia. SignificaI1tly, it lost its Aegean toastline and therefore access to the Mediterranean. However, it was the only

.The Treaty ot Sevres (1920)· The disintegtatíbn of fhe Ottomart Empite had been long expected and both Britain andPrance hoped to make sorne gains in the regien. In the Treaty ofS~vres:<> Syria went to Prancé as a manda te

Palestine, Iraq, Transjordan and Cyprus went to GreatBritainEastern Thrace went to GteeceRhodes and the Dodecanese Islands went to Ita.lySmyrna was occúpied by the Greeks forfive-years ánd theaaplebiscitewas heldThe Straits (exít fronr t}ie Black Sea) were fübecome a deníilimhed Z<>ll~ athninistered pythe Leagµe of Natio11s, and Britain, Prance and Ita.ly were to keep troops in Turkey.

e treaty wasaccepted by Sultan Muhammad VI. Yet there fieree resentm.eIJ,tto the terms. The nationalistleaciér Mustapha Kemal leda National Assembly at Ankara

topledge

pf Chanak.. 11ded to attack the British s.olq~c;:r~·~· ·promise was·agreed upop,ho

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923)The provisions of the Treaty of Lausann.e ran as follows;@ Turkey regained Eastern Thrate, Sücyrna, sorne territory alortgthe Sytian bordet and

several Aegean isla.ndsTurkish soveteignty over the Sttaitswas recognized, but the area rernained demilitarized

·~ Foteign troops wete WithdtaWn froJ:ll Turl<ish territory

What were the eritlcisrns of the peace settlernents inEastern and South-Eastern Europe?It was very di¡ffi:cultto apply the principie of selfdetetrnination c(Jnsistently and fairly.

defensible border and because the new state Czt:cho¡¡lova.kia, needed a minerals and industty, itwasgiveitthe ex'"-Austrian Sudetenland1 which containedthree a:nd a half million Gerrnan speakers. The new Czechosfovakia set up on

cettain

"

lines therefore contained .ti.ve maín radal.groups: Czechs, Boles, Magyars, Ruthenians Gerfuanspeªker R<tcíl:ll prQbl{!nts were aj.so rife i11 the newYugoslavia., where at least a. dozen nationalitie.s within..its borders. 'Ihus the historian Alan Sharp writes that'the 191.9 minorities w-eté p.tobably mote discon:tented than those of 1914' (Modern HistoryReview, N'oveniber 1991).

ancLAustria su.ffered by 1922. Theweakm~ss ef these new st;1tes WM

to ere.ate a powe.r v:a.cuum in this partof Europe andGertnan dominatícn,

thus the area became an easy target

~ Hungary resented.the Ioss ofits terrltnries, partícu.larly Transylvania. Czeclíoslovakia,R;()tn'!11ia and Xug{)slav~alíiter formed the Líttle Entente, with the aim of p.rotec.ting oneanother fr.om any Hungarian attempt to regain controlover their tetritories.Turkeywas extreniely bitterabout the settlement, and this bitterness led t() a takeover by

;

!

D'Annunzío leader in ltaly's occ.upied Fiume witha supporters in thename ofltalian n<}.ti.011a1,ists, and in 1924 theYugpslavians gave Fim;ne

;Jlt was the impact of the war andthe ies by the early 1920s?

·al .issues~iht:mgh.'\y;tt~te:rn Europewas still familiar on the map irt l92D, this was notthe

case m'$a$tern E.urope, where no fewertban nine .new or revived states came intl) ezj:stell.cer

r-'.

slavia. Me<Jnwhilt\ Rl,lssia's gQVernment was new a Bolshevik dictatorship that was

uraging revolution abroad, The frontiers of new states thus becamethefrontiers of the pe.fecm whkh Russia was ex1:lµded. R.ussia was not invited to theVersailles Conferenee was not a member of the League of.Natíons until 1934.

e new Europe remained divided not only between the 'victors' and the 'defeated~ bm between those who wanted to maintain the peacesettlement and these who wa,nted to it revised, Not only Getn1any, but also Hungary and ltaly, were active in putsuing theits of getting the treatíes changed. Despite Wilson's hopes to the contrary, internationals' developed, such as thatformed by the Little Entente. The peacemakers had hoped

Íot an:d. encouraged democtaq in the new states, Yet the people in Central Burope had only

erience with autocraey, and governments were undermined by the rivalry between the

'fferent ethnic groups and by the economic problema that they faced,

ough Britain and France still had their empires.and continued theír same colonialdes, the. war saw the startofthe decline of these powers on theworld stage. The role

of eriea in the war had made it clear that Btitain and Ftance were going to find it

nomic issuesh~rve seen, the wat caused severe econemic disruption in. Europe. Germany

suffered ady badly, but all couritries>ofEurope faeed rising prices, 'the i:hlpact ofinflation ations whích had grown accustomed to stable príces anda reliable'

currency wass.• and was as much psyt:hological as econornic. The lost landmark of a

stable, which destroyed the wealth. of manybourgeoisoollapse of the currency rneant

farnilies. In GermaJ,ly, for example,

and South~Eastern Europe, the new fra.gmentation of the area.h.indered·e recovery. There was now serious disruption in what had been a free trade atea of rnillion inhabit<Jnts.,From 1919, each country tried to bl1H<f up its econ()my, which rce tompetition and high tariffs .. Atte:rnpts at economk coopetationfüundered

c:cess was wrecked by the Gr~t.Depr~s§iQl'l.. As note<l, only Af]lerka and Ja.pan

:'.etJ:'<ld~tional structuresin sótiety. Aéro5s.Europe, . 1914,lústmu ofits power

>JTidthe countty ofits atístoctacy completely. fo thetates were hroken up; many

govemments,sµch and distributedland outtothe peasants. In

1'111111

!HE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR 1 -~~·. ·--

France, standards of'health and welfarealso rose during thewar, thus.ímprevingthe lives ofthe poorest citizens. Measures were introdueed to i.mprove the health of'children. In

Britain, social legislatíon eontinued after the war with the Housing.Act of 1918, whidr snbsidízedthe building of'hceses, and the Unemploymertt Insurance Acts ef 1920 and 1921, whiehincreased benefits for unem.ployed workers an.d their-families,

After the war, women gained rights in society to which they had prevíously been denied. Such changes were reflectad in a growing fernale cenfidence and changas in fashion and

behavieur, In Britaín and.America the so-called 'flappers' wore plain, short dresses, had short hair, srnoked cígarettes and drank cocktails, This kind of behaviour would have

been considered unacseptable before the war. In Britain, sorne professions also epened up to women after the war; they could now train to become archítects and lawyets and were

allowed to serve on a jury.

The endof thewar also saw women gettingthevote in a number of countries;Russia in

1917, Austria and Britain.in 1918, Czechoslovakia, Germany, theNetherlands, Poland and

Swedenin 1919 and Ameriq¡. and Belgium in 1920. The role thatwomen played in the war

•

their work and to their more traditional roles in the

• Examine,;s hintlt is very easy wíth the s€cond essay questíon at the bottcm to be too \i~Úe br

general in your ansvvec The probíern with soci:al, politltaf and econornk effects is that it is hard'to makesweeping generaliz9~ions; theyvaried from country to tóuntryand riot ali were cau?ed by the: waronly. Yoúthúsneed to ensure tha.t y6ü gi\ie ve!)!

he causes of World War II are complex, and so we have divided the key themes into two

hapters. In this chapter we will look at the failure of collective security in preventing the outbreak of war, along with the impact of the Great Depression in Europe in the l 930s.

In the next chapterwe will look more specifically at Hitler's policies as a cause of war, and

the European powers responded to the threat that Nazi posed to

!

e faUure of 'ccllective security'e have seen, one ofWilson's Fourteen Points Ied to the creation of the League of911s, an otganizatior1 that sought to prevent another war breaking out between states.

he Lea~eoft¡a[~~n$Covenant] to the conventionai r, _which 'Wi~f1I'!!f4Sfºn¡V-inced, had been sustained by force. This had created a Srace .·~f;iC(Jl,f,tivities abroad. Now military power and expansionism

were. · ',~n;'l1/hich 'world pubfic opinion' rather than alliances

repla._ceq§)

a11enges. Altlíougliit was success w()rk colléctl:y~lythfough tJ:i~·

~¡.·

CAUSES OF WORLD WAR 11 IN EUROPE: THE FAILURE OF OOLLEOTIVE SECURITY '

Collective security and the League ot NatíonsThe principle of eollective security was theidea thatpeace could be presetved by countties acting tQgether- c-0llectively- to prevent one country attacki11g am:ither. Collectivesecµ(was to be made practkally possíble by the machínery of the Leagúe of Natiens, When there ·.was a dispute between cmmt;ries theywaµld refer the iSsue(s) to the League's

The Covenant of the League of NationsThe League met for the firsttime in Geneva in December 1920. Its key objective was to keep the peace and avoid roture conftict by advising on and settlíng international disputes. It also aímed to premote disarmarnent, supervise the mªndated territeries ªnd pr:om.ote international good will and soeperation thtough.its varíens otganizaüons

"

soci\tl and ecenomic.develepment, 'Ihe initial membershipstates.and 12 neutral states; however, by 1926 all ex-enemj'

ef'the League was 32 Alliedstates had jeined, The USSR

amendments made in 1924),which prescribed when and how the League was to • Artklesl~7 were concemed

withthememhershipAssembly, Council and Secretaríat,

and orgariization oftheLeague,

ofwa•• Artitles 1s~21 concerned treaty obligations and the League's e}t}'ectations of itll

memberstates,

Arüde 22 eoneemed the mandated térritoríes,Attide ~3 cencemed humanítarían issues such as labour conditions,the trafficking ofwornen. chíldren and dn1gs, health Issues and the affu¡¡ tra(ie,Artide 24 eoncerned the cornmissions,

••

•••

Deafing with international disputeslt was set clownin the Covenant that member states should refer theit disputes to one of followin ....

••

The JtistiArbittation (having a neutral pers.on or group of people listi;ning to and judging adispute)•

Ifmember states failed to refer their dispute to the League, or failed to follow itsrecommendations, the League could then impose economic si'j.nctions., the maintool for the League against aggtess<lts. In the aftetmath ofWotld War I, in whkh the econoi:uic blockade of GermanY had been effective, this economk weapon appe(lred to have the potential to be effective in fo.rdng compliance with füe Lea.gu.~'s decisions.

In theory, the League could call for milita:ry áction as a last resótt a.gainstan aggressot. Yet the Le~e did .not have it.s own armed forces, and in. re.Uity memberstates <lid no~ wantto put theit sovereign forces under international .con.trol. In addition, the