/CACN11VI111CCCCCAXX

c,B

ulgariaA

lexander Kornezov*

I. Nature

andscope

oftherights

protected

Qi.A

rethere

anyrem

aining(potential

oractual)

gapsin

thesu

bstantive

scopeand

levelof

protectionof

fundamental

rights?A

ndcan

(potential)gaps

inone

fundamental

rightssource

befilled

byl

referenceto

otherfundam

entalrights

sources?Itis

possibleto

identifytw

ogroups

offundamental rights

whose

scopeand!

.orlevel

ofprotectionvaries

accordingto

theirsource.

The

rightsclassified

inthe

firstgrouphave

aw

iderscope

underthe

Bulgarian

Constitution

thanunder

theC

harteror

theE

CH

R(P

artA).

The

rightsclassified

inthe

secondgroup

enjoya

wider

scopeor

levelof

protectionunder

theC

harteror

theE

CH

Rthan

underthe

Constitution

(Part

B).

After

identifyingthe

result

inggaps,

theanalysis

thendraw

sa

number

ofconclusions

(Part

C),

with

.regards,

first,tothe

fundamental

rightsw

hichshould

beconsidered

aspart

ofBulgaria’s

constitutional identity(P

artC

,point1);second,

tothe

problems

rw

hichm

aypotentially

arisefrom

theresulting

gaps(P

artC

,points2

and3);

andthird,

tothe

possiblew

aysoffilling

inthe

gaps(P

artC

, points4

and5).

A.

Fundam

ental

rights

whose

scopeis

wid

erunder

the

Bulg

arianC

onstitution1.

Anum

berofsocial

rightsguaranteed

bythe

Bulgarian

Constitution

generallyhave

aw

iderscope

thanthose

underthe

Charter.

Thus,for

example:

—by

virtueof

article48,paragraph

5ofthe

Constitution,

workers

andem

ployeesshall

beentitled,

inparticular,

toa

guaran

teedm

inimum

pay.T

heright

toa

guaranteedm

inimum

payis

notenshrined

inthe

Charter

(seearticle

31);

•D

r.A

lexanderK

ornezovL

L.M

.(B

ruges)w

orksas

Legal

Secretary

atthe

Court

ofk

V

Justiceofthe

European

Union.

Foundingm

ember

andm

ember

ofM

anagement

Board

oftheB

ulgarianA

ssociationfor

European

Law.

Editor

inchiefofthe

(Bul

garian)E

uropeanLaw

Review

.TeachesEU

lawat

theU

niversityof

Nationai

andW

orldEconom

y(Sofia).The

views

expressedin

thissubm

issionare

strictlypersonal.

260B

ulg

ariaB

ug:ria

2h

—under

article52,

paragraphl

ofthe

Constitution

theright

tohealth

careis

definedas

theright

to“affordable

med

icicare”,

andeven

to“free

medical

carein

accordancew

ithconditions

andprocedures

establishedbylaw

”.m

esubstantive

scoprofthis

rightis

thereforew

iderthan

theright

tohealth

carerecognized

byarLicie

35of

theC

harter;—

similarly,

accordingto

Article

47,paragraph2

ofthe

Connnnon

mothers

havethe

rightto

“prenatalandpostnatal

leave,jre:obstet

nccare,alleviated

working

conditionsand

cthersocial

aSSISance°;

—the

rightto

educationhas

aw

iderscope

.inderartici

oftheB

nigarianC

onstitu

tion.

itguarantees

notonly

freeprim

aryand

secondaryeducation

instate

andm

unicipalschools

(simi

larlyto

article14

ofthe

Charter),

butalsofree

highereaucation

accordingto

theconditions

laiddow

nby

law.

inadditior.,

theestablishm

entsofhigher

educationhave

theco

nstitu

tion

rightto

academic

autonomy.

2.T

heright

toa

fairtrial

hasone

specificdim

ensionunder

Buig.nan

constitu

tional

law,

According

toarticle

31,parag

raph

2of

theC

onstitution,no

oneshall

beconvicted

solelyby

virtueof

hisor

herconfession.

B.F

undamental

rightsw

hosescope

isw

iderunder

theC

harter/EC

I-IR1.

The

scopeof

theprohibition

ofdiscrim

inationunder

theB

ulgariuC

onstitutionseem

snarrow

erin

comparison

with

theC

hartersi.r

theE

CH

R.

Inparticular,

language,age

andsexual

orientaticHue

notlisted

among

thegrounds

onw

hichdiscrim

inationis

prohibited

(Article

6,paragraph

2of

theC

onstitution).T

heB

ulg

aiaiC

onstitutionalC

ourthas

heldthat

theaforem

entionedarticle

co

tainsan

exhaustivelist

ofall

thegrounds

onw

hichdiscrim

inatioiis

prohibited.’B

ycontrast,

Article

21ofthe

Charter

refersexpressi

tothe

abovementioned

threegrounds

ofdiscrim

ination.A

rticleE

CH

Rdoes

notm

entionage

andsexual

orientationbut

prohibiLs

“discrimination

onany

groundsuch

as..

.“.In

addition,age

andsex

ualorientation

arem

entionedin

Article

1of

Protocol

No

12of

theE

CH

R.

2

1Judgm

entN

o.I

from1

Feb

ruary

1993, caseN

o.23/92;

judgm

ent

No.

Ifrom

16January

1997case

No. 27/96;judgm

entN

o.1

from27

January2005,case

No.

8/2004.2

Bulgaria

isnot

asignatory

toP

rotocolNo

12E

CH

R.

Itis

notclear

whether

thedrafters

oftheC

onstitutioniru

entio

nally

excludedthe

aforementioned

threegrounds

ofdiscrimination.

The

lawon

protectionagainst

discrimination,

which

was

adoptedseveral

yearsafter

that,contains

alonger

listotprohibited

grounasof

discrimination,w

hichcontains,

inprticu

la:,agc

andse

xualoh

enttscjn

asw

ellas

allother

groundsrecognized

byin

ternatio

nal

treatiesto

which

Bulgaria

issig

nato

r3

Ina

recentJudgm

enthow

everLire

Constitutional

Court

refcredto

tnegero

catprinciple

otequality

inorder

tofillin

[heresulting

gap

.4

2.T

hefreedom

ofassem

blyand

as8or

may

beseen,

atleast

inune

case,as

more

restrictedunder

theC

onstitutionthan

underthe

EC

HR

.T

heform

erstipulates,

inA

rticle11,p

anag

rah4,that

“thereshall

beno

politicalparties

onethnic,

raca!or

religicuslines,..

This

prohibitionm

ayor

may

notw

ithstandthe

judicialcontrol

exer

.csedby

theE

CH

Rin

relationto

Article

11E

CFIR

,inpas

ticularw

ithrogard

tothe

testof

proportionality.T

hesam

eapplies

inrelation

toA

stides12

and52,paragraph

1ofthe

Charter.

3.T

heright

offree

movem

entalso

hasa

differentsubstantive

scope.U

nderarticle

35,paragraph1,of

theC

onstitntioneveryone

shallbe

freeto

choosea

placeof

residenceand

shallhave

theright

tofree

domofniovem

entin

theterritory

ofthecountry,

asw

ellas

theright

toleave

thecountry.

How

ever,this

rightcan

berestricted

bylaw

“inthe

name

ofnational

security,public

health,and

therights

andfreedom

sofother

citizens”.In

comparison,

underE

Ulaw

thefree

movem

entofEuropean

citizenscan

onlybe

restrictedon

groundsof

publicsecurity,

publicpolicy

orpublic

health

.6

Itcould

thereforebe

arguedthat

thescope

ofthisrightis

wider

underE

Ulaw

thanunder

thenational

Constitution,

inso

faras

underthe

latterthe

rightsand

freedoms

ofothercitizens

canbe

asufficientground

fordenying

theright

offreem

ovement.

Article

4,paragraph1

ofthelaw

.Judgm

entNo

11from

5O

ctober2010,case

13/2010.The

Constitutional

Courthas

alreadydeclared

anticonstitutionalone

politicalparty

(“OM

O-Ilinden”-P

IRIN

,judgment

No

1from

29F

ebruary2000,

caseN

o3/99)

andhas

rejectedanother

motion

toapply

Article

11,paragraph4

oftheC

onstitution(this

caseconcerned

theM

ovement

forR

ightsand

Freedom

s,see

judgment

No

4from

21A

pril1992,case

No

1/91).It

remains

tobe

seenw

hetherthis

traditionalapproach

tothe

possiblerestriction

of

thefreedom

ofmovem

entunder

EU

laww

ouldrem

ainvalid

inthe

lightofA

rticle52,

paragraph1

oftheC

harter.

1

262B

ulgaria

4.The

righttu

marriage

islim

ited,under

article46, paragraph

i,ofthe

Consthudcn,

tothe

voluntaryunion

between

am

anan

da

wom

an.

Article

12liH

Ras w

omen

na

s;milar

way. By

contrast,the

righttom

arriageconterred

byarticle

9of the

Charter

isnot

hmitea

tom

arriages

between

individualsof the

oopositesex

andalso

encompasses,

unlikem

eC

jnsr:tu:ion,other

forms

of foundng

afam

ily.’5.

There

area

number

offundam

entalrights

chathave

oeenco

on

cratedin

thenarte

rand/or

theE

CH

Rbu

which

arenot par;

ortL

Bulgarian

Constitution.

‘Iheseare,

orexam

ple:—

protectionof personal data.

itcan

bearg

ued

that

this

rightto

sonicex

tent

coveredby

the

right

topriv

atean

dfam

ilylife

unaexarticle

2201

toe

onstitu

lion;

laowever

mccc

two

rightsdo

u0t

necessarilyand

always

coincide;—

thew

orkers’right

toin

form

ation

and

conn.dtationw

ith:;

riin

dertak

hg

(Article

27of

theC

harter).N

osim

ilarright

canhr

foundin

riteC

onstitution;the

ri,eht tosoond

administration

(ar tide41

ofthe

Charter),

—die

rightof access

todocum

ents(article

42ofthe

Charter,.

This

isonly

toa

certainextent

coveredby

article41, paragraph

2of tue

Constituticu

whch

entitlescitizens

to“obtain

information

from;a

tebodies

andagencies

onany

matter

oflegitim

ateinteres:

tothem

which

iSnot

astate

orofficial

secretand

doesnot

affectthe

rightsofothers”.9

—rue

rightto

legmaid

(AricIe

47of

theC

harter,artacie

6,para

grap

h3,

letterc)

EC

HR

),i/ic

prin

ciple

of

pro

portio

nality

ofcrim

inalcjei:ces

crpen

alties(A

rticle49

oftheC

harter),as

well

asthe

rightnor

tobe

triedorpum

shec!tw

icein

criminalp

roceed

ings forthe

came

ci iminaloffence

(Article

50of

theC

harterand

rtacie

4of

Pro

toco

l No

7to

theE

CH

R).

L.

Colu

stiis

1.T

heouest;on

otw

hichconstrtutaonal

rightsshall

beconsidered

tobe

partof

aM

ember

State’sco

nstitu

tional

ket1

iyhas

noclear

answer

inthe

academic

writings

orin

thecase

law.

Itcould

beargued

thatC

hapter1

ii-’undamental

principles”)and

Chapter

Ii(“F

nndamental

Rights

andO

bligationsof

Citizens”)

ofthe

Constitution

shouldbe

regardedas

being

ce

PaLiC

, point5

below.

Seefor exam

plejudgm

ent oftheC

onstitutional CourtN

oI from

1996, caseN

c.7/96.

Bulgaria

263

panof

Bulgarian

constitutionalid

entity

.9

This

isa

tatherlarge

approachto

thestotion

of“constitutional

identity”since,

ifit

were

tobe

accepted,it

would

covervirtually

allprinciples

andfundam

enairights

enshrinedin

theC

onst:tution.O

nepossible

consequenceof

suchan

interpretationw

ouldbe

that certaincontentious

constitutionalprovisions,

suchas

theprohibition

ofsam

esex

marriages,m

aybe

consideredas

partofthecountry’s

constitutionalidentity. T

hesam

em

ayapply

tothe

varioussocial rights

enshrinedtherein.

Itcould

alsobe

arguedthat

Bulgaria’s

legalorder

hasa

certainnum

bet of unwritten

principlesw

hichunderline

itsconstitutional

identity.O

nesuch

example

isthe

obligatoryuse

oftheC

yrillicalphabet

inofficial

doorsirients

andin

publicplaces. T

hism

aygive

riseto

certainproblem

srelated

tothe

(obligatory)transcription

inC

yrillicof

names

of individualsfrom

otherM

embea

Statesw

hoenjoy

certainrights

asE

uropeancitizens:

namely

theright

offree

movem

ent.T

hefull

andeffective

exerciseofthis

rightm

aybe

hindered,iii

certaincircum

stances,if

undernational

lawhis

orher

name

cannotbe

transcribedin

thesam

ew

ayas

itappears

inhis

orher

Mem

berState

oforigin.‘TheC

ourt’scase

lawhas

alreadyaddressed

similar

issues,for’

example

inthe

recentR

unevidcase’°.

2.T

hecom

parativeanalysis

carriedout

aboveshow

sthat

thereare

notruly

“unique”fundam

entalrightsunder

theB

ulgarianC

onstitutionboth

theC

harterand

theEC

I-IRrecognize

thesam

eor

verysim

ilarfundam

entalrights.

Still,it

couldbe

arguedthat

thesubstantive

scopeof

alim

itedcat

egoryof

fundam

ental

rightsguaranteed

under

tLe

Constitu

tion

isw

ider(Part

Aabove).

Inthis

regard,it

shouldbe

keptin

mind

thataccording

toartide

53ofthe

Charter

thelatter

shallnotbeinterpreted

ina

way

thatwould

limitor

restricttherights

guaranteedunder

thenational

constitutionsof the

Mem

berStates.

How

ever,a

pote

ntia

lconflic

tcannot

beexcluded,

inpar-

ticularas

faras

theconstitutionally

recognizedsocial

rightsare

concernedw

hosescope

isperceived

aspoientiaily

wider.

Sucha

conflictcould

resultin

casesw

herethese

rightshave

tobe

balancedagainstother

fundamental

rightsofparticular

importance

underE

Ulaw

,such

asthe

rightto

freem

ovement.

Suchconflicts

remain

however,

forthe

time

being,hypothetical,

giventhat

thecountry

hasnot

sofar

experiencedan

influxofm

igrantworkers.

3. As

faras

thesecond

groupof fundam

entalrights

areconcerned

(Part

B),it isgenerally

consideredthattheir

potentiallylarger

scopeunder

EU

law

This

viewis

supported,although

indifferent

terms,

inthe

caselaw

ofthe

Constitutional C

ourt—

see,forexam

ple,judgment N

o4

from21

April

1992,caseN

o1/91, Section

I, point3).10

Case

C-391/09.

‘1*

264B

ulgariaB

ulgariaw

ouldnot,

asa

whoie, lead

ccproU

lems

of alarge

scale.Still,

certainobec

tionsgaiu

stir

iieg

thelevel of protection

resutL

gfrom

EU

lawm

ayarise

insom

especIfic

casesw

herethe

possibilityfat

publicauthoritie2

toact

inthe

pualic.interest

is,as

aresuti,

restricted.O

nesuch

exampte

stems

fromthe

prohibitionnf discrim

inationon

groundsof

ethnicorigin.

While

thistype

ofJiscrim

inahonis

alsoprohibited

underthe

Cciistitucion

an

therelevant legislative

acts,it

isgeflerally

perceivedthai

thelevel

ofpro

te’tion

underE

Ulavr

may

behighei

thanunder

nationallaw

.B

yapplying

ELlaw

,ifl particular

theC

harterand

Directive

2000/43,’EC

, thisspecilic

gro

uw

ofdiscrim

inationcould

forexam

pleprevent

publicauthorities

andprivate

com

panie

sfro

mta

kin

gth

enecessary

measure

sagain

st

the

abusiv

euse

of

the

nationalelectrical

grinor

ofother

utilitieSby

theresinents

of some

depi ivecneighbourhoods

where

them

ajorityof

thepopulation

belongsto

acertain

ethnicgroup

b)-limiiing

theaccess

tothe

respectivem

easurement

devices.”4.

The

comparative

analysisof

tuefundam

entalrrghts

protectedunder

theB

ulgarianC

onstitution, onthe

onehand, and

theC

harterand

theE

CR

,or.the

otherhand, show

sthatcertain

gapscannot be

excludedoutrtghL

These

gapscart

however

efihed

inseveral

way

.Firstly,

thefundam

entalrights

whicn

arepart

of theC

harter/EC

HR

butnot partof

theC

onstitution(P

anB,

point5), are

recogntzed, inone

way

oranother,

invat:ous

nationaLegzslat:ve

acts, whrc,

aithoughnot

constitutional innature, provide

forsim

ilarprotec

tion.T

hefa

ct

chartilese

rightsare

notpart

oftheoaiaiague

orconstitutiona’

rightsm

ayartect

the3udicial

controlexercised

bythe

Constitutional

Court.

Arguably,

tileratte-

may

notbe

ableto

exatnnew

hethera

national lawtrio

latesthese

rightssince

theyare

notin

theconstitutron.

Seco

niy

,som

egaps

cante

tilledby1efereace

toother fu

naain

ena.

rightsguara

nceed

bythe

Constitution

(eg.the

rightof

access

todocum

entscan

be,to

some

extent,covered

bythe

corutitutionalright

toobtain

info

rnaatioi;

ther:ght

toprotectIon

ofpersonaldata

canbe

partiallycovered

bythe

constitutionalright

of privateand

family

life).T

hirdly;‘:he

resultinggaps

may

alsobe

filledby

referenceto

therelevant

instruments

ofinternational

law. T

heC

onstitu

tknai

coartIc

competent

LO

reviewthe

compatibIlity

ofanational

14Ww

ithan

internationalagreem

entto

which

Bulgaria

issig

nato

ry.

12

The

Constitutional

courtha

beenasked,

onthis

basis,to

ruleon

variousoccasions

onm

ecom

patibilityof a

nationallaw

with

theE

CH

R.

Therefore,

aslong

asa

givenfundam

entalright

is

“Such

acase

ispresently

pendingbefore

theEC,’

—case

C-394111, B

eiov.12

Article

149, paragraph1, point

4of the

Constitution.

enthrinedin

theE

CH

R,

theC

onstitutionalcourt

wril

ento

eit,no

matter

whether

thisright

hasbeen

recorJz

ed

bythe

ConstItution

ortiot.

Sincem

ostof

theresulting

gaps,how

ever,stern

fromthe

Charter,

andnot

theE

CH

P,

thisrecourse

canbe

of litheor

nooarticuiar

ise.It

would

thereforebe

important

tosee

whether

theC

onstitutionalcourt

isprepared

tore’iw

tuecom

patibilityofa

nationallaw

with

EU

lawand

declarethe

former

anti-constitutional,

ifii

breachesE

Ulaw

.‘ihe

Constitutional

aomt

hasnot

yettaken

aclear

standon

thism

atter.T

hisproblem

canhow

ever,in

certaincases,

besidestepped.

One

suchexam

pleis

theright

tointegrity

ofthe

personin

thefield

ofm

edicineand

biology.T

hisright

hasa

wider

reachunder

article3,

caragraph2

ofthe

Charter

incom

parisonw

itharticle

29, paragraph2

ofthe

Constitution.

Yet,

giventhat

Bulgaria

issignatory

tothe

Convention

ofH

uman

Rights

andB

iomedicine,

adoptedby

theC

ouncilof

Europe

which

providesfat

verysim

ilarprotection

tothat

oftheC

harter;the

substantivescope

ofthis

fun

damental

rightshould

bedeem

edto

beprotected

ina

identicalm

anner.the

same

appliesto

theinternational

Covenant

onE

conomic,

Socialand

Cultural

Rights

andInternational

Covenant

onC

iviland

Political

Rights

which

canbe

seenas

means

ofinterpretationofthe

relevantinternationally

recognizedfundam

entalrights.’3

5.It

cannotbe

ruledout

thatsom

eofthe

resultinggaps

may

bein

tentIonally

sought.If

that

isthe

case,the

gapsshould

berespected.

Such

appearsto

bethe

casew

iththe

rightto

marriage.

While

thenatio

nal

Constitution,

asw

ellas

theE

CI-IR

haverestricted

theright

tom

arriageto

mdividuals

ofihe

oppositesex,A

rticle9

oftheC

harteris

more

widely

andneutrally

worded.

How

ever,the

latterdoes

notseek

tofill

iirthis

particulargap,

giventhat

itexplicitly

refersback

tothe

nationallaw

sw

hichregulate

them

atter.This

shouldbe

interpretedas

meaning

thatthe

limitations

oftherightto

marriage

byvirtue

oftheB

ulgarianC

onstitutionrem

ainvalid

evenifthey

come

within

thescope

ofEU

law.

Inother

areas,the

same

fundamental

rightm

ayhave

adifferent

scope.depending

onw

hetheritcom

esunder

EU

lawor

riot,O

nepossible

example

couldbe

theright

tofree

movem

ent.If

itis

exercisedw

ithinthe

EU

,the

Charter

andthe

relevantprovisions

ofE

Ulaw

will

apply.if

itis

execisedoutside

ofthe

EU

,it

can,in

general,be

subjectedto

stricterrules

undernational

law.

See,for

example,Judgm

entN

o7

from4

April

1996ofthe

Constitutional

Court,

raseN

o1/1996.

ItII,

266

Bulgaria

Bu

lgaria

2r1

Q2.

Wh

atis

the

role

ofg

eneral

legalprn

cipies:

canth

eyfu

nctio

nas

sou

rcesof

fun

dam

ental

righisp

rotectio

n?

Itmay

notalw

aysbe

possibleto

drawa

clear linebetw

eengenerallegalp

rinciples

andfundam

entalrights

The

Bulgarian

Constitution

may

bethougnt

todraw

sucha

line:C

hapterI

isabout

“Fundam

entalprinciples”,

while

Chapter

11is

about“F

undamental

rightsand

obligationsof

thecitizens”.

Toa

certainextent

thisdistncuon

isconsistent

with

thesubstantive

con

tentof

thesetw

ochapters.

Acloser

lookhow

evershow

sthat

some

typicalfundam

entalrights,

suchas

theright

toproperty

andinheritence

(Article

17),asw

ellasthe

rightto

consumer

protection(A

rticle19,paragraph

2)are

includedin

Chapter

Iand

may

thereforebe

viewed

notas

rights,butalso

asprinciples.

Itmay

beargued

thattheE

UC

harteroffundam

entalrights

doesnot

make

aclear-cutdistinction

between

rightsand

principleseither.’4

The

caselaw

oftheC

onstitutionalcourt

shows

thatsom

efundam

entalconstitutional

principles,such

asthe

principlesoflegality

(Article

4),equal

ity(A

rticle6),

apublic

hearingand

audiaturet

alterapars,

asw

ellas

theprinciple

oftruth

(Article

121)are

oftenused

asm

eansofinterpretation

todefine

theactual

scopeand

levelof protection

ofagiven

fundamental

right.O

neexam

pleis

theprinciple

of non-discrimination

whose

scopeis

relativelynarrow

underthe

Constitution

giventhe

limited

number

ofgroundslisted

inA

rticle6, paragraph

2.In

onecase,

theC

onstitutionalC

ourtreferred

tothe

generalprincipleofequality

inorder

tofillin

theresulting

gap.’5

There

arealso

anum

berofim

portantprinciples,

mostly

of proceduralnature,

which

areenshrined

invarious

legislativeacts.

Exam

plesof these

arethe

principlesof

fairness’

6,of

soundad

min

istration’

7,of

pro

portio

nality

18,

ofdeciding

acase

within

areasonable

time’

9,of

transaprencyand

accessibility

20.

Tnese

principles,although

notconstitutional

inrank,

may

alsobe

usedas

atool

of interpretationof the

scopeand

therequired

levelof

protectionofcertain

fundamentalrights.

‘See

thereply

toQ

uestion8.

15Judgm

entNo

11from

5O

ctober2010,case

13/2010.16

Article

6(1)ofthe

Code

of administrative

procedure.‘

Article

6(1)ofthe

Code

ofadministrative

procedure.“

Articles

6(2)(5)and

10of the

Code

of administrative

procedure.“

Article

13ofthe

Code

ofcivilprocedureand

Article

11of the

Code

ofadministrative

procedure.26

Articjesi2

and13

oftheC

odeofadm

inistrativeprocedure.

II.H

orizo

nta

ffcct

axi

Coilsion

ofidghts

Q3.

To

wh

atex

tent

is‘h

orizo

ntal

effect’of

fundam

ental

rights

accepted

inth

eM

ember

States?

How

isth

ecase

lawof

the

EC1in

thisresp

ectreceiv

ed?

Thehorizontal

effectoffundamental

rightshas

beengenerally

wellreceived

inB

ulgariaboth

bythe

legislaturearid

theease

law.

Inparticular,

thereare

nosigns

ofnationalcourts

Jeingreluctant

toaccept

tne

caselaw

otthe

EC

Jin

thisrespect.

Q4,

How

do

Mem

ber

States

within

their

respectiv

eju

risdictio

ns

andEU

institu

tions

dealw

ithcaS

esof

the

collis;oriof

rights,bo

thas

regards?

a.cl1

ision

sbetw

eenclassic

rights(e.g.

no

n-d

iscijuiju

atton

asdfree

domofexpression

orreligion,etc.)

Bulgarian

constitutionallaw

makes

thetra

ditio

nal

distin

ction

between

absoluteand

relativehum

anrights.

Whilst

theform

ercannot

be

subject

torestrictions,

thelatter

can.E

xamples

ofrelative

human

rightsare

thefreedom

ofconscience,ofthoughtand

religion(A

rticle37),the

freedomof

expression(A

rticles39),

theright

toobtain

anddissem

inateinform

ation(A

rticle41).

The

Constitutional

courthas

explicitlyrefused

toestablish

ahierarchy

between

the

variousconstitutional

rightsand

hasconfirm

edth

atco

llisions

shouldbe

resolvedon

acase

bycase

basisby

balancingthe

rightsin

questio

n21.

For

thepurposes

ofbalancing

the

variousco

ncu

rrent

fundam

ental

rights,natio

nal

jurisd

iction

s,and

inparticu

larthe

Constitutional

Court,

without

givingpriority

toa

givencategory

ofrightsover

another,would

resolvethe

resultingcollision

byappiying

theprinciple

ofproportionality.2

2In

some

casesthe

collisionm

aybe

resolvedby

referringto

theresp

ective

constitutionalprovisions,some

ofwhich

explicitlyprovide

fora

number

ofexhaustively

enumerated

groundson

which

some

ofthe

relativehum

anrights

canbe

restricted—

forexam

plethe

freedomofconscience,ofthought

andreligion

(Article

37),thefreedom

ofexpression

(Articles

39),the

rightto

obtainand

disseminate

information

(Article

41),which

canbe

restricted,inter

alia,ifexercisedto

thedetrim

entofthe

“rightsand

obligationsofotner

JudgmentN

o7

from

4A

pril1996,

caseN

o1/1996.

22For

anexam

ple,seeJudgm

entNo

2from

31M

arch2011,case

No

2/2011.

26

Bulgaria

citizens”.T

hisconstruction

issufficiently

vagueto

allowa

largedegree

offiexibality

anda

caseby

caseapproach.

Incases

where

theC

onstitutionitself

doesnot

containan

exhaustivelist

ofpossible

groundsfor

restriction,

nationaljurisdictionsalso

referto

thegeneral

prohibitionof

abuseof

rights(A

rticle57

paragraph2

oftheC

onstitution)as

atO

Olfor

resolvingthe

resultingcollision.

The

caselaw

containsvarious

examples

where

thefreedom

ofreligion

hadto

bew

eighedagainst

theprinciple

ofequal

treatment

(e.g.religious

clothingincom

patiblew

ithschool

unifo

rms

23

).

Since

theprinciple

ofequal

treatment

implies

theprohibition

ofprivileges

forcertain

groupsof

thesociety

(inthis

case,the

privilegenot

tow

eara

schooluniform

),it

isgenerally

consideredthat

itsw

eightagainst

thefreedom

ofreligion

isbig

ger.B

alancingthe

freedomofexpression

againstthe

rightto

privacyor

tohum

andignity,

itis

normally

thelatter

which

will

prevail,unless

theper

sonin

questionis

publicand

therevealed

circumstances

havea

linkw

ithhis

publicstatu

re.24

The

caselaw

alsoshow

ssom

erecurrent

criteriaw

hichare

oftentaken

intoconsideration

forthe

purposesof

thebalancing

act—

forexam

plethe

voluntarynature

ofan

individual’saction

(heor

shehave

voluntarilychosen

tosign

upfor

acertain

educationalcurriculum

which

includesreligious

training);the

generalnature

ofa

discriminatory

beh

aviour

(itis

aimed

ata

specificgroup

ofpeople

assuch,

irrespectiveof

theperson’s

individualbehaviour)

—in

suchcases

theprohibition

ofdiscrim

ination

willprevail

overthe

freedomofexpression,

etc

.25

b.collisions

between

onthe

onehan

dclassic

rightsand

socio-economic

andcu

ltural

rightson

theother

(e.g.free

movem

entrights

andfre

edom

ofexjw

ession,religion)T

histype

ofhorizo

ntal

collisionw

illalso

beresolved

alongthe

linesexplained

above.It

shouldbe

addedthat

nationaljurisdictions

havenot

yet,at

thisstage,

hadto

dealw

ithbalancing

theright

of freem

ovement

ofcitizens

fromother

EU

Mem

berS

tatesagainst

otherfundam

entalrights

forthe

reasonsexplained

underQ

uestion1.T

hecase

lawhow

evercontains

aninteresting

example

with

regardto

thepossibility

torestrict

thefree

23See, for

example,D

ecisionN

o37

from27

july2007,case

No

65/2006,C

omm

issionforprotection

fromdiscrim

ination.24

judgment

No

7from

4A

pril1996

oftheC

onstitutionalCourt,case

No

1/1996.25

Decision

No

141from

20June

2008,case

No

40/2007,Com

mission

forprotection

fromdiscrim

ination;D

ecisionN

o211

from8

October

2008,case

No

8/2008,C

omm

issionforprotection

fromdiscrim

ination.

l3uIgaia2u9

movem

ento

f Bulgarian

citizens,i.e.

theirright

toleave

thecountry,

Pscases

wh

erethe

exerciseofthis

rightmay

affectth

erights

ofothercitizens.

Under

nationallaw

Bulgarian

citizensm

aybe

pro

hib

itedfrom

leavingthe

coun

tryif

theyhave

unpaid

substan

tialpublic

orp

riv

ate

debts

26

This

rule

was

challengedboth

beforethe

Constitutional

Court

aridthe

competent

adru

inistrativ

eco

urts.

Itw

asarg

ued

beforethe

Con

stitutio

nal

Co

urt

that

this

ruleaim

edat

protectingthe

creditor’srights.

Article

35oftire

Constitution

allows

therestrictio

nof

thefreedom

of movem

entif

itis

eAercisea

tothe

detrim

ent

ofthe

rightsand

freedoms

ofoth

ercitizens.

The

Constitu

tional

Co

urt

hadth

us

tobalance

thed

ebto

rsright

ton

eem

ovement

againstthe

creditor’sright

torecover

hism

oney.It

heldth

atin

thecase

of nonpaym

entof

publicdebts,

thecitizens’

constitutionalrights

tosocial

securitybenefits,

education,m

edicalinsurance,

etc.are

atstake.

inthe

caseofnon

payment

ofprivate

debt,at

stakeis

thecreditor’s

rightto

property.It

concluded,in

both

cases,th

atthese

constitu

tion

alrig

hts

arew

orth

yof

pro

tection

and

acceptedthat

thefreedom

ofm

ovementm

aybe

restrictedin

orderto

protectthem

.A

tthe

end,the

challengedlegal

provisionw

asheld

tobe

inco

mpat

iblew

ithth

eC

on

stitutio

nn

ot

becauseth

eabove

men

tion

edrig

hts

were

incapableofrestricting

thefreedom

ofm

ovement

butbecause

theresulting

restrictionw

asdisp

ropo

rtionate.

27

Inparallel,

thequestion

was

broughtto

theE

CJ

fora

prelim

inary

nil

ingby

anad

min

istrative

court.T

hekey

questionis

wheth

erunder

EU

lawfree

movem

entrights

canat

allbe

restrictedon

theground

thatthey

affectadversely

otherpeople’s

rightsand

freedoms.

Itshould

berem

indedth

atthe

freem

ovement

rightscan

berestricted

underE

Ulaw

onlyon

groundsof

publicorder,public

securityand

publichealth.

Inaddition,

purelyeconom

icreasons

cannotjustify

sucha

restriction

.28

While

AG

Mengozzi

hassu

ggested

thatthenotion

of“public

order”m

ayin

exceptionalcircumstances

beconstrued

ascovering

thepaym

ent ofapublic

debt(since

thetaxes

collectedby

theState

may

servenot

onlya

purelyeconom

icgoal),this

may

notbethe

caseofa

privated

eb

t.29

The

caseis

stillpendingbefore

theEC

J.T

hereis

anim

portan

tco

ncep

tual

differen

cebetw

eenth

ew

aythe

Co

nstitu

tional

Cou

rtresolved

thecollision

andth

ew

aythe

EC

J

26A

rticles75,paragraphs

5and

6ofthe

Law

onthe

Bulgarian

personal identificationdocum

ents.T

heam

ountofthepublic

debtisdeterm

inedatB

GN

3000(approx.

EU

R2500),w

hilethe

amountofthe

privatedebtis

definedsim

plyas

“substantial”.27

JudgmentN

o2

from31

March

2011,caseN

o2/2011.

28See,

forexam

ple,Article

27ofD

irective2004/38.

29O

pinionofA

GM

engozziof6Septem

ber2011,

C-434/10.

27(1B

lgara

Bulgaria

171

traditionallydoes.

While

thelatter

israther

reluctant toadm

itrestrictions

tothe

freem

ovement1ig

hts

atall

and,if it

does,itconstructs

themas

excep

tjOiS

tothe

rulew

hichit

theninterprets

ina

particularlystrict

tnanner,the

Constitutional

Court

hadno

conceptualproblem

sto

admit

aw

idearray

ofpossiblerestrictions.

While

theform

eris

preparedto

allowoniy

restric

tionsintim

atelyiinked

topublic

order,public

securityand

publichealth,

thelatter

allows

practicallyany

sortof

fundamental

rightas

apossible

counterbalanceto

thefree

movem

entrights.

This

means,

inthe

particular

casein

uestio

n,

thatthe

Constitutional

Court

isprepared

tobalance

the

freem

ovement

right;,on

me

onehand,

andthe

affectedconcurrent

rights,

suchas

theright

toproperty,

therIght

tosocial

securitym

edicalcare.

etc.

(irrespectiveof w

hetherthey

areof purely

economic

natureor

not),on

the

otherhand,

relying,for

thepurposes

of thenalancing

act,on

theprinc:pie

of prcportionaiity.O

nthe

cortraryaccording

toA

GM

engozzi,the

above

mcntioned

concurrentrights

would

quaiifyas

possiblejustifications

forthe

resultingrestriction

of theright

tofree

movem

entonly

inexceptional

cir

cumstances

andonly

iftheycan

beassociated

with

“publicorder”.

c.collisions

between

room-econom

ican

dcu1trra1

rights

iiiterse

(e.g.rig

ht

tostrike

andfree

movem

ent)?N

attonalcourts

haveyet

toelaborate

onthe

possiblesolutions

ofcollisions

between

socio

-eccr

1om

ic

andcultural

rightsin

terSe.

Itcan

however

be

assumed

thatthey

will

relyon

thetraditional

way

courtshave

dealtw

ithcollision

issues,nam

elyby

balancingthe

concurrentrights

aridby

applyingthe

principleof proportionality,

asw

ellas

theprohibition

ofabuseofrights.

Itis

interestingto

notethat

theright

tostrike

isenshrined

inA

rticle

Oor

theC

cristttuticn.U

nl:keother

constitutionallyrecognized

rlgnis,

thecm

nst:tutioEdoes

notexpltcrtiy

providefor

restrrctsonsto

therlgnt

tostrike

—the

constitutionaltext

simply

statesthat

“workers

andem

ployees

shallhave

theright

tostrike

indefence

oftheir

coilectiveeconom

icand

socialinterests”

andthat

thisright

“shallbe

exercisedin

accordancew

rthO

Ofld

it;OflS

andprocedures

establishedby

lawT

heC

onsttu

tionai

Court

hashow

everheld

thisdoes

notm

eanthat

theright

tostrike

cannotbe

subjectto

restrictions.In

particular;it

hasreferred

tothe

prohibitionof

abuseofright

inorder

tojustify

thecom

patibilityw

iththe

Constitution

of

anational

lawdenying

theright

tostrike

ofa

number

of professions,such

as,am

ongothers,

thoserelated

tothe

distributionand

supplyof

energy.

thesector

ofcom

munications,

ofm

edicalcare,

etc

.3°

Itdid

nothow

ever

examine

whether

theresulting

prohibitionto

strikein

t120abovem

entionedeconom

icsectors

was

proportionateto

thepursued

objectiv

e.3

1T

hiscould

mean

thatthe

levelofprotection

under

(heC

onstitt;o

1im

aybe

lower

thaiithatguaranteed

byA

rticle28

of theC

harterand

Article

11E

CH

R.

32

Q5.

How

does,

orsh

ould

,th

eb

alancin

gtak

eplace

inth

eco

ntex

tof

the

multip

licityof

EU,

EC

HR

and

natio

nal

legalo

rders

Q’rnulti!evei’

legalorder)?

Itis

submitted

thatthe

fundamental

rightsenshrined

inthe

EC

I-iRshould

beperceived

asa

minim

umstandard

ofprotection.

This

isconrirm

ed,in

particular,by

Article

52,paragraph3

ofthe

Chartei

accordingto

which

them

eaningan

dscope

oftherights

enshrinedin

theC

harterw

hichcorrespond

torights

guaranteedby

theE

CH

Rshall

bethe

same

asthose

laiddow

nby

thesaid

Convention.T

hisarticle

goeson

tosay

thatU

nionlaw

may

however

providem

oreextensive

protection.T

henext

levelofprotection

(insubstantive

terms)

isthe

Charter,

sub

jectto

itsfield

ofapplication

(Article

51).It

containsrights

which

arenot

protectedunder

theE

CH

R.

The

substantivescope

ofcertaincorresponding

rightsis

alsow

iderunder

theC

harterthan

theE

CH

R.

The

lastlevelofprotection

(insubstantive

terms)

may

incertain

casesbe

thenational

Constitutions

orbills

ofrightsof

theM

ember

States,iii

sofar

asthe

Charter

shallnot

beinterpreted

asrestricting

oradversely

affecting

therights

recognizedby

nationalC

onstitutions(A

rticle53).

Therefore,

inprinciple,

itshould

bepossible

fornational

Constitutions

toprovide

alonger

listofrights

worthy

ofprotectionor

ahigher

levelofprotection

ofthe

correspondingrights

thanthat

ofthe

Charter.

aSee

thedissen

ting

opin

ion

ofjudge

T.T

odorovw

hoargues

that

while

theC

onstitutionm

aybe

interpretedas

permitting

certainrestrictions

tothe

rightto

strike,itdoesnotperm

itthe

denialofthisright.

He

furthersubm

itsthatthe

rightto

strikecan

takevarious

forms

andthat notallof them

imply

theeffective

interruptionof

allof

therespective

services.In

otherterm

s,he

implicitly

suggeststhat

ifthe

principleofproportionality

hadbeen

applied,the

prohibitionto

strikeatissue

would

nothavepassed

thetest.

32U

nderA

rticle11,paragraph

2E

CH

R,

Statesm

ayim

poseiaw

fui“restrictions”

onthe

exerciseof the

rightsconferred

bythis

article“by

mem

bersofthe

armed

forces,of

thepolice

orofthe

administration

ofthe

State”.T

heE

xplanationsrelating

tothe

Charter

ofFundam

entalR

ights(2007/C

303/02)also

mention

that“the

modahties

andlim

its”forthe

exerciseofcollective

action,including

strikeaction,

come

undernationallaw

sand

practices.

Judgment N

o14

from24

September

1996, caseN

o15/96.

272B

Ulgaria

Bulgaria

27

The

abovestructure

may

however

proveto

bedifficult

toim

plement in

practice.especially

incases

ofa

horizontalcollision

offundam

entalrights

where

thelevels

of protectionof

theconcurring

rightsis

differentat

oneof

theabovem

entionedlevels. Such

adifference

may

seriouslyaffect the

balance

between

theserights

andm

aythus

changethe

outcome

ofthe

coilision.It

issubm

ittedthat

insuch

casesit

may

Sem

oreappropriate

toleave

thefinal

balancingact

tothe

nationaljudge

ratherthan

theE

CJ.

Finding

theb

al

ancebetw

eencolliding

rightsoften

comes

down

toapplying,

inone

formor

another,the

principleof

pro

portio

nality

.T

heE

CJ

hasa

longstan

din

gp

rac

ticeofleaving

theactua

applicationor

thisprinciple

totne

nationai judge.

Suchan

approachin

thearea

ofhorizontally

collidingfundam

entalrights

isparticularly

instifiedby

Article

6, paragraph3

TE

Uand

Article

53of

the

Chaiter

bothof

which

bestowparticular

importance

tothe

constitutional

traditionsof M

ember

statesin

thearea

of fundamental

rights.L

eavingthe

finalbalancing

actto

thenational

judgew

ouldthus

allowthe

aforem

en

honedconstitutional

traditionsto

beduly

takeninto

consideration.

Q6.

Wh

atro

ed

oes

the

legislatu

reh

ave

ingran

ting

horiz

on

taleffect

tofu9darnental

rights?W

hat

isits

role

ino

rderin

gan

d

prioritizingrights

wh

ichm

igh

tcoH

ide?In

particular,w

hatis

the

inf!u

ence

ofth

en

on

-discrim

inaU

on

Directiv

eson

the

exercise

of

oth

erfu

ndam

ental

rightsin

the

Mem

ber

States?

ism

eznioncdabcve,

thehorizontal

effectof

fundamental

rightshasr1o

t

raisedspecific

conceptualproblem

sneither

inthe

caselaw

norin

theleg

tsiatve

process.T

.elegislature

hasso

tarabstained

fromordering

or

prioritizingrlgnts

wisich

may

collide.N

onetheless,tne

influenceor

the

non-d

iscrimin

ation

directiveshas

beenfar-reaching.

Inparticular,

theP

aniament

passeda

speciallaw

onnon-discrim

inationw

hichprovides,

inte

rcilia, for

aspecific

quasi-jurisdictional proceoureto

deal with

discrim

inatIon

complaints.

Aspecialbody

was

createdto

thatend,the

Com

mission

faiprotection

trornm

scrtmination.

sa

result,the

controlover

thep

ractrcal

applicationor

tnenon-discrim

inationrules,

includingthe

horizontalapplication

thereofhas

intensifledover

thelast

severaiyears,

asillustrated

bythe

ever-increasingcase

lawof

theC

omm

ission.it

may

beargued

thatin

practical

terms,

asa

conseq

uen

ceof

the

non-d

iscrimin

ation

directiv

es,th

e

pro

tection

of

the

righ

tsbased

on

thep

rincip

leof

non-d

iscrimin

ation

has

beenp

rioritized

mco

mpariso

nw

itho

ther

fun

dam

ental

rights.

Iii.C

onsequencesof

theenify

iotnforce

oftie

Ei.C

harterof

Furidam

eiitaflights

Q7.

Isth

eC

harter

perceiv

edas

bein

ga

mere

000unuationand

con

solidationof

the

previous(i.e.

pro-Lisbon)

sources

ofEU

fundamental

rightsp

rotectio

n;

ord

oes

the

Ch

arterp

iov

ide

add

edw

otectio

n(or

rights)as

com

pared

tothe

pro-Lisbon

situation,if

one

looksat

the

caselaw

invarious

jurisdictionssince

itsen

tryinto

force?

The

Charter

shouldbe

perceived,ii:

theflrst placc,

asa

com

inuaio

.an

dconsolidation

ofthe

pre-Lisbon

sourcesof

EU

fundamental

rightspro

tection.S

incethese

sources—

includingthe

EC

HR

,the

constitutionaltraditions

andthe

internationalobligations

ofM

ember

States,the

Social

Charters

ofihe

Union

andthe

Council

ofEurope

andthe

jurisprudenceof

theEC

Jand

theE

CH

R—

alreadycover

asubstantial

partofthe

fundamen

talrights

enshrinedin

theC

harter,the

latterseem

sindeed

asa

tokenof

continuationand

consolidation.It

isof

coursepossible

toargne

that

certainrights

enshrinedin

theC

harterare

“new”.T

heseare

mostly

some

oftheso-called

secondand

thirdgeneration

rights(e.g.

thew

orkers’right

toinform

ationand

consultationw

ithinthe

undertaking,the

rightto

protectionin

caseof

unjustifiedd

ism

issal,the

rightto

socialsecurity,

socialassistance

and

healthcare,

theright

tothe

protectionor

personaldata,the

rightto

ahigh

levelof en

viro

nm

entalprotection,

theright

toconsum

erprotection,

theright

toasylum

,etc.).Y

et,thefact

isthat

theserights

alreadyenjoy

protectionunder

variousE

Ulegalinstrum

ents,buthad

hithertonot

beenconsidered

asfundam

entalrights

inthe

contextofE

Ulaw

.T

hepre-L

isboncase

lawof

Bulgarian

courtscontains

onlysporadic

referencesto

theprotection

offundam

entalrights

underE

Ulaw

.T

hisis

explained,on

theone

hand,by

thedifficulty

toidentify

theexact

EU

sourceofsuch

rightsand,

onthe

otherhand,

bythe

well established

practiceto

referto

otherinternational

instruments,

suchas

theE

CH

R.

Apre-

andpost-L

isbon

comparison

ofthelevel

andscope

ofprotection

offundam

entalrighLs

underE

Ulaw

inthe

caselaw

ofBulgarian

courtscannot

thereforebe

conclusive.

Thecase

lawpost-L

isbonhow

everindicates

thatthe

Charter

hasquickly

takenplace

asa

primary

sourceof

fundamental

rightprotectionfor

matters

coming

within

thescope

ofEU

law.

Litigants

would

nowoften

referin

theirclaim

sto

theC

harterand

nationaljurisdictions

havealready

made

several

274B

ulg

aiaB

ulg

ara

referencesfor

tothe

ECJ

onthis

matte

r33

Theapparent

changein

thecase

law

canbe

explainedby

theincreased

visibilityoffundam

entalrights

protection

underE

Ulaw

asa

resultofthe

entryinto

forceofthe

Lisbon

Treaty.

Q8.

Has

the

distin

ction

mad

en

the

Ch

arter,especiaH

yin

tsoffi

cialE

xp

lanatio

ns

ReiaU

ngto

the

Ch

arterof

Fundam

ental

Rights

(Oi

2007/C3

03

IO),

betw

eeii;ghts

and

rreeoo

ms’

and‘p

riiciples

been

reflectedin

ttepractice

ofco

urts

and

legislatu

resn

the

respectiv

eju

risdictio

ns

1as

well

asin

the

do

ctrine?

The

distin

ction

mane

inthe

Charter

between

principlesand

‘rightsand

freedoms”

hasnot

sofar

beenreflected

inthe

caselaw

ofBulgarian

courts

orin

thedoctrine.

It ishow

eversubm

ittedthat

itm

ay, insom

ecases, be

dif

f1cu

itto

drawa

clear-cutdistinction

between

thetw

o.if

we

lookcloser

at

some

oftueso-called

socio-economic

rights,such

adistinction

may

prove

uneasy.Som

eof

theserights

arealready

labelledas

“hybrid”,i.e.

contain

ingboth

“righn”and

“principles”—

suchis

thecase

ofthe

rightto

social

securityand

socialassistance,

which,

accordingto

theE

xplanations,co

n

tainsboth

elements.

Others,w

hichare

normally

labelledas

“rights”, suchas

theright

tow

ork,com

eactually

veryclose

toa

“principle”,especially

when

itcom

esdow

nto

theirjusticiability.

Indeed,w

ithoutproper

implem

enta

tiontarough

legislativeor

executiveacts,

some

ofthesocio-econom

icrights

cannotgive

riseto

directciaim

sfor

positiveaction

bythe

Union’s

insti

tutionsor

Mem

berstares

authorities,in

otherterm

s,sndividuals

cannotdirectly

relyon

themas

partofa

lawsuitto

asserta

rightof access

orrequest

thecreation

ofbenefits

orservices.

Ifthese

socio-economic

rightsare

notenforceable

perse,

thecourts

shouldnonetheless

takethem

intoaccount

as“principles”,

particularlyw

henthey

haveto

interpretor

reviewthe

legalityof legislative

orexecutive

acts.T

heopposite

isalso

true.Som

e“principles”

actuallycom

every

closeto

a“right”.

Forinstance,

theintegration

of personsw

undisabilities

Article

26ofthe

Charter)

islabelled

inthe

Explanations

asa

“principle”,w

hichm

eansthat

itcannot

giverise

todirect

claims

forposi

tiveac.ion.

This

however

may

notalw

ayshold

true,at

leastunder

nationallaw

,w

het esuch

aclaim

(forinstance,

ensuringsonic

formof

accessto

apublic

buildingas

aprereq.Iisite

forthe

exerciseof the

person’sother

fu

r1da-

mental

rights)m

aynotbe

inadmissible.

C-394111,Belov;

C-249/I1, B

yankov;C

-27/ll, Vinkov; C-434/1O

, Aladzhov;C

-430/IG,

Gaydarov;C

-339110, Esiov.

IV.

Co

nscq

uen

esof

theaccsso

iiof

theW

inthe

EC

h

Q9.

Do

esEU

accession

toth

eE

CH

Roverall

add

toth

ep

rOtectio

n

offu

ndam

ental

rightsof

citizens;

does

ito

utw

eigh

thepro

cedural

com

plicatio

ns

tow

hich

itm

aygive

rise,for

instan

cew

hen

the

EU

isco

-responden

t,an

dm

ore

especially

when

aprior

involv

emen

t

ofth

eECJ

ina

casep

end

ing

atth

eE

CtH

Rw

ould

beco

me

possib

le?

Itissubm

ittedthat

EU

accessionto

theE

CIIR

is,beforeall,

asym

bolicges

tureof politicalw

ill.It w

ouldadd

verylittle,

ifanything,ta

thesubstantive

scopeof the

fundamental

rightsw

hichare

subjectto

protectionunder

EU

law,

especiallynow

afterthe

entryinto

forceof the

Lisbon

Treaty.

On

the

onehand,

theE

UC

harterof

Fundam

entalR

ightscontains

am

uchlonger

listof rights

worthy

of protectionthan

theEC

I-IR. A

sfar

asthe

rightsw

hich

come

underboth

instruments

areconcerned,

itis

clearthat

thesobstantive

scopeof

some

ofthem

isw

iderunder

theC

harterthan

underthe

EC

HR

.

The

EC

HR

cantherefore

beseen

asa

minim

umstandard

which

isalready

ensuredby

theC

harterw

hichhas

become

bindinglaw

.O

nthe

otherS

and,

longbefore

theL

isbonT

reaty,the

EC

Jhas

consistentlytaken

intoaccount

andobserved

boththe

EC

HR

andthe

caselaw

of theS

trasbourgcourt.

Itcannothow

everbe

excludedthat

incertain

areasof E

Ulaw

theacces

sionto

theE

CH

Rm

ayeventually

bringabout

significantchanges.

One

such

areais

ELIcom

petitionlaw

where

it hasbeen

arguedthatv

arious

basicp

rirci

piesand

notions,asw

ellasthe

systemitself,are

incompatible

with

theE

CH

R.

Withoutbeing

necessaryto

embark

onthis

endlessdebate,

itshouldbe

noted,

forthe

purposesofthis

paper,thatthis

viewis

notshared

byshe

author.T

heaccession

tothe

EC

HR

would

however

entaila

number

ofp

roce

duralcom

plications.O

bviously,one

ofthemis

thefear

thatthe

Strasbourg

courtw

illeventually

haveto

ruleupon

(indirectly)the

separationof

coin

petencesbetw

eenthe

Union

andits

Mem

berStates

which

isa

delicateissue

reservedexclusively

—and

itshould

remain

so—

forthe

EC

J.It

ssdilficult

toenvisage

asatisfactory

solutionto

thisproblem

.T

heautom

aticadd-up

ofthe

EU

asco-respondent

incases

where

therespondent

Mem

berState

hassupposedly

implem

entedor

appliedE

Ulaw

asa

possiblesolution

hasits

drawbacks.

Inthe

eventthe

Strasbourg

courtfin

ds

aviolation

ofthe

EC

HR

andcondem

nsboth

theE

Uand

theM

ember

State,it

would

supposedlydo

sow

ithoutsaying

—since

ithas

nocom

petencein

thatregard

—w

hether

theillegality

resultedfrom

theautonom

ousaction

ofthe

Mem

berState,

fromE

Ulaw

aloneor

froma

mixture

ofboth.

Incase

ofdisagreem

ent

between

theE

Uand

theM

ember

State—

which

may

affectthe

execution

276B

ulgariaB

ugaria

277

ofthe

Strasbourg

uag

emen

t—

howshould

thisbe

resolved?By

creatingyet

anotherspecific

procedurebefore

theEC

J?

Another

complication

stems

fromthe

errisageu

“preliminary

refer

encerrom

Strasboarg

toL

uxembourg

incases

where

thenJ

hadnot

had

me

opportunltyto

rJe

opor.m

evancitty

ofanact

of cueE

Lw

ithregaro

o

rundamentai

rights.T

huw

ouidunaoubtedly

placean

otn

eprocedural

our

denon

oothcourts,

wouid

causefurther

delaysand

would

raiseconcerns

aboutthe

effectivenature

cf theavailable

remedies

with

regad

,in

partica

lar,to

theirlim

espan.

Afurther

complication

may

arisofrom

thepossibility

of Mem

berStates

tosue

theE

Uin

Strasbourg

(Article

33E

CH

R).

Ifthis

isallow

ed,M

ember

Statesm

aydecide

totake

uptheir

casein

Strasbourg,

oncethey

havelost

inL

uxembourg.

This

may

applyto

bothactions

forannulm

entand

the

infringement

actions.Such

apossibility

may

createunw

antedtensions

insidethe

Union

andjeopardize

itsinstitutional

equilibrium.

Itis

tnereforesubm

ittedthat

theprocedural

complications

which

EU

accessionto

theE

CH

Rm

ayentail

outweigh

theresulting

hypothetical—

andm

arginal,if

atall

—strengthening

ofthe

protectionof

fundamental

rightsin

theEU

.

Q1O

.T

he

EC

tHR

Bosphorus

rulin

gex

empts

Mem

ber

State

action

covered

byEU

lawfrom

scrutinyon

the

rebuttab

leassu

mptio

nof

anoverall

confo

rmity

ofEU

measu

resw

iththe

EC

HR

?

—Is

this

‘double

standard

’of

review

of

Mem

ber

State

action.

dep

endin

gon

wheth

erit

isdeterm

ined

auto

nom

ously

or

onth

e

basisof

EUlaw

,justified

and

acceptab

leto

allM

ember

States?

—H

avenaio

nal

courts

followed

theB

osphorusruling

inth

eircase

laww

hen

parties

invokedth

eE

CH

R?

—D

oes

the

Bosphorus

pre

sum

ptio

nhav

eth

eoverall

effe

ct

ofsh

ifting

the

ultim

ateau

thority

concern

ing

the

questio

n

wheth

erE

CH

Rrig

hts

hav

ebeen

infrin

ged

fromS

trasbourg

to

Luxem

bourg?—

Will

the

Bospfrorus

presu

mptio

nbe

tenab

le,also

inlight

ofth

e

purp

oses

ofaccessio

nto

the

EC

HR

?

Tne

Bosphorus

jurisprudencehas

secureda

particularlyim

portant privilege

forE

Ulaw

inthat

it createsa

presumption

ofitsoverall conform

ityw

iththe

EC

HR

.D

espiteits

many

critics,one

shouldnot

light-heartedlydiscard

the

againstthe

signatoriesto

hcC

onvention.‘[he

judgment

inB

usphorusis

deeplyrooted

inthe

ideathat

therule

of lawand

theprutection

offu

nda

mental

rightsare

inherentIc

tueE

U,

anidea

whi,h

ishardiy

debatablein

itself.It is

however

alsotrue

thatthe

Bosphorus

presuinuionw

ascreated

to

alarge

extentdue

tcthe

factthat

atthat

time

theE

Uw

asnot

asignatory

to

theE

CH

R.

Upon

EU

accession,theB

osphorusjurisprudence

would

become

lesstenable,

us-hessit is

incorporated,in

onew

ayor

another, inthe

accession

agreementitself

We

haveno

information

ofB

ulgariancourts

havingrelien

uponthe

Bosphorus

presumption

incases

where

partieshave

invokedthe

EC

HR

.

V.T

hefu

ture

offundam

enialrights

protection,aiin

ua

andE

uropean,in

theEU

as“area

tffundam

ental‘ights”

Qil.

Isth

ein

terpretatio

nw

hich

the

ECJ

hasso

fargiven

ofth

egen

eralpro

visio

ns

on

the

scope

ofth

eC

harter,

itsrelatio

nto

natio

nal

constitu

tional

rights

and

hum

anrig

hts

treaties,an

don

restric

t

ingth

eex

erciseof

rights

(Title

VII

of

the

Charter)

looked

upon

favourably?

Itis

obviousthat

theauthors

of theC

harterhave

soughtto

putinto

place

specialprecautions

inorder

todefine

theboundaries

ofits

application

amidst

fearsof

apossible

extensionof

EU

competencea.

theresulting

text

ofA

rticle51

seems,

atfirst

sight,to

setclear

limits

tothe

applicationof

theC

harter.T

hoselim

itsshould,

ina

lotof

cases,be

easyto

comply

with.

Afurther

lookinto

theissue

however

revealsa

number

ofpotentialpro

b

lems,

acertain

“greyarea”

which

may

orm

aynot

fallw

ithinthe

scopeof

theC

harter.A

ccordingto

Article

51,paragraph

1,Mem

berStates

should

comply

with

theC

harter“only

when

theyare

impiernenting

Union

law”.

The

exactm

eaningof

thisproviso

may

causeuncertainties

when

itcom

es

toits

applicationin

practice.O

neexam

pleis

theclassical

scenarioof ad

opt

ingnational

measures

implem

entinga

Union

directive.T

hesem

easures

would

sometim

escontain

notonly

theprescriptions

following

fonc

the

directivebut

alsocom

plementary

provisionsw

hichthe

Mem

berState

has

takenautonom

ously,albeit

inthe

contextof

itsobligation

toim

plement

theE

Udirective.

Shouldthese

complem

entaryprovisions

beconsidered

as

“implem

enting”E

Ulaw

?A

notherexam

pleis

thesituation

where

EU

law

allows

forderogations

anda

Mem

berState

adoptsa

measure

which

falls

Bosphorus

jurisprudenceas

creatingdouble

standardsor

asdiscrim

inatoryw

ithinthe

scopeof

thederogation.

Should

sucha

measure

beconsidered

278B

uIg

araB

ugaria

as“im

plementing

EU

law”?

‘Letan

oth

erexam

plem

aybe

drawn

fromthe

principleof

effectivenessw

hichrequires

that

Mem

berS

tatestake

allneces

sarym

easuresto

ensuiethe

effectiveap

piicau

inof

EU

ia.

When

Mem

ber

Statesnripose,

torinstance,

criminal

sanctio

nsfo

rbreaches

of Eu

law, w

ith

outE

Ulaw

expresslyim

posin

gsuch

anobligation

uponM

ember

States,

arethey

“implem

entingU

nionlaw

”?T

hesequeries

exemplify

thepossible

uncertaintiessu

rraun

dg

theau

cno:nouscharacter

of thenational

meas

urein

question.T

heseuncertainties

couldm

akeelusive

thecontours

ofthe

areaotherw

iseexclusively

reservedfor

thenational

billsor

rights.

The

matters

which

remain

clearlyats

idof

thescope

of

EU

law,

and

therefo

reoutside

ofthe

scopeof

the

Charter,

inoth

erw

ords,outside

of

the“grey

area”,are

notsa

red

frompossible

controversieseither.

An

easy

answer

may

bethat

theM

ember

States’bills

of rightsrem

ainunaffected

and

thereforefuily

appIicableas

longas

them

atterfalls

nuislueE

Ulaw

.T

his

conciusson,alth

ough

itis

inprinciple

correct,is

howecer

tempered

byat

leastone

furth

erinterrogation.

Would

itb

eten

abte

atall

tom

aintaintw

o

parallelsystem

sof

hum

ans

rights

pro

tection,

onebased

onthe

natio

nal

constitutionfor

them

attersrem

ainingoutside

ofthe

scopeof

EU

law,

and

theother

basedon

theE

UC

harterfor

them

atterscom

ingw

ithinthe

scope

of EU

law?

While

sucha

distinctionis

intheory

possibleand

couldin

many

casesbe

appliedin

orderto

flndconcrete

solutions,it

ishsghiy

questio

nab

le

whether

itis

reasonableand

justifiableto

proceedthat

way

sincechis

would

raisequestions

aboutthe

very“fundam

ental”nature

of therespective

right.

Suchan

approachm

ayresult

intosecuring

adifferent

levelof protection

for

thesam

eright

dependingon

whether

itcom

esunder

EU

lawor

not. Am

ore

appropriatesolution

may

consistin

try

ing

toav

oid

conflictsbetw

eenthe

ro

when

e’erth

isis

ossth

ieH

owever,

incases

where

there

arem

atetia

differencesbetw

eenthe

two,

theproblem

sm

ayprove

difficultto

resolve.

Q12.

iSth

erea

gen

eraiEU

human

rights

com

peten

ce,or

sho

uld

there

be

such

com

rete

nce?

What

areth

eim

plicatio

ns

for

the

futu

reof

theE

CH

Rsvsterri

ofpro

tection

ofrights?

There

isnc

generalE

Uhum

anrtghrs

competence.

Article

51of

theC

harter

confirms

thatnational

authorities, when

theyact

outsidethe

scopeof

EU

law,

areact

bonndby

itsprovisions.

One

example

where

theE

CJ

drewthat

lir1e

anddeclined

togive

aprelim

inaryruling

preciselyon

thebasis

ofthe

limita

tionsplaced

uponthe

fieldof application

ofthe

Charter,

isthe

caseE

stov

34.

The

futu

reaccession

ofthe

EU

tothe

EC

HR

will

increasethe

impo

r

tanceof the

latterdue

tothe

judicialmechanism

thatw

illbeut

intoplace.

One

consequenceis

thatthe

provisionsand

thecase

lawof the

EC

tHR

will

nowappear

evenm

oreoften

inthe

caselaw

ofthe

ECJ

which

will

haveto

make

sure,under

thethreat

ofan

everpossible

sanctionby

Strasbourg,

that

thefundam

entalrights

protectionthat

itoilers

isat

leastequivalent

tothat

of theS

trasbourgcourt.

Another

consequenceis

thattile

European

courtitt

Strasbourg

willbecom

ethe

ultimate

judgein

thearea

of

fundartenta1rights

protectionin

theEU

.T

hereverse

processis

alsopossible,

Given

thatthe

Charter

providesa

wider

protectionoffundam

ental rightsthan

theE

CH

R,

tilelatter

maY

bein

flu

encedthereby.

Thecase

lawof the

EC

tHR

alreadycontains

examples

where

it

referredto

theC

harterin

orderto

justifya

broaderconception

of theprotec

-

tionof

afundam

entalright

underthe

Conv

entio

n.

35

Inaddition,

theE

CtH

R

hasdeclared

theC

hartera

“sourceof in

spiratio

n”,

36

This

processshould

retain

ourattention

sinceit

exemplifies

theinfluence

theC

harterhas

andw

illexert

uponthe

EC

HR

.G

iventhat

theC

harterisundoubtedly

more

advanced,m

ore

complete

andm

orethorough

thatthe

Convention,

thisprocess

canonly

be

beneficialforthe

overallprotectionof hum

anrights

inE

urope.

Q13.

What

rolesh

ou

ldbe

env

isaged

forEU

institu

tion

sas

tofu

nda

men

talrig

hts

pro

tection

with

ina

more

poly

centric

constitu

fional

system

ofE

urope?W

ouldyou

conclu

de

onth

ebasis

ofthe

dev

el

op

men

tof

the

ever-w

iden

ing

scope

of

EUlaw

and

fundam

ental

rightsactivity,

asw

ellas

yo

ur

discu

ssion

ofth

ep

revio

us

questio

ns

inyour

repo

rt,th

ata

grad

ual

but

defin

itetran

sferof

hum

anrights

Inits

judgm

ent

fromJuly

11,2002.

Christine

Goodw

inv.

United

Kingdom

(No.

28957195)the

EC

tHR

recognizedthe

rightof transsexuals

iom

arrya

partnerw

hosesex

isthe

same

asthe

transsexual’sprevious

sex.In

sodoing, the

Courthad

tom

oveaw

ayfrom

thestrict

senseof

Article

12E

CH

R(“m

enand

wom

enhave

theright

to

marry”)

byinvoking

thebroader

wording

ofArticle

9of the

Charter,w

hichgenendly

recognizesthe

“rightto

marry.”

Inthe

following

yearsthe

EC

tHR

startedto

referto

theC

harterm

oreoften

(see, forexam

ple.judgment ofA

pril19,2007,

Vilho

Eskelinen

andothers

v.F

inland,N

o.63235/00,w

herethe

EC

tHR

referredto

Article

47of

the

Charter

andthe

Explanation

Relating

toit; judgm

entof

Novem

ber12,

2008,D

emir

andB

aykarav.T

hckey,N

o.34503/97,w

herethe

EC

tHR

referredto

Articles

12et 28

of

theC

harter;judgm

entof

17S

eptember

2009,S

coppolav. Italy

(Nc,.

2),No.

0249103,

where

theEC

tHR

referredto

Article

49of the

Charter

andthe

caselaw

of theE

Cj).

36See, for

example,judgm

entof N

ovember

12,2008,D

emir

andB

aykarav. Turkey,

No.

34503/97.

C-339/10, order of the

Court

from12

Novem

ber2010.

280B

ulg

ariaB

ulg

aria281

pro

tection

hastak

enplace

fromM

emb

erS

tatesto

the

EUan

dfrom

the

Council

ofE

uropeard

EC

HR

toth

ea;?

EU

institutionshould,

inthe

firstplace,

reviewtheir

administrative

prac

ticesin

thelight

ofthe

Charter

andthe

EC

HR

.T

hisholds

particularly

truefor

anum

berof

areasof

EU

laww

herethe

European

Com

mission

hasinvestigative

powers

—co

mpetitio

njaw

,state

aids,an

ti-du

mp

ing

andcountervailing

measures,

fraudinvestigations,

etc.In

theseareas

the

Com

mission

shouldundertake

toreview

with

meticulous

carecertain

aspectsof its

administrative

practices.in

particular,the

roleof the

hearing

officershould

bereinforced.

TheE

uropeanO

mbuesm

ancan

make

signifi

cantcontribution

tothe

reviewprocess.

The

European

Parliam

entshould

alsopit

intoplace

am

echanismw

nichw

ouldallow

scrutinyof every

legis

lativeproposai

inthe

lightof

theC

harterand

theE

CH

R.

Itcan

certainlybe

concludedthat

agradual

butdefinite

transferof

human

rightsprotection

fromM

ember

Statesto

theE

Uhas

andis

taking

place.T

hisprocess

hadalready

begunbefore

theL

isbonT

reatyas

aresult

ofthe

caselaw

ofthe

ECJ

which

hadrecognized

some

ofthe

fundamental

rightsas

generalprinciples

ofE

Ulaw

onthe

basisof w

hicnit

reviewed

rue

compatibility

ornational

orprivate

thorizontal)m

easurestailing

within

rue

scopeof E

Ulaw

.W

iththe

entryinto

forceof

theL

isbonT

reatythis

process

hasbecom

edefinite

andirrevocable.

Where

inthe

pasthum

anrights

pro

tectionw

asentrusted

tonational

constitutionallaw

,even

when

anational

measure

came

within

thescope

of EU

law,

sincethe

EUhad

atthe

time

no

bindingbill

ofrights,

EU

lawhas

nowofficially

takenover

ihisarea

of fun

damental

rightsprotection.

itseem

show

everm

oredifficultto

assert thata

transferof hum

anrights

protectionfrom

tueC

ouncilof

Europe

andthe

EC

HR

tothe

EU

hasor

is

takingpiece.

While

sucha

viewcould

findcom

fortin

theB

osphoruspre

sumption,

thefuture

accessionof

theE

Uto

theE

CH

Rand

thepossible

abandonof

tha.presum

ption,has

putthe

issueunder

adifferent

light.It

is

truethat

ne

EU

hasgradually

startedto

dealin

anever

expandingm

an

ncrw

ithhum

anrights

issues.it

isalso

truethat

theE

CtH

Ritseifis

taking

inLoaccount

theC

harteras

asource

ofin

spiratio

n.

37

This

doesnot

how

evernecessarily

mean

thathum

anrights

protectionhas

been“transferred’

fromthe

Council

of nuropeto

theEU

.T

hefuture

accessscnof the

tothe

EC

HR

willhave

asa

consequence.am

ongother

things,that

thefInal

word

onhum

anrights

protectionw

illbe

reservedfor

Strasbourg.

Q14.

Alth

ough

fun

dam

ental

rights

pro

tection

inth

eEU

hasbeen

triggered

byM

ember

State

courts,

the

com

mo

nconstitU

tjOfl&

jtrad

itions

of

Mem

ber

States

on

fundam

ental

rights

pro

tection

hav

enot

functio

ned

asan

importan

td

irectso

urcc

of

pro

tection

inth

ecase

lawof

the

EC

),T

hisgiv

esrise

toth

egen

eralq

ues

tion

what

the

role

of

the

com

mo

nan

din

div

idu

alco

nstitu

tional

traditio

ns

canbe

atpresen

tan

din

fu

ture.

Itis

clearthat

nationalconstitutional

fundamental

rightsprotection

will

eventuallyundergo

some

sortofm

etamoiphesis.

At

thissrae,

we

canonly

speculateas

tow

hatthe

outcome

ofthisnietanorphosls

may

be.Itis

certainlypossible

toargue

thatthe

importance

ofshenational

billsof

rightsw

illbe

weakened

overtim

eas

largechunks

otnational

lawhave

nowto

comply

with

EU,

andnot

nationalstandards

offundam

entalrights

protection.Y

et,certain

areasof

lawrem

ainexclusively

reservedfor

thenational

law(on

conditionthat

itcomplies

with

theE

CH

R).although,

asw

esaw

inour

replyto

Question

11,thism

ayalso

proveto

beelusive.

The

Charter

itselfpaystribute

tonational

constitutionaltraditions,

ifa

givenm

attercom

esw

ithinthe

scopeof

EU

law,

itis

obviousthat

itshould

firstand

foremost

beconsistent

with

theC

harter.N

onetheless,A

rticle52,

paragraph4

thereofmakes

apraisew

orthyattem

ptto

strikea

difficultbal

anceas

itprovidesthatinsofar

asthe

Charter

recognisesfundam

entalrights

asthey

resultfrom

the“constitutional

traditionscom

mon

tothe

Mem

berStates”,those

rightsshallbe

interpretedin

harmony

with

thosetraditions,

Itrem

ainsto

beseen

what

theactual

ieachofthis

provisionw

ouldbe

inp

ractice,

theinput

fromthe

EC

Jbeing

ofparticularim

portancein

thisregard.

Overall,

itshouldn’t

beunjustifiably

difficultto

takedue

accountof

thisprovision

inthe

caselaw

.It

shouldhow

everbe

notedthat

thereare

atleast

two

preliminary

questionsw

hichaw

aitanansw

er.First,

what

sortof

rightsand/or

principlesqualify

as“constitutional

traditions”,L.is

highlyunlikely

thatMem

berStates

havea

readyansw

erto

thatquery

Itispossible

thatthey

tryto

arguethat

allfundam

entalrights

andprinciples

which

areenshrined

innational

constitutions,are

partof

theirconstitutional

traditions.T

heapproach

ofthe

EC

Jm

ayhow

everbe

more

restrictive.Second,

Article

52refers

onlyto

theconstitutional

traditionsco

mm

on

tothe

Mem

berStates.

TheC

harterdoes

notsay

much

aboutindividual

constitutionaltraditions.

Seethe

replyto

theprevious

question.

282B

ulg

aria

Itissubm

ittedthat

eventhough

theC

harterhas

failedto

takedue

accountof the

constitutionaltraditions

which

cannotbe

consideredas

“comm

on”,it

would

notbe

wise

tocom

pletelydisregard

them.

Very

oftenthey

arethe

expressionoflocal

sensitivitiesw

hicha

societym

aydeem

tobe

essential orinherent

toits

verystructure.

Apossible

way

ofgettingaround

thatpro

blem

,while

takinginto

considerationthe

individualconstitutionaltraditionsofa

Mem

berState

ina

particularcase,

isto

leavethe

finalappraisal

oftheproportionality

ofagiven

measure

tothe

nationalcourt,thus

allowing

it,asthe

casem

aybe,to

accountforthe

specificconstitutional

traditionsof that

Mem

berState.

The

possibledivergences

between

thescope

andlevel

of protectionof

fundamentalrights

onE

Uleveland

onnationallevelshould

nothowever

beexaggerated.In

mostcases

a“peaceful”

anda

perfectlycom

patibleco-exist

enceshould

beperfectly

possible.Inthe

rarecases

ofintolerabledifferences,

solutionsshould

besought

ona

caseby

casebasis,possibly

alongthe

linesindicated

inthe

presentsubmission.