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Abstracts
The International Conference of Religious
Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem
Islamic Sciences and Culture Islamic Sciences and Culture Islamic Sciences and Culture Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyAcademyAcademyAcademy
Center for Islamic Philosophy and TheologyCenter for Islamic Philosophy and TheologyCenter for Islamic Philosophy and TheologyCenter for Islamic Philosophy and Theology
Qom, IranQom, IranQom, IranQom, Iran
March March March March 9999----10101010, , , , 2011201120112011
Contents
Contents
The Message of the Conference Chairman ................................
A Report of the Conference ....................................................
Introduction .................................................................................
The Scientific Council of the Conference ................................
Part I
Exegetical and Scriptural Issues
about Mind-Body Relation
The Soul and Body in the Quran and Ḥadīth .............................
Reza Berenjkar
Multi-Dimensionality and Immortality of Humans in the Quran
................................................................................................
Alireza Alebouyeh
Fakhr Rāzi's Religious Arguments for the Immateriality of the
Soul ..............................................................................................
Mahdi Zakeri
The Son of the Mud and the Darkness of the Unknown Self
Shafiq Joradi
A Critique of the Implication of the Quranic Verse “They Ask
Thee about the Spirit” for Immateriality of the Soul ................
Rouhollah Beheshtipour
Conte
nts
5
................................. 15
.................... 16
................. 19
.................................... 21
............................. 25
Dimensionality and Immortality of Humans in the Quran
...................................... 26
Fakhr Rāzi's Religious Arguments for the Immateriality of the
.............................. 27
The Son of the Mud and the Darkness of the Unknown Self .... 28
A Critique of the Implication of the Quranic Verse “They Ask
................ 29
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The Role of the Body in Quran ...................................................
Amri Harboush
The Distinction or Sameness of Rūḥ and Nafs in the QuranGholamreza Parhizkar
The Soul-Body Problem in Early Muslim Theologians .............
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani
The Soul-Body Theories among Mid-Century Shiite
Mutakalimīn and their Implications for the Doctrine of
Resurrection ................................................................................
Alinaqi Khodayari
The Soul and the Resurrection in Sayyid Murtaḍā’s View
Alireza As’adi
The Immateriality of the Soul in Some Ash'arite Views: The
History, Textual Evidence and Implications .............................
Ahmed Abdeljabbar Snobar (Jordan)
Ghazālī and the Nature of the Soul and its Relation to the Body:
the Conflict between the Quran and Philosophy .......................
Mehdi Akhavan
The Soul in the Quran from Tirmidhī 's View ...........................
Mohammed Soori
A Comparison of Ṣadrāean View of the Soul-Body Relation to
the Quranic Conception of the Man ................................
Mohammad Abbas-Zadeh Jahromi
Soul and Spirit in Mīrzā Mahdī Eṣfahānī's View .......................
Mohammad Biabani
Soul and Body in Allāmeh �āṭabā'ī’s View ..............................
Mansour Nasiri
An Exegesis of 1 Corinthian 5:5 ..................................................
Daniel Bediako
................... 30
in the Quran ..... 31
............. 32
Century Shiite
and their Implications for the Doctrine of
................ 33
ā’s View ........ 34
The Immateriality of the Soul in Some Ash'arite Views: The
............................. 35
Ghazālī and the Nature of the Soul and its Relation to the Body:
....................... 36
........................... 37
Body Relation to
........................................... 39
....................... 40
.............................. 41
.................. 42
PART II
Afterlife
2.12.12.12.1. The Doctrine of Intermediate State. The Doctrine of Intermediate State. The Doctrine of Intermediate State. The Doctrine of Intermediate State
The Intermediate-State Perfection .............................................
Mahdi Nekouyi Samani (Iran)
Perfection in Barzakh ................................................................
Ahmad Efshagar (Iran)
Perfection and Volition in Barzakh ................................Ahmadreza Honari (Iran)
Luke 16:19-31: Intermediate State of the Soul? .........................
Daniel Berchie
Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Development of the
Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility with the Bibli
Teaching on the Afterlife .............................................................
Robert Osei-Bonsu
2.22.22.22.2. . . . Resurrection and the MindResurrection and the MindResurrection and the MindResurrection and the Mind----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
An Analysis of Ṣadrāean Quranic Eschatology in light of the
Mind-Body Problem ................................................................
Hamed Shiva
A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist Account of
Resurrection ................................................................................
Ali Sana'ei
The Ethereal Body and Quranic Resurrection............................
Mostafa Mo'meni (Iran)
The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical Psychology for his
Eschatology..................................................................................
Sadeq Mirahmadi Sarpiri (Iran)
The Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife Doctrines .............
Yasser Khoshnevis
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............. 47
.................................. 48
............................................ 49
......................... 50
Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Development of the
Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility with the Biblical
............................. 51
Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
adrāean Quranic Eschatology in light of the
.................................... 55
A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist Account of
................ 56
............................ 57
The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical Psychology for his
.................. 58
............. 59
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The Problem of Resurrection and the Mind-Body Relation in
Ibn Sina and Mullā Ṣadrā ...........................................................
Zahra Alemi (Iran)
The Sameness and Likeness of Afterlife Bodies in the Quran
Akbar Qorbani (Iran)
The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men in
Different Forms ................................................................
Marzieh Rezaee (Iran)
The Dualist Afterlife: Avicenna and Mulla Ṣadrā ......................
Jari Kaukua
Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity
from Early to Reformation-Era Christianity .............................
Michael J. Sigrist
Augustine and Ibn Sina on Souls in the Afterlife ......................
Gareth B. Matthews
Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Resurrection:
Mapping Philosophical Conclusions Onto Faith
Doctrines .....................................................................................
Richard Taylor
Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect (Rational Soul)
and the Denial of the Individual Immortality ............................
Hassan Yousofian
The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal World (
al-mithāl) in the Illuminationist tradition (ḥikmat al-
the 13th century. ................................................................
Roxanne D. Marcotte
The Implications of Avicenna’s Conception of the Soul for his
Conception of Survival ................................................................
Reza Akbari
Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection in Islamic and Christian
Doctrines ......................................................................................
Akbar Faydei (Iran)
Body Relation in
........................... 60
The Sameness and Likeness of Afterlife Bodies in the Quran ... 61
The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men in
........................................... 62
...................... 63
Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity
............................. 65
...................... 69
Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Resurrection:
Mapping Philosophical Conclusions Onto Faith-Based
..................... 70
Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect (Rational Soul)
............................ 71
Imaginal World (‘ālam
ikmat al-ishrāq) of
........................................... 73
The Implications of Avicenna’s Conception of the Soul for his
................................. 75
Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection in Islamic and Christian
...................... 77
Bodily Resurrection ................................................................
Kobra Rahimi, Nasrollah Shameli (Iran)
Resurrection and the Soul-Body Relation in Ibn Sina ..............
Kobra Majidi Bidgoli (Iran)
The Implications of Ṣadrāean Psychology for Eschatology
Mohammad Reza Haji Esma'ili, Zahra Alafchian (Iran)
The Immortality of the Soul in Quran ................................
Qorbanali Karimzadeh Gharamaleki (Iran)
The Soul-Body Relation in Resurrection: A perspective from
Islamic Philosophers and Theologians ................................
Mohammad Es’haq Arefi (Iran)
The Soul-Body Relation in the Resurrection and its Role
Bodily Resurrection in Ṣadrā ......................................................
Ahmad Sa'adat
Ṣadrāean Theory of the Soul and the Bodily Resurrection
Gholamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani
Soul-Body Monism with a Dual-Aspect Theory of their
Relations and an Account of the Bodily Resurrection ..............
Askari Soleimani Amiri
The Survival of the Soul in Mullā Ṣadrā's View .........................
Hadi Mousavi (Iran)
Thomistic Hylomorphism and Human Persistence: Connections
and Prospects between Christianity and Islam .........................
Stephen R. Ogden
2.32.32.32.3. . . . Metempsychosis and Raj’aMetempsychosis and Raj’aMetempsychosis and Raj’aMetempsychosis and Raj’a
Correct Metempsychosis in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View and his
Explanation of Maskh Verses .....................................................
Vahideh Ameri (Iran)
Metempsychosis in Quran and Ḥadīth ................................
Mohammad Taqi Yousofi
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.................................... 78
.............. 79
adrāean Psychology for Eschatology ...... 80
Mohammad Reza Haji Esma'ili, Zahra Alafchian (Iran)
........................................ 81
Body Relation in Resurrection: A perspective from
...................................... 82
Body Relation in the Resurrection and its Role in
...................... 83
adrāean Theory of the Soul and the Bodily Resurrection ....... 84
Aspect Theory of their
.............. 86
......................... 89
Thomistic Hylomorphism and Human Persistence: Connections
......................... 90
adrā’s View and his
..................... 95
....................................... 96
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The Soul-Body Relations and Raj'a ................................
Hossein Elahi-Nijad
2.42.42.42.4. . . . Heaven and HellHeaven and HellHeaven and HellHeaven and Hell
The Soul-Body Problem and the Heaven’s Unusual
Characteristics ............................................................................
Mohammad Hossein Heshmatpour
The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its Attachment to the
Soul and the Body ................................................................
Rajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah Al-Mentawi
Hell in the Quran and Ḥadīth ....................................................
Shokoufeh Gholami, Sousan Goudarzi (Iran)
2.52.52.52.5. . . . Do Persons Exist before this WorldDo Persons Exist before this WorldDo Persons Exist before this WorldDo Persons Exist before this World????
Soul and Body in the Worlds of Dhar ................................Ali Afzali
Ṣadrāean View on ḥodūth and Qedam of the Soul ...................Mohammad Miri
The Grounds for the Ṣadrāean Theory of Material Origin and
Spiritual Survival of the Soul ......................................................
Morteza Pouyan (Iran)
Muslim Mystics’ View of the ḥodūth and Qedam of the SoulMohammad Miri
A Critique of the Theory of the Material Origin and the Spiritual
Survival of the Soul ................................................................
Gholamreza Fayyazi
Out of Eden: Evolution and the Fall ................................
Martin Lembke
An Analysis of the Objections of Mulla Shamsa Gilani and
Mohammad Sadiq Ardistani to Ṣadrāean Theory of the Soul
Abolhassan Ghaffari (Iran)
............................................ 97
Body Problem and the Heaven’s Unusual
............ 101
Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its Attachment to the
..................................... 103
....................105
...................................... 109
................... 110
adrāean Theory of Material Origin and
...................... 111
of the Soul .. 112
A Critique of the Theory of the Material Origin and the Spiritual
.................................... 113
......................................... 115
An Analysis of the Objections of Mulla Shamsa Gilani and
adrāean Theory of the Soul . 117
PART III
The Nature of Human Persons, Morality
and God-Human Relations
Ṣadrāean View f the Role of the Body in Cognition .................
Ahmad Va’ezi
The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the Method
of Disjunction (faṣl) and Conjunction (waṣl): A Discussion of
the Limits of the Religious and Philosophical/Scientific Thought
in the Explaining the Phenomenon of Consciousness .............
Samir Abuzaid (Egypt)
The Immateriality of the Soul and Cognition in Islamic
Philosophy and Quran ...............................................................
Morteza Erfani
Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Consciousness and Existence
Mehnaz Zainab
The Influence of the Non-doxic on the Doxic Dimensions of the
Soul in Ghazālī ................................................................
Zahra (Mitra) Poursina
Islamic Philosophical Psychology and the Doctrine of
Quran ..........................................................................................
Zolfaghar Nasseri
In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart of
philosophy of mind ................................................................
Charles Taliaferro
The Moral Aspect of the Soul: The Place of Soul in the Solution
of Moral Issues in Ghazali and Aquinas ................................
Zohreh Sadat Naji (Iran)
Islamic Ethics without Souls .....................................................
Aliakbar Golghandashti
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The Nature of Human Persons, Morality
................. 121
The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the Method
): A Discussion of
the Limits of the Religious and Philosophical/Scientific Thought
............. 122
The Immateriality of the Soul and Cognition in Islamic
............................... 125
Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Consciousness and Existence .......... 126
doxic on the Doxic Dimensions of the
...........................................128
Islamic Philosophical Psychology and the Doctrine of Fitrah in
.......................... 129
In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart of
................................... 130
The Moral Aspect of the Soul: The Place of Soul in the Solution
................................... 131
..................... 132
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Images of the Body in Rumi’s Mathnavi ................................
Ebrahim Alipour
The Gender of the Mind and the Islamic Doctrine of Gender
Justice .........................................................................................
Hadi Sadeqi
The Real Happiness (Sa’adah) in Ṣadrāean Philosophy
Mohammad Ghasem Elyasi
Human Happiness and the Role of Religion in Fārābi's View
Yarali Kord Firouzjaei
Human Dignity on the basis of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla
Ṣadrā ...........................................................................................
Sima Mohammadpour Dehkordi (Iran)
The Soul-Body Relation in the Philosophy of Malebranche, the
Islamic Philosophy and Ash'arite Thought and Its Implications
for the Free Will and Divine Agency ................................
Majid Zia'i (Iran)
PART IV
God, Prophecy and the Mind-Body Problem
Does God Have a Mind? ............................................................
Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen
Ibn Sina’s View of Revelations and Miracles in Terms of his
Mind-Body Theory ................................................................
Hamidreza Khademi (Iran)
The Characteristics of Prophetic Imagination in Aquinas
Alireza Fazeli
A Philosophical Explanation of Imamah in Peripatetic
Philosophy ..................................................................................
Mortaza Yousofi-Rad
Human as the Vicar of God and the Nature of the Soul
Seyyed Mohammad Akbarian
................................... 133
The Gender of the Mind and the Islamic Doctrine of Gender
......................... 135
adrāean Philosophy .......... 136
Human Happiness and the Role of Religion in Fārābi's View 137
Human Dignity on the basis of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla
...........................138
Body Relation in the Philosophy of Malebranche, the
Thought and Its Implications
......................................... 139
Body Problem
............................ 143
Ibn Sina’s View of Revelations and Miracles in Terms of his
..................................... 144
The Characteristics of Prophetic Imagination in Aquinas ....... 145
in Peripatetic
.................. 146
Human as the Vicar of God and the Nature of the Soul ........... 147
PART V
Mind-Body Problem and the Religious Belief
Psychological Philosophy between Aristotle and Ibn Sina
Hossein Rostami Jalilian (Iran)
An Approach to the Soul-Body Relation: The Plan of a View
Ahmad Shahgoli (Iran)
A Comparative Examination of the Soul-Body Relation in
Aquinas and Ibn Sina ................................................................
Zahra Zare' (Iran)
Soul-Body Problem in Ibn Sina, Ṣadrā and Zonouzi ................
Rahmatollah Karimzadeh (Iran)
The Soul-Body Relation in Ṣadrāean Philosophy .....................
Seyyed Yadollah Yazdanpanah
A Critique of the Principles of the Ṣadrāean Philosophy
S. Yahya Yasrebi
Cartesian and Neo-Cartesian Arguments for Dualism ............
Edward Wierenga
Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists? .............................
Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen
A Defense of Ibn Sina’s Theory of the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and
Survival ......................................................................................
Seyyed Hassan Sa’adat Mostafavi
Soul, Body, and their Interrelations ................................
Ali Abedi Shahroudi
Rational Character and Immortal Happiness: Ibn Sina’s View
on the Role of Intellect in Afterlife Happiness .........................
Amir Divāni
Persons Without Immaterial Souls ................................
Lynne Rudder Baker
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Body Problem and the Religious Belief
Philosophy between Aristotle and Ibn Sina ...... 151
Body Relation: The Plan of a View .. 152
Body Relation in
................................. 153
................ 154
..................... 155
adrāean Philosophy ......... 156
............ 158
............................. 159
A Defense of Ibn Sina’s Theory of the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and
...................... 160
.......................................... 161
Rational Character and Immortal Happiness: Ibn Sina’s View
......................... 164
........................................... 165
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What is Dualism and Its Relation to Science and Religion?
Uwe Meixner
Unity and Subjectivity: the Plotinian Perspective and Its
Aftermath...................................................................................
Douglas Hedley
The Soul-Body Relation in Ibn Ḥazm's View ............................
Khaled Amohammad Faraj Alohaishi
The Concept of Soul and Spirit in the Scriptures and Fakhr
Razi's View ..................................................................................
Bahloul Mohammad Hossain Taha
A Philosophical Explanation of the Soul-Body Relations in
Ṣadrāean View ............................................................................
Ahmad Sa'adat
Soul-Body Relation in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi,
and Mulla Ṣadrā ................................................................
Es'haq Shirdaqi
The Soul-Body Relation in Ṣadrāean Philosophy .....................
Mehri Changi Ashtiani (Iran)
Emergentism: How Mind May Become Body-Free .................
Rouhollah Ramezani Varzaneh
Swinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soul ................................
Amir Dastmalchian
A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic Doctrines and the
Mind-Body Problem ................................................................
Yasser Pouresmail
What is Dualism and Its Relation to Science and Religion? .... 167
Unity and Subjectivity: the Plotinian Perspective and Its
................... 168
............................ 169
The Concept of Soul and Spirit in the Scriptures and Fakhr
.................. 170
Body Relations in
............ 171
Body Relation in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi,
......................................... 172
..................... 173
................. 174
.................................. 175
A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic Doctrines and the
................................... 176
The Message of the Conference Chairman
The Message of the Conference Chairman
The Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology has focused its
research programs on macro-projects in order to enrich the
intellectual-cultural heritage, propose new inquiries, discover
novel grounds, correct and comprehensive reformulation of the
issues in the heritage, pave the path for theorization and
pushing the boundaries of knowledge. In this direction, the
Center has on its agenda the translation of important issues and
holding academic seminars, in addition to research works
regarding the topics of the macro-projects.
Because of the significance of anthropological issues for Islam
and other Abrahamic religions and the theological implications
of mind-body theories, the Center decided to found studies
about the philosophy of mind and philosophical psych
order to reformulate and reintroduce the Islamic traditional
theories of the philosophical psychology (ilm al-nafs
consideration of, and comparison with, contemporary theories
in the philosophy of mind. Therefore, the macro-project of "th
mind-body relation" was established in 2006.
Some published or nearly-published (Farsi) works of this
macro-project ever since then are: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Mind, A Descriptive Bibliography of the
Philosophy of Soul, An Examination of Physicalistic Theories of
The Message of the Conference
Chairm
an
15
Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology has focused its
projects in order to enrich the
cultural heritage, propose new inquiries, discover
novel grounds, correct and comprehensive reformulation of the
he heritage, pave the path for theorization and
pushing the boundaries of knowledge. In this direction, the
Center has on its agenda the translation of important issues and
holding academic seminars, in addition to research works
Because of the significance of anthropological issues for Islam
implications
body theories, the Center decided to found studies
about the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology, in
order to reformulate and reintroduce the Islamic traditional
nafs) with a
consideration of, and comparison with, contemporary theories
project of "the
published (Farsi) works of this
project ever since then are: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Mind, A Descriptive Bibliography of the
ysicalistic Theories of
16
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onfe
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and t
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the Mind, Emergentism and Consciousness, Faculties of the
Soul and the Modularity of the Mind, Christianity and the
Mind-Body Problem, Dualism and Behaviorism, The Identity
Theory, Functionalism and Eliminativism.
Given the desirable progress of this macro-project and because
of the role the mind-body theories play in our accounts of most
religious doctrines, the Center decided to hold the International
Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem,
which was welcomed by thinkers and philosophers around the
world. Great Islamic scholars of Islamic Seminary (
such as Ayatollah Javadi Āmoli, Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan
Mosṭafavi, Ali Abedi Shahroudi, Ahmad Va'ezi, Seyyed Yadollah
Yazdanpanah, Gholamreza Fayyazi, Amir Divani, Reza
Berenjkar, Iranian university professors such as Mohammad
Saeedimehr, Reza Akbari, Hossain Sheykhrezaee, and foreign
visitors such as Lynne Rudder Baker and Edward Wierenga.
A Report of the Conference
After the approval of the conference in the Islamic Sciences and
Culture Academy, the conference posters and the brochures (in
three languages of Farsi, Arabic and English) were sent to over
70 Iranian academic centers and 120 centers abroad.
papers, 9 Arabic papers and 21 English papers were received by
the Secretariat of the conference, both through the call
papers and by the Iranian and Non-Iranian invitees.
In order to introduce the contemporary theories of the soul
body relation in Islamic philosophy, some dialogues were made
with contemporary figures in the field, such as Ayatollah
Mostafavi, Ayatollah Seyyed Razi Shirazi, Seyyed Yadollah
Yazdanpanah, Ali Abedi Shahroudi, Gholamreza Fayyazi,
Muhammad Hossein Heshmatpour, Gholamhossein Ebrahimi
the Mind, Emergentism and Consciousness, Faculties of the
Soul and the Modularity of the Mind, Christianity and the
Body Problem, Dualism and Behaviorism, The Identity
project and because
body theories play in our accounts of most
religious doctrines, the Center decided to hold the International
Body Problem,
y thinkers and philosophers around the
world. Great Islamic scholars of Islamic Seminary (Hawzah)
Āmoli, Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan
afavi, Ali Abedi Shahroudi, Ahmad Va'ezi, Seyyed Yadollah
vani, Reza
Berenjkar, Iranian university professors such as Mohammad
Saeedimehr, Reza Akbari, Hossain Sheykhrezaee, and foreign
visitors such as Lynne Rudder Baker and Edward Wierenga.
Islamic Sciences and
Culture Academy, the conference posters and the brochures (in
three languages of Farsi, Arabic and English) were sent to over
. 103 Farsi
ere received by
the Secretariat of the conference, both through the call-for-
In order to introduce the contemporary theories of the soul-
body relation in Islamic philosophy, some dialogues were made
contemporary figures in the field, such as Ayatollah
Mostafavi, Ayatollah Seyyed Razi Shirazi, Seyyed Yadollah
Yazdanpanah, Ali Abedi Shahroudi, Gholamreza Fayyazi,
Muhammad Hossein Heshmatpour, Gholamhossein Ebrahimi
Dinani, and Seyyed Yahya Yasrebi.
Also two pre-conferences have been held; "The Soul
Relation in Sadraean Philosophy and Islamic Peripatetic
Philosophy" by the contribution of Ayatollah Mostafavi,
Abdorrasul Oboudiat and Ali Afzali on January 20,
"The Soul-Body Relation in Quran and Hadith" by the
contribution of Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, Reza Berenjkar, and
Mahdi Zakeri on February 17, 2011.
Also in order to introduce some Western mind-body theories
and their accounts of the resurrection, 8 weekly seminars were
held as follows:Lynne Baker's constitution view and its account
of the resurrection (by Mahmoud Morvarid in two sessions:
December 22 and 29, 2010), emergentism and its account of
resurrection (by Yasser Khoshnevis in two sessions:
and 12, 2011), Peter van Inwagen's eliminativist view and its
account of the resurrection (by Mahmoud Morvarid in two
sessions: January 19 and 26, 2011) and Alvin Plantinga
dualism and its account of the resurrection (by Mansour Nasiri
in two sessions: February 9 and 16, 2011).
Finally I should thank Ebrahim Alipoor, the head of the
Philosophy Department where the conference was organized,
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, the Scientific Secretary of the
conference, Yasser Pouresmail, the director of the conference,
Mohammad Reza Zekavat, the Conference Ceremonial and
Information Secretary, Ghaffar Shave'ei, the Conference
Finance and Sponsorship Secretary, Habib Ghahramani, the
Conference International Secretary. I should also thank the
members of the scientific council of the conference, Reza
Akbari, Reza Berenjkar, Lynne Rudder Baker, Charles
Taliaferro, Mohsen Javadi, Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, Mahdi
Zakeri, Mohammad Saeedimehr, Gholamreza Fayyazi,
The Message of the Conference
Chairm
an
17
conferences have been held; "The Soul-Body
Relation in Sadraean Philosophy and Islamic Peripatetic
Philosophy" by the contribution of Ayatollah Mostafavi,
, 2011; and
uran and Hadith" by the
contribution of Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, Reza Berenjkar, and
body theories
weekly seminars were
Lynne Baker's constitution view and its account
of the resurrection (by Mahmoud Morvarid in two sessions:
emergentism and its account of
: January 5
en's eliminativist view and its
account of the resurrection (by Mahmoud Morvarid in two
and Alvin Plantinga's
dualism and its account of the resurrection (by Mansour Nasiri
ly I should thank Ebrahim Alipoor, the head of the
Philosophy Department where the conference was organized,
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, the Scientific Secretary of the
conference, Yasser Pouresmail, the director of the conference,
nference Ceremonial and
Information Secretary, Ghaffar Shave'ei, the Conference
Finance and Sponsorship Secretary, Habib Ghahramani, the
Conference International Secretary. I should also thank the
members of the scientific council of the conference, Reza
kbari, Reza Berenjkar, Lynne Rudder Baker, Charles
Taliaferro, Mohsen Javadi, Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, Mahdi
Zakeri, Mohammad Saeedimehr, Gholamreza Fayyazi,
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Muhammad Legenhausen, Uwe Meixner, Mansour Nasiri,
Edward Wierenga. I shall appreciate the efforts of the paper
evaluators, faculty members, office managers and colleagues of
the Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology. It is hoped that
the conference helps enrich the literature on the topic and make
the grounds for the religious inter-dialogue between Christian
and Islamic scholars.
Alireza Alebouyeh
Head of the Center for
Islamic Philosophy and Theology
Chairman of the International Conference of
Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem
Muhammad Legenhausen, Uwe Meixner, Mansour Nasiri,
f the paper
evaluators, faculty members, office managers and colleagues of
the Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology. It is hoped that
the conference helps enrich the literature on the topic and make
n Christian
Chairman of the International Conference of
Body Problem
Introduction
Introduction
The question of the human ultimate nature was one of the
oldest questions of the mankind, and perhaps this was the
question with which the humans recognized themselves as
distinct from other animals and acquired aware of their own
selves. The antiquity of the question can be demonstrated by
what one might see in the scriptures and ancient philosophies.
On the other hand, most religions and schools of thoughts have
the knowledge of the self at the focus of their attentions. In
modern Western philosophy, though there was disapproval and
reluctancy towards most parts of the old metaphysics, which
was emphasized by the slogan of the consummation of the
metaphysics, the problem of the self and the human nature still
remained as one of the main concerns, and new approaches
were offered.
The heritage of the monotheistic religions has a distinguished
position among the thoughts and doctrines about the nature of
the human person. This valuable heritage can be explored not
only the scriptures, but also in the innumerable works of the
religious scholars. It seems that within the last centuries,
sufficient attention was not paid to this heritage. One of the
purposes of the "International Conference of Religious
Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem" is to pay e
Intr
oduction
19
The question of the human ultimate nature was one of the
oldest questions of the mankind, and perhaps this was the
question with which the humans recognized themselves as
distinct from other animals and acquired aware of their own
antiquity of the question can be demonstrated by
might see in the scriptures and ancient philosophies.
On the other hand, most religions and schools of thoughts have
the knowledge of the self at the focus of their attentions. In
losophy, though there was disapproval and
reluctancy towards most parts of the old metaphysics, which
was emphasized by the slogan of the consummation of the
metaphysics, the problem of the self and the human nature still
ns, and new approaches
The heritage of the monotheistic religions has a distinguished
position among the thoughts and doctrines about the nature of
the human person. This valuable heritage can be explored not
the innumerable works of the
religious scholars. It seems that within the last centuries,
sufficient attention was not paid to this heritage. One of the
purposes of the "International Conference of Religious
Body Problem" is to pay enough
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attention to this domain and show the depth of the issues which
can be good subject-matters for researchers of the field.
The religious knowledge is much dependant on the mind
problem, and we can say, without exaggeration, that few faith
related propositions can be found which are not somehow
related to the mind-body problem. The topics of the conference
papers which only illustrate part of the domain (and more
topics should be dealt with in the future) reflect the significance
the mind-body problem for our understanding of religious
doctrines. Some people might still think that the mind
problem is relevant only to the doctrines of resurrection and
after death, but the fact is that it is closely relevant to other
religious doctrines such as our knowledge of the God, his
attributes and the divine acts, the nature of the revelation
(vaḥy), prophecy, imamah, and other foundations of the
religious belief. The papers of the International Conference of
Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem –abstracts of
which are published in this volume- is evidence for the relation
between religious doctrines and the mind-body theories.
This conference which is the result of the common efforts of
intellectuals and scholars of two great religions –Christian
and Islam- can be a pattern for a religious inter-dialogue in
academic domains.
We hope this step to be the first stage of an extended research
program of "religious philosophy of mind".
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani
The Scientific Secretary of the Conference
attention to this domain and show the depth of the issues which
matters for researchers of the field.
The religious knowledge is much dependant on the mind-body
problem, and we can say, without exaggeration, that few faith-
propositions can be found which are not somehow
body problem. The topics of the conference
papers which only illustrate part of the domain (and more
topics should be dealt with in the future) reflect the significance
lem for our understanding of religious
doctrines. Some people might still think that the mind-body
problem is relevant only to the doctrines of resurrection and
after death, but the fact is that it is closely relevant to other
ur knowledge of the God, his
attributes and the divine acts, the nature of the revelation
, and other foundations of the
religious belief. The papers of the International Conference of
abstracts of
is evidence for the relation
body theories.
This conference which is the result of the common efforts of
Christianity
dialogue in
We hope this step to be the first stage of an extended research
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani
Conference
The Scientific Council of the Conference
The Scientific Council of the Conference
Alireza Alebouyeh Mohsen Javadi
Islamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran University of Qom, Iran
Mohammad Taqi Sobhani Mahdi Zakeri
Islamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran University of Tehran, Iran
Reza Akbari Ebrahim Alipoor
Imam Sadiq University, Tehran,
Iran
Islamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran
Mohammad Saeedimehr Gholamreza Fayyazi
Tarbiat Modarres University,
Tehran, Iran
Imam Khomeini Education and
Research Institute, Qom, Iran
Reza Berenjkar Muhammad Legenhausen
University of Tehran, Iran Imam Khomeini Education and
Research Institute, Qom, Iran
Lynne Rudder Baker Uwe MeixnerUniversity of Amherst,
Massachusetts, USA
University of Regensburg,
Germany
Yasser Pouresmail Mansour NasiriIslamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran
Islamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran
Charles Taliaferro Edward Wierenga
St. Olaf College, USA University of Rochester, New York,
USA
The Scientific Council of the Conference
21
The Scientific Council of the Conference
Mohsen Javadi
University of Qom, Iran
Mahdi Zakeri
University of Tehran, Iran
Ebrahim Alipoor
Islamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran
Gholamreza Fayyazi
Imam Khomeini Education and
Research Institute, Qom, Iran
Muhammad Legenhausen
Imam Khomeini Education and
Research Institute, Qom, Iran
Uwe Meixner University of Regensburg,
Mansour Nasiri Islamic Sciences and Culture
Academy, Qom, Iran
Edward Wierenga University of Rochester, New York,
Part I
Exegetical and Scriptural Issues
about Mind-Body Relation
Abstracts
The Soul and Body in The Soul and Body in The Soul and Body in The Soul and Body in thethethethe QuranQuranQuranQuran and and and and ḤḤḤḤadīthadīthadīthadīth
RezaRezaRezaReza BerenjkarBerenjkarBerenjkarBerenjkar
University of TehranUniversity of TehranUniversity of TehranUniversity of Tehran (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
There have been different issues regarding the soul
relation: soul-body distinction, variety of souls, faculties of the
soul, its temporal emergence (ḥudūth) and eternity (qedam
motion and perfection, its immortality and the soul
interaction. In this paper I will try to give an account of the
soul-body relation consonant with the Quran and Ḥadīth
touches the main soul-body issues.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, body, Quran, Ḥadīth, immortality.
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adīthadīthadīthadīth
There have been different issues regarding the soul-body
body distinction, variety of souls, faculties of the
qedam), its
and the soul-body
interaction. In this paper I will try to give an account of the
adīth which
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MultiMultiMultiMulti----DimensionalityDimensionalityDimensionalityDimensionality and Immortality ofand Immortality ofand Immortality ofand Immortality of
Humans in the QuranHumans in the QuranHumans in the QuranHumans in the Quran
Alireza AlebouyehAlireza AlebouyehAlireza AlebouyehAlireza Alebouyeh
Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
In this paper I will deal with the question of the nature of the
human person in the Quran; does the Quran take humans to be
one-dimensional or multi-dimensional? I shall examine three
claims in this regard: (1) The Quran takes humans to be
dimensional, (2) the other dimension of humans (besides his
material, bodily dimension) is not the soul as a substance in the
philosophical sense, (3) since the material dimension corrupts
after death, the other non-bodily dimension is immortal. This
entails that the criterion for the personal identity of the worldly
and afterlife person is his non-bodily dimension, and the bodily
dimension is merely peripheral. This paper has two sections,
one of which deals with the verses which demonstrate the
dimensionality of humans and the other with the verses which
show their immortality.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, spirit, immortality, Quran, human dimensions.
and Immortality ofand Immortality ofand Immortality ofand Immortality of
In this paper I will deal with the question of the nature of the
human person in the Quran; does the Quran take humans to be
dimensional? I shall examine three
The Quran takes humans to be multi-
besides his
material, bodily dimension) is not the soul as a substance in the
since the material dimension corrupts
bodily dimension is immortal. This
ils that the criterion for the personal identity of the worldly
bodily dimension, and the bodily
dimension is merely peripheral. This paper has two sections,
one of which deals with the verses which demonstrate the multi-
ensionality of humans and the other with the verses which
soul, spirit, immortality, Quran, human dimensions.
Fakhr RFakhr RFakhr RFakhr Rāāāāzi's Religious Argumentszi's Religious Argumentszi's Religious Argumentszi's Religious Arguments
for the Immateriality of the Soulfor the Immateriality of the Soulfor the Immateriality of the Soulfor the Immateriality of the Soul
Mahdi ZakeriMahdi ZakeriMahdi ZakeriMahdi Zakeri
Tehran UniversityTehran UniversityTehran UniversityTehran University (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Fakhr Rāzi in his Al-Nafs wa al-Rūḥ wa Sharḥ Quwāhuma
to make religious-textual arguments for the idea of an
immaterial soul distinct from the material body; the chapter in
which he discusses the issue is "on the arguments from the
scripture for the idea that the soul is distinct from the body
of his 10 textual arguments are Quranic ones and two of them
are from Ḥadīth. Four of these arguments focus on texts in
which the word nafs is used; two are the ones in which the
stages of the human creation are mentioned; the other two are
about the survival after death; one argument employs the
human cognizance, and the last one makes an appeal to the
distinction between the world of spirits and bodies in religious
texts. In this paper I try to give an analysis of these arguments.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Fakhr Rāzi, immateriality, soul, Quran, survival after
death.
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Quwāhuma tries
textual arguments for the idea of an
immaterial soul distinct from the material body; the chapter in
which he discusses the issue is "on the arguments from the
idea that the soul is distinct from the body". 8
textual arguments are Quranic ones and two of them
. Four of these arguments focus on texts in
is used; two are the ones in which the
n are mentioned; the other two are
about the survival after death; one argument employs the
human cognizance, and the last one makes an appeal to the
distinction between the world of spirits and bodies in religious
lysis of these arguments.
, immateriality, soul, Quran, survival after
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The Son of the Mud and the DarknessThe Son of the Mud and the DarknessThe Son of the Mud and the DarknessThe Son of the Mud and the Darkness
of the Unknown Selfof the Unknown Selfof the Unknown Selfof the Unknown Self
Shafiq JoradShafiq JoradShafiq JoradShafiq Joradiiii
AlAlAlAl----Ma’Ma’Ma’Ma’āāāārif Alrif Alrif Alrif Al----ḤḤḤḤikmiah Centerikmiah Centerikmiah Centerikmiah Center (Lebanon)(Lebanon)(Lebanon)(Lebanon)
Ancient philosophies usually took the soul to be the
entity of the human and the body to be worthless and negligible.
This Gnostic thought has affected our philosophical theories
too. In this paper, having talked about the meanings of the
words rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), and jasad (body), I will show
that Quran and Ḥadīth –in consonance with the views of early
Muslim mutakalimīn (theologians)- take the body to be an
important factor of the human entity. Also in this paper, I will
point to the Christian theory of incarnation and show that the
Bible and the early Church Fathers emphasize the significance
of the body as an inseparable part of the humans in all the
worlds. Only in the modern Western philosophy, Descartes
proposed soul-body dualism and challenged the role of the body
in the human entity. Finally I will consider some religious
textual evidence about the creation of the human,
Anwār, Ḥadīth of ṭinah (mud), and bodily resurrection to show
that the body has an important role in the nature of the
humans.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), body, mutakalimīn
ṭinah, bodily resurrection.
The Son of the Mud and the DarknessThe Son of the Mud and the DarknessThe Son of the Mud and the DarknessThe Son of the Mud and the Darkness
Ancient philosophies usually took the soul to be the ultimate
of the human and the body to be worthless and negligible.
our philosophical theories
too. In this paper, having talked about the meanings of the
(body), I will show
in consonance with the views of early
take the body to be an
important factor of the human entity. Also in this paper, I will
stian theory of incarnation and show that the
Bible and the early Church Fathers emphasize the significance
of the body as an inseparable part of the humans in all the
worlds. Only in the modern Western philosophy, Descartes
challenged the role of the body
in the human entity. Finally I will consider some religious
textual evidence about the creation of the human, Ḥadīth of
(mud), and bodily resurrection to show
that the body has an important role in the nature of the
mutakalimīn, Quran,
A Critique of the Implication of the A Critique of the Implication of the A Critique of the Implication of the A Critique of the Implication of the QuranicQuranicQuranicQuranic
“T“T“T“They Ask hey Ask hey Ask hey Ask TheeTheeTheeThee about the Spirit”about the Spirit”about the Spirit”about the Spirit”
for Immateriality of the Soulfor Immateriality of the Soulfor Immateriality of the Soulfor Immateriality of the Soul
Rouhollah BeheshtipourRouhollah BeheshtipourRouhollah BeheshtipourRouhollah Beheshtipour
Imam Khomeini International University Imam Khomeini International University Imam Khomeini International University Imam Khomeini International University (Qazvin, Iran)(Qazvin, Iran)(Qazvin, Iran)(Qazvin, Iran)
One of the main Quranic arguments for the immateriality of the
soul is Isrā: 85: “they ask thee about the spirit, tell them the
spirit is of my Lord's amr”. According to some exegesis, the
verse refers to the human soul and provides a support for its
immateriality. On this interpretation, amr is taken to refer to
the world of the spiritual, immaterial entities. But in th
I will show that this interpretation fails, since the word
(spirit) has never been used in the Quran to refer to the human
person. Rūḥ refers instead to certain knowledge that prophets
and Imams possessed, which gave them the ability to rece
revelations and do miracles.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: the verse of rūḥ, immateriality, world of
a'ẓam.
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QuranicQuranicQuranicQuranic Verse Verse Verse Verse
One of the main Quranic arguments for the immateriality of the
l them the
”. According to some exegesis, the
verse refers to the human soul and provides a support for its
is taken to refer to
the world of the spiritual, immaterial entities. But in this paper,
I will show that this interpretation fails, since the word rūḥ
(spirit) has never been used in the Quran to refer to the human
refers instead to certain knowledge that prophets
and Imams possessed, which gave them the ability to receive
, immateriality, world of amr, ism
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The Role of the Body in QuranThe Role of the Body in QuranThe Role of the Body in QuranThe Role of the Body in Quran
Amri HarboushAmri HarboushAmri HarboushAmri Harboush
Mentouri University (Algeria)Mentouri University (Algeria)Mentouri University (Algeria)Mentouri University (Algeria)
Islam does not take the body to be accidentally or randomly
created; rather God has created the soul and the body and never
considers the body and its needs in a negative way, nor allows
for its humiliation or harm or violence. Instead Quran calls for
meeting the biological or bodily needs in accordance with the
demands of faith and divine teachings. All body-related affairs
from eating and drinking to sleeping and sexual intercourse
count as sacred as far as they are in accordance with divine
commands. In Quran and the Islamic thought, the body has a
significant role. In addition to existential, moral and aesthetical
characters, it has a religious character too, and this allows for
the talk of an Islamic body. However, the body has historically
been marginalized in the Islamic culture and there have
been much talk about it. An examination of the body’s
transformations in Quran –e.g. its transfer from the worldly life
to the afterlife- shows that the body is not in the same status all
the time; your worldly body is not your barzakhī body, your
barzakhī body is not your resurrected body, and your
resurrected body is not your body in heaven or hell. In this
paper, I will talk about these transformations and the role of the
body all throughout.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: body, Quran, resurrection, heaven, hell, forms of
body.
Islam does not take the body to be accidentally or randomly
God has created the soul and the body and never
considers the body and its needs in a negative way, nor allows
for its humiliation or harm or violence. Instead Quran calls for
meeting the biological or bodily needs in accordance with the
related affairs
from eating and drinking to sleeping and sexual intercourse
count as sacred as far as they are in accordance with divine
commands. In Quran and the Islamic thought, the body has a
to existential, moral and aesthetical
characters, it has a religious character too, and this allows for
the body has historically
been marginalized in the Islamic culture and there have not
examination of the body’s
e.g. its transfer from the worldly life
shows that the body is not in the same status all
body, your
ed body, and your
resurrected body is not your body in heaven or hell. In this
paper, I will talk about these transformations and the role of the
body, Quran, resurrection, heaven, hell, forms of
The Distinction oThe Distinction oThe Distinction oThe Distinction or Sameness ofr Sameness ofr Sameness ofr Sameness of
RūRūRūRūḥḥḥḥ and and and and NafsNafsNafsNafs in the Quranin the Quranin the Quranin the Quran
Gholamreza ParhizkarGholamreza ParhizkarGholamreza ParhizkarGholamreza Parhizkar
Hawzahof Qom (Iran)Hawzahof Qom (Iran)Hawzahof Qom (Iran)Hawzahof Qom (Iran)
In this paper I will talk about whether or not the words
(spirit) and nafs (soul) refer to one and the same thing. An
examination of Quranic verses and Ḥadīth shows that
one and the same meaning and I have classified 5 categories of
arguments for this view. However there is a slight difference
between the two: rūḥ refers to the immaterial aspect of human
person and nafs includes the man's material aspects as well
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), Quran, Ḥadīth, body.
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In this paper I will talk about whether or not the words rūḥ
(soul) refer to one and the same thing. An
shows that they have
categories of
arguments for this view. However there is a slight difference
refers to the immaterial aspect of human
material aspects as well.
, body.
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The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
in Early Muslim Theologiansin Early Muslim Theologiansin Early Muslim Theologiansin Early Muslim Theologians
Mohammad Taqi SobhaniMohammad Taqi SobhaniMohammad Taqi SobhaniMohammad Taqi Sobhani
Islamic Sciences and Culture (QomIslamic Sciences and Culture (QomIslamic Sciences and Culture (QomIslamic Sciences and Culture (Qom, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
Anthropological issues came into currency among Muslim
theologians (mutakalimīn) and philosophers only since the
century A.H. and there is not much information available about
the mutakalimīn’s views on the matter in the first three
centuries. More research shows that the issue was a matter of
serious discussion in the mid-second century A.H. and raised
controversies among mutakalimīn. Interestingly a variety of
theories about the immateriality and materiality of the soul
were at stake from the dawn of this discussion. In this paper, I
will examine and compare the views of Hishām ibn Ḥ
Hishām ibn Sālim (of Shiite mutakalimīn) on the one hand, and
Abulhodhail 'Allaf and Naẓām (of Mu’tazilites) on the other, and
will finally compare these with the views of the late Shiite
Mu’tazilites such as Sadūq, Mufīd, Murtaḍā, and Qāḍ
Jabbār.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: nafs (soul), mutakalimīn, Mu’tazilites,
materiality, immateriality.
Anthropological issues came into currency among Muslim
and philosophers only since the 4th
century A.H. and there is not much information available about
in the first three
centuries. More research shows that the issue was a matter of
second century A.H. and raised
. Interestingly a variety of
theories about the immateriality and materiality of the soul
were at stake from the dawn of this discussion. In this paper, I
Ḥakam and
) on the one hand, and
m (of Mu’tazilites) on the other, and
with the views of the late Shiites and
ḍī 'Abd al-
s, Shiites,
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body Theories among MidBody Theories among MidBody Theories among MidBody Theories among Mid----Century Shiite Century Shiite Century Shiite Century Shiite
MutakalimīnMutakalimīnMutakalimīnMutakalimīn and their Implicationsand their Implicationsand their Implicationsand their Implications
for the Doctrine of Resurrectionfor the Doctrine of Resurrectionfor the Doctrine of Resurrectionfor the Doctrine of Resurrection
Alinaqi Alinaqi Alinaqi Alinaqi KhodayariKhodayariKhodayariKhodayari
Imam Khomeini School of Religions and History (QomImam Khomeini School of Religions and History (QomImam Khomeini School of Religions and History (QomImam Khomeini School of Religions and History (Qom, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran
In this paper I will introduce some of the views of the mid
century Shiite mutakalimīn (from 4th to 7th century A.H.), their
historical development, and their implications for the doctrine
of resurrection. In the introduction of the paper, some
Mu’tazilite views which count as backgrounds to Shiite
mutakalimīn will be reviewed.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: nafs (soul), mutakalimīn, resurrection.
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Century Shiite Century Shiite Century Shiite Century Shiite
and their Implicationsand their Implicationsand their Implicationsand their Implications
, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
In this paper I will introduce some of the views of the mid-
century A.H.), their
historical development, and their implications for the doctrine
of resurrection. In the introduction of the paper, some
Mu’tazilite views which count as backgrounds to Shiite
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The Soul and the ResurrectionThe Soul and the ResurrectionThe Soul and the ResurrectionThe Soul and the Resurrection
in Sayyid Murtain Sayyid Murtain Sayyid Murtain Sayyid Murtaḍḍḍḍāāāā’s View’s View’s View’s View
Alireza As’adiAlireza As’adiAlireza As’adiAlireza As’adi
Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)
A comprehensive account of some religious doctrines depends
on our views about the humans and their characte
Different anthropological theories yield various accounts of
religious doctrines. The main anthropological problem is that of
the ultimate nature of humans. In this paper, I will talk about
the soul-body problem in the view of one of the main Shii
theologians, Sayyid Murtaḍā, and some challenges that
might face in accounting some of the religious doctrines.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: nafs (soul), body, resurrection, anthropology,
Murtaḍā.
A comprehensive account of some religious doctrines depends
on our views about the humans and their characteristics.
Different anthropological theories yield various accounts of
religious doctrines. The main anthropological problem is that of
I will talk about
view of one of the main Shiite
that his view
religious doctrines.
(soul), body, resurrection, anthropology, Sayyid
The Immateriality of the SoulThe Immateriality of the SoulThe Immateriality of the SoulThe Immateriality of the Soul
in Some Ash'arite in Some Ash'arite in Some Ash'arite in Some Ash'arite Views:Views:Views:Views:
The History, Textual Evidence and ImplicationsThe History, Textual Evidence and ImplicationsThe History, Textual Evidence and ImplicationsThe History, Textual Evidence and Implications
Ahmed Abdeljabbar SnobarAhmed Abdeljabbar SnobarAhmed Abdeljabbar SnobarAhmed Abdeljabbar Snobar ((((JordanJordanJordanJordan))))
In this paper I will talk about the views of some Ash'arites who
believe that the soul is an immaterial, a-spatial substance which
is not described as physical and is not characterized by material
features such as penetration and separation; rather
attached to matters as a governing principle. Ghazālī and R
in some of his opinions- and Baiḍāwī are the most famous
proponents of this view. However, this view is against the
mainstream of Ash'arites who believe in the materiality of the
soul.
Here I will examine the textual evidence of the proponents of
this view and their implications –specially of late Ash'arites
and point to the theory of Hanbalites who conclusively reject
the immateriality of the soul and make textual arguments for
the materiality of the soul.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: immateriality, rūḥ (spirit), Ash'arites
Ḥadīth.
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The History, Textual Evidence and ImplicationsThe History, Textual Evidence and ImplicationsThe History, Textual Evidence and ImplicationsThe History, Textual Evidence and Implications
In this paper I will talk about the views of some Ash'arites who
spatial substance which
not characterized by material
features such as penetration and separation; rather it is
and Rāzī –
are the most famous
proponents of this view. However, this view is against the
mainstream of Ash'arites who believe in the materiality of the
Here I will examine the textual evidence of the proponents of
of late Ash'arites-
and point to the theory of Hanbalites who conclusively reject
the immateriality of the soul and make textual arguments for
Ash'arites, Quran,
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GhazGhazGhazGhazāāāāllllīīīī andandandand the Nature of the Soulthe Nature of the Soulthe Nature of the Soulthe Nature of the Soul
and its Relation to the Body:and its Relation to the Body:and its Relation to the Body:and its Relation to the Body:
the Conflict between the Quran and Philosophythe Conflict between the Quran and Philosophythe Conflict between the Quran and Philosophythe Conflict between the Quran and Philosophy
Mehdi AkhavanMehdi AkhavanMehdi AkhavanMehdi Akhavan
Allameh Tabatabei University (TehranAllameh Tabatabei University (TehranAllameh Tabatabei University (TehranAllameh Tabatabei University (Tehran, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
Ghazālī’s philosophical psychology has positive and negative
aspects. One of the most important problems in which Quranic
doctrines are denied by the philosophical intellect is in the field
of philosophical psychology. His negative views can be inferred
from his attacks on philosophical views in the Questions
of Tahāfut al-Falāsifah. In his view, falāsifah
philosophers) have provided 10 arguments for the immateriality
of the soul, all of which fail to prove the claim. Ghaz
criticizes the falāsifah’s view that the soul is immortal, since it
entails that bodies cannot be resurrected, thus he accuses
falāsifah of heresy. Thus in Ghazālī’s works, religious doctrines
and philosophical views in issues concerning the soul meet.
Falāsifah such as Ibn Rushd and Ṣadrā have adopted different
approaches to such challenges. This paper will di
dispute between Ghazāī and falāsifah.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: nafs (soul), Ghazāī, immateriality, resurrection,
qiyāmah.
the Conflict between the Quran and Philosophythe Conflict between the Quran and Philosophythe Conflict between the Quran and Philosophythe Conflict between the Quran and Philosophy
’s philosophical psychology has positive and negative
roblems in which Quranic
doctrines are denied by the philosophical intellect is in the field
of philosophical psychology. His negative views can be inferred
from his attacks on philosophical views in the Questions 18 & 19
falāsifah (Muslim
arguments for the immateriality
of the soul, all of which fail to prove the claim. Ghazālī also
’s view that the soul is immortal, since it
ed, thus he accuses
’s works, religious doctrines
and philosophical views in issues concerning the soul meet.
have adopted different
approaches to such challenges. This paper will discuss the
āī, immateriality, resurrection,
The Soul in the Quran from The Soul in the Quran from The Soul in the Quran from The Soul in the Quran from TirmidhīTirmidhīTirmidhīTirmidhī 's View's View's View's View
Mohammed SooriMohammed SooriMohammed SooriMohammed Soori
Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
Though Tirmidhī has no independent work on Quranic exegesis,
some of his discussions about the human soul throughout his
works are of exegetical character. The most important of his
works about the soul is Qawr al-Ūmūr which is the main
reference of this paper. Tirmidhī usually appeals to Quranic
verses, and rarely does he recourse to other sources such as
Ḥadīth. It seems that his account of the soul was completely
novel and unique in his time, and it remains novel even today,
though it had impacts on some mystics such as Ibn Arab
Tirmidhī distinguishes between two types of souls: inward
(bāṭin) and outward (ẓahir). The essence of the inward soul is
the most inferior type of mud, since the mud was the footstep of
the Lucifer (Iblīs) before the creation of Ādam. Tirmi
that the footstep of each person is part of him. This is why the
Lucifer sees at least part of Ādam as his own and thus
prostrate (sajdah) for him. The inward soul has different states
and it should be challenged with, in order for the p
achieve happiness. The outward soul, unlike the inward, has no
particular tendencies and merely obeys anyone who dominates
it. If knowledge which is the light and intellect dominates the
outward soul, it would become intellectual, and if the inwar
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's View's View's View's View
has no independent work on Quranic exegesis,
some of his discussions about the human soul throughout his
works are of exegetical character. The most important of his
which is the main
usually appeals to Quranic
verses, and rarely does he recourse to other sources such as
of the soul was completely
, and it remains novel even today,
s Ibn Arabī.
distinguishes between two types of souls: inward
). The essence of the inward soul is of
the most inferior type of mud, since the mud was the footstep of
Tirmidhī argues
that the footstep of each person is part of him. This is why the
dam as his own and thus did not
for him. The inward soul has different states
in order for the person to
achieve happiness. The outward soul, unlike the inward, has no
particular tendencies and merely obeys anyone who dominates
it. If knowledge which is the light and intellect dominates the
outward soul, it would become intellectual, and if the inward
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soul dominates it, it would become Satanic. Tirmidhī
talk about the materiality or immateriality of the soul directly
(in fact the issue seems to have been strange, unknown to him),
but his talks imply that he took the soul to be fin
matter (jism laṭīf).
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: nafs (soul), Quran, Tirmidhī, inward soul, outward
soul.
Tirmidhī did not
talk about the materiality or immateriality of the soul directly
(in fact the issue seems to have been strange, unknown to him),
but his talks imply that he took the soul to be fine-grained
(soul), Quran, Tirmidhī, inward soul, outward
A Comparison of A Comparison of A Comparison of A Comparison of ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean View of the Soulean View of the Soulean View of the Soulean View of the Soul
Relation Relation Relation Relation totototo the Quranic Conception of the Manthe Quranic Conception of the Manthe Quranic Conception of the Manthe Quranic Conception of the Man
Mohammad AbbasMohammad AbbasMohammad AbbasMohammad Abbas----Zadeh JahromiZadeh JahromiZadeh JahromiZadeh Jahromi
The Higher Education Complex (Jahrom, The Higher Education Complex (Jahrom, The Higher Education Complex (Jahrom, The Higher Education Complex (Jahrom, Iran)Iran)Iran)Iran)
The soul-body unification in Ṣadrāean philosophy is based on
some principles, which can be compared with the Quranic
picture of the man. Some of these principles are as follows:
human persons are individuated by their souls, their souls are
not specifica, the soul is created out of the body, it is
evolution, immaterial, hierarchical (tashkīkī) in character,
unified with its faculties, and its unity is not numerical.
In this paper, I will try to give Quranic evidence for the
Ṣadrāean view. The Quran ascribes various attributes to the
human person: dignity, superiority to all other creatures, being
created in hardship, ungratefulness, being in loss, weakness,
hastefulness, voraciousness, and ignorance, which can all be
explained in Ṣadrāean terms.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, body, Transcendental philosophy, Quran,
religious doctrines.
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ean View of the Soulean View of the Soulean View of the Soulean View of the Soul----Body Body Body Body
the Quranic Conception of the Manthe Quranic Conception of the Manthe Quranic Conception of the Manthe Quranic Conception of the Man
hilosophy is based on
some principles, which can be compared with the Quranic
picture of the man. Some of these principles are as follows:
human persons are individuated by their souls, their souls are
it is subject to
in character,
unified with its faculties, and its unity is not numerical.
In this paper, I will try to give Quranic evidence for the
The Quran ascribes various attributes to the
human person: dignity, superiority to all other creatures, being
created in hardship, ungratefulness, being in loss, weakness,
hastefulness, voraciousness, and ignorance, which can all be
soul, body, Transcendental philosophy, Quran,
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Soul and SpiritSoul and SpiritSoul and SpiritSoul and Spirit
in Min Min Min Mīīīīrzrzrzrzāāāā MahdMahdMahdMahdīīīī EEEEṣṣṣṣfahfahfahfahāāāānnnnīīīī's View's View's View's View
Mohammad BiabaniMohammad BiabaniMohammad BiabaniMohammad Biabani
Āl alĀl alĀl alĀl al----Bait Institute (Qom, Iran)Bait Institute (Qom, Iran)Bait Institute (Qom, Iran)Bait Institute (Qom, Iran)
In this paper, I will talk about Mīrzā Mahdī Eṣfahā
about the soul and spirit. Mīrzā Mahdī is the founder of a
theological movement in Iran which is often known as the
school of tafkīk or ma'ārif which emphasizes on the separation
between religious beliefs and philosophical arguments. I will
talk about the meaning and nature of the soul and the
the difference between them, the way of knowing the soul, types
of souls and spirits, the need of the soul to the body, the role of
the soul and the spirit in the nature of human beings, the stages
of human creation (as composed of the body and the spirit), the
soul and spirit in the uterus, in the world, in
(purgatory) and in the afterlife.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Mīrzā Mahdī Eṣfahānī, soul, spirit, human essence.
ānī's views
is the founder of a
theological movement in Iran which is often known as the
which emphasizes on the separation
between religious beliefs and philosophical arguments. I will
the spirit and
the difference between them, the way of knowing the soul, types
of souls and spirits, the need of the soul to the body, the role of
spirit in the nature of human beings, the stages
ion (as composed of the body and the spirit), the
soul and spirit in the uterus, in the world, in barzakh
ī, soul, spirit, human essence.
Soul and BodySoul and BodySoul and BodySoul and Body
in Allin Allin Allin Allāāāāmeh meh meh meh ababababāāāāṭṭṭṭababababā'īā'īā'īā'ī’s View’s View’s View’s View
Mansour NasiriMansour NasiriMansour NasiriMansour Nasiri
Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (QomIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (QomIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (QomIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
As to the problem of the soul, Allāmeh abāṭabā'ī is generally a
dualist and specifically a defender of Ṣadrāean transcendental
(muta'āliyah) philosophy, though his view has its own
characteristics. Firstly, he widely appeals to the Quran and
Ḥadīth; secondly he is in disagreement with Ṣadrā on various
points, for instance, in the way he states the soul-body relation.
In this paper, I will investigate Allāmeh abāṭab
regarding the significant problems of the soul, such as the
meaning of rūḥ (spirit) and nafs (soul) in the Quran and
the proofs of the existence of the soul, the immateriality of the
soul, the nature of the human and their implications for an
account of religious doctrines, such as the afterlife and the
resurrection.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Allāmeh abāṭabā'ī, soul, body, dualism.
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is generally a
ean transcendental
philosophy, though his view has its own
istics. Firstly, he widely appeals to the Quran and
on various
body relation.
abā'ī's view
gnificant problems of the soul, such as the
(soul) in the Quran and Ḥadīth;
the proofs of the existence of the soul, the immateriality of the
human and their implications for an
such as the afterlife and the
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An Exegesis of An Exegesis of An Exegesis of An Exegesis of 1111 Corinthian Corinthian Corinthian Corinthian 5:55:55:55:5
Daniel BediakoDaniel BediakoDaniel BediakoDaniel Bediako
Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)
First Corinthians 5:5 reads, “To deliver such an one unto Satan
for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in
the day of the Lord Jesus” (KJV). This text presents both
exegetical and theological difficulties that relate to the spirit
body dichotomy. For example, questions that are often asked
include the following: How is the church to "deliver" the
incestuous man to Satan? What does "destruction of the flesh"
mean? What about the salvation of the "spirit" in the day of the
Lord? What implications does this text have for church
discipline? The article focuses on three areas. The first briefly
surveys various scholarly views on the passage; the second
establishes its historical and literary contexts; and the third
provides a lexical analysis of the relevant lexical items of the
text (i.e., “deliver,” “destruction,” “flesh,” “spirit,” “save”),
indicating how they fit into the context of 1 Corinthians
the Pauline writings in general.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: 1 Corinthians, body, flesh, spirit, save, duality
To deliver such an one unto Satan
for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in
” (KJV). This text presents both
exegetical and theological difficulties that relate to the spirit-
body dichotomy. For example, questions that are often asked
e the following: How is the church to "deliver" the
incestuous man to Satan? What does "destruction of the flesh"
mean? What about the salvation of the "spirit" in the day of the
Lord? What implications does this text have for church
e focuses on three areas. The first briefly
surveys various scholarly views on the passage; the second
establishes its historical and literary contexts; and the third
provides a lexical analysis of the relevant lexical items of the
destruction,” “flesh,” “spirit,” “save”),
Corinthians 5 and
duality.
PART II
Afterlife
2222. . . . 1111. . . . The DoctrineThe DoctrineThe DoctrineThe Doctrine
of Intermediate Statof Intermediate Statof Intermediate Statof Intermediate Stateeee
The IntermediateThe IntermediateThe IntermediateThe Intermediate----State State State State PerfectionPerfectionPerfectionPerfection
Mahdi Nekouyi SamaniMahdi Nekouyi SamaniMahdi Nekouyi SamaniMahdi Nekouyi Samani (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
One of the main issues in philosophy and theology is the
problem of the nature of the soul, its immateriality and life in
barzakh. The problem of the perfection and change in the soul
after its separation from the body is one of the most
complicated and yet rarely discussed philosophical issues. Can
we give a philosophical explanation of this religious doctrine?
This is an acknowledged doctrine on the basis of Ḥa
ones which show that persons in barzakh will be rewarded by
what their survivors do. Some people believe that
completely narrational (naqlī) in character and it cannot be
rationalized by philosophical explanations. But others try to
give philosophical explanations for the perfection in barzakh
this paper I will try to give a philosophical explanation on the
basis of Ṣadrāean philosophy.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, immateriality, immortality, imaginal body,
barzakh.
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One of the main issues in philosophy and theology is the
e of the soul, its immateriality and life in
and change in the soul
after its separation from the body is one of the most
complicated and yet rarely discussed philosophical issues. Can
we give a philosophical explanation of this religious doctrine?
adīths: the
will be rewarded by
what their survivors do. Some people believe that barzakh is
) in character and it cannot be
rationalized by philosophical explanations. But others try to
barzakh. In
this paper I will try to give a philosophical explanation on the
soul, immateriality, immortality, imaginal body,
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Perfection in BarzakhPerfection in BarzakhPerfection in BarzakhPerfection in Barzakh
Ahmad EfshagarAhmad EfshagarAhmad EfshagarAhmad Efshagar (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The perfection in barzakh is an issue which has not been much
discussed. In his return to God, the human person passes from
different worlds to reach the divine neighborhood (whether
rewarded or punished). When entering each of thes
both body and soul acquire new properties and lose some
defects; this is perfection, that is, a change towards the better.
Barzakh is one of the worlds in which every person will reside
after their death and gets perfected. Philosophers have trou
accounting for the perfection in barzakh though it is an
established religious doctrine. The problem arises because
the soul is considered to be immaterial, (2) any perfection
motion or change is restricted to matters and it is impossible for
immaterial entities to change, and (3) in afterlife there are no
actions which are subjects to rewards and punishments. In this
paper I will try to solve the problem by rejecting (2)
want to argue that there is motion in immaterial entities.
KeywoKeywoKeywoKeywords:rds:rds:rds: perfection, barzakh, human, resurrection, soul, body.
is an issue which has not been much
discussed. In his return to God, the human person passes from
different worlds to reach the divine neighborhood (whether
rewarded or punished). When entering each of these worlds,
both body and soul acquire new properties and lose some
defects; this is perfection, that is, a change towards the better.
is one of the worlds in which every person will reside
after their death and gets perfected. Philosophers have trouble
though it is an
The problem arises because (1)
any perfection,
motion or change is restricted to matters and it is impossible for
in afterlife there are no
actions which are subjects to rewards and punishments. In this
), that is, I
want to argue that there is motion in immaterial entities.
, human, resurrection, soul, body.
Perfection and Volition in Perfection and Volition in Perfection and Volition in Perfection and Volition in BarzakhBarzakhBarzakhBarzakh
Ahmadreza HonariAhmadreza HonariAhmadreza HonariAhmadreza Honari (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
One of the stages of the human life is the material, worldly one.
In this stage humans undergo essential changes on the basis of
the substantial motion (ḥarikat jawharī) and gradually change
to become actualized. According to religious doctrines, humans
move to the world of barzakh after death, and enjoy an
intermediate-state life between their death and the general
resurrection. Religious doctrines show that the human
perfection does not stop by their death, and they will continue
to change even in the world of barzakh. This doctri
accounted for in terms of the substantial motion and the
principle of the renewal of the similar (tajadud amthāl
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: material world, substantial motion, perfection,
barzakh.
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One of the stages of the human life is the material, worldly one.
In this stage humans undergo essential changes on the basis of
and gradually change
to become actualized. According to religious doctrines, humans
after death, and enjoy an
state life between their death and the general
resurrection. Religious doctrines show that the human
perfection does not stop by their death, and they will continue
. This doctrine can be
accounted for in terms of the substantial motion and the
tajadud amthāl).
material world, substantial motion, perfection,
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Luke Luke Luke Luke 16:1916:1916:1916:19----31313131: : : : Intermediate State of the SoulIntermediate State of the SoulIntermediate State of the SoulIntermediate State of the Soul
Daniel Daniel Daniel Daniel BerchieBerchieBerchieBerchie
Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)
This study seeks to determine the meaning of Luke
The question is whether this passage teaches intermediate state
of the disembodied soul after death or not. Having studied the
setting in which Jesus told this parable and Lucan context, this
paper concludes that the presentation of the unseen world
represents the eschatological judgment.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: immaterial soul, death, intermediate state.
Intermediate State of the SoulIntermediate State of the SoulIntermediate State of the SoulIntermediate State of the Soul????
This study seeks to determine the meaning of Luke 16:19-31.
The question is whether this passage teaches intermediate state
of the disembodied soul after death or not. Having studied the
this parable and Lucan context, this
paper concludes that the presentation of the unseen world
immaterial soul, death, intermediate state.
Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Purgatory: A Study of the Historical DevelopmentDevelopmentDevelopmentDevelopment
of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility
with the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlifewith the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlifewith the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlifewith the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlife
Robert OseiRobert OseiRobert OseiRobert Osei----BonsuBonsuBonsuBonsu
Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)Valley View University (Ghana)
When it comes to the afterlife, Seventh-day Adventists advocate
“soul sleep” condition, in which the dead person is in some sort
of suspended state until the final judgment. On the other hand,
many Evangelical Christians believe that the dead go directly to
Heaven to be with the Lord. But in Roman Catholicism,
purgatory is considered as the place where the dead believers
expiate their remaining sins before entering the visible presence
of God. This doctrine has been criticized extensively both by
Catholics and Evangelicals in spite of its massive defence by the
Holy office. Several alternative views about the resurrection of
the dead have been propounded by some twentieth century
Protestants and some notable Catholic theologians. Although
the doctrine of purgatory has been approved and reaffirmed by
several Church councils, the question still remains: i
doctrine of purgatory biblically justifiable? Does the work of
salvation extend beyond the grave? This study is an attempt to
find satisfactory answers to these questions. This study
therefore surveys the doctrine of purgatory in the light of the
biblical teachings about death. The first chapter surveys the
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DevelopmentDevelopmentDevelopmentDevelopment
of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility
with the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlifewith the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlifewith the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlifewith the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlife
day Adventists advocate
e dead person is in some sort
of suspended state until the final judgment. On the other hand,
many Evangelical Christians believe that the dead go directly to
Heaven to be with the Lord. But in Roman Catholicism,
the dead believers
expiate their remaining sins before entering the visible presence
of God. This doctrine has been criticized extensively both by
Catholics and Evangelicals in spite of its massive defence by the
out the resurrection of
the dead have been propounded by some twentieth century
Protestants and some notable Catholic theologians. Although
the doctrine of purgatory has been approved and reaffirmed by
several Church councils, the question still remains: is the
doctrine of purgatory biblically justifiable? Does the work of
salvation extend beyond the grave? This study is an attempt to
This study
therefore surveys the doctrine of purgatory in the light of the
iblical teachings about death. The first chapter surveys the
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background to the doctrine with reference to the Judaism, the
Apocrypha, the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and
Church Councils. The second chapter looks at the nature of
purgatory, the duration and the nature of the punishment
meted out to those who go to purgatory; and how souls are
released from purgatory. The third chapter will also examine
the biblical teaching on death. The study concludes that the
purgatory is based on tradition rather than the Bible. The Bible
emphasizes the finality of one’s destiny in this life rather than
after this life. When it comes to our salvation, human efforts
have no merits.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Bible, purgatory, afterlife.
background to the doctrine with reference to the Judaism, the
Apocrypha, the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and
Church Councils. The second chapter looks at the nature of
tion and the nature of the punishment
meted out to those who go to purgatory; and how souls are
released from purgatory. The third chapter will also examine
the biblical teaching on death. The study concludes that the
er than the Bible. The Bible
emphasizes the finality of one’s destiny in this life rather than
after this life. When it comes to our salvation, human efforts
2222. . . . 2222. . . . ResurrectionResurrectionResurrectionResurrection
and the Mindand the Mindand the Mindand the Mind----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
An Analysis of An Analysis of An Analysis of An Analysis of ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Quranic Eschatologyean Quranic Eschatologyean Quranic Eschatologyean Quranic Eschatology
in light of the Mindin light of the Mindin light of the Mindin light of the Mind----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
Hamed ShivaHamed ShivaHamed ShivaHamed Shiva
Mofid University (QomMofid University (QomMofid University (QomMofid University (Qom, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
This paper will provide a report of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view on
resurrection in light of the mind-body problem. Here I shall
categorize Mulla Ṣadrā’s view with an eye on his exegetical
work, and will show that he gives a different interpretation of
Quranic resurrection, though he is against ta’wīl, in a coher
way. I will then talk about the views of Mullā Ṣadrā’s opponents,
and show first that it is wrong to ascribe two different views to
Ṣadrā; a Quranic and a philosophical one, and secondly, that his
opponents fail to provide a better explanation of the
resurrection.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, resurrection, soul, body, Quran.
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ean Quranic Eschatologyean Quranic Eschatologyean Quranic Eschatologyean Quranic Eschatology
s view on
body problem. Here I shall
s view with an eye on his exegetical
work, and will show that he gives a different interpretation of
, in a coherent
s opponents,
and show first that it is wrong to ascribe two different views to
; a Quranic and a philosophical one, and secondly, that his
opponents fail to provide a better explanation of the
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A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist
Account of ResurrectionAccount of ResurrectionAccount of ResurrectionAccount of Resurrection
Ali Sana'eiAli Sana'eiAli Sana'eiAli Sana'ei
Semnan University (SemnanSemnan University (SemnanSemnan University (SemnanSemnan University (Semnan, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
It seems that the religious doctrine of resurrection is not
compatible with materialism, but Lynne Rudder Baker as a
materialist tries to philosophically account for resurrection. She
distinguishes between matter, living organism, and human
persons. She regards the mental life of humans as wholly
material which is formed by way of evolution. The mental life
transfers from the material body to an intermediate-
by way of a miracle. This argument is of a theological character,
which shows a weakness in her philosophical explanation of the
resurrection. Her criterion for the personal identity of persons
in this world and the next is not compatible with her
functionalist view, and cannot adequately account for the
intermediate states of persons between death and the general
resurrection. In order to give a more adequate account of the
resurrection it seems that we should better appeal to the theory
of the existential degrees of humans in Islamic philosophy, since
an imaginal (mithālī) body accounts for the metaphysical
relation between the material world and the intermedi
and counts as a criterion for the personal identity of persons in
this world and the hereafter.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, Lynne Baker, Resurrection, soul, mind, body.
A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist
It seems that the religious doctrine of resurrection is not
with materialism, but Lynne Rudder Baker as a
materialist tries to philosophically account for resurrection. She
distinguishes between matter, living organism, and human
persons. She regards the mental life of humans as wholly
way of evolution. The mental life
-state body
by way of a miracle. This argument is of a theological character,
which shows a weakness in her philosophical explanation of the
r the personal identity of persons
in this world and the next is not compatible with her
functionalist view, and cannot adequately account for the
intermediate states of persons between death and the general
account of the
resurrection it seems that we should better appeal to the theory
of the existential degrees of humans in Islamic philosophy, since
) body accounts for the metaphysical
relation between the material world and the intermediate state,
and counts as a criterion for the personal identity of persons in
adrā, Lynne Baker, Resurrection, soul, mind, body.
The Ethereal Body and Quranic ResurrectionThe Ethereal Body and Quranic ResurrectionThe Ethereal Body and Quranic ResurrectionThe Ethereal Body and Quranic Resurrection
Mostafa Mo'meniMostafa Mo'meniMostafa Mo'meniMostafa Mo'meni (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Bodily resurrection is one of the essential Islamic beliefs which
resist a philosophical argumentation. Ibn Sina has admitted
that this doctrine cannot be philosophically proved and accepts
it only because of the textual religious evidence. However, Mull
Ṣadrā believes that the doctrine can be philosophically
accounted for on the basis of some principles such as the
principality of existence (aṣālat wujūd), hierarchy of existence,
and substantial motion, and concludes that an ethereal body
will be resurrected in the afterlife. In this paper, I will discuss
about whether this ethereal body can account for the bodily
resurrection that is cited in Quran or not. I will show that the
Ṣadrāean account is not compatible with the Quranic
resurrection except if we make unusual interpretations of
Quranic verses.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, Mullā Ṣadrā, bodily resurrection, ethereal
body.
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The Ethereal Body and Quranic ResurrectionThe Ethereal Body and Quranic ResurrectionThe Ethereal Body and Quranic ResurrectionThe Ethereal Body and Quranic Resurrection
Bodily resurrection is one of the essential Islamic beliefs which
argumentation. Ibn Sina has admitted
that this doctrine cannot be philosophically proved and accepts
evidence. However, Mullā
believes that the doctrine can be philosophically
accounted for on the basis of some principles such as the
, hierarchy of existence,
and substantial motion, and concludes that an ethereal body
ted in the afterlife. In this paper, I will discuss
about whether this ethereal body can account for the bodily
resurrection that is cited in Quran or not. I will show that the
ean account is not compatible with the Quranic
ake unusual interpretations of
adrā, bodily resurrection, ethereal
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The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical
Psychology for his EschatologyPsychology for his EschatologyPsychology for his EschatologyPsychology for his Eschatology
Sadeq Mirahmadi SarpiriSadeq Mirahmadi SarpiriSadeq Mirahmadi SarpiriSadeq Mirahmadi Sarpiri (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Avicenna accepts the doctrine of bodily resurrection only as a
religious belief and thinks that it cannot have a philosophical
proof. However, he tries to prove another type of resurrection
which is based on the rational happiness and miserability of the
men and calls it "spiritual resurrection". He talks about the
survival of the souls, their unification after death, the
happiness and miserability and bodies, their perfection and
imperfection, the rejection of metempsychosis, the
immateriality of the soul, the soul-body interaction, the soul
body relations in order to achieve perfection and other
eschatological issues which are affected by his psychological
view. This paper will discuss the implications of Avicenna's
psychology for his eschatology.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, soul, bodily resurrection, spiritual
resurrection.
The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical
rine of bodily resurrection only as a
religious belief and thinks that it cannot have a philosophical
proof. However, he tries to prove another type of resurrection
which is based on the rational happiness and miserability of the
. He talks about the
survival of the souls, their unification after death, their
happiness and miserability and bodies, their perfection and
imperfection, the rejection of metempsychosis, the
ion, the soul-
body relations in order to achieve perfection and other
eschatological issues which are affected by his psychological
view. This paper will discuss the implications of Avicenna's
ly resurrection, spiritual
The Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife DoctrinesThe Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife DoctrinesThe Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife DoctrinesThe Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife Doctrines
Yasser KhoshnevisYasser KhoshnevisYasser KhoshnevisYasser Khoshnevis
Sharif University (Tehran, Iran)Sharif University (Tehran, Iran)Sharif University (Tehran, Iran)Sharif University (Tehran, Iran)
In this paper, I introduce the causal version of property
emergentism as an alternative for reductionism. After that, I
show that the property of qualitative consciousness has the
characteristics of emergent properties. Then, I elaborate the
substance emergentism thesis and distinguish three versions of
it. In the final section, I consider the relationship between four
mentioned versions of emergentism with afterlife doctrines,
both in embodied and disembodied states and identify
necessary conditions for consistency of the considered
with the afterlife doctrines.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: emergentism, consciousness, reductionism, bodily
resurrection.
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The Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife DoctrinesThe Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife DoctrinesThe Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife DoctrinesThe Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife Doctrines
In this paper, I introduce the causal version of property
After that, I
qualitative consciousness has the
characteristics of emergent properties. Then, I elaborate the
substance emergentism thesis and distinguish three versions of
etween four
mentioned versions of emergentism with afterlife doctrines,
both in embodied and disembodied states and identify
considered versions
, reductionism, bodily
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The Problem of Resurrection and the MindThe Problem of Resurrection and the MindThe Problem of Resurrection and the MindThe Problem of Resurrection and the Mind
Relation in Ibn Sina and MullRelation in Ibn Sina and MullRelation in Ibn Sina and MullRelation in Ibn Sina and Mullāāāā ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrā
Zahra AlemiZahra AlemiZahra AlemiZahra Alemi (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Different views about the mind-body relations lead to different
accounts of death and resurrection. In this paper I will talk
about the commonalities of two Muslim philosophers in this
regard (the soul's being ḥādith- being proceeded by
nothingness, the perfection of the soul and its unification with
intellect after death, the spiritual and bodily resurrection, the
rejection of metempsychosis, the rejection of the eternal
punishment) and their disagreements (the materiality or
immateriality of the soul in its origin, the kind of the attachment
of the soul and the body to one another, and the possibility or
impossibility of a philosophical argument for bodily
resurrection). Thus I will give a comprehensive presentation of
their perspectives on the problem of resurrection. I conclude
with the contention that Mullā Ṣadrā has given a more adequate
account of resurrection which is compatible with Quranic
teaching.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, Mullā Ṣadrā, soul, body, resurrection.
The Problem of Resurrection and the MindThe Problem of Resurrection and the MindThe Problem of Resurrection and the MindThe Problem of Resurrection and the Mind----Body Body Body Body
adrāadrāadrāadrā
body relations lead to different
accounts of death and resurrection. In this paper I will talk
about the commonalities of two Muslim philosophers in this
being proceeded by
rfection of the soul and its unification with
intellect after death, the spiritual and bodily resurrection, the
rejection of metempsychosis, the rejection of the eternal
punishment) and their disagreements (the materiality or
ts origin, the kind of the attachment
body to one another, and the possibility or
impossibility of a philosophical argument for bodily
resurrection). Thus I will give a comprehensive presentation of
resurrection. I conclude
has given a more adequate
account of resurrection which is compatible with Quranic
adrā, soul, body, resurrection.
The Sameness and Likeness of AfterlThe Sameness and Likeness of AfterlThe Sameness and Likeness of AfterlThe Sameness and Likeness of Afterlife Bodiesife Bodiesife Bodiesife Bodies
in the Quranin the Quranin the Quranin the Quran
Akbar QorbaniAkbar QorbaniAkbar QorbaniAkbar Qorbani (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
One of the main issues regarding the mind-body problem is
whether afterlife bodies are the same as (or identical with)
worldly bodies or are just like them (or similar to them in all
aspects, without being identical)? Some Quranic verses seem to
testify to the sameness and some seem to demonstrate the
likeness. In this paper, after a brief introduction of the accounts
given by Ghazālī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and Price, I will examine the
Quranic verses and conclude that in Quran, the human soul
which is the criterion of man's identity is, in fact, the same as
man's worldly soul, but his afterlife body will be like his worldly
body. Thus the changes in his worldly body do not give rise to
any problems about his personal identity.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Quran, soul, body, sameness, likeness, afterlife.
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ife Bodiesife Bodiesife Bodiesife Bodies
body problem is
whether afterlife bodies are the same as (or identical with)
worldly bodies or are just like them (or similar to them in all
tical)? Some Quranic verses seem to
testify to the sameness and some seem to demonstrate the
likeness. In this paper, after a brief introduction of the accounts
and Price, I will examine the
n Quran, the human soul
which is the criterion of man's identity is, in fact, the same as
man's worldly soul, but his afterlife body will be like his worldly
body. Thus the changes in his worldly body do not give rise to
Quran, soul, body, sameness, likeness, afterlife.
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The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men
in Different Formsin Different Formsin Different Formsin Different Forms
Marzieh RezaeeMarzieh RezaeeMarzieh RezaeeMarzieh Rezaee (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The resurrection of humans in different forms is one of the
Islamic doctrines and is not compatible with philosophical
views. According to Quran, some people will be resurrected as
dogs and pigs (moreover, it says that some people are in these
forms even in this world). If we take humanness to be a
specifica proximus and rationality as its differentia, we cannot
account for the above doctrine. This is why some exegetics have
interpreted these verses as metaphorical. If we accept the
principle of the validity of appearances (ẓawahir) of the verses,
we should seek for a philosophical explanation for such verses.
In this paper, I will talk about the troubles for Ibn Sina's view in
the explanation of this doctrine, and then defend the
explanation as plausible. One of the Ṣadrāean philosophical
grounds in explaining this doctrine is the substantial motion
and his theory of the soul-body relation. According to the
substantial motion, human persons do not count as stable
entities; rather they are perdurant entities which can be reduced
to an animal degree.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: resurrection, substantial motion, qiyāmah
entity.
The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men
The resurrection of humans in different forms is one of the
Islamic doctrines and is not compatible with philosophical
views. According to Quran, some people will be resurrected as
dogs and pigs (moreover, it says that some people are in these
n this world). If we take humanness to be a
, we cannot
account for the above doctrine. This is why some exegetics have
interpreted these verses as metaphorical. If we accept the
of the verses,
we should seek for a philosophical explanation for such verses.
In this paper, I will talk about the troubles for Ibn Sina's view in
the explanation of this doctrine, and then defend the Ṣadrāean
ean philosophical
grounds in explaining this doctrine is the substantial motion
body relation. According to the
substantial motion, human persons do not count as stable
entities which can be reduced
qiyāmah, perduant
The Dualist Afterlife:The Dualist Afterlife:The Dualist Afterlife:The Dualist Afterlife: Avicenna and Mulla Avicenna and Mulla Avicenna and Mulla Avicenna and Mulla
Jari KaukuaJari KaukuaJari KaukuaJari Kaukua
University of University of University of University of JyväskyläJyväskyläJyväskyläJyväskylä (Finland)(Finland)(Finland)(Finland)
Subscribing to the principles of logically valid reasoning and
parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion
that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval
Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Quranic
account of the afterlife in ways that may have compromised at
least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent
precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of
Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular
case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence
incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with
Revelation risk neglecting important variations between
theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of
possibilities in the concepts involved.
From this perspective, I will consider the eschatological
implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and
Mulla Ṣadrā, who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human
being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern
one's body. Two questions will then emerge as especially central
to dualistic accounts of the afterlife. (1) How do we make sense
of the kind of first-personality that must be an irreducible
constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter
fulfills the eschatological promise given in the Revelation? For
in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in
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Avicenna and Mulla Avicenna and Mulla Avicenna and Mulla Avicenna and Mulla ṢṢṢṢadradradradrāāāā
logically valid reasoning and
parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion
that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval
Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Quranic
compromised at
least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent
precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of
Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular
case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence or
incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with
Revelation risk neglecting important variations between
theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of
the eschatological
implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and
who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human
being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern
ally central
How do we make sense
personality that must be an irreducible
constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter
Revelation? For
in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in
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this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In
the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines to
which Avicenna and Mulla Ṣadrā subscribe, individuality entails
materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have
a distinctly first-personal existence only when some kind of
connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition
of one's individuation. (2) How do we account f
emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the
Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts
that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily
instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the reve
account is in danger of becoming a mere metaphor.
In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's
dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife.
He does try to give an account of a genuinely first
afterlife, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from
the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which
Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife
is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to
the second question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the
Revelation in almost exclusively metaphorical terms.
On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first
question, Mulla Ṣadrā conceives of the separate existence of the
human soul in much broader terms than his predecessor. By
means of the concepts of mental existence (wujūd dhihni
the world of images ('ālam al-mithāl), he ends up with a
conception of human afterlife that is richer in terms of
experiential content, and thereby potentially more coh
with the revealed account.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Avicenna, Ṣadrā, afterlife, dualism.
this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In
the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines to
individuality entails
materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have
personal existence only when some kind of
connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition
How do we account for the
emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the
Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts
that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily
instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the revealed
In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's
dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife.
He does try to give an account of a genuinely first-personal
e, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from
the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which
Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife
is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to
d question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the
On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first
conceives of the separate existence of the
s than his predecessor. By
wujūd dhihni) and
), he ends up with a
conception of human afterlife that is richer in terms of
experiential content, and thereby potentially more coherent
Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal
Identity from Early to ReformationIdentity from Early to ReformationIdentity from Early to ReformationIdentity from Early to Reformation----Era ChristianityEra ChristianityEra ChristianityEra Christianity
Michael J. SigristMichael J. SigristMichael J. SigristMichael J. Sigrist
George Washington University (USA)George Washington University (USA)George Washington University (USA)George Washington University (USA)
This paper explores early and Reformation-era Christian
attempts to render the idea of an afterlife coherent. The specific
focus is on early Reformed Christians’ unequivocal belief in a
bodily criterion of personal identity and of a physical afterlife. I
trace how the differences that emerge from this endeavor are
partially sourced in Jewish divisions over the same. Lending
focus and structure to this broadly reconstructive project is a
sustained critique of Princeton philosopher Mark Johnston’s
recent agenda-setting series of lectures published as
Death.
Christian thinking about the afterlife and immortality can be
traced to two conflicting sources. The first is the Pharisaic
doctrine of resurrection. Not all Jews during the time of the
early Roman Empire believed in an immortal soul or an
afterlife. The Gospel book of Mark records that during his trial a
group of Sadducees attempted to confound Jesus by putting to
him questions that made the notion of an afterlife conflict with
the laws of marriage (proof, thought the Sadducees, that
resurrection was impossible) (Mark 12: 18 – 27). By contrast
the Pharisees—importantly, the Apostle Paul was a committed
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Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal
Era ChristianityEra ChristianityEra ChristianityEra Christianity
era Christian
attempts to render the idea of an afterlife coherent. The specific
focus is on early Reformed Christians’ unequivocal belief in a
bodily criterion of personal identity and of a physical afterlife. I
race how the differences that emerge from this endeavor are
partially sourced in Jewish divisions over the same. Lending
focus and structure to this broadly reconstructive project is a
sustained critique of Princeton philosopher Mark Johnston’s
setting series of lectures published as Surviving
Christian thinking about the afterlife and immortality can be
traced to two conflicting sources. The first is the Pharisaic
doctrine of resurrection. Not all Jews during the time of the
an Empire believed in an immortal soul or an
afterlife. The Gospel book of Mark records that during his trial a
group of Sadducees attempted to confound Jesus by putting to
him questions that made the notion of an afterlife conflict with
ge (proof, thought the Sadducees, that
By contrast,
importantly, the Apostle Paul was a committed
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member of this group—believed in resurrection, an explicitly
material afterlife in which the bodies of the dead are physically
raised and reconstituted. The reconstituted body was clearly
understood to be the same person as had died. The notion of an
afterlife that I will call—following accepted precedent
‘resurrectionism’ clearly presupposes a bodily criterion of
personal identity. Immortality in the afterlife is achieved by the
fact that one will after the Great Day enjoy the same body
enjoys now.
The second source of Christian thinking about the afterlife
comes from Greek philosophical and especially Platonic
influences. While it is unlikely the earliest Christians (from the
first century CE) were very conversant in Hellenic philosophy,
by the fourth and fifth centuries—significantly, the time which
witnessed the important Councils from Nicea to Chalcedon
Church ‘doctors’ who would decide the basic orthodox tenets of
the Christian religion (most importanty, Origen, Tertullian and
Augustine of Hippo) certainly were. It is from these sources and
Plato especially that the notion of an afterlife came to rest upon
the notion of an immaterial soul that could not be destroyed
and therefore would survive the death of the body.
These two traditions vie uneasily throughout the period of pre
Reformation Christianity. The first portion of my paper
(roughly a third) briefly outlines and comments upon the
juxtaposition of these conflicting sources and remarks upon
attempts by Catholic philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and
Anselm of Canterbury to marry them in ways which were not
explicitly inconsistent. The majority of the paper, however,
focuses upon the fundamental rethinking of the matter enabled
by Reformed Christian thinkers who would reject accepted
Catholic doctrine.
believed in resurrection, an explicitly
dies of the dead are physically
raised and reconstituted. The reconstituted body was clearly
person as had died. The notion of an
following accepted precedent—
ly criterion of
personal identity. Immortality in the afterlife is achieved by the
same body as one
The second source of Christian thinking about the afterlife
especially Platonic
influences. While it is unlikely the earliest Christians (from the
first century CE) were very conversant in Hellenic philosophy,
significantly, the time which
ea to Chalcedon—the
Church ‘doctors’ who would decide the basic orthodox tenets of
the Christian religion (most importanty, Origen, Tertullian and
Augustine of Hippo) certainly were. It is from these sources and
life came to rest upon
soul that could not be destroyed
These two traditions vie uneasily throughout the period of pre-
Reformation Christianity. The first portion of my paper
(roughly a third) briefly outlines and comments upon the
juxtaposition of these conflicting sources and remarks upon
philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and
Anselm of Canterbury to marry them in ways which were not
explicitly inconsistent. The majority of the paper, however,
focuses upon the fundamental rethinking of the matter enabled
would reject accepted
Specifically, Reformed Christian and Lutheran thinkers nearly
universally rejected the Platonic conception in toto
resolutely affirm the Pharisaic tradition of resurrectionism.
That is to say, nearly all Reform Christian thinkers of the
and 17th centuries insist upon a bodily criterion of personal
identity vis-à-vis the afterlife. Histories of this era that touch
upon matters of dispute over the afterlife tend to explain the
emergence of resurrectionism mainly by appeal to doctrinal
forces: a desire to return to a conceived ‘early church’ and an
associated deep mistrust of anything Hellenic. By contrast,
philosophical work on personal identity rarely reaches back to
sources such as the early Reformed Christians due to the
professional burden that arguments should not rest upon
assumptions about the supernatural. I therefore turn to these
texts and history with a philosophers’ eye and re
attempts by early Reformed and Lutheran Christians to develop
a fully physical conception of the afterlife based upon the bodily
criterion of personal identity assumed by resurrectionism.
This latter, longer portion of the paper is organized around the
recent attempt at refutation of Christian physicalism by Mark
Johnston. Johnston claims that the very idea of personal
identity by virtue of bodily identity after death and physical
corruption is ‘incoherent.’ I examine the writings and
arguments of Reformed Christian resurrectionists and
mortalists (those thinkers who believe that the person literally
ceases to exist from the period after death to the period of
Judgment Day, at which time God brings the person back into
existence) in order to show that (1) they are aware of the sorts of
objections which Johnston raises and (2) offer rejoinders that
while not obviously refuting Johnston’s argument, subject them
to reasonable rejection. Specifically, Johnston offers a modal
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Specifically, Reformed Christian and Lutheran thinkers nearly
in toto and
resolutely affirm the Pharisaic tradition of resurrectionism.
m Christian thinkers of the 16th
centuries insist upon a bodily criterion of personal
the afterlife. Histories of this era that touch
upon matters of dispute over the afterlife tend to explain the
inly by appeal to doctrinal
forces: a desire to return to a conceived ‘early church’ and an
associated deep mistrust of anything Hellenic. By contrast,
philosophical work on personal identity rarely reaches back to
ians due to the
professional burden that arguments should not rest upon
assumptions about the supernatural. I therefore turn to these
texts and history with a philosophers’ eye and re-construct
attempts by early Reformed and Lutheran Christians to develop
a fully physical conception of the afterlife based upon the bodily
criterion of personal identity assumed by resurrectionism.
This latter, longer portion of the paper is organized around the
recent attempt at refutation of Christian physicalism by Mark
hnston. Johnston claims that the very idea of personal
after death and physical
corruption is ‘incoherent.’ I examine the writings and
arguments of Reformed Christian resurrectionists and
believe that the person literally
ceases to exist from the period after death to the period of
Judgment Day, at which time God brings the person back into
they are aware of the sorts of
offer rejoinders that,
while not obviously refuting Johnston’s argument, subject them
to reasonable rejection. Specifically, Johnston offers a modal
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argument that he claims is based upon a wholly ‘mundane’
notion of necessity. He claims that the mundane laws of
necessity hold regardless of one’s views of the supernatural. I
provide an argument to show that Johnston’s demonstration of
this claim is weak, and therefore that how one views the
supernatural, most significantly the purposes and nature of
God, in fact influence how one conceives of the afterlife. This
point is further reinforced by an examination of writings on
precisely this point by Reformed Christians (which explains in
part why esoteric disputes in this area were regularly so heated).
I lay out the problem as early Reformed Christians conceived it
of determining exactly what constitutes the same body
virtue of what is the resurrected body the same body as the one
that had died?) and why the same body can be understood as
being the same person. My general conclusion is that Christian
resurrectionism—or at least, the best forms of it as presented by
some of the more astute Reformed Christian thinkers
least a coherent idea regardless of whether or not it is true.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Early Christianity, Reformation Era, resurrection,
personal idenittu.
argument that he claims is based upon a wholly ‘mundane’
undane laws of
necessity hold regardless of one’s views of the supernatural. I
provide an argument to show that Johnston’s demonstration of
this claim is weak, and therefore that how one views the
supernatural, most significantly the purposes and nature of
God, in fact influence how one conceives of the afterlife. This
point is further reinforced by an examination of writings on
precisely this point by Reformed Christians (which explains in
part why esoteric disputes in this area were regularly so heated).
I lay out the problem as early Reformed Christians conceived it
the same body (by
body as the one
that had died?) and why the same body can be understood as
. My general conclusion is that Christian
or at least, the best forms of it as presented by
some of the more astute Reformed Christian thinkers—is at
least a coherent idea regardless of whether or not it is true.
Christianity, Reformation Era, resurrection,
Augustine and Ibn Sina on SoulsAugustine and Ibn Sina on SoulsAugustine and Ibn Sina on SoulsAugustine and Ibn Sina on Souls
in the Afterlifein the Afterlifein the Afterlifein the Afterlife
Gareth B. MatthewsGareth B. MatthewsGareth B. MatthewsGareth B. Matthews
University of Massachusetts, Amherst (USA)University of Massachusetts, Amherst (USA)University of Massachusetts, Amherst (USA)University of Massachusetts, Amherst (USA)
Despite remarkable similarities between Augustine and Ibn
Sina on the soul’s knowledge of itself, there seem to be
important differences between these two thinkers on issues
concerning souls in the afterlife. The question of what
individuates a soul after bodily death is a serious and difficult
question for Ibn Sina. He seems to find this matter quite
perplexing. By contrast, Augustine does not address this topic
directly. Nevertheless, Augustine does make various claims
about the afterlife that would give him at least the basis for an
account of soul individuation after physical death. One might
well wonder, however, whether either Augustine or Ibn Sina
should be satisfied with the account I offer.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Augustine, Ibn Sina, soul, body, afterlife.
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Despite remarkable similarities between Augustine and Ibn
’s knowledge of itself, there seem to be
important differences between these two thinkers on issues
concerning souls in the afterlife. The question of what
individuates a soul after bodily death is a serious and difficult
find this matter quite
perplexing. By contrast, Augustine does not address this topic
directly. Nevertheless, Augustine does make various claims
about the afterlife that would give him at least the basis for an
death. One might
well wonder, however, whether either Augustine or Ibn Sina
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Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General
Resurrection: Mapping Resurrection: Mapping Resurrection: Mapping Resurrection: Mapping Philosophical Conclusions Philosophical Conclusions Philosophical Conclusions Philosophical Conclusions
Onto FaithOnto FaithOnto FaithOnto Faith----Based DoctrinesBased DoctrinesBased DoctrinesBased Doctrines
Richard TaylorRichard TaylorRichard TaylorRichard Taylor
Marquette University (USA)Marquette University (USA)Marquette University (USA)Marquette University (USA)
It is well known that Thomas Aquinas argued for the continued
existence of the individual human soul after separation at the
death of the body with reasoning founded on his philosophical
understanding of the soul and its nature as intellectual knower
using reasoning from his study of the Muslim Philosophers
Avicenna and Averroes. Aquinas also argued on philosophical
grounds for the unity of the human person with Aristotelian
teleological reasoning that entails the post-mortem resurrection
of the body and its reuniting with the soul. And on the basis of
his Christian faith Aquinas also held as a matter of doctrine that
the soul does not die with the body and that at the end of time
the soul would be reunited with the body in a general
resurrection. This paper provides a critical analysis of the
reasoning of Aquinas on these two issues evaluating carefully
the extent to which the philosophical conclusions reached map
onto the religious beliefs he held by faith.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Aquinas, soul, death, general resurrection.
Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General
Philosophical Conclusions Philosophical Conclusions Philosophical Conclusions Philosophical Conclusions
It is well known that Thomas Aquinas argued for the continued
existence of the individual human soul after separation at the
unded on his philosophical
understanding of the soul and its nature as intellectual knower
using reasoning from his study of the Muslim Philosophers
Avicenna and Averroes. Aquinas also argued on philosophical
Aristotelian
mortem resurrection
of the body and its reuniting with the soul. And on the basis of
his Christian faith Aquinas also held as a matter of doctrine that
t the end of time
the soul would be reunited with the body in a general
resurrection. This paper provides a critical analysis of the
reasoning of Aquinas on these two issues evaluating carefully
the extent to which the philosophical conclusions reached map
Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect
(Rational Soul) and the Denial(Rational Soul) and the Denial(Rational Soul) and the Denial(Rational Soul) and the Denial
of the Individual Immortalityof the Individual Immortalityof the Individual Immortalityof the Individual Immortality
Hassan YousofianHassan YousofianHassan YousofianHassan Yousofian
Imam Khomeini EducatioImam Khomeini EducatioImam Khomeini EducatioImam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
One of the theories of Ibn Rushdd (Averroes) which brought
about serious attacks from the Church in the 13th century was
the theory of the unity of the intellect (rational soul) in all
humans, its consequence taken to be the denial of the individual
immortality. Proponents of Ibn Rushd admitted the
consequence and in order to defend this view along with the
doctrine of individual immortality they had to subscribe to the
weird theory of the double truth (the possibility of the truth of
two contradictory propositions in two different domains). The
source of the theory of the intellectual unity is in Aristotle’s view
of the active and passive intellects. According to Ibn Rush
interpretation of Aristotle, the active intellect is –besides the
passive one- an intellect which separates from the human body
at death and enjoys an immortal life. However, given the fact
that the active intellect is numerically one and it is not the case
that each human person has their own active intellect and the
passive intellect dies with the death of the body, we should come
to the conclusion that the theory of intellectual unity entails the
denial of the resurrection and individual immortality. According
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Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect
n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)n and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
One of the theories of Ibn Rushdd (Averroes) which brought
century was
the theory of the unity of the intellect (rational soul) in all
be the denial of the individual
d admitted the
consequence and in order to defend this view along with the
doctrine of individual immortality they had to subscribe to the
of the truth of
two contradictory propositions in two different domains). The
source of the theory of the intellectual unity is in Aristotle’s view
Ibn Rushd’s
besides the
an intellect which separates from the human body
at death and enjoys an immortal life. However, given the fact
that the active intellect is numerically one and it is not the case
intellect and the
passive intellect dies with the death of the body, we should come
to the conclusion that the theory of intellectual unity entails the
denial of the resurrection and individual immortality. According
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to this theory, what remains after death is one universal
immaterial entity (the active intellect). Ibn Rush
sometimes been explicit on this consequence and took
philosophers to think that each human individual does not
enjoy their own souls. The underlying reason for this claim is
that the source of numerical plurality is matter; therefore, if the
soul is immortal, there will only be one soul when the bodies
disappear. Nonetheless Ibn Rushd proposes the possibility of
there being a fine-grained matter, which might be the grounds
for the plurality of the souls after death.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Rushd, rational soul, individual immortality,
active intellect, passive intellect, resurrection.
th is one universal
Ibn Rushd has
sometimes been explicit on this consequence and took
philosophers to think that each human individual does not
enjoy their own souls. The underlying reason for this claim is
that the source of numerical plurality is matter; therefore, if the
immortal, there will only be one soul when the bodies
d proposes the possibility of
grained matter, which might be the grounds
, individual immortality,
The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal
World (World (World (World (‘ālam al‘ālam al‘ālam al‘ālam al----mithālmithālmithālmithāl) in the Illuminationist ) in the Illuminationist ) in the Illuminationist ) in the Illuminationist
tradition (tradition (tradition (tradition (ḥḥḥḥikmat alikmat alikmat alikmat al----ishrāqishrāqishrāqishrāq) ) ) ) of the of the of the of the 13131313thththth century.century.century.century.
Roxanne D. MarcotteRoxanne D. MarcotteRoxanne D. MarcotteRoxanne D. Marcotte
University of Queensland (Australia)University of Queensland (Australia)University of Queensland (Australia)University of Queensland (Australia)
This paper will explore the function of the Illuminationist
(ishrāqī) imaginal realm (‘ālam al-mithāl) in the posthumous
life of souls (especially those that have yet to attain their
perfection) in the works of Ibn Kammunah (d.672/1277
al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d.after 688/1289) and Quṭb al
Shirāzi (d.710/1311) who all wrote commentaries on the works
of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d.1191), the founder of the
Illuminationist tradition. Of significance are the
functions that Suhrawardī ascribed to this fourth imaginal
realm he introduces (a departure from traditional Avicennan
Peripateticism), a world that is also equated with the world of
immaterial apparitional forms (al-ashbāḥ al-mujarradah
suspended forms (al-muthul al-mu‘allaqah) through which
Suhrawardī claims that the resurrection of bodies (
ajsād) occurs. This paper aims to explore how those three
authors conceived of the relation between this imaginal realm
and the posthumous life of souls with close readings of the
following edited works: Ibn Kammunah’s Tanqiḥāt fī Shar
Talwīḥāt (ed. Ḥabībī, 2009), a commentary on Suhrawardī’s
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The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal
) in the Illuminationist ) in the Illuminationist ) in the Illuminationist ) in the Illuminationist
century.century.century.century.
This paper will explore the function of the Illuminationist
) in the posthumous
life of souls (especially those that have yet to attain their
672/1277), Shams
b al-Din al-
who all wrote commentaries on the works
the founder of the
Illuminationist tradition. Of significance are the various
functions that Suhrawardī ascribed to this fourth imaginal
realm he introduces (a departure from traditional Avicennan
Peripateticism), a world that is also equated with the world of
mujarradah) and of
) through which
Suhrawardī claims that the resurrection of bodies (ba‘th al-
) occurs. This paper aims to explore how those three
authors conceived of the relation between this imaginal realm
fe of souls with close readings of the
āt fī Sharḥ al-
a commentary on Suhrawardī’s al-
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Talwīḥāt (ed. Ḥabībī, 2009), and his al-Kāshif
Isfahānī, 2008), also known as al-Jadīd fī al-Ḥikmah; Shams al
Dīn al-Shahrazūrī’s Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (ed. Ziai,
Rasā’il al-Shajarat al-Ilaḥiyyah fi ‘ulum al-Haqa’iq al
Rabbaniyyah (ed. Habīb, 2009), and his (iii) al-Rumuz wa al
Amthāl al-Lāhūtiyyah fī al-Anwār al-Mujarradah
Malakūtiyyah) (ed. Privot, 2008); and Quṭb al-Din al
Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and his Taḥqīq ‘Ālam al-Mithāl
Walbridge, 1992). It is hoped that this paper will highlight
significant elements of the 13th century legacy of the
Illuminationist tradition’s eschatology.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, world of mithāl, Suhrawardī, resurrection of
bodies.
Kāshif (ed. Nājī
; Shams al-
, 2001), his
Haqa’iq al-
Rumuz wa al-
Mujarradah al-
Din al-Shirāzi’s
Mithāl (ed.
that this paper will highlight
century legacy of the
, Suhrawardī, resurrection of
The Implications of Avicenna’s ConceptionThe Implications of Avicenna’s ConceptionThe Implications of Avicenna’s ConceptionThe Implications of Avicenna’s Conception
of the Soul for his Conception of Survivalof the Soul for his Conception of Survivalof the Soul for his Conception of Survivalof the Soul for his Conception of Survival
Reza AkbariReza AkbariReza AkbariReza Akbari
Imam Sadiq University (TehranImam Sadiq University (TehranImam Sadiq University (TehranImam Sadiq University (Tehran, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
For Avicenna, the soul is essentially the intellect and the other
faculties such as the vegetative and the animative belong to the
soul in virtue of the soul’s attachment to the body. The intellect
as the essence of the soul is immaterial and the other faculties
are material because of their embodied realization. This
psychological foundation in Avicenna’s philosophy is the basis
of his specific view about the resurrection. According to him, the
spiritual resurrection can be proved by reasoning, but reasoning
can in no way prove a bodily resurrection. The spiritual
resurrection is nothing but the pleasures and pains of the
intellectual faculty which are the results of the virtues and vices
in the person. Since the intellectual faculty is immaterial and
survives the bodily death, a philosophical explanation of its
pleasures and pains is possible and this is what Avicenna has
done. However, given that vegetative and animative faculties
have embodied realizations and are evolved from the soul’s
attachment to the body, they don’t survive the bodily death and
their pleasures and pains cannot be philosophically explained
for Avicenna. That is why Avicenna has given up the bodily
resurrection to the revelations. It seems that this intellectual
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The Implications of Avicenna’s ConceptionThe Implications of Avicenna’s ConceptionThe Implications of Avicenna’s ConceptionThe Implications of Avicenna’s Conception
of the Soul for his Conception of Survivalof the Soul for his Conception of Survivalof the Soul for his Conception of Survivalof the Soul for his Conception of Survival
oul is essentially the intellect and the other
faculties such as the vegetative and the animative belong to the
soul in virtue of the soul’s attachment to the body. The intellect
as the essence of the soul is immaterial and the other faculties
because of their embodied realization. This
psychological foundation in Avicenna’s philosophy is the basis
of his specific view about the resurrection. According to him, the
spiritual resurrection can be proved by reasoning, but reasoning
ove a bodily resurrection. The spiritual
resurrection is nothing but the pleasures and pains of the
intellectual faculty which are the results of the virtues and vices
in the person. Since the intellectual faculty is immaterial and
h, a philosophical explanation of its
pleasures and pains is possible and this is what Avicenna has
done. However, given that vegetative and animative faculties
have embodied realizations and are evolved from the soul’s
urvive the bodily death and
their pleasures and pains cannot be philosophically explained
for Avicenna. That is why Avicenna has given up the bodily
resurrection to the revelations. It seems that this intellectual
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modesty (putting the religious propositions regarding the
resurrection beyond the limited human intellect) is much better
than the unsuccessful attempts of those who seek reasoning for
bodily resurrection. It appears that bodily resurrection is a non
reasonable religious doctrine and we still need more theoretical
apparatus for proving it.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, intellect, soul, immortality, bodily
resurrection.
s regarding the
resurrection beyond the limited human intellect) is much better
than the unsuccessful attempts of those who seek reasoning for
bodily resurrection. It appears that bodily resurrection is a non-
more theoretical
Ibn Sina, intellect, soul, immortality, bodily
Bodily and Spiritual ResurrectionBodily and Spiritual ResurrectionBodily and Spiritual ResurrectionBodily and Spiritual Resurrection
in Islamic and Christian Doctrinesin Islamic and Christian Doctrinesin Islamic and Christian Doctrinesin Islamic and Christian Doctrines
Akbar FaydeiAkbar FaydeiAkbar FaydeiAkbar Faydei (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Resurrection is one of the common beliefs of all monotheistic
religions. This paper will comparatively examine the
resurrection in Islamic and Christian beliefs, and will emphasize
that the simple conception of resurrection in Christianity has
evolved to a comprehensive and complex one in Islam. Thou
Christianity has put much emphasis on resurrection, it has not
mentioned its details, but Islam has mentioned many details of
this doctrine.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Islam, Christianity, bodily resurrection, spiritual
resurrection.
A
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77
all monotheistic
religions. This paper will comparatively examine the
resurrection in Islamic and Christian beliefs, and will emphasize
that the simple conception of resurrection in Christianity has
evolved to a comprehensive and complex one in Islam. Though
Christianity has put much emphasis on resurrection, it has not
mentioned its details, but Islam has mentioned many details of
Islam, Christianity, bodily resurrection, spiritual
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Bodily ResurrectionBodily ResurrectionBodily ResurrectionBodily Resurrection
Kobra Kobra Kobra Kobra Rahimi, Nasrollah ShameliRahimi, Nasrollah ShameliRahimi, Nasrollah ShameliRahimi, Nasrollah Shameli (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Bodily resurrection is one of the controversial philosophical and
theological issues. There is no doubt about the implication of
the Quran and Ḥadīth for bodily resurrection, but it is still
subject to religious challenges, such as incompatibility with the
resurrection of people in the form of their actions (like animals),
Ḥadīths which show that the residents of heaven are beautiful
and young, but the residents of the hell are ugly, the
consciousness of the limbs and members of the body and their
oration, the unusual wideness of the heaven or the
extraordinary abundance of the heavenly blessings, all of which
are not compatible with a worldly body. In this paper we will
deal with this apparent contradiction.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: bodily resurrection, Ḥadīth, animal resurrection.
Bodily resurrection is one of the controversial philosophical and
theological issues. There is no doubt about the implication of
for bodily resurrection, but it is still
subject to religious challenges, such as incompatibility with the
resurrection of people in the form of their actions (like animals),
s which show that the residents of heaven are beautiful
residents of the hell are ugly, the
consciousness of the limbs and members of the body and their
ness of the heaven or the
extraordinary abundance of the heavenly blessings, all of which
this paper we will
, animal resurrection.
Resurrection and the SoulResurrection and the SoulResurrection and the SoulResurrection and the Soul----Body RelationBody RelationBody RelationBody Relation
in Ibn Sinain Ibn Sinain Ibn Sinain Ibn Sina
Kobra Majidi Kobra Majidi Kobra Majidi Kobra Majidi BidgoliBidgoliBidgoliBidgoli (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Making a distinction between rational and imperfect souls and
maintaining the survival of all souls after death, Ibn Sina makes
a picture of the bodily and spiritual resurrection; he
acknowledges the bodily resurrection merely by an appeal to
scriptural evidence, and believes that the spiritual resurrecti
can be philosophically proved. Ibn Sina believes that the
spiritual resurrection and the rational happiness of the souls
after death are based on the perfection of its theoretical and
practical faculties. For him, only simple souls can have a kind of
bodily resurrection in heavenly bodies. His views seem to be in
conflict with the religious doctrines about the resurrection and
this is what I will examine in this paper.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, soul, body, resurrection.
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Body RelationBody RelationBody RelationBody Relation
t souls and
maintaining the survival of all souls after death, Ibn Sina makes
a picture of the bodily and spiritual resurrection; he
acknowledges the bodily resurrection merely by an appeal to
scriptural evidence, and believes that the spiritual resurrection
can be philosophically proved. Ibn Sina believes that the
spiritual resurrection and the rational happiness of the souls
after death are based on the perfection of its theoretical and
practical faculties. For him, only simple souls can have a kind of
dily resurrection in heavenly bodies. His views seem to be in
conflict with the religious doctrines about the resurrection and
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The Implications of The Implications of The Implications of The Implications of ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Psychean Psychean Psychean Psychologyologyologyology
for Eschatologyfor Eschatologyfor Eschatologyfor Eschatology
Mohammad Reza Haji Esma'iliMohammad Reza Haji Esma'iliMohammad Reza Haji Esma'iliMohammad Reza Haji Esma'ili, , , , Zahra AlafchianZahra AlafchianZahra AlafchianZahra Alafchian (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Mulla Ṣadrā has presented a novel view about the resurrection
on the basis of his Transcendental philosophy (
muta'āliah). Upholding the origination (ḥudūth
immateriality of the soul, Ṣadrā believes that the soul is material
in its origin, spiritual in its survival, though there is no duality
between them. In his discussion of the different degrees of the
soul, he tries to prove the imaginal (mithālī) immateriality
which is very important in his eschatology, since the faculty of
imagination will survive the death and can feel pains and
pleasures. Ṣadrā takes the images to be immaterial, thus they
remain with the soul; this is the first stage of the afterl
the last stage of the material world. Notwithstanding all his
efforts, he has just proved the sameness of the afterlife body
with the worldly body, since he believes that the soul will create
his own body in the afterlife by employing his faculty o
imagination. But such a resurrection seems incompatible with
the religious doctrines. In this paper I will talk about the
implications of his psychology for his eschatology in order to see
whether his formulation of the doctrine of resurrection is
compatible with religious texts or not.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul, body, resurrection.
ologyologyologyology
has presented a novel view about the resurrection
hilosophy (ḥikmat
udūth) and
believes that the soul is material
in its origin, spiritual in its survival, though there is no duality
between them. In his discussion of the different degrees of the
materiality
which is very important in his eschatology, since the faculty of
imagination will survive the death and can feel pains and
takes the images to be immaterial, thus they
remain with the soul; this is the first stage of the afterlife and
the last stage of the material world. Notwithstanding all his
efforts, he has just proved the sameness of the afterlife body
with the worldly body, since he believes that the soul will create
his own body in the afterlife by employing his faculty of
imagination. But such a resurrection seems incompatible with
the religious doctrines. In this paper I will talk about the
implications of his psychology for his eschatology in order to see
whether his formulation of the doctrine of resurrection is
The Immortality of the Soul in QuranThe Immortality of the Soul in QuranThe Immortality of the Soul in QuranThe Immortality of the Soul in Quran
Qorbanali Karimzadeh GharamalekiQorbanali Karimzadeh GharamalekiQorbanali Karimzadeh GharamalekiQorbanali Karimzadeh Gharamaleki (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The immortality of the soul has been approached to in
philosophical, theological, mystical and Quranic ways by
Muslim thinkers. In this paper I will classify what Muslim
thinkers have said about this issue within five views. And then I
will talk about the usage of the words nafs (soul) and rū
in the Quran and their implications for the immortality of the
soul. I will conclude that the Quran makes a tripartite claim
about the immortality: (1) the continuity of the human life after
death and before the general resurrection in barzakh
resurrection of the bodies in the Day of Judgment, and
creation of an appropriate afterlife body.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Quran, immortality, theology, Islamic philosophy,
barzakh.
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The Immortality of the Soul in QuranThe Immortality of the Soul in QuranThe Immortality of the Soul in QuranThe Immortality of the Soul in Quran
The immortality of the soul has been approached to in
philosophical, theological, mystical and Quranic ways by
Muslim thinkers. In this paper I will classify what Muslim
thinkers have said about this issue within five views. And then I
rūḥ (spirit)
in the Quran and their implications for the immortality of the
soul. I will conclude that the Quran makes a tripartite claim
the continuity of the human life after
barzakh, (2) the
and (3) the
Quran, immortality, theology, Islamic philosophy,
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The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body Relation in ResBody Relation in ResBody Relation in ResBody Relation in Resurrection:urrection:urrection:urrection:
A perspective from Islamic PhilosophersA perspective from Islamic PhilosophersA perspective from Islamic PhilosophersA perspective from Islamic Philosophers
and Theologiansand Theologiansand Theologiansand Theologians
Mohammad Es’haq ArefiMohammad Es’haq ArefiMohammad Es’haq ArefiMohammad Es’haq Arefi (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The bodily resurrection is one of the issues which Islamic
thinkers adopted different approaches to account for.
Mutakalimīn on the basis of their understanding of the religious
texts and falāsifah on the basis of their argumentative principles
presented different accounts. Mullā Ṣadrā has formulated one of
the most novel views in this regard, about the weakness and
strength of which I will talk in this paper.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: mutakalimīn, Muslim philosophers, soul
bodily resurrection.
urrection:urrection:urrection:urrection:
A perspective from Islamic PhilosophersA perspective from Islamic PhilosophersA perspective from Islamic PhilosophersA perspective from Islamic Philosophers
The bodily resurrection is one of the issues which Islamic
thinkers adopted different approaches to account for.
g of the religious
on the basis of their argumentative principles
has formulated one of
the most novel views in this regard, about the weakness and
, Muslim philosophers, soul-body,
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body Relation in the ResurrectionBody Relation in the ResurrectionBody Relation in the ResurrectionBody Relation in the Resurrection
and its Role in Bodily Resurrection in and its Role in Bodily Resurrection in and its Role in Bodily Resurrection in and its Role in Bodily Resurrection in ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrā
Ahmad Sa'adatAhmad Sa'adatAhmad Sa'adatAhmad Sa'adat
AlAlAlAl----Mustafa University (Gorgan, Iran)Mustafa University (Gorgan, Iran)Mustafa University (Gorgan, Iran)Mustafa University (Gorgan, Iran)
There are at least 4 views about the soul-body relations in
resurrection. Some people believe that there is no body in
resurrection; this is called "spiritual resurrection". Others
believe that there is only body and no immaterial soul is
involved; this is called "bodily resurrection". Others believe that
the worldly body returns to the afterlife soul; this the "bodily
spiritual resurrection", and the last view is the Ṣadrā
that the afterlife body has an extention (three dimensions), but
it does not consist of matter (hylo). In resurrection, the soul and
body have a causal relation, and not an active
(hylomorphic) relation; that is to say, in the afterlife the soul
creates or brings about the body. This is compatible with the
Quranic resurrection, since the Quran says that in resurrection
there will be both body and soul, but it does not say anything
about what the body is; it might be hylomorphic one or non
hylomorphic.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul-body relation, bodily resurrection.
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Body Relation in the ResurrectionBody Relation in the ResurrectionBody Relation in the ResurrectionBody Relation in the Resurrection
adrāadrāadrāadrā
body relations in
resurrection. Some people believe that there is no body in
resurrection; this is called "spiritual resurrection". Others
believe that there is only body and no immaterial soul is
called "bodily resurrection". Others believe that
the worldly body returns to the afterlife soul; this the "bodily-
adrāean view
that the afterlife body has an extention (three dimensions), but
consist of matter (hylo). In resurrection, the soul and
body have a causal relation, and not an active-passive
(hylomorphic) relation; that is to say, in the afterlife the soul
creates or brings about the body. This is compatible with the
tion, since the Quran says that in resurrection
there will be both body and soul, but it does not say anything
about what the body is; it might be hylomorphic one or non-
body relation, bodily resurrection.
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ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāeaneaneanean Theory of the SoulTheory of the SoulTheory of the SoulTheory of the Soul
and the Bodily Resurrectionand the Bodily Resurrectionand the Bodily Resurrectionand the Bodily Resurrection
Gholamhossein Ebrahimi DinaniGholamhossein Ebrahimi DinaniGholamhossein Ebrahimi DinaniGholamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani1111
University of Tehran (Iran)University of Tehran (Iran)University of Tehran (Iran)University of Tehran (Iran)
Though the relation of the mind-body problem with the
religious doctrines is an awesome task, we can dare say that the
Ṣadrāean account of the bodily resurrection is the best
explanation and better than that is the account given by Z
Outstanding scholars like Eṣfahānī Kumpānī have subscribed to
Zunūzī’s account of the bodily resurrection. Ṣadrā
believe in souls which exist prior to bodies, and maintains that
what exists before bodies is the intellect. Human persons are in
this world individuated by their material bodies, though they
share their human quiddity; that is, if there is no matter, there
will not be any individuation in the intellectual (aqlānī
The material origination of the souls means that the soul
matter in its origination, not that it originates when the body is
formed. Thus the soul is a matter in the origination, and once
the perception begins in the animal or human, it develops to
have an imaginal (mithālī) immaterial existence, and once it
starts to have a universal (rational) cognition, it will have a
rational immaterial existence. The soul has many degrees, the
most primary of which is the matter and the highest of which is
1. The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.
body problem with the
religious doctrines is an awesome task, we can dare say that the
bodily resurrection is the best
explanation and better than that is the account given by Zunūzī.
have subscribed to
adrā does not
bodies, and maintains that
what exists before bodies is the intellect. Human persons are in
this world individuated by their material bodies, though they
share their human quiddity; that is, if there is no matter, there
aqlānī) world.
The material origination of the souls means that the soul is a
matter in its origination, not that it originates when the body is
formed. Thus the soul is a matter in the origination, and once
mal or human, it develops to
) immaterial existence, and once it
starts to have a universal (rational) cognition, it will have a
rational immaterial existence. The soul has many degrees, the
the highest of which is
the super-rational stage. The soul is thus a hierarchical entity
which is at the same time both material and immaterial. Thus
the Ṣadrāean view of the soul is monistic and not dualistic, and
he takes this to be compatible with the religious conception.
However what appears to be meant by the Quran and
not compatible with the immaterial soul and the
bodily resurrection, and they should be reinterpreted in order to
become compatible with the appearance of the religio
evidence.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, material origination, spiritual survival, bodily
resurrection.
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rational stage. The soul is thus a hierarchical entity
which is at the same time both material and immaterial. Thus
ean view of the soul is monistic and not dualistic, and
eligious conception.
However what appears to be meant by the Quran and Ḥadīth is
not compatible with the immaterial soul and the Ṣadrāean
bodily resurrection, and they should be reinterpreted in order to
become compatible with the appearance of the religious textual
adrā, material origination, spiritual survival, bodily
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SoulSoulSoulSoul----Body Monism with a DualBody Monism with a DualBody Monism with a DualBody Monism with a Dual----AspectAspectAspectAspect
Theory of their Relations and an Account ofTheory of their Relations and an Account ofTheory of their Relations and an Account ofTheory of their Relations and an Account of
the Bodily Resurrectionthe Bodily Resurrectionthe Bodily Resurrectionthe Bodily Resurrection
Askari Soleimani AmiriAskari Soleimani AmiriAskari Soleimani AmiriAskari Soleimani Amiri
Imam Khomeini Imam Khomeini Imam Khomeini Imam Khomeini Education and Research InstituteEducation and Research InstituteEducation and Research InstituteEducation and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
The human person is indubitably a material creature, but
should we reduce him to this perceived material object, or
should we maintain that he has another immaterial aspect?
According to physicalism, human persons are reduced to this
complicated, evolved matter, without any immaterial aspect.
However many philosophers claim that human persons have an
immaterial entity. There are different groups of immaterialists:
(1) Plato and Platonists believe that humans are immaterial, a
temporal entities which have existed before this world, and have
been attached to a worldly body. The soul, on this conception, is
a prisoner in the body, (2) Aristotle and his Muslim proponents
maintain that human persons are immaterial, a
entities created and attached to the body as its form. The soul
on this conception did not exist before the creation of the body;
rather it was created once the body was created, though it has
an immaterial nature. These two theories cannot accoun
bodily resurrection; the only thing they can show is the spiritual
one (the rational happiness and miserability). That is why Ibn
Sina explicitly says that he cannot prove the Quranic
AspectAspectAspectAspect
Theory of their Relations and an Account ofTheory of their Relations and an Account ofTheory of their Relations and an Account ofTheory of their Relations and an Account of
(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
The human person is indubitably a material creature, but
should we reduce him to this perceived material object, or
should we maintain that he has another immaterial aspect?
ons are reduced to this
complicated, evolved matter, without any immaterial aspect.
However many philosophers claim that human persons have an
immaterial entity. There are different groups of immaterialists:
immaterial, a-
temporal entities which have existed before this world, and have
been attached to a worldly body. The soul, on this conception, is
Aristotle and his Muslim proponents
maintain that human persons are immaterial, a-temporal
entities created and attached to the body as its form. The soul
on this conception did not exist before the creation of the body;
rather it was created once the body was created, though it has
an immaterial nature. These two theories cannot account for the
resurrection; the only thing they can show is the spiritual
one (the rational happiness and miserability). That is why Ibn
Sina explicitly says that he cannot prove the Quranic
resurrection, (3) Ṣadrā believes that human persons are
primarily mere pieces of matter without any immaterial aspect.
According to Ṣadrāean philosophy, the matter with which the
human persons are identified at their origination will be subject
to intensive (ishtidādī) substantial motion, and it undergoes the
solid, vegetative, and animal stages and finally finds its way to
the rational stage. The subject of this motion will in each of the
stages be a form unified with its matter as one and the same
existence. The human sperm has a solid form at first, and will
attain a vegetative form which is unified with its matter and will
constitute one and the same existence. From this it will evolve
to the animal stage developing sense and volitional motion with
an animal form unified with its matter. However at this stage
human perceptions and imaginations are immaterial, and thus
his animal form will be immaterial too. This will constitute one
and the same being with a hierarchical (tashkīkī) existence, one
aspect of which is material and the other is immaterial. The
animal form will continue to evolve through its substantial
motion, and will transform into an actual human being with
rational immateriality which will constitute one simple
hierarchical existence. It might still continue to evolve so much
that it loses its matter and elemental body and finally dies. At
this stage the soul will be accompanied by a body which has
been created by its perceptions and imaginations, since
whenever the soul imagines an object, it will be unified with that
image, and since these images are immaterial, their owners
should be imaginal too. Thus the soul has an imaginal (
body in which these images are recorded. This imaginal body
will accompany the soul in barzakh (purgatory) and
resurrection. Ṣadrā tries to justify the bodily resurrection on the
basis of some principles: the principle of the priority of
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believes that human persons are
ily mere pieces of matter without any immaterial aspect.
ean philosophy, the matter with which the
human persons are identified at their origination will be subject
substantial motion, and it undergoes the
vegetative, and animal stages and finally finds its way to
the rational stage. The subject of this motion will in each of the
stages be a form unified with its matter as one and the same
existence. The human sperm has a solid form at first, and will
a vegetative form which is unified with its matter and will
constitute one and the same existence. From this it will evolve
to the animal stage developing sense and volitional motion with
an animal form unified with its matter. However at this stage
perceptions and imaginations are immaterial, and thus
his animal form will be immaterial too. This will constitute one
) existence, one
aspect of which is material and the other is immaterial. The
m will continue to evolve through its substantial
motion, and will transform into an actual human being with
rational immateriality which will constitute one simple
hierarchical existence. It might still continue to evolve so much
and elemental body and finally dies. At
this stage the soul will be accompanied by a body which has
been created by its perceptions and imaginations, since
whenever the soul imagines an object, it will be unified with that
immaterial, their owners
should be imaginal too. Thus the soul has an imaginal (mithālī)
body in which these images are recorded. This imaginal body
(purgatory) and
tries to justify the bodily resurrection on the
basis of some principles: the principle of the priority of
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existence (iṣālat wujūd), the hierarchy of existence, the
intensiveness of the substantial motion, the form
approach to identity, the immateriality of the faculty of
imagination, and some others. Proponents of Ṣadrā adopted two
approaches to the problem of bodily resurrection: some take the
Ṣadrāean account of the bodily resurrection to be compatible
with the Quran, like Sabzawārī and Imam Khomeini, and some
acknowledge the Ṣadrāean notion, but take the Quranic notion
of the bodily resurrection to be wider than this and try to
present philosophical accounts for the Quranic resurrection.
According to the latter, though the soul separates from the
elemental body in the course of its substantial motion, the
corpse because of its materiality goes on its substantial motion
until when the whole world changes and transforms into the
afterlife. The transformed elements of the world are thus
attached to their respective souls and will be governed by the
soul. Therefore, each person will be resurrected by his own
body, and they will be the one and the same thing, their duality
being a matter of a conceptual analysis.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Platonists, physicalism, monism, bodily resurrection,
Ṣadrā.
), the hierarchy of existence, the
intensiveness of the substantial motion, the form-based
lity of the faculty of
adopted two
approaches to the problem of bodily resurrection: some take the
ean account of the bodily resurrection to be compatible
ni, and some
ean notion, but take the Quranic notion
of the bodily resurrection to be wider than this and try to
present philosophical accounts for the Quranic resurrection.
According to the latter, though the soul separates from the
lemental body in the course of its substantial motion, the
corpse because of its materiality goes on its substantial motion
until when the whole world changes and transforms into the
afterlife. The transformed elements of the world are thus
ir respective souls and will be governed by the
soul. Therefore, each person will be resurrected by his own
body, and they will be the one and the same thing, their duality
, bodily resurrection,
The Survival of the SoulThe Survival of the SoulThe Survival of the SoulThe Survival of the Soul
in Mullin Mullin Mullin Mullāāāā ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrā's View's View's View's View
Hadi MousaviHadi MousaviHadi MousaviHadi Mousavi (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Mullā Ṣadrā gives a novel account of the survival of the soul,
which counts both as a philosophical proof of the resurrection,
and a plausible analysis of the personal identity of resurrected
people. Ṣadrā employs his principles of the emergence of the
soul, the unificatory combination of the soul and the body, the
substantial motion of the human being, and soul-body relation
in a comprehensive account of the survival of the soul. He
argues for the survival on the basis of his own notion of the
soul-body relation in the framework of the substantial motion.
The soul for the survival of which he argues, includes not only
all the immaterial stages of the soul, but also the body as the
soul's lowest stage. Thus it seems that Ṣadrā is able to account
for the bodily resurrection on the basis of his analysis of the
survival of the soul.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, survival, soul, body, bodily resurrection.
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gives a novel account of the survival of the soul,
which counts both as a philosophical proof of the resurrection,
of the personal identity of resurrected
employs his principles of the emergence of the
soul, the unificatory combination of the soul and the body, the
body relation
the survival of the soul. He
argues for the survival on the basis of his own notion of the
body relation in the framework of the substantial motion.
The soul for the survival of which he argues, includes not only
, but also the body as the
is able to account
for the bodily resurrection on the basis of his analysis of the
adrā, survival, soul, body, bodily resurrection.
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Thomistic HyThomistic HyThomistic HyThomistic Hylomorphism and Human Persistence: lomorphism and Human Persistence: lomorphism and Human Persistence: lomorphism and Human Persistence:
Connections and ProspectsConnections and ProspectsConnections and ProspectsConnections and Prospects
between Christianity and Islambetween Christianity and Islambetween Christianity and Islambetween Christianity and Islam
Stephen R. OgdenStephen R. OgdenStephen R. OgdenStephen R. Ogden
Yale University (USA)Yale University (USA)Yale University (USA)Yale University (USA)
While the hylomorphic view of human nature as expounded by
Thomas Aquinas was prominent within the historical Christian
tradition, it boasts few proponents among contemporary
Christian philosophers. The latter have followed suit with most
Anglophone philosophers in the mind-body debate, separating
into camps of dualism or materialism. In contrast, the
Thomistic approach has been dismissed as an untenable
augmentation of Aristotelian metaphysics. Contemporary
Muslim philosophers might also reject Aquinas’ theory for
similar reasons, remaining unconvinced of its coherence. In
addition, they may recall Aquinas’ vehement rejection of the
Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd’s interpretation of Aristotle,
particularly regarding the human soul and the active intellect.
Hence, Aquinas might seem an unfitting resource for the
exploration of Islamic doctrines of human nature (al-insān
resurrection (al-qiyāma). This paper will first argue for the
coherence of Aquinas’ conception of the persistence of the
human person (i.e., personal identity over time), including the
survival of the human soul at death and subsequent
lomorphism and Human Persistence: lomorphism and Human Persistence: lomorphism and Human Persistence: lomorphism and Human Persistence:
While the hylomorphic view of human nature as expounded by
Thomas Aquinas was prominent within the historical Christian
tradition, it boasts few proponents among contemporary
Christian philosophers. The latter have followed suit with most
body debate, separating
into camps of dualism or materialism. In contrast, the
s been dismissed as an untenable
augmentation of Aristotelian metaphysics. Contemporary
Muslim philosophers might also reject Aquinas’ theory for
similar reasons, remaining unconvinced of its coherence. In
ction of the
shd’s interpretation of Aristotle,
particularly regarding the human soul and the active intellect.
Hence, Aquinas might seem an unfitting resource for the
-insān) and
). This paper will first argue for the
coherence of Aquinas’ conception of the persistence of the
human person (i.e., personal identity over time), including the
survival of the human soul at death and subsequent
resurrection. On this point, I will demonstrate how Aquinas is
importantly indebted to the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sīnā for
the view that the soul can subsist of itself once individuated by
the designated matter of a particular human body. Then, I will
consider how Aquinas’ hylomorphism may offer fruitful
prospects for the explanation of human nature and resurrection
not only for Christianity but also for Islam by comparing it to
other modern Christian interpretations (of Aquinas or
otherwise) as well as to a more thoroughgoing Muslim
proponent of resurrection than Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rushd
the philosophical theologian al-Ghazālī and his preferred option
for explaining the possibility of resurrection in the Tahāfut al
Falāsifa. I conclude that Thomistic hylomorphism
powerfully account for bodily resurrection and a true “return”
(Quran 17:15) of identically the same human body to the same
human soul.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Christianity, Islam, form, matter, dualism,
materialism.
A
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On this point, I will demonstrate how Aquinas is
importantly indebted to the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sīnā for
the view that the soul can subsist of itself once individuated by
the designated matter of a particular human body. Then, I will
nas’ hylomorphism may offer fruitful
prospects for the explanation of human nature and resurrection
not only for Christianity but also for Islam by comparing it to
other modern Christian interpretations (of Aquinas or
ghgoing Muslim
proponent of resurrection than Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rushd—namely,
Ghazālī and his preferred option
Tahāfut al-
. I conclude that Thomistic hylomorphism can more
powerfully account for bodily resurrection and a true “return”
) of identically the same human body to the same
Christianity, Islam, form, matter, dualism,
2.32.32.32.3. . . . MetemMetemMetemMetempsychosis and Raj’apsychosis and Raj’apsychosis and Raj’apsychosis and Raj’a
Correct Metempsychosis in MullCorrect Metempsychosis in MullCorrect Metempsychosis in MullCorrect Metempsychosis in Mullāāāā ṢṢṢṢadrā’adrā’adrā’adrā’s Views Views Views View
and his Explanation of Maskh Versesand his Explanation of Maskh Versesand his Explanation of Maskh Versesand his Explanation of Maskh Verses
Vahideh AmeriVahideh AmeriVahideh AmeriVahideh Ameri (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Metempsychosis (tanāsukh) means the belonging of the soul to
a new body after leaving a previous body. In the opinion of
Muslim philosophers, especially Mullā Ṣadrā, metempsychosis
is unacceptable and impossible. But in Ṣadrā's words there is a
kind of metempsychosis that is the perfection of soul by good or
bad deeds that will be manifested in the Hereafter. He called
this the correct metempsychosis in the corporeal resurrection.
With a little reflection it is clear that the true metempsychosis of
Mullā Ṣadrā and corporeal resurrection are two expressions of
one and the same fact. Otherwise some verses of Quran have
talked about metamorphosis (maskh) of a group of people into
monkeys and pigs. But if metempsychosis is wrong, how can
this doctrine be justified? Ṣadrā maintains that these verses are
about the hereafter and introduces it as a case of tr
metempsychosis and corporeal resurrection. Some followers of
the Ṣadrāean Philosophy, such as Āyatollah Javadī Ā
Allāmeh abāṭabā’ei, believe that these verses are about this
world, and present some philosophical explanations to make it
justified. According to their opinion, metempsychosis proposed
in these verses does not mean that the human persons are
replaced by individual monkeys or pigs. Rather it should be
defined as "human ape".
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, metempsychosis, metamorphosis, soul, body.
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s Views Views Views View
and his Explanation of Maskh Versesand his Explanation of Maskh Versesand his Explanation of Maskh Versesand his Explanation of Maskh Verses
means the belonging of the soul to
s body. In the opinion of
metempsychosis
's words there is a
kind of metempsychosis that is the perfection of soul by good or
Hereafter. He called
this the correct metempsychosis in the corporeal resurrection.
With a little reflection it is clear that the true metempsychosis of
and corporeal resurrection are two expressions of
ses of Quran have
) of a group of people into
monkeys and pigs. But if metempsychosis is wrong, how can
maintains that these verses are
about the hereafter and introduces it as a case of true
metempsychosis and corporeal resurrection. Some followers of
Āmolī and
’ei, believe that these verses are about this
world, and present some philosophical explanations to make it
d. According to their opinion, metempsychosis proposed
in these verses does not mean that the human persons are
replaced by individual monkeys or pigs. Rather it should be
, soul, body.
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Metempsychosis in Quran and Metempsychosis in Quran and Metempsychosis in Quran and Metempsychosis in Quran and ḤḤḤḤadīthadīthadīthadīth
Mohammad Taqi YousofiMohammad Taqi YousofiMohammad Taqi YousofiMohammad Taqi Yousofi
AlAlAlAl----MustafMustafMustafMustafāāāā University (Qom, Iran)University (Qom, Iran)University (Qom, Iran)University (Qom, Iran)
Metempsychosis has been dealt with not only in Islamic
philosophy, but also in Islamic theology (kalām), Ḥ
Quranic exegesis, and there have theological or textual
arguments for or against metempsychosis. Proponents of
metempsychosis take some texts of Quran and Ḥadīth
consonant with the necessity of metempsychosis, but others
maintain that evidence from Quran and Ḥadīth shows the
impossibility of the metempsychosis. In this paper, the two
views will be examined and then it will be demonstrated that
Quran and Ḥadīth do not show that the metempsychosis is
impossible; rather they show that a particular
metempsychosis –that the Hindu type of permanent
metempsychosis- never occurs, though it is logically possible.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: metempsychosis, metamorphosis, death, bodily
resurrection, soul, body.
adīthadīthadīthadīth
Metempsychosis has been dealt with not only in Islamic
Ḥadīth, and
Quranic exegesis, and there have theological or textual
arguments for or against metempsychosis. Proponents of
adīth to be
consonant with the necessity of metempsychosis, but others
shows the
impossibility of the metempsychosis. In this paper, the two
views will be examined and then it will be demonstrated that
do not show that the metempsychosis is
impossible; rather they show that a particular case of
that the Hindu type of permanent
never occurs, though it is logically possible.
metempsychosis, metamorphosis, death, bodily
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body Relations and Raj'aBody Relations and Raj'aBody Relations and Raj'aBody Relations and Raj'a
Hossein ElahiHossein ElahiHossein ElahiHossein Elahi----NijadNijadNijadNijad
Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
In the Shiite Ḥadīths there are words such as raj'a
raddah, 'awd, awb which all mean something like return or
regress. The Shi'ite doctrine of raj'a is the belief in the Second
Coming or the Return to Life of given past historical figures
after their physical death; the figures include the believers who
were oppressed and unbelievers who have oppressed. They will
return with the same physical and psychological characteristics
that they had in this world. This doctrine will give rise to
questions regarding souls and bodies. How can the return be
accounted for; do their souls return to their previous bodies or
to new bodies or to other people's bodies or to imaginal
(mithālī) bodies?
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Shiite, raj'a, soul, body, metempsychosis.
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raj'a, karrah,
which all mean something like return or
is the belief in the Second
Return to Life of given past historical figures
after their physical death; the figures include the believers who
were oppressed and unbelievers who have oppressed. They will
return with the same physical and psychological characteristics
this world. This doctrine will give rise to
questions regarding souls and bodies. How can the return be
accounted for; do their souls return to their previous bodies or
to new bodies or to other people's bodies or to imaginal
2.42.42.42.4. . . . Heaven and HellHeaven and HellHeaven and HellHeaven and Hell
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
and the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristicsand the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristicsand the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristicsand the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristics
Mohammad Hossein HeshmatpourMohammad Hossein HeshmatpourMohammad Hossein HeshmatpourMohammad Hossein Heshmatpour1111
University of Qom (Iran)University of Qom (Iran)University of Qom (Iran)University of Qom (Iran)
Heaven is generally illustrated as the highest joy and beauty
conceivable and this is why the characterizations of the heaven
are usually in bodily terms, though most philosophers believe in
the immaterial soul and the spirituality of the resurrection.
However Ṣadrā tries to reconcile the intellectual and religious
doctrines. His account of the bodily resurrection depends on
what he concludes from the nature of the mind and the body.
He takes the body to be a combination of elements which has
the disposition to receive a form and have a substantial motion
in which both matter and form are subject to perfection. The
form is the soul which is material in its origin (though not a
matter; that is, it indwells in the matter) and through
substantial motion, it evolves into an immaterial entity. Hence
the Ṣadrāean well-known slogan: the soul is material in its
origination and immaterial in its survival. The changes in the
elements of the body do not bring about changes in the identity
of the person. The soul as a form of the body which evolves from
bodily characters to the spiritual ones is what goes to
The matter has three layers: elemental, intermediate (
1 The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.
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and the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristicsand the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristicsand the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristicsand the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristics
Heaven is generally illustrated as the highest joy and beauty
conceivable and this is why the characterizations of the heaven
are usually in bodily terms, though most philosophers believe in
the immaterial soul and the spirituality of the resurrection.
tries to reconcile the intellectual and religious
doctrines. His account of the bodily resurrection depends on
what he concludes from the nature of the mind and the body.
He takes the body to be a combination of elements which has
n to receive a form and have a substantial motion
in which both matter and form are subject to perfection. The
form is the soul which is material in its origin (though not a
matter; that is, it indwells in the matter) and through
lves into an immaterial entity. Hence
known slogan: the soul is material in its
origination and immaterial in its survival. The changes in the
elements of the body do not bring about changes in the identity
rm of the body which evolves from
bodily characters to the spiritual ones is what goes to barzakh.
The matter has three layers: elemental, intermediate (barzakhi)
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and afterlife (ukhrawī). When the person moves from the world
to barzakh, his elemental body is separated and when he moves
to the afterlife his intermediate body is separated. In the world
of barzakh all material properties exist except the material stuff.
Thus the material heaven exists without the material stuff. Thus
the concept of matter should be generalized to include the
elemental, celestial (falakī), imaginal (mithālī), and afterlife
bodies. Mulla Ṣadrā believes that the heaven is inside us; our
joyful imaginations are our heaven in the afterlife, and this is a
concrete, objective joy and not a mental one. The
theory is supplemented with the view that there is an external
heaven besides this internal heaven. The material heaven is
created by God as a plateau, and its trees and palaces are
created by our deeds. This is what religious texts also express.
Our deeds have two effects; an effect inside us and an effect
outside of us. Thus for Ṣadrā, the afterlife rewards and
punishments are objective. The only incompatibility of the
Ṣadrāean view with the Quran seems to be the verse “who
revive the bones when they are rusty” (71:36). In this paper we
will discuss the Ṣadrāean view on the nature of heaven and its
characteristics.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul, body, heaven, hell.
). When the person moves from the world
is separated and when he moves
to the afterlife his intermediate body is separated. In the world
all material properties exist except the material stuff.
Thus the material heaven exists without the material stuff. Thus
ld be generalized to include the
), and afterlife
believes that the heaven is inside us; our
joyful imaginations are our heaven in the afterlife, and this is a
not a mental one. The Ṣadrāean
theory is supplemented with the view that there is an external
heaven besides this internal heaven. The material heaven is
created by God as a plateau, and its trees and palaces are
s texts also express.
Our deeds have two effects; an effect inside us and an effect
the afterlife rewards and
punishments are objective. The only incompatibility of the
ean view with the Quran seems to be the verse “who will
In this paper we
ean view on the nature of heaven and its
The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its
Attachment Attachment Attachment Attachment to the Soul and the Bodyto the Soul and the Bodyto the Soul and the Bodyto the Soul and the Body
Rajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah AlRajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah AlRajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah AlRajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah Al----MentawiMentawiMentawiMentawi
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (Egypt)Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (Egypt)Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (Egypt)Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (Egypt)
The Quran bestowed on the blessings of heaven psychological
perfections and motivations which make the believer hasten for
the pleasure of the Lord, meeting his commands. On the top of
these intellectual perfections is the God's pleasure (
which is the greatest joy and happiness. Of forms of this
blessing is what is mentioned in the following Quranic verse: "in
heaven they have what the souls long for and the eyes enjoy",
and in Ḥadīth qudsī, "I have provided for my righteous servants
what no eye has seen and no ear has heard and has never
occurred to the heart of any person". Moreover, there are
colorful perceptual delights and pleasures. This shows the error
of some orientalists who say that "Quranic description of
heaven is in terms of perceptual properties", as it is not true that
Muslims agreed on describing their heaven which is full of
perceptual joy as psychological. The truth is that th
description has combined the perceptual and intellectual
blessings in an equal way in order to equally meet the
psychological motivations and bodily tendencies. Peripatetic
philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes interpreted the heaven
verses as intellectual perfections only and took the apparently
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The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its
to the Soul and the Bodyto the Soul and the Bodyto the Soul and the Bodyto the Soul and the Body
The Quran bestowed on the blessings of heaven psychological
perfections and motivations which make the believer hasten for
, meeting his commands. On the top of
these intellectual perfections is the God's pleasure (riḍwān)
which is the greatest joy and happiness. Of forms of this
blessing is what is mentioned in the following Quranic verse: "in
long for and the eyes enjoy",
, "I have provided for my righteous servants
what no eye has seen and no ear has heard and has never
occurred to the heart of any person". Moreover, there are
shows the error
of some orientalists who say that "Quranic description of
heaven is in terms of perceptual properties", as it is not true that
Muslims agreed on describing their heaven which is full of
perceptual joy as psychological. The truth is that the Quranic
description has combined the perceptual and intellectual
blessings in an equal way in order to equally meet the
psychological motivations and bodily tendencies. Peripatetic
philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes interpreted the heaven
intellectual perfections only and took the apparently
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perceptual blessings as approximations to the laymen, since the
pleasure of the human essence in the afterlife when he is perfect
cannot be compared to the worldly pleasures, but mutakalimīn
such as Ghazālī, Rāzī and Ṣūfiah and most Muslims
acknowledge the apparent Quranic indication that there are
perceptual and intellectual blessings in the same manner, for
who is not moved by the pleasure of seeing the streams of
heaven with eye-catching vistas?
KeywKeywKeywKeywords:ords:ords:ords: Quran, soul, body, heaven.
perceptual blessings as approximations to the laymen, since the
pleasure of the human essence in the afterlife when he is perfect
mutakalimīn
and most Muslims
acknowledge the apparent Quranic indication that there are
perceptual and intellectual blessings in the same manner, for
who is not moved by the pleasure of seeing the streams of
Hell in the Quran and Hell in the Quran and Hell in the Quran and Hell in the Quran and ḤḤḤḤadīthadīthadīthadīth
Shokoufeh Gholami, Sousan GoudarziShokoufeh Gholami, Sousan GoudarziShokoufeh Gholami, Sousan GoudarziShokoufeh Gholami, Sousan Goudarzi (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The hell is the great fire place where sinners are tortured. In the
Quran and Ḥadīth there are different names for the hell, each of
which designates a specific degree or state of the punishment.
According to the religious textual evidence, the hell is already
created but humans fall short of grasping it. The punishment in
the hell is the fruit of the person’s deeds. There are detailed
descriptions of these punishments in the Quran and
their foods are bitter named zaqūm which make them more
hungry. In this paper we will talk about these detailed
descriptions.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Quran, Ḥadīth, hell, punishment.
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The hell is the great fire place where sinners are tortured. In the
there are different names for the hell, each of
which designates a specific degree or state of the punishment.
According to the religious textual evidence, the hell is already
created but humans fall short of grasping it. The punishment in
fruit of the person’s deeds. There are detailed
descriptions of these punishments in the Quran and Ḥadīth;
which make them more
hungry. In this paper we will talk about these detailed
2.52.52.52.5. . . . Do Persons ExistDo Persons ExistDo Persons ExistDo Persons Exist
before this World?before this World?before this World?before this World?
Soul and Body in the Worlds of Soul and Body in the Worlds of Soul and Body in the Worlds of Soul and Body in the Worlds of DharDharDharDhar
Ali AfzaliAli AfzaliAli AfzaliAli Afzali
Iranian Institute of Philosophy (TehranIranian Institute of Philosophy (TehranIranian Institute of Philosophy (TehranIranian Institute of Philosophy (Tehran, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
The world of dhar –as a world in which humans existed before
their birth- was a matter of dispute among Muslim thinkers.
Disputes over whether such a world exists at all, its nature, the
way humans existed there, whether they existed in a collective
or individual way, and whether humans are immaterial in the
world of dhar or have material bodies as well. This paper
concerns the question whether humans in dhar
immaterial or had material bodies as well, and if they had
bodies, what were the properties of this body and its relation to
the soul. What we can know from Ḥadīth is that firstly, humans
had an existence before their birth, and secondly the world of
dhar is not a single world; rather it has hierarchical degrees in
one of which humans were disembodied souls and in
one, they had a kind of material bodies which was composed of
dhar matter which had an interaction with their souls.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, body, world of dhar.
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DharDharDharDhar
a world in which humans existed before
was a matter of dispute among Muslim thinkers.
Disputes over whether such a world exists at all, its nature, the
way humans existed there, whether they existed in a collective
er humans are immaterial in the
or have material bodies as well. This paper
were only
immaterial or had material bodies as well, and if they had
s relation to
is that firstly, humans
had an existence before their birth, and secondly the world of
is not a single world; rather it has hierarchical degrees in
one of which humans were disembodied souls and in another
one, they had a kind of material bodies which was composed of
matter which had an interaction with their souls.
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ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Viewean Viewean Viewean View
on on on on ḥḥḥḥodūthodūthodūthodūth and and and and QedamQedamQedamQedam of the Soulof the Soulof the Soulof the Soul
Mohammad MiriMohammad MiriMohammad MiriMohammad Miri
Imam Khomeini Education andImam Khomeini Education andImam Khomeini Education andImam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
Among the most prominent views about the problem of
and qedam of the soul in the history of Islamic philosophy,
there are three mainstream ones: the platonic view of
(qedam), the Peripatetic view of spiritual ḥudūth (origin), and
the Ṣadrāean view of material ḥudūth and spiritual survival
(baqā) of the soul. In this paper I shall argue that Ṣadrā
is more compatible with religious doctrines.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, ḥudūth, eternity (qedam), Plato, Peripatetic
philosophers.
Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
Among the most prominent views about the problem of ḥodūth
of the soul in the history of Islamic philosophy,
there are three mainstream ones: the platonic view of eternity
(origin), and
and spiritual survival
adrāean view
), Plato, Peripatetic
The Grounds for the The Grounds for the The Grounds for the The Grounds for the ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Theory of Material ean Theory of Material ean Theory of Material ean Theory of Material
Origin and Spiritual Survival of the SoulOrigin and Spiritual Survival of the SoulOrigin and Spiritual Survival of the SoulOrigin and Spiritual Survival of the Soul
Morteza PouyanMorteza PouyanMorteza PouyanMorteza Pouyan (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
In this paper I will talk about the Ṣadrāean theory of the
material origin and the spiritual survival of the soul. To do this I
will talk about the following: the soul-body relation in Islamic
Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental philosophies,
ūsī's trouble for philosophers regarding the immortality of the
soul after the corruption of the body, the motivations of the
Ṣadrāean view, Ṣadrā's answer to ūsī's objection, and the
arguments for the Sadrean view.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, Peripatetic philosophers, Ishrāqī
philosophers, soul, body.
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ean Theory of Material ean Theory of Material ean Theory of Material ean Theory of Material
Origin and Spiritual Survival of the SoulOrigin and Spiritual Survival of the SoulOrigin and Spiritual Survival of the SoulOrigin and Spiritual Survival of the Soul
ean theory of the
itual survival of the soul. To do this I
body relation in Islamic
Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental philosophies,
's trouble for philosophers regarding the immortality of the
ion of the body, the motivations of the
's objection, and the
ā, Peripatetic philosophers, Ishrāqī
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Muslim Mystics’ ViewMuslim Mystics’ ViewMuslim Mystics’ ViewMuslim Mystics’ View
of the of the of the of the ḥḥḥḥodūthodūthodūthodūth and and and and QedamQedamQedamQedam of the Soulof the Soulof the Soulof the Soul
Mohammad MiriMohammad MiriMohammad MiriMohammad Miri
Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
Muslim mystics ('urafā), centuries before Ṣadrā, took human
persons to be eternally originated (ḥādith azalī); that is, they are
originated as to their existence in this world and they are
eternal as to their existence in the worlds before this world.
Mystics talked about this in their discussions about the
"depository (istīdā’i) stages and the ascending (mi’rāj
soul’s composite”, “the place of the essence of the Perfect Man
in previous worlds”, “the alast Promise”, etc. Moreover, there
are plenty of evidence in their words which refer to the
materiality of the soul’s origination as to its existence in this
world. In the Quran and Ḥadīth there have been texts
refer to the souls’ having been created long before the bodies on
the one hand and texts which refer to the materiality of the
soul’s origination in this world on the other. This shows that the
mystical view can account for the religious doctrines on
origination of the persons and the previous worlds.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: mystics ('urafā), Ṣadrā, ḥudūth, soul.
of the Soulof the Soulof the Soulof the Soul
Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
took human
); that is, they are
this world and they are
eternal as to their existence in the worlds before this world.
Mystics talked about this in their discussions about the
mi’rāj) of the
the Perfect Man
Promise”, etc. Moreover, there
are plenty of evidence in their words which refer to the
materiality of the soul’s origination as to its existence in this
there have been texts which
refer to the souls’ having been created long before the bodies on
the one hand and texts which refer to the materiality of the
soul’s origination in this world on the other. This shows that the
mystical view can account for the religious doctrines on the
A Critique of the Theory of the Material OriginA Critique of the Theory of the Material OriginA Critique of the Theory of the Material OriginA Critique of the Theory of the Material Origin
and the Spiritual Survival of the Souland the Spiritual Survival of the Souland the Spiritual Survival of the Souland the Spiritual Survival of the Soul
Gholamreza FayyaziGholamreza FayyaziGholamreza FayyaziGholamreza Fayyazi
Imam Khomeini Education and Research Imam Khomeini Education and Research Imam Khomeini Education and Research Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (QomInstitute (QomInstitute (QomInstitute (Qom, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran
Ṣadrā takes the soul to be the principle of the life in the body.
The soul is primary material, dependent on the body; this is
what is called a vegetative soul and has the properties of
nutrition, growth, and reproduction. This vegetative life evolves
to a sentient, animal life and develops to be low-level imaginal
(mithālī) immaterial entity; that is, it has no material stuff,
though it has some material properties such as the shape, color,
volume and weight. Most people, in Ṣadrā’s view, merely enjoy
these two levels of the soul. The soul might continue to evolve
into rational immateriality which has the function of universal
cognition. The immaterial survival of the soul might have two
meanings: (1) the soul is both material and immaterial before
death, or (2) the soul is merely immaterial in its survival when it
is wholly separated from the body. Therefore Ṣadrā believes that
the three stages of the soul (material, imaginal, and rational)
exist as one thing, and this unity is explained by his theory of
the existential hierarchy. But it seems that this is a complete
contradiction; one and the same thing cannot be both material
and immaterial, and thus it cannot account for the bodily
resurrection. The main reason why Ṣadrā is committe
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A Critique of the Theory of the Material OriginA Critique of the Theory of the Material OriginA Critique of the Theory of the Material OriginA Critique of the Theory of the Material Origin
and the Spiritual Survival of the Souland the Spiritual Survival of the Souland the Spiritual Survival of the Souland the Spiritual Survival of the Soul
, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
takes the soul to be the principle of the life in the body.
The soul is primary material, dependent on the body; this is
what is called a vegetative soul and has the properties of
ative life evolves
level imaginal
immaterial entity; that is, it has no material stuff,
though it has some material properties such as the shape, color,
view, merely enjoy
these two levels of the soul. The soul might continue to evolve
into rational immateriality which has the function of universal
cognition. The immaterial survival of the soul might have two
aterial before
the soul is merely immaterial in its survival when it
believes that
the three stages of the soul (material, imaginal, and rational)
ned by his theory of
the existential hierarchy. But it seems that this is a complete
contradiction; one and the same thing cannot be both material
and immaterial, and thus it cannot account for the bodily
is committed to this
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account of the bodily resurrection is the impossibility of
metempsychosis, but the fact is that it is not impossible; rather
it is religiously incorrect when one is committed to it without a
commitment to the doctrine of resurrection.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul, body, material in origination, spiritual in
survival, hierarchy of existence.
account of the bodily resurrection is the impossibility of
impossible; rather
it is religiously incorrect when one is committed to it without a
adrā, soul, body, material in origination, spiritual in
Out of Eden: Evolution and the FallOut of Eden: Evolution and the FallOut of Eden: Evolution and the FallOut of Eden: Evolution and the Fall
Martin LembkeMartin LembkeMartin LembkeMartin Lembke
Lund University (Sweden)Lund University (Sweden)Lund University (Sweden)Lund University (Sweden)
Following physicist and Anglican priest John Polkinghorne, I
shall focus on ‘the major Christian doctrine that I find most
difficult to reconcile with scientific thought’, namely, the Fall,
including the closely related notion of Original sin. Like
Polkinghorne, I admit that this doctrine is a ‘rather extreme test
case’ and that reconsiderations thereof should be offered with
appropriate tentativeness, but still I wish to see whether or to
what extent orthodox Christian belief can be made consonant
with our present scientific understanding of biological evolution
and hence of pre-human and early human history. Now the
doctrines of the Fall and Original sin (as traditionally
understood) seem to imply at least three highly problematic
ideas: (i) the historicity of a primordial human couple (Adam
and Eve); (ii) an original sinful act through which this first
couple was subjected to biological death; and (iii) the biological
transmission of this sinful act as a hereditary stain to all
subsequent human generations. Pace Polkinghorne, I shall
argue that these ideas can be squared with evolutionary theory
only if one is prepared to posit the existence of a non
soul: a postulate which wholly accords with another Christian
doctrine, which may be called the Necessity of the soul: namely,
the doctrine that human beings essentially depend
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115
Following physicist and Anglican priest John Polkinghorne, I
major Christian doctrine that I find most
difficult to reconcile with scientific thought’, namely, the Fall,
including the closely related notion of Original sin. Like
Polkinghorne, I admit that this doctrine is a ‘rather extreme test
iderations thereof should be offered with
appropriate tentativeness, but still I wish to see whether or to
what extent orthodox Christian belief can be made consonant
ding of biological evolution
n and early human history. Now the
doctrines of the Fall and Original sin (as traditionally
understood) seem to imply at least three highly problematic
ideas: (i) the historicity of a primordial human couple (Adam
ugh which this first
couple was subjected to biological death; and (iii) the biological
tary stain to all
subsequent human generations. Pace Polkinghorne, I shall
tionary theory
only if one is prepared to posit the existence of a non-material
soul: a postulate which wholly accords with another Christian
doctrine, which may be called the Necessity of the soul: namely,
the doctrine that human beings essentially depend on
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immaterial soul-substances for their existence. Seen from an
evolutionary point of view, of course, this latter doctrine raises
deep difficulties of its own. In particular, one needs to clarify
the function of the immaterial soul in relation to the mat
grounded evolution of the mind, as well as the causal relation
between the material body and the soul. Trying to shed some
light on these issues, I shall conclude that the doctrine of the
Necessity of the Soul is yet to be confuted or made redundan
our knowledge about the interrelatedness of mind and brain.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: fall, original sin, orthodox faith, science.
substances for their existence. Seen from an
evolutionary point of view, of course, this latter doctrine raises
deep difficulties of its own. In particular, one needs to clarify
the function of the immaterial soul in relation to the materially
grounded evolution of the mind, as well as the causal relation
between the material body and the soul. Trying to shed some
light on these issues, I shall conclude that the doctrine of the
Necessity of the Soul is yet to be confuted or made redundant by
our knowledge about the interrelatedness of mind and brain.
An Analysis of the Objections of MullaAn Analysis of the Objections of MullaAn Analysis of the Objections of MullaAn Analysis of the Objections of Mulla
Shamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq ArdistaniShamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq ArdistaniShamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq ArdistaniShamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq Ardistani
to to to to ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Theory of the Soulean Theory of the Soulean Theory of the Soulean Theory of the Soul
Abolhassan Abolhassan Abolhassan Abolhassan GhaffariGhaffariGhaffariGhaffari (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Mullā Shamsa Gilānī takes the soul to be spiritual in origin and
spiritual in survival, and rejects the theory of the material origin
of the soul as incompatible with religious evidence. Mulla
Ṣadrā's primary answer to this objection is based on the
distinction between the soul (nafs) and spirit (rūḥ); thus
religious texts does not mean the soul; souls are material in
origin, though spirits are immaterial in their origins. However,
Mullā Ṣadrā is not always committed to this distinct
main answer to this objection is that the soul's existence before
this world is to mean that they exist in their causes, not that
they exist as souls.
Mullā Muḥammad Sādiq Ardistāni also defends the theory of
the spiritual origin of the soul. In his opinion, to say that the
soul has an origin is to contradict both the immateriality of the
soul and its survival. This is why Mulla Ṣadrā adheres to the
theory of the material origin of the soul, and since he accepts
the arguments for the immateriality of the soul, he modifies his
view through an appeal to the substantial motion of the body to
become immaterial and thus spiritual in survival. But according
to Ardistānī what is in the matter cannot be otherwise, and it is
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An Analysis of the Objections of MullaAn Analysis of the Objections of MullaAn Analysis of the Objections of MullaAn Analysis of the Objections of Mulla
Shamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq ArdistaniShamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq ArdistaniShamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq ArdistaniShamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq Ardistani
takes the soul to be spiritual in origin and
spiritual in survival, and rejects the theory of the material origin
of the soul as incompatible with religious evidence. Mulla
sed on the
); thus rūḥ in
religious texts does not mean the soul; souls are material in
origin, though spirits are immaterial in their origins. However,
is not always committed to this distinction. His
main answer to this objection is that the soul's existence before
this world is to mean that they exist in their causes, not that
ni also defends the theory of
the spiritual origin of the soul. In his opinion, to say that the
soul has an origin is to contradict both the immateriality of the
adheres to the
the soul, and since he accepts
the arguments for the immateriality of the soul, he modifies his
view through an appeal to the substantial motion of the body to
become immaterial and thus spiritual in survival. But according
ter cannot be otherwise, and it is
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impossible to move from the matter since there would not then
be any subject for such a movement. In this paper, I will defend
the Ṣadrāean view and its compatibility with the religious
doctrines.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, Mullā Shamsa Gilānī, Mullā M
Sādiq Ardistāni, soul, body.
impossible to move from the matter since there would not then
be any subject for such a movement. In this paper, I will defend
ean view and its compatibility with the religious
Muḥammad
PART III
The Nature of Human Persons,
Morality and God-Human Relations
ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean View ean View ean View ean View
f the Role of the Body in Cognitionf the Role of the Body in Cognitionf the Role of the Body in Cognitionf the Role of the Body in Cognition
AhmAhmAhmAhmad Va’eziad Va’eziad Va’eziad Va’ezi
Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom)
Muslim philosophers, including Ṣadrā, maintain that the
human soul benefits from bodily organs in its acts and
cognitions. This gives rise to different questions. Does the
employment of the body include all manners of cognition or is
restricted to some sorts of cognition? Should we take cognition
and perception to be existentially dependent on the bodily
organs or the soul? In this paper I will show that Ṣadrā
cognition to be of different degrees; the higher the cognition the
more independent it is from the body. Thus the relation of the
perceptions to the bodily organs differs in degree on the basis of
the place of the various perceptions; for example, the
intellectual cognition as the highest degree of the human
cognition is not mediated by any bodily organs. Finally I will
deal with the relation of the faculties of the soul to bodily
organs, the existential relation between the soul and its
faculties, the way the cognitive forms exist and their relations to
the soul.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: acts of soul, body, faculties of the soul, perception,
intellectual cognizance.
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maintain that the
human soul benefits from bodily organs in its acts and
cognitions. This gives rise to different questions. Does the
all manners of cognition or is
restricted to some sorts of cognition? Should we take cognition
and perception to be existentially dependent on the bodily
adrā takes the
es; the higher the cognition the
more independent it is from the body. Thus the relation of the
perceptions to the bodily organs differs in degree on the basis of
the place of the various perceptions; for example, the
degree of the human
cognition is not mediated by any bodily organs. Finally I will
deal with the relation of the faculties of the soul to bodily
organs, the existential relation between the soul and its
r relations to
acts of soul, body, faculties of the soul, perception,
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The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the
Method of Disjunction (Method of Disjunction (Method of Disjunction (Method of Disjunction (fafafafaṣṣṣṣllll) and Conjunction () and Conjunction () and Conjunction () and Conjunction (
A Discussion of the Limits ofA Discussion of the Limits ofA Discussion of the Limits ofA Discussion of the Limits of the Religious and the Religious and the Religious and the Religious and
Philosophical/Scientific Thought in the ExplainingPhilosophical/Scientific Thought in the ExplainingPhilosophical/Scientific Thought in the ExplainingPhilosophical/Scientific Thought in the Explaining
the Phenomenon of Consciousnessthe Phenomenon of Consciousnessthe Phenomenon of Consciousnessthe Phenomenon of Consciousness
Samir AbuzaidSamir AbuzaidSamir AbuzaidSamir Abuzaid (Egypt)(Egypt)(Egypt)(Egypt)
The problem of consciousness has a special place in the
contemporary philosophical thought. With the great scientific
progress of the humans and the developments in computer
technology, artificial intelligence, biology, biochemistry, brain
research and neurology and the possibility of knowing the
behavioral centers in the brain and the influence of the
electrical charges and chemical drugs on the human behavior,
the dominant belief is that it is eventually possible to explain the
human mind in biological terms and claim that the mind is
nothing but an enormous computational apparatus. However,
by the end of the twentieth century difficulties were raised
against this explanation. Notwithstanding the scientific and
theoretical progress in explaining the workings of the human
brain and the possibility of knowing the different cerebral
centers for perception and behavior, there are two bas
problems which resist against the biological explanation:
intentionality and consciousness. The two problems merged so
that consciousness was related to intentionality in different
The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the
) and Conjunction () and Conjunction () and Conjunction () and Conjunction (wawawawaṣṣṣṣllll):):):):
the Religious and the Religious and the Religious and the Religious and
Philosophical/Scientific Thought in the ExplainingPhilosophical/Scientific Thought in the ExplainingPhilosophical/Scientific Thought in the ExplainingPhilosophical/Scientific Thought in the Explaining
The problem of consciousness has a special place in the
contemporary philosophical thought. With the great scientific
he humans and the developments in computer
technology, artificial intelligence, biology, biochemistry, brain
research and neurology and the possibility of knowing the
behavioral centers in the brain and the influence of the
drugs on the human behavior,
the dominant belief is that it is eventually possible to explain the
human mind in biological terms and claim that the mind is
nothing but an enormous computational apparatus. However,
culties were raised
against this explanation. Notwithstanding the scientific and
theoretical progress in explaining the workings of the human
brain and the possibility of knowing the different cerebral
centers for perception and behavior, there are two basic
problems which resist against the biological explanation:
intentionality and consciousness. The two problems merged so
that consciousness was related to intentionality in different
ways. The basic question here is the way "physical" inputs of
perception (like wave of light, sound waves, and chemical
composites) transform intro visual, auditory and tactile
sensations. This is the problem which is called "the hard
problem". Because of the intractability of this problem in direct
scientific ways, it changed into an inter-disciplinary problem in
which physics, quantum mechanics, organic chemistry,
neurology, artificial intelligence, psychology and cognitive
sciences besides philosophy are involved. This way several
scientific and philosophical theories emerged which focus on
different positions such as exclusionary materialism,
functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, in addition to theories
of mystery which regard the human consciousness as
unexplainable. In light of this general contemporary form of the
problem of consciousness, I will present a conception of the
correct methodology of explaining the human consciousness in
the framework of the correct relation between religion,
philosophy and science. This methodology sets limits for
religious and philosophical/scientific thought in the process of
explaining the phenomenon of consciousness, and this relies on
a basic categorization of the phenomenon of consciousness as a
"mystery" for science, and this demands for reliance on the
method of disjunction and conjunction, which is focused on
works of Shaykh Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (11 a.c
therefore begin by a brief introduction of the problem of
consciousness in contemporary philosophy and then a brief
introduction of the method of disjunction and conjunct
its foundation in the works of Jurjāni and the methodological
steps that can be drawn from it and the way it can be employed
in scientific and philosophical propositions which are marked
by mystery. I will then explain how this method can greatly
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ways. The basic question here is the way "physical" inputs of
(like wave of light, sound waves, and chemical
composites) transform intro visual, auditory and tactile
sensations. This is the problem which is called "the hard
problem". Because of the intractability of this problem in direct
disciplinary problem in
which physics, quantum mechanics, organic chemistry,
neurology, artificial intelligence, psychology and cognitive
sciences besides philosophy are involved. This way several
d which focus on
different positions such as exclusionary materialism,
functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, in addition to theories
of mystery which regard the human consciousness as
unexplainable. In light of this general contemporary form of the
em of consciousness, I will present a conception of the
correct methodology of explaining the human consciousness in
the framework of the correct relation between religion,
philosophy and science. This methodology sets limits for
l/scientific thought in the process of
explaining the phenomenon of consciousness, and this relies on
a basic categorization of the phenomenon of consciousness as a
"mystery" for science, and this demands for reliance on the
nction, which is focused on
c.). I will
therefore begin by a brief introduction of the problem of
consciousness in contemporary philosophy and then a brief
introduction of the method of disjunction and conjunction and
ni and the methodological
steps that can be drawn from it and the way it can be employed
in scientific and philosophical propositions which are marked
by mystery. I will then explain how this method can greatly
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contribute in solving some common religious-philosophical
propositions. After this, I will apply this methodology to the
phenomenon of consciousness, and illustrate how our reliance
on this method can prevent the religious thought from
trespassing its limits and becoming an anti-scientific religious
thought, and how can this method prevent the rational
philosophical/scientific thought from trespassing its limits and
becoming an anti-rational and anti-scientific belief.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: scientific thought, human mind, intentionality,
consciousness, religion.
philosophical
propositions. After this, I will apply this methodology to the
phenomenon of consciousness, and illustrate how our reliance
on this method can prevent the religious thought from
scientific religious
thought, and how can this method prevent the rational
philosophical/scientific thought from trespassing its limits and
nd, intentionality,
The Immateriality of the Soul and CognitionThe Immateriality of the Soul and CognitionThe Immateriality of the Soul and CognitionThe Immateriality of the Soul and Cognition
in Islamic Philosophy and Quranin Islamic Philosophy and Quranin Islamic Philosophy and Quranin Islamic Philosophy and Quran
Morteza ErfaniMorteza ErfaniMorteza ErfaniMorteza Erfani
Sistan UniversitySistan UniversitySistan UniversitySistan University (Zahedan, Iran)(Zahedan, Iran)(Zahedan, Iran)(Zahedan, Iran)
In Islamic philosophy, cognition or consciousness is taken to be
characteristic of immaterial entities. An immaterial entity can at
the least cognize herself (auto-cognition), even if it does not
cognize others (hetero-cognition). Therefore, hetero
is grounded in auto-cognition and auto-cognition is grounded in
turn in the immateriality. Thus material entities have no
cognition of themselves or others. But many Quranic verses
seem to contradict this philosophical view; for example, the
verses in which all worldly beings are said to glorify (
God, and since glorification is impossible without cognition,
these verses would indicate that all beings have cognition. I will
argue that both science and the Quran show that cognition is
not restricted to immaterial beings and that each being enjoys a
degree of cognition. Moreover, auto-cognition does not
constitute hetero-cognition; rather it is grounded in the
cognition of cognition (or self-cognition).
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Quran, Islamic philosophy, immateriality of the soul,
cognizance, perception.
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The Immateriality of the Soul and CognitionThe Immateriality of the Soul and CognitionThe Immateriality of the Soul and CognitionThe Immateriality of the Soul and Cognition
In Islamic philosophy, cognition or consciousness is taken to be
of immaterial entities. An immaterial entity can at
cognition), even if it does not
cognition). Therefore, hetero-cognition
cognition is grounded in
immateriality. Thus material entities have no
cognition of themselves or others. But many Quranic verses
seem to contradict this philosophical view; for example, the
verses in which all worldly beings are said to glorify (tasbīḥ)
on is impossible without cognition,
these verses would indicate that all beings have cognition. I will
argue that both science and the Quran show that cognition is
not restricted to immaterial beings and that each being enjoys a
cognition does not
cognition; rather it is grounded in the
Quran, Islamic philosophy, immateriality of the soul,
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Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, ConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness
and Existenceand Existenceand Existenceand Existence
Mehnaz ZainabMehnaz ZainabMehnaz ZainabMehnaz Zainab
Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)
In this paper I would analyze Pakistan’s philosopher
Iqbal’s concepts concerning mind, consciousness and the
material reality, and how these factors interact to form the
organic whole called Life. Although Iqbāl was writing in the
modernist Bergsonian perspective, his philosophy of Ego or
Khudi can be analyzed in the context of contemporary mind
body theories. His theory relates to how mind an
consciousness in combination with the human will form an
extension of Divine Consciousness and Will and how the human
act can be reflective of Divine Act. He adheres largely to an
existential point of view; but his ideas about the mind and body
are also inspired by modern empiricism and objectivity.
However, his conclusions about the mind- body problem are
based on his Islamic faith and the theories of the medieval
Islamic philosophers, which could be analyzed in contemporary
perspective for interesting insight into Islamic concept of mind
body problem in the post modern world.
The naturalist and phenomenologist theories of mind overlook
the aspects of mind-body problem encompassing the
transcendent human consciousness and its Divine sources. The
ConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousnessConsciousness
Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)
In this paper I would analyze Pakistan’s philosopher-poet
Iqbal’s concepts concerning mind, consciousness and the
factors interact to form the
l was writing in the
modernist Bergsonian perspective, his philosophy of Ego or
can be analyzed in the context of contemporary mind-
body theories. His theory relates to how mind and
consciousness in combination with the human will form an
extension of Divine Consciousness and Will and how the human
act can be reflective of Divine Act. He adheres largely to an
existential point of view; but his ideas about the mind and body
inspired by modern empiricism and objectivity.
body problem are
based on his Islamic faith and the theories of the medieval
Islamic philosophers, which could be analyzed in contemporary
nsight into Islamic concept of mind-
The naturalist and phenomenologist theories of mind overlook
body problem encompassing the
transcendent human consciousness and its Divine sources. The
Islamic perspective combined with contemporary empirical
findings about mind and consciousness could add some
interesting aspects to the mind-body problem and its
implications for contemporary knowledge.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Iqbal, soul, consciousness, existence.
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c perspective combined with contemporary empirical
findings about mind and consciousness could add some
body problem and its
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ThThThThe Influence of the None Influence of the None Influence of the None Influence of the Non----doxic on the Doxic doxic on the Doxic doxic on the Doxic doxic on the Doxic
DimensionsDimensionsDimensionsDimensions of the Soul in Ghazof the Soul in Ghazof the Soul in Ghazof the Soul in Ghazāāāāllllīīīī
Zahra (Mitra) PoursinaZahra (Mitra) PoursinaZahra (Mitra) PoursinaZahra (Mitra) Poursina
Shahid Shahid Shahid Shahid Beheshti University Beheshti University Beheshti University Beheshti University ((((TehranTehranTehranTehran, Iran), Iran), Iran), Iran)
One of the most important problems in epistemology is whether
knowledge is only acquired merely through the human
and perceptive capacities or it is influenced by other aspects of
the human person? In this paper I will examine Ghaz
answer to this question. I will first focus on the different
relations and interactions between the aspects of the human
soul and then show that these interactions involve the mutual
influences of the soul and body, one of which is the influence of
the non-doxic (for example, emotional or volitional) aspects on
the doxic ones (and the process of the knowledge acquisition).
KeKeKeKeywods:ywods:ywods:ywods: dimensions of the soul, body, Ghazāli.
doxic on the Doxic doxic on the Doxic doxic on the Doxic doxic on the Doxic
One of the most important problems in epistemology is whether
knowledge is only acquired merely through the human cognitive
and perceptive capacities or it is influenced by other aspects of
the human person? In this paper I will examine Ghazāli's
answer to this question. I will first focus on the different
relations and interactions between the aspects of the human
ul and then show that these interactions involve the mutual
influences of the soul and body, one of which is the influence of
doxic (for example, emotional or volitional) aspects on
doxic ones (and the process of the knowledge acquisition).
Islamic Philosophical PsychologyIslamic Philosophical PsychologyIslamic Philosophical PsychologyIslamic Philosophical Psychology
and the Doctrine of and the Doctrine of and the Doctrine of and the Doctrine of FitrahFitrahFitrahFitrah in Quranin Quranin Quranin Quran
Zolfaghar NasseriZolfaghar NasseriZolfaghar NasseriZolfaghar Nasseri
Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)
Several verses of the Quran concern the fundamental doctrine
of fiṭrah. Fiṭrah consists in the innate religious ideas and
tendencies, such as the idea of God and the loving or needing
tendency towards Him. In this paper I will talk about the views
of some contemporary Ṣadrāean scholars (abātab
Muṭaharī) about fiṭrah, and will then talk about the
explanations of fiṭrah in terms of dualistic and Ṣadrā
of the soul-body relation.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Quran, fiṭrah, Ṣadrā, soul, body.
A
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Several verses of the Quran concern the fundamental doctrine
rah consists in the innate religious ideas and
tendencies, such as the idea of God and the loving or needing
In this paper I will talk about the views
tabā’i, and
, and will then talk about the
adrāean views
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In Defense of Integrative Dualism; PlacingIn Defense of Integrative Dualism; PlacingIn Defense of Integrative Dualism; PlacingIn Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing
values at the heart of philosophy of values at the heart of philosophy of values at the heart of philosophy of values at the heart of philosophy of mindmindmindmind
Charles Taliaferro Charles Taliaferro Charles Taliaferro Charles Taliaferro
St. Olaf CollegeSt. Olaf CollegeSt. Olaf CollegeSt. Olaf College (USA)(USA)(USA)(USA)
"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied
nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured
in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable
bifurcation. Instead of such a splintered, divided concept of the
person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that while a
person is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can
survive the death of the body), in this life he or she functions as
a united, embodied being. Embodiment consists of six
nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such
as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal
constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and
affective incorporation. This united concept of an embodied
person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human
nature. This value-oriented concept of embodiment can be a
rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim dialogue.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: substance dualism, integrative dualism, moral
values, philosophy of mind.
In Defense of Integrative Dualism; PlacingIn Defense of Integrative Dualism; PlacingIn Defense of Integrative Dualism; PlacingIn Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing
mindmindmindmind
"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied
nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured
in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable
f such a splintered, divided concept of the
person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that while a
person is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can
survive the death of the body), in this life he or she functions as
g. Embodiment consists of six
nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such
as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal
constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and
d concept of an embodied
person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human
oriented concept of embodiment can be a
Muslim dialogue.
substance dualism, integrative dualism, moral
The Moral Aspect of the Soul:The Moral Aspect of the Soul:The Moral Aspect of the Soul:The Moral Aspect of the Soul:
The Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral IssuesThe Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral IssuesThe Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral IssuesThe Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral Issues
in Ghazali and Aquinasin Ghazali and Aquinasin Ghazali and Aquinasin Ghazali and Aquinas
Zohreh Sadat NajiZohreh Sadat NajiZohreh Sadat NajiZohreh Sadat Naji (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Ghazālī and Aquinas, as religious philosophers, take souls and
bodies as distinct. Though this view is as old as ancient Greek
philosophy, their religious perspective on the issue has different
consequences. On the other hand, they have both dealt with
moral issues. In this paper I will talk about the relation between
these two issues: the implications of their views about the soul
body distinction, the immortality of the soul and the rewards
and punishments in the hereafter for their moral philosophy. At
the end of the paper, I will talk about the impacts of the
scriptures on their philosophical views.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, morality, Ghazālī, Aquinas.
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The Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral IssuesThe Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral IssuesThe Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral IssuesThe Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral Issues
and Aquinas, as religious philosophers, take souls and
bodies as distinct. Though this view is as old as ancient Greek
philosophy, their religious perspective on the issue has different
consequences. On the other hand, they have both dealt with
es. In this paper I will talk about the relation between
these two issues: the implications of their views about the soul-
body distinction, the immortality of the soul and the rewards
and punishments in the hereafter for their moral philosophy. At
of the paper, I will talk about the impacts of the
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Islamic Ethics without SoulsIslamic Ethics without SoulsIslamic Ethics without SoulsIslamic Ethics without Souls
Aliakbar GolghandashtiAliakbar GolghandashtiAliakbar GolghandashtiAliakbar Golghandashti
Mofid UniversityMofid UniversityMofid UniversityMofid University (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
Ethics is one of the main branches of practical philosophy (or
wisdom). Many books have been written about this branch by
Muslim thinkers. Virtue ethics has been widely accepted in the
Islamic thought. Part of reason to adopt such an approach to
ethics was its compatibility with Islamic doctrines. The subject
of Islamic ethics with this approach is the soul, since it is the
soul that can acquire moral virtues and is perfected by them.
The main question of this paper is the following: what will
happen to Islamic virtue ethics if someone denies the soul? Can
we defend a virtue ethics in which there is no soul or there is
material soul?
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: morality, Islamic philosophy, soul, body.
branches of practical philosophy (or
wisdom). Many books have been written about this branch by
Muslim thinkers. Virtue ethics has been widely accepted in the
Islamic thought. Part of reason to adopt such an approach to
lamic doctrines. The subject
of Islamic ethics with this approach is the soul, since it is the
soul that can acquire moral virtues and is perfected by them.
The main question of this paper is the following: what will
one denies the soul? Can
we defend a virtue ethics in which there is no soul or there is
Images of the Body in Rumi’s MathnaviImages of the Body in Rumi’s MathnaviImages of the Body in Rumi’s MathnaviImages of the Body in Rumi’s Mathnavi
Ebrahim AlipourEbrahim AlipourEbrahim AlipourEbrahim Alipour
Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Q(Q(Q(Qom, Iran)om, Iran)om, Iran)om, Iran)
Soul (nafs), corpus (tan), body (badan), flesh (jism), spirit (
psyche (ravān) and life (jān) are frequently used with a moral
function in Rūmī’s Mathnavī, and words “souls”, “life” and
“psyche” are used in the philosophical sense of the so
use of the words “corpus”, body, flesh in contrast with “life” and
“psyche” is evidence of his dualistic conception of the soul
relation. Because of the frequency of the words regarding the
souls and bodies in Mathnavī, I will try to examin
psychology through the images, and to do this, I will try to show
the presuppositions and implications of the images of the body
in Mathnavī. Rumi is also influenced by Quranic verses and
Ḥadīth. Occasionally he refers to the self or soul and its
transcendence by making an appeal to verses such as "I
breathed into him from my spirit" (nafakht), "fall from Eden"
(ihbiṭū) and "the spirit is from my Lord's amr (command)"
(amri rabbī).
ihbitu (fall from Eden) threw the soul in the body/So that the
pearl of Eden hide in the mud
Rumi believes that humans have fallen from the heavens and
divine reed-place (neyestān) and from the Throne ('arsh
Floor (farsh):
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Images of the Body in Rumi’s MathnaviImages of the Body in Rumi’s MathnaviImages of the Body in Rumi’s MathnaviImages of the Body in Rumi’s Mathnavi
), spirit (rūḥ),
) are frequently used with a moral
, and words “souls”, “life” and
“psyche” are used in the philosophical sense of the soul. Rumi’s
use of the words “corpus”, body, flesh in contrast with “life” and
“psyche” is evidence of his dualistic conception of the soul-body
relation. Because of the frequency of the words regarding the
, I will try to examine Rumi’s
psychology through the images, and to do this, I will try to show
the presuppositions and implications of the images of the body
. Rumi is also influenced by Quranic verses and
. Occasionally he refers to the self or soul and its
transcendence by making an appeal to verses such as "I
), "fall from Eden"
(command)"
(fall from Eden) threw the soul in the body/So that the
Rumi believes that humans have fallen from the heavens and
'arsh) to the
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He says, O' my inferior lowly parts/My distance is bitterer, [for]
I am Heavenly
He takes death to be the soul's fly-away from the earthly body:
When the soul steps away from the life/It would be so that the
body will lose life
He takes the soul to be immaterial, infinite, a-spatial, and
immortal. However, he concedes the interactions between t
soul and body.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, spirit, body, morality.
He says, O' my inferior lowly parts/My distance is bitterer, [for]
away from the earthly body:
When the soul steps away from the life/It would be so that the
spatial, and
immortal. However, he concedes the interactions between the
The Gender of the MindThe Gender of the MindThe Gender of the MindThe Gender of the Mind
and the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justiceand the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justiceand the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justiceand the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justice
Hadi SadeqiHadi SadeqiHadi SadeqiHadi Sadeqi
Dar alDar alDar alDar al----ḤḤḤḤadīthadīthadīthadīth College (Qom, Iran)College (Qom, Iran)College (Qom, Iran)College (Qom, Iran)
The problem of the gender of the mind is the following: is the
human mind (regardless of the body) subject to gender
distinction (masculinity and femininity)? This is a metaphysical
issue about the role of gender distinction in human entity,
which was not a subject of discussion until recently. Some
people believe that men and women's mind or soul (on the basis
of dualism) ontologically differ and thus they belong to two
different specifica (or types). On the contrary, some
philosophers reject the above view by rejecting the
psychological or personality differences between men and
women, and some reject it while maintaining the differences. In
this paper I will talk about the space of possible views in this
regard on the basis of Islamic philosophy, and then
implications for the doctrine of gender justice in Islam.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: gender, soul, mind, justice.
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and the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justiceand the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justiceand the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justiceand the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justice
The problem of the gender of the mind is the following: is the
human mind (regardless of the body) subject to gender
distinction (masculinity and femininity)? This is a metaphysical
issue about the role of gender distinction in human entity,
a subject of discussion until recently. Some
people believe that men and women's mind or soul (on the basis
of dualism) ontologically differ and thus they belong to two
(or types). On the contrary, some
w by rejecting the
psychological or personality differences between men and
women, and some reject it while maintaining the differences. In
this paper I will talk about the space of possible views in this
discuss its
implications for the doctrine of gender justice in Islam.
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The Real Happiness (Sa’adah)The Real Happiness (Sa’adah)The Real Happiness (Sa’adah)The Real Happiness (Sa’adah)
in in in in ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Philosophyean Philosophyean Philosophyean Philosophy
Mohammad Ghasem ElyasiMohammad Ghasem ElyasiMohammad Ghasem ElyasiMohammad Ghasem Elyasi
Graduate Institute of Khatam alGraduate Institute of Khatam alGraduate Institute of Khatam alGraduate Institute of Khatam al----Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)
In this paper I will try to talk about the aspects of happiness in
this world and the afterlife. I will examine theories of material
happiness, spiritual happiness and internal happiness as
alternatives to the Ṣadrāean view of comprehensive happiness.
This will be done by theoretical principles such as the
principality of existence, existential hierarchy, material
origination and spiritual survival of the soul, the substantial
motion, human free will, the relation between this world and
the afterlife, the unification of the soul with faculties, and the
intellecting-intellected unity. According to Ṣadrā, happiness is
of two kinds: real and unreal, each of which is worldly and
afterlife. These 4 types of happiness are of two sorts in turn
dependent on external and internal perceptions and appetitive
faculties, or resultant from theoretical and practical intellect.
The real happiness is what refers to the human intellect.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: transcendental philosophy, happiness, substantial
motion, soul.
Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)
In this paper I will try to talk about the aspects of happiness in
this world and the afterlife. I will examine theories of material
happiness, spiritual happiness and internal happiness as
ean view of comprehensive happiness.
will be done by theoretical principles such as the
principality of existence, existential hierarchy, material
origination and spiritual survival of the soul, the substantial
motion, human free will, the relation between this world and
nification of the soul with faculties, and the
, happiness is
of two kinds: real and unreal, each of which is worldly and
types of happiness are of two sorts in turn:
l and internal perceptions and appetitive
faculties, or resultant from theoretical and practical intellect.
The real happiness is what refers to the human intellect.
transcendental philosophy, happiness, substantial
Human HapHuman HapHuman HapHuman Happiness and the Role of Religionpiness and the Role of Religionpiness and the Role of Religionpiness and the Role of Religion
in Fin Fin Fin Fāāāārrrrāāāābi's Viewbi's Viewbi's Viewbi's View
Yarali Kord FirouzjaeiYarali Kord FirouzjaeiYarali Kord FirouzjaeiYarali Kord Firouzjaei
Baqir alBaqir alBaqir alBaqir al----Olum UniversityOlum UniversityOlum UniversityOlum University (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
Fārābī has discussed the human happiness in many of his
works. Humans are composite of souls and bodies, and souls
can become immaterial beings, though they are primarily
material or hylic. The rational soul can reach to the stages of
actual reason and mustafād reason through cognizance of the
intelligible (ma'qūlāt), and become immaterial beings that can
survive without material bodies. The human happiness is his
abstraction from matter (immateriality) and conjunction with
the immaterial intellects. Since most people cannot grasp this
mode of existence and do not know how to achieve it, they
should be guided by people who have grasped them, and they
are the prophets. The prophet has an intellectual cognizance of
happiness and most people have an imaginary cognizance of it.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Fārābī, religion, soul, happiness.
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piness and the Role of Religionpiness and the Role of Religionpiness and the Role of Religionpiness and the Role of Religion
has discussed the human happiness in many of his
works. Humans are composite of souls and bodies, and souls
hough they are primarily
material or hylic. The rational soul can reach to the stages of
reason through cognizance of the
, and become immaterial beings that can
appiness is his
abstraction from matter (immateriality) and conjunction with
the immaterial intellects. Since most people cannot grasp this
mode of existence and do not know how to achieve it, they
should be guided by people who have grasped them, and they
are the prophets. The prophet has an intellectual cognizance of
happiness and most people have an imaginary cognizance of it.
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Human Dignity on the basisHuman Dignity on the basisHuman Dignity on the basisHuman Dignity on the basis
of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrā
Sima MohamSima MohamSima MohamSima Mohammadpour Dehkordimadpour Dehkordimadpour Dehkordimadpour Dehkordi (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The human dignity (kirāmah) is recognized by all religions, and
is more widely referred to in the Quran. Influenced by religious
doctrines, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a version of philosophical,
religious and mystical anthropology according to which the
human person is one and the same entity with a divine aspect in
all their natural, psychological and rational stages. Thus Mull
Ṣadrā takes humans and the Quran to be equivalent to each
other, both having an outward and an inward. In
philosophy rationality is taken to be the most important ground
for the human dignity. In Ṣadrā's mystical views, human is
taken to be the universal being (kawn jāmi') and one of the main
aspects of this feature is that humans are successors or
substitutes of God on the earth. Though Mullā Ṣadrā
about the training of ideal men, his ideas about the grounds of
the human dignity are not worked out and need to be more
elaborated.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Quran, religious doctrines, Mullā Ṣadrā, human
dignity.
adrāadrāadrāadrā
is recognized by all religions, and
is more widely referred to in the Quran. Influenced by religious
presents a version of philosophical,
ing to which the
human person is one and the same entity with a divine aspect in
all their natural, psychological and rational stages. Thus Mullā
takes humans and the Quran to be equivalent to each
other, both having an outward and an inward. In Ṣadrāean
philosophy rationality is taken to be the most important ground
's mystical views, human is
) and one of the main
aspects of this feature is that humans are successors or
adrā thinks
about the training of ideal men, his ideas about the grounds of
the human dignity are not worked out and need to be more
adrā, human
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the Philosophy
of Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophyof Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophyof Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophyof Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophy
and Ash'arite Thought and Its Implicationsand Ash'arite Thought and Its Implicationsand Ash'arite Thought and Its Implicationsand Ash'arite Thought and Its Implications
for the Free Will and Divine Agencyfor the Free Will and Divine Agencyfor the Free Will and Divine Agencyfor the Free Will and Divine Agency
Majid Zia'iMajid Zia'iMajid Zia'iMajid Zia'i (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
The soul-body relation and their interaction is one of the main
issues in the philosophy of Malebranche and the Islamic
philosophy. This problem will have implications for the problem
of free will and divine agency. Some scholars take
Malebranche's view to be akin to Ash'arite line of thought, but I
will show that this is not true. His view on the soul
relation does not entail the deterministic conception of the
human will, rather it entails something in the middle of both
determinism and indeterminism, and thus he would better be
compared with Muslim philosophers (though not exactly).
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Malebranche, Ash'arite, soul, body, vaporous soul,
determinism, free will.
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Body Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the Philosophy
of Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophyof Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophyof Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophyof Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophy
and Ash'arite Thought and Its Implicationsand Ash'arite Thought and Its Implicationsand Ash'arite Thought and Its Implicationsand Ash'arite Thought and Its Implications
for the Free Will and Divine Agencyfor the Free Will and Divine Agencyfor the Free Will and Divine Agencyfor the Free Will and Divine Agency
body relation and their interaction is one of the main
issues in the philosophy of Malebranche and the Islamic
philosophy. This problem will have implications for the problem
of free will and divine agency. Some scholars take
Malebranche's view to be akin to Ash'arite line of thought, but I
is not true. His view on the soul-body
relation does not entail the deterministic conception of the
human will, rather it entails something in the middle of both
determinism and indeterminism, and thus he would better be
(though not exactly).
, soul, body, vaporous soul,
PART IV
God, Prophecy
and the Mind-Body Problem
Does God Have a Mind?Does God Have a Mind?Does God Have a Mind?Does God Have a Mind?
Hajj MHajj MHajj MHajj Muhammad Legenhausenuhammad Legenhausenuhammad Legenhausenuhammad Legenhausen
Imam Khomeini Education and Research InstituteImam Khomeini Education and Research InstituteImam Khomeini Education and Research InstituteImam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
Theists sometimes describe God as a mind without a body. In
this paper several questions related to this claim are considered:
Is it possible for there to be minds without bodies? Do minds
have to have parts? Do minds have to be temporal? What is the
nature of consciousness? I will argue that in a plausible sense of
“mind” God does not have a mind. Furthermore, I will try to
show that there are important theological traditions,
the dominant stream in Islamic philosophy, in which God is not
understood as having a mind, but is nevertheless knowing,
willing, and living.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: God, mind, body.
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(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
Theists sometimes describe God as a mind without a body. In
this paper several questions related to this claim are considered:
es? Do minds
have to have parts? Do minds have to be temporal? What is the
nature of consciousness? I will argue that in a plausible sense of
“mind” God does not have a mind. Furthermore, I will try to
show that there are important theological traditions, including
the dominant stream in Islamic philosophy, in which God is not
understood as having a mind, but is nevertheless knowing,
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Ibn Sina’s View of Revelations and MiraclesIbn Sina’s View of Revelations and MiraclesIbn Sina’s View of Revelations and MiraclesIbn Sina’s View of Revelations and Miracles
in Terms of his Mindin Terms of his Mindin Terms of his Mindin Terms of his Mind----Body Body Body Body TheoryTheoryTheoryTheory
Hamidreza KhademiHamidreza KhademiHamidreza KhademiHamidreza Khademi (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Ibn Sina takes the soul to be the governing principle of the
body, instead of the Aristotelian view of the soul as the vital
principle. Thus Ibn Sina does not acknowledge the materiality
of the soul and its indwelling in the body, unlike Aristotle. Thus
the soul, despite its unity, has faculties which enable it to have a
relation to the body. In his view, the animal faculties do not act
without the body, and their existence is not separated from their
agency. He then concludes that every particular perception is
done through a material organ. In Ibn Sina’s philosophy,
imagination is an internal faculty which enable the soul to
receive revelations. Revelation (vaḥy) is a divine speech
received by the prophet through an angel. Prophets have three
characteristics: perfection of the theoretical faculty or the
faculty of guess, the perfection of imagination and the
perfection of the governing (mutaṣarifah) faculty. Ibn Sina
accounts for the miracles in terms of these three characte
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, revelation (vaḥy), miracle, soul, body,
faculties of the soul.
Ibn Sina’s View of Revelations and MiraclesIbn Sina’s View of Revelations and MiraclesIbn Sina’s View of Revelations and MiraclesIbn Sina’s View of Revelations and Miracles
Ibn Sina takes the soul to be the governing principle of the
body, instead of the Aristotelian view of the soul as the vital
principle. Thus Ibn Sina does not acknowledge the materiality
e body, unlike Aristotle. Thus
the soul, despite its unity, has faculties which enable it to have a
relation to the body. In his view, the animal faculties do not act
without the body, and their existence is not separated from their
es that every particular perception is
done through a material organ. In Ibn Sina’s philosophy,
imagination is an internal faculty which enable the soul to
) is a divine speech
Prophets have three
characteristics: perfection of the theoretical faculty or the
faculty of guess, the perfection of imagination and the
) faculty. Ibn Sina
accounts for the miracles in terms of these three characteristics.
, miracle, soul, body,
The Characteristics of Prophetic ImaginationThe Characteristics of Prophetic ImaginationThe Characteristics of Prophetic ImaginationThe Characteristics of Prophetic Imagination
in Aquinasin Aquinasin Aquinasin Aquinas
Alireza FazeliAlireza FazeliAlireza FazeliAlireza Fazeli
Yasouj University (Yasouj, Iran)Yasouj University (Yasouj, Iran)Yasouj University (Yasouj, Iran)Yasouj University (Yasouj, Iran)
In his detailed discussion of prophecy, Aquinas talks about the
way the prophetic knowledge is acquired, and takes the most
appropriate supernatural cognition of the prophet to be an
imaginational one. In this paper I will talk about the
characteristics of this special cognition. I will first talk about the
faculty of imagination in Aquinas, then discuss about his
position against Ibn Sina which takes the prophetic knowledge
to be a perfection of the faculty of imagination. Aquinas takes
the prophet as a normal human individual and takes his
prophecy to be a divine intervention without there being any
capacity inside the prophet which distinguishes him from other
human beings. In order to reject the interference of the
prophetic imaginations with the images of the perception,
Aquinas upholds the isolation of the prophet's perceptions at
the time of receiving the prophecy. This is against the account
given by some Muslim philosophers such as Fārābī.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Aquinas, prophecy, prophetic knowledge,
imagination.
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The Characteristics of Prophetic ImaginationThe Characteristics of Prophetic ImaginationThe Characteristics of Prophetic ImaginationThe Characteristics of Prophetic Imagination
In his detailed discussion of prophecy, Aquinas talks about the
way the prophetic knowledge is acquired, and takes the most
appropriate supernatural cognition of the prophet to be an
imaginational one. In this paper I will talk about the
this special cognition. I will first talk about the
faculty of imagination in Aquinas, then discuss about his
position against Ibn Sina which takes the prophetic knowledge
to be a perfection of the faculty of imagination. Aquinas takes
rmal human individual and takes his
prophecy to be a divine intervention without there being any
capacity inside the prophet which distinguishes him from other
human beings. In order to reject the interference of the
of the perception,
Aquinas upholds the isolation of the prophet's perceptions at
the time of receiving the prophecy. This is against the account
, prophecy, prophetic knowledge,
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A Philosophical Explanation of A Philosophical Explanation of A Philosophical Explanation of A Philosophical Explanation of ImamahImamahImamahImamah
in Peripatetic Philosophyin Peripatetic Philosophyin Peripatetic Philosophyin Peripatetic Philosophy
Mortaza YousofiMortaza YousofiMortaza YousofiMortaza Yousofi----RadRadRadRad
Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
Islamic peripatetic philosophers such as Fārābi and Ibn Sina
tried to give philosophical explanations as to the nature and
existence of imāms in Shiite doctrines. They gave
comprehensive explanations of the nature and capacities of the
rational soul and its degrees of perfection, and accordingly tried
to explain imāmah as a perfection of the soul. On this account,
imām has a cosmic governance (velāyat takvīnī) because of the
way he exists.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Islamic Peripatetic philosophy, imamah, soul.
ImamahImamahImamahImamah
and Ibn Sina
tried to give philosophical explanations as to the nature and
in Shiite doctrines. They gave
comprehensive explanations of the nature and capacities of the
rational soul and its degrees of perfection, and accordingly tried
as a perfection of the soul. On this account,
) because of the
Islamic Peripatetic philosophy, imamah, soul.
Human as the Vicar of GodHuman as the Vicar of GodHuman as the Vicar of GodHuman as the Vicar of God
and the Nature of the Souand the Nature of the Souand the Nature of the Souand the Nature of the Soullll
Seyyed Mohammad AkbarianSeyyed Mohammad AkbarianSeyyed Mohammad AkbarianSeyyed Mohammad Akbarian
Islamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyIslamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)(Qom, Iran)
The problem of divine vicariate of human beings is related to
the problem of the soul in some respects. The divine vicariate of
humans and the cosmic (takvīnī) and legislative (
governance (velāyat) of the Perfect Man (insān kāmil
religious doctrines and the writings of the Muslim thinkers
show an anthropocentrism in the world. The world in religious
and philosophical works is envisaged as being directed in its
evolution to realize the Perfect Man. In this paper I will examine
the divine vicariate of humans on the basis of the Quran and
Ḥadīth, and then generalize it to the human kind. Finally I will
talk about its implications for the nature of the human soul and
its degrees on the basis of the Ṣadrāean view.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: human, vicar of God, soul, body, cosmic governance,
legislative governance.
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The problem of divine vicariate of human beings is related to
the problem of the soul in some respects. The divine vicariate of
and legislative (tashrī'ī)
insān kāmil) in
religious doctrines and the writings of the Muslim thinkers
show an anthropocentrism in the world. The world in religious
and philosophical works is envisaged as being directed in its
on to realize the Perfect Man. In this paper I will examine
the divine vicariate of humans on the basis of the Quran and
, and then generalize it to the human kind. Finally I will
talk about its implications for the nature of the human soul and
human, vicar of God, soul, body, cosmic governance,
PART V
Mind-Body Problem
and the Religious Belief
Psychological PhilosophyPsychological PhilosophyPsychological PhilosophyPsychological Philosophy
between Aristotle and Ibn Sinabetween Aristotle and Ibn Sinabetween Aristotle and Ibn Sinabetween Aristotle and Ibn Sina
Hossein Rostami JalilianHossein Rostami JalilianHossein Rostami JalilianHossein Rostami Jalilian (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
We will discuss the Aristotelian definition of the soul and then
talk about issues such as the unity of the soul, its immateriality
and immortality, and its faculties. Within the discussion we will
point to Ibn Sina's views which are influenced by the
Aristotelian psychology. We will try to show that the
Aristotelian view that the soul is the form of the body and his
view that the corruption of matter brings about the c
of the form (and vice versa) are compatible. Aristotle maintains
that the intellectual soul is wholly independent of the body and
thus completely immaterial. Therefore he should not count as a
materialist. Ibn Sina has made modifications in the A
definition of the soul and considered it to be a definition of the
relational nature of the soul and not of its essence, which will
have implications for his views about the soul.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Aristotle, Ibn Sina, soul, body, immortality.
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We will discuss the Aristotelian definition of the soul and then
talk about issues such as the unity of the soul, its immateriality
Within the discussion we will
point to Ibn Sina's views which are influenced by the
Aristotelian psychology. We will try to show that the
Aristotelian view that the soul is the form of the body and his
view that the corruption of matter brings about the corruption
of the form (and vice versa) are compatible. Aristotle maintains
that the intellectual soul is wholly independent of the body and
thus completely immaterial. Therefore he should not count as a
materialist. Ibn Sina has made modifications in the Aristotelian
sidered it to be a definition of the
relational nature of the soul and not of its essence, which will
Aristotle, Ibn Sina, soul, body, immortality.
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AAAAn Approach to the Souln Approach to the Souln Approach to the Souln Approach to the Soul----Body Relation:Body Relation:Body Relation:Body Relation:
The Plan of a ViewThe Plan of a ViewThe Plan of a ViewThe Plan of a View
Ahmad ShahgoliAhmad ShahgoliAhmad ShahgoliAhmad Shahgoli (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
This paper aims to introduce some of the issues concerning the
soul-body relation from a different perspective. The paper
consists of some sections, the second problem of which
central. The most important problems in this paper are
anything which occurs in the soul or in the body will affect only
that part (the soul or body), (2) the mutual interaction of the
soul and the body; that is, any state, idea, or belief that occurs in
the soul will affect the body too; likewise any volitional bodily
act will affect the soul, (3) in addition to this universal
interaction, each psychological character has a manifestation
suitable with the bodily aspect; in fact the body and i
translation or reflections of the psychological characters and
properties; likewise each volitional bodily act has a particular
expression in the soul. That is why the plurality of the types and
individuations of an act leads to the plurality of the function of
the soul, (4) I will examine the different forms of relations
between objects and the place of the soul and body in this
regard, and will introduce the paths of the soul-boy interaction
and I will give a philosophical explanation of the cases which
seem to be counter-examples to this general rule.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul-body relation, reflection, interaction.
Body Relation:Body Relation:Body Relation:Body Relation:
This paper aims to introduce some of the issues concerning the
body relation from a different perspective. The paper
consists of some sections, the second problem of which is more
The most important problems in this paper are: (1)
anything which occurs in the soul or in the body will affect only
the mutual interaction of the
at occurs in
the soul will affect the body too; likewise any volitional bodily
in addition to this universal
interaction, each psychological character has a manifestation
suitable with the bodily aspect; in fact the body and its acts are
translation or reflections of the psychological characters and
properties; likewise each volitional bodily act has a particular
expression in the soul. That is why the plurality of the types and
f the function of
I will examine the different forms of relations
between objects and the place of the soul and body in this
boy interaction
ases which
A Comparative Examination of the SoulA Comparative Examination of the SoulA Comparative Examination of the SoulA Comparative Examination of the Soul----Body Body Body Body
Relation in Aquinas and Ibn SinaRelation in Aquinas and Ibn SinaRelation in Aquinas and Ibn SinaRelation in Aquinas and Ibn Sina
Zahra Zare'Zahra Zare'Zahra Zare'Zahra Zare' (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Thomsitic account of the nature of the soul has any similarities
with Ibn Sina's views. Adhering to an Aristotelian perspective,
Aquinas takes the soul as the form of the body or the first
actuality of the body, in light of which the living organism can
perform its vital tasks. He takes the human soul to be an
immaterial substance and immortal. In his arguments for the
existence of this immaterial substance, he takes the soul to be
imperfect, which has the tendency to perfection. He rejects the
Platonic view of the soul-body relation as a capta
relation. What distinguishes Aquinas' view from Ibn Sina's is
that the former maintains that soul cannot acquire all its
actualities without the body, though it is an independent
substance, and that a combination of the soul and body
constitutes the human person, but Ibn Sina takes the soul and
not the body as the constituent of the human person.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, Aquinas, soul, body.
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Body Body Body Body
soul has any similarities
with Ibn Sina's views. Adhering to an Aristotelian perspective,
Aquinas takes the soul as the form of the body or the first
actuality of the body, in light of which the living organism can
man soul to be an
immaterial substance and immortal. In his arguments for the
existence of this immaterial substance, he takes the soul to be
imperfect, which has the tendency to perfection. He rejects the
body relation as a captain-ship
relation. What distinguishes Aquinas' view from Ibn Sina's is
that the former maintains that soul cannot acquire all its
actualities without the body, though it is an independent
substance, and that a combination of the soul and body
e human person, but Ibn Sina takes the soul and
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SoulSoulSoulSoul----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
in Ibn Sina, in Ibn Sina, in Ibn Sina, in Ibn Sina, ṢṢṢṢadrā adrā adrā adrā and Zonouziand Zonouziand Zonouziand Zonouzi
Rahmatollah KarimzadehRahmatollah KarimzadehRahmatollah KarimzadehRahmatollah Karimzadeh (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
Ibn Sina takes the intellectual soul to be immaterial, and thus
the soul –as integrated with the intellect- will be immaterial too.
Bu this gives rise to the problem of how an immaterial entity
can belong to a material body. Ṣadrā proposes to solve the
problem on the basis of the substantial motion, saying that the
soul is material in origination and that the soul is united with
the body. Finally we will deal with Zunūzi’s view of the soul
body relation as unificatory combination.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, Ṣadrā, Zunūzi, soul-body relation.
tual soul to be immaterial, and thus
will be immaterial too.
Bu this gives rise to the problem of how an immaterial entity
proposes to solve the
bstantial motion, saying that the
soul is material in origination and that the soul is united with
zi’s view of the soul-
n.
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body RelationBody RelationBody RelationBody Relation
in in in in ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Philosophyean Philosophyean Philosophyean Philosophy
Seyyed Yadollah YazdanpanahSeyyed Yadollah YazdanpanahSeyyed Yadollah YazdanpanahSeyyed Yadollah Yazdanpanah1111
The most important issue in Islamic philosophical psychology is
how the soul exists. Muslim Peripatetic philosophers take the
vegetative, animal and human composites to have souls as their
specific forms. The soul is immaterial in essence, material in its
governing relation to the body. However, in Ṣadrā’s view the
relation to the body lies in the essence of the soul, since if the
soul were immaterial in its essence, it could not have any
relations to the material body. Moreover, the view that the soul
is the form of the body is discussed. According to Ṣadrā,
is essentially in need of a body, though it is rational in character.
The soul will have a substantial motion due to its relation to the
body, but the motion will lead to its independence from
body at death, and it will survive the death, because of its
immaterial rational character. In this paper we will extensively
discuss the Ṣadrāean soul-body theory.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: transcendental philosophy, soul-body, substantial
motion, happiness.
1. The paper is rewritten by Mohammad Reza Fallah.
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The most important issue in Islamic philosophical psychology is
how the soul exists. Muslim Peripatetic philosophers take the
vegetative, animal and human composites to have souls as their
specific forms. The soul is immaterial in essence, material in its
s view the
relation to the body lies in the essence of the soul, since if the
soul were immaterial in its essence, it could not have any
relations to the material body. Moreover, the view that the soul
adrā, the soul
is essentially in need of a body, though it is rational in character.
The soul will have a substantial motion due to its relation to the
body, but the motion will lead to its independence from the
body at death, and it will survive the death, because of its
immaterial rational character. In this paper we will extensively
body, substantial
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AAAA Critique of the PrinciplesCritique of the PrinciplesCritique of the PrinciplesCritique of the Principles
of the of the of the of the ṢṢṢṢadrāean Philosophyadrāean Philosophyadrāean Philosophyadrāean Philosophy
S. Yahya YasrebiS. Yahya YasrebiS. Yahya YasrebiS. Yahya Yasrebi1111
Allameh Allameh Allameh Allameh abaabaabaabaṭṭṭṭaba'ei Universityaba'ei Universityaba'ei Universityaba'ei University
The Ṣadrāean principles such as the principality of the existence
and the substantial motion are seriously problematic, hence the
theories based upon them, such as his theory of the bodily
resurrection. As to the principality of the existence, we should
distinguish between the mystical and Ṣadrāean versions. On the
mystical version, nothing exists except God which is the
absolute existence (personal unity of existence). On the
Ṣadrāean version, everything can be analyzed to a whatness
quiddity (māhiyah) and a being (existence), but what exists in
fact is the existence and not the quiddity. My objection is that
the distinction between whatness and being is a mental
analysis, and this duality does not exist in the external world.
For example, when there is a tree outside, there is only one
phenomenon, regardless of its quiddity or existence. However,
the point is that whenever Ṣadrā employs this principle
problems, it is the mystical version that he has in mind. One of
these cases is the immateriality of the soul. The belief in the
spiritual immaterial soul is a Greek heritage and is not rooted in
the scriptures. As to the bodily resurrection, philosophical views
1. The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.
ean principles such as the principality of the existence
and the substantial motion are seriously problematic, hence the
hem, such as his theory of the bodily
resurrection. As to the principality of the existence, we should
ean versions. On the
mystical version, nothing exists except God which is the
y of existence). On the
ean version, everything can be analyzed to a whatness or
and a being (existence), but what exists in
fact is the existence and not the quiddity. My objection is that
is a mental
analysis, and this duality does not exist in the external world.
For example, when there is a tree outside, there is only one
phenomenon, regardless of its quiddity or existence. However,
employs this principle to solve
problems, it is the mystical version that he has in mind. One of
these cases is the immateriality of the soul. The belief in the
spiritual immaterial soul is a Greek heritage and is not rooted in
losophical views
are not compatible with the textual evidence of religious
doctrines. Recent Muslim philosophers such as
Mudaris, Muhammad Taqī Āmolī, Mirzā Aḥmad
Sayyid Abolḥassan Rafī’eī Qazvīnī and Allameh aba
the Ṣadrāean account of resurrection to be incompatible with
religious evidence.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: transcendental philosophy, principality of existence,
substantial motion, bodily resurrection, immateriality of the
soul, survival.
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are not compatible with the textual evidence of religious
doctrines. Recent Muslim philosophers such as Āqā Alī
mad Āshtianī,
abaṭaba'i find
account of resurrection to be incompatible with
transcendental philosophy, principality of existence,
substantial motion, bodily resurrection, immateriality of the
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Cartesian and NeoCartesian and NeoCartesian and NeoCartesian and Neo----Cartesian ArgumentsCartesian ArgumentsCartesian ArgumentsCartesian Arguments
ffffor Dualismor Dualismor Dualismor Dualism
Edward WierengaEdward WierengaEdward WierengaEdward Wierenga
University of Rochester (NY)University of Rochester (NY)University of Rochester (NY)University of Rochester (NY)
This paper considers a series of arguments for substance
dualism. The first are suggested by passages in Descartes;
others, due to Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga, are of
more recent vintage but seem to be inspired by Descartes’
arguments. For the ones that seem plausible the paper
discusses the bearing of their conclusions on the question of
survival of death and resurrection.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: substance dualism, Cartesian arguments, survival.
Cartesian ArgumentsCartesian ArgumentsCartesian ArgumentsCartesian Arguments
This paper considers a series of arguments for substance
dualism. The first are suggested by passages in Descartes;
others, due to Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga, are of
t seem to be inspired by Descartes’
arguments. For the ones that seem plausible the paper
discusses the bearing of their conclusions on the question of
substance dualism, Cartesian arguments, survival.
Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?
Hajj Muhammad LegenhausenHajj Muhammad LegenhausenHajj Muhammad LegenhausenHajj Muhammad Legenhausen
Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
Charles Taliaferro has defended dualism in the philosophy of
mind as the best position available to Christians on the subject.
Since Christians and Muslims are in basic agreement on many
religious doctrines, such as the existence of God, angels, and the
afterlife, one might plausibly suppose that if dualism is the
position Christians should take, Muslims should follow suit. In
this paper I argue that the reasons given by Taliaferro against
Christian materialism do not provide conclusive reason for
Christians to reject materialism. Furthermore, I argue that the
religious doctrines of Christians and Muslims are indeterminate
with respect to some important issues in the philosophy of
mind, that is, that there are versions of materialism and dualism
that appear to be no less consistent with religious teachings
than their rivals. Finally, I offer a brief discussion of the
philosophy of mind of Mullā Ṣadrā in order to illustrate how
positions may be developed that do not correspond to current
understandings of either materialism or dualism.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: dualism, God's existence, afterlife, Christians,
Muslims.
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Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists?
Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)
Charles Taliaferro has defended dualism in the philosophy of
mind as the best position available to Christians on the subject.
ince Christians and Muslims are in basic agreement on many
religious doctrines, such as the existence of God, angels, and the
afterlife, one might plausibly suppose that if dualism is the
position Christians should take, Muslims should follow suit. In
paper I argue that the reasons given by Taliaferro against
Christian materialism do not provide conclusive reason for
Christians to reject materialism. Furthermore, I argue that the
religious doctrines of Christians and Muslims are indeterminate
ect to some important issues in the philosophy of
mind, that is, that there are versions of materialism and dualism
that appear to be no less consistent with religious teachings
than their rivals. Finally, I offer a brief discussion of the
in order to illustrate how
positions may be developed that do not correspond to current
dualism, God's existence, afterlife, Christians,
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A Defense of A Defense of A Defense of A Defense of Ibn SinaIbn SinaIbn SinaIbn Sina’s Th’s Th’s Th’s Theoryeoryeoryeory
of the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survivalof the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survivalof the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survivalof the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survival
Seyyed Hassan Sa’adat MostafaviSeyyed Hassan Sa’adat MostafaviSeyyed Hassan Sa’adat MostafaviSeyyed Hassan Sa’adat Mostafavi1111
Imam Sadiq University (Tehran, Iran)Imam Sadiq University (Tehran, Iran)Imam Sadiq University (Tehran, Iran)Imam Sadiq University (Tehran, Iran)
Ibn Sina maintains that the soul is not eternal and it was not
created before bodies; rather it is originated when the body was
created. The soul as an immaterial form governs the body in its
developments, though in the first stages, only its vegetative and
then its animal characters manifest. The body is the occasion of
the soul’s perfection, not its essence. The perfections that the
soul acquires are not changes in the essence of the soul; rather
they are necessary incidents of the soul, and thus they never
separate from the soul even after death. According to Ibn Sina’s
theory the bodily resurrection is possible, though it is not
necessitated by philosophical proofs. Only the spiritual
resurrection is necessary on the basis of philosophical
reasoning.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: spiritual origination, spiritual survival, soul, Ibn
Sina.
1. The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.
of the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survivalof the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survivalof the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survivalof the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survival
Ibn Sina maintains that the soul is not eternal and it was not
created before bodies; rather it is originated when the body was
The soul as an immaterial form governs the body in its
developments, though in the first stages, only its vegetative and
then its animal characters manifest. The body is the occasion of
the soul’s perfection, not its essence. The perfections that the
acquires are not changes in the essence of the soul; rather
they are necessary incidents of the soul, and thus they never
separate from the soul even after death. According to Ibn Sina’s
theory the bodily resurrection is possible, though it is not
tated by philosophical proofs. Only the spiritual
resurrection is necessary on the basis of philosophical
spiritual origination, spiritual survival, soul, Ibn
Soul, Body, and their InterrelationsSoul, Body, and their InterrelationsSoul, Body, and their InterrelationsSoul, Body, and their Interrelations
Ali Abedi ShahroudiAli Abedi ShahroudiAli Abedi ShahroudiAli Abedi Shahroudi
HawzahHawzahHawzahHawzah of Qom (Iran)of Qom (Iran)of Qom (Iran)of Qom (Iran)
In this paper we will first give a picture of the Islamic
Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental theories of the
soul-body problem, and then talk about our own theory. In our
view, the nature is by itself inertial such that even its substantial
motion is in line with the existential width. For the course of
nature to transform, its direction should change by an outside
cause. Also an outside cause should continuously exert
horizontal and vertical actualities on the nature in order
change its direction and make the perfection possible. The main
cause of the existence of the nature and its perfections is the
cause of whole of "the best order" (neẓām aḥsan), thus the
necessary being (wājib al-wujūd) is the source of the whole
order and the changes without a change in His necessary
essence; rather the necessary being as the adequate cause (
tāmmah) creates the intellects, souls, humors, and the totality
of the world, and through His causal dominance, He passes His
existential effects through the horizontal and vertical chain,
brings the nature to the substantial motion and determines its
direction along with the vertical order of the existence, in
addition to the horizontal one. Moreover, since the necessary
being is super-adequate cause, He has an adequate effect
through a path other than the vertical order, without the
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In this paper we will first give a picture of the Islamic
Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental theories of the
body problem, and then talk about our own theory. In our
ts substantial
motion is in line with the existential width. For the course of
nature to transform, its direction should change by an outside
cause. Also an outside cause should continuously exert
horizontal and vertical actualities on the nature in order to
change its direction and make the perfection possible. The main
cause of the existence of the nature and its perfections is the
), thus the
) is the source of the whole
and the changes without a change in His necessary
essence; rather the necessary being as the adequate cause (ellat
) creates the intellects, souls, humors, and the totality
of the world, and through His causal dominance, He passes His
ects through the horizontal and vertical chain,
brings the nature to the substantial motion and determines its
direction along with the vertical order of the existence, in
addition to the horizontal one. Moreover, since the necessary
e cause, He has an adequate effect
through a path other than the vertical order, without the
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falsification of the vertical and horizontal order or
predestination (jabr) and divine resignation (tafwīḍ) in rational
beings. Thus the substantial motion is not only linear, but
vectorial. The soul originates by the origination of the fertilized
ovaries, and its human growth continues through the vectorial
substantial motion. Vegetative and sentient souls and their
faculties are stages of the human soul, though th
independent existence in plants and animals. The human soul is
united with all the faculties. There are three types of relation
between the soul and the body: (1) existential (and not material
connection, (2) existential unification, (3) governing
The bodily existence needs its complement, because of its
existential incompleteness, and since the soul is the
complement of the existence of the body, it should exist in the
horizon of its existence, though the stage of its realization is
distinct from that of the body. Thus while the soul is immaterial
even in its lowest stage, it has bodily characters (though not a
body itself) because of its existential connection with the body
as a matter (hyle) for the soul. The nature's substantial motion
is all-encompassing motion which crosses the horizontal order
of the world, and thus brings about transformations in respects
of the substantial intensification (ishtidād), quantitative,
qualitative and spatial motions. Moreover, the repetitive
(tajadudī) substantial motion changes to a vectorial and tensor
substantial motion via the influence of the universal soul and
the universal intellect, and this paves the path for the existential
perfection which is governed by rules different from those of the
incidental perfection. The nature is subject to change via
universal souls and the universal soul which are paths of the
divine act throughout the existential degrees and have the
dispositional and occurrent possibilities of higher acquirements.
falsification of the vertical and horizontal order or
) in rational
only linear, but
vectorial. The soul originates by the origination of the fertilized
ovaries, and its human growth continues through the vectorial
substantial motion. Vegetative and sentient souls and their
faculties are stages of the human soul, though they have
independent existence in plants and animals. The human soul is
united with all the faculties. There are three types of relation
and not material)
governing relation.
The bodily existence needs its complement, because of its
existential incompleteness, and since the soul is the
complement of the existence of the body, it should exist in the
horizon of its existence, though the stage of its realization is
inct from that of the body. Thus while the soul is immaterial
even in its lowest stage, it has bodily characters (though not a
body itself) because of its existential connection with the body
as a matter (hyle) for the soul. The nature's substantial motion
encompassing motion which crosses the horizontal order
of the world, and thus brings about transformations in respects
), quantitative,
qualitative and spatial motions. Moreover, the repetitive
substantial motion changes to a vectorial and tensor
substantial motion via the influence of the universal soul and
the universal intellect, and this paves the path for the existential
perfection which is governed by rules different from those of the
dental perfection. The nature is subject to change via
universal souls and the universal soul which are paths of the
divine act throughout the existential degrees and have the
dispositional and occurrent possibilities of higher acquirements.
Thus parts of it will be detached to be transformed into organic
material body for substantial and accidental changes. The
detached parts are incomplete existences whose complete
existences are disturbed, and they can thus admit of
complementary existences and transform into other kinds of
being. The soul which has stages is a being which can be
completed and is thus incomplete. Its unificatory combination
with an organic natural body is possible. Though the soul and
the body have a unificatory combination, but since th
combination just falls in the stage of their existential
connection, they gradually distance from one another and
continue their tensor substantial motion in the ends of the
existence where the soul is separated from the body and has
received its actualities and the body becomes complete through
the substantial motions, and thus in resurrection, the soul
existentially belongs to the material body.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: soul, body, substantial motion, existential
attachment, the best order, rational beings, resurrection.
A
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it will be detached to be transformed into organic
material body for substantial and accidental changes. The
detached parts are incomplete existences whose complete
existences are disturbed, and they can thus admit of
m into other kinds of
being. The soul which has stages is a being which can be
completed and is thus incomplete. Its unificatory combination
with an organic natural body is possible. Though the soul and
the body have a unificatory combination, but since this
combination just falls in the stage of their existential
connection, they gradually distance from one another and
continue their tensor substantial motion in the ends of the
existence where the soul is separated from the body and has
ities and the body becomes complete through
the substantial motions, and thus in resurrection, the soul
soul, body, substantial motion, existential
tion.
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Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:
Ibn Sina’s View on the Role of IntellectIbn Sina’s View on the Role of IntellectIbn Sina’s View on the Role of IntellectIbn Sina’s View on the Role of Intellect
in Afterlife Happinessin Afterlife Happinessin Afterlife Happinessin Afterlife Happiness
Amir DivAmir DivAmir DivAmir Divāāāānininini
Mofid University (Qom, Iran)Mofid University (Qom, Iran)Mofid University (Qom, Iran)Mofid University (Qom, Iran)
Muslim philosophers regard the intellect or the rational soul as
the constituent of the nature of men which is what distinguishes
humans from other creatures. The intellect has two major
powers: the power to know and the power to act. In this paper I
will deal with the role of the intellect in happiness and its
degrees on the basis of the degrees of the soul’s rational faculty.
According to Ibn Sina, the happiness and miserability of
humans in the afterlife depends on the theoretical and practical
position of the rational soul and since the immortal happiness
and miserability depend on the theoretical condition of the
intellect, there will be two main groups of people: those who
have achieved the theoretical perfection of the intellect (thus
enjoy happiness), and those who do not enjoy such a perfection
(thus in miserability). Therefore, Ibn Sina merely emphasizes
on the spiritual and intellectual immortality and believes that
bodily characters do not bring about any changes in the essence
of the rational soul.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Sina, rational faculty, soul, happiness,
immortality.
Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:Rational Character and Immortal Happiness:
Ibn Sina’s View on the Role of IntellectIbn Sina’s View on the Role of IntellectIbn Sina’s View on the Role of IntellectIbn Sina’s View on the Role of Intellect
Muslim philosophers regard the intellect or the rational soul as
of men which is what distinguishes
humans from other creatures. The intellect has two major
powers: the power to know and the power to act. In this paper I
will deal with the role of the intellect in happiness and its
the soul’s rational faculty.
According to Ibn Sina, the happiness and miserability of
humans in the afterlife depends on the theoretical and practical
position of the rational soul and since the immortal happiness
l condition of the
intellect, there will be two main groups of people: those who
have achieved the theoretical perfection of the intellect (thus
enjoy happiness), and those who do not enjoy such a perfection
ly emphasizes
on the spiritual and intellectual immortality and believes that
bodily characters do not bring about any changes in the essence
Ibn Sina, rational faculty, soul, happiness,
Persons Without Persons Without Persons Without Persons Without Immaterial SoulsImmaterial SoulsImmaterial SoulsImmaterial Souls
Lynne Rudder BakerLynne Rudder BakerLynne Rudder BakerLynne Rudder Baker
University of Amherst (Massachusetts, USA)University of Amherst (Massachusetts, USA)University of Amherst (Massachusetts, USA)University of Amherst (Massachusetts, USA)
Traditionally, Christians and Muslims have held that a human
person is (or has) an immaterial soul. Since there does not
seem to be a place for immaterial souls in the natural
offer an alternative view that I call ‘Person
Constitutionalism ‘.
Person-Body Constitutionalism holds that there are no (finite)
immaterial entities like souls. Instead of distinguishing
between souls and bodies, Constitutionalism distingui
between whole persons and bodies. Human persons are
essentially embodied, but do not essentially have the bodies that
they in fact have at any given time. So, human persons, though
spatially coincident with their bodies, are not identical to their
bodies. Persons are distinguished from their bodies by having
first-person perspectives essentially.
I shall try to show that Constitutionalism is consistent with
Christian doctrines. First, I set out Constitutionalism. Then,
after critically discussing Thomas Aquinas’s view of
Resurrection, I discuss the compatibility between
Constitutionalism and the Resurrection, and an intermediate
state between death and a general resurrection (e.g., Purgatory).
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Traditionally, Christians and Muslims have held that a human
person is (or has) an immaterial soul. Since there does not
seem to be a place for immaterial souls in the natural world, I
offer an alternative view that I call ‘Person-Body
Body Constitutionalism holds that there are no (finite)
immaterial entities like souls. Instead of distinguishing
between souls and bodies, Constitutionalism distinguishes
between whole persons and bodies. Human persons are
essentially embodied, but do not essentially have the bodies that
they in fact have at any given time. So, human persons, though
spatially coincident with their bodies, are not identical to their
odies. Persons are distinguished from their bodies by having
I shall try to show that Constitutionalism is consistent with
Christian doctrines. First, I set out Constitutionalism. Then,
omas Aquinas’s view of
Resurrection, I discuss the compatibility between
Constitutionalism and the Resurrection, and an intermediate
state between death and a general resurrection (e.g., Purgatory).
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Finally, I have a brief discussion of Constitutionalism
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The conclusion is that
Person-Body Constitutionalism is congenial to these central
Christian doctrines, and the existence of immaterial souls is not
required for traditional Christianity.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: immaterial soul, constitution view, person, body.
m and the
the Incarnation. The conclusion is that
Body Constitutionalism is congenial to these central
Christian doctrines, and the existence of immaterial souls is not
l soul, constitution view, person, body.
What is Dualism and Its RelationWhat is Dualism and Its RelationWhat is Dualism and Its RelationWhat is Dualism and Its Relation
to Science and Religion?to Science and Religion?to Science and Religion?to Science and Religion?
Uwe MeixnerUwe MeixnerUwe MeixnerUwe Meixner
Regensburg University (Germany)Regensburg University (Germany)Regensburg University (Germany)Regensburg University (Germany)
The paper distinguishes various forms of (psychophysical)
dualism and inquires into the reasons for the wi
(almost unanimous) rejection of dualism by Western
intellectuals. It is argued that dualism is very well compatible
with science (in fact: good for it). The contrary impression is
due to the confusing of science with materialist metaphysics.
Often, the rejection of dualism is simply the outcome of an anti
religious attitude. But, in fact, dualism –in the senses explicated
in the paper- does not require the truth of the Christian or any
other religion. However, it is argued -contrary to what some
believers believe- that the Christian religion requires the truth
of dualism (if most of what the Scriptures tell about the
resurrection of the dead is to be believed).
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: dualism, science, religion, materialism.
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The paper distinguishes various forms of (psychophysical)
dualism and inquires into the reasons for the widespread
(almost unanimous) rejection of dualism by Western
intellectuals. It is argued that dualism is very well compatible
with science (in fact: good for it). The contrary impression is
due to the confusing of science with materialist metaphysics.
, the rejection of dualism is simply the outcome of an anti-
senses explicated
does not require the truth of the Christian or any
ontrary to what some
that the Christian religion requires the truth
of dualism (if most of what the Scriptures tell about the
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Unity and Subjectivity:Unity and Subjectivity:Unity and Subjectivity:Unity and Subjectivity:
the the the the Plotinian Perspective and Its AftermathPlotinian Perspective and Its AftermathPlotinian Perspective and Its AftermathPlotinian Perspective and Its Aftermath
Douglas HedleyDouglas HedleyDouglas HedleyDouglas Hedley
Cambridge University (UK)Cambridge University (UK)Cambridge University (UK)Cambridge University (UK)
In my paper I consider the anti-materialistic arguments of
Plotinus
about the simplicity of the soul, their reception in both
Christian
and Islamic theology, and conclude with an account of the
relevance of
such arguments for contemporary philosophy of religion.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Plotinus, simplicity of the soul, Christian theology,
Islamic theology.
Plotinian Perspective and Its AftermathPlotinian Perspective and Its AftermathPlotinian Perspective and Its AftermathPlotinian Perspective and Its Aftermath
materialistic arguments of
about the simplicity of the soul, their reception in both
ith an account of the
such arguments for contemporary philosophy of religion.
Plotinus, simplicity of the soul, Christian theology,
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body RelationBody RelationBody RelationBody Relation
in Ibn in Ibn in Ibn in Ibn ḤḤḤḤazm's Viewazm's Viewazm's Viewazm's View
Khaled Amohammad Faraj AlohaishiKhaled Amohammad Faraj AlohaishiKhaled Amohammad Faraj AlohaishiKhaled Amohammad Faraj Alohaishi
AlAlAlAl----Jabal alJabal alJabal alJabal al----Gharbi University (Gharbi University (Gharbi University (Gharbi University (LibyaLibyaLibyaLibya))))
The problem of the soul-body relation is one of the most
difficult philosophical issues. Since Ibn Ḥazm was a soul
dualist, he had to explain the nature of this relation and since he
found it hard to explain the relation between an immaterial
entity (soul) and a material one (body), he tended to accept the
idea of the soul as a fine-grained matter (jism laṭīf) through a
reconciliation between philosophical views (Greek or Islamic)
and the religious doctrines that he learned from the Quran. One
thing that supports this conclusion is that many philosophers
and theologians had tendencies toward this view. For example,
while Ibn Sin takes the soul to be an immaterial, spiritual soul,
he had to make an appeal to a fine-grained matter as
intermediate between the soul and the body.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ibn Ḥazm, soul, body, dualism.
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body relation is one of the most
azm was a soul-body
dualist, he had to explain the nature of this relation and since he
relation between an immaterial
entity (soul) and a material one (body), he tended to accept the
) through a
reconciliation between philosophical views (Greek or Islamic)
he learned from the Quran. One
thing that supports this conclusion is that many philosophers
and theologians had tendencies toward this view. For example,
while Ibn Sin takes the soul to be an immaterial, spiritual soul,
grained matter as
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The Concept of Soul and SpiritThe Concept of Soul and SpiritThe Concept of Soul and SpiritThe Concept of Soul and Spirit
in the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's Viewin the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's Viewin the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's Viewin the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's View
Bahloul Mohammad Hossain TahaBahloul Mohammad Hossain TahaBahloul Mohammad Hossain TahaBahloul Mohammad Hossain Taha
National University (Malaysia)National University (Malaysia)National University (Malaysia)National University (Malaysia)
In this paper, I will first talk about the meaning of nafs
and rūḥ (spirit) in the Quran and Ḥadīth and the relation
between them. I will then go on to briefly point to
view about the soul, and finally talk about Ghazālī's and R
views about the soul and the spirit.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Rāzī, Ghazālī, soul, body.
in the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's Viewin the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's Viewin the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's Viewin the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's View
nafs (soul)
and the relation
between them. I will then go on to briefly point to falāsifah's
's and Rāzī's
A Philosophical Explanation of the SoulA Philosophical Explanation of the SoulA Philosophical Explanation of the SoulA Philosophical Explanation of the Soul----Body Body Body Body
Relations in Relations in Relations in Relations in ṢṢṢṢadrāean Viewadrāean Viewadrāean Viewadrāean View
Ahmad Sa'adatAhmad Sa'adatAhmad Sa'adatAhmad Sa'adat
AlAlAlAl----MusMusMusMusṭṭṭṭafā University (Gorgan, Iran)afā University (Gorgan, Iran)afā University (Gorgan, Iran)afā University (Gorgan, Iran)
For Ṣadrā, the soul is a perdurant entity which is
constant change and motion, and has many different
hierarchical degrees from a material, hylic one which has no
actuality to a complete actuality and the unification with active
intellect. Thus we cannot talk about one type of relation
between the soul and body; rather there can be four types of
relations: (1) the existential attachment of the soul to the body
at the time of the origination (ḥudūth), (2) the innovative
relation in which the soul creates an imaginal (mithālī
appropriate to its characters, (3) the perfectional relation in the
super-imaginal stage of the soul when the actual theoretical
intellect is not yet achieved, and (4) the intellectual existence of
the soul (without a body) in which the soul is unified with the
active intellect.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul, active intellect, perfection of the soul,
actuality of the soul.
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Body Body Body Body
the soul is a perdurant entity which is subject to
constant change and motion, and has many different
hierarchical degrees from a material, hylic one which has no
actuality to a complete actuality and the unification with active
intellect. Thus we cannot talk about one type of relation
he soul and body; rather there can be four types of
the existential attachment of the soul to the body
the innovative
mithālī) body
the perfectional relation in the
imaginal stage of the soul when the actual theoretical
the intellectual existence of
the soul (without a body) in which the soul is unified with the
adrā, soul, active intellect, perfection of the soul,
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SoulSoulSoulSoul----Body Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the Philosophy
of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrā
Es'haq ShirdaqiEs'haq ShirdaqiEs'haq ShirdaqiEs'haq Shirdaqi
Razavi University of Islamic Studies (MashhadRazavi University of Islamic Studies (MashhadRazavi University of Islamic Studies (MashhadRazavi University of Islamic Studies (Mashhad, Iran, Iran, Iran, Iran))))
How can an immaterial soul interact with a material body or be
combined to constitute a single entity? This is the problem of
the soul-body relation. In this paper, the solutions to this
problem by Ibn Sina, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā
examined.
KeywoKeywoKeywoKeywords:rds:rds:rds: Ibn Sina, Suhrawardī, Mullā Ṣadrā, soul, body.
Body Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the PhilosophyBody Relation in the Philosophy
adrāadrāadrāadrā
can an immaterial soul interact with a material body or be
combined to constitute a single entity? This is the problem of
body relation. In this paper, the solutions to this
adrā will be
adrā, soul, body.
The SoulThe SoulThe SoulThe Soul----Body RelationBody RelationBody RelationBody Relation
in in in in ṢṢṢṢadrāadrāadrāadrāean Philosophyean Philosophyean Philosophyean Philosophy
Mehri Changi AshtianiMehri Changi AshtianiMehri Changi AshtianiMehri Changi Ashtiani (Iran)(Iran)(Iran)(Iran)
One of the characteristics of the Ṣadrāean philosophy is that it is
based on or inspired from religious teachings besides the
philosophical reasoning. This philosophical system tries to give
a systematic account of most religious doctrines on the basis of
some principles such as the hierarchy of existence, principality
of the existence, substantial motion, the knower-known unity,
and the perfection of the humans. In this paper I will illustrate
the Ṣadrāean account of the soul-body relation on the basis of
his principles, and will show that it will give coherent
explanations of key religious doctrines such as the bodily
resurrection and the embodiment of the deeds (tajasum a'māl
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: transcendental philosophy, soul, body, bodily
resurrection, embodiment of the deeds (tajasum a'māl
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ean philosophy is that it is
based on or inspired from religious teachings besides the
philosophical reasoning. This philosophical system tries to give
a systematic account of most religious doctrines on the basis of
f existence, principality
known unity,
and the perfection of the humans. In this paper I will illustrate
body relation on the basis of
ill give coherent
explanations of key religious doctrines such as the bodily
tajasum a'māl).
transcendental philosophy, soul, body, bodily
tajasum a'māl).
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Emergentism:Emergentism:Emergentism:Emergentism:
How Mind May Become BodyHow Mind May Become BodyHow Mind May Become BodyHow Mind May Become Body----FreeFreeFreeFree
Rouhollah Ramezani VarzanehRouhollah Ramezani VarzanehRouhollah Ramezani VarzanehRouhollah Ramezani Varzaneh
Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran, Iran)Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran, Iran)Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran, Iran)Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran, Iran)
As an alternative to both monism and dualism, emergentism, on
the version I would defend, aims at securing the initial
dependency of mind on, and at the same time its final
independence from, matter. Emergentists differ on whether
what emergent are there, just some properties or a substance as
well. In my paper, I shall argue that among dualist views
substance emergentism is the least problematic in accounting
for a body-attached mind susceptible of becoming (partially or
wholly) independent of the body. I also argue that when
emergentism were proved true, there would be a good
ontological explanation for a kind of explanatory gap regarding
mind-body interaction. Finally, I would argue that in accounting
for some principal religious doctrines (resurrection, purgatory,
etc.) the best option to choose is a form of substance
emergentism.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: emergentism, monism, dualism, matter, mind.
As an alternative to both monism and dualism, emergentism, on
the version I would defend, aims at securing the initial
and at the same time its final
independence from, matter. Emergentists differ on whether
what emergent are there, just some properties or a substance as
well. In my paper, I shall argue that among dualist views
c in accounting
attached mind susceptible of becoming (partially or
wholly) independent of the body. I also argue that when
emergentism were proved true, there would be a good
ontological explanation for a kind of explanatory gap regarding
body interaction. Finally, I would argue that in accounting
for some principal religious doctrines (resurrection, purgatory,
etc.) the best option to choose is a form of substance
emergentism, monism, dualism, matter, mind.
SwSwSwSwinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soulinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soulinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soulinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soul
Amir DastmalchianAmir DastmalchianAmir DastmalchianAmir Dastmalchian
The Islamic College (London, UK)The Islamic College (London, UK)The Islamic College (London, UK)The Islamic College (London, UK)
In his attempt to make plausible the Christian doctrine of
Atonement, Richard Swinburne faces many objections. One
objection has been that no sense can be made of the belief that
life is a gift and hence humans have no responsibility to God
and no subsequent need to atone to God for wrongdoing. One
way out of this objection requires belief in a soul. I explain why
and show a link with Islamic teaching.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: Atonement, Christianity, Swinburne, dualism.
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inburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soulinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soulinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soulinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soul
In his attempt to make plausible the Christian doctrine of
Atonement, Richard Swinburne faces many objections. One
he belief that
life is a gift and hence humans have no responsibility to God
and no subsequent need to atone to God for wrongdoing. One
way out of this objection requires belief in a soul. I explain why
nement, Christianity, Swinburne, dualism.
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A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic
DoctrinesDoctrinesDoctrinesDoctrines and the Mindand the Mindand the Mindand the Mind----Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
Yasser PouresmailYasser PouresmailYasser PouresmailYasser Pouresmail
Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (ISCA)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (ISCA)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (ISCA)Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (ISCA)
In this paper I shall present an outline of the research on
Islamic doctrines and the mind-body problem. To do this, I will
first enumerate the Islamic doctrines which have implications
for theories of the mind-body problem or are accountable in
terms of some theory of the mind-body relation, such as
different versions of dualism or materialism. The Jeudo
Christian doctrines will be mentioned by way of comparison. I
will then give dualistic, materialistic or other accounts for each
of these doctrines. If there is any literature about the doctrine, I
will give an introductory formulation of it and if there is no
literature, I will try to carve the logical space of the possible
theories which can explain the doctrine. In the introduction of
this paper, I will make general remarks about religious dualism
and materialism in both Christian and Islamic traditions and
the religious motives behind them. Furthermore, I will discuss
the presuppositions and the methodology of this research.
Keywords:Keywords:Keywords:Keywords: religious doctrines, the mind-body problem,
dualism, materialism.
A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic
Body ProblemBody ProblemBody ProblemBody Problem
In this paper I shall present an outline of the research on
body problem. To do this, I will
first enumerate the Islamic doctrines which have implications
body problem or are accountable in
body relation, such as
dualism or materialism. The Jeudo-
Christian doctrines will be mentioned by way of comparison. I
will then give dualistic, materialistic or other accounts for each
of these doctrines. If there is any literature about the doctrine, I
ry formulation of it and if there is no
literature, I will try to carve the logical space of the possible
theories which can explain the doctrine. In the introduction of
this paper, I will make general remarks about religious dualism
h Christian and Islamic traditions and
the religious motives behind them. Furthermore, I will discuss
the presuppositions and the methodology of this research.
body problem,