central america in the 1980s

8/12/2019 Central America in the 1980s

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America in the 1980s

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NTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA DATABASE

ntral America in the 1980sTom Cooper 21, 2003, 06:30

ring the whole 1980s several fierce civil wars were fought in Central America. Although all of them saw at least the intensive use of helicopters, not much air combats developed, foremost because only in the case of Nicaragua was the armed oposition flying any kind of aircraft.

e War in Nicaragua began actually in mid-1970s, when the "Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional" (FSLN, popularly known as "Sandinists") started a rebellion against the regime of the Somoza family, whiched the country already since the 1920s. By July 1979, the rebelion turned into a whole revolution, and the Somozas were forced to leave the country. Once at the helm, however, the Sandinists showed no will to sharepower with any other opponents of the Somoza regime, and this was soon to cause a new civil war, as the new opposition - to become popularly known as "Contras" - started an armed rebellion.

San Salvador, the situation was only in so far different, that there the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FFMLN. or popularly FMLN) - inspired by what happened in Nicaragua - started an uprisingainst the brutal military regime.

e situation became complex, when the Contras in Nicaragua as well as the regime in San Salvador started to receive military and financial help from the USA, in 1981. To contrary, the Sandinists were receivingme help from Cuba, while also supporting the FMLN. The increased US support for Contras and the regime in San Salvador also lead to the involvement of the sixth party - Honduras - in this struggle, which was soonbecome the hub for most US clandestine and covert operations in the area.

e two wars that developed subsequently in Nicaragua and San Salvador - as well as a similar war already going on since years in Guatemala - were characteristic for all similar conflicts in Latin America: the guerillasuld operate in smaller units, which were highly mobile and used the cover of the tropical vegetation. The small regular Armies were usually not especially successful in anti-guerilla operations, and needed muchtruction from the outside, which finally lead to the development of many special-operations capable units as well as the intensive use of helicopters, needed for transportation of reinforcements and supplies, as well asevacuation of casualties. Combat aircraft were scarce on all involved sides (Nicaragua actually possessed no real combat aircraft) and - in total - the number of missions flow by them was low, but they were often

cisive, and several times interesting air combats developed.

e involved air forces were very small. The Nicaraguan AF barely survived the revolution in 1979, and was only vegetating with a handfull of "flyable" - but not really "operational" T-28s and Cessna 337Ds. From81 and through the mid-1980s there were persistent rumours that Nicaragua was short of receiving MiG-21 fighters from Cuba or the USSR. This never happened, even if Libya tried to deliver 17 Aero L-39s in 1983ter one of the three LARAF Il-76s experienced problems while crossing the Atlantic, the whole f ormation landed in Brazil, where their load was impounded).

In April 1983 three LARAF Il-76TDs and a C- 130 landed at Manaus airport, in Barzil, after one of the Il -76s developed some technical problems. The aircraft were then searched by the Brazilian authorities: instead of medical supplies - as quoted in the transport documentation - crates with 17 Aero L-39s bound for Nicaragua were found. The cargo was impounded,while the transports were permitted to return to Libya. (via Tom Cooper)

tead the Fuerza Area Sandinista's most powerfull assets became some 40 Mi -8 and Mi-17s, the first of which were delivered in 1981, and - from late 1983 - 18 Mi-25s, supported by remaining An-2s and T-28. Thein airfields from which the FAS operated were Augusto Cesar Sandino (Managua), Bluefields, Corinto Point, El Bluff, Estali, La Rosita, Montelimar, Punta Huete, and Puerto Cabezas.

total of18 Mi-25s were delivered to the Fuerza Aerea Sandinista/Defensa Antiarea (FAS/DAA) in 1983 and 1984 (known serials were 329, 338, 339, 340, 341, 355, 359, 361, 369. They operated mainly from Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport, near nagua, but were frequently also deployed to Punta Huete, Montelimar, Puerto Cabezas, Esteli, La Rosita, Bluefields, and El Bluff. Combined with irregular fighting battalions, regular Army troops, and Mi-8s, Nicaraguan Mi-25s kept the Contras on the

n, but at least two were shot down (including one by AAA, on 19 June 1986).


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e Fuerza Area Salvadorena, which was so proud for its (debated) feats from the war with Honduras, in 1969, was only barely more capable, foremost because of the possession of some 20 Ouragans, pruchased fromael, a squadron-worth of UH-1Hs, and other light transport and liaison aircraft.

nally, the Fuerza Area Honduranea was probably the most potent air arm in the area. I t was flying 14 F-86E/F/K Sabres, most of which were purchased from Yugoslavia, in mid-1970s, then 17 SMB.2s (actuallya'ars", modified with the J -52 engine in longer fuselage, and with additional hardpoints), purchased from Israel in early 1980, and was searching for the replacement for Sabres.

roughout the wars in Nicaragua and San Salvador, the US were to deploy very different types of units and aircraft mainly belonging to the US Army foremost to Honduras, but sometimes also in Panama.rthermore, the CIA was active in the area - especially in Nicaragua, via several of its front companies which flew a plethora of different helicopters, light and medium transports, and finally throught private enterprisesicially owned by several Nicaraguan oppositional parties.

ter 1981, in which many smaller skirmishes and only a very small number of larger operations by regular forces were undertaken in Nicaragua and San Salvador, all sides started to bolster their air assets. By 1985, for ample, the Nicaraguan FAS has received its full quota of Mi -24s and Mi -8s, the Salvadorean FAS no less but 80 UH-1Hs (of which - foremost due to heavy losses - only some 60 remained operational). Salvadoreanso flew approximately a dozen of A-37s, and at least four O-2As. Simultaneously, Honduras was short of replacing its ageing Sabres by modern fighters. Intitially, FAH was interested in the purchase of Kfir C.2 or C.7

hters from Israel, but Pentagon was against this idea, and - after much negotiations - surplus F-5Es from USN stocks were delivered instead. In addition, the FAH also operated two dozens of A-37s, and a similar mber of UH-1Hs, which were - together with O-2As and Hughes 500s - frequently involved in operations inside Nicaragua as well.

Nicaragua, the Sandinist Army also used MANPADs for downing several transports owned by the Contras and CIA front companies already since 1981, while the Contras started to receive MANPADs - foremost SA -but reportedly also some Blowpipes - and proved increasingly dangerous for FAS helicopters. The first FAS Mi -8 was shot down in December 1982, followed by another in early 1983. In late 1983 the Nicaraguandefense units downed also a DC-3 used by the Contras, and in 1984 an OH-58 helicopter was also forced down near the Hondran border. From early 1984 a series of clashes between the Nicaraguan and Hondurances developed: the first of these saw a FAH A-37B and five helicopters supporting Contras against the Nicaraguan troops along the border. By mid-1984, however, the Defensa Antiarea arm of the FAS - equipped h some SA-7s, SA-14s, and light AAA - was enlargened and successful in downing an O-2A and a Hughes 500 used by the Contras. In August and September 1985 the FAH SMB.2s, F-86s, and A-37s supported ively some 500 Contras involved in battly Army troops around Jalapa. During the fighting in the area, in September, a FAH SMB.2s intercepted and downed a Nicaraguan Mi-8 thus scoring the first air-to -air kill of war.

A trio of Dassault Super Mystre B.2s - or, better said, their Sa'ar version, equipped with the J-52 engines in alengthened jet-pipe - purchased during the 1970s from Israel, seen at La Ceiba, in Honduras. The first batch of fiveSMB.2s arrived from Israel in mid-1976, followed by seven more later the same year, one in 1977, and the last two in1978. Honduran pilots were trained by Lt.Col. (ret.) Dany Shapira, then an employee of IAI. They, were the most potentfighters in Honduran arsenal until the arrival of the F-5Es, in 1986. In September 1985 a FAH SMB.2s shot down a

Nicaraguan Mi-8, and several air-to- air victories were scored over the time against drug-smuggling aircraft. The aircraftwere painted in dark green/tan over, pale grey under before delivery, but have got the "low wiz" sheme later during their career with the FAH. Although a total of 21 were purchased, only 17 were indeed operational during most of the wars in

Nicaragua and El Salvador, as three were used as sources o f spares, and at least on e crashed in the early 1980s. (viaTom Cooper)

e intensive FAH and CIA support could not prevent the Contras from suffering considerable losses during their 1986-campaigns, and the war was in general not developing positive for them. In March 1987, the FAHn introduced its first F-5Es into service, and already in the same month, one of these was used to down a Nicaraguan Mi -17 near San Andres Bocay. Perhaps unrelated to the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador, on theht from 9th to 10th of the same month, FAH Casa C.101 ("FAH-236"), flown by Capt. A. Cabrera Lobo, closely guided by the ground control, intercepted the C-47A (FAB-2045) operated by Gerardin Mazariegos'roExpress airline near the border between Guatemala and El Salvador. The C-47 was officially listed as DC-3, and was reportedly on an "illegal flight" of some sort and using the callsign HK-313 (usually used bylombian AVIVA Cessna T210K): Capt. Lobo shot it down using 30mm guns. The wreckage came down near Palmital, and the crew of three was killed.

the next day FAH SMB.2s also intercepted an Beechcraft King Air used for drug-smuggling. The aircfaft was attacked by gun-fire and forced to land at San Andres Island with one engine afire.

metimes in early 1988 another FAS helicopter was shot down by Honduran fighters. By this time, the tensions between the warring fractions were exceptionally high, with all participants also becoming war-weary.erefore, during the late 1980s, both the war in Nicaragua and San Salvador rather "died away" than were finished by the military victory of any side.

e experiences from the small number of air combats known to have happened in this area during the 1980s are actually pretty important, as the conflicts like these became characteristic for many subsequent wars,ught in the South Eastern Europe and Africa, through the 1990s - of course, with remark, that the equipment was completely different.

e fact, that most air combats happened by accident, with both sides rather "stumbling" over each other, and the winner was usually the side which was capable of bringing its weapons to bear first, the experiences from

se air combats point at the need of a much better control of the air space in operations of such small volume like most of those fought in - for example - Nicaragua. Furthermore, both combat and transport helicoptersbviously need to be properly armed and defended for air combats, not only against other helicopters, but even more so against fixed-wing aircraft. Fighters also lacked better weapons for anti-helicopter warfare, and

quisition of low-flying helicopters over the hot jungle with the help of IR-homing AAMs was never easy. Some reports indicate, that the actual number of air-to-air engagements was much higher than known, albeit,t in most engagements neither side managed to properly acquire, fire or hit the opposition.

ditional details via the forum of the LAAHS.com, the website of Latin American Aviation Heritage Society.


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