central asia

Anis H. Bajrektarevic is a Professor and aChairperson for International Law and GlobalPolitical studies, Vienna, Austria. He is editorof the NY-based Addlton’s GHIR Journal(Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations), aswell as the Senior Editorial member of manyspecialized international magazines, includ-ing the Canadian Energy Institute’s JournalGeopolitics of Energy.

Samantha Brletich, specializing peace opera-tions policy at George Mason University, Ar-lington, VA, with a focus on Russia and CentralAsia. She is the prominent member of theModern Diplomacy’s Tomorrow’s People plat-form. Ms. Brletich is an employee of the USDepartment of Defense.

ANIS H. BAjREkTAREvIC SAMANTHA BRLETICH

MODERN DIPLOMACY | SPECIAL REPORTSwww.moderndiplomacy.eu

INTERESTS & INFLUENCES OF MAJOR EXTERNAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA

HISTORY

CENTRAL ASIA: IN DEVELOPMENT

HISTORY FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

INDEPENDENCE POST-SOVIET ERA

COUNTRY ANALYSIS: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS

KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN TAJIKISTANTURKMENISTANUZBEKISTAN

MAJOR EXTERNAL PLAYERS

CHINAEUROPEAN UNIONRUSSIAUNITED STATES

NEW EMERGING ACTORS

IRAN

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

TURKEY

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CENTRAL ASIA: IN DEvELOPMENT

The history of Central Asia was largely shapedby climate and geography particularly the tem-peratures, terrain, and the availability of naturalresources. The dryness and the non-arable landled to the development of few bustling citiesand few densely populated areas. This was alsoreinforced by the nomadic culture. These fac-tors heavily influence the current history andthe dynamics within the region and CentralAsia’s relations with its neighbors and social,economic, and political partners. Historically,the region of Central Asia did not particularlyexist until after the collapse of the Soviet Union.It was either known as the Soviet Union or themore general, Eurasia. However, Central Asiahas emerged as one of the most importantgeostrategic areas in modern-day politics andeconomics.

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HISTORY

Due to Central Asia’s geographic and strategic location, it has always enjoyed cer-tain advantages, but also suffered many disadvantages. Some advantages are ac-cess to trade routes, emerging global powers and emerging global markets, Russiaand China. Geographically, the region is rich in fossil fuels and minerals. CentralAsia’s geographic location puts it at a disadvantage as being used as a battle-ground for external powers from the East and from the West. To clearly understandthe geo-strategic significance of landlocked Central Asia one must know about itsrich and complicated history.

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Not much is known about the people of CentralAsia until the 8th century B.C. with the appear-ance of the Scythians. They exhibited some ofthe same traits as Central Asian people dotoday: nomadic, traveled the same areas, andused horses—an important part of theirlifestyle (used for warfare as well). The Scythi-ans, as a nomadic empire, declined around 5thcentury B.C. Afterwards, a new Central Asia Em-pire, the Xiongnu Empire, emerged and chal-lenged the Chinese and adopted many HanDynasty customs.

Moreover, during the 8th century, the Tajiks(who are Persians) emerged as an ethnic group.The establishment of the Tajik nation-state alsobegan around this time. The Scythians wereconquered by the Uyghurs, the first and mostsignificant Turkic Group. The Uyghurs tradedacross Eurasia; they brought different objectsinto China, such as Persian silvers and textilesand acted as cultural ambassadors as they in-troduced Islam in China and carried Chineseculture to the West. Around the year of 840 B.C.,the Uyghur Empire collapsed and in the late 9thand 10th century, the Chinese Empire collapsedand the Iranian Empire went through a decline.Also during 9th and 10th century, the PersianSamanid dynasty (819 – 999 A.D.), a Sunni Mus-lim Empire, gained control of Central Asia and,in alliance with the caliph of Baghdad, estab-lished Bukhara (now in Uzbekistan) as the mainMuslim center in the region.

The Mongols came into power in the 13th cen-tury and here is where we see the influence ofthe Central Asian people’s culture in a powerfulgroup. The Mongols were interested in tradewhich was typical for the region and focused onscience. The end of the Mongol Empire markeda turning point for Central Asia.

Recorded history began in Central Asia in 6thcentury B.C. with the advent of the largeAchaemenid Empire. Also the 6th century sawthe expansion of the Turkish Göktürk Empire(552 A.D., the Ruruan Empire fell), Turkic tribesspread throughout the region including thepastoral nomad group like the Uyghurs,brought together by the trade of the Silk Routeat Turfan, which was then ruled by China’s TangDynasty. The Göktürk Empire built a significantempire along the steppes and encompassed allof greater Mongolia, lands westward to theCaspian Sea, and the lands eastward to Korea.After the collapse of the Göktürk Empire (orKhanate) in 744 A.D., the Uighur Empire(Khanate) followed and fell, there were smallerpower structures/kingdoms until the Mongolsestablished their dominance in the 13th cen-tury. The Göktürk Empire lends itself to the eth-nic designator, “Turk” which was passed ontogroups settling in this area. This empire was fol-lowed by the Uyghur Empire.The expansion of the Achaemenid Persian Em-pire and later, Alexander the Great’s Empire, sawa mix of sedentary and nomadic lifestyles and

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cultures—one can argue this historical fact is adriving force in identity conflicts in the region.This also started a trend—which can still beseen today and not only in Central Asia—of civ-ilized kingdoms stamping out and suppressingnomads. Still, nomads had access to Easternempires.The early 5th and 4th centuries were “markedby a growth in the population of the foothillbelt at Kopet Dag.”[1] Transoxiana (referencesmodern Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, southern Kyr-gyzstan and southwest Kazakhstan) was “cre-ated” in 4th century B.C. From the SamanidDynasty, Ahmad’s (son of the founder Saman-Khoda) son Nasr became governor of Transox-ania in 875 CE. Transoxiana’s major cities wereBukhara and Samarkand which are now part ofmodern-day Uzbekistan. The region was alsoreferred to as Sogdiana (or Sogdia) whichemerged during the 4th century.3,000 B.C. marked the arrival of the Indo-Irani-ans, as the Indo-Iranians split from the Indians,Dards, and Kafirs. The Iranians migrated to Iranand the Indian subcontinent from the northand the north-west and their “ancient home [issuspected to be] in the territories lying to thenorth of the Iranian plateau and India.”[2] Per-taining to the Indo-Iranians their migrations in-dicated that Central Asia was an intermediarystop, but this is left up to speculation.[3] Thelifestyle of the nomadic people caused a lot ofdistress as they were known for their violenceand devastation.

Interestingly, the horse in modern Kyrgyz soci-ety represents strength but does strike fear andjars memories of the past. It was used as a toolof dominance, fear, and development. As earlyas 4500 B.C., the horse was domesticated andbred for horse meat (which is still a typical meatin the region) and around 4,000 B.C. the horseswere used for transport.

Around the same time, more sedentary andagrarian societies (city-states) began to form.One of the more notable city-states was theBactria–Margiana Archaeological Complex(BMAC) or Oxus Civilization that formed around2300 B.C. to 1700 B.C. The area is now coveredby modern-day parts of northern Afghanistan,eastern Turkmenistan, southern Uzbekistan andwestern Tajikistan and was centered on theupper Amu Darya River. Many of the artifactsfrom BMAC were spread throughout the MiddleEast showing a high degree of interaction andtrading with other cultures and areas through-out the region. The other sedentary cities lo-cated near the tri-border region of the FerghanaValley became part of the ancient and influen-tial Great Silk Road.These areas became criticalfor the nomadic peoples as they could not pro-duce these goods on their own. Nomadic tribaldominance began to fade around 1500 B.C.The 2nd and 1st millennia B.C. saw the develop-ment of many Empires including the MedianEmpire and Achaemenid Empire (both hadruled parts of Central Asia).


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The Persian and Macedonian Empires also influ-enced and played a significant role in CentralAsia during this time. The Han Dynasty alsoruled parts of Central Asia during the first mil-lennium, and the Han Dynasty established theProtectorate of the Western Regions in 60 B.C.By 1000 B.C., nomadic pastoralist became adominant way of life and influenced the activi-ties of the tribes in the region. Many of thesegroups practiced transhumance, the seasonalmovement of people and their livestock. Theymaintained herds of sheep, goats, and camelsand conducted animal migrations.

During the rule of the Tang Dynasty, along withthe Sui Dynasty, is when the Chinese begantheir expansion to Central Asia. The Sui Dynastycaused internal conflicts among the CentralAsia tribes. The Tang Dynasty also engaged inconflict over Central Asia with the Tibet Dynastyover territories in the Tarim Basin from 670–692A.D. and in 763 A.D.. The Han Dynasty came toprominence and lasted from 206 BC – 220 A.D..The Great Silk Road was established during theHan Dynasty and expanded by the Han Dynastyaround 114 A.D.. The Han Dynasty is the mostmemorable and most arguably the most impor-tant since it marks the Golden Age in ChineseCulture. The Han Dynasty was the second impe-rial dynasty of China, preceded by the Qin dy-nasty (221–207 B.C.) and succeeded by theThree Kingdoms period (220–280 A.D.). The HanDynasty can be separated into the Former Han

(or Western Han) which occurred from 206 B.C.to 9 A.D.) and the Latter Han (or Eastern Han)which occurred from 25 AD to 220 A.D. By 100A.D., four Empires covered the region: TheRoman Empire, the nomadic Parthian Empirethe Kushan Empires, and the Han Empire. All ofthese Empires resided along the Great SilkRoadand all of them fell.

Many of the influences that occurred duringthis period of time are visible in the region. Atthe end of the 7th century, the religious armyof Islam reached Central Asia. Furthermore, inthe 8th century, Islam was introduced by Arabrulers and remains a defining characteristic ofthe Central Asia peoples as all five countriespractice Sunni Islam with variations of Islamalso practiced.

During the 10th and 13th centuries the Kyrgyzpeople migrated from the Yenisei River regionin central Siberia to the Tian-Shan region. Dur-ing the 13th century, under Mongol rule, Tajik-istan was annexed and became part of theMongol Empire. Around this time, the ancestorsof the Turkmen, the Oghuz Seljuk tribes, andMongols migrated to this area.[4] In the 14thcentury, Tajikistan became part of Tamerlane’sEmpire. Tamerlane also annexed present-dayUzbekistan, and Samarkand was made the cap-ital. The Kazakhs, as a people, emerged as astrong and distinct ethnic group in the 15thcentury.

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Between the 15th and 17th centuries, the“southern part of modern Turkmenistan comesunder Persian rule, while the northern part isdominated by the Uzbek-ruled states of Khivaand Bukhara[5].”

During the 17th and 18th centuries the QingDynasty had incorporated parts of Central Asiainto the Chinese Empire, but their dominancewas cut short as inner turmoil halted the expan-sion. During the same time period, Kyrgyz peo-ple settled in modern-day Kyrgyzstan whichwas conquered by the Oirats (Mongol tribeafter centuries of Turkic rule in 1658)Then in1758, the Kyrgyz people were conquered andbecame nominal subjects of Chinese Empire. Inthe 18th century, materials like cotton, silk andkarakul (a breed of domestic sheep) were soldfrom Bukhara, Uzbekistan to Russia, whichbrought prosperity as well as economic powerto the region. The 18th and19th centuries sawan increase and rise of independent Emiratesand Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand, andSamarkand. In 1876, the Khanate of Kokandwas conquered by the Russians and incorpo-rated the land that is now Kyrgyzstan, into itsempire. The Kazakh people during this timesplit into three groups: the Elder, Middle andLesser Zhuzes, or Hordes, which were led byKhans.

HISTORY fROM THE 19TH CENTuRY TO THECOLLAPSE Of THE SOvIET uNION

By the end of the 19th century, the Russian Em-pire, the Qing Dynasty of China, and other pow-ers expanded into the area and seized control.Since then, Central Asia has been a playgroundfor countries to play due to its highly importantgeo-strategic location, its proximity to othercountries, trade routes, and natural resources.

There was a Central Asia Revolt in 1916 (or theBasmachi Movement), caused by the removalof Islam as a provision that kept peoples out ofthe conscription process. The Russian Revolu-tion facilitated the declaration of an independ-ent Turkestan, which was declared by theGovernment of Jadid Reformers (TurkestanMuslim Council) in Kokand. The autonomousareas of Bukhara and Khiva were also invaded.This resulted in the creation of the TurkestanAutonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR);Bukhara and Khiva also became SSRs in 1918.Modern day Kyrgyzstan was the Kirghiz Au-tonomous SSR in 1920; Kazakhstan was theKazakh Autonomous SSR in 1925 (Kazakhstanwas also part of the Kirghiz SSR until it wasgranted its own SSR status); the Uzbek SSR andthe Turkmen SSR was created in 1924. Tajikistansplit from the Uzbek SSR. The Kyrgyz Au-tonomous Oblast became a SSR in 1936 whichwas formerly the Kyrgyzstan Autonomous SSR.


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After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the thenSoviet states were incrementally incorporatedinto the Soviet Union. Mongolia andAfghanistan were not, but were influenced byRussia. As the Soviet States were forcibly an-nexed, their unique and historical cultures in-cluding their language, customs, and traditionswere replaced by the Soviet singular identityand the Russian language; atheism or religiousneutrality was forced upon them. This left a cul-tural and religious void that bubbled to the sur-face after the Soviet Union collapsed. Becauseof the rapid industrialization, the rapid urban-ization and the relocation of minorities and eth-nic Russians to Central Asia, conflict still existsbetween ethnic groups particularly in Kaza-khstan and Kyrgyzstan, and many are strug-gling to find and learn their native languages.The government of the Central Asia states arestruggling to adapt to pre-Soviet annexation re-ligious and faith and customs (e.g. Islam andmarriage-by-capture). Under Soviet rule, education and the literacyrates in the Kirghiz SSR increased.

Along with this improvement, the Soviets setup large collectivist farms while slowly erodingand wiping out the Kyrgyz lifestyle. During the1920s, many Kyrgyz resettled as part of land re-form. The Kazakh during this time period (startof 1920s to the end of 1930s) suffered greatlosses due to starvation in the effort to stiflelifestyles and collectivize agriculture. In the yearof 1868, Ukrainian and Russian peasants wereresettled in Kazakhstan to begin industrializa-tion and agrarian reform. In the 1940s, hun-dreds of thousands of Koreans, Crimean Tatars,Germans, and others were forcibly moved toKazakhstan. In 1953, the Virgin Lands Campaignwas created to help alleviate agriculture andpopulate sparsely settled areas.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, native tradi-tions emerged and while this was positive, it im-pacted lifestyles and relationships between thedifferent groups in Central Asia. The significanceof the Silk Road faded away because of theircultural differences: Uzbekistan had its centerof interest on agriculture whereas the Kazakhspreferred their nomadic pastoralism. Uzbekswere also traders and mercantilists, and weremore sedentary than their Kazakh and Kyrgyzcounterparts. The diversity and the economicprosperity of this region appealed to Russia. Thepotential for large infrastructure-projects, bilin-gual schools (where Russian was taught and be-came the primary language), and irrigationprojects were established.

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INDEPENDENCE POST-SOvIET ERA

The populations of Central Asia opposed inte-gration of their lands into the Soviet Empire.Central Asian states played an integral part ofthe Soviet system as the areas were repopu-lated with non-Turkic peoples. They were usedto house industrial centers to protect the indus-try from military strikes and the Nazi Army.Those who were accused of Nazi collaborationduring World War II by the Soviets were forciblydeported to Central Asia. One of the most no-table groups is the Chechens, many of whichdied on the way there or due to poor condi-tions. Much resentment is held against the Rus-sians and Russian Government by Chechensbecause of these forced deportations. The Kaza-khs also suffered heavy human losses at thehands of Soviet collectivization policies. As the Soviet regime feared the influence of Is-lamic culture and the Turkic ethnicity, it decidedto create five Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) inCentral Asia. Through this plan, the individualrepublics were provided the chance to developtheir national identities to a certain degree inorder to pre-empt the emergence of a common“Turkestani” identity and more importantly toprevent the formation of Turkestan.The economies of the five Central Asian Re-publics collapsed in spring 1991; none of thecountries were prepared for independence.They began new state-building measureswhich proved.

Each of the countries has experienced changesin power, governmental and constitutionalchanges, and uprisings and civil wars respec-tively. New traditions and languages were re-vived and policies favoring the titular ethnicitieshave become common and have isolated mi-norities. A prime example would be the ethnicRussians in Kazakhstan and the process of Kaza-khization. Another example would be the re-vival of the custom in Kyrgyzstan, bridekidnapping, which is considered to be a form ofhuman trafficking and overall a human rightsviolation. Overall many of the countries are con-sidering switching from the Cyrillic script to theLatin script. Many publications in Uzbek andKyrgyz languages appear in Latin. This transi-tion is unlikely to happen with the Kazakh lan-guage as Kazakh is written in Cyrillic (with theinfluence of some Greek letters).One of the main obstacles was the political sys-tem that allowed Soviet Union CommunistParty bosses rise to power. Many of the old “Ap-paratchiks” rule in the countries today includ-ing: Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev,Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, and Tajikistan’sEmomali Rakhmon. In 2006, Turkmenistan’sSupramurat Niyazov died and Kyrgyzstan’slong-standing President Askar Akaev wasousted in the 2005 Tulip Revolution as well ashis replacement, Kurmanbek Bakiev, wasousted in unrest in 2010 under similar circum-stances which paved the way for democraticelections.


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Each of the newly independent states experi-enced destabilization. As compared to other re-gions that have experienced annexation andthen independence, Central Asia has been rel-atively calm. The events that occurred in theCentral Asian states (see below) are normal andexpected for states undergoing transition.

Tajikistan endured a civil war lasting from1992-1997 causing 50,000 deaths, 1.2 milliondisplaced (according to UN figures) and a hu-manitarian disaster causing lasting discord andfragility. There are still occasional flare-ups of vi-olence: Khorog in 2010 and the attacks inDushanbe in September 2015.

kyrgyzstan experienced riots in the early 1990sbetween ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz.

kazakhstan experienced student riots in the1990 Alma-Ata riots

kyrgyzstan was the only country to have a “col-ored revolution” in 2005 which ousted formerSoviet Community Party boss (and his family),Askar Akaev, from the country.

In 2010, kyrgyzstan experienced another re-volt which resulted in the ousting of PresidentKurmanbek Bakiev and his family from Kyrgyzs-tan. Ethnic clashes also occurred in 2010 be-tween ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks insouthern Kyrgyzstan and played large role in his

ouster. Many from the Bakiev family are wantedon murder charges, inciting violence, and forfraud. Kyrgyzstan has gone through a bumpytransition on its way to be one of the fewdemocracies in the region.

uzbekistan has had its share of poor publicitywith Islam Karimov’s tactics and Uzbekistan’sunofficial policy of torture and disregard forhuman rights against his political opponentsand alleged and confirmed extremists and ter-rorists. This was best demonstrated by theevents in May 2005, the Andijan Massacre.

Turkmenistan’s President NursultanNazarbayev, “Turkmenbashi,” died in 2006, leav-ing a closed-country more susceptible to desta-bilizing factors. Current President GurbangulyBerdymukhammedov, ascended to the Presi-dency (he was Niyazov’s dentist), and made aseamless transition. Berdymukhammedov hasdisassembled Turkmenbashi’s cult of personal-ity while building his own simultaneously.

kazakhstan, since independence has re-mained the most stable despite random ex-tremist/terrorist attacks in Aktobe, Atyrau andpolitical violence such as the oil worker laborprotest in Zhanaozen in December 2011. Economically, Kazakhstan is at the top and hasexpanded its political partnerships and hasmade a name for itself in the natural resourcemarket.

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The post-Soviet Era for the region has beenmixed. Each of the countries has created newrelationships, new policies, and have sharedstruggles and faced challenges. Each of thecountries have been subjected to political, so-cial, and economic pressures resulting fromtheir closeness with Russia and their diplomaticrelations with Russia or lack thereof with othernon-former Soviet Union countries. Turk-menistan has maintained its stance of neutralityavoiding membership in Russian-dominatedorganizations. Turkmenistan’s membership inregional organizations such as the CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shang-hai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and theEurasian Economic Union (EEU) has openednew markets and has facilitated new economicand security arrangements and partnerships,but at the same time has strengthened Russia’sgrip over the region and individual countriessuch as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

kAzAkHSTAN AT A gLANCE

Official name: Republic of KazakhstanCapital: Astana (Astana became capital in 1997—for-mer capital was Almaty)Largest city: Almatygovernment type: Republic; authoritarian presidentialrule, with little power outside the executive branchIndependence: 16 December 1991 (from Soviet Union)National legislature: based on Islamic law and Romanlaw, has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdictionLegislative branch: Bicameral ParliamentHead of state: President Nursultan A. NAZARBAYEV(elected President December 1, 1991), elected again in2005, and elected again in 2010 and made “leader forlife.”geographic location: Central Asia, south of Russia andnorthwest of China; a small portion west of the UralRiver in eastern-most EuropeArea: 2,717,300 sq. km (1 million square miles)Natural resources: major deposits of petroleum, natu-ral gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel,cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold,uraniumPopulation: 17, 400,000 (July 2013 est.)Languages: Kazakh (state language) 64.4%, Russian(official, used in everyday business, designated the “lan-guage of interethnic communication) 95% (2001 est.)Ethnic groups: Kazakh 53.4%, Russian 30%, Ukrainian3.7%, Uzbek 2.5%, German 2.4%, Tatar 1.7%, Uygur1.4%, other 4.9% (1999 census)Religions: Muslim 47%, Russian Orthodox 44%, Protes-tant 2%, other 7%Life expectancy: 62 years (men), 73 years (women)(UN)Internet domain: .kzInternational dialing code: +7gNI per capita: U.S. $11,380 (World Bank, 2013 est.)Current gDP (uSD): $224.4 billion (2013 est.).gDP growth: 6.0% (World Bank 2013 est.)unemployment rate: 5.2% (ILO 2013 est.)[6] Inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.8% (World Bank 2013est.)Categorized by the World Bank as an Upper Middle In-come country

KAZAKHSTAN

IPOLITICAL DEvELOPMENT

In August 1995 the governing structure of Kazakhstanwas converted from a parliamentary democracy into apresidential republic, and slowly, but gradually PresidentNazarbayev started to recruit family members for key po-sitions in the national government as well as in the busi-ness sector. Nepotism has become a staple in Kazakhpolitics. Nazarbayev responded with threats, imprison-ment and isolation towards opponents, but even hisown daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva and her husband,criticized President Nazarbayev. Media outlets that didnot support the government were closed and politicalopposition and political critics were and are silenced.Media repression continues. Due to international pres-sures regarding Kazakhstan’s crackdown on the media,Nazarbayev who can be best described as a “soft author-itarian” president whom loosened media restrictions tomake Kazakhstan and himself appear more democratic.

Kazakhstan says that it is devoted to progressing and im-plementing democratic principles. However democraticreforms such as elections have fallen short of meetinginternational standards. A key component to the foun-dation of democracy is competitive, free, and transpar-ent elections. Kazakhstan has held elections, but they donot meet international standards and always favorNazarbayev and Nur Otan his party. The most recentelection of President Nazarbayev was in late April 2015where there was no opposition. He won 95% of the voteand the elections were deemed undemocratic and failedto meet international standards.

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Furthermore, the parliamentary elections of2005 highlighted the lack of transparency. Inthe 2005 elections, Nazarbayev won a seven-year term; Nazarbayev won 91% of the vote.Two other candidates, Zamarkhan Tayukbay(from the party For a Just Kazakhstan) andAlikhan Baymenov (from the party Ak Zhol)were able to compete, giving the illusion of po-litical party pluralism and further solidifyingNazarbayev’s hold on the opposition and onthe government.[7] The 2011 Kazakhstan Par-liamentary elections were considered a shamby the international community. In 2011, parlia-ment held a national referendum extendingNazarbayev’s presidency without elections until2020.The elections were an attempt to estab-lish/appoint Nazarbayev as “President for Life”of Kazakhstan. It was passed unanimously bythe Upper and Lower houses of the Kazakh par-liament and later was rejected by the Constitu-tional Court facing international pressures.Instead, the Kazakh parliament sneakily “heldearly presidential elections three months later,and Nazarbayev won an additional four-yearterm with over 95 percent of the vote.”[8]Nazarbayev won 95.5% of the vote which ishigh despite his popularity. The Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)had over 400 election monitors in the countrybefore the election.[9] Exit polls conducted by“Kazakhstan’s Association of Sociologists andPolitologists” gave Mr. Nazarbayev 94.82% ofthe vote, based on an exit poll of 1.2% of those

who voted, while the Institute of Democracygave him 95.1%, based on a sample of 50,000voters.”[10] Nine million people in Kazakhstanare eligible to vote, out of those nine million,90% casts their ballots which points to voterfraud because of such a high voter turnoutrate.[11] Political competition is weak and the Nur-Otanparty (meaning Radiating Fatherland) reignsdominant with 762,000 members and holds 83out of 107 seats in Kazakhstan’s Parliament.Nur-Otan is the result of a merger of many po-litical parties including Asar (the party of hisdaughter Dariga Nazarbayeva), Fatherland(Nur-Otan’s predecessor), Civic Party, and theAgrarian Party. Political opposition in Kaza-khstan is virtually non-existent and when it isdoes exist, it is most likely staged. There are nineregistered political parties in Kazakhstan. Themain opposition party, Alga! (Forward), hasbeen disestablished after its party leaderVladimir Kozlov was sentenced to seven-and-a-half years in jail for “calling for the forcible over-throw of the constitutional order,” and “creatingand leading an organized group with the aimof committing one or more crimes.”[12] Kozlovwas also the leader of Halyk Maidany, or Peo-ple’s Front Movement, which underscored thegrievances against the government.[13] Thecharges brought against Kozlov were regardingthe 2011 events in Zhanaozen. The charges arealleged politically motivated and are designedto stifle political opposition.

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The Kazakhstan National Security Committee(KNB) led the criminal investigation against Ko-zlov and his associates. Using intelligence serv-ices underscores that Kozlov and other Alga!members involved are being targeted for theirpolitical activities, not protest matters. There arenine political parties registered in Kazakhstanas of May 2015.[14]

The current status of political development inKazakhstan remains static. Nazarbayev will re-main in power for the foreseeable future untilhis death. Nazarbayev has no succession planwhich is worrisome. Political party pluralism re-mains low and the opposition is expected to besilenced. Kazakhstan will continue to exploreoptions with Western institutions like it did withthe OSCE chairmanship in 2010 to appear moredemocratic. Kazakhstan will also increase its re-gional participation and is expected to join theChina-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB).

On April 27, 2015, Kazakhstan President Nursul-tan Nazarbayev was almost unanimously re-elected as President of Kazakhstan in a snapelection by the population of Kazakhstan. Thisis his fifth term as President. Nazarbayev, age74, won 97.7% of the vote; the opposition (saidto exist to make the election appear more com-petitive) won the remaining 2.3% vote. OSCEdeployed an Election Observation Mission teamto make sure the elections met OSCE standards.The OSCE requested that 400 observers be de-ployed to voting facilities. OSCE observersstated that “voters were not offered a genuinechoice.”[15] The Kazakhstan Central Election Commissionstated that 95% turned out to vote and theChairman of the Election Committee called theelections an “expression of civil society, electoralactiveness and political responsibility.”Nazarbayev was sworn in on April 29, 2015.[16]Nazarbayev will be the age of 80 when his termends in 2020.

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LEgAL ENvIRONMENT

A considerable proportion of Kazakhstan’s legalenvironment originates from Soviet times. Thecurrent legal framework is considered to be oneof the best among the post-Soviet states but isstill suffering heavily from the widespread cor-ruption, lack of transparency, and the absenceof an independent judiciary. The current legalsystem is based on civil law comprised of bothelements from Islamic law particularly, Adat,which is customary law and Roman law as “leg-islative and other normative legal acts can bedivided according to the constitutional, admin-istrative, civil, criminal, labor and other materialor procedural laws.”[17] The Kazakhstan Consti-tution is at the top of the hierarchy of laws. Thefirst Kazakh Constitution was adopted by theSupreme Council of Kazakhstan on January 28,1993, amended in August 1995, and in October1998, “the Parliament enacted a Law on amend-ments and complements to the Constitution ofthe Republic of Kazakhstan.” There are threebranches to the Kazakh government: legislative(Senate and the Majlis), executive branch (Cab-inet of Ministers and other central state institu-tions), and the judicial branch (Supreme Courtand Constitutional Council).

The President is the head of state and the high-est representative body is the bicameral Parlia-ment comprised of the Senate and the Majlis.The Senate has 39 seats and its composition isbased on “deputies elected in twos from eachregion, major city and the capital of the Repub-lic of Kazakhstan, at a joint session of thedeputies of all representative bodies of the re-spective oblast, major city and the capital of theRepublic.”[18] The Majlis is comprised of 77deputies: 67 elected from geographical elec-toral districts by voters and the other “10deputies are elected on the basis of the PartyLists according to the system of proportionalrepresentation”[19] and serve five year terms.The Kazakh Parliament, in comparison to theUnited States Congress, carries out similar func-tions such as: making additions to the Consti-tution, approving budgets, granting warpowers to the President by making decisions onwar and peace and the use of armed forces.[20]

The judicial branch is the only branch that ex-ercises judicial law in Kazakhstan and is com-prised of regional, district, city, and town courts.The Constitutional Court’s functions are drivenby Article 72 of the Constitution.[21] The Con-stitutional Council’s members have a term of sixyears and the Council consists of seven mem-bers. The chairperson of the ConstitutionalCourt is appointed by the President, two mem-bers are appointed by the President of the Re-public, two by the Senate chairperson, and twoby the Majlis.[22]

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Kazakhstan experiences a wide variety of crimetaking place in urban and rural centers; mostcrime takes places in urban centers: “crime ratesduring 2012 rose substantially nationwide ascompared to 2011.”[23] Crimes against foreign-ers are uncommon, but when they do occur,they are low level theft, purse snatching, as-saults and robberies.[24] Financial fraud andcorruption is growing and credit card informa-tion is often compromised.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND CHALLENgES

Recognizing a change from a centralized econ-omy to a free market economy, the introductionof the tenge currency, foreign direct invest-ment, mass privatization, and exploitation of oil,Kazakhstan has managed to become one of thebest performing former-Soviet Republics. Kaza-khstan has vast oil and natural gas reserves andKazakhstan is also the second largest oil andgas producer of the former Soviet Union states,behind Russia. Kazakhstan’s energy petroleumindustry accounted for one-third of its GDP in2008. Kazakhstan has a potential total of 95-117billion barrels of oil reserves; proven reservesrange from eight to 22 billion[25]. Natural gasreserves are four trillion cubic meters and 1.5-2.35 trillion are considered proven[26]. The“Kazakh oil is now transported mainly throughRussian territory via old Soviet pipelines…aswell as via the new [CPC] system [formed in1992] (Tengiz-Novorossisk).”[27] The pipelinesare old, decrepit, could cause environmental

problems if they burst, and are costly to re-pair.[28] Defects in other major pipelines suchas the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline have madecountries reliant upon Russia and the Baku-Tbil-isi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.[29] Kazakhstan hasalso relied on rail networks and shipping fortransport.

Kashagan, is an offshore oil field in Kazakhstan’sCaspian Sea oil zone (divided among CaspianSea consortium members) and was discoveredin 2000 along with the oil field is the largest oildiscovery in the last thirty years. Kashagan isthe largest old field outside of the Middle Eastand the fifth largest in the world. The Kashaganoilfield is expected to be the largest oilfield out-side of the Middle East with estimated reservesof 50 bbl/d.[30] It is considered an oil megapro-ject as excavation has proven difficult. Accord-ing to the Kazakhstan news outlet Tengri News,Kashagan is the most expensive oil project yetas “development has already absorbed $116 bil-lion,”[31] and “the field's commercial reservesare estimated to made from 9 billion barrels to16 billion barrels of oil[;] geological reserves areestimated at 35 million barrels.”[32] The projectwas activated in 2013 and pumping of oilbegan, but pipes were damaged and sulfur gasstarted to leak and operations ceased.


18

The Tengiz oil field is Kazakhstan’s largest oilproducing field and has undergone massive ex-pansion led by Chevron, and exploration “[hasrisen in costs] from $23bn to about $40bn.”[33]The expansion took five years to complete andcosts $7.2 billion. Tengiz, by comparison, is thesize of the American city, Chicago. According toChevron, Tengiz also produces somethingcalled “sour gas” which is gas that has higherconcentration toxic hydrogen sulfide. Due tothis need, there will be a Second Generationplant with the largest sour gas processing unitsin the world.[34]

Kazakhstan also is involved in the exploitationof the Caspian Sea resources and is involved inthe demarcation process. There are multipleplans to divide up the Caspian Sea for resourceexploitation. On January 25, 2006, the Presi-dents of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a Proto-col on Amendments to the Protocol on theRussia-Kazakhstan Agreement on Delimitingthe Northern Part of the Caspian Sea, aimed atexercising sovereign power over subsurface re-source management. The instability of Russianenergy politics and its “energy arrogance” hasdriven Kazakhstan to seek other energy part-ners, including “long-term partnerships withmajor international oil companies… which willenable [Kazakhstan] to exploit [their] natural re-sources effectively.”[35] Russia has focused onblocking Western access to gas and oil to re-duce competition: “in Central Asia, Russia hascarried out the task of neutralizing alternatives

to pro-Russian projects of integration in thepost-Soviet space.”[36] Kazakhstan has takenthe pragmatic foreign policy approach to de-marcation by securing its own rights while rec-ognizing the superiority of Russia only to notjeopardize its own ambitions.

The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union(EEU) and the integration of regionaleconomies was designed to stabilize regionalmarkets. The Kazakh tenge was devalued inFebruary 2014. On August 19, 2015, the tengelost more than a quarter of its value caused bya sharp fall in world crude oil prices. As a result,Kazakhstan introduced a freely floating ex-change rate which helped stabilize Kaza-khstan’s economy. According to Reuters, “theofficial tenge rate tumbled by [26.2%] to 255.26per dollar on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange inresponse to the policy shift.”[37] Kazakhstan’s economy also “suffered a 40% fallin exports between January and July [2015],said National Economy Minister YerbolatDosayev.” Imports shrank by 20% between Jan-uary and July 2015. Kazakhstan PresidentNazarbayev called the EU and U.S. sanctionsagainst Russia barbaric as the sanctions had aripple effect throughout the region. Kazakhstan"also suffered under the impact of westernsanctions against Russia and, as a metals ex-porter, from low commodities prices.[38] Kaza-khstan’s economy was also impacted by theChinese yuan and the “correction” to the Chi-nese economy.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

SOCIAL AND DEMOgRAPHIC CHALLENgES

Although the constitution regulates that thecivil rights of all ethnic groups are equal, somespecial rights are only grated to ethnic Kazakhpopulation and those who speak the Kazakhlanguage which often plays a major role whenit comes to obtaining better employment. Thisdiscriminates against non-Kazakhs and non-Kazakh speaking peoples. Ethnic Russians in thecountry feel especially targeted because of thecollapse of the Soviet Union, the gradual yetdramatic decrease of ethnic Russians leavingKazakhstan, and the process of Kazakhization.The Kazakh government initiated a Kazakhrepatriation program to bring back those whohad left Kazakhstan. The Oralman (Kazakh forreturnee) program was instituted in 1991. Ac-cording to a 2011 article from Central Asia On-line, “300,000 Oralman families, or 1m people,resettled under the 2009 Nurly Kosh [program]over the past 20 years – moving largely toMangistau, Southern Kazakhstani and AlmatyOblasts and to the cities of Almaty and As-tana.”[39] A revised program was developed in2011 and will address the “geographical distri-bution, employment and the provision of hous-ing” and land allotments.[40]

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russians em-igrated out of Kazakhstan because of a declin-ing standard of living, policies of Kazakhization,and loss of identity with the new Kazakhstan.

Between 1989 and 1999, the Russian popula-tion decreased from 6 million to 4.5 million.[41]Emigration during the 1990s hit a peak in 1994when 300,000 were Russians left in Kazakhstan.By 2000, “migration from Kazakhstan alone con-stituted more than 28% of the internal migra-tion in former Soviet territory.”[42] Currently,Russians have considerable populations in theNorth Kazakhstan Province (48.5% in 2006),Pavlodar Region (38.26% in 2007), Akmola Re-gion (36.5% Russians in 2009), Kostanay Region(28.6% in 2009), and central Karagandy Region(39.17% in 2010).

Extremism and terrorism are a concern in Kaza-khstan and the other Central Asian states.Uzbekistan alone (and for a while) faced anarmed group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbek-istan (IMU), trying to overthrow the despoticIslam Karimov. Due to the increase and spreadof radical Islam, Kazakhstan is facing internalstability caused by extremists. Multiple extrem-ist/terrorist groups exist in Kazakhstan: the Sol-diers of the Caliphate (Jund Al-Khalifah), theHizb-ut Tahrir (non-violent pan-Sunni organiza-tion), Tablighi Jamaat, and many pro-Uighurseparatist groups, including the East TurkestanLiberation Organization (ETLO), are labeled ex-tremist by the Kazakh authorities.


20

of 5 USD per day, poverty in Kazakhstan re-mains at 42%.[45] Agriculture, while a low con-tributor to GDP (6% in 2011) employsone-fourth of the population at 26% in2011.[46] Interestingly over 80% of Kaza-khstan’s land was classified for agricultural useincluding 70% for pasture; arable land consti-tutes less than 10%.[47] Kazakhstan’s unem-ployment rate remains at 5.2%.There is no major conflict between religion andstate. Religious groups experience discrimina-tory treatment from the government. TheUighur population is often alienated. Freedomof religion in Kazakhstan is limited. Since 1999,minority religious groups have emerged andhave registered with the state adhering to reg-ulations which shows some progress; these re-lations are handled by the Religious IssuesCommittee. Missionaries (foreign and domestic)also face scrutiny and must register with theMinistry of Justice. Religious education isbanned. According to a Freedom House 2014report, the religious rights in Kazakhstan are ona downward trend, “as laws passed in 2005banned all activities by unregistered religiousgroups” and in 2011, “law required [re-registra-tion] of all religious groups, gave the govern-ment unprecedented authority to regulatereligious communities, and forbade religiousexpression in government institutions.”[48]

Kazakhstan has the largest Uighur Diaspora andit is suspected that the Kazakh government la-bels pro-Uighur independence groups as ex-tremist to appease China as the Chinese policytowards Uighurs has been of one domesticcounter-terrorism threat, social isolation, andcultural destruction.

There have been many acts of terrorismthroughout the country. The Kazakh govern-ment, to maintain its inclusive image, selec-tively applies the terms “terrorist,” “terrorism,”and “terrorist act” to actions that are seen as athreat to Nazarbayev’s power and acts that canupset the status quo. Such an example wouldbe the rioting caused by oil workers on strike inZhanaozen. Kazakh police turned the situationviolent, and as a result the incident was labeled“terrorist” because it upset the public order aslaborers were protesting poor wages and poorlabor conditions. Spending on social issues andwelfare is increasing, but still a large portion ofthe population remains poor. According to theWorld Bank, poverty levels dropped in Kaza-khstan from 47% in 2001 to three percent in2013.[43] Based on the international povertyline, (based on GDP PPP), “corrected USD 2.50per capita per day, poverty in Kazakhstan fellfrom 41 percent in 2001 to 4 percent in2009.”[44] Compared to a higher poverty line

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Court on 26 May2015 struck down the homophobic (anti-gay)draft legislation that prohibited the “propa-ganda of nontraditional sexual orientation” sim-ilar to the bill that Russia passed in 2013 and thebill that Kyrgyzstan is currently trying to pass.The law formally called, “On Protecting Childrenfrom Information Harmful to their Health andDevelopment” was introduced in February2015. The text of the law was never made pub-lic. The Kazakh Court’s decision on the discrim-inatory law set a precedent and shows thestrength of its national-level institutions. Someobservers see Kazakhstan’s striking down of thelaw as a reputation management and some seethe actions of the Supreme Council as a step toreaching democratic reforms.

fOREIgN POLICY

Kazakhstan mainly deals in agreements per-taining to oil and gas resources with Russia,China, the U.S., and the European Union (EU)being its main trade partners. The country triesto increase independence and to play Russia,China and the U.S. off each other as to maximizeits geopolitical benefits. This embodiesNazarbayev’s multi-vector foreign policy whichallows Kazakhstan to maintain ties with Russiawhile pursuing its interests outside of its imme-diate geographic area and with other regionaland world superpowers. Under this foreign policy, Kazakhstan has madegreat strides in developing its political, eco-nomic, and security relationships with other na-tions and Western-oriented institutions andorganizations.

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Kazakhstan has dragged itself slowly closer tothe West by holding the chairmanship of theOSCE in 2010, one of the few Former Soviet Re-publics to do so. Kazakhstan is also developingrelations with members of the regional organi-zations it belongs to outside of these frame-works to ensure cooperation with Chinawithout Russian interference. Kazakhstan hasbeen active with NATO in military training (seeStrategic perspectives).

STRATEgIC PERSPECTIvES

Regional stability and security are key elementsin Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and domesticpolicy respectively. Kazakhstan’s diplomatic ef-forts are also a focus as Nazarbayev continuesto execute his “multi-vector foreign policy.”Nazarbayev has been able to strike the balancebetween his Western-oriented pursuits and hisregional pursuits which include relations be-tween Russia and China. To avoid anotherCrimea-like situation, Nazarbayev has focusedon its regional relationship more to executeNazarbayev’s vision of an integrated regionaleconomic space through the Customs Union(which Kazakhstan joined in 2010) and finallythrough the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Furthermore, after the OSCE Chairmanship in2010, President Nazarbayev said it has been an“historic event for the entire OSCE commu-nity”[49] that had been characterized by “thespirit of Astana.” Kazakhstan still aims to join theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) as soon aspossible. Kazakhstan also seeks closer ties tothe U.S. security-political pact, the North At-lantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Kazakhstan and NATO signed an IndividualPartnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2006 and Kaza-khstan is a member of the NATO Partnership forPeace (PfP) Program. Talks between NATO andKazakhstan take place with the European Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The keyareas of cooperation between the two are po-litical, military, and security-sector reforms, andcounter terrorism efforts. According to UnitedNations mandates, there is a readily deployableinfantry battalion called KAZBAT to participatein NATO-led peace keeping operations.[50]Through the Planning and Review Process, abrigade called KAZBRIG “is a major projectaimed to give Kazakhstan the rotational capa-bility to continuously sustain a battalion-sizedcontribution.”[51]

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

kYRgYzSTAN AT A gLANCE

Official name: Kyrgyz Republicgovernment type: RepublicIndependence: 31 August 1991 (from Soviet Union)National legislature: based on French and Russianlaws; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdictionLegislative branch: Unicameral Supreme CourtHead of State: Almazbek Atambayev (since April 2011)geographic location: Central Asia, west of China;neighboring Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, andChina; part of the tri-border country region, FerghanaValleyArea: 199,900 sq. km (77,182 sq. miles)Natural resources: abundant hydropower; significantdeposits of gold and rare earth metals; locally ex-ploitable coal, oil, and natural gas; other deposits ofnepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead, and zincPopulation: 5,720,000 (World Bank 2013 est.).Languages: Kyrgyz 64.7% (official), Uzbek 13.6%, Russ-ian 12.5% (official), Dungun 1%, other 8.2% (1999 cen-sus)Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 70.9%, Uzbeks 14.3%, Russians:7.8%, Dungans: 1.1%, Ukrainians: 0.4%, Uighurs: 0.9%(UN Stats 2009 census)[52] Religions: Islam 75%, Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%Life expectancy: 64 years (men), 72 years (women)(UN)Internet domain: .kgInternational dialing code: +996Current gDP (uSD): $7.226 billion (World Bank 2013est.)gNI per capita (uSD): 1,200 (World Bank 2013 est.)gDP growth: 10.5% (World Bank 2013 est.)unemployment rate: 7.9% (ILO 2013 est.)[53] Inflation rate (consumer prices): 6.6% (World Bank 2013est.)

KYRGYZSTAN

KKyrgyzstan’s future seemed very bright in the early1990s, as it had political competition, political plural-ism, and equal political rights as well as freedom ofspeech, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience,and freedom of religion. But during the term of Pres-ident Askar Akaev, elections were manipulated andthe level of corruption rose, which resulted in an up-heaval in March 2005, also known as the Tulip Revo-lution. Akaev fled to Russia and was replaced byKurmanbek Bakiev. This momentous event in post-So-viet history has paved the way for a new Kyrgyzstanthat is open to democratic ideals, inclusiveness, andbe recognized by the West as a democracy in a landof autocrats and authoritarians.

POLITICAL DEvELOPMENT

In the mid 1990s, the country struggled with a politi-cal and economic regression, but after President AskarAkaev managed to build an attractive basis in orderto gain foreign countries to support the state buildingprocess in Kyrgyzstan, the country was considered themost democratic and transparent country in CentralAsia garnering it the name, “the Switzerland of Asia,”and “an oasis of democracy.” As Akaev changed hisdemocratic political style, he became more authori-tarian. After holding fraudulent parliamentary elec-tions in February 2005, a political upheaval took placein March 2005 (known as the Tulip Revolution) and re-sulted in the election of Kurmanbek Bakiev to the of-fice of President.

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The party leader or chairman, Omurbek Take-bayev—who clashed with now ousted Presi-dent Bakiev in 2010—was nominated forPresident of Kyrgyzstan twice, but failed to se-cure the country's top position.[56] The Ata-Jurt (Motherland) party was formed in 2006under the ideology of right wing while espous-ing ethno-nationalism at the same time. Ata-Jurt was once part of the government-ledcoalition, but now it is in opposition to the gov-ernment. The party had some members fromthe part of Kurmanbek Bakiev and opposesAtambayev; the party currently holds 28 seatsin the Kyrgyz Parliament. [57]

Ar-Namys is one of the major political parties inKyrgyzstan and was formed in 1999, but formerPrime Minister Felix Kulov (2005-2007); Kulovwas also vice president in 1992. Ar-Namys wasformed in December 2011 along with SDPK, Re-spublika and Ata Meken. The party traditionallyhas taken an opposition stance and was deniedregistration in the 2000 Parliamentary elec-tions.[58] Ar-Namys, in response, formed thePeople's Congress of Kyrgyzstan electoral al-liance with three other opposition partiesstrengthening their more liberal stance on so-cial issues and national politics.[59] Respublikawas formed in 2010 and is in opposition to thegovernment. In comparison to Western politicalparties, Respublika is right-wing and liberal(more right-wing) and focuses on the followingprinciples: “nationhood, progress, cooperation,equality and responsibility, Eurasian vector ofdevelopment and economic prosperity.”[60]

In April 2010, another political upheaval tookplace, which resulted in the resignation of for-mer President Bakiev. In June 2010, a referen-dum devoted to changing the former republictype of government into a parliamentarydemocracy was successful, and legitimized theposition of Roza Otunbayeva as President,which she took over in April 7, 2010. Accordingto election observer of the OSCE, the electionsconfirmed that “fundamental freedoms” havebeen respected. Current President AlmazbekAtambayev was elected in a Kyrgyz presidentialelection in 2011 and he took over the Presi-dency in December 2011. He is to serve one six-year term. He is a member of the SocialDemocratic Party of Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan, unlike its Central Asian neighbors,is a fragile democracy and does have politicalparty pluralism. There are several political par-ties in the country: the Social Democratic Partyof Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), Ata-Meken, Ata-Jurt, Ar-Namys, and Respublika.

The SDPK was formed in 1994 and is social-de-mocrat in political orientation and is the mostprominent political party in Kyrgyzstan.[54]Ata-Menken (Fatherland) Party joined the gov-ernment led coalition in 2010 with the SDPK,Respublika and Ar-Namys, but withdrew fromthe faction in 2010. Ata-Meken is one of the old-est political parties in Kyrgyzstan, being estab-lished in 1992 and split from the ErkinKyrgyzstan Party.[55] Ata-Meken also partici-pated in all Parliamentary elections.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The Kyrgyz political parties, although in a coali-tion, are often divided on issues of national in-terest such as Kumtor Gold Mine and politicalreform.

On October 4, 2015 Kyrgystan’s Parliamentaryelections were held nationwide. Half of the 5.8million voters who are eligible to vote are ex-pected to participate in the national parliamen-tary elections; 500,000 to 800,000 Kyrgyzcitizens who live abroad are expected to vote inthe elections. There are 14 parties (over 2,000candidates) competing for the 120 seats in Par-liament also referred to as the Supreme Council,the Jogorku Kengesh. The participating partieswere: the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan

(SDPK), Ata-Meken (Fatherland), the RespublikaAta-Jurt (also Fatherland) party, Bir Bol, the Kyr-gyzstan party, and Butun Kyrgyzstan Emgek(United Kyrgyzstan Labor), the Onuugu-Progress party. Some other parties such as Ar-Namys (Dignity). Ata-Meken and RespublikaAta-Ju anrt merged into one party in October2014. The SDPK captured most of the seats.The success of the parliamentary elections per-mits Kyrgyzstan to keep its status as a democ-racy among autocratic and oppressive regimes.Based on preliminary results (with all votes notcounted), the parties that were re-elected tothe Supreme Council have pro-Russian policies,extending Kyrgyzstan’s close relationship withRussia.

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LEgAL ENvIRONMENT

The Kyrgyz Republic has vastly changed sincethe collapse of the Soviet Union and its subse-quent independence. Civil liberties under bothformer Presidents Akaev and Bakiev suffered.The Kyrgyz legal system was shaped under So-viet law and has elements of the French legalstructure and the Russian legal structure. TheCivil Code of Kyrgyzstan was reinvigorated in1996 after replacing the old Civil Code whichdated back to 1964. The second portion of theCivil Code was in 1998 and includes the follow-ing provisions: “general statements and regula-tions of civil-legal relationships; the law ofproperty and other proprietary interests; oblig-atory rights including separate kinds of insur-ance; the law of intellectual property;inheritance law; application of norms of inter-national and private law to civil and legal rela-tionships.”[61]

Justice is “administered” only by courts in Kyr-gyzstan. Many of these courts are also part ofthe other Central Asian states. The three courtsare: Constitution Court of the Kyrgyz Republicwhich protects the Constitution of Kyrgyzstanand determines that constitutionality (or theunconstitutionality) of laws. The second majorcourt is the “Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Re-public is the supreme body of judicial power inthe sphere of civil, criminal and administrativelegal proceedings and exercises supervisionover the judicial activity of oblast, city, districtand military courts of the Republic.”[62]

The third major court is the Supreme Arbitrageof the Kyrgyz Republic and arbitration courts ofmunicipalities “settle disputes between eco-nomic entities based on different forms of prop-erty, arising in the economic sphere and in theprocess of management.”[63]

There is also contract law, enterprise law, bank-ing, immigration, labor, property —regulatedby the Constitution and the “ the Law of the KROn the Denationalization and Privatization ofState Property in the Kyrgyz Republic—, oblig-atory and intellectual property law (Battalova2002, par. 12-19, 21 ). Intellectual property lawwas assigned under and regulated by “Depart-ment of Intellectual Property was established atthe Ministry of Education and Science of theKyrgyz Republic – Kyrgyzpatent.”[64] Tax law isanother important aspect of Kyrgyz Republicregulatory law and is regulated by the JogorkuKenesh and the local and state administrativeentities. [65] Corruption can be found at all levels and courtdecisions are often bribed, due to low salariesof judges and other legal persons. This remainsone of Kyrgyzstan’s largest obstacles in buildinga sustainable and durable democracy and athreat to the country’s long-term stability. AnApril 2012 EurasiaNet article characterized Kyr-gyzstan’s courts as being legal circuses, with un-educated and unqualified judges, a convictionrate of 100% as judicial are often unable to de-liver acquittals.[66]

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Kyrgyzstan has been tinkering with the idea ofintroducing juries in cases. Kazakhstan andGeorgia have implemented juries only in mur-der cases, but have been slow to implement thesystem across all levels and types of criminal of-fenses.[67] Council for Selection of Judges, cre-ated in 2011 as a product of the 2010Constitution appoint judges, but are often in-fluenced by political parties who are involvedin the process.[68]

In July 2012, juries were introduced based on“an amendment to the Law on Jurors in KyrgyzCourts adopted by the national legislature” inMay 2012 in accordance to and codified by theKyrgyz Constitution, Article 15.6 and by Article82.1 which states, “participate in the judicialprocess in the cases and in the order specifiedby the law.”[69] Available research and primarysources reveal no implementation of the intro-duction of jurors into the Kyrgyz legal system.

Compliance with human rights improved andopposition to independent media outlets areless suppressed because of the Tulip Revolu-tion. Kyrgyzstan’s institution of more demo-cratic and liberal value-based reforms andKyrgyzstan’s need for integration regionally andglobal Kyrgyz social policy is still in develop-ment as the country faces intolerance towardshomosexuals (flirting with a law similar to theRussian law relating to homosexual-friendlypolicies), bride kidnapping and labor and gen-der equality. Kyrgyzstan’s integration into andparticipation in many regional organizationssuch as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), the Organization for Security and Coop-eration for Europe (OSCE), and the newerEurasian Economic Union (EEU) will heavily in-fluence or stump its democratic and legalprospects for becoming more open, transpar-ent, and fair in its court proceedings and legalsystem.

30


Through privatization of small and medium-sized businesses, liberalization of prices, smartforeign exchange rate management and a sta-ble national currency (the some), Kyrgyzstan’seconomy gained strength after the Soviet col-lapse. In 1998, Kyrgyzstan became the firstcountry in the Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS) to join the World Trade Organiza-tion.

Gold represents approximately 80% of all ex-port trades outside the CIS, which means Kyr-gyzstan has narrow export diversity whichreflects the country’s natural resources. Kumtorgoldmine is the country’s largest mine whichalso produces the most gold. Operations atKumtor goldmine are overseen by Canada’sCenterra Gold. The Kumtor Gold Mine has facedcalls by Kyrgyz politicians to nationalize themine. The mine in recent years has become asource of contention and has become the focusof Kyrgyz political and social struggles as theKyrgyz become more assertive in negotiatingmining contracts and ensuring that the state,the mining communities, and the Kyrgyz peo-ple receive appropriately distributed benefits.The deals of the Kumtor Gold Mine have causedpolitical upheaval as the Prime Minister of Kyr-gyzstan in mid-April 2015, Joomart Otorbayev,resigned over failing to strike a deal with theCanadian company. The new Kyrgyz Prime Min-ister is Temir Sariyev.


Similar to the other post-Soviet countries, Kyr-gyzstan has a multicultural society. The Russiansrepresent the biggest ethnic minority in thestate. Conflicts occur due to the numerous ex-claves (ongoing border conflicts and ethnic ten-sions) and enclaves, as well as the Kyrgyzlanguage is a necessity for high ranked politicalposts. Although equal human rights aregranted to all citizens, some discrimination forethnic minorities is visible. Furthermore, al-though Kyrgyzstan is a Muslim country, thefunctions of state is clearly separated from reli-gion. In other words, it is a secular state.Most Kyrgyz conform to Sunni Islam. Kyrgyz,Russians, and Uzbeks are the main ethnicgroups. The Uzbeks reside in the South, espe-cially in the southern city of Osh. The city of Oshand the southern portion of Kyrgyzstan hasfrom time to time been the site of ethnicclashes in 1990s and in 2010. Kyrgyz andUzbeks have divergent histories and get a longduring times of tranquility. Uzbeks according tomany human rights watch dog groups still facesystemic discrimination at the hands of Kyrgyzpersons and law enforcement. The lush andvegetative tri-border area of the Ferghana Val-ley also poses issues and it has been deemed ahotbed for religious extremism. There are manyextremist and terrorist groups respectively inKyrgyzstan most prominently the Hizb ut-Tahrirand many Kyrgyz citizens have been reportedto go fight alongside the Islamic State.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Kyrgyzstan, mirroring the action of its formerconquering Russia, is attempting to pass ananti-gay propaganda bill similar to the bill thatRussia passed in 2013. The Kyrgyz anti-gay lawincludes harsher penalties such as one year ofimprisonment for violating its provisions. Dueto the structure of Kyrgyzstan’s legislature, thebill requires three readings and subsequentlythree passing votes. The bill has gone throughto readings and two favorable votes: 15 Octo-ber 2014 and 24 June 2015. Each of the read-ings passed with landslides with the Junereading receiving 90 votes in favor and twoagainst.Passing of the draft law would no longer allowKyrgyzstan to fulfill its international obligationsto equality and political rights. Kyrgyzstan isparty of to the UN Office of the High Commis-sioner for Human Rights International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Equality forall is also enshrined in the Kyrgyz Constitution;this law would violate the constitution of theKyrgyz Republic. The law would put restrictionson media and peaceful assembly violating Arti-cle 31 of the Constitution: “the right to free ex-pression of opinion, freedom of speech andpress.” The Kyrgyz Constitutions also declaresthat “the propagation of national, ethnic, racialand religious hatred, gender as well as other so-cial supremacy which calls to discrimination,hostility and violence shall be prohibited” underSection 4 of Article 2. Kyrgyzstan’s anti-gay billdemonstrates Russia’s increasing influence in itspolitical affairs and now the country’s moral af-fairs. The discriminatory draft law has receivedinternational condemnation from the UnitedNations, global human rights groups, Westerncountries and domestic activists.

Homophobia in Kyrgyzstan is systemic andmany gay Kyrgyz men are often abused(beaten, threatened and arbitrarily detained) bypolice and in police custody.

fOREIgN POLICY

Kyrgyzstan was the former home of U.S. Air BaseManas Transit Center, near Bishkek InternationalAirport. President Rosa Otunbayeva announcedthat the contract for the base will be extended,but due to political tension over the U.S. pres-ence at Manas, the base was closed in July 2014to coincide with the U.S. withdrawal of U.S.forces from Afghanistan. The base was to sup-port NATO logistics and served as an alternativelogistical hub after the 2005 closure of theKarshi-Khanabad Air Base (or K2 Airbase) inUzbekistan (see Uzbekistan Foreign Policy). Ad-ditionally, a Russian air base, Kant Air Base, is aleftover military installation from Soviet times.

China is also becoming increasingly important,particularly in terms of trade and infrastructuraldevelopment for Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly,Kazakhstan plays an essential role for Kyrgyzs-tan in the region, due to important transit func-tions in terms of trade and pipelines transport.


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After Almazbek Atambayev assumed the Presi-dency, he flew to Turkey on his first official visitas President to increase bilateral trade. Themove, as Atambayev did not visit Russia first (asmost Central Asian presidents do and do so reg-ularly) signified that Kyrgyzstan was looking todiversify its strategic partnerships. This is agrand departure from the usual Kyrgyz politick-ing as “former Kyrgyz presidents has been toplay one superpower against the other in orderto gain maximum benefit for Kyrgyzstan and itsruling regimes” and “have led to two forcedregime changes in a decade.”[70] Russian assis-tance to Kyrgyzstan comes in two forms—eco-nomic and military—which both result inRussia have a more dominating and controllingpresence in Kyrgyzstan.

President Atambayev’s foreign policy alsoreached out to the more eastern Asian statessuch as Japan in which the Kyrgyz relationshipplayed on the two countries long relationship,spanning over two decades. Kyrgyzstan is look-ing to attract more foreign investment into thecountry. This was also the purpose with havingPresident Atambayev visit Turkey. This furtheradvances the more modern, more Kyrgyz-ori-ented, and more assertive foreign policy. Thishas proven to be working as Turkey (at the timeof 2012) has stated that it will increase Turkishinvestments to Kyrgyzstan over the new fewyears totaling $450 billion if favorable invest-ment climate is created and “both sides willwork towards increasing bilateral tradeturnover between the two countries to$1 bil-lion by 2015 from $300 million in 2011.”[71]


The new government and the following gov-ernments have to look for economic opportu-nities due to the fact that resources are scarce.Kyrgyzstan has used its natural resources to at-tract foreign investors, but changes in the po-litical climate and a more assertive andnationalistic Kyrgyzstan government may pushforeign investors away. The natural resourcesexploration and exploitation opportunities pro-vided by Kyrgyzstan will further drive its rela-tionship with the West. The most important taskfor Kyrgyzstan to complete in the realm of botheconomics and politics is balancing its own self-interests against close ally and former colonizer,Russia. Kyrgyzstan must be able to establish asustainable and stable environment in order toget the economy running smoothly and to pro-tect its countries resources. Kyrgyzstan, regard-ing its Western partners, is concerned withforeign investment opportunities and politicalstability. Kyrgyzstan hosts Kumtor Gold mine,an open pit mine in Northeast Kyrgyzstan,which is owned and operated by Canadian Cen-terra Gold via Kumtor Operating Company(KOC). The mine, which has been operationalsince 1997, has become the center of political,social, and economic struggle in Kyrgyzstan asthe Kyrgyz seek to nationalize the mine as theyfeel they need great control over their resourcesand that the revenue is not being equally dis-tributed. Environmental damages caused todrinking and irrigation resources and glaciersthat supply the drinking and irrigation waterhave been tainted. Centerra Gold/KOC has setup the Issyk Kul Development Fund to give backto the local mining communities.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

One percent of the revenue from Kumtor GoldMine is placed in the fund and is spent basedon government’s spending plans and with gov-ernment priorities. The operation at Kumtor hasmet local resistance as local had protested theoperation of the mine and the presence of a for-eign company by blocking roads which re-sulted in the forced shut down of the mine. Ifnationalization of the mine were to occur, itcould have the potential to devastate the Kyr-gyz economy as the Kyrgyz government wouldhave to upfront the operating costs, providejobs and benefits, and carry out routine main-tenance and engage in environmental safe-guards. All of these are pricey. It is unclear if themine were to be nationalized if the Issyk Kul De-velopment Fund would cease to exist.

Kyrgyzstan was considered a strategic asset tothe European and Western coalition partners.The U.S. ran Afghanistan-related logistics oper-ations out of Bishkek International Airport atGanci Airbase. Due to political strife and the endof U.S. operation and the withdrawal of U.S.troops Manas Transit Center (the facility wasdowngraded), the U.S. has lost influence in Cen-tral Asia. Kyrgyzstan before the closure ofManas was the only country to host both a U.S.airbase and a Russian airbase.

Kyrgyzstan at this time represented the politicalstruggle between Russia and the U.S. over thestrategic area of Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan also shares a border with China.Here there are ethnic, cultural, and historicallinkages with the Turkic Uighurs that reside inthe far Western Province Xinjiang also known asthe Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Chinahas also invested in Kyrgyz gold mine and goldmine exploration meeting the same fate as Cen-terra Gold’s KOC by addressing protests by localand more assertive demands by the Kyrgyzgovernment. From a strategic standpoint, Kyr-gyzstan’s large natural resources make it an at-tractive location for investors, but due to thewealth, the Kyrgyz has more maneuveringpower.


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TAjIkISTAN AT A gLANCE

Official name: Republic of Tajikistangovernment type: RepublicIndependence: 9 September 1991 (from Soviet Union)National legislature: based on civil law system; no ju-dicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted com-pulsory ICJ jurisdictionLegislative branch: Bicameral Supreme AssemblyHead of State: President Emonmali RAKHMON (orRakhmonov) (since 6 November 1994; head of stateand Supreme Assembly chairman since 19 November1992)geographic location: Central Asia, west of China,north of Afghanistan, neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyr-gyzstanArea: 143,100 sq. km (55,251 sq. miles)Natural resources: hydropower; some petroleum, ura-nium, mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, tung-sten, silver, goldPopulation: 8, 208,000 (World Bank 2013, est.)Languages: Tajik (official language closely related toPersian), Russian widely used in government and busi-nessEthnic groups: Tajik 79.9%, Uzbek 15.3%, Russian 1.1%,Kyrgyz 1.1%, other 2.6% (2000 census)Religions: Sunni Muslim 85%, Shia Muslim 5%, other10% (2003 est.)Life expectancy: 65 years (men), 71 years (women) (UNest.)Internet domain: .tjInternational dialing code: +992Nominal gDP: USD 13.65 bn (2009 est.)gNI per capita (uSD): $870 (World Bank, 2011 est.)gDP growth: 7.4% (World Bank 2013 est.)unemployment rate: 10.8% (ILO 2013 est.)[72] Inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.0% (World Bank2013 est.)

TAJIKISTAN

IIn Tajikistan, a civil war took place from 1992 to 1997,because of internal instability and growing conflicts andinfighting between the elite. Tajikistan remains one ofthe poorest Former Soviet Republics and the poorestcountry in Central Asia. The government neglects topursue the democratization process and PresidentEmomali Rakhmon (also seen as Emomali Rakhmonov)is constantly expanding his power.


In 1992 a civil war took began, after the collapse of theregime of the former communist president RahmonNabiyev. In 1994, Emomali Rakhmon, leader of the Peo-ple’s Front of Tajikistan (PF), took over the presidencyafter elections without the participation of oppositionparties. When it comes to elections, opponents werenot allowed to participate, and political opposition fig-ures was suppressed and partly arrested.

The collapse of the health, education system, infrastruc-ture and society suffers from extreme poverty. Tajikistanslowly but gradually recovered economically, especiallydue to the favorable world prices of aluminum and cot-ton. Despite some economic growth, Tajikistan is thepoorest state in Central Asia and in the Former SovietUnion.

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Democracy and market reforms are yet to be es-tablished, the international community toler-ates the authoritarian rule of EmomaliRakhmon and his government. PresidentRakhmon has created fewer problems and at-tracts less attention than his Uzbekistan andKazakhstan counterparts. Demonstratingfragility and factionalism inside Tajikistan, 22people died Friday September 4, 2015 inDushanbe during a shootout at a governmentdefense complex that left thirteen militants andnine police officers dead. On September 6,2015, it was reported that President Rahmonstated that the attacks against the police werestaged by Islamic State sympathizers who “pur-sued the same goals as the Islamic State.” Theleader of the rogue group of militants was for-mer Deputy Defense Minister, General Ab-duhalim Nazarzoda. On Wednesday September16, 2015, Tajikistan’s forces killed rogue GeneralNazarzoda. Also killed were 12 militants werekilled including four government troops. The at-tacks occurred in the capital of Dushanbe and

the nearby city of Vahdat. General Nazarzodahad fled to the Ramit Gorge after he was outedfrom his position and charged with treason. Re-tired and active servicemen were reported tosupport Nazarzoda.

Tajikistan also cracked down on religious free-dom in the country. The banishment and crim-inalization of the IRPT (also known as theIslamic Revival Party of Tajikistan Islamic Partyof Tajikistan) in September 2015 represents fur-ther political opposition in Tajikistan and Rah-mon’s paranoia. The Tajikistan Governmentclaims that the party’s failure to enter intoMarch 2015 Parliamentary elections motivatedthe banning of the Party due to “inactivity.” Theexiled party leader of the IRPT, Muhiddin Kabiri,was accused of aiding the dead Defense Minis-ter responsible for the shootout in Dushanbeaccording to Radio Free Europe Radio Libertyon September 17, 2015. This highlights Tajik-istan’s fragility after its five year civil war whichended in 1997.

LEgAL ENvIRONMENT

The Constitution of Tajikistan, like many na-tions, is the Supreme Law of the Land accordingto Article 10 of the document. The Constitutionof Tajikistan was introduced in November 1994and has been amended two times: September1999 and June 2003. The Constitution providesfor the separation of powers and the establish-ment of a democratic, legal, secular and unitarystate, according to Article 10.

The national legislature is based on a civil lawsystem without judicial review of legislativeacts. The national constitution was adopted assupreme law in 1994. Tajikistan has an inde-pendent judiciary but is considerably influ-enced by the executive branch and issusceptible to corruption. Because of the lowlaw salaries of judges, they are vulnerable tobribery. Tajikistan has been dealing with cor-ruption through its legislature, legal system,and with regional organizations such as the Or-ganization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-rope (OSCE).The following laws are meant to curb corrup-tion: the Presidential Decree on AdditionalMeasures to Step up the Struggle against Eco-nomic Crime and Corruption, the Law on theFight against Corruption, and the relevant sec-tions of the Criminal Code. According to theUnited Nations report on Tajikistan’s public ad-ministration, a “nation-wide anti-corruptionplan has yet to be developed and adopted, and

an interdisciplinary anti-corruption coordinat-ing body envisaged in the Presidential Decreehas yet to be established.”[73] The fight againstcorruption is compartmented like it is in manycountries where there are different types ofagencies and organizations fighting differenttypes of corruption. For example, the tax ad-ministration would detect and investigate taxcorruption, fraud, and bribery (e.g. Anti-corrup-tion Division within the Tax Police Department).Tajikistan is a member of the Organization forSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).The OSCE has been extremely active in stabiliz-ing Tajikistan’s still fragile post-war political andlegal environment through police reform, legalreform, and electoral reform to stabilize post-civil war Tajikistan. The OSCE strives to preventcorruption and to promote transparency anddemocratic elections and most importantlyhuman rights in a region marreed by a terriblehuman rights record. The OSCE office in Tajik-istan is the largest interstate and interregionalorganization. The OSCE engages in democraticefforts including a civic education program foryouth and young adults in the remote areas ofthe country, to develop electoral and politicalprocesses to meet the country's commitmentto democracy and civil and political rights. TheOSCE specifically assists with the developmentof the legal system by engaging in capacitybuilding, developing the legal system andtrains law practitioners of all levels.


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The legal environment has improved since theend of the civil war in 1997, but many problemsremain. Like many authoritarian regimes, thelegal system is used to the President’s advan-tage and is used to repress groups that maythreaten their power and any perceived threatsto the stability of a country. While Tajikistan issecular, is not friendly towards those who out-wardly practice, tolerate, and embrace Islam.Tajikistan’s population primarily consists ofSunni (95%) and Salafi Muslims (5%). Mosquesand parishioners are to register with the gov-ernment. In October 2011, the ground was bro-ken for construction for the largest mosque inthe Former Soviet Union to accommodate 115,000 worshippers despite the country’s intoler-ance for Islam. In recent years, the governmentof Tajikistan has closed down hundreds of un-registered mosques.

According to the United States’ Commission onInternational Religious Freedom 2013 report onTajikistan, Tajikistan is a country of particularconcern. Tajikistan in 2009, after passing ahighly restrictive law, “has increased the crimi-nal and administrative penalties for violations”and “religion law places onerous administrativeburdens on religious groups, which prevent orcontrol religious activity” and non-violentgroups that are unregistered are deemed “ille-gal.”[74]

The law also prevents private religious educa-tion, “requires state permission for an institutionor organization to provide religious instruction,and requires that both parents provide writtenpermission for a child to receive approved in-struction.”[75]


After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Tajikeconomy crumbled. Key trade goods were andare cotton and aluminum, but these productshave not yet reached the level of output whichthey had before the country’s independence,and thus, have not made a significant economicimpact. Tajikistan’s GDP barely managed toreach pre-independence levels in recent years.Tajikistan’s GDP growth rate is 7.4% and its cur-rent GDP per capita is 1,036.58 (est. 2013) USD;its GDP is $8.508 billion (2013). According to2014 World Bank figures, Tajikistan growthslipped to 6.7% after a decrease in remittances(declining two percent) and weaker “industrialexport growth” affected by lower prices for cot-ton and aluminum.[76] Tajikistan’s GDP is wellbelow the other Central Asian states making itthe poorest Central Asian state. Economic re-forms nearly only took place in the small andmedium business sector, consequently large in-dustrial enterprises faced lacks of financial andprofessional resources, which resulted in a dras-tic decrease of production.

Tajikistan is relatively unattractive to foreign in-vestors due to its proximity to conflict areas,the adversarial business climate, and the lack offinancial and professional background of localcounterparts, political bureaucracy, and wide-spread and rampant corruption. Tajikistan reliesheavily on foreign assistance mainly from Rus-sia, China, and Iran and international financial

institutions and organizations such as the EUand the World Bank.

Poor governance and the government’s failureto implement banking and political reformaimed at tackling corruption remain the mainobstacles for Tajikistan to develop a friendly for-eign investment atmosphere. Micro financingorganizations and efforts continue to grow, “aretypically well governed, and are filling manygaps left by the weak banking sector.”[77] Tajik-istan’s black market is also growing which canbe attributed to its currency controls whichhave boosted its underground economycaused by the lack of remittances (because ofthe Russian economy and Tajikistan’s economyis dependent on remittances), “with less cur-rency flowing into the country, the Tajik somonihas slid almost 17 percent so far this year, to6.23 somoni per dollar, according to the officialexchange rate” and were accused of speculat-ing on the currency which caused financial ex-changes to shut down.[78]

This has forced many to trade currency illegallyand there are customers because of the highdemand and that banks are not selling hardcurrency and “economists warn that Tajikistancould emulate neighboring Uzbekistan, wherethe difference between the National Bank rateand the black market rate has grown to over 40percent.”[79]


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The micro-financing according to the WorldBank Study, has had the greatest impact onrural areas which are typically the poorest. TheWorld Bank is committed to assisting Tajikistandevelop its financial and private sectors“through policy advice, technical assistance,and financial support” through banking legisla-tion, transaction modernization and develop-ment.[80]

However, recent reforms have improved Tajik-istan’s business environment, and like many re-form undertaken by fellow Central Asian states,have provided more investor protections. Ac-cording to the World Bank Report, Tajikistan,“Tajikistan became the 147th State party to theConvention on the Recognition and Enforce-ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards…on Novem-ber 12, 2012.”[81]


Degrees at school and universities are easily ob-tained with bribery. The country faces massivelabor migration, a relatively high HIV/AIDS in-fection rate, and drug trafficking. Through a se-curity lens, Tajikistan has to deal with extremistIslamic groups and constant crackdowns onMuslims. Tajikistan has also seen a rise in itsSalafi Muslim population. Salafi Muslims believein a pure form of Islam. Unfortunately, manyWahabbi extremists identify themselves asSalafis which has prompted a harsh crackdownin Tajikistan to prevent extremism from flour-ishing and to maintain a secular state.

Due to the terrain and geography (half of theterritory is higher than 3,000 meters), it is con-siderably difficult to provide adequate infra-structure. Tajikistan has many infrastructureprojects that need to be completed. Tajikistandoes and will continue to benefit from its net-work of hydroelectric power plants. Iran hasbeen instrumental in funding Tajikistan’s devel-opment projects. Poverty remains, by large,one of the larger social struggles of Tajikistan.Approximately 51% of the population has tomake ends meet with less than $2 USD per day.Economic growth has resulted in a decline ofpoverty. The national poverty rate droppedfrom 81% to 47% in 2009. An increased in thestandard of living and further poverty reductionare goals of Tajikistan’s National DevelopmentStrategy to 2015[82]. The government has beenaccused of squandering public funds on image-enhancing projects like a large mosque andpalaces throughout Dushanbe.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

fOREIgN POLICY

Tajikistan is highly dependent on internationalsupport and international donor funds. The Eu-ropean Union became a strategic partner ofTajikistan and is working “to facilitate Tajikistaneconomic transition, promoting inclusive, sus-tainable human and economic develop-ment.”[83] Tajikistan and the European Unionsigned a Partnership and Co-operation Agree-ment in 2004 which entered into force in 2010.The partnership agreements focuses onstrengthening economic partnerships, the de-sire to promote international peace and secu-rity, and to protect the rule of law and humanrights all while encouraging regional coopera-tion.[84] The European Union has also becomea foreign policy priority for Tajikistan.

Due to Tajikistan’s unfavorable and landlockedgeographical position, Russia is still the mostimportant partner in terms of political, eco-nomic, and military support. Russia is interestedin Tajikistan for many of the same reasons it isinterested in its other former Soviet subordi-nates: provides a strategic context to maintainits sphere of influence, countering Western andChinese influence, and to house Russian troops.In April 2015, Russia reaffirmed its military rela-tionship with Tajikistan focusing on the deteri-oration of the security situation after NATOforces have moved out of the region after theU.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.[85]

Tajikistan shares a 1,200km border with Tajik-istan and Russia’s Russia’s 201st Motorized RifleDivision is stationed near the border and troopsfrom the 201st Motor Rifle Division will be stay-ing until 2042[86]. The Kremlin-backed media outlet, Russia Today,reported in April 2015 that Russia is to give“about $1.2 billion worth of weapons and mili-tary equipment to the Central Asian nation ofTajikistan, which is currently threatened by in-vasion from the Islamic State” as part of Russia’smodernization package for Tajikistan and tostrengthen border security betweenAfghanistan and Tajikistan.[87]

Meanwhile, Tajikistan’s relations with neighbor-ing Afghanistan have improved in the pastyears; the relations with Uzbekistan still remainvery tense and problematic over resourcescarcity and border security. The tension be-tween Tajikistan and Uzbekistan arises out ofthe energy sector, particularly regarding thecontroversial water issues, and is “borne out ofsimilarity, proximity, and scarcity.”[88]

Tajikistan is also cultivating closer ties withother major countries in the region such as Iran,Turkey, and India. Turkey, when the SovietUnion collapsed, had its sights on its Turkic re-publics as they share linguistic, religious, andcultural ties.


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The Turkey-Tajikistan relationships began in1991 when Turkey recognized Tajikistan’s inde-pendence and 60 protocols have been signedbetween two countries since then and at thetime of this publication. The two countries since2012 have focused their relationship on agricul-ture and technology.

Turkey’s trade volume in 2012 with Tajikistanexceeded $500 million dollars. The country hasalso engaged in “an agreement of cooperationbetween the state television broadcasters ofthe two countries, agreements of cooperationbetween the ministries of agriculture as well asenergy,” a memorandum of understanding be-tween banks, and a cultural exchange programfor the year 2013-2014.[89] Other cultural proj-ects are facilitated by the Dushanbe Coordina-tion Office of the Turkish InternationalCooperation and Development Agency (TİKA)and the Turkish Language Research and Appli-cation Centre (TÖMER) in Dushanbe.

Education still remains an issue for Tajikistan.President Rahmon announced the closure ofthe Gülen schools inspired by the teachings ofthe Fethullah Gülen. The Gülen movementschools were the top performing schools in thenation. The schools underscore the conflict be-tween Tajikistan’s government and the Justiceand Development Party (AKP). The closure ofthe schools highlights the ongoing and escalat-ing conflict between the AKP and the opposi-tion in Turkey. Other Central Asian states havealready closed the Gülen Schools in the past.The India-Tajikistan relationship has also ex-panded in the realm of security, trade and en-ergy creating a strategic partnership betweenthe two countries. Relations between the twocountries started after the collapse of the SovietUnion and when India recognized Tajikistan’s in-dependence in 1991. India’s relationship withTajikistan is the only successful example ofIndia’s “Connect Central Asia Policy” which hasleft India without a robust strategic policy.


President Emamoli Rakhmon has been able tosecure and enlarge his power and is expectedto stay in office until the foreseeable future.Presidential terms are seven years according tothe Constitutions. President Rakhmon has beenin power since 1994. The population is aware ofthe risk of another civil war and will do anythingto prevent violent upheavals in the future.To prevent this and to grow the country, it is es-sential that the country restructures the eco-nomic and social system to reduce nepotism,and tribal loyalties and to increase the socialwelfare of its citizens.

Tajikistan also faces problems with its neigh-bors: it has border conflicts with Kyrgyzstan dueto two Tajik enclaves on Kyrgyz territory, Vorukhlocated south of the mountain of Ak-Tash andWestern Qalacha near the Kyrgyz railroad sta-tion. Sarvan is the Tajik enclave in Uzbekistanand is known as Sarvak, Sarvaksoi and Sarvaki-bolo which is completely surrounded by Uzbek-sitan and is located in the tri-border region ofthe Ferghana Valley and in the Isfara Valley.Tajikistan also faces Islamic movements ofUzbek groups in the Tajik mountains and is amatter of Tajik concern.The relationship with the Iran is becoming in-creasingly vital.

The Farkhor Air Base, located 130km south ofDushanbe, Tajikistan is jointly operated by theIndian and Tajik Air Forces and is only India’sonly air base outside of its borders. The basewas established in May 2002 by India and haspreviously served as a transport base to supplythe Afghan Northern Alliance and before be-coming a strategic military asset served as ahospital to treat Afghan fighters.[90] Tajikistanis also important to India as Tajikistan is close tothe highly-contested Kashmir area and servesas a way for India to protect its interests politi-cally.

In the areas of trade relations and energy coop-eration, the partnership could easily expand as“India’s total trade with Tajikistan has gone upfrom$10.7 million in 2004-05 to $41.33 millionin 2010-11” but are below levels of what theycould be.[91] Tajikistan is one of the richercountries when it comes to hydroelectric powerand has many precious gems and mineralswhich make it an attractive trading partner forIndia. The lack of infrastructure in Tajikistandoes pose an obstacle for India. India is cur-rently an observer in the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) and Tajikistan has been afull supporter of full India membership in theorganization.


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TuRkMENISTAN AT A gLANCE

Official name: Turkmenistangovernment type: Republic; authoritarian presidentialrule with little power outside the executive branchIndependence: 27 October 1991 (from Soviet Union)National legislature: based on civil law system and Is-lamic law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdictionLegislative branch: Two parliamentary bodiesHead of State: President Gurbanguly BERDY-MUKAHMEDOV (since 14 February 2007)geographic location: Central Asia, bordering theCaspian Sea, between Iran and KazakhstanArea: 488,100 sq. km (188,456 sq. miles) Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, sulfur, saltMain exports: Oil, gas, textiles, raw cottonPopulation: 5,240,000 (World Bank 2013 est).Languages: Turkmen 72%, Russian 12%, Uzbek 9%,other 7%Ethnic groups: Turkmen 85%, Uzbek 5%, Russian 4%,other 6% (2003)Religions: Muslim 89%, Eastern Orthodox 9%, un-known 2%Life expectancy: 61 years (men), 69 years (women)(UN)Internet domain: .tm International dialing code: +993Nominal GDP: USD $41.85 billion (World Bank 2013 est.)gNI per capita (uSD): $6,880 (World Bank, 2013)gDP growth: 10.2% (World Bank 2013 est.)unemployment rate: 10.7% (ILO 2013 est.)[92] Inflation rate (consumer prices): 10% (2009 est.;World Bank 2013 est is NA)Ranked as Upper Middle Income country by the WorldBank

TURKMENISTAN

AAfter the death of the former ruling dictator SaparmuratNiyazov, who named himself “Turkmenbashi,” which lit-erally means “Father of the Turkmen,” the former Vice-Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, waselected new President on 11 February 2007—the elec-tions were held without the permission of the participa-tion of political opponents. Turkmenistan still remainsisolated not only from Central Asia, but from rest of Asiaand the West. The country still maintains its non-alignedstatus, declaring and practicing neutrality in manygeopolitical organizations and demonstration neutralityregarding the conflicts such as Crimea, the Caspian Seadeals, and staying out of the new AIIB and the securityorganizations such as the CSTO and the SCO.


After Saparmurat Niyazov had elected himself head ofstate by direct elections in October 1990, he replacedcommunism with a unique version of independent au-thoritarian nationalism, led by a pervasive cult of person-ality—his own personality. Although the constitutionstated that the country was democratic and was basedon a presidential republic with the separation of powers,Niyazov established a brutal regime which became in-creasingly dependent on its domestic secret service andsecurity forces. In 2006, Niyazov began to isolate thecountry from international and regional organizations.China was the only nation which remained important toNiyazov’s regime.

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President Supramurat Niyazov, also known asTurkmenbashi (“Father of All Turkmen”), passedaway on 21 December 2006 because of a heartattack at age 66. He ruled Turkmenistan underSoviet rule and after independence since 1985.Turkmenistan faced a power vacuum that wasnot allowed to form after the seamless transi-tion of power to former dentist GurbangulyBerdymukhammedov. There was fear of vio-lence and hope as many hoped a new Presidentwould pull back the curtains on the secretivestate. Before Niyazov’s death, there was onlyone political party, Democratic Party of Turk-menistan.

There was great hope for a democracy or atleast a less authoritarian and megalomaniacleader and a more transparent government. Theseamless transition to an unknown political andpublic figure, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamme-dov, was welcomed as he was a political new-comer and was not part of the SovietCommunist apparatchik. The transition wentsmoothly with no turmoil, but offered no op-portunity for political pluralism and a debateabout the future of the country to take place.Since Niyazov’s death in 2006, Berdy-mukhammedov has done away with much ofTurkmenbashi’s cult of personality and installedhis own. There was not much in changes inleadership, leadership style, and policies. Thetransition was uneventful and Turkmenistan re-mains still one of the most secret and reclusivecountries in the world.

After the election, Berdymukhamedov under-lined the continuation of Niyazov’s policies, butafter his first year in office, some changes in do-mestic policies such as health care and educa-tion as well as discrimination policies werealready visible. Now Turkmenistan is trying toestablish relationships with states which are lo-cated outside Central Asia. Turkmenistan stillconsiders itself part of the non-aligned move-ment and Turkmenistan is not part of any of theregional security organization that other Cen-tral Asia states are.

LEgAL ENvIRONMENT

Turkmenistan’s legal environment is constitu-tionally well regulated with an independent ju-diciary (but judges are hired and fired by thepresident). Like its neighbor and transitioningcountries and economies, Turkmenistan needsto strengthen rule of law and access to justicefor its entire population, as well as to promotecivil society activity by promoting freedom ofspeech, access to information and to promotereligious freedom. Under the current PresidentBerdymuhkammedov, these reforms will behard to achieve as he is engulfed in his own cultof personality. Reforms in Turkmenistan havebeen focused on political and economic re-forms. Turkmenistan is a unitary state led by atotalitarian President. In 2006, it was stated thatthe Turkmen law was transitioning from Sovietlaw, but will include elements of Islamic law (be-cause of the history of Turkmenistan).

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Turkmenistan is a civil law country with its lawshierarchically organized. The Constitution ofTurkmenistan establishes permanent neutralityand the Turkmen Constitution promoteshuman rights according to Article 3: “to ensureconditions for the free development of individ-ual personality, and also commits to protect thelife, honor, dignity, freedom, individual inviola-bility, and natural and inalienable rights of thecitizen.”[93]

The Constitution also calls for a separation ofpowers as codified by Article 4 as it is dividedamong three branches: Legislative, Executive,and Judicial. The Majlis is the highest represen-tative body (which is similar to Uzbekistan's rep-resentative body) and is the equivalent to aParliamentary body.

While the Constitution of Turkmenistan is all en-compassing and reflects the legal system ofmany democratic countries such as the UnitedStates and Western European ParliamentarySystems, the Constitution is obviously not heldand its’ legally structured inherently flawed dueto the nature of its leadership structure.

Holding to the idea that democratic reformshould follow economic progress or develop si-multaneously, “Turkmenistan’s post-indepen-dence transition towards a market-orientedeconomy supported by democratic and plural-istic institutions can be viewed as slow.”[94] Likeany developing nation and like many of the For-mer Soviet Republics, the country faces corrup-tion in the form of bribery. The regulatoryframework and the legal system of Turk-menistan have harmed its commercial develop-ment as they fall short of internationalstandards and, “they do not seem to be appliedin practice, since there is no functioning stockexchange and there appears to be no public is-suance of shares.”[95] In Turkmenistan, you have to pay to be “intro-duced” to the Government of Turkmenistan inother words receiving a letter of invitation tovisit the country. Turkmenistan has repeatedlyranked high (numerically low on a wide scale)on the corruption index indicating a high levelof corruption. Transparency International in2013, ranked Turkmenistan 170 out of 174. Po-litical corruption and corruption in the publicservice sector also exists.

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Especially in the first years after the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, the Turkmen society sufferedextreme poverty. The economy slowly recov-ered, but in 1996, a total collapse slowed eco-nomic development. Structural reforms in theeconomic environment remain very low andmany areas are still under strict control of thestate. Privatization only took place with smallunprofitable entities. Oil, gas, and cotton arethe most important trade products, which ac-count for approximately 80% of total exports,but also agriculture outputs like grain crops,rice, and vegetable become increasingly essen-tial. However, the society has only a low domes-tic purchasing power. Similar to the Sovietplanned economy, Turkmenistan’s economy isconsidered in long-term programs. The coun-try’s economy remains underdeveloped. Thecountry has little interaction with global mar-kets.

Economic corruption is often a driver in the lackof foreign direct investment in the country.Even with Turkmenistan’s status of the world’sfifth largest gas producer, it has been unable totake advantage of its rich resources. As of No-vember 2014, Turkmenistan produces roughly70 billion cubic meters of natural gas each yearand to break this monopoly has begun to ex-port gas to Iran and China. The closed-out na-ture and the neutrality stance of thegovernment (derived from the non-alignedmovement which Turkmenistan considers itselfstill a part of ) does negatively affect the coun-try.

The lack of governmental and political trans-parency also deters investors because of therisk associated with misinformation and se-crecy. Turkmenistan’s restrictive freedom ofmovement policy is also worrisome as thecountry is strict on who it lets in and out. The freedom of movement of its people is alsoworrisome as Turkmenistan will be unable todevelop its networks and its human capital—according to economics one of the most impor-tant elements of developing an economy—tofurther develop and diversify its narrow-basedeconomy.


Although Turkmenistan’s laws and regulationsstate that all citizens have the same civil rights,ethnic minorities (e.g. Uzbeks, Russians, Kaza-khs opponents of regime etc.) often face dis-crimination regarding education and civilservices. They are banned from the right to votein parliamentary elections. Furthermore, formerPresident Niyazov propagated his extreme na-tional ideology of the “perfect Turkmen.”

President Niyazov also considered himself to bethe Father of all Turkmen engulfing himself andthe country in his eccentric and pervasive cultof personality. Upon Niyazov’s death, it was ex-pected that his cult of personality would be dis-mantled, but it was only replaced by the newPresident’s, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov,affinity for himself.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Concerning salary income inequality, the great-est among the Central Asia states with gravedifferences between urban and rural living con-ditions, the regime tried hard to improve the so-cial security system. It also considers providinghandicapped people, sick people, and provid-ing maternity benefits. When Niyazov declaredhimself as President for Life in 1999, he drasti-cally cut back on social welfare programs whilespending money on lavish and often outra-geous projects.

Human rights abuses are reported to run ram-pant in the country. Many international humanrights watchdog groups including Amnesty In-ternational and Human Rights Watch (HRW) de-scribe the human rights situation inTurkmenistan extremely repressive, “media andreligious freedoms are subject to draconian re-strictions, and human rights defenders andother activists face the constant threat of gov-ernment reprisal” and that torture remainswidespread.[96]

Citizens of Turkmenistan are forced to see itsleader’s face throughout the country, are forcedto attend hour long events and are not allowedto leave or use the toilet according to HRW 2014World Report on human rights[97]. There is lit-tle media coverage that actually report what isgoing on inside in the country. A simple glanceat news outlets reporting news on Turk-menistan only highlight the President’s visitsand what things he is doing for the people ofTurkmenistan.

There are no independent media outlets, lim-ited internet access (even though it has ex-panded under the PresidencyBerdymukhammedov). Internet fees are $100month, which many cannot afford and internetactivity is monitored along with other elec-tronic and telecommunications activity.[98]The Turkmen government has been accused ofmaking false accusations to imprison politicalopponents, human rights advocates, and manyhave been victims of what HRW calls “enforceddisappearances” and many of those kidnappedare believed to have died in detention.[99]

Religion and state are largely kept separate andonly Sunni Islam and the Russian OrthodoxChurch are officially recognized and are tightlycontrolled by the regime. Groups are forced toregister and face regular government scrutiny.According to Amnesty International, a 2013code, “Provisions in the Code of AdministrativeOffences, which came into force in January,punished the import, export and distribution ofreligious materials.”[100] Many Jehovah’s wit-nesses were imprisoned in 2013; one remainsin jail.[101] Similar to the situation in Tajikistan,no “congregations of unregistered religiousgroups or communities are allowed, and reli-gious communities have been unable to regis-ter for years” in Turkmenistan.[102] This createsa high risk for those who wish to practice reli-gion in private. A new 2013 law determinedthat “new fines for involvement in unregisteredreligious activity”; the law is to go into force in2014[103].


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fOREIgN POLICY

The government of Turkmenistan is strictly au-tocratic. Russia and Ukraine are the most impor-tant customers of natural resources andtherefore play an essential role in Turk-menistan’s foreign policy. Russia is a recipient ofTurkmen gas; Turkmenistan started exportinggas to China in 2009. In spite of the increasedattention from the western world in the region,President Niyazov kept close contacts to the Tal-iban regime after the terror attacks against theU.S. on September 11, 2001. Turkey, Azerbaijan,Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Iran were used asa counterweight to Russia playing importantroles in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. The EU-Turkmen relations are mainly based on mineralfuels import from Turkmenistan and machineryand transport equipment to Turkmenistan. TheEU is Turkmenistan’s most important importpartner and third most important export part-ner. Turkmenistan’s weak democratizationprocess, poor human rights record, and its cur-rent foreign policy have so far intimidated west-ern countries from pursuing economiccontracts with Turkmenistan.


Although some saw Berdymukhamedov as a re-former, he has not made any policy departuresfrom the policies of Niyazov. The only develop-ment is the export of gas to China in 2009. Asfar as the transformation process from the for-mer Soviet planned economy to a market econ-omy, Turkmenistan slowly but gradually has toimplement structural reforms.Berdymukhamedov has still not managed toachieve economic independence from oil andgas exports. The country needs further reforma-tion of the health care system as well as the ed-ucational sector.

While Turkmenistan’s non-aligned position anddevotion to the now phased-out and geopolit-ically unrealistic neutrality in all affairs havebeen beneficial, Turkmenistan can capitalize onits potential. Turkmenistan has much vulnera-bility such as being close to the Afghan border.A violenct incident broke out in February andMay 2014 where there was a shootout betweenTurkmen border guards and a “small armedgroup that crossed the border from the

Ghormach region of Afghanistan’s FaryabProvince” along the Turkmen-Afghan border ac-cording to Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty’sTurkmen Service, Azatlyk. Radio Free Europealso reported that “Qishloq Ovozi[, a blog,] haspreviously reported that there are militantgroups in northern Afghanistan who are alliedwith the Taliban but are led by ethnicUzbeks.”[104]

A similar incident happened in September2014, where Turkmen border guards crossedinto Afghanistan chasing away reportedly theTaliban who resided along the border accord-ing to Eurasia Net.[105] As a result of this activ-ity and tensions mounting betweenTurkmenistan and Afghanistan, Turkmenistanlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have decided toclose their borders. This shuts off the ethnicTurkmen populations in Afghanistan that resideclose to the border, causing problems if arefugee crisis situation ever were to occur. Con-struction equipment appeared along the Turk-men-Afghan border in October 2014:“Turkmenistan’s frontier with Jowzjan’sKhamyab district, which neighbors Qar-qeen.”[106] Despite Turkmenistan’s neutralstance, it cannot shield Turkmenistan from re-gional forces such as the Taliban and violencethat has plagued its neighbors for over two andthree decades respectively.

uzBEkISTAN AT A gLANCE

Official name: Republic of Uzbekistangovernment type: Republic, authoritarian presidentialrule with little power outside the executive branchIndependence: 1 September 1991 (from Soviet Union)National legislature: based on civil law system; hasnot accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdictionLegislative branch: bicameral Supreme AssemblyHead of State: President Islam KARIMOV (since 24March 1990; when he was elected president by theSupreme Soviet)geographic location: Central Asia, north ofAfghanistan; neighboring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turk-menistan, and TajikistanArea: 447,400 sq. km (172,700 sq. miles) Natural resources: natural gas, petroleum, coal, gold,uranium, silver, copper, lead and zinc, tungsten, molyb-denumMain exports: Cotton, gold, natural gas, mineral fertil-izers, ferrous metals, textiles, motor vehiclesPopulation: 30,240,000 (World Bank 2013 est.)Languages: Uzbek 74.3%, Russian 14.2%, Tajik 4.4%,other 7.1%Ethnic groups: Uzbek 80%, Russian 5.5%, Tajik 5%,Kazakh 3%, Karakalpak 2.5%, Tatar 1.5%, other 2.5%(1996 est.)Religions: Muslim 88% (mostly Sunnis), Eastern Ortho-dox 9%, other 3%Life expectancy: 66 years (men), 72 years (women) (UNest.)Internet domain: .uz International dialing code: +998Nominal gDP: USD 56.80 billion (World Bank 2013 est.)gNI per capita (uSD): 1,900 (World Bank 2013 est.)gDP growth: 8.0% (World Bank 2013 est.)unemployment rate: 10.8% (ILO 2013 est.)[108] Inflation rate (consumer prices): 14.1% (2009 est.) of-ficial data; based on independent analysis of consumerprices, inflation reached 38% in 2008. World Bank 2013estimate is unavailable at this time.

UZBEKISTAN

IIn March 1990, the ethnic Uzbek outsider and strong leaderIslam Karimov became head of state of Uzbekistan. Hestarted his term with suppression of media, oppositiongroups, and minorities. After the terror attacks against theU.S. on September 11, 2001 Uzbekistan provided logisticalsupport to the U.S. with an airbase, the Karshi-Khanabad (K2)Air Base, which closed when U.S. and EU criticized Uzbek-istan’s handling of the 2005 Andijan events and accused theUzbek government of human rights abuses. The remainingGerman military base located in Termez Airport in Uzbek-istan used by Karimov to pressure against EU sanctions. Ger-many had been paying Uzbekistan 10 -15 million Euros peryear.[107]


President Islam Karimov declared his intention to build amodern secular democratic state based on the rule of lawwith a quick transformation to a free market economy, butsince student protests (involving 3,000 students from theAgriculture College in Tashkent) demanding more democ-racy and better economic reforms in 1992 in response to afellow student being shot by police over the desire for pricereform,[109] he began to form a tough regime around himwith a strong internal security apparatus and little power forall remaining political officials. The autocratic leadership wasjustified by the government in respect of the chaotic circum-stances in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Corrup-tion can be found in all governmental institutions at all levelsand clan and tribal politics play an essential role in the realmof replacement of high-ranking governmental positions.

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LEgAL ENvIRONMENT

Uzbekistan’s national legislature is based on acivil law system and nominally has an inde-pendent judicial branch. Legal decisions aremade by the President, Cabinet of Ministers,and various ministries and regional mayorats(mayorships). The Cabinet of Ministers which iscomposed of the Prime Minister, his deputies,ministers, chairmen of state committees andthe head of Karakalpakstan (an autonomous re-gion in Uzbekistan) exercise Executive Author-ity and issues ordinances that affect all stateorganizations, enterprises, and bodies.Uzbek-istan’s Constitutional Court is the most powerfulof the three courts (the other two are theSupreme Court and the High Economic Court)and renders the constitutionality of legislativeand executive branches. The High EconomicCourt settles all disputes in the commercial sec-tors of the economy between local and statebodies; “the Economic Procedure Code pro-vides that foreign parties have the same proce-dural rights and duties as Uzbek parties inmatters before an Uzbek court.”[110]

Although the constitution declares the separa-tion of powers, in fact the president and its pro-ponents have enough power to intervene inany court decision. President Islam Karimov ap-points and removes judges arbitrarily mostly tosuit his political and own power-preservingneeds. The rule of law in Uzbekistan is minimaland the national constitution does not success-fully protect fundamental rights and freedoms.

Uzbekistan’s legal system faces many chal-lenges. The structure of the country’s powerstructure excludes many from freely participat-ing and ensuring that the rights of citizens areensured. Foreign investment and separately theregional security threats and economic, socialand political problems has been impeded ac-cording to the UN in a 2006 report titled, TheImplementation of the Convention on the Elim-ination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen according to the Chairman of Uzbek-istan’s National Human Rights Centre.[111]Chairman Saidov stated that “expandingwomen’s rights and ensuring gender equalitywas fundamental to Uzbekistan’s quest toachieve the Millennium DevelopmentGoals.”[112] Since 2006, around 200 NGOs existin Uzbekistan, but many of the organizationsare thought be under heavy State influence andare not able to operate freely and serve the in-terest of the women of Uzbekistan. This boilsdown to Uzbekistan’s poor rule of law. In a 2007Freedom house report, Uzbekistan ranked last.Freedom house has declared Uzbekistan notfree. The ten-year anniversary of the AndijanMassacre provides a yardstick on Uzbekistan’sperformance regarding rule of law and humanrights: little progress and slow progress.Progress in Uzbekistan is difficult and funda-mentally flawed. A 2011 Human Rights WatchReport states that widespread human rightsabuses still exist in the country especially in itscriminal justice system.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Corruption is also widespread. Neither has im-proved with the adoption of habeas corpuswhich was adopted by the government in 2008.Habeas corpus is not transparent as “police andinvestigators can hold suspects up to 72 hoursbefore bringing them before a judge for ahabeas corpus hearing, a period incompatiblewith human rights norms,” arbitrary detentionsskill exist and habeas corpus trials are not madepublic which undermines fairness according tothe report.[113]

There have been many attempts to reform thejudicial system. The UNDP had initiated the De-cember, 2000 new edition of Law “On Courts” ofUzbekistan which will help Uzbekistan adoptinternational practices and best standards. Thisprogram focused on four areas: developedmechanisms for separation of powers; imple-ments new institutions of justice system (civiland criminal courts); “empowers the JudicialDepartment to operationally (logistics and fi-nance) support the courts, acting in strict com-pliance with the principle of courtindependence;” and implement democratictools.[114] While these reforms have been im-plemented, nothing has changed.

There are other challenges that the Uzbek legalsystem faces: international pressure about itshuman rights and human rights abuses record,its juvenile justice system, fair trials, independ-ent and impartial courts and civil liberties.

Religious intolerance is also an issue that can bedealt with through the legal system. Until thereare fundamental reforms and political changes,it is unlikely that any court or judicial reform willtake place and actually be implemented.


Uzbekistan has resources of cotton and gold, aswell as of oil and gas. Exploitation of these re-sources was accelerated remarkably in the early1990s and exports were limited to meet domes-tic consumption levels. Controversy hasplagued Uzbekistan’s cotton sector and cottonexports as Uzbekistan has enlisted the citizensof Uzbekistan including school-aged childrento pick cotton. To many this is forced labor and child labor, butthe Uzbek government dismisses the accusa-tions calling the cotton picking a citizen’s dutyto help Uzbekistan thrive. There have been nu-merous accounts documented of medicalworkers, civil servants, teachers and studentshaving to pick cotton and coerced to do so byfacing penalties. Solidarity Center, a NGO, re-leased a fifteen page document which statedthat public organizations, including schools,were required to provide between 30 percentand 60 percent of their staff for the duration ofthe harvest, and in some cases, up to 80 percentof their staff. Children often had no classes dur-ing these weeks because teachers were work-ing in the fields.[115]


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This negatively impacts the exports of theUzbek cotton as in 2012, 100 internationalclothing manufacturers refused to use Uzbekcotton. Many equate the forced work as ahuman trafficking problem.

Uzbekistan has planned to increase gold pro-duction output. Uzbekistan is home to Man-atau, one of the largest gold pit mines in theworld. The slumping Russian markets have alsoimpacted the Uzbek gold commodities marketin May 2015 and also experiencing the effectsof the drop in the prices of oil and gas. Theslump in the Russian economy could produceeconomic conditions for Uzbekistan and theother Central Asian states by pushing their in-flation to double digits. The current inflationrate according to the Government of Uzbek-istan is 5.5-6.5. The Uzbek national refinancingrate is nine percent according to a 2015 Uzbekgovernment figure.

So far Uzbekistan has not managed to convertfrom the former Soviet planned economy to atotal free market economy. The country testedseveral economic models and structural re-forms are slowly developed and implemented.Uzbekistan’s economy started to significantlygrow in 2002. In order for Uzbekistan to main-tain a steady growth rate, changes need to bemade to the private sector according to a rec-ommendation made by the International Mon-etary Fund (IMF) as Uzbekistan’s “fiscal policyremains prudent, with a balanced budget, andthe banking sector is stable, [well-capitalized]and highly liquid.”[116]


According to the Uzbekistan’s law and regula-tions, all permanent residents of Uzbekistanhave the right of citizenship without ethnic orreligious discrimination and share the same civilrights. The international organization FreedomHouse assessed the Uzbek regime rankedamongst the eight nations with the worsthuman right records for 2005.

This ranking was mainly due to the AndijanMassacre, reports of Karimov boiling peoplealive, and the arrest and torture of political dis-sidents and the conditions at Jaslyk prison, andother documented human rights violations.Uzbek citizens receive limited informationabout news which could pose a threat to theregime. The Uzbek police and security appara-tus have the legal right to imprison peoplewithout any cause or without a warrant.

The country suffers from poverty. Statistics fromthe United Nations Development Program(UNDP) puts the figure at 16% (75% of thosewho are living below the poverty line live inrural areas) in 2011 and the per capita GDP PerCapita, PPP (2011) is $3,827.[117] The povertyrate used to be 28%. The UNDP report identifiedthat Uzbekistan has made significant progressin decreasing malnutrition and reducing low-income rates and the report identified that so-cial cohesion “has been maintained throughmore equitable income distribution, the cre-ation of employment opportunities with a spe-cific focus on rural areas, and attention given tovulnerable populations” and the same appliesto gender equality.”[118]

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Uzbekistan faces a common problem of devel-oping or transitioning countries, not enoughemployment and a great employment and in-come disparity between the rural and the urbanareas. This disparity has driven many working-age people (many young to older adult males)to find employment in Russia and Kazakhstan;remittances totaled 12% to 15% of the GDPfrom 2010 to 2012.[119] This is compoundedby a large number of the Uzbek populationbeing under the age of 60.3% which may causea “youth bulge” affect which is usually and neg-atively linked to internal stability and social un-rest.

Uzbekistan also faces many health challengesthat are associated with a developing or semi-developed country particularly the spread ofHIV/AIDs which has hit hard its Central Asianneighbors such as Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan alsomanaged to keep the rate of the spread of in-fection regarding tuberculosis low. The govern-ment has also decreased maternal mortalityrates by providing better healthcare.

fOREIgN POLICY

Uzbekistan is the only country among the Cen-tral Asian republics which is self-sufficient in thearea of food and energy supply.

Uzbekistan has severe conflicts with its neigh-boring countries Turkmenistan and Kazakhstanand especially with Tajikistan (mined border be-tween Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). Uzbekistandoes not show a lot of willingness to improvethe situation. Uzbekistan suspended its mem-bership and participation in the Collective Se-curity Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2012, butstill participates in the more economic-orientedorganization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-ization (SCO) and has expressed interest in join-ing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB). From this move, it seems like Uzbekistan, likemany other Central Asian states, it moving awayfrom more Russian-centric organizations, tomore multilateral organizations that are morefocused on economics and development ratherthan security and military arrangements andpolicy.

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After September 11, 2001 and the resulting fearof evoking terrorism in the region, Uzbekistansought bilateral ties with Russia and also to alimited extent with the U.S. and EU. But after theAndijan Massacre in 2005, the U.S., the EU, aswells as other international institutions revokedfinancial support and the EU partly sanctionedUzbekistan for human rights violations. Thesanctions were eased by the EU and the EUlifted the arms embargo sanction completely inOctober 2009. To many the lifting of the sanc-tions allows the Uzbek government to not beheld accountable for their actions. Humanrights violations committed by the Uzbek gov-ernment including arbitrary arrests, torture andpoor treatment of detainees, “compulsory reli-censing of lawyers,” and “interference in thework of human rights organizations” demon-strates the poor disregard that the Karimov Ad-ministration has for human rights and howseriously he does not take reforms.[120]

After the U.S. chastised the Uzbek governmentover the Andijan Massacre, Uzbekistan bannedand evicted the U.S. from the Karshi-Khananbad(K2) air base. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined theShanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),which signaled the regional direction towardsRussia and China and a clear resentment to-wards western democratic influence. Uzbek-istan’s involvement in the Collective SecurityTreaty Organization (CSTO) has wavered.Uzbekistan suspended its membership volun-tarily in June 2012. This has not significantly im-pacted the drills as Uzbekistan barelyparticipated in the rapid-reaction drills or themilitary drills. Uzbekistan justified the voluntar-ily suspension because the CSTO, “ignoresUzbekistan and does not listen to its opin-ions.”[121] Uzbekistan had suspended its mem-bership in 1999, but rejoined in 2006 after itreceived international condemnation over theevents in Andijan.


Although Islamic groups are not seriously en-dangering the Uzbek regime, because thegroups are yet too weak to influence all socialclasses significantly, the country has to pay at-tention to these movements. The Islamic Move-ment of Uzbekistan (IMU) is the largestextremist/terrorist threat to the country as thegroup’s existence relies on the overthrow of Ka-rimov. The IMU was driven out of Uzbekistanand many IMU fighters are now Furthermoreaccording to Central Asian experts, Uzbekistanis considered to be the country with the highestpotential for an unpredictable and maybe vio-lent political transition among the former So-viet republics.

Uzbekistan remains a strategic location for mil-itary operations. Despite the falling out be-tween the EU and the U.S. and renewedrelations that followed, Uzbekistan is still attrac-tive to Western countries. As the Islamic Stategrows and the Central Asian states are facedwith external threats and their citizens who arefighting in Syria and Iraq respectively expectedto return home, Uzbekistan understands theiruse to those who wish to fight global terrorism.

MAJOREXTERNAL

PLAYERS

DCHINA

Diplomatic relations between China and the CentralAsian republics started with independence of the coun-tries in December 1991. For China, Central Asia offers nu-merous new opportunities. China is interested ineconomic and security issues as the Chinese are con-cerned about the Muslim Islamist or extremist move-ments in this region. In China’s own western XinjiangRegion, they face a rebellious Uighur population. Fortransportation, Tajikistan and particularly Kyrgyzstan arethe most important partners, as they serve as transitcountries for Chinese products, being the crossroads be-tween West and East and are along the new Great SilkRoad. As the SCO is a high priority on Beijing’s agendaand considered to be the second most important re-gional organization besides the AIIB, Uzbekistan’s ac-ceptance or membership in the organization is verymuch appreciated by China. China also needs CentralAsia states’ cooperation on the Silk Road Economic Beltand the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road projects

Central Asian republics gradually decreased their skep-ticism towards Russia and China as the republics oftenrepresented a Central Asian perspective in a global con-text. Trade relations started to boom in 1998 after theeconomic crisis in Russia.

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Foreign trade with Central Asian countries isnow a top priority as China is aware of the hugeamount of natural resources as Chinese energydemands increase. When it comes to China dis-tributing developmental aid, it is clear that thisis characterized by a high degree of self-inter-est. China invested in several Central Asian oiland gas fields as well as pipeline infrastructureto expand the energy partnership which will aidChinese economic growth. China also invests ininfrastructure and exploration of natural re-sources to benefit China’s own economy. In thefuture, China will try to further strengthen itsposition in the region and the new AIIB pro-vides China that very opportunity. It plans to beactively involved in the development of CentralAsia’s hydro-carbon sector and to improve therelated pipeline infrastructure. For this reason,China is not only an attractive partner for Cen-tral Asia but also for Russia, which currentlydoes not have enough financial resources torenovate the outdated huge Soviet-era pipelinenetwork in which most of Kazakhstan’s gasflows through as Kazakhstan lacks its own self-sufficient structure. China tries to boost CentralAsia’s purchasing power in order to enablethem to buy more Chinese products.

Furthermore, China knows that the U.S. in-creased its presence due to the terror attacks onSeptember 11, 2001 and reduced engagementwith the region after Afghanistan and Iraq warsended, whereas China, due to its geographicproximity, will stay engaged with the countries.

China understands Central Asia’s developmentand state-building needs: improved and newinfrastructure, stronger ties to East Asia, and de-velopment money and most importantly an al-ternative to Russia. Russia’s assertive anddownright illegal actions in Crimea have manyCentral Asian states spooked especially Kaza-khstan.

China did not only gain economic strengthwithin the last few years, but China also requiresmilitary strength to fully exert its influence inCentral Asia. The international community is concernedabout the huge defense and weapons spend-ing, but China claims that these are only for de-fense purposes. In contrast to Russia, the U.S.and members of the European Union (EU) (Ger-many), China lacks a permanent military pres-ence in Central Asia but will take advantage ofthe many regional organizations.

The Chinese Diaspora in Central Asia has beensignificantly increasing since the collapse of theSoviet Union due to the (easier) ability to mi-grate. Particularly, the Uighurs and Dungans (aMuslim people of Chinese origin), from the sup-pressed Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region(XUAR) of China are already form a considerablepart of ethnic minorities. Regarding the Uighurpopulation, China and Kazakhstan have formeda relationship which is staunchly anti-Uighurdespite Kazakhstan being considered a morefavorable home than China for Uighurs.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

EuROPEAN uNION

Immediately after the dissolution of the SovietUnion, the European Union (EU) was in the mid-dle of its own development and reinforcementof its international position. Following the Sep-tember 11, 2001 attacks and the following in-ternational fight against terrorism inAfghanistan, the EU was forced to engage itselfwith the entire Central Asia region more in-tensely. The main EU-oriented interests are se-curity issues such as combating terrorism, drugtrafficking, illegal migration/ immigration,human trafficking and supporting the democ-ratization process, as well as energy securitymaintenance for Europe. European companiesheavily invest in Kazakhstan as it offers thefriendliest business climate among the region’sresource rich countries. The EU’s focus in CentralAsia started when the Central Asian states weregranted and declared their independence.

Trade between EU member states and CentralAsian republics respectively operate under theframe of most-favored nation (MFN) status interms of tariffs.

The PCA (Partnership and Co-operation Agree-ment) regulates also various trade related mat-ters such as the provisions on the eliminationof quantitative restriction, state aids, and com-petition. Kazakhstan’s, Kyrgyzstan’s, Uzbek-istan’s, and Tajikistan’s EU-trade relations areregulated with the PCA whereas Turkmenistan’sPCA agreement is yet not ratified by the EUbodies. Turkmenistan’s bilateral trade is gov-erned instead by an Interim Trade Agreementwhich was signed in 1998. Turkmenistan andUzbekistan are the other two resource richcountries (besides Kazakhstan) in Central Asia.Therefore trade between EU and these twostates has been steadily increasing. Trade be-tween the EU and Turkmenistan for 2013, to-taled 1.957 million Euros: 866 imports and 1091exports with an export balance of 255 millionEuros.[122] Concerning Uzbekistan, trade be-tween the two has steadily increased as a gen-eral trend. For the years of 2009 to 2013, exportshave vastly exceeded imported goods. [123]For 2013, total trade between the EU andUzbekistan was 1.655 million Euros.[124]

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European Union interest concerning CentralAsia rose significantly due to Ukraine-Russia gasdispute at the end of 2005, which provided awake-up call to the EU in order to get awayfrom Russian natural resource dependence.Therefore, the diversification of the EuropeanUnion’s energy supply becomes a key issue inits energy security policy forcing it to seek newpartners and energy opportunities. The EU addresses Tajikistan in a regional con-text under the June 2007 European Council un-derstanding called European Union and CentralAsia: Strategy for a New Partnership. This part-nership covers relationships for all five CentralAsia states and focuses on using common bilat-eral and regional economic and security ap-proaches.

The 2007 New Partnershipwas further solidifiedby the European Community Regional StrategyPaper (hereafter: Regional Strategy) for Assis-tance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013.The Regional Strategy covered financial assis-tance, democratic, economic, and social issuesand mapped out the assistance and how it wasto be used. The Regional Strategy sets out Eu-ropean Committee “response, objectives andpriorities for European Community support forCentral Asia...together with an indication of themeans to be used to provide assistance prima-rily under the Development Cooperation

Instrument (DCI)” with a budget of 719 millionEuros.[125] The aim of the EU assistance pro-gram to Central Asia can be narrowed down tothree priorities: Central Asian regional cooper-ation and good neighborly relations; reductionof poverty and increase the standards of living;and promote good governance and economicreform.

Security is also a key objective for the EU whenit comes to Central Asia as the European Secu-rity Strategy outlined many of the issues thatCentral Asia is currently facing such as terror-ism, extremism, organized crime (drug traffick-ing and human trafficking), and weaponsproliferation (such as WMDs, and WMD-relatedmaterials and technology).[126] The EU focuseson internal stability to include prevent and ef-fectively dealing with terrorism, enhancing thejudiciary and the rule of law, corruption, and im-proving the trade and investment climate.

The EU strives to improve the democratizationsprocess as well as the human rights in CentralAsia. The EU has a Rule of Law Initiative, whichbegan in December 2011 for a duration of 36months, which is the platform for Central Asiaand wishes to carve out best international prac-tices and international standards for CentralAsia to include: democracy, human rights, goodgovernance, rule of law, and judicial reform.

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The core objective and purpose of the Rule ofLaw Initiative is to foster political dialog andsupport the country’s judicial and legal reformswhich “contributes towards the development ofa stable and democratic political framework,functioning economic structures and the pro-motion and respect of human rights, as calledfor by the EU strategy for Central Asia.”[127] TheRule of Law initiative will target primarily fiveMinistries of Justice and Ministries of the Inte-rior (Rule of Law Initiative Coordinators), public/government-owned institutions and practition-ers of law. This is quite the undertaking madeby the EU as the structure of the Central Asiastates may make the success and implementa-tion of reforms more difficult. There are fourcomponents of the project: Forums for dialoguefocusing on conferences and technical workinggroups to enhance policy; training for legal pro-fessionals; communication/ mapping/ network-ing which focuses on the creation of experts,communication and information access tools;and lastly advice facility—“background analy-ses and studies will complement dialogueevents and serve to advance policy.”[128]

The EU promotes human rights among all part-ner nations and has criticized Central Asianstates for their human rights record.

Even though the EU is partly represented in theregion, there is great potential to become a sig-nificant external player in Central Asia. Westerncritics should avoid misinterpreting the anti-western attitude of the SCO and should strivefor common ground and interests in the CentralAsian region and work with individual countriesas they would be more receptive to bilateralagreements.

As the region becomes more integrated andmore willing to work with other regional organ-izations outside of the geographic area and asbilateral relations between Central Asia and EUmember states grow, the EU will become apowerful and strategic ally with Central Asia. Ex-pectedly, once this happens, the EU will moveto more concrete relationships such as invest-ment and trade rather than focusing on devel-opment assistance and nation-building andcapacity-building efforts.


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RuSSIA

The Russian Federation undoubtedly has thelongest shared history and the longest relation-ship with the Central Asian countries, datingback to the 18th century when the Tsarist Em-pire slowly but gradually expanded its empiresouthwards via Kazakhstan into Central Asia.During the post-Soviet period, Russia did notcare a lot about Central Asia, but when Putinbecame President, the Russian policy towardsCentral Asia rapidly changed, highlighting thegeostrategic importance of the region. Russia isalso interested in domestic stability and secu-rity as well as concerns about Islamist extrem-ism and terrorist movements in its near abroadcountries. Current Russian relations with theCentral Asian reflect the post-Soviet collapse re-lationship: up and down with longer periods ofstability and cooperation.

Moreover Central Asian migrant workers play asignificant role as Russia’s economy, and issomewhat dependent on unskilled and cheaplabor from Central Asia. Migrant workers fromCentral Asia also rely upon the Russian labormarket to send back remittances to their homecountries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).

Migrant laborers in Central Asia are also facingan increasingly xenophobic, nationalistic, andpro-Russian atmosphere which has resulted intargeted discrimination and violence. Many mi-grant workers have been killed by extremely vi-olent and Nazi-inspired groups. The SOVACenter in Russia keeps track of the violence.President Vladimir Putin has condemned thehate crimes publicly and has signed into law in2002 legislation/criminal code provisions—Ar-ticles 282 and Article 213 which criminalizeshooliganism— against inciting racial enmityand hate crimes. Like most Russian provisionsin the criminal code, the addition to the crimi-nal code is vague and its enforcement and in-terpretation is left up to an interpretativejudicial system. Many of the hate crimes havebeen deemed hooliganism carrying a lesserpenalty. However, Putin has continued to dis-criminate against homosexuals in the countryand those who support the Lesbian, Gay, Bisex-ual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) alliance(s)in Russia and has passed controversial anti-gaylegislation in 2013.

The contributions of Central Asian raw materialstowards Russia is shrinking, as Central Asiancountries seek alternatives and diverse pur-chasers and investors to establish contractswith new infrastructure networks and compa-nies in order to become less dependent on Rus-sia’s infrastructure investments.

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When it comes to military and security relations,a trend is visible that the Central Asian countriesseek closer defense cooperation with Russia.Russia’s closest military and political ally in Cen-tral Asia is Kazakhstan. Russia leased an area of11 million hectares based on a bilateral agree-ment. In 1995, Russia and Kazakhstan signedsignificant border protection agreements. Rus-sia still leases Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmod-rome which often launches Russian Proton-Mrockets.

Kyrgyzstan is a very important outpost for theRussian forces as Russia has a military presenceat Kant Airbase; Russia does not pay rent forKant airbase and has leased Kant airbase until2032. A 2013, EurasiaNet article states that KantAirbase was “designated as a base for the Col-lective Security Treaty Organization’s [(CSTO)]new Collective Air Forces, assuming that struc-ture in fact gets built.”[129] The long presenceof the base and the eviction of the U.S. Airbasedemonstrated the strong Kyrgyz-Russian rela-tionship. Cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan islegally based on more than 150 treaties andagreements and Russia is for Tajikistan the mainsupplier of military equipment. The legal coop-eration between Russia and Turkmenistan isbased on the concluded treaty on “joint meas-ures to create the armed forces of Turk-menistan” in 1992.

This was a guarantee by Moscow to secure Turk-menistan. Bilateral relations between Russiaand Uzbekistan are legally based with morethan 200 treaties and agreements. After the col-lapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan was oneof the most active partners in the fields of secu-rity and defense with Russia. This has changedover the years in terms of regional securitystructures. Both countries are focused on anti-terror and counter-terrorism measures andwork on this issue unilaterally and bilaterally.

The Russian Diaspora holds much clout amongthe major external players in Central Asia, beingthe most significant role and the longest histor-ical development. The first wave of Russian set-tlement took place in the end of the 19thcentury and during the Soviet Union millionsflooded Central Asia in order to work in the es-tablished factories and to develop agriculturalstructures. The 1953 Virgin Lands Program wasa program that relocated two million Russian,Ukrainian, and Belarusian persons to Kaza-khstan, which caused Kazakhstan’s non-Kazakhpopulation to skyrocket. The campaign wasaimed at increasing the Soviet Union’s agricul-tural production to address issues negatively af-fecting food security in Russia. Kazakhstan hasthe most ethnic Russians which account fornearly 22% of its population: the total esti-mated population of Kazakhstan is 17.6 millionand Russians account for 4.6 million.


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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnicRussians suddenly became a minority due tonationalistic policies that focus on more nativecustoms and Turkic languages—effectively re-placing Russian as the national language eventhough Russian remains an official and regionallanguage in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajik-istan respectively. Ethnic Russians still repre-senting a significant number of people, they areafraid about the growing nationalist move-ments within the Central Asian countries whichhas the potential to replace Russian customsand Russian cultural symbols or foment anti-Russian sentiments

When it comes to Russia’s developmental andeconomic aid engagement, Russia’s main assis-tance in the last years included writing off debtsunder loans lent by the former Soviet Union inparticular under the framework of the “HeavilyIndebted Poor Countries Initiative.”

Furthermore, Russia tried to assist in the areasof education, improvement of national institu-tions, administrations, industrial developmentand trade facilitation. Moreover, Russia tries tofoster capacity building in the field of environ-mental protection and is interested in combat-ing and developing legislation against allpossible threats of terrorist movements. Thefive Central Asian countries agree on this initia-tive as Central Asia is in a rough neighborhood.There are fears of a spillover because of theAfghanistan War and when the U.S. ended com-bat operations in Afghanistan in late December2014. The Central Asia states have already seen anuptick in activity such as the gun battle in Sep-tember 2014 between ethnic Turkmen Afghansand the Taliban. According to Central Asia On-line, in late August 2014 “[ethnic] Turkmens inShah District fought off a Taliban offensive forthree days.”

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Russia’s creation and dominance over multipleregional organizations also demonstrates Rus-sia’s commitment to strategic partnerships anda strategic presence in Central Asia. Russia,which headed the now failed Commonwealthof Independent States, is using the regional or-ganizations to keep a political tight grip (or try-ing to keep a tight grip on some countries) onmany former Soviet states that are still part ofthe organization, many of which are CentralAsian states. Russia and the Central Asian statesalso share memberships in the security and mil-itary oriented CSTO (Uzbekistan suspended itsmembership), the Chinese-designed and ledeconomic-focused Shanghai Cooperation Or-ganization (SCO), and the newest economicand free-trade organization/bloc, the EurasianEconomic Union (EEU). Russia, through its dom-inance (or desired dominance in the SCO)within these organizations, desires to keep theCentral Asian states closer as many former So-viet states have abandoned Russia as an eco-nomic partner have looked to the West instead.Russia needs the Central Asian states’ participa-tion in these regional organizations to maintainits regional supremacy. Unfortunately, many ofthe Central Asian states rely on Russia formoney, loans, and cooperation. The ability tohave a say in their own affairs is lacking andheavily influenced by Russia.

uNITED STATES

For the U.S., Central Asia is a region of growingimportance, but faces challenges there mainlya burgeoning Russian influence. On one hand,Central Asia is located in the center of the “Axisof evil” (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) as U.S. pres-ident George W. Bush defined the region in thecontext of the global war on terrorism. Less sta-ble countries such as Iran, China, and Russia, areeager to participate in the exploitation of thehuge energy and mineral reserves in CentralAsia and also foster the liberalization and de-mocratization process in Central Asia. The U.S.is also interested in Central Asia due to itsstrategic geopolitical location and would allowthe U.S. to expand its sphere of influence.

The U.S. established diplomatic relations withthe Central Asian republics after the collapse ofthe Soviet Union in 1992, and built embassiesin all five newly independent states’ capitals.Furthermore, the U.S. supported their desire formembership in western international organiza-tions such as NATO.

Throughout the 1990s, diplomatic relations be-tween the U.S. and the Central Asia States re-mained on a rather low level, but the diplomaticactivities as well as its general engagement inCentral Asia changed completely after the Sep-tember 11 terror attacks.


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Subsequently, the U.S. foreign policy was ad-justed to meet the new conditions in the regionand the U.S. signed a series of military treatiesand defense agreements with the Central Asiancountries. The U.S., by doing so, took advantageof the countries’ locations near its new battle-ground of Afghanistan using Kyrgyzstan’sManas International Airport (Ganci Airbase andalso known as the Manas Transit Center) for lo-gistics and a transit hub and the Karshi-Khan-abad Airbase in Uzbekistan.

For the U.S., stability in the Central Asian includ-ing economic development and human assis-tance to support Central Asia is important toprevent Russia, China, Iran and other from un-dermining the U.S. influence in the country.Also proper development of the social andphysical infrastructures of the Central Asianstates would ensure smooth operations for U.S.operations out of Uzbek and Kyrgyz Airbases re-spectively and would reduce the possibility oflarge-scale violence called by the instability andelements of terrorism in the Central Asianstates. Simply, the U.S. presence acted as a de-terrent.

U.S. investment in the Central Asian region ismuch greater than in Russia and many otherCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS)countries except Azerbaijan. The U.S. signedwith all five Central Asian republics trade agree-ments that focus on investment links andstrong trade as “merging Central Asianeconomies constitute growing markets for U.S.exports and services and strategic destinations

for investment in sectors such as oil/gas, min-ing, manufacturing, and food processing.”[131]The U.S. has many agreements in already exist-ing including bilateral investment trade agree-ments with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and in2004 a Trade and Investment Framework Agree-ment (TIFA) was signed “to encourage and facil-itate the exchange of goods and services tosecure favorable conditions for long-term de-velopment and diversification of trade betweenand amongst the Parties.”[132] Accession intothe World Trade Organization also remains a pri-ority between the U.S. and the Central Asianstates.

Furthermore, the U.S. has invested in multipledevelopments in the Central Asian region.Within the early 1990s, aid and assistance pro-grams to supported the development of politi-cal systems, economy and the civil society(including Open Society Foundations and RadioFree Europe Radio Liberty news services), mili-tary assistance was developed.

The Central Asian militaries received trainingfrom the U.S. military and the possibility to at-tend military and language schools in the U.S.,under the frame of the International Militaryand Education and Training (IMET). Accordingto the U.S. Department of State, IMET “facilitatesthe development of important professional andpersonal relationships, which have proven toprovide U.S. access and influence in a criticalsector of society that often plays a pivotal rolein supporting, or transitioning to, democraticgovernments.”[133]

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IMET has three functions which pertain to ex-panding the U.S.’s influence in Central Asia: “im-part skills and knowledge”; “Provide trainingand education that augments the capabilitiesof participant nations' military forces to supportcombined operations and interoperability withU.S., NATO and regional coalition forces”; and to“Expose foreign military and civilian personnelto the important roles democratic values andinternationally recognized human rights canplay in governance and military opera-tions.”[134] The program also increases thecivil-military relationship.

Although U.S. multinational energy firms andother private foreign investors became recentlydiscouraged to further invest Central Asiancountries due to doubts about transparencyand prejudices of increasing corruption, manyU.S. energy companies are engaged in theCaspian Sea Basin exploration as well as ex-ploitation of natural gas and oil; many oil andgas companies such as Exxon and Shell havebeen active in the region for nearly 20 years.

When deciding upon distribution of foreign aidto the Central Asia states to combat againsthuman trafficking, unemployment rates, andmassive labor migration, human rights offensesand reform are considered.

Turkmenistan as well as Uzbekistan are themost repressive regimes in the world and havefaced criticism from the U.S. over human rightsabuses. For this reason the U.S. assistance inthese two countries is considerable smaller, inparticular in Turkmenistan due to their lack oftransparency on the matter and many othercivil matters as information in the country isquite controlled and censorship is rampant andfree speech is practically non-existent.

The U.S. still provides foreign aid for the coun-tries to develop. The total amount of funds re-quested for Turkmenistan for FY 2015 is 5.1million USD. For Kazakhstan, 9.7 million USDwas requested for FY 2015; for Kyrgyzstan, 41.7million USD was requested for the FY 2015 year;Tajikistan, 29.9 million USD was requested forFY 2015; and for Uzbekistan, 10.3 million was re-quested for FY 2015.[135] U.S. foreign aid toTurkmenistan through USAID is heavily focusedon good governance, healthcare (particularlylowering the infant mortality rate), and eco-nomic growth. These core areas also addressedin Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (in addition to socialsector support), Tajikistan (in addition to agri-culture and food security), and in Uzbekistan.Kyrgyzstan is also working with USAID on aCountry Development Cooperation Strategy(FY 2015-FY 2019).


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NEWEMERGING

ACTORS

TThe reason of these actors’ interests in Central Asia aremainly rooted in cultural and ideological similarities, as-piration of regional and supra-regional security and sta-bility, the desire for closer economic cooperation, andenhanced. As the governments of the post-Soviet beganto form respectively and continue to grow developingseparate from each other, each Central Asian state canoffer regional countries and actors and multi-stategroups great benefits. Most of these benefits are eco-nomic and political.

IRAN

Relations between Iran and the Central Asian region dateback to the time of the historical Great Silk Road. Withthe collapse of the former Soviet Union, Iran faced thedevelopment of nine newly independent states in its im-mediate neighborhood. Due to the favorable geograph-ical position, Iran plays an important role as analternative transit country for the landlocked CentralAsian countries, in order to avoid transit ways throughRussia. As regional cooperation is especially importantfor Iran, Iran is very much interested in tightening its re-lations with Central Asia. Many of the emerging and ex-isting regional threats in Central Asia have the potentialto affect Iran.

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Iran’s disadvantage for further cooperation anddeepening of relations with the Central Asiancountries are domestic, economic, politicalwhich makes it particularly difficult for privateinvestors to develop their strategies in CentralAsia. Iran has been involved in the developmentof Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves, as theCaspian Sea is off of Iran’s Western Coast. Thiswould make Iran an important ally to Kaza-khstan in terms of divided the Caspian Sea re-sources, contract agreements and negotiations,oil and natural gas transport infrastructure, andoil diplomacy especially dealing with Russia.

In recent years, Iran has taken advantage of itscommon cultural ancestry with Tajikistan tocarve a niche in Central Asia. Tajikistan is theonly non-Indo European speaking country inthe Central Asia region. Tajik, Tajikistan’s na-tional and official language is a form of Persianand Tajik uses the Persian script.

Iran was the first country to open an embassyin Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe. Iran also as-sisted in mediating the devastation Tajik CivilWar (1992-1997). Iran is the second largest in-vestor in Tajikistan after China. Iran has investedheavily in infrastructure projects in Tajikistansuch as the Sangtodeh-2 Hydroelectric PowerPlant (HPP).

The Sangtodeh-2 HPP started constructed inthe 1980s and construction stopped due to thelack of financing and Iran expressed interest infunding the project which was finalized in 2005.The HPP on the Vakhsh River produced its firstunit in 2011. The HPP is operated by Iraniancompany Sangob. Iran will most likely furtherto investments into Tajikistan’s energy sector.Trade between the two countries, as Iran con-siders Tajikistan to be its main ally in CentralAsia, has increased from “$ 400 million in 2010,up from $ 250 million in the previous year” andIran contributed 65.5 million in foreign direct in-vestment.[136]

The Anzob Tunnel is a resurrected Soviet Eratransportation tunnel that would allow Tajiks totransit goods during harsh climate and allowthe flow of trade all year. The Anzob Tunnel con-nects Dushanbe to the Northern Fergana Valley.Construction of Anzob Tunnel began in 2003and construction was completed in 2006; Iraninvested 31 million USD into the project andwas expected to cost 110 million USD.[137] Thetunnel has garnered a dangerous reputationwith falling and crumbling rock and water dam-age and running water and ventilation is poor.A social media site posted video of the tunnelcalling it the death tunnel because of the poorconstruction and poor maintenance.

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SAuDI ARABIA AND THE uNITED ARABEMIRATES

The first records about Arabs in Central Asiadate back to the eighth century when nomadicArab communities arrived in the historic placesof Uzbekistan and Tajikistan such as Bukharaand Samarkand during the Muslim conquests.But as the Arabs lived rather isolated and didnot marry with other ethnicities the Arabic lan-guage could survive until the 20th century. Butduring the tsarist conquest and the later rule ofthe Soviet Union, the Arabs were forced eitherto flee or to completely integrate into the Cen-tral Asian societies.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates(UAE) developed close relations with the Mus-lim countries of the former Soviet Union. The re-lations are driven due to shared religious values,as Mecca, which is somewhat a must go thereonce in a lifetime, is located in Saudi Arabia.

The foreign policy of the UAE is in contrast tothis of Saudi Arabia more focused on economicissues even tough displaying sympathy for fel-low Muslim countries. Previously the foreignpolicy of the UAE was directed towards indus-trialized states from the West. However, the col-lapse of the Soviet Union opened for the UAEnew prospects in terms of political, cultural, butpredominantly economic relations in the nearneighborhood. The emerging economies ofCentral Asia are increasingly aware of the signif-icance of Dubai as an intraregional key transithub for imports and exports.

The economies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE arebased on the exploitation of its enormous nat-ural resources. Saudi Arabia has the largest andthe UAE the world’s fifth largest proved oil re-serves, which means they are, in contrast toChina, Europe and the U.S., not dependent onenergy supply form Central Asia. The trade andinvestment relations between Central Asia andSaudi Arabia received new impulses when theCentral Asian governments and banks graduallyopened up to Islamic banking.

On the whole the biggest advantage of bothcountries, which makes them to significant op-ponents of other external players of the CentralAsian region, is the similarity of the country pro-files and strategies.


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TuRkEY

Turkey shares Turkic ancestry with Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan andexplains the long lasting commonly shared his-toric roots between Turkey and the four CentralAsian republics. The idea of Pan-Turkism be-tween the five countries (including XinjiangProvince in China) has been entertained.Turkey’s relationship with Central Asia is fo-cused on economics and regional cooperation:“a working democracy and free-market econ-omy; political and economic reform process;political and economic stability and prosperityin the region; …an environment conducive toregional cooperation; to support their vocationtoward Euro-Atlantic institutions, and to assistthem to benefit from their own energy re-sources” as stated by now Prime Minister AhmetDavutoglu (then Foreign Affairs Minister) in2012.[138]

The collapse of the Soviet Union motivated theTurkish leaders to immediately develop friendlyrelations and strong ties with the Central Asianstates forming an unofficial pan-Turkic alliance.The mutual sympathy originates from the sameethnicity and culture, the Turkic language fam-ily— Central Asia countries’ culture was sup-pressed by the Soviet system as the Sovietsystem provided a singular ideological identity.Although the Turkish desire for sustainable andinfluential investments as well as religious, cul-tural and educational power in Central Asia washigh, the financial resources were rather limitedin the 1990s.

After Central Asia’s independence, Turkey letthe newly independent states feel that theywere Third World. In the late 1990s, Turkey real-ized that their first approach was not helpfuland it had to completely change the foreignpolicy towards Central Asia in order to keep bi-lateral relations.

Regarding Turkmenistan, Turkey was the firstcountry to recognize the new independentstate and was the first country to open an em-bassy in Ashgabat.[139] Turkey has recently be-come Turkmenistan’s largest trade andinvestment partner with trade totaling 3.5 bil-lion USD in 2012.[140] President Berdy-mukhamedov stated that the issue of a freetrading zone for Turkish forms operating in spe-cific parts of Turkmenistan is considered. Theyear of 2012 marked a significant increase in re-lations as Turkmenistan’s President visitedTurkey and Turkey’s President visited Turk-menistan in 2013. There are also 600 Turkishcompanies registered in Turkmenistan and“Turkish companies assumed contracting workin the country, totaling more than 34 billionUSD.”[141] Turkey’s development aid programs for CentralAsia have also rapidly developed and big stepshave been taken in the fields of educational, so-cial and cultural cooperation projects.Turkey has also expressed interest in joining theShanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) andKazakh President Nazarbayev extended Turkeyand invitation to join the EEU.

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Turkey became a dialog partner for the SCO inApril 2013. Turkey’s membership in the SCOmakes Turkey the only NATO member withmembership in the SCO and an organizationdominated by Russia and China. Interestingly,the SCO was to act as a counterweight to NATO.Turkey’s status signals that Turkey, a countrywith a lot to offer, is seeking to solidify its influ-ence somewhere other than the EU as its acces-sion into the EU has remain stalled as Erdoğansee the SCO as “more powerful” than theEU.[142] This is part of the wider regional eco-nomic policy of Kazakhstan and it highlightsTurkey’s need to belong to an economic andpolitical organizations; Turkey’s accession intothe European Union is still stalled.

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