central banks and federal reserve systemgoals of monetary policy structure of federal reserve in...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
Economics 301: Money and Banking
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 2: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
GoalsReading
Goals and Learning Outcomes 1/ 14
Goals:
Learn about possible objectives for monetary policy.Learn about structure of Federal Reserve System.
Learning Outcomes:
LO4: Explain the structure of the Federal Reserve System andthe mechanisms in which it controls the money supply.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 3: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
GoalsReading
Goals and Learning Outcomes 1/ 14
Goals:
Learn about possible objectives for monetary policy.Learn about structure of Federal Reserve System.
Learning Outcomes:
LO4: Explain the structure of the Federal Reserve System andthe mechanisms in which it controls the money supply.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 4: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
GoalsReading
Reading 2/ 14
Read Mishkin, Chapter 12.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 5: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 6: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 7: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 8: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 9: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 10: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 11: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 12: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 13: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Inflation Stability 3/ 14
Inflation Stability: Overriding goal of most central banks isto maintain a low and stable rate of inflation.
Why Stability?
When overall price level changes unpredictably, it is difficult tointerpret changes in prices of individual goods, services, andassets.Leads to sub-optimal decisions for risk averse people, lessefficient financial system.Stability essential for long-term planning.
Why inflation?
Unexpected deflation redistributes wealth from borrowers tolenders.Unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from lenders toborrowers.Deflation is prevented for social concerns.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 14: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 15: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 16: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 17: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 18: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 19: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 20: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 21: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Time Consistency Problem 4/ 14
Central bank’s desire for price stability may take back seat toconcerns over low production, unemployment, etc.
If central bank regularly abandons long-run price stabilityobjective - people begin to expect that.
Decreases central bank’s credibility.
Increases uncertainty, risk, and produces a less efficienteconomy and financial system.
Time Consistency Problem of parenting:
Long-term policy - don’t reward bad behavior.Short-term concern - give kid what he wants to shut him up.
Kydland and Prescott argue, the less a government does tostabilize the economy, the more stable it will be.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 22: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 23: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 24: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 25: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 26: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 27: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 28: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 29: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
High Level of Employment 5/ 14
Reasons to aim for a high level of employment:
High unemployment leads to idle workers, idle resources, lowerGDP.Employment statistics computed on a monthly basis by theBureau of Labor Statistics.Social cost of unemployment.
Three types of unemployment:1 Frictional unemployment: unemployment causes by normal
turn-over in the labor force, normal job/candidate search costs.2 Structural unemployment: unemployment caused by
permanent decreases in demand for certain types of labor(perhaps due to changes in international trade or technology).
3 Cyclical unemployment: unemployment associated withdownturns in the economy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 30: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Economic Growth 6/ 14
Closely related to goals of high employment / high output.
This policy implies a long-run goal, not growth from quarterto quarter.
Policies that promote:
Firms to invest in new capital, higher future productionpossibilities.Consumers to save more (in equilibrium saving = investment).
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 31: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Economic Growth 6/ 14
Closely related to goals of high employment / high output.
This policy implies a long-run goal, not growth from quarterto quarter.
Policies that promote:
Firms to invest in new capital, higher future productionpossibilities.Consumers to save more (in equilibrium saving = investment).
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 32: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Economic Growth 6/ 14
Closely related to goals of high employment / high output.
This policy implies a long-run goal, not growth from quarterto quarter.
Policies that promote:
Firms to invest in new capital, higher future productionpossibilities.Consumers to save more (in equilibrium saving = investment).
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 33: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Economic Growth 6/ 14
Closely related to goals of high employment / high output.
This policy implies a long-run goal, not growth from quarterto quarter.
Policies that promote:
Firms to invest in new capital, higher future productionpossibilities.Consumers to save more (in equilibrium saving = investment).
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 34: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Economic Growth 6/ 14
Closely related to goals of high employment / high output.
This policy implies a long-run goal, not growth from quarterto quarter.
Policies that promote:
Firms to invest in new capital, higher future productionpossibilities.Consumers to save more (in equilibrium saving = investment).
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 35: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 36: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 37: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 38: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 39: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 40: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 41: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Other Goals 7/ 14
Financial market stability: financial crisis interferes with thefinancial market’s function to channel saving to people withproductive investment opportunities.
Interest rate stability:
Encourages minimal uncertainty regarding bond market capitalgains.Encourages long-run investment in capital.
Stability in foreign exchange markets:
Rises in the value of the dollar hurts exporting industries.Decreases in the value of the dollar hurts consumers, industriesthat depend on foreign factors of production.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 42: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Hierarchical and Dual Mandates 8/ 14
Hierarchical mandate: explicit statement by a central bankthat inflation stability is their first priority.
Examples: Bank of England, Bank of Canada, EuropeanCentral Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Dual mandate: central banks whose rules allow for multipleobjectives.
United States Federal Reserve has a dual mandate: promotelong-run output growth and inflation stability.
Dual mandates can lead to time consistency problems.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 43: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Hierarchical and Dual Mandates 8/ 14
Hierarchical mandate: explicit statement by a central bankthat inflation stability is their first priority.
Examples: Bank of England, Bank of Canada, EuropeanCentral Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Dual mandate: central banks whose rules allow for multipleobjectives.
United States Federal Reserve has a dual mandate: promotelong-run output growth and inflation stability.
Dual mandates can lead to time consistency problems.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 44: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Hierarchical and Dual Mandates 8/ 14
Hierarchical mandate: explicit statement by a central bankthat inflation stability is their first priority.
Examples: Bank of England, Bank of Canada, EuropeanCentral Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Dual mandate: central banks whose rules allow for multipleobjectives.
United States Federal Reserve has a dual mandate: promotelong-run output growth and inflation stability.
Dual mandates can lead to time consistency problems.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 45: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Hierarchical and Dual Mandates 8/ 14
Hierarchical mandate: explicit statement by a central bankthat inflation stability is their first priority.
Examples: Bank of England, Bank of Canada, EuropeanCentral Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Dual mandate: central banks whose rules allow for multipleobjectives.
United States Federal Reserve has a dual mandate: promotelong-run output growth and inflation stability.
Dual mandates can lead to time consistency problems.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 46: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Inflation StabilityOther Goals
Hierarchical and Dual Mandates 8/ 14
Hierarchical mandate: explicit statement by a central bankthat inflation stability is their first priority.
Examples: Bank of England, Bank of Canada, EuropeanCentral Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Dual mandate: central banks whose rules allow for multipleobjectives.
United States Federal Reserve has a dual mandate: promotelong-run output growth and inflation stability.
Dual mandates can lead to time consistency problems.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 47: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 48: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 49: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 50: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 51: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 52: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 53: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 54: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 55: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 56: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 57: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Structure of the Federal Reserve 9/ 14
Board of governors.
Seven members appointed by the president and confirmed bythe senate.Each has a 14 year term. A new seat comes up every 14 years.One chairman with a 4 year renewable term.
Federal Open Market Committee
Board of governorsPresident of the New York FedFour presidents of the other regional feds (rotate).
Federal Reserve Districts
Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, each with a federal reservebank.New York Fed implements monetary policy.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 58: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Federal Reserve Districts 10/ 14
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 59: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Federal Reserve Districts 11/ 14
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 60: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 61: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 62: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 63: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 64: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 65: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 66: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Functions of Federal Reserve Banks 12/ 14
Check clearing services.
Issue new currency.
Withdraw damaged currency.
Provide discount loans to banks in their district.
Evaluate proposals for bank mergers and expansion of services.
Collect data and report on local and national economicconditions.
Hold reserve deposits for banks in their district.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 67: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 68: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 69: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 70: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 71: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 72: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 73: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 74: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve DistrictsFederal Reserve BanksCentral Bank Independence
Central Bank Independence 13/ 14
Federal Reserve is largely independent from whims ofpoliticians.
Board of governors have long terms (14 years).
Fed does not use tax dollars - they actually earn around $40billion / year.
Legislation that structures Fed was written by Congress, theycan change it.
Case for independence:
Policy that results in successfully meeting long-term goals, mayhave negative short-run consequences.Possible pressure to finance Federal Government budgetdeficits.Fiscal authority has demonstrated inability.
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System
![Page 75: Central Banks and Federal Reserve SystemGoals of Monetary Policy Structure of Federal Reserve In ation Stability Other Goals In ation Stability 3/ 14 In ation Stability: Overriding](https://reader033.vdocument.in/reader033/viewer/2022042111/5e8bf9d3a4597714386872c2/html5/thumbnails/75.jpg)
Goals of Monetary PolicyStructure of Federal Reserve
Coming up...
Coming up... 14/ 14
Another debate.
Money Supply Process (Chapter 13)
Economics 301: Money and Banking Central Banks and Federal Reserve System