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1615 WASHINGTON 25. 0. C.

APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: DEC 2004

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT MILITARY THOOCOT (SECRET): "Fortificationand Its Tasks in Medern Warfare", by Major-General of Engineer Troops P. Ogorodnikov,Colonel Ye. Maykov, and Lieutenant-Ceneralof Engineer Troops A. Smirnov-Nesvitskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article fromthe SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, anddistributed down to the level of division commander.

2. For convenience of reference by OSIB agencies, thecodeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOPSECRET CSDB reports containing documentar y Soviet material.The word . IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to beused only, among persons authorized to read and handle thismaterial..

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONRARKmaterial should be handled on a heed-to-know basis withinyour office. Requests for extra copies of this report or forutilization of any part of this document in any other formshould be addressed to the originating office.

Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the Army

The Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

.Director, Division of IntelligenceAtomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for Wational Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic InterpretationCenter

17 September 1962

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- Copy It- Copies #2 and 3• Copies #4 and S- Copies 06 and 7

Army - • Copies #8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15Navy - Copies 116, 17, and 18Air - Copies #19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25NSA - Copy 026AEC - Copy 127NIC . - Copy 028GMAIC - Copy #29SecDef/ISA - Copy 130DDR. - Copy #31DDI - Copy 032AD/NE - Copy 033AD/CI - Copy #34

.AD/RR - Copies #35 and 36AD/SI - Copies 037, 38, and 39NPIC - Copy ripLS/PAD (NPIC) - Copy #41DDP - Copy #42A/DDP - Copy #43CFI - Copy 144_,CSR - Copy #45SR/Rp - Copies #46, 47, 48, 49, SO, and SI

DCIStateDIAJCS

IRON BARK,<7.?s•"

COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT

SCWRCE

MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Fortificationand Its Tasks An Modern Warfare", by Major-General :A Engineer Troops P. Ogorodnikov,Colonel Ye. Maykov, and Lieutenant-Gereralof Engineer Troops A. Smirnov-Nesvitskiy

August 1961

Documentary

• A reliable source al). .

Following is a verbatim translation of an articleentitled "Fortification and Its Tat,ks in Modern Warfare",by Major-General of Engineer Troops P. Ogbrodnikov, Colonel Ye.Maykov, and Lieutenant-General of Engineer Troops A. Smirnov-Nesvitskiy

This article appeared in Issue 5 (60) of 1961 of aspecial version of the Soviet journal Military Thought . whichis classified SECRET by the Soviets and is vblished irregu-larly. Issue 5 (60) was sent to press on 25 August 1961.

contained the Table of Contents for this issue.

:omment: 'Military Thought is published by theUbbli ministly -Tir-DFrense in three versions, classtfied RESTRICTED,SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issuedmonthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issuedregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960.By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been -published, 6 of them during 1961.

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COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE

Fortification and its Tasks in Modern Warfare

Lately, in the pages of the periodicalmilitary press, views are being expressed con-cerning fortification and its eignifiCance in .modern warfare which are of great interest fordeveloping the theory of military science and thepractice of building the armed forces..

• As is correctly pointed outbyanUmber•of authors, in our postwar literature the expres-sion of erroneous opinionsconcerning fortifica-tion could be observed. In some cases the rightfor fortification to exist as an independent.science, entering into the general system ofmilitary 'science, was denied, and in others itwas asserted that the working out of the theo-retical bases offortificationAetracts:froM:.the.performance' of vital.prictical tasks. In somehistorical papers questions of emplOying forti-fications in combat, in an operation, cr in awar were. ignored. Improper. scientific-terms,were used ("defensive structUres", "non-explosivebarriers", "sPeciaiconstiuction",etc.) just toavoid' the use of fortification terminology.

All this could only reflect negativelyon the state of the theory and practice of. forti-fication, which in turn complicated the practicaldevelopment of new equipment and forms of forti-fication•that correspond to the present natureof warfare. The development of the theory ofcomprehensive protection of the armed forces andthe country as a whole from the action of modernmeans of mass destruction has not yet' receivedproper development in our military science. Thepractice of carrying out protective measures isconducted without due theoretical generalization

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and unified control, by- separate departments.

For some time even incorrect and harm-.ful theories begafi to appear, on the "absOlutefies"of nuclear/missile weapons, the impossibility ofcreating anoperable system of antinuclear pro-r.tecticn, the futility of efforts. to reduce lossesin a' nuclear war, etc. These "theories" denythe need to develop comprehensive protection inthe system of engineer preparation of the countryfor war, in the building of the armedforces4-,andin the creation of new means and methods of aimedcombat' . They also give rise to variouti.one-sidedtheories of . "protective maneuver", "dispersal" or"duplication" as the only means of protection thatit is supposedly worth employing in a future war.

Fortification is a military-technical Science with specific practical tasks, with definitetheoretical principles and with methodology andterminology that are inherent in it. It creates aspecial type of military-engineering equipment--fortification structures, that 'directly support.the conduct of combat or of protection: it occupieitself with questions of planning and erectien.offortification structures and systems of them, em-ploying them in a battle, operation or war as ameans for conducting armed combat. Here.fortifi-cation enters into the field activity of militaryscience and becomes a composite part of it. Atthe same time it represents one of the aspectsof construction, and for that reason its theoryand practice are based on the Thysico-mathemitical,general-technical, and construction sciences, andon the various fields of the technology and eco-nomics of construction. In this it does not differfrom the other military-technical sciences thatenter into the composition of military science andconnect it with those, or other branches of pro-duction or construction.

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. 0 We do not share the opinion Of those authors.who consider that fortification emerges as the appliedpart of tactics ., operational art:and:strategy. Thismechanical merger of fortificatiOn'with the theory'_of military art would be wrong. The latter explores• conformity with the law of conducting armed combat, and-therefore occupies a leading position in relatiOn.to,.Abe military-technical sciences that develop definitebranches of military equipment'and:methods.foremploying it in a battle, operation,,and_a war. .Their similarity and the differences between themare determined by mutual agreeme nt and the'con-tradictions of tactics and the ,technology of armedcombat.

Obviously something should also be saidconcerning the military-engineering art, whichorganically belongs to tactics, operational art,and strategy, and therefore occupies the leadingposition in relation to fortification and othermilitary-engineering sciences, but does not mergewith them mechanically.

The correlation , . of weapons and forti-fication equipment arises from the requirementsfor conducting a battle. The appearance of newweapons immediately calls'for the need to createappropriate positions that ensure effective op-eration of these weapons, to organize protectionfrom the effect of enemy weapons, to set upbarriers that paralyze the movement of enemy weaponson the battlefield, and that create favorable con-ditions for the operation of our weapons, i.e., tobuild fortification structures.

Weapons and fortification equipmentare developed in complex dialectical coordination,mutually influencing one another. This coordina-tion cannot be limited to their simple juxtaposi-tion to each other. New means and methods ofarmed combat make it necessary to create also new

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forms of fortifications. All this does not gointo the formula of simple juxtaposition offortification to weapons of destruction.

It is correct that the protection ofthe armed fomes and the zone of interior andthe safeguarding of the stability of the nationalfortress in a general nuclear/missile war arenow becoming one of the main tasks of fortifica-tion. However the modern make-up of fortificationdoes not limit itself only to its protective functions.Fortification arose from practical requirements forconducting a battle. _Throughout the entire extentof the history of wars its combat functions developedequally with the protective functions of fortifica-tion. M. V. Frunze put the "strengthening of thefirepower of our disposition "* as one of the mainmisbions of fortification.

From past experience we know that thecasemating of weapons* increased their effective-ness of action by 2 to 3 times.

In' modern cOnditions the combat functicnsof fortifications are not lost, but arc increasing,and above, all the signific .auce of fortificationstructures and fortifications is increasing as ameans for increasing the effectiveness and stabilityof nuclear/missile weapon operations. For example,the construction of more improved fortificationstructures increases the degree of protection ofmissiles and, at the same time, increases theircombat readiness for launching; reduces the launchtime, improves conditions for ensuring accuracy offire, stable communications, storage of nuclear warheads,etc

*1. H. V. Frunze, Collected Works, Volume 1, 1929,page 595.

*2. Casemating of weapons means disposition in thecasemate of a closed fortificurion structure on aspecial mounting.

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Thus the modern tasks of4ortificationconsist .not only of the protection of the armedforces and zone of interior.from . .the action ofmeans of destruction, but also of the retentionof the stability of the armed forces and increas-ing the effectiveness of their fire both ontactical , and strategic scales, in supporting highly-.mobile troop operations in a general nuclear war.Therefore the scientific basis for fOrtification.is not only the theory of proper 'protection but .above, all the theory of armed cOnbat,. the thoroughstudy of the nature . of modern battle,with complex equipment, and the theoretical gen-eralizaticn of practical troop rcqUirements. Thisis what determines the need to employ various kindsand types of fortifications and fortification struc-tures, the working out of their technologicaldiagrams, the planning and form, requirements forconstruction,. .components, equipping, and. timelimits And erection methods *' •

Taking the above into consideration ,aslightly clarified definition should be given:fortification is the military-technical scienceregarding the creation and combat employment ofspecial engineer structures and systems of them that.ensure the conduct of a battle and the protectionof the armed forces and the zone of interior in awar. Fortification is a composite part of militaryscience.

In the past fortification was used onlyon a tactical scale, which was mainly explainedby the limited capabilities of weapons. However,the development of the means of armed combat up-set this situation. It is true that remnants ofthe past sometimes make themselves known; forexample, fortification construction in the depthof the country, for some unknown reasons, is calledspecial construction; they try to maintain thatan antiatomic shelter built'for the protection of the

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population, and not for the troops, ceases to bea fortification structurejetc. The practicallyunlimited operating range of modern weapons andthe increased capabilities of troops spread thezone ef armed combat over the entire surfaceof the earth. The centers of nuclear and chemicaldestruction, and surface and aerial battles, maydevelop far from the front lines. Therefore, itshould be stated that the activity of fortificationhas gone far beyond the limits of the ground forcesbattlefield, and that the tasks of modern forti-fication are to ensure stability and effectxve-ness of armed forces operations over the entiretheater of a general nuclear war, and to protectthe zone of interior, ensuring the stability ofthe national economy and of the entire countryduring an attack by modern weapons.

The one-sided execution of any oneProtective measure will not be able to ensuresatisfactory protection. The modern system of protection from weapons of mass destruction mustdefinitely be comprehensive and must include thefollowing basic elements:

- antiair and Antimissile defense(cotter);

-- direct fortification protection:the construction of fortification structures,the individual protection of persons, combat,transport and special vehicles, increasing thefortification strength of designs'of engineerstructures and technical means, the use andreinforcement of the protective features of theterrain;

-- measures for reducing destructionand increasing viability: dispersal, camouflage,disorientation of enemy intelligence, use ofmaneuver or duplication, etc.

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-- the organization of antiatomic,antichelical and antibacteriological protectionservices;

-- measures for eliminating the effectsof an enemy nuclear attack and for restoringthe combat effectiveness of installations beingprotected.

• All these elements are interconnectedand. mutually depend on each other;, only theircomprehensive employment can give the necessaryProtective effect. It should be added that the •system of protection must be overall and contin-uous as regards time and area, and also concen-trate on the most important composite parts of the.armed forces and the zone, of interior.

The present status and .tendencies inthe future development of means and methods ofarmed combat present a series of new complextasks for fortification. There has been asharp curtailment of the permissible timelimits for erecting fortification structuresin a battle and operation. The technical solu-tions of protection are becoming more complex.New requirements are levied or forms of forti-fications, the types and construction of struc-tures, and means and methods for erecting them.These tasks cannot be satisfactorily performedon the basis of employing old fortificationequipment and old methods of fortificationconstruction. In accordance with this, inmodern fortification two basic directions forits future development can be cited:

-- development of new technical meansand methods for the fortification support oftroops in a battle and operation in sharplyreduced time limits (several hours), withwidescale employment of means of individual

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protection of personnel and equipment, .mechanizedeatrenching of troop subunits, 'combat and trans-port vehicles, with the use of.portable setsof prefabricated or unitary (monOblochnaya) sheltersand highly efficient engineer machinery;

-- the development of advance fortifi-cation construction and a system of engineerpreparation of theaters of military operations orareas of forthcoming operations on the basisof new meaus and methods of modern industrialconstruction.

The correct combination of these twodirections of fortification development, on thebasis of widescale use of potential created bythe scientific-technical revolution that isoccurring in the production and construction ofthe national economy, will permit the successfulperformance of the new tasks posed by the modelzdevelopment of means and methods of armed combat.

Major-General of Engineer TroopsP. Ogorodnikov

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The problems of antinuclear protectionof troops and strategically important objectivesand of the entire territory of the country thathave been brought up in the Collections of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" have extremelygreat significance.

The fact that in a future war the basicmeans of mass destruction will be nuclear/missileweapons, which surpass all previous means ofdestruction in their destructive power, is ap-parent to all. Thus a regiment (battle group)

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that finds itself on Open terrain may be destroyedwith one burst of a nuclear warhead with a . yield of.150 kilotons, and in order to destroy the. basic.forces of a modern army, operating on open terrain.,,three or four thermonuclear (hydrogen) warheadswith a Yield of 10 Megatons each will be adequate..

It is necessary to take into considera-tion the unlimited possibMties for increasingthe yield of nuclear/missile weapons. And as aresult of:their employment therecan be totaldestruction of huge territories. For example,as a result of a 10-megaton hydrogen missilewarhead or bomb, the area of destruction willamount .to up to.500 km2 . According to 'the dataof the 'British military theorist Liddell-Hart,5 to 10 hydrogen bombs are enough to destroy all

. the main industrial centers of Britain.

• In a future war, economic and political.centers, and strategic objectives located inthe interior of.the country, will naturally besubjected to the most destructive strikes. Ob-viously, in border areas the lower yieldoso-,

-called "tactical", but still sufficiently dt,-structive, nuclear weapons will find Empicymnt.Even from the views stated it is apparent howimportant it is to find the most effectivemethods and means to protect the country,. its

• economic potential, its armed forces and thepopulation of the country from such destructivestrikes.

The availability of models of nuclear/missile weapons that have higher qualitativeindices than those of the enemy already appearsas an effective means of defense. But at thesame time, within the limits of the economicpotential of the country, a lot has been doneand is being done in our country by the processof capital construction, carried out by the

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Ministry ofof Defense in order to protect missilesites, PVO weapons and control points from enemystrikes. Therefore the demand of some authorsconcerning the need to create a-single military-erglneer center on the armed forces scale, cap-able of resolving specific questions on thepreparation of the armed forces of the countryand territory of the nation for war, causes .bewilderment.

As is known, the General Staff is suchan organ. In practice its ideas'and'plans thattake into consideration the realistic require-ments of the types of armed forces, based on theeconomic potentialities of the country, arecarried out by the military-construction organsthat are subordinate to the Deputy Minister ofDefense, and locally, to the troop commanders of themilitary districts. In connection with this, thereis another allegation that, at least, is not stricus,that engineer control of national fortificationpreparation is decentralized and, in a number'of cases, is found in the hinds of organizationsthat do not have Military-theoretical scientifictraining.

It may have been expected that theauthors would show in their articles how thetask of antinuclear protection and the engineerpreparation of-the country for a war can basi-cally be accomplished by using the possibilitiesof'fortification, thus avoiding Certain inebt-sistencies between the scientific theory offortification protection and actual practice.HoweverOn our opinion, the periodical presslays too much stress on proving the need to

'preserve the term "fortification", which, al-legedly,.has been unjustly ignored by our mili-tary press and manuals ever since World War II.But if they were able to get along without thisterm for such a period of time, then it is all

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to. the good. As a case in point, it is stated in .the yield Service Remilations„ which also ignores.the term "fortification", that the basis of.. anti-nuclear defense of troops is engineer preparation.of . terrain, which ihcludes the building of engineerstructures and various types of shelters, preparationof concealed maneuver routes, and setting up barriersand camouflage..

TherefOre in our opinion, there is no:need : to take the concept of "engineer supportand engineer preparation of terrain", firmly

' established for decades in Soviet military science,and identify it now with the term "fortification".

The proposition expressed by someexperts that fortification can give the armedforces of a country the means (underlined by us--.•Ye.11.)and methods for creating situations whichrikAku it possible to withstand the enemy's strilt.:does not correspond with reality. It is entirelyobvious that fortification cannot "give" themeans. It is primarily called upon to work outtypes and designs of cstructions, and the methcd.::of erecting them.

Experience gained from exercises hasindicated that the simplest antinuclear struc-tures which Can be managed by the troops underConditions of transient combat operationsexceptionally high mobilityjoffensive or de-fensive, which now, as a rule, will occur morefrequently miring an offensive), are trenches,foxhole's and shelters for . equipment. Settingup blindages and shelters, even when ready-madestructures ',.re available, and excavation of pitsby earth-moving machinery, will take severalhours. But this period of time just will not beavailable now on the field of battle, especiallyto the tank units and infantry. Antinuclearprotection must be constant, because strikes by

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nuclear/missile weapons can be delivered suddenly,at any time and from any direction.

A radical solution of the problem ofprotecting troops on the field of battle (inoffensive operations) apparently must `be sought inthe creation of a combat vehicle which will becapable of protecting the troops from the effects ofnuclear/missile weapons without any engineer .preparation, and all the more, certainly, without.•"means" of fortification. Such combat vehiclesare already being suggested by several authorsand scientific collectives. A line combat vehiclecan serve as the wheelbase for a command, transport,ambulance, repair, engineer, chemical, and evena missile combat vehicle.

Naturally, along with these measuresthere will be widespread use in,operations ofthe protective properties of the:teirain, camou-flage, dispersal, antinuclear maneuver and engineerpreparation of terrain.

The problems listed in the materialsof the Collections, and some of the practicalrecommendations in the field of civil defensemeasures for protecting the population from themeans of mass destruction, have definite value,and their introduction into the actual work '-of urban development can be legalized throughappropriate organs. Moreover, such measuresare already partially being put into practice.The suggestions regarding the timely preparationof missile positions, antiair defense meansand control points should also meet with approval.

The solution to the problem of properdefense which has been raised in the pages ofthe press, is, we are deeply convinced, theprerogative of a narrow circle of individuals,

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probably the General Staff. Only Under theseconditions, can we count on the requisite protectionof installations, one which will correspond tothe requirements of our strategy, and mainly, onecarried out with due regard for the economic cap-abilities of the country. The protection ofinstallations of the territory of the country isachievedowthe whole; not so much by passivemeasuresCreating various types of shelters (Weare'nOt4dVdtates Of theirUnderestimation)i asby thejntelligent,.. from the quantitative andqualitative standpoint, employment Of nuclear/missile weapons and by carrying out countermea-sures-directed toward the disruption of enemy em-ployment-of weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, it cannot be saidthat the_eaiSting system for managing capitalconstruction in the interests of nuclear pro-tection preparation of the ter-ritOry of the country is ideal. But we dO notsee the need to change it fundamentally, asproposed by some authors; It is a question ofthe improvement of the system. It is necessary 10centralize all the forces and means that existin the country, scientific centers,. design •agencies and educational institutions thatoccupy themselves With construction questionsin this field, andsubordinate them to theDeputy Minister of Defense for Construction,and locally to the troop commanddrs of themilitary districts.

The need for the further strengtheningof military-construction agencies in military.districts has become critical'. It is hardlyjustifiable that the KEG (billeting department-kvartirno-eksploatatsionnyy otdel) and the KEU(Billeting Directorate - kvartirno-eksploatatsionnoyeupravleniye) agencies act as customers. In ouropinion it would be more correct to have capital

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construction departments in the military districts,which must organize all their work in close coor-dination with the sLaff of the district.

As regards the further development ofmilitary-scientific activity, the Practicalworkers--military builders, executing a consider-able volume of work to ensure the combat readi-ness of our country, wait for the military en-gineers and fortification specialists to grasp,as deeply as possible, the development and designof more sensible, more stable from the antinuclearstandpoint, and at the same time economical, types ofstructures that answer the specific oharacteristics••of the new types of armed forces, It is time to thinkout seriously a new organization of planning,in order to eliminate the numerous existing planningorganizations, the dissipation of efforts and anumber of other faults.

• Colonel Ye.. Maykov

Fortification appears tO be only part Ofmilitary science, but it . is part of military-en-gineer work, engineer support Of a battle and oper-ation, part of engineer preparation of the territoryof our nation, and also of the countries united bythe Warsaw Pact.

Since engineer preparation of a theaterof military operations is already conducted inpeacetime, the question of fortification must beexamined more broadly, jointly with other aspectsof engineering, at the same time touching upon thestructure of the engineer troops and the nature ofengineer support as a whole on the scale of thearmed forces.

In postwar times the tendency to under-estimate the role and significance of engineertroops and engineer support has become more appar-ent. It is admitted that with the employment ofnew Meals of combat the role of engineer supportin a modern battle or operation has increased

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significantly4AOUt together with this there is. .talk about . theackwardness of engineer-troops'1,even uselessness; in practice even their incor-rect employment., is . permitted.

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our opinion, are; first, the underestimation ofthe role, an&significance.of engineer troops and.

, i engineersUpOrt50#the part of A number of respon-siblOind ..1*A4n0ailitary chiefs, secondly, in-difie*enci7640*liart Of the leadership of theengineer -department to such:undereStimatiOnIthdrdly,disigreekent'in:Opinions on engineer support.in.theleadership of.' the types of armed forces.

As.4„result, engineer troops are actu-ally regardedaSspecial troops of the ground troops,at a time. Whenenginett support embraces all types oftroops,,4.6010,0*Oy• the ground troops. The appear-ance of nevCt*OetOf armed forces -- PVO and MAS-sile troops -- and the development of the types tLatexisted earlier '(ground troops, air forces. and navy.'do not reduce t, contrary, increase therole and significance of engineer support.

While it is expedient to divide the armeforces -into-types-and to create corresponding inde-pendent central:organs, the decentralization of theengineer support of these types of armed forces is •clearly inexpedient. This is confirmed by the dailywork of the military, districts and groups of forces.

Engineer support he acquired a different,higher quality, and it is simply impossible to per-form all its tasks with the forces and means of theengineer troops that are presently included in theground troops. The new types of armed forces requireconsolidation of engineer support and a considerableincrease in the number of engineer units, and notnarrowly parochial, piecemeal actions for theirengineer support.

Large units and formations of the types ofarmed forces cooperate at the tactical and operationallevel, striving for the achievement of

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the overall goal of an operation, but for thefull engineer support of these operations thereare no forces and equipment. Engineer supporthas to be carried out piecemeal, even thoughit is known - that a small-scale operation in anyfield is unprofitable and uneconomical.

Since the engineer troops of. the SovietArmy were: incorporated into the ground troops,they have been reduced in numbers to the pointwhere they cannot fulfill modern tasks Theorganic structure of engineer subunits and units,organized without consideration for realisticequipping of the engineer troops and the require-ments of equipment, is such that it does not evenensure the servicing of organic engineer machinery.Poor knowledge of modern engineer equipment onthe part of the command echelon leads to the factthat, for example, MDK excavation machines arereplaced by roadbuilding machines (BAT) in theT/O &.E of units. Experience has shown that thelatter, when used as excavation machines, breakdown quickly. Therefore, by a directive of-theChief of the Engineer Troops, the use of road-building machines as excavating machines is pro-hibited, but the T/0 & E approved by the DeputyCommander-in-Chief of the Ground Troops statesthat MDK excavating machines must be replaced withBAT machines. In our opinion, this contradictionshows the parochial resolution of the question andlack of concern for the missile troops, not tomention the inexpedient use of new engineer equipment

The transfer of the engineer troopsto the subordination of the Ground Troops ledto the fact that the interests of other types ofarmed forces for engineer support are not beingconsidered. At large exercises and operationalgames no one occupies himself with the engineersupport of such types of armed forces as aviation,PVO, missile troops and the navy. StillI all cal-

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culations in them are based on the engineertroops in the composition of the Ground Troops.

Let us take aviation as an example.It does not have forces for sweeping airfieldscaptured during an. offensive for mines; to recon-struct them, to prepare approaches to them, and,of course, for building landing strips .. Existing.engineerbatta liona-are n0t, :XretPe,0 to executethese tasks and are ue0100.44.14111.-thei. 'So•how will aviationSUPpOWirOU4d..ArOonsdiirteg_swift tempos of their advance?: The experience ofexercises shows that in order to Support frontair army operations it must be allotted 10 to 12engineer battalions. And where can they be obtained?At the expense of army or divisional engineer units?This means to leave the ground . troops withoutengineer support,.which will lead to the disruptionof the tempo ofthe . advaxiCiand -failure to fulfillthe task./

It is clear, that av iation must be sup-ported from-an engineer standpoint and the liquida-tion of the engineer service in the air forces iscompletely unjustified. The construction Of newairfields cannot be managed without the.partici-pation of engineer troops. In the experience ofthe Group of Soviet FOrces in Germany, the mine-sweeping of terrain, the repair and replacement ofengineer machinery, assistance of aviation withappropriate machines and crews from the engineer troops,and other measures, have become standard practice:In this way the engineer troops must and undoubtedlywill be brought in for engineer support of aviationduring offensive operations, as it was in World War II.

The first steps in the life of the newtypes of armed forces PVO and missile troops ---show that they too cannot manage without engineersupport.. The preparation of positions, decorativeand dummy camouflage, construction of routes and

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crossings, and mine-sweeping in siting and waitingareas. will require a lot of work.

The preparation of engineer cadres,especially for missile units and subunits, wasnot ever thought of in the ground troops. Oneof the three engineer schools was closed. TheLeningrad. school.that . prepared driver-mechanicsfor engineer: machinery was transferred to Kalin-ingrad. •, A: large sum of money was expended for,_the relocation. The educational-materials.,baie.created over decades has been destroyed,as a. result the engineer officers that are re-quired by aviation, artillery, missile . troops . andother types of armed forces are not available.In the Ground Troops the attitude is taken that .two schools will be enough for them, and let theappropriate commanders worry about engineertroopsfor the other-branches of the armed forCeiThisparochial approach gave birth . to the unnecessarysplintering not only of the preparation of cadretybut also of engineer support, and led to .acrease in the role of engineer troops in themodern phase. •

A similar situation prevails in thenavy. During World War II engineer supportplayed no small role, especially in the opera-tions of the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and NorthernFleets.

In modern operations the rear areawill require engineer support that is great involume and varied in nature. Without touchingupon all the measures of engineer support of therear area, let us take bridge support as an example.The modern tempos of an offensive require consti-tution of engineer subunits that ensure the forcingof water barriers in 3 to 4 hours. Consequently,the rear area must be provided with pontoon-bridgingsubunits and units with parks of floating bridges

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that can be. assembled quickly.-

The splintering . Of'engineer control gave.rise to yet another department in the army--construction add the quartering of troops, in whichthe "customer" and "contractor" are combined. Intime this will lead to overfulfillment of con-struction plans and the. absence of funds for bil-leting troops. .Moreover, repairs and construction.

• work carried out by trOOpsare. not 'always of good.quality. .This estab1iShMent4lso-carries outother work that is not integral to it, _connectedwith the preparation of the theaters of militaryoperations (TVD) from an engineer standpoint. Andthe authors of some articles correctly state thatinAL number of cases the preparation of TVD is .in the. handsof organizations that do not havemilitary-theoretical training,

The apparatus for:Construction andquartering must be reorganized. The functions ofthe engineer department—Special construction,should be excluded from it, •nA the billeting-housekeeping directorate should be handed overto the rear services A' military-constructiondirectorate should be created, instead of thisapparatus, in the role of a . "contractor", thenthe mode of life of the troops will improve and the"customer" will make firmer demands, not worryingabout soldiers'honor, the troops will live better,and there will be savings for the state.

Questions of engineer support force us .to refer to the lessons of World War II. In itsfirst period we suffered great losses, and inour opinion one of the reasons was the under-estimation of military-engineer work in the army.Soon after the start of the war, in November 1941,the order of the Supreme High Commander came out"On the Underestimation of Military-Engineer Workin the Army", which noted faults in engineer

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support and indicated ways to correct them.However, some front and army troop commandersinterpreted the order formally and did notstrive for wider understanding of engineer support,thereby reducing its influence on tactics. Theseefforts did not get any support then, but afterthe war they influenced to a certain degree thedepreciation of the role of engineer troops andengineer support.

Many engineer troop officers have lostthe prospect of growth. All the principal posi-t:'.ons in,. the troops: commanding officers ofbattalions, divisional engineers, chiefs of staff .of regiments and brigades, deputy commanders ofbrigades--are no higher than lieutenant-colonel.This is an obvious injustice. toward engineercadres. Thkoilghout the entire' existence of theSoviet Army the divisional engineer had , the rankof colonel, and this was the highest level thatengineer troop officers could attain. The chiefs •of staffs of engineer brigades and deputy com-manding officers of brigades also had room foradvancement, and now it is lost, growth is im-peded and naturally all this is felt in theservice.

And another thing—in the past,when theengineer troops and arms of troops were equippedwith a . combat engineer spade and simple engineerequipment, the chief of the district engineertroops had a deputy for equipment. And now, whenthe arming and equipping of engineer troops withmateriel has become a ‘ fact and machinery hasentered firmly into engineer support, when thereis more than 85 HP of machinery per person inthe engineer troops, this position has beenabolished. The reduction occurred at the momentwhen the question is being raised of introducingengineers for repair and use of equipment into theT/0 of engineer directorates of districts and groups

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of forces. With this attitude toward the new'equipment of the engineer troopsva great dealof damage will be done to engineer support and to theeconomy of the country. And what is more expensive:keeping an extra 20 engineers on the T/O orthe premature wearing out of expensive equipment?This question cannot be left without attention.

And finally, our probable enemies,namely the American Army, are creating powerfulequipment and forces for engineer support of abattle and operation, are centralizing themanagement of them and are detaching them fromthe composition of all arms of troops. And we,having forgotten the lessons and mistakes ofthe initial period of the last war, are implementinganew the dispersal of forces and equipment.

In accordance with our firm belief,it is necessary to reexamine the T/0 of theengineer troops,and to bring them into conformitywith the equipment with which they are provided.And above all--to end the indifference andneutrality of the engineer department towardtheir troops and their affairs.

The urgent need has arisen to eliminatethe splintering of engineer control in the ArmedForces and to remove the engineer departmentfrom the Ground Troops, creating a Chief Military-Engineer Directorate of the Ministry Of Defensewith the appropriate directorates and departments.

Lieutenant-General of Engineer TroopsA. amirnov-Nesvitskiy

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