certeza property midterm reviewer

7/27/2019 Certeza Property Midterm Reviewer

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PROPERTY ATTY. CERTEZAMIDTERM REVIEWER (ART. 414-475)

PAGE 1 | A T E N E O D E M A N I L A L A W 2 C 2 0 1 3

ALBERTO. ANBOCHI. ATTILO. AVILA. LOQUE. MIRANDA. REVOTE. REYES. SALVADOR. SULIT.

T H I S R E V I E W E R M A Y N O T B E R E P R O D U C E D A N D D I S T R I B U T E D W I T H O U T T H E P E R M I S S I O N O F T H E A U T H O R S

TITLE I:CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Definition of PropertyUnder the Civil Code, property , considered as an object, is that which is, or may be,appropriated.

Concept of Appropriation Although not defined by the Code, it has been considered as equivalent to

occupation, which is the willful apprehension of a corporeal object which hasno owner, with intent to acquire its ownership.

However, note that property involves not only material objects but alsointangible things, like rights or credits.

Things as distinguished from Property Paras : Thing is broader in scope for it includes both appropriable and non-

appropriable object. Tolentino : By things are meant all objects that exist and can be of some use to

man.

Classification of Things1. RES NULLIUS(belonging to no one) These things belong to no one since they

have not yet been appropriated. Examples: fish still swimming in the sea.Note: Until they are caught and safely deposited in a boat, a fisherman maynot be considered the owner thereof ( Alvarado vs. Basa )

2. RES COMMUNES (belonging to everyone) Things owned by everybody in thattheir use and enjoyment are given to all of mankind. Examples: air we breathe,

the wind, sunlight, and starlight.3. RES ALICUJUS(belong to someone) These are objects, tangible or intangible

which are owned privately , either in collective or individual capacity.Examples: your book, your shares of stock, your parcel of land. Note: Sincethey can be owned, they should be considered property.

Characteristics of Property1. Utility for the satisfaction of moral or economic wants2. Susceptibility of appropriation

3. Individuality or substantivity (i.e. it can exist by itself and not merely aspart of a whole).

ARTICLE 414

Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation areconsidered either:(a) Immovable or real property; or(b) Movable or personal property.

ImportanceThe classification of property into immovables or movables assumes its importancefrom the fact that different provisions of the law govern the acquisition,possession, disposition, loss, and registration of immovables and movables.

Query: Is the Human Body real or personal property?

Paras : The human body, whether alive or dead, is neither real nor personalproperty, for it is not even property at all, in that it generally cannot beappropriated. While a human being is alive, he cannot, as such, be the objectof a contract, for he is considered outside the commerce of man. He may of course offer to another the use of various parts of his body, even the entirebody itself in obligations requiring demonstrations of strength or posing. Hemay donate part of his blood, may even sell part of his hair, but he cannot sellhis body.

Tolentino : In general, the living human body is not considered as a thing,although some parts of it are considered as things when separated from it;such as, the hair and the teeth. Upon death, the corpse becomes a thing,although it is not susceptible of appropriation by reason of public morality. Anonerous cont ract disposing ones own corpse even for scientific purposes isvoid, although a gratuitous disposition of the same for such purpose isconsidered valid.

CHAPTER 1IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

ARTICLE 415


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Para. 2: Trees and plants are real property by nature if they are spontaneousproducts of the soil and by incorporation if they were planted thru labor. Butthe moment they are detached or uprooted from the land, they becomepersonal property. Growing crops, express codal provisions, are considered

real property by incorporation. However, under the chattel mortgage law,growing crops may be considered as personal property and may thus be thesubject of a chattel mortgage ( Sibal vs. Valdez, 50 Phil 512 ).

Para 3: For incorporated thing to be considered real property, the injury orbreakage or deterioration in case of separation must be s ubstantial.

Para. 3 distinguished from Para. 2

PARA. 3 PARA. 2(1) Cannot separate from immovable

without breaking or deterioration(2) Need not be placed by the o wner(3) Real property by incoporation

(1) Can be separated from immovableswithout breaking or deterioration

(2) Must be placed by the owner or byhis agent express or implied

(3) Real property by incorporation anddestination

Para 5: The essential requisites are:1. The placing must be made by th e owner of the tenement, his agent or

duly authorized legal representative2. The industry or works must be carried on in the building or on the land3. The machines must tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or

works (also called ADAPTABILITY)4. The machines must be essential and principal elements in the industry

and not merely incidental

Para. 5 refers to real property by destination or purpose.

Para 6: The houses referred to here maybe already be deemed included inpara. 1 (Manresa)

Para 7: If fertilizer is still in th e barn or on the grou nd wrapped in newspapers,they are considered personal property for they have not yet been actuallyused over the lands.

Para 8: Mines, including the minierals still attached thereto, are realproperties, but when the minerals have been extracted, the latter becomechattels

Para 9: A floating house tied to a shore used as residence is considered realproperty. Vessels are considered personal property.

Para 10: Properties referred to here are not material things but rights whichare necessarily intangible.

QUERY: Can we properly consider a building to be immovable by incorporationsince it is attached to the land?

There are two views. According to Tolentino , a building is immovable by nature.Buildings are always immovable. It cannot be moved from place to place. Animmovable by incorporation, on the other hand, presupposes that a movable wasattached to an immovable so as to be an integral part of. That, however, appliesonly to constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil but not to buildings, landand roads. On the other hand, Paras posits that a building is an immovable byincorporation. A building is considered immovable provided that it is more or less apermanent structure, substantially adhered to the land, and not meresuperimpositions and provided there is the intent of permanent annexation.Hence, Paras views a building as essentially a movable which, when, attached tothe land with an intent of permanence, becomes an immovable. There is nodistinction with constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil because they are tobe understood as attachments that are more or less permanents.

CASES

Leung Yee vs. Frank Strong Machinery CompanyFACTS: The Compania Agricola Filipina purchased from Strong Machienery Co.rice-cleaning machines which the former installed in one of its buildings. As securityfor the purchase price, the buyer executed a chattel mortgage on the machines andthe building on whic h they had been installed. Upon buyers failure to pay, the

registered mortgage was foreclosed, and the building was purchased by the seller,the Strong Machinery Co. This sale was annotated in the Chattel MortgageRegistry. Later, the Agricola also sold to Strong Machinery the lot on which thebuilding had been constructed. This sale was not registered in the Registry of Property but the Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.Previously however, the same building had been purchase d at a sheriffs sale byLeung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, although Leung Yee knew all the time of theprior sale in favor of Strong Machinery. This sale in favor of Leung Yee wasrecorded in the Registry. Leung Yee now sues to recover the property fr om StrongMachinery.


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ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property?

HELD: The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel

Mortgage Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building aspersonal property does not change its character as real property. Thus, neither theannotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect onthe building. If Leung Yee was in good faith, Art. 1473 would have applied whichsays:If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shallbe transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in goodfaith, if it should be personal property.

Punsalan vs. Vda De LacsamanaFACTS: Punsalan was said to have been an owner of a parcel of land. He mortgagedsaid land to PNB. Punsalan defaulted in his payments. PNB forclosed the propertyand was the highest bidder. Before acquiring title thereto, Punsalan who was still inpossession of the land built a warehouse on said property. The warehouse wasthen leased for a period of 10 years. During the period of the lease, PNB acquiredtitle to the parcel of land and then soon after wa s able to sell the land includingthe building and improvements on the land to Lacasama. Punsalan filed suitbefore the Court of First Instance asking for the annulment on said sale of thebuilding plus damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI is the proper venue to file such action?

HELD: The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or realproperty as provided in article 415(1) of the Civil Code. Buildings are alwaysimmovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which itstood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seemto have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wisechanged its character as immovable property.

The action of the plaintiff is a real action affecting title to real property which,under Section 2, Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court, must be tried in the province

where the property or any part t hereof lies.

Prudential Bank vs. PanisFACTS: Spouses Magcale executed a deed of Real Estate Mortgage with Prudential

Bank over a building which includes a right of occupancy (lot was not theirs yet,subject to an application of a miscellaneous sales patent) on the lot. Subsequently,Spouses Magcale entered into an additional loan from said bank over the sameproperties. However, prior to the additional loan, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent wasissued over the parcel of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on thebuilding erected on the land belonging to another?

HELD: Yes, in the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building"separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that abuilding is by itself an immovable property." Thus, while it is true that a mortgageof land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvementsthereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the landon which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgagefor the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt withseparately and apart from the land. In the same manner, this Court has alsoestablished that possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on thegrantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage.

NOTE: 2nd Mortgage was held not valid. Since the mortgaged was entered intoafter the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent, it fell squarely under theprohibitions stated in the Public Land Act co vering property under a Sales patent.

Bicerna vs. TenezaFACTS: A complaint was filed int eh Court of First Instance (RTC) alleging that thedefendants had forcibly demolished the house of the plaintiffs worth P200. Theplaintiffs asked for damages or for a declaration that the materials belong to them.

ISSUE Does the CFI (RTC) have j urisdiction?

HELD: No, because no real property is being sued upon, the house having ceased toexist, and the amount of damages sought does not exceed the jurisdictional


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amount in inferior courts.

Sibal vs. Valdez

FACTS: In a case brought by plaintiff against defendant, the latter won. For thepurpose of satisfying the judgment won by the defendant, the sheriff attached thesugar cane that was then growing on the lots of the plaintiff. Said lots incidentallyhad already been previously attached by another judgment creditor of the plaintiff.Within one-year period given by law for redemption, the plaintiff wanted toredeem the lots from one creditor, and the sugar cane from t he other creditor. Thelots were redeemed, the redemption of the sugar cane was however refused by thedefendant, who contended that the sugar cane was personal property, andtherefor could not be the subject of the legal redemption sought to be enforced.The plaintiff upon the other hand claimed that the sugar cane was real property forsame could be considered as growing fruits under par. 2 of Art. 415.

ISSUE: How should the sugar can be regarded -- as real property or as personalproperty?

HELD: The sugar cane, although considered as growing fruits and thereforeordinarily real property under Par. 2 of Art. 415 of the Civil Code, must be regardedas personal property for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and also forpurposes of attachment, because as ruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court, theright to the growing crops mobilizes (makes personal, as contradistinguised fromimmobilization) the crops by anticipation. More specifically, it said that theexistence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, agathering as it were, in advance, rendering the crop movable.

Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co.FACTS: Charles Swift was awarded the franchise to construct, maintain and operatean electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila. The company was later on called Meralco. In lieu of this, the companyconstructed 40 Steel Towers within Quezon City, on the land belonging to it. Threeof said towers were then declared by the City Assessor of Quezon City liable for realproperty tax.

ISSUE: Are the steel towers or poles of the Meralco considered real or personalproperties?

HELD: They are personal (not real) properties. Be it noted that:a) they do not come under Par. 1 of Art. 415 because they are neither

buildings or constructions adhered to the soil.

b) they do not come under Par. 3 because they are not attached to animmovable in a fixed manner, that is, they can be separated withoutbreaking the material or causing deterioration of the object to which theyare attached;

c) they do not come under Par. 5 because they are not machineries,receptacles, or instruments, but even if they are, they are not intended foran industry to be carried on in the premises.

Tsai vs. CAFACTS: EVERTEX executed a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage with PBCom for aloan of P3,000,000 appended to the mortgage was a list of certain machineries andequipment. Subsequently, EVERTEX entered into a second loan for an amountP3,356,000 secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal Properties attached withthis load was a list of said properties. EVERTEX, due to business reverses, filedinsolvency. All its assets were taken into the custody of the Insolvency Court,including the collateral, real and personal, securing the two mortgages. In resultthereto, EVERTEX failed to meet its obligations to PBCom, the latter thencommenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. PBCom emerge as the highestbidder in both foreclosure proceedings. PBCon upon consolidation of its ownershipover the lot and all the properties in it, leased the property to Tsai for P50,000 amonth. Soon after sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai for P9,000,000.EVERTEX contested the sale and aver that PBCom did not have any legal basis orfactual basis to appropriate certain properties (contested properties), because theywere not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage nor in the Chattel Mortgage

and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriffs Sale andCertificate of Sale resulting from the foreclosure proceedings.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed

properties is proper?

HELD: No. The subject mortgages were intended by the parties to involve chattels,insofar as equipment and machinery were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Lawapplies, which provides in Section 7 thereof that: "a chattel mortgage shall be


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deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or substitutedproperty thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depositoryas the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrarynotwithstanding."

And, since the disputed machineries were acquired after the said chattelmortgages, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include thecontested machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages.

Berkenkotter vs. Cu UnjiengFACTS: The Mabalacat Sugar Company borrowed from the defendant a sum of money, mortgaging as security two lots together with all its buildings andimprovements. Later, to increase its productive capacity, the Company purchasedadditional machines a new sugar mill which were needed for the s ugar industry.

ISSUE: Are the additional machines also considered mortgaged?

HELD: The mortgage of a parcel of land generally includes all future improvementsthat may be found on said parcel. These improvements include real properties, likethe additional machines and sugar mill purchased. Said additional machienry arereal properties because they are essential and principal elements of the sugarcentral. Without them, the sugar central would be unable to carry out its industrialpurpose. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessarymachinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which ithas been established must necessarily be permanent.

Sergs Products vs. PCI Le asingFACTS: In 1998, judge issued writ to seize Sergs machineries to satisfy PCI Leasingscomplaint for a sum of money. Sergs contends that under Art. 415, the

machineries were immovable and cannot be the subject of seizure.

ISSUE: May the machineries be seized?

HELD: Yes. Although the machineries qualify as immovable property in Art. 415 par.5, the parties stipulated in their contract t hat subject machineries are personal andnot considered as real. They are estopped from claiming otherwise.

Valdez vs. Central Altagracia

FACTS: J. Sanchez owned land with a sugar house named Central Altagracia (CA orcorporation). He leased this to S. Castello and a brother who may install equipmentwhich after lease will belong to Sanchez. The lease ended but it was extended. Thiswas not recorded in a public registry. The Castello brothers transferred rights

acquired in the lease to F. Cornwell. The corporation retained its name. UnderCornwell, CA borrowed money from Nevers & Callaghan (N&C) to install newmachinery. The corporation then sold its rights on the land to R. Valdez including allmachinery. Valdez was to assume the obligation of the lease transferred by theCastellos to CA. Through all this, the plant operation continued. The sale of rightswas made before a notary but not put on public records. Valdez then resold hisrights to the company (this transaction was not again reflected in public records)with a condition that he holds title until he be fully paid. Meanwhile, thecorporation defaulted on its loan from N&C. A judgment was rendered and N&Cwas to recover and levy on the machinery in the sugar house.Subsequent to N&Cs suit for recovery, the following occurred: (1) the heirs of Sanchez filed a case: either to recover property because Castello has no right totransfer or seek payment from lease; (2) one of both the Castellos sued the

company on the theory that there was default in obligations assumed by the latter;and (3) discord broke out in Central Altagracia. CA sued Valdez on the ground thatthe sale was fictitious because when the company needed money, Valdez agreed toadvance the amount if made president. When Valdez was made president, he didnot pay the debt to N&C.A judge appointed a temporary receiver. Other creditors of the corporation joinedand prayed for a receiver. The previous judgment in favor of N&C was retainedpending appeal.The operation of the plant by the receiver was unsuccessful. There was no meansof paying the debt except by way of the property of CA. The continuedreceivership was opposed by the heirs of Sanchez and N&C. N&C now wants toenforce the judgment of levy on the machinery.

ISSUE: Whether or not N&C has the right to levy on the machinery.

HELD: Yes. The machinery can be levied by N&C although the machines areimmovable (by destination; although placed by a tenant, it is now immovablebased on the lease agreement with Sanchez) because N&C was not given legalnotice of the lease. This came about because the contracts between Sanchez andCA and Valdes and CA were not recorded in public instruments. As such, it cannotbe prejudicial to third persons. To N&C, the machinery is movable, thus can belevied upon.


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Alternative doctrine: The machinery would be considered as real property.Machinery placed on property by a tenant does not become immobilized: whenhowever, a tenant places it there pursuant to a contract that it shall belong to the

owner, it becomes immobilized as to that tenant and his assigns having notice,although it does not become so as to the creditors not having legal notice of thelease. Machinery which is movable in its nature becomes immobilized when placedin a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by atenant, a usufructuary, or a person having only temporary right, unless such personacted as the agent of the owner.

Mindanao Bus vs. City AssessorFACTS: City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro assessed tax on Mindanao Bus Cosequipment for bus repairs as they are immovable. Petitioner contends they are notprincipal equipments for the industry.

ISSUE: Can the equipment be taxed?

HELD: No. They are not immovable under Art. 415 par. 5. The too ls and equipmentsin question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principlemunicipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoesby motor trucks.

Metropolitan Bank vs. AlejoFACTS: Spouses Acampado obtained loans from the bank. They executed a r ealestate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their names. Sy Tan Se filed aComplaint for Declaration of Nullity of the T CT against the spouses. The bank wasnot made a party thereto. The sp ouses defaulted and the bank acquired the lotthrough a winning bid. It executed an Affidavit for Consolidation of Ownership for

the RD to issue a new T CT. Meanwhile, the RTC annulled the title of the spouses.The bank filed for annulment of the RTC decision. The CA dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment on the civil case should be annulled.

HELD: Yes. The property was mortgaged to the petitioner and such mortgage wasannotated on the TCT before institution of the civil case. The nullification of the TCTcarried with it the nullification and cancellation of the mortgage annotation.Although a mortgage affects the land and not merely its TCT, the cancellation of the TCT and the mortgage annotation exposed the bank to real prejudice because

its rights over the mortgaged property would no longer be known and respected bythird parties. The nullification of the TCT adversely affected its property rights,considering that a real mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.In relation to Article 415: The bank as a mortgagee has a real right over the

immovable property. This case gives an example of immov able property under Art.415 (10).

CHAPTER 2MOVABLE PROPERTY

ARTICLE 416-418

Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not

included in the preceding article;(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is

considered as personal property;(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science;

and(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to

place without impairment of the real property to which theyare fixed.

Art. 417. The following are also considered as personal property:(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables

or demandable sums; and(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial

entities, although they may have real estate

Art. 418. Movable property is either consumable or nonconsumable. To thefirst class belong those movables which cannot be used in amanner appropriate to their nature without their being consumed;to the second class belong all the others


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Memory Aid: Movable Properties under Article 416-417

LTO SNN

Those real property considered by Law as personal property All things which can Transported from place to place without impairment of

the real property to which they a re fixed. Obligations which have for their object movables Shares of stock Those movables suspeceptible of appropriation Not included in Article 415. Forces of Nature which are brought under control by science

Three tests to Determine whether Property is movable or Immovable1. If the property is capable of being carried from place to place

(DESCRIPTION TEST)

2. If such change in location can be made without injuring the real propertyto which it may in t he meantime be attached (DESCRIPTION TEST)3. If finally, the object is not one of those enumerated of included in Article

415 (EXCLUSION TEST)

Note: Exclusion test is SUPERIOR to description test. Consumabes and Non-ConsumablesConsumables things are those whose use according to their nature destroys thesubstance of the thing or causes their loss to the owner. Food is an example of aconsumable thing; money in coin is a non-consumable.

Fungibles and Non-FungiblesThe quality of being fungible depends upon their possibility, because of theirnature or the will of the parties, of being substituted by others of the same kind,not having a distinct individuality. These are generally the things whoseindividuality can be determined by counting, weighing or measuring. Ten heads of cattle or 100 copies of newspaper are examples of fungible things. On the otherhand, non-fungibles are those which have their own individuality and do not admitof substitution. Example: ten bottles of wine which I have in my room.

Distinction between Consumable and Fungibles

A classification of things into fungibles and non-fungibles is a classificationaccording to purpose, depending on whether they can be substituted by otherthings of the same kind, quality or quantity. The classification into consumable ornon-consumable is according to the nature of the building.

CASES

Sibal vs. ValdezSee case above under Article 415

Laurel vs. AbrogarFACTS: Baynet Co. offered ISR (International Simple Resale) which is a method of re- routing PLDTs call lines abroad to avoid expenses. PLDT accuses Baynet of theft.

ISSUE: Are telephone calls personal property?

HELD: Yes. It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, t he humanvoice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmittedto the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. Intangibleproperty such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may betaken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of theCivil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought unde r control byscience."

Sonny Lo vs. KJS Eco-Framework SystemsFACTS: Lo bought from KJS steel s caffoldings and made down payment. He wasunable to pay subsequent installments so they signed a deed of assignmentassigning Los receivables from Jomero Rea lty as payment. Jomero t hereafterrefused payment upon KJSdemand.

ISSUE: Was Los obligation extinguished upon signing deed of assignment?

HELD: No. Lo breached his obligation under the Deed of Assignment because he didnot execute and do all such further acts and deeds as shall be reasonably necessary to effectually enable KJS to recover whatever collectibles KJS has, that is, he did notensure that he had no unpaid obligation from Jomero so the it may not set-off what Lo owed it.


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T H I S R E V I E W E R M A Y N O T

B E R E P R O D U C E D A N D D I S T R I B U T E D W I T H O U T T H E P E R M I S S I O N O F T H E A U T H O R S

CHAPTER 3PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS

ARTICLE 419-424

Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

Properties are owned either in a public capacity ( dominio publico ) or in aprivate capacity ( propiedad privado ). The State may own properties both inpublic and in private capacity.

Definition of Public Dominion Public Dominion means ownership by the State in that the State has control

and administration. In another sense, it means ownership by the public ingeneral, in that not even the State or subdivisions thereof may make them theobject of commerce as long as they remain properties for public use.

Public dominion does not carry the idea of ownership; property of publicdominion is not owned by the State, but pertains to the State, which asterritorial sovereign exercises certain juridical prerogatives over suchproperty. Their purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but thecitizens; they are intended for the common and public welfare, and so theycannot be the object of appropriation, either by the State or private persons.

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,

torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,and are intended for some public service or for thedevelopment of the national wealth.

Three kinds of Property of Public Domain1. FOR PUBLIC USE like roads2. FOR PUBLIC SERVICE like national government buildings3. FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL WEALTH like our natural

resources

Other of similar character under Paragraph 1 of Article 420 1. Public streams2. Natural beds of river3. River channels

4.

Waters of rivers5. Creeks6. Lands thrown up by the sea and formed by accretion upon the shore by

the action of the water, together with the adjacent shore7. Lands reclaimed from the sea by government8. The Manila Bay area or costal area9. Private lands which have been invaded by the waters or waves of the sea

and converted into portions of t he shore or beach10. Streets even when planted by persons with coconut trees

Characteristics of Properties of Public Dominion1. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be leased, donated,

sold, or be the object of any contract.

2. They cannot be acquired by prescription; no matter how long thepossession of the properties has been.

3. They are not subject to attachment and execution4. They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.5. They cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the

subject of a Torrens Title; if erroneously included in a Torrens Title, theland involved remains property of the public domain.

6. In general, they can be used by everybody.7. They may either be real or personal property as the law does not

distinguish.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character statedin the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

Definition of Patrimonial propertyPatrimonial property of the State is the property it owns but which is not devotedto public use, public service or the development of the national wealth. It is wealthowned by the State in its private capacity, as distinguished from its public capacity.

Patrimonial properties may be acquired thru prescription.


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Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for publicuse or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonialproperty of the State.

Propwrty of public domain ceases to be such and becomes private property of the State only upon a declaration by the government, through the executiveor legislative departments, to the effect that it is no longer needed for publicuse or service. It matters not whether the property is actually devoted topublic use or public service.

If the property has been intended for such use or service, and the governmenthas not devoted it to other uses, or adopted any measure which amounted toa withdrawal thereof from public use or service, the same remains propertyfor public use or service notwithstanding the fact that it is not actuallydevoted for public use or service.

Mere possession of land does not itself automatically divest it of its publiccharacter.

Different rule for abandoned river bedsAlthough, as a rule, property of public dominion when no longer used for publicservice shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State, Article 461 providesthat an abandoned river bed belongs not to the State ut to the private land ownerwhose land is now occupied by the changed course, in proportion to the area lost.

Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided intoproperty for public use and patrimonial property.

Properties of Political Subdivisions Property for public use Patrimonial property

Alienation of the Properties Properties of a political subdivision for public use cannot be alienated and may

not be acquired by prescription. Properties of a political subdivision which are patrimonial in character may be

alienated and may be acquired by others thru prescription.

Donation by the National Government to a Political Subdivision

The National Government may donate its patrimonial property to amunicipality and latter may own the same. A municipality is a juridical personcapable of acquiring properties.

When thus donated, the property becomes either property for public use or

patrimonial property, depending on the use given to the property. When, for example, a municipality allows private persons to build on a landdonated by the National Government and collects rentals, the property ispatrimonial in character

Conversion of Properties of Political Subdivision for Public use to Patrimonial Apply Article 422 by analogy When a municipalitys properties for public use are no longer intended

for such use, the properties become patrimonial.

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, thesquares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public worksfor public service paid for by said provinces, cities, ormunicipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial andshall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisionsof special laws.

Property for public use by provinces and towns are governed by the sameprinciples as property of public dominion of the same character. They are outsideof the commerce of man, and therefore they cannot be the subject matter of private contracts, they cannot be acquired by prescription, and they are not subjectto attachment and execution. They become private property of the province ortown when no longer for public u se, applying Article 422 by analogy.

Art 424 enumerates the various kinds of properties of political subdivisions:1. Property for public use2. Patrimonial property

Basis of Classification Under Art. 424, the basis of the classification would be the use. However,

the National Government still controls the disposition of prprties of


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political subdivisions regardless of the use to which they are devotedprovided that the properties came from the State.

The properties of provinces, cities and municipalities may also beclassified into:

1.

Those acquired with their own funds in their private or corporatecapacity2. Those held by the political subdivision in trust for the State for the

benefit of the inhabitants. (Reason: the political subdivision owes itscreation to the State. It is the States agent for the purpose of localadministration).

CASES

Laurel vs. GarciaFACTS: Roponggi is a property of the Phils. In Japan. Pres. Aquino wanted todispose of Roponggi through a sale. Prohibitions were filed against this action.

ISSUE: Can Roponggi property be subject of bidding?

HELD: No. The Roppongi property is for public service as dictated by theReparations Agreement. It is of public dominion and is outside of the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. The Roppongi property is correctly classified underparagraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State andintended for some public service. Its ownership is a special collective ownership forgeneral use and enjoyment and thus, it s erves the citizens.

Republic vs. Court of AppealsFACTS: Del Rio purchased a land in Laguna de Bay and so he filed to register theland. Private oppositors who obtained permission from Del Rio to construct duck

houses in the land opposed registration. Director of Land also refused registrationon the ground that part o f the land is foreshore land of Laguna de Bay.

ISSUE: Can del Rio register land?

HELD: Yes. The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted to be thehighest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depthbeing the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the timeduring the year." Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level

of the water at which it is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the"highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to beregistered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it beconsidered as foreshore land. The land sought to be registered not being part of

the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Directorof Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as privateproperty provided that the applicant proves t hat he has a registerable title.

Macasiano vs. DioknoFACTS: An ordinance authorized the closure of certain streets in Paranaque and theestablishment of flea markets thereon. Metropolitan Manila Authority approvedsuch ordinance subject to the condition that the said streets are not used forvehicular traffic and that majority of the residents do not oppose the establishmentof the flea market. Flea markets materialized but Brig. Gen Macasiano ordered thedestruction of the stalls.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance authorizing the lease and use of public streets orthoroughfares as sites for flea markets are valid? NO!

HELD: Streets herein involved are local roads devoted for public service and areconsidered public properties of the municipality pursuant to Art. 424 of the CivilCode. The local government has no authority to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to thepublic in general are outside the commerce of men and cannot be disposed /leased to private persons. The closure should be for the purpose of withdrawingthe road from public use when such property is no longer intended or necessary forpublic use/ service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the propertybecomes patrimonial property of the LGU.

City of Manila vs. IACFACTS: Vivencio is buried in a lot leased for 50 years in the North Cemetery. Said lotwas certified pursuant to an Admin Order and believing that the lease was only for5 years, authorities of the cemetery removed from said lot the remains of Vivencioas the said lot was rented o ut to another lessee.

ISSUE: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are proprietaryfunction of the City of Manila? YES!


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HELD: North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. With the actsof dominion (administration and government of the cemetery; prescribingprocedure and guidelines for the use / disposition of burial lots), it is within theclass of property which Manila owns in it s proprietary or private character.

Reclaimed Lands

Chavez vs. PEAFACTS: The government entered into a contract to reclaim certain areas in ManilaBay for the construction of the M anila-Cavite road. Pres. Marcos created PEA and itwas tasked to oversee the reclamation project. Pres. Cory granted the landsinvolved in the project to PEA and TCTs were issued to it covering the lands calledFreedom Islands. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI todevelop the Freedo m Islands. This agreement was approved by PEAs board of directors and Pres. Ramos. Senate Pres. Maceda claimed that the JVA was thegrandmother of all scams. The Senate investigated the matter and concluded that

the lands under the JVA were inalienable. As such, it cannot be sold to AMARIwhich is a private corporation. The TCTs covering the lands were void and the JV Aillegal. The Legal Task Force created by Pres. Ramos investigated the matter andupheld the validity of the JVA. N ews reports mentioned that there wererenegotiations between PEA and AMARI. Zulueta filed a case but it was dismissed.Chavez also filed a case seeking the disclosure of the terms of the renegotiations aswell as assailing the validity of the sale of the lands. PEA and AMARI signed anamended JVA which was approved by Pres. Estrada. Chavez now prays that this bedeclared null and void.

ALTERNATIVE FACTS: Amari, a private corporation, was tasked by PEA to reclaimthe land in the Manila Bay. Whatever is r eclaimed will be shared by PEA and Amariin a 70-30 division respectively. The Freedom Islands have already been reclaimedand subject to development. More areas along the Bay are to be reclaimed.

ISSUE: What is the nature of (a) the Freedom Islands a nd (b) the lands to bereclaimed in the future?

HELD: (a) On the Freedom Islands: They are reclaimed lands and as such, are a partof public domain and property of the government. Unless classified as alienable, itcannot be sold. There was no legislation from Congress declaring the islands asalienable. Pres. Cory issued a sales patent to PEA as a declaration that the land is

alienable. According to the SC, granting such is the case, the private corporationcannot alienate that land because it will violate the Co nstitution. Amari can onlylease.(b) On the future reclaimed lands: According to the SC, they are not reclaimed as

of yet and the land is of public domain. It cannot be subject of a sale or a contract.The JVA is null and void. PEA still owns the property.

Phil. Fisheries Development Authority vs. CAFACTS: Mun. of Navotas assessed the real estate taxes allegedly due from PhilFisheries Devt Authority on properties under its management and operationlocated in Navotas Fishing Port Complex (NFPC). Taxes remained unpaid and theMunicipality wanted NFPC to be sold at public auction. PFDA claims that NFPC wasowned by Rep. of the Phils and is not a taxable entity.

ISSUE: WON PFDAis liable to pay the real property tax? NO!

HELD: PFDA, being an instrumentality of the national government, is exempt fromreal property tax, but the exemption does not extend to the portions of the NFPCleased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial use. Art. 420provides that property for public use such as ports constructed by the State areproperties of the public dominion. The NFPC is one such property. The land inwhich NFPC sits is a reclaimed land, which belongs to the state. Reclaimed landsare lands of the public domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat, be thesubject of a sale may it be public or private.

Others

Manila Lodge 761 vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: The City of Manila was authorized to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay.Eventually, the City conveyed a po rtion of the reclaimed area to Manila Lodge No761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the USA (BPOE, for short) with aright to repurchase. BPOE sold the same land to The Elks Club, Inc. A TCT wasissued to The Elks Club, Inc. but the same was changed to the BPOE. The latter filedto cancel the Cit ys right to repurchase. This was granted by the court. Meanwhile,BPOE sold the land to Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). The City filed to havethe right of repurchase reannotated after 50 years from the execution of the sale.TDC filed a complaint. The trial court reaffirmed the order of reannotation butreserved the right to TDC to bring action to clarify its rights. The trial court


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eventually ruled that the land is public and that the sale is null and void. It also heldthat TDC is a purchaser in good faith and that BPOE is entitled to recover from theCity of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land is of public dominion.

HELD: Yes. Article 344 (now Article 424) describes what properties are for publicuse. The reclaimed area is an extension of the o ld Luneta, a public park and forpublic use. As such, it has the same quality as Luneta public. The area wasformerly a part of Manila Bay. It is a part of the national domain open to public use.Also, in order to be a property of public domain an intention to devote it to publicuse is sufficient. It is not necessary that a plaza be constructed or laid out in orderthat it is considered property for public use. Intention is sufficient. Although thegovernment could convert it into a patrimonial property, such was not done in thiscase. It remained part of public dominion. The sale is null and void.

Hilario v. City of ManilaFACTS: The Hilario estate is beside the San Mateo river. A flood destroyed the ditchand the river meandered into the estate creating a s trip of land segregating it fromthe rest. The eastern part of this strip is the disputed land which stands betweenthe old riverbed and the new course of the river. The City of Manila claims it canmake extractions on the riverbed because this is of public domain.

Issue: When a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a newone through a private property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership as well?

HELD: Yes. All riverbanks are of public ownership including those formed when ariver leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339

of the old Civil Code i s very clear. It included riverbanks as property of publicownership. Riverbank is part of riverbed. The lower court is correct that banks of the river are part of its bed. All beds of rivers are public ownership, it follows thatthe banks which form part of th em, are also of public ownership.

Vda. De Nazareno v. Court of AppealsFACTS: A parcel of land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river and is herein thesubject of controversy. Respondents leased the subject lots on which their houses

stood from Nazareno. Lessees failed to pay and so they were ejected. BeforeNazareno dies, he wanted to perfect his title over the accretion area subject of thecontroversy. He claims the area as his and a survey plan was approved by theBureau of Lands. However, said plan was never released because respondents

protested before the Bureau.

ISSUE: WON the subject land is a public land? YES!

HELD: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 has the ff.requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) thatthe land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or thesea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion. Claimants have not met the firstand second requirements because the accretion was formed by dumping of boulders and sawdust so the deposition of soil is not gradual a nd imperceptible andnot a result of the action of water. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of natureand the requirement that the deposit should be to the effect of the current of the

river is indispensable. Where the land is not formed by water current but is also aconsequence of mans intervention, it is a man -made accretion and such is part of public domain.

Government vs. CabangisFACTS: In 1896, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea,. It remainedsubmerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessarydredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been recoveredA took possession of it.

ISSUE: The ownership of the reclaimed land

HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has becomeproperty of the public domainion because in letting it remain submerged, A may besaid to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the seashore,it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it landagain, its status as public dominion remained unchanged; therefore, A is notentitled to the land.


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Meneses vs. CAFACTS: Darum, the District Land Officer of Los Baos, Laguna, issued to PablitoMeneses Free Patents and Certificates of Title covering the subject land. Menesesacquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of

Rights in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and "some monetaryobligations" in favor of Pablito. After the execution of said document, Pablito tookpossession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as hisown for tax purposes and paid t he corresponding realty taxes.

Quisumbings filed a petition for the nullification of the free patents and titlesissued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Meneses, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their"private accretion land", and, confederating with District Land Officer Darum andLand Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and original certificates of title tothe land.

The CFI ruled in favor of the Quisimbings, finding that the lands registered by theMeneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid rightas owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited thedisputed lots.

ISSUE: W/N the lands were public domain, NOT accretion lands.

HELD: NO. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not apublic land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided thatthe applicant proves that he has a registerable title.Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Coderequires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil orsediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the r esult of the action of thewaters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place isadjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).

Maneclang vs. Intermediate Appellate CourtFACTS: Petitioner Maneclang, et. al. filed a complaint for quieting of title over acertain fishpond located within the four 4 parcels of land belonging to them andthe annulment of Municipal Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95. The trial court dismissedthe complaint upon a finding that the body of water t raversing the titled properties

of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore publicin nature and not subject to private appropriation. The lower court likewise heldthat Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Creek and ResolutionNo. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries,

including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by respondents asmembers of the Municipal Council in the exercise of their legislative powers.Petitioners appealed but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the Compromise Agreement is null and void.

HELD: YES. the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Courta Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing theownership of petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titledproperties. The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of thefishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was

originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. A creek is a recess or armextending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, a propertybelonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriationand acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered underthe Torrens System in the name of any individual. Neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented thewater from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into afishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the publicdomain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legaleffect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.

Dacanay vs. AsistioFACTS: MMC Ordinance indicated that the authorizing and regulating of the use of certain city/municipality streets, roads and open spaces within Metro Manila forflea market and/or vending areas shall be subject to the approval of theMetropolitan Manila Commission. The trial court found that the mentioned streetsare of public dominion, thus, outside the commerce of men. It disallowed the useof the streets as flea market and/or vending areas as it held based on differentcases that properties for public use may not be leased to private individuals. TheCity has been allowing the stalls to proliferate on the streets and it must desist.Invoking the trial courts decision, Dacanay, a concerned citizen, residing in Heroes


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del 96 street, one of the affected streets, wrote a le tter to the public officialsconcerned but his concerns were left unanswered. Dacanay then filed a complaintagainst the mayor and city engineer in the Ombudsman for dereliction of publicduties through manifest partiality. The public officials insist that it would be harsh

and inhuman to eject the stallowners and their dependents from the area inquestion as it would be hard to relocate them. The Ombudsman found that thepublic officials were purely motivated by their perceived moral and socialresponsibility toward their constituents, but found that there was an omission of an act to be performed. The Ombudsman then recommended the filing of theinformation in court.

ISSUE: W/N public streets or thoroughfares can be leased or licensed to marketstallholders by a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Commission.

HELD: No, public streets or thoroughfares cannot be leased or licensed. Thepetition is meritorious. A public street is a property for public use hence outsidethe commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of

man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. As stallholders pay feesto the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, theCity Government, contrary to law, has b een leasing portions of the streets to them.Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right to usethe city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a fewshould not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whosehealth, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the city officials are underlegal obligation to protect. The order authorizing the use of the streets as vendingareas contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for publicuse.

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene vs. Bercilles

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, theterminal portion of one of its streets. Later it authorized the sale thru publicbidding of the property. The Cebu Oxygen and Cetylene Co was able to purchasethe same. It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of the land. Thepetition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lotis still part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be registered.

ISSUE: May the lot be registered in t he name of the buyer?

HELD: Yes, the land can be registed in the name of the buyer, because the street

has already been withdrawn from public use and accordingly has becomepatrimonial propery. The lots sale was therefore valid

ARTICLE 425

Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of allproperty belonging to private persons, either individually orcollectively.

By virtue of Art. 425, the Code recognizes the rights to private property. Collectively here refers to ownership by private individuals as co -owners, or

by corporations, partnerships or other juridical persons allowed by the CivilCode to possess and acquire properties.

Roads may be either public or private property. Aliens have no right to acquire any public or private agricultureal, commercial,or residential lands. The same rule applies to foreign corporations, even if it bea religious or non-stock foreign corporation.

The constitutional provision against the acquisition of land by aliens isABSOLUTE.

PROVISIONS COMMON TO THE THREE PRECEDING CHAPTERS

ARTICLE 426

Art. 426. Whenever by provision of the law, or an individual declaration, the

expression "immovable things or property," or "movable things or property," is used, it shall be deemed to include, respectively, thethings enumerated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

Whenever the word "muebles," or "furniture," is used alone, itshall not be deemed to include money, credits, commercialsecurities, stocks and bonds, jewelry, scientific or artisticcollections, books, medals, arms, clothing, horses or carriages andtheir accessories, grains, liquids and merchandise, or other thingswhich do not have as their principal object the furnishing or


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ornamenting of a building, except where from the context of thelaw, or the individual declaration, the contrary clearly appears.

TITLE II: OWNERSHIP

CHAPTER IOWNERSHIP IN GENERAL

ARTICLE 427 to 439

Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights.

OwnershipThe independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in hispossession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery, subject to no restrictions exceptthose imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisionsof the law.

Kinds of Ownership:

According to Paras :

1. Full Ownership This includes all the rights of an owner.2. Naked Ownership This is ownership where the right to the use and the

fruits has been denied.a. NOTE: Naked Ownership + Usufruct = FULL OWNERSHIP

3. Sole Ownership Where the ownership is vested in o nly one person.4. Co-Ownership When ownership is vested to two or more owners.

According to Certeza :

1. Beneficial ownership right of its enjoyment is in one person where thelegal title is in another.

2. Full ownership includes all the rights of an owner.3. Naked ownership ownership where the right to use and to the fruits are

denied.

Where Questions of Ownership should be decided

Questions relating to ownership or even to the validity or discharge of a mortgageshould generally be ventilated in an ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION OR PROCEEDING.

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, withoutother limitations than those established by law.

The ownership has also a right of action against the holder andpossessor of the thing in order to recover it.

Codal Map for Rights of an Owner under Art. 428 in relation to other provisions

Rights of an Owner under the Civil Code1. The Right to ENJOY

a. Which includes:i. The Right to Possess

ii. The Right to Useiii. The Right to the Fruits


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2. The Right to DISPOSEa. Which includes:

i. The Right to Consume or Destroy or Abuseii. The Right to Encumber or Alienate

3. The Right to RECOVER or VINDICATE

Rights of an Owner under Roman Law1. Jus Possidendi The Right to POSSESS

a. The right to hold a thing or enjoy a right.2. Jus Utendi The Right to USE

a. This right includes the right to exclude any person.3. Jus Fruendi The Right to the FRUITS

a. The right to three kinds of fruits (Natural, Industrial, and CivilFruits)

4. Jus Abutendi The Right to CONSUME (includes to TRANSFORM orABUSE)

5. Jus Disponend The Right to DISPOSE

6. Jus Vindicandi The Right to RECOVER

Actions to Recover Personal Property

Replevin An action or provisional remedy where the complaint prays for therecovery of the possession of personal property.

NOTE: Property already placed under legal custody may not be a proper subject of replevin.Actions to Recover Real Property

1. Forcible Entry or Unlawful Detainer Accion Interdictal 2. Accion Publiciana Plenary action to recover the better right of

possession.3. Accion Reivindicatoria Reivindicatory Action

Additional Actions to Recover Real Property1. Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction2. Writ of Possession

Forcible Entry ( Detentacion )

It is a summary action to recover material or physical possession of real propertywhen a person originally in pos session was deprived thereof by force, intimidation,strategy, threat, or stealth. It prescribes within one (1) year.

Unlawful Detainer ( Desahucio )It is the action that must be brought when possession by a landlord, vendor,vendee, or other person of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld afterthe expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of anycontract, express, or implied. In short, to make out a case of unlawful detainer, thecomplaint must show that the withholding of possession or refusal to vacate isUNLAWFUL. The action must be brought within one (1) year from the timepossession becomes unlawful. The issue is POSSESSION DE FACTO (materialpossession), not possession de jure nor ownership.

Accion PublicianaIt is intended for the recovery of the better right to possess, and is a plenary actionin an ordinary civil proceeding before the Regional Trial Court. It must be brought

within a period of ten (10) years. The issue is POSSESSION DE JURE, not possessionde facto.

Two kinds of accion publiciana 1. Where the entry was not obtained through Fraud, Intimidation, Stealth,

Treat, or Strategy.2. Where the one (1) year period for bringing forcible entry or unlawful

detainer has already expired.

Accion ReivindicatoriaIt is the action to recover ownership over real property. It must be brought withinten (10) or thirty (30) years as the case may be, depending on whether the otherparty seeks to obtain ownership by ordinary or extraordinary prescription. Theissue involved is OWNERSHIP, and for this purpose, evidence of title or mode maybe introduced.

Writ of InjunctionOrdinarily, a person deprived of his possession of real or personal property, is notallowed to avail himself of this remedy, the reason is that the defendant in actualpossession is presumed disputable to have the better right. However, under certainconditions, and in view of frequent delays in cases of this nature, this remedy may


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be availed of in the original case of forcible entry, and during appeal, in the case of unlawful detainer.

Writ of PossessionIt is an order directing the sheriff to place a successful registrant under the Torrenssystem in possession of the property covered by a decree of the Court. This is usedin connection with the Land Registration Law.

The Limitations on Ownership1. Those given by the State.

a. I.e. Police Power, Power of Taxation, Power of EminentDomain.

2. Those given by the Law.a. I.e. the legal easement of waters, the legal easement of right of

way.

3. Those given by the owner (or grantee) himself.a. I.e. owner leases his property; owner cannot use the property

while lease is still at force.4. Those given by the person (grantor) who gave the ting to its present

owner.a. I.e. donor may prohibit the donees from partitioning the

property for a period not exceeding twenty (20) years.

Art. 429 The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to excludeany person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For thispurpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary torepel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasionor usurpation of his property.

Doctrine of Self -Help It is the right to counter, in certain cases, force with force. Relate this with Article11 of the Revised Penal Code on Self Defense, which includes defense to a personsproperty rights.

Art. 430 Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by meansof walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other meanswithout detriment to servitudes constituted therein.

Art. 431 The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner asto injure the rights of a third person.

No Injury to Rights of Third PersonsThis is one of the fundamental bases of police power, and constitutes a justrestriction on the right of o wnership.Example:

1. Blowing your saxophone in the middle of the night.2. Burning your house in the city.

Art. 432 The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert animminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to thedamage arising to the owner from the interference, is muchgreater. The owner may demand from the person benefited

indemnity for the damage to him.

State of NecessityThis Article refers to a state of necessity as distinguished from the principle of self-help in Art. 429. Under the RPC, the state of necessity is a justifying circumstance.Example:

1. Driving over a cow in order to save your person from colliding inparallel walls.

Art. 433 Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputablepresumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicialprocess for the recovery of the property.

Disputable Presumption of OwnershipTwo requirements to raise a disputable (rebuttable) presumption of ownership:

1. Actual possession; and2. Claim of Ownership

NOTE: This Article applies to both immovable and movable property.


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Art. 434 In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and theplaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on theweakness of the defendants claim.

Requisites in Action to Recover1. Property must be identified

a. Boundaries of the land sought must be proved.b. In case of doubt, the court may require each party to present

plans prepared by a competent person.2. Strength of the Plaintiffs Title

a. Evidence of Ownership could be:i. Torrens Certificate

ii. Spanish Titleiii. Long and actual possession

Art. 435 No person shall be deprived of his property except by competentauthority and for public use and always upon payment of justcompensation.

Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shallprotect and, in a proper case, restore the ownership in hispossession.

Eminent Domain This is a limitation on the right of ownership which may be exercised

even over private properties of cities and municipalities, and even overlands registered with a Torrens title.

According to Cooley, it is the right of the State to acquire private propertyfor public use upon payment of j ust compensation.

This is inherently possessed by the Legislature, but it may be validlydelegated to local governments, other public entities, and public utilities.

Eminent Domain Distinguished from ExpropriationWhile eminent domain refers to the RIGHT, expropriation usually refers to thePROCEDURE, thru which the right is exercised.

Essential Requirements of Eminent Domain

1. Taking by COMPETENT AUTHORITY2. Observation of DUE PROCESS OF LAW3. Taking for PUBLIC USE4. Payment of JUST COMPENSATION

Competent AuthorityAuthority as of Right The StateAuthority by virtue of grant Persons or Corporations offering Public ServicesExamples:

1. National Government (thru President)2. City of Manila (thru the Municipal Board with the Mayors approval) 3. Provinces (thru the Provincial Board with the approval of the

Executive Secretary of the President)4. Municipalities (thru the municipal councils, with the approval of the

Executive Secretary of the President)5. Other public corporations (thru the Board of Directors, provided

there is prior government approval)6. The Manila Railroad Co.

Due Process of LawThere must be proper expropriation proceedings.It must include:

1. A notice to the owner of the property.2. A full opportunity to present his side on whether or not the purpose

of the taking is public; or whether the government reasonably needs theproperty.

3. Such other procedural requisites provided by law.

Strict Construction Whenever an entity is granted the right to expropriate, thegrant must be strictly construed.

Public UseThe question as to whether or not any specific or particular use is a public one isultimately a judicial question. HOWEVER:

If the Congress has specifically allowed expropriation of realty for adesignated or specified public purpose, the courts of justice are notallowed to inquire into the necessity of such purpose.


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If the grant is merely a general one, courts have jurisdiction to d ecidewhether the taking is indeed for a public use. In such case, the issue is aquestion of fact, and the Court should inquire into and hear proof uponthe question.

Doctrine of Reasonable Necessity Absolute necessity for expropriation is notrequired; all that is needed is a reasonable necessity for the public use intended.(Manila Railroad Co. vs. Michell).

Payment of Just CompensationJust Compensation means a fair and full equivalent value of the loss sustained.Computation: Just Compensation = Market Value + (Consequential damages Consequential benefits)Market Value the price that the property will bring when it is offered for sale byone who desires, but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who is under nonecessity of having it.

NOTE: Incidental or consequential benefits may be set off only against theconsequential damages, and not against the basic value of the property taken.

Effects of Expropriation on the Ownership of the Property Expropriated Ownership is transferred only when payment of just compensation with

proper interest is made. (Jacinto vs. Director of Lands) The government shall restore the owner in his possession o f the property

if the owner will not be paid just compensation. If the property expropriated is no longer needed for the public use it was

originally intended:o If the judgment gave full ownership to the plaintiff, he remains

the owner even after the need has disappeared.o If the grant had been conditional, that is, that ownership would

revert to the original owner, said condition is a valid one. Expropriation transfers ownership over all kinds of properties whether

real or personal, tangible or intangible. (Metropolitan Water District vs.Director of Lands)

Extraordinary ExpropriationIt is for the purpose of championing the cause of social justice to the end thatpublic welfare will be enhanced.

Difference between Sale and E xpropriationA sale is voluntary while expropriation is involuntary. Thus, an owner who is willingto sell his property to the government, with a price mutually agreed upon, thetransaction is a sale, and it is not essential to institute condemnation proceedings.

Art. 436 When any property is condemned or seized by competent authorityin the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shallnot be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that suchcondemnation or seizure is unjustified.

Seizure as an Exercise of Police PowerThis article is based on the maxim that the welfare of the people is the supremelaw of the land. Unlike eminent domain, police power needs no giving of just andfinancial compensation before it can be exercised.Police power can refer to condemnation, seizure, total destruction provided thatthe public interest is served and the means used are not unduly harsh, abusive oroppressive.

A State in the exercise of police power may abate nuisances:Public nuisances that which affects a community or a considerable number of personsPrivate nuisances not publicNuisance per se nuisance under ALL circumstancesNuisance per accidens nuisance only under certain circumstances like a factory ina residential area

Due ProcessWhen the government exercises police power and issues police regulations, theperson concerned is not deprived of property without due process of law providedthat the requisites of law were followed.

Art 437 The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works ormake any plantations and excavations which he may deem properwithout detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws andordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Surface Right of a land owner


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T H I S R E V I E W E R M A Y N O T B E R E P R O D U C E D A N D D I S T R I B U T E D W I T H O U T T H E P E R M I S S I O N O F

T H E A U T H O R S

This article deals with the extent of ownership which a person has over a parcel of land. He also owns its surface up to the boundaries, with the right to make thereonallowable constructions, plantings and excavations subject to servitudes oreasements, special laws (ex. Mining Law), ordinances, reasonable requirements of aerial navigation and principles of human relations.It may also be further restricted by reasonable requirements of undergroundshelters and depots with proper State permission provided that the surface right isnot substantially disturbed. The idea is if the ownership does not extendindefinitely upwards, it shouldnt extend indefinitely downwards.

Regalian Doctrine ObservedThe State owns the mines and natural resources. If mines are discoveredunderneath the land of the owner, the mines belong to the State for thedevelopment of national wealth. This doctrine is for the benefit of the State andnot of private persons.

Art 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other

property on which it is found.

Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance,one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is atrespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.

If things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State mayacquire them at their just price, which shall be divided in conformitywith the rule stated.

Where hidden treasure may be found: on land, building or other property.

Treasure found on on es own property If X finds hidden treasure on his house, he owns it and if he is married, it belongs tothe conjugal partnership.

Treasure found on anothers property For the finder to be entitled to the share, he must have found the hiddentreasure by chance on the property of another. There must be no intent to look.BUT Paras believes the words by chance means by good luck whether there is a

deliberate search or not because it would be extremely difficult to find hiddentreasure without deliberately looking.

If A asked B, land owner if he could look for treasure on his land and B allowed andsubsequently A found treasure, how much of the treasure would go to A?It is believed that the treas

certeza property midterm reviewer

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