channels stu summer 2008

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  • 8/6/2019 Channels Stu Summer 2008

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    1Ganesh Iyer

    Channel Strategy: Going to Market

    XMBA 206.1

    Session 8

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    2Ganesh Iyer

    Dell Direct

    Fostered a new age of price competition. Priced 20 to 30%below IBM and consistently

    22 yr old UT Austin marketing major, initial seed capital of 80K

    IBM open architecture,

    investment in R&D, advertising and sales force support.

    Sold through regular distribution channels. Depended upon dealerservice and support

    Dell targeted the expert market

    sold thru 1-800 number.

    Direct marketing cut out the channel fat

    piggybacked upon IBM open architecture

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    3Ganesh Iyer

    Key Learning

    Integrated Channel and Pricing Strategy

    Channel decisions must always go hand in hand withSegmentation, Pricing and other elements of the marketing mix.

    Dells direct was possible because it was an integrated strategy Right target identification

    Direct marketing, no distribution or salesforce cost.

    no advertising

    And so lower price can be delivered to the price sensitive target

    consumer.

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    4

    Ganesh Iyer

    Learning

    Coordinating channels is critical for efficient behavior ofretailers.

    Channel decisions go hand in hand with the other elements ofthe marketing mix.

    Channel decisions have greatest the most long-term impact andare the hardest among all marketing strategy to change.

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    5

    Ganesh Iyer

    Why Use Channel Intermediaries?

    Wholesaleror Retailer

    With Intermediaries

    Milk P1 Bread P2 ShampooP3 Soap P4

    C1 C2 C3

    P1 P2 P3 P4

    C1 C2 C3

    Without Intermediaries

    ReducingTransactionCosts

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    6Ganesh Iyer

    Why Channel Intermediaries?

    Customers buy baskets or assortments of goods. Economizes on thetime cost of shopping

    Retail Service is most efficiently provided by an intermediary

    product demonstration, after-sales service

    Inventory carrying

    Intermediaries provide inventory buffer. Hedge against demandfluctuations for the manufacturers.

    Financing

    Examples automobiles or appliances

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    7

    Ganesh Iyer

    Types of Channel Intermediaries

    Goodyears Distribution

    Industry Goodyear

    Garages 6 0

    W. House clubs 6 0

    Mass Merchandisers 12 0

    Manufacturer Owned 9 27

    Independent 63 58 (50 indp. 8franchises)

    Other 4 15

    What does this imply?

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    9Ganesh Iyer

    Managing Retail Intermediaries

    Channel Conflict

    When each member of the channel is an independent business,retailers might not behave according to the manufacturerdesires

    This is called Channel Conflict

    Key problems with independent channels = Channel Conflict.

    Each member has her own private interests or profits inmind.

    Retail perspective may be more short term short-term profitsthan the manufacturer.

    National vs. Local perspective

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    10Ganesh Iyer

    Solution to Channel Conflict:

    Channel Coordination

    General Principle

    Manufacturers must find ways to maximize total channel profits.

    Why?

    The incremental profits can be used in two ways:

    Absorbed by the manufacturer leaving the retailer or other downstream channel member no worse than before.

    Shared with the channel members to reward them for providingbetter service.

    The challenge is to get the retailers to behave in a conventionalchannel with independent retailers

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    11Ganesh Iyer

    Channel Conflict and Coordination

    Double Marginalization

    ManufacturerGoodyear

    Retailer

    (Independent Dealer)

    Market

    C = 10

    W

    P

    P D

    30 10

    40 6

    50 2

    D(P)

    Demand forGoodyear Tiempo at your dealership

    First stage

    Second stage

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    12Ganesh Iyer

    Double Marginalization

    P D Ret_Profit Mfg_Profit Total_Profit

    30 10 20*10 = 200 0 200

    40 6 30*6 = 180 0 180

    50 2 40*2 = 80 0 80

    W = 10

    30 10 10*10 = 100 10*10 = 100 200

    40 6 20*6 = 120 10*6 = 60 180

    50 2 30*2 = 60 10*2 = 20 80

    30 10 X X X

    40 6 0 180 180

    50 2 10*2=20 30*2=60 80

    W = 20

    W = 40

    30 10 0 200 200

    40 6 10*6 = 60 20*6 = 120 180

    50 2 20*2=40 20*2=40 80

    W = 30

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    13Ganesh Iyer

    Double Marginalization Problem

    What wholesale price will the manufacturer charge?

    Manufacturer wants high W,

    But this forces retailer to charge high retail prices with too littledemand

    Can the manufacturer do better?

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    14Ganesh Iyer

    Solution to Double Marginalization

    Two-Part Tariff: McDonalds charges Upfront Franchise Fees from its franchise and a

    variable royaltyWhy?

    Two part tariff =F

    + Wq Suppose the manufacturer asks the retailer for an upfront Franchise Fee (F= $195) and in return charges W = c = 10

    What happens?

    Manufacturer Profits = 195, Retailer Profits = 5 Retail price = low at 30

    Demand = high at 10.

    Upfront Franchise fees helps in solving channel conflict because ithelps the manufacturer to lower wholesale price without sacrificingprofits.

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    15Ganesh Iyer

    Channel Conflict and Coordination

    Horizontal Conflict

    Horizontal Retailer Free-Riding:

    Services provided by one retailer helps other competing retailers McDonalds franchisees in a region.

    Free riding of pre-sale informational services.

    Goodyear selling to discounters and mass merchandisers.

    Solutions

    Random Monitoring ofFranchises

    Exclusive territories: Retailer is guaranteed all consumers in aterritory? What are the benefits?

    Saturn dealerships

    Prevents free-riding of retail services.

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    16Ganesh Iyer

    Should Goodyear Expand distribution to Mass

    Merchandisers?

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    17Ganesh Iyer

    Should Goodyear Expand distribution to Mass

    Merchandisers?

    Pros

    Over of all tire buyers (emergency purchases) make same day purchases--be within an arms length of desire unplanned purchases.

    Michelin and others already everywhere

    Mass merchandisers account for a declining percentage of replacement

    (12% in 91 28% in 1976). Their prices are 97% of independent dealers. Lessof a threat for independent dealers. Warehouse clubs are more of a threat.

    Mass merchandisers sell only 34% of private labelless interested in bait andswitch.

    Independent dealers are becoming less Goodyear loyal. Using Goodyear nameto bait-and-switch to private labels. Going to mass merchandisers might counter-

    balance this

    Cons

    Increased Price Competition

    Independent dealers might respond by supporting private labels

    Intensive distribution Erosion of brand loyalty

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    18Ganesh Iyer

    Vertical Retailer Free-Riding

    Retailer may use the manufacturers brand to draw customersinto the store and then sell other higher margin brands (Bait-and-Switch)

    Possible problem with Goodyear dealers as the market maturesand becomes more competitive.

    Solution

    Exclusive Dealing Contract: Requirement not to carry other

    brands. Provides incentives to retailers to invest in service to build up theproduct and therefore the manufacturer to invest in advertising andbrand building.

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    19Ganesh Iyer

    Channel Conflict and Coordination

    Manufacturer Free-Riding

    Manufacturer may not provide the promised advertising supportfor the retailers local market.

    Manufacturers may open supply to competing retailers after aretailer has invested in developing the manufacturers product.

    Solution

    Exclusive territories.

    Why are automobiles often sold through exclusive dealerships inexclusive territories.

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    20Ganesh Iyer

    Consumer Segmentation and Channel Design

    Design channels to serve the needs of target consumersegments.

    Which channel to use depends upon which consumer segment comparison shopper vs. product information vs. after-sales service.

    emergency vs. planned

    Evolution of consumer behavior to one-shop shopping has

    affected tire channels.

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    21Ganesh Iyer

    Information Needs and Channel Design

    Customers could identify Aquatread as being differentgrooves

    Can the role of this feature be easily communicated by TVadvertising determines how important is the role of retailinformation

    Primary information (education, demonstration, service)

    Early phase of product life cycle PLC.

    Need a dedicated authorized dealer channel which does not dealwith competitive products.

    Comparative information Later phase of PLC need to accentuate benefits versus

    competition.

    If you have a superior product you can move into channels whichdisplay products side by side.

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    22Ganesh Iyer

    Learning

    Coordinating channels is critical for efficient behavior ofretailers.

    Channel decisions go hand in hand with the other elements ofthe marketing mix.

    Channel decisions have greatest the most long-term impact

    and are the hardest among all marketing strategy to

    change.