chap 3 judicial inquiry digest const2

7/27/2019 Chap 3 Judicial Inquiry DIGEST CONST2

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[G.R. No. 152895. June 15, 2004]

OFELIA V. ARCETA,petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG,Presiding Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, MetroManila, respondent.

[G.R. No. 153151. June 15, 2004]

GLORIA S. DY,petitioner, vs. The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge,Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, respondent.

QUISUMBING,J .:

FACTS:

Both assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, also known as BatasPambansa Bilang 22.

1. G.R. No. 152895

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating B.P.Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatoryportion of said Information reads:

That on or about the 16 th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account or for value the check saidaccused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not have sufficient funds or creditwith the drawee bank for the payment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)

days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason

2. G.R. No. 153151

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed by the MeTC of Caloocan City as CriminalCase No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense in this wise:


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That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfullyand feloniously make and issue Check No. 0000329230 drawn against PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amountof P2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to apply for value in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at thetime of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such

check in full upon its presentment which check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNTCLOSED

ISSUE(S):

concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22.

RULING:

WHEREFORE,the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrinethat the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites arepresent: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal andsubstantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicialreview is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is thevery lis mota of the case

the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of acopy of an order, decision, or resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them

understandably within the ambit of Rule 65

Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify asthe actual and appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exerciseof this Courts power of judi cial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their facespetitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action.

Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse,figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65,Section 4 [11] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliestopportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliestopportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should

have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, thepetitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismissthe cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22.

Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in thecontroversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justifyits nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one
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that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative . [13] We have examined the contentions of thepetitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in itsimplementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 1284 48. February 1, 2001]

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MIRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petiti oners, vs . THE COURT OFAPPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO.,INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J .:

FACTS: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973 -1974, they produced 70,501.08 picul s [1] of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage planted to thesame crop was lower, yielding 65,100 picu ls of sugar, with 23,696.40 piculs marked for export.

Private respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed th e Mirasols sugar production venture for cropyears, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signedCredit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. TheChattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the petitioners attorney -in- fact to negotiate and to sell the latter s sugar in

both domestic and e xport markets and to app ly the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

57 9 [2] in November, 1974 . The decree authorized private respondent Philippine Exchange Co., In c. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar

allo cated for export to the United Sta tes and to other foreign markets . The price and quanti ty was determined by the SugarQuota Adminis tra tion, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, and finall y, by the Of fice of the President. The decree

further authori zed PNB to finance PHILEXs purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize

from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead

expenses and liabilities had been deducted

Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations , petitioners asked PNB for an account ing of the procee ds of the s ale of their export sugar. PNBignored the request. Meanwhile, petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfundedwithdrawals from their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and

demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for payment, petitioners on August 4, 1977, conveyed to PNBreal properties valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn accountofP1,513,347.78.

On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by petitioners to PNB stoodat P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then

proceeded to extrajudic ially fo reclose the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auct ion sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB st ill had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.
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PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under saidlaw, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to thedisposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages againstPNB wi th the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil Case No. 14725 .

After trial on the merits, the trial court decided as f ollows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiffs and against the defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Philippine Exchange Co.,Inc. (PHILEX):

(1)Declaring Presidential Decree 579 enacted on November 12, 1974 and all circulars, as well as policies, orders andother i ssuances issued in furtherance thereof, unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to theSolicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuance s [7] thereof are unconstitutional.

RULING:

WHEREFORE , the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R.CV 38607 AFFIRM ED . Costs against petitioners.

1. . It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority an d juris diction to consi der theconstitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order . [9] The Constitution vests the power of

judicial re vie w or the power to declare a law, treaty, intern ational or executi ve agreement, pres identialdecree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional TrialCourts .[10] In J.M . Tuason and Co. v. Court of A ppeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961) we hel d:

Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in casesinvolving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgmentsof inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. [11]

The purpose o f the manda tory notice in R ule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Soli ci tor General to decide whether o r not his

intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary.

In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial courtever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on theconstitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of therequired notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questionedpresi dential decrees.

2. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there mustbe before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of ju dicial re vie w. Second, the question before the
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Court must be ri pe for adju dication. Third, the person challenging the vali dity of the ac t must have standingto challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have bee n raise d at the earlies t opportunity, andlastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very li s mota of the case . [16]

As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled onother grounds .[17] The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume thatthe acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. Todoubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that themeasure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be inaccord with the Constitution before i t was finally enacted and approved . [18]

The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNBs obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined,without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, whichis applicable to PNBs intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The governing law should be the lawon agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners agent. In other wo rds, the requisite that theconstitutionality of the law in question be the very li s mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on theconstitutionality of P.D. No. 579.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner , vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTORVILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE

NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTERan d CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ONAUDIT,respondents .

D E C I S I O N PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of aNational Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

Petitioner contends :

"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATIONREFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308
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As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents thegovernment as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of hisdepartment . [18] He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he hasthe authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interferewith the discretion of its officials . [19] Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he isgranted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge hisduties effectively . [20]

An administr ative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in theadministrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for thesole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy . [24] We reject theargument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987 .

As said administrati ve order redefines the parameters of some basic ri ghts o f our cit izenry vis-a-visthe State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules andthe legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be coveredby law.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998]

SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO, LEAHARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO

CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANOROQUE, petitioners , vs . COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFOPINEDA,respondents .

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J. :

FACTS:

Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted aninvestigat ion on the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government offic ials in

jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling.

In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of xxxnational and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the Government s WitnessProtection, Security and Benefit Program. Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity asChairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C.Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also revealed that he and members of his family were in danger
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of being liquidated, facing as he did the formidable world of corruption with a well-entrenched hold onPhilippine social, political and economic systems.

After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, t heDepartment of Justice admitted Roque to the program, providing him a monthly allowance, temporaryshelter and personal and security protection during witness duty.

On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. andNelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG),several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered himmoney and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conductingraids on their respective gambling operations

On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roqueto the Witness Protection Program, which was d enied by petitioner Secretary in a letter-reply datedJanuary 11, 1996 (Annexes H and I ). On January 23, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition for Certiorari ,Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctionwith the respondent Court of Appeals.

Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA6981 expressly require that corroboration must already exist at the time of the witnessapplication as a prerequisite to admission into the Program.

Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that corroboration must already exist at the time of the witnessapplication as a prerequisite to admission into the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides:

On the other hand, petitioners contend that said provisions merely require that thetestimony of the state witness seeking admission into the Program can be substantiallycorroborated or is capable of corroboration. So long as corroboration can be obtained whenhe testifies in court, he satisfies the requirement that his testimony can be substantiallycorroborated on its material points.

ISSUE(S):

The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrantthe exercise of judicial power.

RULING:

There is no quarrel with this point. Until a more opportune occasion involving a concreteviolation of RA 6981 arises, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised bypetitioners.


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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

No Actual Controversy

Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentallydefective. The Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty of the cour tsof justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable. [6]

Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1)there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must beripe for adjudication ;[8] and (3) the person challenging must have standing ; that is, he haspersonal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain directinjury. [9]

The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of

judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or toresolve hypothetical or feigned problem s [10] or friendly suits collusively arranged between partieswithout real adverse interests

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertionof opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and

jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstractdifference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on thelegal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only adviseswhat the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts . [14]

In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Courtreverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of RespondentRoques testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with anyof their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision wouldfrustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. Buttheir apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mereapprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.

After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors,Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque hadalready testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roquesadmission into the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant

judicial review.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
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PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,Petitioners,vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVESECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,Respondents.

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G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,Petitioners,vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTUROC. LOMIBAO,Respondents.

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G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A.AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA,TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOS EL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R.MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENEANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO,GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS -BARAQUEL,IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OFCONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GATINCIONG,Petitioners,vs.EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DNDRONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTUROLOMIBAO, CHIEF P NP,Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG ANDSECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITOV. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN

CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN,Petitioners,vs.HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVESECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO,Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006


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ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG),Petitioner,vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTORGENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M.AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C.BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES (IBP),Petitioners,vs.HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HISCAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HISCAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF,Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA,Petitioner,vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR -GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINENATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THEARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASEXECUTIVE SECRETARY,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J . :

FACTS:

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PresidentialProclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal -

Arroyo committed grave abuse of disc retion. Petit ioners contend that respondent officials of theGovernment, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actuallytrampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuancesare void for being unconstitutional.

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Po wer I ,President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state o f national emergency

by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 do hereby command the ArmedForce s of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppre ss all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and toenforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regula tions promulgated b y mepersonally or upon my direction ; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution dohereby declare a State of National Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:


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elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Leftrepresented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance andengaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constitutedGovernment elected in May 2 004;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017,

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after allthese petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 whichreads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued onthe basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PhilippineNational Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent andsuppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as maybe necessary;

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that theproximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftistinsurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot tounseat or assassinate President Arroyo . 4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the Presidentand take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

While he explained that it is not respondent s ta sk to state the facts behind the questionedProclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence SanJuan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escapedtheir detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant andto elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to " show and proclaim our displeasure at thesham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the st reets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms. " 5

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled " Oplan Hackle I " which detailedplans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in BaguioCity. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyoherself

Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the " Magdalos D -Day would be onFebruary 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinosbrother, businessmen and mid-level go vernment officials plotted mo ves to bring down the Arroyoadministration
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For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities relatedto the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I ; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issuedearlier by the local governments.

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions- Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging atthe EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clustersof anti-riot police

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency hasceased to exist.

ISSUE(S):

A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions mo ot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al. ), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al .), 171489(Cadiz et al .), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

RULING:

A-1. But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity. "23 Courtsmay exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actualcase or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, theconstitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of theconstitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 24

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussionthereon.
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Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officialshereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shallcommence on the first Monday of March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including actsamounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not bequalified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate inany partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall b econclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by theCommission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. Theperiod of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January28, 1980. ( ibid .)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question theaccreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg.

53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "Thequestion of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als . No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,

ISSUE(S):

RULING:

that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of anappropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question:(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that theconstiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raisedthe issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.


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HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR.,petitioners , vs. COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELECBIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERSGIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOMESINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFICCONSORTIUM,respondents .

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J .:

FACTS:

On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046 , [5] which authorized Comelec toconduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the pollbody to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao (ARMM).

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436[6]

authorizing Comelec to usean automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes andcanvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. ). However, due to thefailure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu . [8]

In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and localpositions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoralexercise allegedly because of time constraints.

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization programfor the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its AutomatedElection System; namely, Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II -

Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission.Out of the 57 bidders ,[13] the BAC found MPC and the Total Information Management

Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BACs TechnicalWorking Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).

In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that bothMPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technicalevaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003, promulgatedResolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolutionand the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.

ISSUE(S):

the legal standing of petitioners and the alleged prematurity of the Petition.
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RULING:

On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters andconcerned citizens -- respond that the issues central to this case are of transcendentalimportance and of national interest.

We agree with petitioners. Our nations political and economic future virtually hangs in thebalance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt thatthe subject matter of this case is a matter of public concern and imbued with publicinterest ;[18] in other words, it is of paramount public interest [19] and transcendentalimportance. [20] This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following theliberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society. [21] Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of illegaldisburseme nt of public funds, [22] or if public money is being deflected to any improper purpose ;[23] or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through

the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[24]

In the instant case, individualpetitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds areproperly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, thewinning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law andregulation.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA,petitioners, vs . SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT andCHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ONINDIGENOUS PEOPLES,respondents .

FACTS:PER CURIAM :

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus ascitizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its ImplementingRules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that itgrants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted inpart.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its ImplementingRules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
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the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regaliandoctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, inturn, defines ancestral lands;

(2) Section 5, in re lation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalie nable publiclands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private butcommunity property of the indigenous peoples;

(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral dom ains andancestral lands;

(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestraldomains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestrallands;

(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,development or explora tion of minerals and o ther natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter in to agreem ents with nonindigenous peoples for thedevelopment and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,renewable for not more than 25 years; and

(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintai n, develop, protect andconserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for criticalwatersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation. [2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all- encompassing definition of ancestral domainsand ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said are as, Sections 3(a) and3(b) violate the rights of private landowners . [3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and j urisdiction of theNCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains andancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution . [4]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, se ries of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of thePresident is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and programcoordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executivedepartments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution . [6]

ISSUE:

RULING:

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sus taining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other m embers of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinionexpressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provis ions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the casewas redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
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[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA,GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELOREYES, respondents .

D E C I S I O N KAPUNAN,J .:

FACTS:

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappingsand carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines toconduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of theMarines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFPand the PNP Chief . [3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve thepeace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention programincluding increased police patrols . [4] The President further stated that to heighten police visibilityin the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary . [5] Invoking his powers asCommander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the

AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment andutilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawlessviolence .[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crimecampaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time whenthe situation shall have improved . [7]

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SMCity), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center,LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport . [9]

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP ) filed the instantpetition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null andvoid and unconstitutional, arguing that:

I

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OFTHE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVENONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK;
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HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THECONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN ACIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF

ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THEMILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION ISUNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULDREALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION . [10]

ISSUE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;(2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armedforces is subject to judicial review

RULING: First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisitesof standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in thecase such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of thegovernmental act that is being challenged. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors itsstanding on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart fromthis declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi . Themere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, whileundoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general aninterest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which isappropriate for court review . [22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of beingdecided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume

jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cas es wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions.The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political questionbeing a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with theworkings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to stepin to uphold the law and the Constitution.
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By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgmentthat is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal toperform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility . [29] Under thisdefinition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionaryauthority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise hasbeen made in grave abuse of discretion .[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvidentexercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy . [31]

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This isclear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus,cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wi sdom or substitute its own. The presentpetition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertionthat there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence tosupport the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call wasexercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.

G.R. No. L-16263 July 26, 1960

DR. JOSE CUYEGKENG, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, a s member of Board of Medical Examiners, respondent.

G. B. Guevara, R. P. Guevara and E. S. Tipon for petitioners.J. W. Diokno for petitioners in Intervention.Solicitor General Edilberto Barot, Solicitor E. D. Ignacio and Atty. J. A. Garcia for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J .:

FACTS:

The petitioners are doctors Jose Cuyegkeng, Pedro N. Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday,Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita Rivera-Ramirez. Their alleged cause of action ispredicated upon the fact that their names appear in a list of qualified physicians, approved and submitted,to the President of the Philippines, by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association of thePhilippines pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for appointment asmembers of the Board of Medical Examiners, and that respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz, whom thePresident appointed to said board was not named in said list.

it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioners:

ON THE FIRST OF ACTION:
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1. Declaring the petitioners as duly qualified for the position of member of the Board of MedicalExaminers and that any one of them is legally entitled to be appointed as members of said Board;

2. Declaring the appointment of the respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz as members of the Board of Medical Examiners illegal and therefore null and void and ousting him therefrom and perpetuallyprohibiting him (unless appointed in accordance with law) from exercising the rights and

performing the duties and functions connected therewith.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. That pending the hearing on the merits of this case a writ of preliminary injunction be issuedforthwith ex parte ordering the respondent to cease, desist and refrain from assuming the office of member of the Board of Medical Examiners and exercising the rights and performing the dutiesand functions connected therewith, particularly to give or conduct the next examinations for physicians scheduled on or about December 14, 1959 , or to take part in any way in the giving or conducting thereof, and after due hearing to make said injunction permanent;

2. Ordering the respondent to pay the costs of this suit.

Petitioners further pray for such further and other relief as this Honorable Court "may deem justand proper under the premises."

By a resolution dated December 3, 1959, this Court denied the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.

It appears that, on October 16, 1959, said Council, acting in conformity with section 13 of Republic ActNo. 2382, otherwise known as The Medical Act of 1959, approved and submitted to the President arevised list of qualified physicians, including petitioners herein, for appointment to the aforementionedBoard

Petitioner herein, as well as the intervenors, maintain that, pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No.2382, the President cannot appoint to the Board of Medical Examiners any person not named in the listsubmitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Associ ation, and that, accordingly, theaforementioned appointment of respondent is null and void.

Respondent alleged in his answer that three(3) of petitioners herein are, pursuant to section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382, not qualified for appointment to the Board for Medical Examiners, they beingmembers of the professional staff of certain private medical colleges; that there is no cause of actionagainsts him none of the petitioners and intervenors claim to be entitled to the office in question; that theaforementioned lis t, submitted by the executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, is merelyrecommendatory in nature and, as such, not binding upon the President; that insofar as Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 may be construed as limiting the choice of the President, in a mandatory manner,in the selection of members of the Board of Medical Examiners, to the list aforementioned, said legalprovision is unconstitutional and void; and that inclusion in the list above referred to is not one of thequalification prescribed in section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382 for appointment to said Board.

HELD: although none of the groups already adverted to have sufficient votes to constitute the requisitemajority, the members of this Court are unanimous in the opinion that respondent herein has a good andvalid title to his office.

Lastly, this is a a quo warranto proceeding, which, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, may bebrought either by the Go vernment or by a private individual. Not every individual may, however, initiatethe proceedings. Section 6 of said Rule provides:


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equivalent to 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived by the PCSO from the operation of thelottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal incommercial operation. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentalsin any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay thedeficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)

Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity. (R.A. No. 1169, 6(B))

The term of the lease is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lotteryequipment first delivered to the l essee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3)

In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for theloss of, or damage to, the equipment arising from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance andrepair. (Pars. 7-8)

Upon the expiration of the lease, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25million.

On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it issubstantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. Petitioners argue:

1. THE AMENDED ELA IS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS BASICALLY OR SUBSTANTIALLYTHE SAME AS OR SIMILAR TO THE OLD LEASE CONTRACT AS REPRESENTED AND

ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS PGM C AND PCSO.

2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE AMENDED ELA IS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROMTHE OLD LEASE CONTRACT, THE AMENDED ELA IS NEVERTHELESS NULL AND VOIDFOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH AND VIOLATIVE OF PCSO'S CHARTER AND THEDECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF MAY 5, 1995.

3. THE AMENDED EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMEN T IS NU LL AND VOID FOR BEINGVIOLATIVE OF THE LAW ON PUBLIC BIDDING OF CONTRACTS FOR FURNISHINGSUPPLIES, MA TERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY E.O.NO. 301 DATED 26 JULY 1987 AND E.O. NO. 298 DATED 12 AUGUST 1940 AS AMENDED,

AS WELL AS THE "RULES AND REG ULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF IRREGULAR,UNNECESSA RY, EXCESSIVE OR EXTRAVAGANT (IUEE) EXPENDITURES PROMULGATEDUNDER COMMISSION ON AUDIT CIRCULAR NO. 85-55-A DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1985,CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS AWARDED AND EXECUTED WITHOUT THE PUBLIC BIDDINGREQUIRED UNDER SAID LAWS AND COA RULES AND REGULATIONS, IT HAS NOT BEEN

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND IT IS NOT MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVE RNMENT.

4. THE ELA IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2(2), ARTICLE IX-D OF THE 1987 CONS TITUTION IN

RELATION TO COA CIRCULAR NO. 85-55-A.

ISSUE:


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RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declarethe Equipment Lease Agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the PhilippineGaming Management Corp. invalid is DISMISSED.

hold that petitioners have no cause against respondents and therefore their petition should be dismissed.

The Kilosbayan, Inc. is an organization described in its petition as "composed of civic -spirited citizens,pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and nationalrenewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers andconcerned citizens."

Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case," nor that of conclusiveness of judgmentposes a barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit.

Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in decisional law does not

call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling sustainingpetitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real parties ininterest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved. Just five years before that ruling thisCourt had denied standing to a party who, in questioning the validity of another form of lottery, claimedthe right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar.

In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties tothe agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respectto one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them fromthe contract even though they did not intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572(1912)), or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally excluded from it.

These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. . . . The phrase 'present substantial interest' moreconcretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle him, under thesubstantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and thedefendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him

But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring thissuit. Denying to them the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in theexecution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or thenecessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before theCommission on Audit or before the Ombudsman.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.ROSARIO, Pre siding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.


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DAVIDE, JR., J .:

FACTS:

The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined bytheir respective parents.

The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers ' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselvesand others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous thatit is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "representtheir generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving newtimber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dis miss the complaintbased on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issueraised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executivebranches of Government.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss

RULING: .

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challengedOrder of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. Thepetitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of thequestioned timber license agreements

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We findno difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding

generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only bebased on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthfulecology is concerned

10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmonyfor the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation toensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.


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The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthfulecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in thefundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1 987 Constitution

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles andState Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the

civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rightsaltogether for it concerns nothing less than sel f-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittinglystressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governmentsand constitutions

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; andits essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of thedefendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails tostate a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of thefacts alleged in the complaint itself

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulationor determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated andexpressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctri ne is nolonger, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield thatprotects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review

G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,defendants,MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)bonding company and defendant-appellant.

F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

DIZON,J .:

FACTS:

On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in theCourt of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Ma gdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to


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Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to dothat which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled toassert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for

the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not amere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders a ppealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against theappellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPL E OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners,vs.JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

LAUREL,J. :

FA CTS: Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, arerespectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in thecriminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of theseventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, w ho heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931,petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor.

, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano CuUnjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision may or, topay the cos ts and w ith reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Uponappeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prisioncorreccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor , but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.

The instant proceedings have to do w ith the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng onNovember 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Hereinrespondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia , that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that hehas no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge PedroTuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano CuUnjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assumingthat it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,subsectionsubsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicabilityis not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to makesaid law effec tive or otherwise in their respective or otherw ise in their respective provinces

On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a res olution w ith a finding that "las pruebas no hanestablecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes oincongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of thecrime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation


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result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of thePhilippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater importthan the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental lawby the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its ownlaws.

And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not fo llow that

the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a thetrial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time w hen a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented.

We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised

[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002]

MA. J. ANGELINA G

chap 3 judicial inquiry digest const2

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