chapter 1 introduction and motivation 1. introduction
TRANSCRIPT
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The institutionalisation and the influence of both the existential-phenomenological approach
and the humanistic values of the “Third Force” movement in current psychology leave
much to be desired. The lack of outright organisation and an overall theoretical model
remain a chief concern of the “Third Force” or humanistic movement to this day. The
historical origins of paradigms and intellectual groupings that culminated in the humanistic
movement are testimony to the fragmented history. For example, the existential movement
according to Morris (1979), was rather fragmented than organised and so is the status of the
“Third Force” psychology in contemporary psychology.
I regard the ‘fragmented’ history of the “Third Force” as challenging and fascinating. I
maintain that the value of the “Third Force” movement lies rather in its complex and
intriguing history than in its theoretical contribution to psychology. I use the term
‘fragmented’ to illustrate the epistemological diversity within the movement, reflecting
influences from existentialism, phenomenology, humanism, and the American
counterculture of the 1960s extending to the early 1970s. It is this tapestry of thought that
invigorates my focus on the humanistic movement.
The study begins with the epistemological explication of existentialism, phenomenology,
and humanism. The three schools of thought contributed to the epistemological diversity of
the “Third Force”. Kierkegaard’s existentialism stresses human subjectivity and shall be
given parallel attention alongside the theoretical orientation of the humanistic movement.
Jean-Paul Sartre’s radical views on human freedom are discussed, reflecting on the atheistic
approach to the view of man. However, Kierkegaard differs with Sartre in that Kierkegaard
is theist: he regards the ultimate stage of transcendence as a union with the Godly.
2
Phenomenology had an immense impact on the development of existential-
phenomenological psychology. Edmund Husserl and Martin Heiddegger were the main
proponents of the phenomenological thought. Husserl’s phenomenology influenced
qualitative research and psychotherapy alike. However, the focus of Husserl’s influence
shall be confined to psychotherapy in this study. He viewed consciousness as intentional
and transcendental. Heidegger applied the ontological theme of “being- in-the-world” to
Husserl’s phenomenology. Ludwig Binswanger imported Heiddegger’s phenomenology
into psychotherapy, culminating in the existential-phenomenological paradigm of
psychology.
The contributions of the existential-phenomenological approach to therapy and the
humanistic movement are documented in this study, based on Binswanger’s “existential
analysis”. Theories of the eclectic group of founding psychologists (Maslow, Rogers, and
May) are presented. Maslow’s views of “peak experiences” are integrated with Rowan’s
(1983) stages of mystical experiences. Rogers’ “empathy” is viewed from the
transcendental perspective of Zen meditation. Finally, the contributions of humanistic
psychology are discussed, reflecting on the impact of humanistic views on various
therapeutic approaches and the applicability of the person-centered approach to education
and politics.
1.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
The concepts applied in this study are philosophical as implied in 1.1 above. However, their
definitions shall largely reflect how they apply in psychology. Existentialism and
phenomenology are defined separately and then as existential-phenomenological
psychotherapy.
1.2.1 Existentialism
Existentialism is a philosophical movement that emphasizes subjectivity, free will, and
individuality (Reber & Reber, 2001). Existentialism has divergent thinkers within its ranks
and this makes it difficult to clarify its practical usefulness in psychotherapy (Miars, 2002).
3
Morris (1979) argued that this disarray seems most pronounced in humanistic psychology,
which draws most of its philosophical and theoretical concepts from existential sources.
1.2.2 Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that focuses on human experience. Tyler
(1992b) for example asserted that the basic idea of phenomenology is to understand human
experience as well as our interactions with the environment, and our relationship with each
other. In phenomenology, individuals are considered as conscious subjects who act
intentionally and who give meaning to their actions. Phenomenological psychology then,
becomes the study of the way in which the individual himself or herself understands what
he is doing, and how he feels about it.
1.2.3 Existential-phenomenological psychotherapy
Existential-phenomenological psychotherapists have assimilated the ideas of existential and
phenomenological philosophers into a system of psychotherapy (Hansen, 1999). According
to Worrell (1997), existential-phenomenological psychotherapy has, as its philosophical
background, the concepts of “intentionality” and “intersubjectivity”. “Intentionality” refers
to the act whereby consciousness reaches out to the world to interpret objects, retrieving
them as meaningful things. According to Owen (1994), “intersubjectivity” is about
therapists’ aims and intentional awareness about clients and their aims; intermingled with
clients’ awareness and aims about therapists.
1.3 Intention of this study
The aim of this study is to demonstrate the historical significance of the “Third Force” and
its contributions to psychology. The emergence of the “Third Force” brought the
introduction of the existential-phenomenological approach to humanistic psychotherapies,
putting Binswanger’s work to light. The dimension of transcendental psychology, pioneered
by Abraham Maslow, came to the attention of psychologists. The study thus illustrates that
the transcendental approach links psychology with mysticism and Eastern forms of
4
meditation. Also, the person-centered approach brought psychology closer to the issues of
society.
1.4 Outline of the study
Chapter 2 provides the philosophical background of the study. Existentialism,
Phenomenology, and Humanism are discussed, with regard to their relevance in
psychology, particularly psychotherapy.
Chapter 3 illustrates the combination of existentialism and phenomenology into existential-
phenomenological psychotherapy, with particular focus on Binswanger’s “existential
analysis”. The contributions of this approach to psychology are indicated as well.
Chapter 4 reviews the emergence of the “Third Force” movement. The controversies and
diversity within the movement are exposed. Its contributions to therapeutic psycho logy are
reflected upon. Finally, its current status within contemporary psychology and the
implications for the future are indicated.
5
CHAPTER 2
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This section aims at explicating the three philosophical influences that contributed to the
development of existential-phenomenological psychology, pioneered by the Swiss
psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Existentialism and phenomenology
were the main influences that contributed towards this paradigm. Humanism had some
contributions towards the existential-humanistic approach of the “Third Force” movement.
Brennan (1998a, 1998b) preferred the use of the concept “Third Force” to denote what was
neither psychoanalysis nor behaviourism, which is humanistic psychology. I opted for the
use of the same concept in order to reflect on the divergent epistemologies existent within
the movement; ranging from existentialism, phenomenology, and secular humanism. The
nature and critique of this diversity are presented in Chapter 4 below.
Existentialism is presented in this chapter from the early forms as espoused by Kierkegaard.
The latter forms are discussed from the viewpoint of Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism did
not emerge as an organised school of thought. The existential movement had divergent
thinkers within its ranks, and this has made it difficult to clarify its practical usefulness in
psychological endeavours like psychotherapy. It is more a series of thinkers who reflected
on human existence than it is an integrated philosophy (Miars, 2002).
Phenomenology is a philosophical trend founded by Edmund Husserl. Ellenberger (1958)
described Husserls’s phenomenology as a methodological principle: probably because of
Husserl’s emphasis on subjectivity as consciousness, unlike Heidegger who integrated
phenomenology with ontological issues. Martin Heiddegger introduced existential elements
in Husserl’s phenomenology with his concept of “being- in-the-world”. Ludwig Binswanger
brought the concept of being-in-the-world into psychotherapy in the guise of “existential
analysis”, which is the core formulation of existential therapy.
6
The philosophical foundations of Humanism are presented under Section 2.4 below.
According to Hansen (2000), humanism is a philosophical hybrid of existentialism and
phenomenology. The emphasis of the humanistic philosophy is on a person’s inherent
capacity for growth and self-realization. In other words, humanism as a philosophical
paradigm had a bearing on the ideology of the “Third Force” Movement; hence its inclusion
as one of the philosophical trends in this study. The concept “psychological humanism” is
used herein to reflect on the influence of humanistic theory on the “Third Force”
Movement. Hansen (2000) asserted that psychological humanism emerged as a reaction to
the reductionistic orientation of psychoanalysis and behaviourism, and so did the “Third
Force”.
2.2 EXISTENTIALISM
Existentialism is a philosophical movement that emphasises subjectivity, free will, and
individuality above theories that stress the role of society and social groups (Reber & Reber,
2001). In the same vein, Ellenberger (1958) defined existentialism as the philosophical
trend of thought which takes as its focus of interest the consideration of man’s most
immediate experience, his own existence.
Existentialism sprang up spontaneously in different parts of Europe and among different
schools. It has a diverse body of researchers and creative thinkers. Existential thinkers came
in two stages, the phenomenological stage and the existential phase. The former was
represented by Eugene Minkowski in France, Erwin Straus in Germany, and V.E. von
Gebsattel in Germany. The latter comprised of among others, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard
Boss, and Roland Kuhn in Switzerland, and J.H. Van Den Berg in Holland (May, 1958b,
1983). These thinkers formulated ideas that contributed to the emergence of existentialism.
They disagreed with Freud’s psychoanalysis. The contention was that psychoanalysis
disregarded issues pertaining to human existence.
Foulquie (1947) maintained that existence is not a state, but an act, the actual transition
form possibility into reality; to exist is to take leave of what one is (ex) in order to establish
oneself (sistere) on the level of that which formerly was possible. To exist, for
existentialists, is not merely to be (sein) but to be here or there, (dasein); to be in a situation,
7
in a determinate relationship with the world and with other conscious beings. This is a
phenomenological description of existence, akin to Heidegger’s “Being- in-the-world”
(Heidegger, 1962) detailed in 2.3.3 below. In the same vein, May (1958b, 1983) asserted
that the term “existence” comes from the word ex-sistere, which means literally to stand
out, to emerge.
This portrays the human being not as a collection of static substances or mechanisms or
patterns but rather as emerging and becoming, that is, as existing. The approach of
existential psychologists and psychiatrists is always dynamic; existence is equivalent to
coming into being, becoming. The term being is not used as a static word, but a verb form,
the participle of the verb “to be”. Existentialism is thus concerned with ontology, that is, the
science of being. Ontos is a Greek equivalent of “being” (May 1958b, 1983).
Brennan (1998a) described existential philosophy as a paradigm that proposes individual
existence as the act of being, which defines a person’s essence, so that existence precedes
essence. The concept essence was brought into Christian thinking by the scholastic
philosophers of the medieval era, and it brought psychology to a synonymous level with the
Christian goal of perfection of the essence shared by each person, which is the eternal
salvation of the soul. That is, for the scholastics, essence preceded existence.
Foulquie (1947) also viewed existentialism in relation to essence. To Foulquie,
existentialism is a theory that affirms the primacy, or priority of existence. This priority is
affirmed in relation to essence. Essence is what a thing is; for example, ‘I am a man’, and
‘I’ possess the human essence. Foulquie (1947) distinguished between the “universal
essence” and “individual essence”. The “universal essence” comprises of those
characteristics that are common to all the objects of the same kind. With the addition of
those characteristics peculiar to each individual, the universal essence becomes “individual
essence”.
However, it should be noted that Sartre’s (1964) view that existence precedes essence is not
a universally accepted thesis, even to current thinkers. Some thinkers proposed the opposite,
that essence precedes existence, as indicated by the scholastic philosophers above.
Kierkegaard (1964b) is a typical case in this regard. He maintained that the essence of man
8
lies in his or her authentic communication with God. To Kierkegaard, true communication
belongs to those who exist in the isolation of their inwardness, who desire through this
inwardness to express the life of eternity. True communication is opposed to direct
communication. Kierkegaard (1964b) denounced direct communication because it
presupposes certainty; but certainty is impossible for anyone in process of becoming, and
the semblance of certainty constitutes for such an individual a deception. The religious
individual has learned that human indulgence profits nothing, and therefore refuses to listen
to anything from that side, but he or she exists before God. In this regard, essence in
communication with God precedes existence.
2.2.1 Antecedent expressions of existentialism: Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), a Danish thinker and clergyman, is regarded as the main
proponent of modern existentialism. Ellenberger (1958) asserted that existential thinking
had been implicit from time immemorial in many religious and philosophical systems.
Kierkegaard was the first to make explicit its basic assumptions, later elaborated by Karl
Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre.
Kierkegaard’s ideas on existentialism were in direct contradiction to Hegel’s philosophy of
rationalism. Rationalism was a philosophical school of thought that shared the assumption
that truth was to be ascertained by the use of rational thought. Kierkegaard reacted to the
tenets of rationalism by arguing that faith, rather than rational truth, was central to a
person’s existence (Brennan, 1998a). Kierkegaard’s philosophical arguments were mainly
around man’s acceptance of God as true essence, and the emphasis on the concept of
“subjectivity”. Valle, King and Halling (1989) maintained that for Kierkegaard, philosophy
should address itself to the concrete existence of the individual person. It should help to
explain the fundamental themes with which human beings invariably struggle (existential
themes).
Several prominent psychologists (such as Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May,
Adrian Van Kaam, and J.F.T Bugental) have drawn philosophical strength from the
writings of Soren Kierkegaard, hence he was considered by many as the “founding
father” of the existential movement. Central to his thought was the concept of
9
subjectivity. Kierkegaard’s subjectivity implied the process of how individuals think
and understand the existence they know to be true. For this notion, Charlotte Buhler
(cited in Morris, 1979) emphasized the indebtedness of humanistic psychology to
Kierkegaard, especially his interpretation of truth as being contained in the nature of
the relationship of the subject to reality.
Kierkegaard (1964a) distinguished between “objective thought” and “subjective
thought”. He was critical of “objective thought”: he argued that the objective thought
translates everything into results, and helps all mankind to cheat, by copying these off
and reciting them by rote. The “subjective thought” on the other hand, puts everything
in process and omits the result, partly because this belongs to him who has the way,
and partly because as an existing individual he or she is constantly in “process of
coming to be.” That is, an existing individual is constantly in process of becoming.
According to Kierkegaard (1964a), the actual existing subjective thinker constantly
reproduces this existential situation in his thoughts, and translates all his thinking into
terms of process.
The central theme in his writings is the individual as a free agent in a constant process
of becoming. Equally important is the thesis that only as the individual participates in
truth, can it exist. Values and end goals are theologically determined and realized
ultimately when one is able to move through the “aesthetic” and “ethical” stages of
existence to the final stage, “the religious”, where the individual through the “leap” of
faith achieves an existential union with God (Brennan, 1998a; Kierkegaard, 1964b;
Morris, 1979).
Brennan (1998a) explicates the progressive levels of existence as follows: The “aesthetic”
stage characterizes the childhood stage, where experience is dominated by pleasure and
pain. This stage is primitive because the child reacts to external contingencies according to
the needs of the moment. The “ethical stage” requires a person to make choices about the
values of life and take responsibility about those choices. The highest form of existence is
the “religious stage”, where the individual transcends the social morals of the ethical stage
to choose God, which is an act of faith. According to Morris (1979), Kierkegaard viewed
self-actualization (“process of coming to be”) and creativity as expressed in the subjective
10
process of becoming and the individual’s creation of personal, existential freedom. Hence
he referred to “the subject who exists in the isolation of his inwardness…” (Kierkegaard,
1964b, p. 177): constantly in the process of becoming.
Several concepts developed by Kierkegaard were also taken up by Martin Heiddegger to
provide a basis for existential thought. One of those concepts was “dread”, existential
anxiety. Existential anxiety is without any real object. In existential anxiety, Kierkegaard
theorized that people become conscious of their intentions, choices and actions. Existential
anxiety is assumed to be a motivating force which arouses strong defences, in the denial of
death anxiety, fear of freedom and the selection of defensive choices, which is an aspect of
inauthenticity (Owen, 1994).
2.2.2 Modern expressions of existentialism: Sartre’s atheism
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), a French writer of novels, plays, and philosophical essays,
was probably the most popular existentialist of the twentieth century. Jean-Paul Sartre
deserves credit for having explained in his popular writings the main theses of
existentialism in the technical terms of philosophy, while at the same time rendering them
accessible to the lay reader. According to Sartre, existence precedes essence. He asserted
that existence defines the essence of an individual. He placed radical emphasis on choice,
and that each person creates his or her own values and morality (Brennan, 1998a; Foulquie,
1947; Owen, 1994; Sartre, 1964).
Sartre argued that man chooses his essence. He distinguished between the universal
essence, that which makes us man, and the individual essence, that which makes us this or
that particular man – timid or brave, honest or dishonest. However, there are things we
cannot choose: the social class into which we are born, our height, or our intelligence, but
the attitude we adopt towards this crude fact depends upon ourselves. Above all, the choices
that we make in the course of our lives depend upon the objectives that we have set
ourselves (Foulquie, 1947). Thus, choice making is goal-directed and intentional.
Sartre’s ideas on existentialism contradicted those of Kierkegaard at the level of theism.
Although Sartre strongly believed in human freedom of choice and the subsequent
11
responsibilities, he maintained that human freedom cannot accommodate the belief that
there is God (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960; Sartre, 1956, 1964). In Sartre’s atheism, God is
not the King of mankind, for a human being is free. If God had wanted to rule human
beings, He should not have created them as free beings. According to Sartre, “man has one
law - his own” (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960, p.316). Man is nothing else but what he makes
of himself. According to Sartre, this is the first principle of existentialism: existence
precedes essence (Sartre, 1956, 1964).
Therefore, freedom consists of a human being as completely independent from God. Sartre
saw human freedom as a freedom to choose; the only compulsion in life is to choose. Thus,
to live is to choose. These ideas culminated in Sartre’s famous dictum; “I am condemned to
freedom”. Being human is fundamentally a choice in the world. He believed the essence of
being human is freedom and one’s duty of self-determination and self- responsibility. In
other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom (Marcel, 1948; Owen,
1994; Sartre, 1956, 1964).
The aim of Sartre’s existential ‘psychoanalysis’ was to find the essence of the client’s life
and world, based on “the desire to be”. The original choice (project) a client makes can be
traced to a decision a client has made to structure his or her world by means of some object
or viewpoint. For Sartre (1956), an action is on principle intentional, explaining “the desire
to be”. There are different kinds of choices though. We can choose to choose, or choose not
to choose. Also, there are things outside the reach of choice. Sartre believed it was possible
to deduce the sense of a person’s being, by an analysis of the regular types of aims,
awareness and choices that a client made (Owen, 1994).
2.2.3 Implications of the Existential Philosophy for Humanistic Psychology
Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity is similar to the humanistic approach in that
humanistic psychologists incorporate subjectivity in two ways: Firstly in the justification of
their approach towards a new definition of science whose origin is immediate personal
subjective experience. Secondly, humanistic psychologists understand the person as subject
or self. Kierkegaard dedicated his efforts towards the rediscovery of the subjective, of the
12
individual self (Morris, 1979). Subjectivity is central to Carl Roger’s person-centered theory
in the form of self-concept.
Kierkegaard and humanistic psychologists use the ontological base of existentialism to
develop their positions on individuality, freedom, autonomy, decision, responsibility,
authenticity, self-actualization, and the self that becomes creative (Morris, 1979). Other
existential motifs are intersubjectivity, temporality, individuality, death, anxiety, ethics,
guilt, choice, and the search to find the key essence of human nature (Owen, 1994). Similar
to Sartre, Kierkegaard believed that freedom is created through decision.
Morris (1979, p. 76) listed several features that bring Kierkegaard’s existentialism closer to
humanistic psycho logy:
§ A holistic perspective of the person is employed where the sum is greater than its
parts.
§ Emphasis is on the client as a unique individual whose phenomenal perspective is as
valid as the therapist’s.
§ Time is interpreted in relation to the future which is contained in the present.
§ Change is viewed as a continuous process rather than as a simplistic “before and
after” sequence.
This model consists of imaginative involvement and intentionality on the part of the client.
The therapist serves as an active reflector of subjective thinking. The future evolves within
the context of dialogue and mutuality between therapist and client. Similarly, Karl Jasper’s
existential philosophy emphasised communication as dialogue. Jaspers argued that
communication opens thinking space, associated with the freedom of thought (Young-
Breuhl, 1981).
However, Garrison (2001) expressed concern over the interpretation of human values as
done by humanistic psychologists. Garrison suggested that theorists and practitioners of
humanistic psychology should work to clarify their definition of the human condition that
acknowledges the situation of human being within the larger realities that give human life
meaning. He argued that the conception of human values by humanistic psychologists is
‘inward’ towards the ‘self’, rather than relating to the outside world. The romantic tradition
13
of the “Third Force” psychology drew attention to the individual person’s potential for self-
transformation, growth, and freedom.
What was essentially human was an inner drive towards health, and wholeness, which was
often stifled or compromised by society. However, this inner drive could be therapeutically
reawakened in the presence of empathy and understanding. Garrison (2001) referred to this
kind of theorising as “humanistic innerness”. He associates them with the drives pertinent to
psychoanalysis, due to lack of interaction with society. Adams (1999) proposed an
‘interpermeation’ between the self and world where the two fuse and relate reciprocally in a
co-creation of new meaning. Miars (2002) referred to the ‘self-and-world’ construct system
that gives the client’s life meaning.
From the deliberations above, it appears that existentialism is a conscious process and
subjective. These attributes bring the concept of existentialism closer to phenomenology.
Similar to phenomenology, existentialism is immanent (inwardly directed) in terms of
Kierkegaard’s ‘subjectivity’. Kierkegaard theorised that people become conscious of their
intentions, actions, and choices. Because people are in the process of becoming, this brings
existentialism much closer to the humanistic concept of ‘self-actualization’. The existential
phrases “to emerge”, “to be”, and “being” are transcendental in description, akin to the
ontological phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. This brings us to the view of
phenomenology as a transcendental science.
2.3 PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology is defined as the philosophical doctrine that advocates that the scientific
study of immediate experience be the basis of psychology. Phenomenology was founded by
Edmund Husserl with emphasis on events, happenings, occurrences, and so forth, as one
experiences them, with a minimum regard for the external, physical reality, and for the
scientific biases of the natural sciences (Reber & Reber 2001). Thus, phenomenology is the
study of phenomena as they are immediately presented to experience (Foulquie, 1947).
Akin to Foulquie’s definition of phenomenology, Heidegger (1962) defined
phenomenology as the science of phenomena.
14
Moustakas (1994) indicated that the word “phenomenon” comes from the Greek
phaenesthai, meaning to flare up, to show itself, to appear. Constructed from phaino,
“phenomenon” means to bring to light, to place in brightness, “to show itself in itself, the
totality of what lies before us in the light of day” (p. 26). According to Heidegger (1962),
the Greek expression of the term ‘phenomenon’ has the equivalence of the phrase “to show
itself”. The expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies “that which shows itself in itself”, the
manifest. ‘Phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to
the light. They may be expressed as ‘entities’.
Segal (1999) defined phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy that attempts to give a
direct description of experience as it is in itself without taking into account its psychological
origin and its causal explanation. The method used to achieve this is called
phenomenological reduction, which implies putting aside all preconceived ideas about the
event under focus.
The objective reality of events is not denied, but an effort is made to avoid paying a
particular focus to them rather than to the way they are perceived and experienced.
Moustakas (1994) maintains that phenomena are the building blocks of human science and
the basis of all knowledge precisely because subjective experience precedes the natural
scientific method.
Phenomenology began with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who argued for
unbiased observations of phenomena as a means of understanding the world (Hansen, 1999;
Husserl, 1931). It was the controversy relative to the existence of the material world – or
rather the external world as distinct from the internal world of psychic life – which led
Husserl to the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenological movement comprises of a
philosophical method which makes use of descriptions which are phenomenological in the
ordinary sense of the word, but which regards them only as a means of reaching that which
lies beyond the phenomenon (Foulquie, 1947). Hence, phenomenology is regarded as a
transcendental science.
Husserl’s approach was academic; his goal was to find a philosophy of science that is
empirically rigorous but excludes the breaking down of the subject matter into its
15
constituent elements. The implication was that an experience should be perceived as a
whole rather than its constituent elements. Hence, Ellenberger (1958) described Husserl’s
phenomenology as basically a methodological principle, intended to provide a firm basis for
the foundation of a new psychology and of a universal philosophy.
The implication of the Husserlian phenomenology is the relatedness of a person to his or her
world, the physical reality. That is, the subject and the object relate intentionally through
consciousness (Husserl, 1931). This approach to rational knowledge differs with Cartesian
dualism, emanating from Rene Descartes (1596-1650) who advocated that objective reality
can be studied separately by scientific means of identification, measurement, and prediction
(Pretorius & Segal, 2001).
According to Husserl (1977), Descartes gave transcendental phenomenology new impulses
through his “Meditations”; their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an
already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy. The aim
of the “Meditations” was a complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an
absolute foundation. Luypen and Dondeyne (1960) argued that Descartes accepted from the
material world only that which could be expressed in terms of quantity. Cartesian dualism
saw objective reality as separate from the experiencing subject, hence, the subject-object
dichotomy. Its conception of reality affirms the guiding principles of the natural sciences.
Husserl contended that subjective and objective realities are mutually related and
reciprocally determined; opposed to the emphasis on objective reality as separate from
subjective experience (illustrated by the subject-object dichotomy in Cartesian dualism).
Husserl’s phenomenology is based on the concept of intentionality. Intentionality here
refers to consciousness, that is, the internal experience of being conscious of something.
Thus, the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness are intentionally related
(Husserl, 1931; Moustakas, 1994). Through intentionality, a person relates with the
objective world. The interrelatedness is realised by means of phenomenological reduction.
16
2.3.1 Phenomenological reduction
Husserl’s phrase: “back to the things themselves”, is perhaps a simplified description of
what phenomenological reduction is (Luypen, 1966; Pretorius & Segal, 2001). The phrase is
a formulation of an intention to return to the world of original experience and the wealth of
meanings which can be found there. Luypen (1966) maintains that this return must be
without any prior theorizing about experience. That is, all preconceptions about an
experience must be removed.
Luypen (1966) thus describes phenomenological reduc tion as “an instrument by means of
which we can filter out the distorting influences of cultural and scientific prejudices” (p.
21). Phenomenological reduction implies that one gives a qualitative description of what
one sees in consciousness (phenomenon), without any preconceived judgements. The
process of suspending the preconceived assumptions is called “bracketing”. For bracketing
to be a definite process, one needs to make clear these assumptions such that they are
distinguishable to oneself in order to be set aside.
In the presence of a phenomenon, which could be an external object or a state of mind, the
phenomenologist uses an unbiased approach; he observes phenomena as they manifest
themselves and only as they manifest themselves. This observation is accomplished by
means of an operation of the mind which Husserl called the “epoche”, or “psychological-
phenomenological reduction”. The observer “puts the world between brackets”, that is, he
or she excludes not only any judgement of value about the phenomena but also any
affirmation whatever concerning their cause and background (Ellenberger, 1958;
Moustakas, 1994).
Ellenberger (1958) asserted that the observer also strives to transcend the subject-object
dichotomy; he or she excludes the distinction of subject and object and any affirmation
about the existence of the object and of the observing subject. In this manner observation is
greatly enhanced: the less apparent elements of phenomena manifest themselves with
increasing richness and variety, and previously unnoticed structures of phenomena may
become apparent.
17
Valle et al., (1989) argued that bracketing describes a cycle between the pre-reflective
thought and the reflective thought. The concept ‘pre-reflective’ describes something that
gives birth to our reflective awareness. Reflective thought refers to the cognitive process
where one thoughtfully reflects on a phenomenon as it appears in consciousness. As one
brackets his or her preconceptions, more of these appear at the level of reflective awareness.
That is, that which was originally pre-reflective becomes accessible at the level of reflective
thought. This leads to the emergence and the subsequent realisation of new assumptions.
The process continues in this linear fashion to infinity.
2.3.2 Consciousness as intentionality
Consciousness itself is intentional (Luypen, 1966; Moustakas, 1994). Consciousness is
always and of necessity must be consciousness of something, something which is not
consciousness itself. “If the ‘something’ which is no t consciousness itself is thought away,
consciousness itself also is thought away” (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960, p. 20). Thus,
consciousness is not just locked up in itself but is ever intentional in relation to objective
reality. Consciousness can thus be described as an intercourse with reality.
Husserl (cited in Segal, 1999) viewed consciousness as an intentional act through which a
person lets the world appear to him or her. Therefore, in Husserl’s terms, an individual is
able to focus on the things he wishes to know. In this manner, the ‘intended’ object makes
itself known to the individual. From the viewpoint of phenomenology, whether the object
actually exists or not makes no difference. Therefore, consciousness is not merely passive
but is the active revelation of objects.
Intentional acts are acts of consciousness. Moustakas (1994) and Valle et al., (1989) argued
that intentionality is equivalent to consciousness, to the internal experience of being
conscious of something. When speaking of consciousness, one also refers to its intended
object as well. Intentionality resembles the ongoing dimension of consciousness. It is about
awareness of and relation to what is beyond an individual. Consciousness is itself
intentional. Without consciousness there is no world. However, the word “intention” in this
context holds a different meaning from that in its daily use, where it means that which one
proposes or plans to do. In the phenomenological sense, it means consciousness itself.
18
2.3.3 Heiddegger’s “being-in-the-world”
Martin Heiddegger (1889-1976) described philosophy as a study of being, whereas Hurssel
contended that consciousness is the core theme of philosophy (Brennan, 1998a). Heidegger
(1962) argued that ‘being’ is the most universal concept. The ‘universality’ of being is not
that of class or genus. The ‘universality’ of being ‘transcends’ any universality of genus.
‘Being’ may therefore be designated as a ‘transcendence’. According to Heidegger (1962),
the concept of ‘Being’ is indefinable. I probably attribute this fact to the transcendental
status of ‘Being’. In Heidegger’s terms, “Being” cannot be derived from higher concepts by
definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. It cannot be expressed as an entity.
Heidegger proclaimed that, “the essence of man lies in his existence” (Luypen, 1966, p.56).
He asserted that a human being is a being concerned with his or her being. A person’s
concern for his or her being defines what a person is. According to Frie (2000), Heidegger
called for the return to the meaning of Being as such. He referred to the human being that
questions the meaning of Being as Dasein. The word ‘Dasein’ does not have a direct
English equivalent (often used untranslated) except in the relatively rare passages in which
Heidegger himself breaks it up with a hyphen (‘Da-sein’) to show its etymological
construction: literally ‘Being-there’ (Heidegger, 1962). Thus, the English equivalent of
Dasein is roughly estimated as being-there. Heidegger (1962) argued that Dasein is neither
autonomous nor self-contained, but always already situated in the world. Thus, Dasein
exists as ‘being-in-the-world’.
Because Dasein exists as ‘being- in-the-world’, it is ontological. That is, Dasein exists
within the world of other entities, the world of Being-with-one-another. The concept of
“falling” or “thrownness” was used to elaborate on this notion. The “falling” of Dasein
referred to the basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness. This term does not
express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is inherently alongside
the ‘world’ of its concern. Dasein has fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for
Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an
absorption in ‘Being-with-one-another’, the latter being guided by curiosity and ambiguity
(Heidegger, 1962).
19
Heidegger (1962) associates the ambiguity inherent in ‘fallenness’ with the concept of
anxiety. In the face of which one has anxiety, the ‘It is nothing and nowhere’ becomes
manifest. Because of this “nothingness”, the ‘world’ becomes a place in which one has
anxiety. Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, it throws
Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about –its authentic potentiality-for-Being- in-the-
world. With that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible.
The analysis of Being-in-the-world as ‘anxiety’ (“existential analysis”) is the basis of
existential therapy. May (1958a) asserted that one of the major and far-reaching
contributions of the existential therapists is the understanding of the person-in-his-world.
Similarly, Heiddegger regarded human existence as “being- in-the-world”, a concept later
fashioned by existential therapists into psychotherapy in the form of the three modes of
‘world’ (Ellenberger, 1958; Ghaemi, 2001; May 1958a). See Section 3.3.1 below.
Binswanger (1958) argued that by identifying the basic condition or structure of existence
with Being- in-the-world, Heidegger intended to put a message forth about the condition of
the possibility for existence. Binswanger asserted that the formulation “Being- in-the-world”
is an ontological thesis, a statement about an essential condition that determines existence in
general. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, Binswanger applied Heidegger’s
formulation into psychotherapy and thus coined the concept “existential analysis”.
According to Binswanger (cited in Frie, 2000), Heidegger’s fundamental ontology provided
an analysis of the primary structures of human existence and constituted a necessary
foundation for the human sciences. Binswanger was interested in the ontological orientation
of Heidegger’s phenomenology. As interpreted by Binswanger, the notion of “Being- in-the-
world” signifies that we are not isolated individuals, but beings who are always in relation
to other humans and the world around us. The implication is that there is neither a subject-
object dichotomy nor a division between subjective and objective experience.
20
2.3.4 Application of the phenomenological principles to psychotherapy
According to Owen (1994), Husserl’s concept of ‘bracketing’ is applicable to existential-
phenomenological practice. Owen argued that the existential-phenomenological therapy
rejects any imposition of a rigid agenda, assumptions, presuppositions and hypotheses by
therapists about clients.
Owen argued that bracketing can also be used in requesting clients to describe how they see
a problematic situation again, and this encourages a search for new information. The
existential-phenomenological approach encourages a minimal use of extraneous material to
encourage clients constructing their own perception of their circumstances and how they
relate to their world.
Varghese (cited in Nissim-Sabat, 1995) discussed the value of adopting the
phenomenological method developed by Husserl as a means of conceptualising
psychopathology and therapeutic change. Varghese conceptualises psychopathological
states in epistemological terms as maladaptive paradigms. According to Varghese,
paradigms are psychic constructs that enable people to make sense of their experience by
viewing judgements as truths known with certainty. Judgements within a paradigm are thus
protected from challenge, even when contradicted by experience. However, a paradigm may
collapse under weight of a new experience to be replaced by another, more adaptive one.
Tyler (1992) described a paradigm as constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on,
shared by the members of a given community. Paradigms are invisible and unnoticed and
yet they largely determine the way that we interpret our experiences. Phenomenology
maintains that these underlying paradigms affect our thinking and our understanding of
experience as well as our interactions with the environment and our relationship with each
other.
Varghese argued that psychopathology impedes the process of growth by rendering
paradigms more resistant to change. For Varghese, empathy is a matter of grasping the
paradigms, or epistemological constructs, through which patients construe their
experiences. The therapist can achieve this by adopting an attitude that is maximally free
21
from bias; otherwise, the patient’s paradigm will be filtered through the therapist’s and
thereby distorted (Nissim-Sabat, 1995).
For Varghese, optimal empathy or being with the client is enabled through an
epistemological stance that will yield the capacity to encounter the raw data of experience
without pre-existing judgements that will distort it. The phenomenologically inclined
therapist would thus refrain from attaching any presumed idea to the raw data of the
patient’s experience. This allows the therapist ‘to be where the client is’ in his or her
suffering as well as in his or her uncertainty. In this manner, the client experiences the
therapist as being with him or her and the fear of stepping into uncertainty is averted
(Nissim-Sabat, 1995).
In a similar vein of grasping the client’s paradigm, Ellenberger (1958) argued that we do
not understand what the psychotic individual really experiences. Verbal formulations that
describe hallucination as a perception without object, or delusion as erroneous judgement
which is maintained in spite of contrary evidence, are given. But these formulations are
unable to convey to us anything of how a mental patient actually experiences a
hallucination or delusion. The task of the phenomenologist is to grasp the subjective
experience of the patient more fully than could be done with the older, classical frame of
reference.
I regard the interchangeability that exists between existentialism and phenomenology as
crucial in the prevalence of existential-phenomenology. This tendency is particularly
evident in Kierkegaard’s conception of anxiety as “dread” akin to similar postulations by
Martin Heidegger. As indicated above, both existentialism and phenomenology apply to
humanistic oriented therapies. The goal directedness of the concept of “becoming” in
existentialism and Husserl’s epoche as applicable in ‘empathy’ and psychopathology, bear
testimony to the thesis above. Humanism as a philosophy incorporates the elements of both
existentialism and phenomenology, in that humanism can be secular, transcendental, and
existential. Section 2.4. below (Humanism) demonstrates that fact.
22
2.4 HUMANISM
Philosophically, humanism has its roots in phenomenological and existential philosophy.
Psychological humanism has much in common with the existential and phenomenological
philosophy because of its emphasis on free will and subjectivity (Hansen, 2000). The
humanistic tradition has always been concerned with the full development of the person.
The discussions below reflect this sentiment.
A brief history on the development of the humanistic tradition is presented. The history
begins with the European Renaissance period, with emphasis on the appreciation and
imitation of Greek and Roman architecture, art, and literature, including stylistic features
(Criswell, 2000).
The ideological expressions of Humanism are published in “The Humanist” (a magazine of
critical inquiry and social concern), launched by the American Humanist Association
(AHA) in the spring of 1941. Over the decades, “The Humanist” had elaborated on broad
human principles pertaining to altruism; spiritual meaning and value of life; creative and
aesthetic endeavours; as well as applications specific to contemporary moral, cultural, and
social issues (Leuba, 2001).
According to Doerr (2002), the AHA did not favour the division of Humanism into
categories but opted for an unmodified and holistic approach. In addition to the
philosophical explication of Humanism, three categories shall be discussed as proposed by
Kendler (1987). These are, transcendental humanism, secular humanism, and existential
humanism. The three types are given attention because of the implications they bear on the
Third Force psychology.
2.4.1 Philosophical foundations of Humanism
The humanistic tradition has always been concerned with the full development of the
person. Humanism was the term originally used in the European Renaissance period, which
lasted approximately from the 14th to the 17th centuries. The word Renaissance is medieval
French for rebirth. The Renaissance period marked the transition between the medieval and
23
the ‘modern’ period. It first appeared in Italy and represented the rediscovery of classical
Greek and Roman manuscripts and the values they expressed (Criswell, 2000).
Criswell (2000) stated that there was, during the Renaissance period, a flowering of the arts,
sciences, and literature, and an appreciation for individual endeavours. Thus, the
Renaissance man was considered a man of universal genius: someone with expertise in
several areas and broad interests and abilities. In the Renaissance spirit, the humanistic
tradition brings together the mind and body, and the arts and the sciences. This
reconciliation of dichotomous aspects leads towards a powerful development of human
potential for all.
Doerr (2002) took the definition of humanism to even broader horizons. Doerr asserts that
humanism is a progressive life-stance that affirms our ability and responsibility to lead
ethical lives of personal fulfilment that aspire to the greater good of humanity. For Doerr,
humanism recognizes that life is more than cognitive and appreciates the full range of
human emotions, from the varied reactions to life’s tragedies to the wonder and awe at our
natural self and surroundings.
However, Doerr (2002) argued that the modifiers placed in front of the concept Humanism
in order to distinguish and clarify it are themselves confusing and unnecessary. The
examples of these are “scientific humanism” in encyclopaedias or “secular humanism”
under vicious attack from the religious right. Doerr’s argument is that if scientific
humanism exists, then there is “unscientific humanism” existing elsewhere, and this can be
misleading. Hence, the American Humanist Association (AHA), the oldest and the largest
Humanist organisation in North America, leaves Humanism unmodified, offering it in its
fullness without qualification.
Kendler (1987) maintained that the dominant theme of humanism is the exaltation of
freedom. People should be given the freedom to decide their own fate (bearing in mind the
Italian Renaissance of the fourteenth century) instead of having their future dictated to them
by the church or state. With regard to the issues of knowledge, humanism allows
individuals the freedom to interpret knowledge in their own enlightened way.
24
Because of the freedom in the interpretation of knowledge, Kendler (1987) asserted that
various forms of humanism emerged.
Unlike Doerr (2002), Kendler had preferred to elucidate on the three types of humanism,
which are transcendental humanism, secular humanism, and existential humanism. I had
preferred to discuss the three humanistic categories because of their bearing on the “Third
Force” (Humanistic) ideology and psychology in general. However, the common themes of
personal freedom, human values, and respect for classical knowledge remain engrained in
these categories.
2.4.1.1 Transcendental humanism
The basic assumption of transcendental humanism is that important ideas need not be based
on empirical observation. The two possible sources of such ideas are the intuitions of the
mind and mystical experience. Therefore, transcendental humanism is more a state of the
mind than a systematic philosophy. Transcendental humanism advocates the romantic and
idealistic notions that the human spirit is godlike and that the ultimate authority of a
person’s conduct is his or her own conscience (Kendler, 1987).
Maslow (1968/1999) is one of the major proponents of mystical experience as the ‘ultimate’
in self-actualization. He refers to mystical experiences as “peak experiences”. Peak
experiences resemble self- transcendence. Maslow attributes peak experiences to self-
actualized people. For Maslow, peak experiences epitomize a higher level of integration and
personal identity. The detailed description of peak experiences and the accompanying
arguments are presented under Section 4.3.2.1 below.
2.4.1.2 Secular humanism
Secular humanism rejects the religious principle that God created man in his own image and
proposes instead that a human being created God in his own image. This view merges with
Sartre’s atheism (cited in Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960), which stresses human freedom
above the existence of God. Therefore, man is not dependent on God. Secular humanism
argues that because of their intrinsic freedom, people are capable of arriving at moral
25
principles and a philosophy of life in the absence of any dogmatic claims of some higher
authority (Kendler, 1987).
Ellis (1996) asserted that secular humanism is opposite to the religious, mystical, and
spiritual humanism. Secular humanists view persons as unique individuals who always
choose to live in a social group. They try to live together peacefully, fairly, and
democratically. The personalities of individuals are an ongoing, constructing and
reconstructing process. Secular humanists acknowledge that humans have the ability to
imagine, fantasize, and strongly believe in superhuman entities and powers such as gods,
angels, spirits, and fairies. However, Ellis (1996) indicated that belief in such spirits may
help some people to overcome emotional problems such as anxiety. But devout belief in
improbable gods and spirits may create difficulties such as dependency, dogma, and war
against believers holding a slightly different dogma.
2.4.1.3 Existential humanism
Existential humanism, on the other hand, stresses the principle that the only universe that
actually exists resides in human subjective experience. Existential philosophers like Soren
Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre did enough to popularise existentialism. One basic
obsession in existentialism was to break free from the “illusion of objectivity” of the natural
scientific approach and formal systems of philosophy (Kendler, 1987). Living is seen as a
conscious process; and ultimate freedom is the freedom to make choices. In order to cope
with the chaos of life, the individual must give meaning to his or her own life.
One of the existential thinkers who emphasized “meaning” was Viktor Frankl (1969/1988;
1984). According to Frankl, life holds meaning even in the course of suffering, an assertion
that he developed from personal experiences in the death camps of the Second World War.
Like secular humanists, Frankl (1969/1988; 1984) viewed humans as conscious beings with
a capacity to derive meaning from their existence. However, Frankl maintained that self-
realisation moved beyond self-actualization into self-transcendence, a state he described as
akin to experiencing God.
26
I have considered the three types of Humanism because of the applicability to existential-
humanistic approach of the “Third Force” related psychotherapies and its view of man as a
self-actualizing being. Although Secular Humanism is the most influential of the three,
Transcendental and Existential Humanisms have a significant stake in humanistic
psychology. Rollo May’s and Ludwig Binswager’s “existential analysis” had adopted the
existential and phenomenological principles into psychotherapy. Transcendental Humanism
compares significantly with Abraham Maslow’s Transpersonal Psychology, based on
mystical experiences and phenomenological principles. The predominant theme of ‘self-
actualization’ in “Third Force” psychology is based on Secular Humanism, that the
potential to achieve lies in the person. The adaptation of Humanism into psychology yields
psychological humanism.
2.4.2 Psychological Humanism and the “Third Force” movement
Brennan (1998a, 1998b), preferred the concept of “Third Force” Movement to denote that
which is neither psychoanalysis nor behaviourism. The concepts of “Third Force
psychology” and “Humanistic Psychology” shall be used interchangeably as various authors
use them to denote the same thing. I have preferred the use of “Third Force” Movement to
signify the historical emphasis of its origins and the broad theoretical views that define the
movement. The details on the historical development of the Third Force Movement and its
contributions to mainstream psychology are discussed in the Chapter 3. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate on how the ideas of psychological humanism emerge as the core
philosophy of the Third Force Movement.
Embodied in the “Third Force” Movement in psychology, psychological humanism
emerged as a reaction to the reductionist orientation of psychoanalysis and behaviourism.
Early humanists emphasised treating the client as a whole person and were thus opposed to
the prevailing theories of psychology of the time that reduced people to mechanistic
collections of psychic parts (psychoanalysis) or discrete behaviours (behaviourism).
According to humanists, a reductionist mind-set is an obstacle to apprehending the true
experience of the person, a process that is essential for effective psychotherapy (Hansen,
2000).
27
Humanism owes its current form to the thinkers of ancient traditions, the scientific and
social reformers of the European Renaissance, and the progressive thoughts of the twentieth
century that shaped Humanism and founded the AHA. In familiar usage, the word
humanism can mean different things to different people in different contexts. However, the
AHA distinguishes the life-stance of Humanism from other usages by ‘uppercasing’ the
word (Doerr, 2002).
Hansen (2000) alludes to the fact that Humanism is a complex psychological movement,
and theorists have stressed various factors that constitute the humanistic mindset. In a broad
sense, Humanism has placed emphasis on the freedom, subjectivity, and ‘will’ of the
existentialist movement and combined it with the optimistic American mind-set. Thus,
Humanism is a unique hybrid of existentialism (without pessimism), phenomenology
(emphasis on understanding consciousness and human subjectivity), and the postwar
American optimism of the 1950’s. Humanistic theorists, therefore, emphasize the inherent
capacity for growth and “the importance of the therapist grasping and empathizing with the
unique subjective experience of clients” (Hansen, 2000, p.22).
The humanistic tenets espoused by the founders of the Association for Humanistic
Psychology (AHP) are basically creative: that humans behave out of intentionality and
values. Humanistic psychologists differ widely in their approaches to application, but share
some common elements as elaborated by Criswell (2000, p.75):
They focus on the experiencing person and the meaning of experience to
the person; they emphasize the human qualities of choice, creativity, values,
self-realization, and so on; they are concerned with problems that are
meaningful to humans; their ultimate concern is with valuing the dignity
and worth of humans and an interest in the development of the potential
inherent in every person. Particularly important is the person as he or she
discovers his or her own being and relates to other persons and social groups.
From that perspective, humanistic psychology adds a “first person” focus to
an essentially “third person” science.
In conclusion, Criswell (2000) asserted that humanistic psychology places its primary value
on what facilitates the positive development of human beings within the unfolding universe.
28
Moustakas (1985) sums up when he says that the ultimate goal of humanistic psychology is
the preparation of a complete description of what it means to be alive as a human being.
Criswell (2000) argued that the post-modern period had so many things in common with the
principles of the humanistic tradition. According to Elkins (2000), since the birth of the
“Third Force” Movement in 1964, we have seen the rise of postmodernism with its
emphasis on multiple selves and transpersonal psychology and Eastern approaches on the
illusion of separate selfhood. Therefore, Criswell and Elkins link the advent of
postmodernism with the emergence of the Third Force psychology in the early 1960’s.
On the same note, Naudin and Azorin (1998) equated existential analysis with narrative
analysis in that they both deal with the history of the client. Naudin and Azorin argued that
Binswanger insisted on the narrative unity of one’s life and organized his narrative around
the linear unfolding of one theme: As in a fictional narrative, there is a beginning, a
development, and a close. In his narrative, the beginning and the end are not those of a
disease but those of a biography. That is, the history of the patient’s disease is always
connected with the history of the patient’s life.
The advent of European humanism has, without doubt, influenced events that shaped and
provided impetus towards the development of the American Humanist Association. The
adoption of humanistic views into psychology saw the founding of the Association for
Humanistic Psychology in the early sixties. At clinical level, humanism appreciates the
conscious experience of the client and a refusal to reduce client experience to underlying
explanatory structures. Because humanism emphasizes free will, clients must take
responsibility for their behaviour and cannot blame underlying conflicts or structures for
their choices (Hansen, 2000). Humanistic psychology espouses this ideology.
The existential-phenomenological principles are thus prominent in humanistic therapies of
the “Third Force” movement. This is particularly illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4 below.
These Chapters illustrate the emergence of existential-phenomenological psychology and its
stake in “Third Force” psychology, particularly the phenomenological principles of
‘wholism’ (akin to the Gestalt ‘field’) of experience and the principles of epoche in
empathy.
29
CHAPTER 3
EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Existential-phenomenological psychotherapists have assimilated the ideas of existential and
phenomenological philosophers into a system of psychotherapy. Like their philosophical
counterparts, existential therapists are concerned with the issues of death, meaning and
anxiety (Hansen, 1999). The name “existential psychotherapy” is herein used alternatively
with “existential-phenomenological” to denote the same thing. This chapter is an illustration
of how Ludwig Binswanger imported Heidegger’s phenomenology into psychotherapy,
using “existential analysis” as therapeutic approach.
Existential analysis adopts the notion that man is an inherent part of his or her world.
Through consciousness, man reaches out to the world to interpret objects and create a
meaning-structure (existential structure) from the “self-and-world” interaction. Binswanger
proposed three modes of “world” with connotative equivalence of the self, the biological,
and the social. This chapter reviews applicability of the three dimensions to psychotherapy
and the contribution of the existential-phenomenological approach to the ideology of
humanistic psychology.
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The two most famous writers who developed existential thought and applied
phenomenology to human beings are Heidegger and Sartre. Martin Heidegger’s major
existential-phenomenological work is titled “Being and Time”. It is Heidegger who brought
together Husserl’s ideas on pure psychology and transcendental philosophy
(Owen, 1994).
30
Binswanger (1958) adopted Heidegger’s concept of “being- in-the-world” into existential-
phenomenological psychology. Binswanger argued that Heidegger, in his concept of being-
in-the-world as transcendence, had eliminated the gap between “self” and “world”.
According to Binswanger, Heidegger had elucidated the structure of subjectivity as
transcendence.
The German word for transcendence is Ueberstieg, meaning ‘climbing over or above,
mounting’. An Ueberstieg requires, first, that towards which the Ueberstieg is directed and,
secondly, that which is ueberstiegen or transcended; the first, towards which the
transcendence occurs, is called the “world”, whereas the second, that which is transcended,
is the “being” itself. That is, the “world” and the self constitute themselves in the act of
transcending (Binswanger, 1958). Thus, Binswanger used Heidegger’s ontological themes
of phenomenology to inform the basic conceptualisations of existential-phenomenological
psychology.
This leads the discussion to the philosophical tenets of existential-phenomenology, and
hence existential-phenomenological psychotherapy. Existential-phenomenology is a
philosophical discipline that seeks to understand the events of human existence in a way
that is free from the preconceptions of our value systems and the intrusions of the natural
scientific approach to knowledge (Giorgi, 1971).
Existential-phenomenological psychology seeks to explicate the essence, structure, or form
of human experience and behaviour as revealed through descriptive methods and
disciplined reflection (Valle et al., 1989). Therefore, existential phenomenological-
psychology has some traces of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. According to
Worrell (1997), Husserl emphasizes consciousness as intentional, that consciousness is
always consciousness of something. The descriptive method is effective in explaining that
which lies within the experience of the subject.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was one the major proponents of existential-
phenomenological psychology. Merleau-Ponty described psychology as a study of
individual and social relationships as they particularly link consciousness and nature.
Having been influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, Heiddegger, and Sartre,
31
Merleau-Ponty maintained that a human being is endowed with characteristics of
consciousness beyond what is described by the traditional sciences (Brennan, 1998a).
According to Merleau-Ponty, a person is the absolute source of existence. He argued that
psychology should then be the study of intentionality, and maintained that the primary
subject matter of psychology must be experience. As indicated in 2.3.2 above,
consciousness is intentional. Intentionality rela tes to “intersubjectivity” in which the
observer and the observed are both relationally defined, that is, they co-constitute each other
(Brennan, 1998a; Worrell, 1997). This assertion reiterates Heidegger’s concept of “being-
in-the-world.”
Giorgi (1971) described existential-phenomenological psychology that emphasizes human
experience as a core determinant of the philosophy. For the person to experience the
essence of a phenomenon, all pre-conception about the phenomenon should be bracketed.
Husserl’s “epoche” becomes a requirement of true experiencing. The existential-
phenomenological psychotherapy adopts similar principles as illustrated in Section 3.3
below.
3.3 EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOTHERAPY
Existential-phenomenological psychotherapy has its roots in Heidegger’s phenomenology,
with the influence of Husserl’s ideas on consciousness and phenomenological reduction.
Worrell (1997) maintained that existential-phenomenological psychology has as its
philosophical bedrock the relational concepts of ‘intentionality’ and ‘intersubjectivity’.
The basic proposition is that all mental activity, affect and behaviour, is relationally
constituted. The “self” and “world” co-constitute each other. Consciousness is held to a
relational act; it is consciousness because of objects, other subjects, or ideas in the world.
Consciousness reaches out to the world to interpret objects, retrieving them as meaningful
things. Consciousness is not separate from the world; consciousness is always
consciousness of something. Therefore, human beings are seen as constantly involved in the
interpretation of reality both in terms of the perception of objects as well as interpersonal
perception. Thus, ‘meaning’ is regarded as a creation and is relative, and a result of a
32
relational process between human beings (Worrell, 1997). Meaning making is a theme of
existential psychotherapy.
In applying phenomenological ‘bracketing’ in existential-phenomenological therapy, Owen
(1994) argued that one consequence of phenomenology for existential therapy is to request
that people talk from their own experience about things they have personally felt, heard and
seen. An assumption of phenomenology is that consciousness can become conscious at
some point in life. The material that is hidden in the preconscious can be brought to
awareness through an act of ‘pure’ description.
In contrast with the client-centered approach, the therapist-client relationship is not defined
by the reflection of the patient’s words and emotions. May and Yalom (1989) contended
that the process of reflection reduces the client’s capacity to experience himself or herself as
an individual in his or her own right, thus resulting in an amorphous kind of identity.
Consequently, the client cannot stand against the therapist or experience being in an
interpersonal world.
According to Owen (1994), the therapeutic relationship in existential therapy has an
egalitarian character. The relationship in therapy is based around having trust in oneself.
Corey (2001) argued that the therapist’s trust is important in teaching clients to trust their
own capacity to discover a new source of values. In order to engage with the trusting
person, the existential therapist eschews any demand for instant healing from a needy client.
The locus of control is shared, and therapists may vary their presence in the sessions.
Acceptance is a major therapeutic subject. The therapist accepts the client’s ‘maps of the
world’ and challenge safely and appropriately and thereby encourages reappraisal and
reinterpretation by bracketing and helps the client to imagine different possible worlds.
Thus, existential psychotherapy enables clients to change via the exploration of client’s
worlds and histories. Existential therapy challenges the client to embrace a life which
accepts pain, human inevitabilities, death, existential indebtedness without end, and those
things that cannot be changed or carried out (Owen, 1994). Provided suffering is
unavoidable, meaning is possible (Frankl, 1984).
33
The search for meaning is one of the core essentials of the existential-phenomenological
therapy. Corey (2001) asserted that a distinctly human characteristic is the struggle for a
sense of significance and purpose in life. According to Corey, the underlying conflicts that
bring people to therapy are centered in these existential questions: What do I want from
life? What gives my life purpose? Where is the source of meaning in life? Frankl (1984)
argued that the meaning of life differs from person to person, and from time to time, in such
a way that one cannot have a constantly held meaning.
Frankl (1984, 1969/1988) coined the word “logotherapy” for his approach to existential
therapy. Logotherapy emphasizes meaning. “Logos” is a Greek word which denotes
“meaning”. Logogtherapy focuses on the meaning of human existence as well as the search
for such a meaning. This striving to find meaning in one’s life is the primary motivational
force in man. This meaning is unique in that it can be satisfied by the individual alone; only
then does it achieve a significance which will satisfy his own will to meaning.
The task of logotherapy is to assist the client to find meaning in his or her life. Logotherapy
makes the client aware of the hidden logos in his or her existence; it is an analytical process.
In this regard, logotherapy resembles psychoanalysis (Frankl, 1984). According to Owen
(1994), the difference between the two is that psychoanalysis relies on inflexible
assumptions, while the existential-phenomenological approach includes facilitating clients
in interpreting themselves, to make sense of their own world.
Frankl (1969/1988) went beyond the uniqueness of meaning to elucidate on values. Frankl
maintained that there are meanings which are shared by human beings across society and
throughout history. Rather than being related to unique situations, these meanings refer to
the human condition. These meanings are called values. Thus one may define values as
“those meaning universals which crystallize in the typical situations a society or even
humanity has to face” (Frankl, 1969/1988, p. 56).
Therefore, the existential-phenomenological approach stresses the therapist-client
relationship and the search for meaning by the client. The therapist does not impose himself
or herself on the client, but facilitates the client to interpret his or her own existence. The
therapeutic relationship is egalitarian; it is called the I-Thou relationship in existential
34
terms. The section below elucidates on Ludwig Biswanger’s “existential analysis” as
explicated in Rollo May’s (1958a; 1958b) milestone publication titled Existence.
3.3.1 Binswanger’s “existential analysis”
Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) was a Swiss psychiatrist and is known as the founder of
“existential analysis”, yet according to Frie (2000), his work is not commonly studied
today. Rollo May (1958) introduced the work of Ludwig Binswanger to the English
speaking audiences in his publication of Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and
psychology. During the 1960s and into the 1970s, Binswanger gained popularity with the
burgeoning movement of humanistic psychology, but he is relatively unknown today.
Frie (2000) associated the decline in Binswanger’s popularity to the changing nature of
therapeutic training and practice. Training in clinical psychology has often become very
narrow in focus. Consequently, the philosophical nature of Binswanger’s writings is often
deemed too abstract or distant from the concerns of contemporary psychology. The
compounding factor was that most of Binswanger’s writings, including his text on the
nature of human interaction, had not been translated into English.
What we generally know of Binswanger is almost exclusively based on outdated
commentaries and translations that are frequently imprecise. However, the situation is quite
different in current-day Germany and Switzerland, where there is renewed interest in
Binswanger’s work; where it continues to be implemented and expanded on in private
practice, clinic, and hospital settings. The full range and importance of Binswanger’s work
has yet to be appreciated by English-speaking clinicians (Frie, 2000).
Ludwig Binswanger used Heiddegger’s concept of being-in-the-world to formulate
therapeutic principles called existential analysis. That is, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology
enabled Binswanger to develop a philosophically oriented approach to psychiatry that could
account for the human being’s total existence (Frie, 2000; May, 1958a). Existential analysis
is a therapeutic approach based on the principles of existential therapy emphasising free will
and the necessity of individual choice, action and judgement (Reber & Reber, 2001).
35
The concept of “existential analysis” comes from the German equivalent of Daseinsanalyse.
Binswanger coined this term to represent a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology,
and existentialist concepts. It is a reconstruction of the inner world of psychiatric patients
with the help of a conceptual framework based on Heidegger’s phenomenology and Martin
Buber’s I-Thou concept (Ellenberger, 1958; Frie, 2000). The I-Thou concept shall receive
attention later in this section. Binswanger’s resembled a shift from psychoanalysis, based on
interpretation, to existential analysis based on the exploration of the client’s lived-world
(environment ) and inner experiences.
Binswanger (1958) described “existential analysis” as an anthropological type of scientific
investigation; one which is aimed at the essence of being human. Binswanger used the word
“anthropological” in its etymological sense, that is, anthropology as the study of man
(“anthropos”) and specifically, the study of the essential meaning and characteristics of
being human. According to Binswanger, existential analysis has the ideal and exactness of
the phenomenological approach.
In a more therapeutic sense, Van Deurzen (1998) explained existential analysis as an
approach that helps people to discover how they veil their awareness of limitations in life
and how to assist them in the process of the revelation of the underlying truth. May (1958,
1983) described existential analysis as a way of understanding human existence, and one of
the chief blocks to understanding human beings is the emphasis on technique. According to
May, technique follows understanding. Thus, the central task of the therapist is to
understand the client as a being and as being- in-his/her-world.
Ellenberger (1958) pointed to some differences between phenomenology and existential
analysis. Firstly, he argued that existential analysis does not restrict itself to the
investigation of the states of consciousness, but takes into account the entire structure of the
existence of the individual. Secondly, while existential analysis emphasises the unity of the
individual’s inner world of experience, existential analysis emphasizes that the individual
may live in more than one world, and sometimes in conflicting “worlds”. Finally,
phenomenology takes into account only the immediate subjective world of experience while
existential analysis seeks to reconstruct the development and transformations of the
36
individual’s “world” or conflicting “worlds”. Therefore, existential analysis departs from
phenomenology in that it operates within a larger frame of reference.
Binswanger recognized three simultaneous modes of being- in-the-world: the “Eigenwelt”,
the “own world” of subjective personal experience, the private world of self or the world of
relationship to oneself; the “Mitwelt”, which is the “with world” of interpersonal
relationships, the world of social relations or the world of one’s fellow men; and the
“Umwelt”, the “surrounding world” of natural objects or our environment, the environment
within which a person exists (Ellenberger, 1958; Frie, 2000; Ghaemi, 2001; May, 1958a,
1983; Van Deurzen, 1998).
Binswanger’s three modes of world epitomize how an individual relates to the self and
world. May (1958a; 1983) defined “world” as the structure of meaningful relationships in
which a person exists and in the designing of which he or she participates. To be aware of
one’s world means at the same time to be designing it. With regard to the territory of human
experience, van Deurzen (1998) provided a tabular form of the dimensions of experience.
Table 1 provides a representation of the fundamental boundaries of human experience and
identifies the basic contradictions which are inevitably encountered in the different
dimensions, as portrayed by van Deurzen (1998, p. 146):
Dimensions of experience
Basic purpose Intermediate goal Ultimate concern
Natural world Pleasure Vitality Strength
Health Comfort Wealth Fortune
Illness Weakness Misery Death
Public world Success Power Glory
Recognition Fame Influence Respect
Failure Defeat Impotence Isolation
Private world Integrity Selfhood Authenticity
Idividuality Freedom Specialness Kinship
Disintegration Confusion Dissolution of self
Ideal world Truth Ultimate reality Wisdom
Meaning Understanding Knowledge Faith
Absurdity Groundlessness Void
Table 1: The territory of human experience.
37
In terms of Binswanger’s existential analysis, the ‘natural world’ or physical demands in
Table 1 denotes the Umwelt; the biological or instinctual world. The ‘public world’
represents the Mitwelt, which implies social or public challenges. The Eigenwelt is
epitomized by the ‘private world’, which implies mental or private limitations. However,
van Deurzen (1998) added a fourth mode of world, the Uberwelt; it resembles the ‘ideal
world’, the ultimate provocation by the unknown. The basic purpose of Uberwelt is truth,
ultimate reality, and wisdom.
In the dimensions of experience (Table 1), Van Deurzen (1998) presented a schematic map
of human world relations. The schematic map is a testimony to May’s (1983) and Frankl’s
(1984) views that suffering, anxiety, and guilt are an intrinsic part of existence: they are
ontological. Although there is a need to emphasise the positive side of existentialism in the
form “existential authenticity” (to be discussed below), it is worthy to note that human
existence fluctuates between the high tide of fulfilment and the low tide of depletion. Both
are inevitable and they induce some form of distress.
In his later existential analytic studies, Binswanger went on to organize his analyses around
a larger frame of reference: the dinstinction of what he termed “existential modes”. An
“existential mode” is the dimension of Dasein in regard to the Mitwelt (fellow beings). In
contrast to classical psychoanalysis, existential analysis takes into account the fact that the
“self” changes according to the various forms of “dual”, “plural”, “singular”, and
“anonymous” existential modes (Ellenberger, 1958). However, only the “dual” mode of
existence shall be given prominence because of its proximity to the I-Thou concept.
The dual existential mode corresponds with the concept of “intimacy” and is an extension
of Martin Buber’s views of the I-Thou relationship. Buber proposed a dialogical approach,
which emphasized relatedness as the central ingredient for change. From the dialogical
perspective, what occurs between the client and therapist prepares the client to accept and
really engage others (Portnoy, 1999).
According to Portnoy (1999), Buber considered the I-Thou relationship to be the most
mature relationship. The I-Thou relationship involves full respect and mutuality between
38
two persons. During the I-Thou moments, the therapist must be willing to allow himself or
herself to be shaped by the client’s subjectivity. Yontef and Simkin (1989) maintained that
the role of the therapist goes beyond the traditional client-therapist relationship; therapists
are responsible for the consequences of their own behaviour and for establishing and
maintaining the therapeutic atmosphere.
However, the prominent thing in the I-Thou approach is a shift in attitude rather than an
embrace of a specific therapeutic orientation. Portnoy argued that even an analytic therapist
can approach a client with an I-Thou stance. “What is important is the therapist’s
willingness, when appropriate, to let the client know how they affect the therapist. The
therapist also needs to bracket preconceptions, be open to the genuine encounter between
two people…” and take stock of how he or she impacts on the therapeutic relationship
(Portnoy, 1999, p.25).
The goal of existential analysis is to have the therapist apprehend the world of the client as
it is experienced in the here and now. Ghaemi (2001) regards Binswanger’s method as one
of the original versions of an empathic approach to psychotherapy. Binswanger emphasized
the need to live in the world of “Mitsein” or “being with”, where one becomes an equal of
the person he or she is analyzing. He believed in experience as it appears in consciousness
and that existential analysis should reveal the structures of phenomena as uniquely
interpreted by each individual, resulting in a unique context of meaning.
That is, the structures of phenomenal meaning describe each person’s orientation to his or
her world with respect to thought processes, fears, anxieties, and social relations. Although
Binswanger accepted instinctual manifestations in childhood as maintained in
psychoanalysis, he argued that these are experienced in the present consciousness. The past
exists only in the present (Brennan, 1998a).
However, Binswanger insisted on the narrative unity of one’s life and organized his
narrative around the linear unfolding of one theme. The unfolding process follows the
structure of a fictional narrative, with a beginning, a development, and a close. In
Binswanger’s narrative, the beginning and the end are not those of a disease but those of a
39
biography; the history of the client is always linked to the client’s life (Naudin & Azorin,
1998).
Wilhelm Schapp (cited in Naudin & Azorin, 1998) emphasized the concept of
“entanglement” in his phenomenology. Schapp argued that we humans are always
entangled in histories. In every history, one may find someone therein entangled. Personal
history and being entangled in histories are closely linked and inseparable. The unity in
history is predisposed, with some direction of growth. Thus, the history to come is already
predisposed with its specific tinge and texture in conformity with its direction and growth.
Schapp’s analysis is comparable to “narrative analysis” in terms of “co-entanglement”.
According to Schapp, our own entanglement refers to the other person’s entanglement, to
the other person’s (hi)stories. We share with the other person the field of the other’s
(hi)stories. Any other person’s entanglement surges on the basis of co-entanglement. In
narrative analysis, fictitious narrative and real histories converge in that both are valid in the
sense that there is a narrator and a listener, which suggests co-entanglement. Thus,
according to Naudin and Azorin (1998), existential analysis is closely linked to narrative
analysis.
Frie (2000) argued that “authenticity” is one of the concepts implicit in Binswanger’s
writings. Miars (2002) defined existential authenticity as an autonomous self-creation of
who and what individuals are to become. The source of authenticity is subjectivity, that is,
authentic contact with inner experiencing. To become authentic, individuals must transcend
enculturation and invent themselves from within. From an existential perspective, the more
authentic a person is, the healthier his or her relationship with the world becomes. However,
Miars recognizes that achieving authenticity is not an easy task because there are no
predetermined road maps.
Miars (2002) maintained that authenticity is a basic and a reasonable goal (a foundational
value) of existential counselling. Reclaiming authentic contact with subjectivity and using it
as a compass for living can greatly reduce distress regarding emotional and interpersonal
problems. Although authenticity is never achievable in an absolute sense, clients have some
power to choose how they think, feel, and act in the world. The pursuit of such personal
40
choice and responsibility is the essence of authentic being- in-the-world. From the
existential perspective, authenticity becomes an ethical demand to discover ways in which
the client can be self-directing and self-creating.
In order to gain the capacity for an authentic living, clients require an insight that would
assist them to navigate their own self-and-world construct system. Miars (2002) defined the
self-and-world cons truct system as the conception each of us holds about who and what we
are and how our world operates. In psychotherapy and counselling, the self-and-world
construct system is accessed by means of exploring the client’s personal meaning structures
(beliefs) and self-perceptions because these constitute the client’s fundamental way of being
in the world.
Binswanger (cited in Ghaemi, 2001) used the concepts of “existential structure” and
“world-design” to denote the self-and-world construct system. Binswanger argued that the
real pathology is pertinent to the world-design or structure of existence of a client.
Pathology manifests itself when the world-design or the self-and-world construct system is
constricted to such a degree that the self is denied an opportunity of maturing. In this case,
everything stays as it was before, and some forms of continuity and stability are maintained.
If something new happens, continuity and stability are disrupted. Binswanger referred to the
disruptive event as “suddenness”. He described suddenness as a time quality that explodes
continuity and stability and destroys them, and throws the earlier existence out of its course.
The phenomenon exposes the client “to the Dreadful, to the naked horror” (Ghaemi, 2001,
p. 56). This can only result in catastrophe, panic, or anxiety attack.
In order to assist a client to embrace personal change, Miars (2002) suggested some
therapeutic values and conditions that would promote authenticity in existential counselling
and psychotherapy. Miars argued that these conditions provide a stance for the therapist to
help the client relinquish or reduce the hold of constricting self-and-world perceptions.
Thus, the agency of therapeutic change involves the opening of perceptual boundaries. The
stance entails the following values and conditions:
41
§ Firmly and consistently challenge the client to view him- or herself as a living being
rather than an object to be explained. The approach is person-centered, in that the
client’s freedom and autonomy are acknowledged even in the phase of resistance by
the client to come to terms with his or her vital subjectivity. It constitutes an I-Thou
relationship, where there is genuine encounter between therapist and client. Portnoy
(1999) maintained that this effect is attained through a dialogical relationship.
§ Consistently challenge the client to expand his or her personal awareness and take
ownership of every choice, including explicit or implicit choices that maintain
problem issues and struggles. This is a difficult and a painful challenge for the
client; it requires the client to relinquish non-authentic choices in favour of authentic
ones. There is much emotional pain around this process, and the therapist needs to
address this.
§ Respect the client as an autonomous and self-directing individual who has authored
his or her life thus far and has the potential to effectively address (re-author) the
issues that are presented in psychotherapy and counselling. Although this does not
suggest an illusion of omnipotence, the therapist needs to acknowledge the dignity
and power of the client to change his or her life through self-authored choices.
§ Assume that the client has and can continue to create self-and-world meaning
structures that make human life possible. The therapist should refrain from making
value judgements regarding the client’s meaning structures, be they adaptive or
maladaptive. The therapist should respect the presenting meaning structures as the
client’s most adaptive response to the inescapable anxiety of being (existential
anxiety). They are powerful determinants of the client’s subjective psychological
experience and inevitably need to be identified and modified for genuine therapeutic
change to occur.
§ Recognize that changing self-and-world meaning structures is a significantly
difficult task. Such a change requires the client to be conscious, in a deeper and a
fuller sense, of the elements of personal choice and responsibility that are inherent in
holding to an existing self-and-world meaning structure. This domain requires a
42
diligent focus on process than content by the therapist. Process refers to how the
client experiences a given perception and content entails the informational or factual
details that explain or justify the perception.
§ Recognize that when constrictions around the world-design and meaning structures
of the client are loosened, the client inevitably discovers new ways of perceiving the
self and how it is embedded in a personal life world. The client spontaneously
begins to construct a new and different way of being (acting) in the world and
experiences less distress around the issues and symptoms that brought him or her to
therapy. This process epitomizes a genuine therapeutic change in existential terms.
§ Recognize both the therapist and the therapeutic relationship as vital to client
change, yet honour that the most essential change process always was (and is) fully,
and only, the client’s. It is the client’s perception(s) of self and world that is the
essence of therapeutic work.
§ Affirm that the derived outcomes from the therapeutic process may be different
from the initial goals that were set by the client, for example, pain relief or symptom
reduction. The desired initial outcomes often can and do change over the course of
therapeutic work as clients are challenged to recognize the existential foundations of
the issues that brought them into therapy.
The core values and conditions of authentic being in existential therapy, as indicated above,
are evidently based on the self-perception of the client and the therapeutic relationship. The
therapist should acknowledge the world-view of the client as it reveals itself in therapy and
thus assist the client to connect with his or her subjective world. A genuine therapeutic
change (in existential terms) implies a co-creation of meaning structures by the therapist
and the client, although the ultimate change remains with the client.
43
3.3.2 Contributions of existential-phenomenology towards humanistic
psychotherapies
The fundamental contribution of the existential phenomenological approach to
psychotherapy is the understanding of man as “being”. Existential therapy, for example,
does not deny the significance of other interpretations of human nature and behaviour, but
contends that these approaches are meaningful within the context of existential structure of
the individual we are dealing with (May, 1983). Carl Rogers (1980) applied the person-
centered approach to the case-study of Ellen West, presented at length in Binswanger
(1958). It is a case that eluded psychoanalysts but improved with Binswanger’s existential
analysis.
The existential-phenomenological approach has helped bring the person back into central
focus. “It has concentrated on the central facts of human existence: self-consciousness and
our consequent freedom” (Corey, 2001, p.160). Another credit from the existential approach
is the view of death as a positive force, but not a morbid prospect to fear, for death gives
meaning to life.
Existentialists regarded anxiety, guilt, frustration, loneliness, and alienation as ontological,
as inherent entities of existence. They are associated with the failure of humans to realize
their potentialities. These shall be discussed in Rollo May’s view of human nature below.
Therefore, therapeutic themes include wrestling with the problem of personal freedom,
dealing with self-alienation and estrangement from others, facing the fear of death and non-
being, searching for a meaningful life, dealing constructively with guilt and anxiety, and
making choices that lead to full personal expression (Corey, 2001).
In contrast to psychoanalysis and behaviourism, existential therapy goes beyond instinctual
drives, the unconscious, and stimulus-response repertoires, to embrace the meaning of
human existence. Frankl (1984) is one of the most articulate in this regard. In logotherapy,
the client is presented with an opportunity to determine whether the essence of life is about
being responsible to society or to his or her own conscience. Therefore, the logo therapist’s
role is to widen and broaden the visual field of the client so that the whole spectrum of
meaning becomes conscious and visible to him or her.
44
Existential therapy recognizes that each individual has a capacity to organise his or her own
world of experiencing and assign meaning to it, whether in an adaptive or maladaptive
manner. The self-and-world meaning structures of a client provide an access for the
therapist to relate with the client’s conception of the prblem. The existential structure
(world-design) of a client is epitomized by Binswanger’s three modes of world; the natural
and biological world (Umwelt), the social world (Mitwelt), and the personal world self-
awareness and self- relatedness (Eigenwelt).
Binswanger’s analysis is a monumental contribution to humanistic psychotherapy in that
analysis shifts from the drive theory and determinism of psychoanalysis to how the client
relates to his or her world of experience, and his or her perception of the presenting problem
in therapy. In humanistic terms, the client is allowed the freedom to explore his or her world
of experience and derive meaning from it. The basic limitation of the existential approach is
that it is not transcendental, it does not allow for experiences beyond the given reality into
spiritual and mystic realms. This debate shall be given emphasis below.
The existential-phenomenological approach to therapy transcends the subject-object
dichotomy in the form of I-Thou relations between therapist and client. The I-Thou relation
encourages the therapist to relate as a person and risk himself or herself as a person in the
therapeutic relationship. It is a relationship of mutuality and genuine encounter. The
therapist enters the therapeutic relationship as a person rather than an expert. Rogers (1980)
pointed out that the 1958 existential symposium organized by Rollo May exposed him to
Binswanger’s case-study of Ellen West, which helped him present a paper on the person-
centered approach, in discontent with the “mistakes” of the psychoanalytic approach (see
paragraph above).
Existential therapy integrates various therapeutic approaches in terms of practice. It is not a
comprehensive therapeutic system, but a frame of reference from which to view the client’s
suffering from an existential perspective. The therapist has the liberty to employ any of the
large variety of techniques used in other approaches insofar as they are consistent with the
existential principles and a human, authentic therapist-client encounter (May & Yalom,
1989).
45
The existential-phenomenological approach addresses concerns emanating from the cross-
cultural perspective. Existential concepts such as freedom, meaning, responsibility, anxiety,
guilt, and suffering are grounded in the universal characteristics of human beings. Corey
(2001) argued that existential therapy is perhaps the most applicable of all approaches when
working with culturally diverse clients. With regard to Mitwelt, clients can examine the
extent to which their behaviour and perceptions are influenced by social and cultural
conditioning. Clients may increase their freedom by recognizing the social limits imposed
on them, particularly by social institutions.
However, the existential-phenomenological approach comes with its own limitations and
criticisms. The major criticism is that the existential approach lacks a clear theoretical base
with regard to the practices of psychotherapy. Corey (2001) asserted that some therapists
have problems with what they perceive as its mystical language and concepts. Scientifically
oriented therapists contend that the concepts should be empirically sound, that definitions
should be operational, that the hypotheses should be testable, and that therapeutic practice
should be based on research results.
Concepts such as “self-actualization”, “dialogic encounter”, “authenticity”, and “being- in-
the-world” may be vague and elusive for some therapists. This lack of precision may cause
confusion and make it difficult to conduct research on the therapeutic outcomes of
existential therapy. Hence, those beginning and advanced practitioners who are not
philosophically oriented may find the existential concepts elusive to deal with.
The advent of existential-phenomenological approach and humanism in America, have
played a part in the emergence and development of the Third Force movement (Existential-
humanistic psychology). Rollo May, the founder of the American existential-
phenomenological school of thought, has been one of the most influential intellectual
leaders of the Third Force psychology. The next chapter reflects on the historical
developments of the Third Force movement and its current status in psychology.
46
CHAPTER 4
THE EMERGENCE OF THE “THIRD FORCE” MOVEMENT: IMPACT ON
PSYCHOLOGY AND BEYOND
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The advent of European phenomenology and existential philosophy culminated in the
emergence of existential-phenomenological psychology in America, particularly with the
publication of a book titled “Existence” by Rollo May in 1958, co-edited with Ernest Angel
and Henri F. Ellenberger. The combination of ideas from the existential paradigm, coupled
with aspects of humanism, led to the emergence of the humanistic movement (“Third
Force”) in current psychology.
This chapter focuses on the implications of this development on the value system of
existential-humanistic psychology and the way in which humanistic theorists contributed to
this trend. Two additional leaders (other than Rollo May) of the humanistic movement are
discussed to elucidate this course: Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. While Rollo May
contributed the existential-phenomenological component of the “Third Force”, Maslow
contributed to the introduction of the transpersonal theory and Rogers the person-centered
approach. I shall focus on Rogers’ view of “empathy’ for the purpose of this study.
I have given prominence to the three theorists for two reasons: firstly, they formed the core
group of active intellectuals among the founders of the Third Force movement, and
secondly, their theories represent the diversity of paradigms within humanistic psychology.
As indicated in Chapter 1, Maslow represented the transcendental aspect, Rogers the
phenomenological-humanistic, while May encompassed the existential-phenomenological
approach.
The history of humanistic psychology is broad and rather complex, or even confusing at
times (Wertz, 1998). What is presented here is not exhaustive, but an indication of the
47
major trend of events that brought about the emergence of the “Third Force” Movement.
Wertz raised concerns on how authors report differently on the historical developments of
this movement, and hence the confusing aspect. However, I have attempted to reflect on the
common elements of these ‘histories’.
4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE “THIRD FORCE” MOVEMENT
The “Third Force” Movement emerged in the United States and is an umbrella name for
what is called the American Humanistic Psychology. If depth psychology (psychoanalysis)
is regarded as the “First Force” and behaviourism as the “Second Force” movement, then,
humanistic psychology becomes the “Third Force” Movement (Brennan, 1998a).
Humanistic psychology started with a compilation of a mailing list by Abraham Maslow
between the early and mid-1950s with the aim of organising like-minded persons who
shared a common goal of helping the individual grow towards fuller humaneness. The
project was facilitated by the administrative assistance of Anthony Sutich, who kept custody
of the mailing list and communicated with the relevant intellectuals (DeCarvalho, 1990).
Maslow’s and Sutich’s efforts were rewarded by the founding of the Journal of Humanistic
Psychology (JHP) in the spring of 1961 and the American Association for Humanistic
Psychology (AAHP) in the summer of 1963. The first “A”, standing for “American”, was
dropped some years later, due to the international influence the movement was gaining.
Although other names like “self-psychology” and “holistic psychology” were brought
forward, the title “humanistic psychology” was finally adopted for the journal (Moustakas,
1985). However, Smith (1990) attributed the beginnings of humanistic psychology to
publications in the area of personality by Gordon Allport and Henry Murray in 1937 and
1938 respectively.
The emergence of humanistic psychology as a “Third Force” in American psychology was
precipitated by a conference held in November 1964 under the auspices of the American
Association for Humanistic Psychology (AAHP). The conference was held at the Old
Saybrook Inn in Connecticut, hence the title “Saybrook Conference”. The purpose of the
conference was to re-examine the philosophy of the AAHP and to reconsider themes and
directions. The conference was also a reflection of discontent at the dominance of
48
behaviorism and orthodox psychoanalysis (DeCarvahlo, 1990; Elkins, 2000; Greening,
1985; Kendler, 1987; Smith, 1990). Present at the conference were psychologists and
individuals from different backgrounds. The eclectic group consisted of Gordon Allport,
James Bugental, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, Rollo May, Jacques Barzun, Charlotte
Buhler, George Kelley, Clark Moustakas, Henry Murray, Robert Knapp, and a host of
others (DeCarvalho, 1990; Elkins, 2000).
Various authors report on varying combinations and numbers of attendants, some fewer,
and some more. However, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Rollo May became
distinguished intellectual leaders of the movement until their respective deaths. In
distinguishing the “Third Force” Movement, Brennan (1998b) argued that it may be easier
to specify what the “Third Force” Movement is not, rather than what it is. It is not
psychoanalysis, nor is it an experimentally based objective psychology.
The “Third Force” Movement draws its intellectual underpinnings from the literature and
methodologies of European existentialism and phenomenology. It has found its success
mainly in clinical applications, which Brennan (1998b) described as “appropriate since it
tries to understand the person as an individual, existing in particular contexts and times,
wrestling with the choices of life and assuming responsibilities for these choices” (p.251).
Within a few years (that is, mid-sixties), the humanistic movement was recognized as a
“third force” in American psychology. The focus was on defining a human psychology with
emphasis on individual experiences and variability (Brennan, 1999a). To illustrate this
variability, Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow embraced self-actualization as an empirical
principle and as an ethical ideal. They maintained that human nature is intrinsically good
but corrupted by society (Smith, 1990). Rollo May represented the existential aspect of
humanism, which espoused existential concerns of human freedom, values, and choices.
In response to the question of what the philosophy of the humanistic movement would be,
Carl Rogers asserted that the answer would have an existential flavour: man choosing for
him- or herself, man the architect of him- or herself. Rogers assumed that the humanistic
philosophy would center itself on the individual as the evaluating agent. Rogers
simultaneously raised concerns that if deploring and resisting was all the Third Force
49
movement stood for, then they would become a temporary protestant group and be
superseded (Greening, 1987).
The participation of Rollo May in the “Third Force” movement probably consolidated the
existential component of humanistic psychology, hence the name “Existential-Humanistic”
psychology, as implied by some authors (Portnoy, 1999; Schneider, 1996). Influenced by
the philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich, Rollo May brought the current of European
existentialism and phenomenology into humanistic psychology (Martinez, 1998;
Rabinowitz, Good, & Cozad, 1989; Smith, 1990).
With the advent of the counterculture movement of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the humanistic
vision moved out into the streets of America as much as it was making inroads into the
academic and professional community. The human-potential movement spread through
society in the form of encounter groups, growth centres, body therapies, communes,
alternative lifestyles, political programmes, and new spiritualities. The humanistic voice
emerged within the American society in such issues as women’s liberation, civil rights, and
the Vietnam war (Elkins, 2000; Smith 1990).
The counterculture had a number of psychological features that resonated with humanistic
psychology. There was convergence in the area of individualism, a belief in the fulfilment
of the individual as the centre of value. That is, people should “do their own thing” (Smith,
1990, p.10). Other areas of resonance were self-disclosure, which, in the language of
counterculture meant to “let it all hang out” (Jourard, cited in Smith, 1990); an emphasis on
here and now; exaltation of hedonism, implying feeling good about what one does; and
finally irrationalism, as manifested in reliance on intuition over evidence, uncritical affinity
with the occult, and in the celebration of drug- induced “highs” (Smith, 1990).
The major focus of humanistic psychology was on the encounter group movement.
Encounter groups and their use in psychotherapy began with the human potential
movement. Reber and Reber (2001) described an encounter group as a small group that
focuses on intensive interpersonal interactions (encounters). The goal of encounters was to
remove psychological barriers and defences, achieving openness, honesty and the
willingness to deal with the difficulties of emotional expression. Group members were
50
encouraged to deal with ‘here and now’ and disregard intellectualization and persona l
history.
Encounter groups were not regarded as psychotherapy. The “human growth” that they were
supposed to promote was unregulated and it was unevaluated scientifically. By the mid-
1980’s, the encounter group movement had faded into a minor component within the
psychoculture. However, encounter groups continued into the 1980’s without their quasi-
religious orientations that characterized their heyday (Smith, 1990).
In modern day psychology, some scholars believe that humanistic psychology failed to
realize its historical promise and that it now has little voice in the scholarly discourse of our
day. Others believe that the humanistic perspective is still cogent and that it is needed in
psychology even more today than it was in the 1960’s (Elkins, 2000). Along the same vein,
Smith (1990) described humanistic psychology as both a social movement within
psychology and an enduring perspective.
Adding to the controversies of the “Third Force”, Rowan (1989) raised a question of
whether humanistic psychology comes as an entity or is divided into two. Wilber (1989)
responded that there are two humanistic psychologies, one transpersonal, and the other,
which is not. Transpersonal psychology emerged from within the humanistic movement in
favour of the mystical tendencies emanating from the counter-culture. It is a psychology
aimed at connecting human consciousness with the larger spiritual ocean in which people
participate.
Rowan (1989) viewed transpersonal psychology as a shift from what he called the “mental
ego” (ordinary consciousness) to the “subtle self” (transpersonal consciousness). Rowan
linked Maslow and Rogers to the transpersonal paradigm, with self-actualisation as a
transcendental thesis. Pauchant and Dumas (1991) asserted that Maslow challenged the
focus of psychology on pathology, and that humanistic psychology needed to be built from
the study of the “healthiest” individual in society. However, society has its ills and
pessimisms, epitomised by existential guilt, anxiety, and dread - an aspect complemented by
the existential-humanistic psychology.
51
Humanistic psychologists accepted the existential-phenomenological view that an
individual should be understood with the fewest possible preconceptions, so that one
encounters the individual directly rather than filtered through own theories. They
emphasized the role of freedom, choice, decision, and responsibility in human existence.
For the purpose of addressing the dualism of humanistic psychology raised by Wilber
(1989b), I favour the use of the concept ‘existential-humanistic’ to reflect on the unity
between the existential and the transpersonal aspects. The adoption of the concept is an
acknowledgement of the concurrent role of the transpersonal and the existential-
phenomenological approaches in the shaping and theoretical development of the “Third
Force” Movement. However, the term ‘humanistic’ is popularly used to denote the entire
movement.
4.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE “THIRD FORCE” TO THERAPEUTIC
PRINCIPLES OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY
This section aims at elucidating the role humanistic psychology played in institutionalising
the study and views of human experiences. The adoption of existential philosophy and
phenomenology into psychotherapy is one of the milestone achievements of the humanistic
movement. The establishment of an overriding theory for the “Third Force” remains a
concern. In search of what May (1976) called “a new paradigm for humanistic psychology,
a new set of metaphors, a new underlying structure” (p. 34), he organised a conference of
eclectic thinkers in the spring of 1975, including Gregory Bateson and his contextual
approach. May was looking for an explanatory model for the “Third Force”.
Arguments in this section are typical of the scenario above. The humanistic view of man is
discussed, then, followed by the theoretical contributions of Abraham Maslow and Carl
Rogers. Chapter 3 reflected on the contributions of Rollo May’s existential approach to
humanistic psychology. Rogers’ conception of “empathy” is herein used to illustrate the
phenomenological-humanistic aspect. It is also demonstrated that Rogers’ empathy can be
transcendental if combined with Zen meditation. Maslow’s peak experience” is discussed,
with the view to demonstrate the transcendental aspect. The last two sections deal with the
status and future implications of the “Third Force”.
52
4.3.1 View of human nature and links with positive psychology
Chen (2001) indicated that the fundamental philosophy in humanistic psychology is its
recognition of, and focus on the significant role and function of subjectivity in people’s
living experience. According to Chen, people are purposeful and intentional beings who
make sense of the phenomenological world, external and social contexts. The centrality of
human phenomenology lies with people’s capacity and tendency to discern meanings
associated with living experience. Because people are living a holistic and integral life, they
are engaged in a continuous process of meaning making and meaning-exploration.
Humanistic psychology maintains that individuals are healthy social beings capable of
thinking and experiencing in their life journey. Although there may be psychological
difficulties associated with the life journey, people have the capacity to experience and cope
with such difficulties through resilience, and continue their journey of personal
development and growth (Chen, 2001; Strümpfer, 2001). Thus, humanistic psychology
focuses on the phenomenology of individual experiences as purposefully guided and
meaningful. Above all, the ability of humans to overcome psychological difficulties is
indicative of an ‘inherent’ human nature of resilience and the capacity to overcome what
Strümpfer (2001) called ‘inordinate demands’.
Freedom and uniqueness of an individual are some of the basic tenets of humanistic
psychology (Criswell, 2000). Hansen (2000) echoed a similar sentiment that psychological
humanism, in line with existential and phenomenological philosophy, emphasizes free will
and subjectivity. Criswell proceeded to indicate that the founders of the Association for
Humanistic Psychology (AHP) were psychologists who emphasized the human qualities of
choice, creativity, values, and self-actualization. They were concerned with problems that
have meaning to humans; they valued the dignity and worth of humans and focused interest
on the development of the potential inherent in every person. Hence humanistic psychology,
according to Criswell, adds the “first person” focus to an essentially “third person” science.
Criswell (2000) maintained that humanistic psychology places its primary value on what
facilitates the positive development of human beings within the unfolding universe.
Criswell emphasized a concern for all persons and their basic human rights: their right to be
53
treated as individuals with worth and dignity, the right to primacy of their experiences, the
right to the holistic development of their various talents and capacities, as well as the rights
of society to the contributions of all individuals towards what he termed “the cultural
evolution of mankind” (p.75). From this perspective, humanistic psychology extends from
the experiential phenomenology of the person to the broader values of society.
In integrating the humanistic view of man as expressed in the assertions above, Greening
(1998, p. 9) listed five basic postulates of humanistic psychology as follows:
§ Human beings, as human, supersede the sum of their parts. They cannot be reduced to components.
§ Human beings have their existence in a uniquely human context, as well as in a cosmic ecology.
§ Human beings are aware and aware of being aware - that is, they are conscious. Human
consciousness always includes an awareness of oneself in the context of other people.
§ Human beings have some choice and, with that, responsibility.
§ Human beings are intentional, aim at goals, are aware that they cause future events, and seek
meaning, value, and creativity.
The five postulates attribute a positive orientation towards human nature. The implications
are that a human being is unique and whole (Gestalt), intentionally conscious, is endowed
with responsibility for choice, his or her actions are goal-directed (Strümpfer, 2001) in
pursuit of meaning and value. Above all, people are creatively involved in their lives. These
assertions about human nature counter May’s (1958a; 1983) existential pessimism that
anxiety and guilt are ontological, and that psychopathology presents itself as anxiety in the
therapeutic process. Humanistic psychologists have not been keen on this thesis, given their
limited interest.
Sheldon and Kasser (2001) associated the positive attributes of humanistic psychology with
positive psychology. Sheldon and Kasser defined positive psychology as an attempt to
understand healthy aspects of people, that is, fundamental human strengths and resources.
Positive psychologists are thus interested in investigating “the good life” and the
psychological factors that can promote it.
According to Sheldon and Kasser (2001), emerging research indicates that there is a
growing interest in such topics as altruism, wisdom, growth, creativity, spirituality, hope,
54
and love, to mention but a few. Thus, positive psychology is re-exploring the same
questions and issues humanistic psychology has long been interested in. This, in my
opinion, would suggest some convergence of the two paradigms although caution should be
exercised in that humanistic psychology still needs to recognise positive psychology as a
bridge between the phenomenological and natural scientific approaches.
The fundamental concern is that positive psychology does not eschew quantitative methods
for the purpose of theory verification. This perspective is against the spirit and letter of
humanistic psychology although Sheldon and Kasser (2001) equate “quantitative
methodology” with “sensitive humanism”. The argument is that the two can be in harmony,
bringing a new explanatory model for all psychology. Although this is a valuable point, I
presume the move would compromise the essence of humanistic psychology and what it
stands for, the descriptive nature of experience.
In a move to elucidate the scenario, Rich (2001) commented that the scope and meaning of
“the good life” in positive psychology poses a problem. Rich poses the question that if
positive psychology is a science of positive subjective experience, positive individual traits,
and positive institutions, are these experiences, traits, and institutions the same over time
and place, through history and across culture? The answer would probably be “no”, which
would place positive psychology in a precarious position.
Resnick et al. (2001) suggested the development of a more positive psychotherapy as a
compromise. They argued that humanistic psychologists and psychotherapists have long
recognized the value of positive experience. Humanistic psychologists have worked to
facilitate higher and more positive emotions like love, courage, pride, and faith. The
concern is that even among humanistically oriented therapists, this positive philosophy has
not always translated into positive focus in therapy. According to Resnick et al. (2001), we
still focus on pain and thus base our therapeutic approach on a problem perspective.
55
4.3.2 Humanistic and transcendental contributions of the “Third Force”
to contemporary psychology.
This section discusses Maslow’s views on the transcendental aspect of the human potential
to grow and self-actualize. The holistic perspective on psychological development and self-
actualization contributed immensely to the professions of individual and family counselling
and organizational development consulting. The study and quest for “peak experiences” and
self-actualization were popularised as a result (Resnick, Warmoth, & Serlin, 2001). This
section aims at explaining the nature of “peak experiences” and the dimensions thereof as
proposed by Rowan (1983) under 4.3.2.1 below.
Carl Rogers’ views on “empathy” and therapeutic value are discussed. The purpose here is
to elucidate both the humanistic and transcendental aspects of an empathic relationship.
Rogers (1980) referred to the transcendental state as the “altered states of consciousness”.
The section closes with Ryback’s (2001) analogy of the empathic process with musical
melody, a confirmation of the transcendental features of the empathic relationship.
However, the concepts “peak experiences” and “empathy” are not exhaustive of Maslow’s
and Rogers’ theories, they merely serve to illuminate on their influence within the “Third
Force” Movement.
4.3.2.1 Maslow’s “peak experiences” and the phenomenology of mystical
experiences
Abraham Maslow’s theory of self-actualization is the most comprehensive and yet complex
of all within the humanistic movement. Geller (1982) asserted that theories of self-
actualization appealed to the Western mind since Aristotle. From the mid-twentieth century
onwards, there has been a resurgence of the concept of self-actualization in the thought of
numerous philosophers and psychologists, the foremost of whom include Martin Heidegger,
Gabriel Marcel, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Gordon Allport, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, and
Abraham Maslow. According to Geller (1982), this theoretical framework has become a
permanent part of the Western intellectual landscape.
56
Maslow’s interpretation of “peak experiences” is contained in his theory of human
motivation (self-actualization). Maslow (1954/1970) regarded this as a positive theory of
motivation and thus conforms to clinical practice. Maslow developed a hierarchy of needs
based on an individual’s inherent capacity for psychological growth. Basic needs must be
satisfied before an individual progresses to more advanced needs. A small percentage of
persons reach the highest point, which is self-actualization, characterized by peak
experiences and feelings of transcendence.
Lowest in the hierarchy are the physiological needs. Rowan (1999) described the lower end
of needs as “deficiency motivation”, that is, homeostatic in nature, almost an automatic
mechanism. Homeostasis refers to the body’s automatic efforts to maintain a constant state
of the bloodstream. Homeostatic regulation is sustained through food, drink, activity and
sleep, protection against extreme temperatures, and sensory stimulation (Maslow,
1954/1970; Meyer, Moore, & Viljoen, 1997; Rowan, 1999).
Highest in the hierarchy is the need for self-actualization. Having gone through the other
levels such as the need for safety, belongingness, and self-esteem, the person experiences
the desire for self- fulfilment, the tendency to become actualized in what he or she is
potentially capable of (Maslow 1954/1970). The self-actualizing person shares the desire to
transform his or her circumstances, realizes his or her potential, and becomes the best
person (s)he can be (Lewis, 1998).
In the process of self-actualization, Maslow said, we occasionally have a “peak experience”.
For one to know what self-actualization is, one needs to get the feel of the peak experience,
to go to the experience of Being. Maslow called this “transcendence”. He asserted that
transcendence succeeded self-actualization. But either way, the process ends up with
mystical experiences (Rowan, 1983). This is the highest state of consciousness, or what
Rowan called “cosmic consciousness” or “transcendence”. Rowan proposed more than one
type of a mystical experience, in contrast to Maslow. A description of selected types of
mystical experiences is given below, starting with an explication of “peak experiences”.
Rowan (1983) described the peak experience as the unpredictable occurrence of ecstatic
experiences, most often triggered by nature, music, or sex, where there is a union between
57
the person and the Whole. On the concept “whole”, Chauduri (1975) argued that there is
only one true ‘ultimate’ known to humans, and that is the “cosmic whole”. The “cosmic
whole” cannot be equated with any determinate type of cognition, perfection, compassion,
or mystic realization. These are all passing and transient features of the cosmic process.
Wilber (1989a) proclaimed that the mystical event is not a proposition but an experience.
To this effect, Maslow acknowledged the phenomenological nature of the human subjective
experiences. He defined a peak experience as a moment where the perceiver is in cognitive
isolation from material reality. In peak experience there is awe, wonder, amazement,
humility and even reverence, exaltation and piety (Adams, 1999; Maslow, 1968/1999;
Pauchant & Dumas, 1991). Rowan (1983) identified seven stages in the mystical
experience, the first being the peak experience leading up to “the ultimate”.
However, I shall selectively discuss those stages that are more congruent to Maslow’s views
on peak experiences. Having defined peak experiences, three other stages are given
prominence; “real self”, “Deity as substance”, and “Deity as process”. The “real self” is the
feeling of getting in touch with one’s own center, one’s identity, one’s true self - the self
that lies beyond all self- images or self-concepts. Rowan (1983) described this as an
experience of authenticity that consists of self-respect and self-enactment.
The stages of “Deity as substance” and “Deity as process” provide spiritual dimension to
the peak experience. Deity as substance refers to the sense of being in touch with the Deity,
the creator and sustainer of all life and being. Deity is here seen as the pure substance of
spirit. This sense is developed by worship and commitment to some particular notion of the
Deity, be it personal, symbolic or abstract. In the Christian tradition we speak of God the
Father, Islam offers Allah, and Judaism Jehovah. The ecstatic end of this process signifies a
personal change, giving up our existing identities, and this feels like rebirth (Rowan, 1983).
“Deity as process” shares some similarity with the Deity as Substance; they both consist of
worship and commitment. The fundamental difference is that Deity as Process proposes
worship in the company of other believers and the intellectual content of what is believed
becomes more important. It is the sense of being in touch with the Deity as process, rather
than as subject or object; regardless of how fine or abstract. At this stage the person has a
58
choice on what to believe, and these choices must be formed in congruence with theological
principles of faith (Rowan, 1983).
Contrary to Rowan’s views on mystical experiences, the dimension of spirituality is not
emphasised in Maslow’s “peak experiences”. Spirituality is hereby defined as a way of
being and experiencing that comes about through awareness of a transcendental dimension,
and that is characterized by certain identifiable values with regard to self, others, nature,
life, and whatever one considers to be Ultimate (Elkins, Hedstrom, Hughes, Leaf, &
Saunders, 1988).
Similar to Maslow, Elkins et al. (1988) asserted that the spiritual person experiences a sense
of awe, reverence, and wonder even in “non-religious” settings. He or she does not
dichotomise life into sacred and secular, holy and profane, but believes that the sacred is in
the ordinary. This notion corresponds with Rowan’s “Deity as process”: it is self-
transcendental in that the spiritual person goes beyond dichotomy. Maslow (1968/1999)
made a similar reference in the form of “dichotomy-transcendence”. Maslow’s views on
“peak experiences” are typical of the ideology of Transpersonal Psychology.
The discussion above suggests two major dimensions of mystical experiences; that of the
self, and spirituality. The phenomenon of mystical experience is transcendental in that the
person in the peak experiences feels a new sense of identity and integration. In this sense,
Maslow (1968/1999) argued that peak experiences may and do have some therapeutic
effects in the strict sense of removing symptoms. They can change the person’s view of
him- or herself in a healthy direction and release him or her for greater creativity,
spontaneity, and expressiveness.
4.3.2.2 Rogerian empathy
Carl Rogers has been one of the outstanding leaders of the humanistic movement although
he could not claim sole leadership because of the vastness of the movement and its cultural
inclinations (Orlov & Coleman, 1992). Rogers’ major contribution is the person-centered
approach. A major focus shall be given to the concept of “empathy”, its definition and
application in psychotherapy. A brief review of the concepts of “congruence” and
59
“incongruence” is made in order to put the client’s capacity to grow in place. Finally, the
contention by Rogers (1980) and Schuster (1979) that the therapeutic relation is
transcendental (to the level of mystical experiences) is also discussed.
Similar to Maslow, Rogers viewed the human growth potential along the lines of self-
actualization though he preferred to use the concept of “actualising tendency”. This was an
attempt to generalise the phenomenon to the broader population (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981).
Rogers regarded the self and the organism as separate, each with its own actualising
tendency but linked by the concept of “congruence” or “incongruence” (Ford, 1991;
Rogers, 1980; Thorne, 1992).
“Incongruence” refers to the discrepancy between the self as perceived and the actual
experience of the total organism, that is, incongruence of self with experience of the
organism. Incongruence leads to psychological vulnerability that leaves a person anxious
and confused. “Congruence” implies the opposite effect; it is an ideal where a person is
open and conscious of all his or her experiences and can effectively incorporate them into
the self-concept. Congruent people see themselves authentically for what they are, and have
a capacity to realise their potential and live creatively (Ford, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997;
Thorne, 1992). Congruence in a client is the objective of the Rogerian person-centered
approach embodied in the empathic relationship with the client.
Rogers (1980) had several definitions of empathy. I shall present those definitions with
implied themes of ‘meaning’ and the phenomenological-related theme of ‘bracketing’.
According to Rogers, an empathic therapist points sensitively to the “felt meaning” which
the client is experiencing at this moment, in order to help him or her to focus on that
meaning and carry it further to its full uninhibited experiencing.
A later definition of empathy implies that the therapist enters the private perceptual world
of the client and becoming thoroughly at home in it. The therapist lays down his or her
views and values in order to enter another’s world without prejudice. This can be done by
persons who feel secure about themselves in that they will no t be lost in the strange and
bizarre world of the other, and that they can safely return to their own world if they wish to
(Rogers, 1980).
60
Schuster (1979) argued that empathy can be enhanced by means of “mindfulness” in Zen
meditation. Lesh (cited in Schuster, 1979) conducted a study using the simpler form of Zen
meditation involving mindfulness of breathing by counting one’s breath. The results
indicated that the group who practiced meditation improved significantly in their empathy
ability.
The more difficult form of Zen meditation is “shikan-taza”; a form of meditation that seems
most conducive to developing the type of attitude needed in psychotherapy. This kind of
meditation is akin to Buddhist Satipatthana: there is no specific object of meditation here.
The meditator passively notices the endless flow of ideas, emotions, and sensations that
arise in the mind. These are the same phenomena that occur during therapy. The purpose of
this exercise is “bare attention”. Bare attention is the clear and single-minded awareness of
what is transpiring in us and to us in each successive moment of perception (Schuster,
1979). It is akin to Husserl’s “epoche”.
However, Rogers (1980) did recognize the significance of transcendental experiences in
what he called “altered states of consciousness”. The altered state of consciousness is the
transcending experience of unity. The person pictures the individual self as dissolved in a
whole area of higher values, especially beauty, harmony, and love. The person feels at one
with the cosmos. It is in the slightly altered state of consciousness that Rogers believes to
have a healing influence on the other. He argued that his “presence” in this state was
releasing and helpful to the client.
Rogers (1980) maintained that this kind of transcendent phenomenon is evident even in
groups. Rogers and Schuster confirm by their arguments that the principles of
transcendental phenomenology are applicable to psychotherapy. Schuster’s “mindfulness”
can be equated to the act of consciousness and intentionality in phenomenology. Chaudhuri
(1975) argued that consciousness is essentially a self-transcending act, associated with
mystical experiences and the spirituality linked to these experiences. Hence I agree with
Elkins et al. (1988) that psychology cannot afford to ignore the spiritual dimension.
61
Along transcendental lines, Ryback (2001) asserted that empathy at its best has
characteristics highly similar to improvisational jazz. He quoted Wynton Marsalis to say
that jazz music is about communication and connection. According to Ryback, both
empathy and jazz have the following:
§ The invitation to improvise, in jazz, among the musicians; in therapy, between
therapist and client. In the person-centered approach, the person is free to choose
any direction.
§ Progress of possibilities continues until there is a cohesive theme - in jazz, a shared
melody; in therapy, an entrainment of body and mind in both persons. The therapist
is sensitive, moment to moment, to the changing felt meaning flowing in the other
person.
§ Such openness leading to togetherness requires the combination of both skill in
technique and a creative openness. In jazz, musical technique; in therapy, the
therapist’s skill in providing the underlying structure.
§ The process leads to something new rather than mere repetition. In jazz there is
mutual creativity; in therapy, the therapist’s openness to new learning by listening
and reflection goes beyond mere repetition.
The analogy to empathy as jazz music affirms its transcendental nature, the mystical
dimension. The analogy implies that empathic experience goes beyond the usual levels of
consciousness. Rowan (1983) cited music as one of the activating agents of the mystical
experience (see 4.3.2.1 above). Thus, Rogers’ conceptualisation of empathy colludes with
the transcendental ideology of the “Third Force”; it extends on the I-Thou relation of the
existential-phenomenological approach.
However, Rogers (1942) stipulated some conditions that he regarded as crucial in an
empathic relationship. Topmost is the therapist’s warmth and responsiveness, which
gradually develops into a deeper emotional relationship. From the therapist’s point of view,
this is a definitely controlled relationship, an affectional bond with defined limits. The
therapist is aware that he is emotionally involved in this relationship and is sensitive to the
needs of the client. His emotional involvement is limited for the good of the client.
62
The other important quality is the therapist’s lack of judgemental attitude. This allows the
client to freely express his or her emotions. A skillful therapist refrains from imposing his
or her own wishes, his or her own reactions or biases, into the therapeutic relationship.
Advice and suggestion are out of place in Rogerian therapy. This approach provides for the
positive ground for personality growth and development, for conscious choice, and for self-
directed integration. These are the qualities that distinguish a therapeutic relationship from
the usual relationships of everyday life in the family, the school, and the working world
(Rogers, 1942).
I express some reservations with regard to Rogerian empathic approach. Rogers (1942,
1980) stipulated qualities that he regarded as necessary for the therapist. This limits the
scope of interaction and approach from the side of the therapist. The free expression of
emotion in the therapeutic relationship may be misconstrued either by the client or therapist,
particularly under ‘seductive’ circumstances. This poses a serious threat to ethical practice
in psychotherapy. Thorne (1992) argued that it is indeed difficult to conceive of a therapist
who surrenders power for the sake of a therapeutic relationship. The power gradient needs
to be redefined.
4.3.3 Applicability of the “Third Force” principles to contemporary
psychology and beyond
The advent of the “Third Force” psychology moved psychology from the academic and
professional confines into society, politics, and spirituality. For example, it was
demonstrated in the section above that traditional theories of personality and methods of
psychotherapy blended with Zen Bhuddism, translate into transpersonal psychology
(Schuster, 1979; Taylor, 1999). Also, the Rogerian principle of person-centered
communication has been applied in education and politics with some visible successes
(Greening 1987; Rogers, 1980). Humanistic principles have applicability in clinical areas,
namely, ecosystemic therapy, career counselling, Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy
(REBT), and Therapeutic Communities in institutional settings.
Hansen (1999) did a critical review of humanistic approaches to treating disturbed clients.
He indicated that the client-centered approach is beneficial to disturbed clients because the
63
therapist attempts to grasp the full experience of the client and provide a therapeutic
relationship that will catalyse the client’s natural tendency towards congruence and self-
actualization. The person-centered approach deplores the reduction of a client into drives
and behaviours as practiced by psychoanalysis and behaviourism respectively.
Rogers and colleagues conducted a study of the effects of the client-centered approach on
hospitalised schizophrenics. Results indicated that the therapy clients improved slightly
over the control group in the areas of positive personality changes and release rate from the
hospital. In explaining why the differences between the therapy and control groups did not
have greater significance, Rogers argued that all patients were exposed to extensive hospital
milieu therapies. The sole difference was the extra two hours of client-centered intervention
for the therapy group. An extrapolation of these results to current mental health climate
would probably suggest the same (Hansen, 1999).
Tyler (1992, 1994) contended that principles of the ecosystemic approach are applicable to
humanistic psychology. Tyler argued that Roger’s theory is systemic, but is developed with
a stronger emphasis on the phenomenological perspective. The reason is that Rogers
considers the individual’s whole world of experience. The organism reacts to the field as it
is experienced and perceived. Rogers saw personality as two subsystems, the conceptual
and the experiential - contained within an overarching interpersonal system. In an
undeveloped individual, the two systems are highly differentiated and may also function
independently of each other. Individual development is seen as the integration of the two
subsystems - the self and the organism.
This proposition epitomises the concept of “congruence” discussed in 4.3.2.2 above. The
integrative tendencies of an individual can be achieved through empathy after which the
person feels part of the larger whole which transcends the boundaries of the individual self.
The phenomenological view of the ecosystemic approach regards each system as comprised
of a group of individuals who interrelate with one another and reciprocate with the
environment they inhabit. Systemic approaches in the past ignored the individual in favour
of the system. The humanistic approach considers an autonomous system not as an object
but as a phenomenological event - in terms of the individual’s own experiences, beliefs and
personal meanings (Tyler, 1992).
64
Ellis (1996) asserted that Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) is one of the main
humanistic psychotherapies. Based on the ABCD model of the REBT, Ellis argued that it is
not events that upset us but the way we perceive these Activating Events (A’s).
Unfortunately A’s influence us, but our B’s (Beliefs) about these A’s largely bring about
disturbed C’s (Consequences), such as anxiety and depression. In order to undo the
disturbance, we can proceed to D - to actively and forcefully Dispute our self-defeating B’s
(Beliefs). According to Ellis (1996), the ABCD Theory of emotional disturbance is
“unusually phenomenalistic” (p.71). The ABC’s of REBT also stress the meanings and
interpretations people give to events and to results rather than the events and results in
themselves. Also, there is ‘existential choice’ in REBT approach; people, even though they
may not be aware of this, largely choose their dysfunctional core philosophies and
lifestyles. Consciously and unconsciously, they train themselves to feel panicked,
depressed, self-hating, and enraged, rather than get conditioned to feel these ways.
Ellis (1979) felt that the scientific approach has no inner dimensions. People are objects to
be used instrumentally and science holds that values do not exist. For Ellis, REBT is largely
a phenomenological view which holds that humans do have inner dimensions; that external
events in the universe do not directly disturb them, but instead, they largely choose to
disturb themselves. They have the power to choose otherwise and refuse to upset
themselves; they have some measure of “free will” and are definitely not objects to be used
instrumentally. Hence Epictetus’ dictum that “Men are disturbed not by things, but by the
view which they take of them” (Ellis, 1979, p.89).
Even with the inherent differences between humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis,
attempts have been made to integrate the two theories. Of the four psychologies of
psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology is closest to self-psychology and furthest from the
drive theory (the others being “ego”, and “object-relations”). Drive psychology is
inherently deterministic because it attributes all behavioural manifestations to the sexual
and aggressive determinants. Self-psychology assigns great importance to the development
of a sense of self throughout one’s life. Thus, strengthening the structure of the self is the
primary goal of psychotherapy. Self-psychology has many commonalities with humanistic
65
psychology, such as emphasis on subjectivity, sense of self, free will, and a natural human
tendency towards growth (Hansen, 2000).
Along the same vein, Pauchant and Dumas (1991) compared the work of Abraham Maslow,
a founding father of humanistic psychology, and Heinz Kohut, the founding father of self
psychology. Similar to Hansen (2000), they asserted that self-psychology can provide an
empirical bridge between humanistic psychology and modern psychoanalysis. Pauchant and
Dumas (1991) argued that Maslow and Kohut shared a common philosophy of science.
Both were subjectivists and stressed that individuals subjectivily construct their reality.
They acknowledged that to understand the subjective experience of humans in their entirety,
one needed to be phenomenologically attuned to these experiences. Thus, self psychology
can provide humanistic psychology with a powerful scientific understanding of the process
of therapeutic change to enhance the contributions of humanistic clinicians such as May
and Rogers.
At laboratory level, Taylor (1999) expressed content about the burgeoning field of
neuroscience from which numerous humanistic and philosophical implications are emerging
from advances in the biology of consciousness. At the same time, the very concept of
consciousness as centered in brain functions is being called into question, with the
identification of vast parasynaptic information networks that are not directly mediated by
the central and peripheral nervous system. Assertions about information that is not directly
mediated by the central and peripheral nervous system have brought philosophical
discussions about the relation of the brain to the mind, an elusive issue that had haunted
intellectuals for some time. This confirms an argument by humanistic psychologists that a
more holistic model of science will be required to understand these processes beyond the
epistemology of cognitive behaviourism.
Chen (2001) discussed the application of the humanistic principle of ‘meaning-making’ in
career psychology. According to Chen, the content of meaning may vary from context to
context but the philosophy of meaning seems transferable between various life and career
circumstances. That is, vocational counselling recognises the life context of the person and
the meaning structures thereof. Meaning-making in one’s vocational enquiry and effort is
66
always connected to the search for meaning in other aspects of life. Hence, it becomes
reasonable to assume that one’s career needs are closely associated with personal meaning.
From the career development perspective, Chen (2001) argued that meanings associated
with life career roles and career developmental tasks merge and organise to form the total
self-concept. Within the total self-concept is the vocational self-concept which assists one to
coordinate one’s functioning in various life contexts and career psychology. The self-
concept has several other elements like appearance, abilities, personality, gender, values,
and place in society. People generate meanings from these elements of selfhood. Thus in
forming a self-concept, we make sense of ourselves and also perceive how other persons
make sense of us. This is probably the making of one’s value system, values which can be
transferred to the interpretation of the larger environment.
Kuhn (2001) argued that environmental crises, including the depletion of the ozone; global
warming; deforestation; pollution of the air, waters, and land; overpopulation; and loss of
biodiversity through species extinction affect us in various forms. Kuhn maintained that
self-actualization, awareness, responsibility, and authenticity - can address our
environmental crisis through the concepts and practice of empathy, unconditional positive
regard, and wider applications beyond humankind to include the natural world. According
to Khun, an ecological-humanistic psychology and worldveiw includes humans as part of
the environment, not separate from it.
Ecological issues, values, and perceptions that promote actualising of potential in both
humans and the natural world provide an alternative to the dominant worldview of the most
industrialzed countries. Kuhn called for an ecological-humanistic paradigm that promotes a
healthy, sustainable human-nature relatioship. A reasonable approach to environmental
issues would then require a responsible choice from the human side. These attitudes help to
actualise human growth and potentiality (Kuhn, 2001).
Humanistic principles are applicable to education policy making and politics and Carl
Rogers (1980) theorized around these areas. He worked with clients in individual
psychotherapy, then with small groups, and finally with nations (Greening , 1987; Orlov &
Coleman, 1992; Rogers, 1980). Rogers argued that education should be person-centered
67
where the values of freedom to choose, trust, and democracy are realised. The traditional
modes where teachers are custodians of all knowledge should be abandoned. Learners and
teachers should have a say in educational policy in compliance with the democratic
principle. In the extreme, Rogers (1980) suggested that learners should have a part in the
choice of teaching personnel and the curriculum whereas teachers should enjoy a similar
privilege in choosing their administrative officers. Although this notion promotes
democratic principles, I have some reserva tion about the latter suggestions in the choice of
personnel because of limited resources (individual and otherwise) in our communities,
particularly the developing countries. This privilege may translate into abuse of power.
Later in his life Rogers did much work in troubled countries like Northern Ireland, South
Africa, and Central America. He visited South Africa and the Soviet Union towards the end
of his life (Orlov & Coleman, 1992). Way back in 1948 and 1952 Rogers published papers
on social tensions and a hypothetical dialogue between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the cold war era. By 1965 Rogers had developed a theory of group conflict that he
tested by facilitating a group of militant Protestants and Catholics in Belfast, Ireland,
documented in the film The Steel Shutter. He achieved appreciable results with his person-
centered work in the Soviet Union, to the effect that the Russian message in response to the
news of his death was “Farewell, dear comrade” (Greening, 1987).
4.3.4 Prevalence of the “Third Force” movement in current psychology and
implications for the new millennium
Taylor (1999) claimed that humanistic psychology flourished as a distinct movement from
the early 1940s to the late 1960s but the literature analysed in this essay revealed that the
“Third Force” as a distinct movement emerged with the Old Saybrook conference of 1964.
These are some of the historical inconsistencies I have reflected upon earlier on in this
study, which, nonetheless, do not change the reality of the existence of the movement
though I would prefer to stick with the latter view. Wertz (1998) noted that a review of the
history of psychology textbooks shows that humanistic psychology is in crisis. Although
valued and respected by some, it is inadequately understood and dismissed by many.
68
Wertz argued that the value of the movement hinges on the following: whether it faithfully
embodies the historical tradition of humanism, provides an appropriate philosophical
foundation for psychology, asserts relevant critiques of contemporary psychology, affords
the discipline theoretical unity, offers rigorous research methodologies, bridges the gap
between psychology and the humanities, and assumes a leading role in the fight against and
social reformation of the depersonalising tendencies of modern culture. However, Wertz
(1998) attributed the contemporary crisis to sociological factors - inadequate institutional
establishments necessary to gain historical impact.
Taylor (1999) expressed several concerns about institutional disunity of the humanistic
movement in current psychology. He maintained that today, the standing institutions of the
humanistic movement in psychology have a curious relation to one another. The
Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) for example, largely devoted to issues of
counterculture psychotherapy and group experiences, sold the Journal of Humanistic
Psychology (JHP) to Sage Publications after suffering a decline in membership and lowered
revenue. The original founding organizations - JHP, Saybrook, and AHP-continue to exist
in a state of friendly autonomous configuration with regard to their respective policies of
operation, vision, and finances.
Division 32 within the American Psychological Association (APA), the division of
humanis tic psychology, whose founding was opposed by the officers of AHP, has always
maintained its own center of gravity. It continues its affiliation as one of the smaller
divisions of the APA and has a revolving rather than growing membership, with a moderate
influence on the affairs of the larger association. Because of the many separate agendas,
there has been much wringing over everything having to do with the label “humanistic” ,
including proposals to even abandon the name. The movement currently lacks a new
generation of visionary leaders; it has been declared heartless because it has conformed so
much to the mainstream and consequently lost its prerogative for incisive dissent; and it has
been castigated for being still too anti- intellectual. These are concerns expressed by Taylor
(1999).
The concerns over the current status of humanistic psychology spilled over into psychology
as a discipline. Goldberg (2000) for example, contended that today psychology is in crisis.
69
Goldberg asserted that psychology has replaced the former pillars of society – science and
religion, in that most human problems have been reduced to the level of psychological
explanation. This goes against the tide of the post-modern thought where art, architecture,
literature and other areas of human expression are reactive to the modern tendencies
dominated by rigid theory and reductionism. Goldberg (2000) has hinted on some major
problems facing psychology today which I believe would shed some light on the current
status of humanistic psychology:
§ Psychologists have been reluctant to tackle the most important social issues facing
society today. Evil, for example, is the most important problem humankind has ever
faced, yet psychologists have acted as though this problem belongs to theologians
and philosophers to safely deal with. Geller (1982) for example, expressed concern
that self-actualization as conceived of by Maslow and Rogers does not
accommodate evil, which he called the problem of “anthropodicy”.
§ Psychotherapy is a refuge from the social and moral responsibility of the privileged.
Freud’s psychoanalytic approach does not place importance to the community and
social reciprocity of analytic patients. This, according to Goldberg (2000), has had a
subversive impact on our society in that contemporary social theory is more
influenced by psychoanalytic thinking than any other authority. However, Rogers’
humanistic principle had transcended the clinical setting into the realms of education
and politics in society (see Section 4.3.3 above).
§ Finally, Goldberg (2000) lamented that psychological reasoning is more often
applied to works of literature, drama, and high culture than to address the problems
of hatred, prejudice, and intolerance that have permeated our society. Tragically, the
audiences for these creative psychological works are the privileged and well
educated. I would presume that the emphasis of humanistic psychology on the
person’s subjective experiences and existential values, should to some extent
address this deficiency.
Negative evaluations of the humanistic movement levelled by Wertz (1998) proclaim that
the movement is more a common sense attitude of valuing and respecting people, resulting
in artificial sentimentality than a scientific discipline. The movement’s protests outweigh its
positive contributions. The movement has had more impact on therapeutic practice than on
70
the explanation of behaviour. The movement is vague in its objectives, fragmented in its
achievements, and contains no identifiable principles of unity. Above all, Wertz (1998)
claimed that rigorous research has been lacking. I do not entirely agree with these assertions
with regard to the work of Carl Rogers.
Despite the bleak picture painted on humanistic psychology, there are some recognised
positive contributions. These include the introduction into modern psychology of a relevant
historical tradition, important social criticism and progressive reform, valid criticism of
dominant trends in mainstream psychology, new psychotherapeutic orientations and
procedures, and new topics for research (growth, change, self-perception, values, creativity,
love, death). That is, research could be extended to existential concepts; into
phenomenological knowledge; provide a sophisticated philosophy of science and
metapsychology, and set up a fruitful dialogue with the humanities (Wertz, 1998).
In the same vein, Resnick et al. (2001) called for Positive Psychotherapy that integrates
humanistic principles and positive psychology. Cognitive science incorporates the
disciplines of cognitive psychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, philosophy,
linguistics, and anthropology. A successful positive psychology will probably require
contributions from social and personality psychology, psychology of learning and emotions,
cognitive psychology and neuroscience, developmental psychology, and other social
sciences, including anthropology, history, sociology, economics, and political science.
The dialogue between positive psychology and humanistic psychology can be a fruitful one.
Eugene (2001) proposed that positive psychology needs humanistic psychology. Firstly,
positive psychology needs to learn from the existential humanist’s study of the
phenomenology of the scientific method. Phenomenology could become the new standard
on which research is conducted. Secondly, humanistic and transpersonal influences could
benefit positive psychology –from the influences of Jung, May, Frankl, Maslow, Rogers,
and Ellis to the Buddhist teachings of the Dalai Lama.
Based on the concerns and contributions expressed above, suggestions have been made that
would probably carry humanistic psychology into the New Millennium. Criswell (2000)
provides a fascinating vision of the humanistic approach that takes psychology out of the
71
bounds of the clinic and the laboratory. Criswell advocates respect for one another and for
the environment to allow it to actualise its full, positive potential. We must use the
principles of the humanistic tradition in all our endeavours with people throughout society,
all ages, all cultures, and even other species. A similar approach is echoed by Kuhn (2001).
One of the prime things that Taylor (1999) suggested would enlarge and refresh the
humanistic perspective is to renew in people’s minds the definition of the field, and the
place to begin is the clarification of terms. For example, it should be made clear that the
terms “humanistic” and “humanist” do not necessarily mean the same thing. Humanism
may be defined in terms of a philosophy or social program, but the point is “to awaken
psychologists to a new view of humanistic psychology using a psychological language
specifically relevant to their professional concerns” (p. 10).
In conclusion, Schneider (1996) proposed a seven point plan for the advancement of the
existential-humanistic practice. It is a plan that addresses the larger political and economic
targets of our predicament - the future vision of culture. Schneider felt that the following
can be done about that vision: Incorporate social and political consciousness into the
therapy setting [see Laing’s (1967) “The politics of experience”]; support socially conscious
reform movements; inform managed care clients of deeper therapeutic options; conduct
research on existential-humanistic approaches; form coalitions, organisations, and unions
(these could probably involve people from all walks of life epitomizing the Saybrook
experience); write and speak about all the existential-humanistic practice can contribute in
the contemporary climate; and look at our fee-charging practices and clientele served.
However, Elkins (2000) felt that the current Old Saybrook II Project is well positioned to
rekindle the vision of psychology that was articulated at Old Saybrook in 1964. To that
effect: “The humanistic vision must be poured from the wineskins of 1964 into the new
wineskins of the third millennium” (Elkins, 2000, p. 120).
4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The advent of Kierkegaard’s existential thought with emphasis on reality as subjective,
coupled with Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness, culminated in the emergence of
existential-phenomenological psychology championed by Ludwig Binswanger in Europe.
72
However, Binswanger’s “existential analysis” was a reaction to classical psychoanalysis.
He adopted Heidegger’s ontological approach into phenomenology. Rollo May introduced
the existential-phenomenological psychology to the American audience in his 1958
publication titled “Existence”, co-edited by Ernest Angel and Henri Ellenberger.
The emergence of the “Third Force” Movement at Old Saybrook in 1964 saw Rollo May
assuming an intellectual leadership of the Humanistic movement (“Third Force”)
along with Abraham Maslow (the founding father) and Carl Rogers. The participation of
Rollo May consolidated the existential-phenomenological thought within the “Third Force,”
though Maslow’s and Rogers’ concepts of human growth and self-actualization became the
dominant themes of the movement. History indicates that the humanistic movement
flourished in the 1960s and early 1970s in protest against orthodox psychoanalysis and
behaviourism. Its contribution to the academic sphere has been limited because of its
preoccupation with the encounter group movement, which was not scientifically accredited
and also got entangled in spiritual matters rather than psychotherapeutic theory.
Encounter groups vanished in the 1980s but the human potential thought remained
institutionalised in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (founded by Maslow), the
Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) and Division 32 of the American
Psychological Association (APA). Tragically, these institutions remain fragmented today.
This unfortunate history calls for a review of the role of the “Third Force” in the New
Millennium. Various suggestions have been made, ranging from bridging psychology with
the humanities and the formulation of a universal theory within the movement. It is a
responsibility that has haunted the movement since its beginnings.
It is apparent that the richness of the “Third Force” lies in its inclination towards social
ideology than in its academic contribution to psychology. The chronology of events that
influenced its ideology, coupled with epistemological diversity as a social movement are
testimony to this fact. Maslow’s conception of “peak experiences” is typically
transpersonal while, Rogers’ acknowledgement of the “altered states of consciousness”
translates the person-centered approach into the transpersonal. The works of James
Bugental and Irvin D. Yalom in recent times helped consolidate the existential component
of the “Third Force” developing from the introductory effort by Rollo May.
73
Regardless of its ‘unfortunate’ history, humanistic psychology has made its contributions.
The mere fact that the “Third Force” was a protest movement took psychology to new
heights. For example, mysticism and spirituality entered the realms of psychotherapy; the
person-centered approach is applicable to issues of society like politics and education; and
the existential-humanistic approach has been linked to positive psychology, Heinz Kohutt’s
self psychology, Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), the ecosystemic paradigm,
and career psychology. This renders the “Third Force” a flexible psychology. The Old
Saybrook spirit still lingers with us. Hence the Old Saybrook II Project, which attempts to
consolidate the value system of the “Third Force” into the 21st century.
74
REFERENCE LIST
Adams, W.W. (1999). The interpermeation of self and world: Empirical research,
existential phenomenology, and transpersonal psychology. Journal of Phenomenological
Psychology, 30, 39-66.
Binswanger, L. (1958). The existential analysis school of thought. In R. May, E. Angel &
H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology.
New York: Basic Books.
Brennan, J.H. (1998a). History and systems of psychology (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J:
Prentice-Hall.
Brennan, J.H. (1998b). Readings in the history and systems of psychology (2nd ed.).
New Jersey: Prent ice-Hall.
Chaudhuri, H. (1975). Psychology: Humanistic and transpersonal. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 15, 7-15.
Chen, C.P. (2001). On exploring meaning: Combining humanistic and career psychology
theories in counseling. Counselling Psychology Quart erly, 14, 317-330.
Corey, G. (2001). Theory and practice of counselling and psychotherapy (6th ed.). Belmont:
Brooks/Cole.
Criswell, E. (2000). The humanistic tradition: A vision for the future. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 40, 74-82.
DeCarvalho, R.J. (1990). A history of the “Third Force” in psychology. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology. 30, 22-44.
Doerr, E. (2002). Humanism unmodified. The Humanist, 62, 1-2.
75
Elkins, D.N., Hedstrom, L.J., Hughes, L.L., Leaf, J.A. & Saunders, C. (1988). Toward a
humanistic-phenomenological spirituality: Definition, description, and measurement.
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25, 5-18.
Elkins, D.N. (2000). Old Saybrook I and II: The visioning and re-visioning of humanistic
psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 40, 119-127.
Ellenberger, H.F. (1958). A clinical introduction to psychiatric phenomenology and
existential analysis. In R. May, E. Angel & H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new
dimension in psychiatry and psychology. New York: Basic Books.
Ellis,A. (1979). Is rational-emotive therapy stoical, humanistic, or spiritual? Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 19, 89-92.
Ellis, A. (1996). The humanism of rational emotive behavior therapy and other cognitive
behavior therapies. Journal of Humanistic Education & Development, 35, 69-88.
Eugene, T. (2001). Positive psychology and Humanistic psychology: A reply to Seligman.
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 13 –29.
Ford, J.G. (1991). Rogerian self-actualization: A clarification of meaning. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 31, 101- 111.
Foulquie, P. (1947). Existentialism. Translated by K. Raine. London: Dennis Dobson.
Frankl, V.E. (1984). Man’s search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy. New York:
Simon & Schuster, Inc.
Frankl, V.E. (1969/1988). The will to meaning: Foundations and applications of
logotherapy. New York: Penguin.
76
Frie, R. (2000). The existential and the interpersonal: Ludwig Binswanger and Harry Stack
Sullivan. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 40, 108-122.
Garrison, A. (2001). Restoring the human in humanistic psychology. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 41, 91-104.
Geller, L. (1982). The failure of self-actualization theory: A critique of Carl Rogers and
Abraham Maslow. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22, 56-73.
Ghaemi, S.N. (2001). Rediscovering existential psychotherapy. American Journal of
Psychotherapy, 55, 51-64.
Giorgi, A. (1971). Phenomenology and experimental psychology: Part I, In A. Giorgi (Ed.),
Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology, Vol. I. Pit tsburgh: Duquesne
University Press.
Goldberg, C. (2000). Toward an ecological humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 134, 677-683.
Greening, T. (1985). The origins of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology and the
Association for Humanistic Psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 2, 7-11.
Greening, T. (1987). Carl Rogers: 1902-1987. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 27, 134-
140.
Greening, T. (1998). Five basic postulates of humanistic psychology. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 38, 9-10.
Hansen, J.T. (1999). A review and critical analysis of humanistic approaches to treating
disturbed clients. Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Education and Development, 38,
29-38.
77
Hansen, J.T. (2000). Psychoanalysis and humanism: A review and critical examination of
integrationist efforts with some proposed resolutions. Journal of Counseling &
Development, 78. 21-28.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson.
London: SCM Press Ltd.
Hjelle, L.A. & Ziegler, D.J. (1981). Personality theories: Basic assumptions, research, and
applications (2nd ed.). Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Translated
by D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. Translated by
W. R. B. Gibson. London: Allen & Unwin.
Kierkegaard, S. (1964a). Point of view: “That Individual”. In M. Friedman (Ed.), The
worlds of existentialism: A critical reader. New York: Random House.
Kierkegaard, S. (1964b). Concluding unscientific postscript. In M. Friedman (Ed.), The
worlds of existentialism: A critical reader. New York: Random House.
Kendler, H.H. (1987). Historical foundations of modern psychology. Illinois: Dorsey.
Kuhn, J.L. (2001). Toward an ecological humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 41, 9-18.
Leuba, J.H. (2001). Sources of humanism in human nature. The Humanist, 61, 12-14.
Lewis, J. (1998). Self-realisation as a human resource tool. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Luypen, W.A. (1966). Phenomenology and humanism. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press.
78
Luypen W.A. & Dondeyne, A. (1960). Existential phenomenology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press.
Marcel, G. (1948). The philosophy of existence. Translated by M. Harmri. London:
Harvrill.
Martinez, T.J. (1998). Anthropos and existence: Gnostic parallels in the early writings of
Rollo May. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 38, 95-109.
Maslow, A.H. (1968/1999). Toward a psychology of being. New York: John Wiley.
Maslow, A.H. (1954/1970). Motivation and personality (2nd ed.). Harper & Row, Inc.
May, R. (1976). Gregory Bateson and humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 16, 33-51.
May, R. (1958a). Contributions of existential psychotherapy. In R. May, E. Angel &
H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology.
New York: Basic Books.
May, R. (1958b). The origins and significance of the existential movement in psychology.
In R. May, E. Angel & H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry
and psychology. New York: Basic Books.
May, R. (1983). The discovery of being. New York: Norton & Company.
May, R. & Yalom, I. (1989). Existential psychotherapy. In R.J. Corsini & D. Wedding
(Eds.), Current psychotherapies, Itasca Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers.
Meyer, W.F., Moore, C., & Viljoen, H.G. (1997). Personology: From individual to
ecosystem. Sandton: Heinemann.
79
Miars, R.D. (2002). Existential authenticity: A foundational value for counseling.
Counseling and Values, 46, 218-225.
Morris, J.E. (1979). Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity and implications for humanistic
psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 19, 67-79.
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Moustakas, C. (1985). Humanistic or humanism? Journal of Humanistic Psychology,
25, 5-12.
Naudin, J. & Azorin, J.M. (1998). Binswanger and Schapp: Existential analysis or narrative
analysis? Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 29, 12-20.
Nissim-Sabat, M. (1995). Towards a phenomenology of empathy. American Journal of
Psychotherapy, 49, 163-170.
Orlov, A.B. & Coleman, M. (1992). Carl Rogers and contemporary humanism. Russian
Social Science Review, 33, 89-92.
Owen, I.R. (1994). Introducing an existential-phenomenological approach Part 2: Theory
for practice. Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 7, 12-20.
Pauchant, T.C. & Dumas, C.A. (1991). Abraham Maslow and Heinz Kohut: A comparison.
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 31, 49-71.
Portnoy, D. (1999). Relatedness: Where humanistic and psychoanalytic psychotherapy
converge. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 39, 19-24.
Pretorius, H.G. & Segal, A.M. (2001). Phenomenology, hermeneutics and psychotherapy.
Unpublished paper. Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University.
80
Rabinowitz, F.E., Good, G. & Cozad, L. (1989). Rollo May: A man of meaning and myth.
Journal of Counseling and Development, 67, 436-440.
Reber, A.S. & Reber, E. (2001). The Penguin dictionary of psychology (3rd ed.). London:
Penguin.
Resnick, S., Warmoth, A. & Serlin, I.A. (2001). The humanistic and positive psychology
connection: Implications for psychotherapy. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41,
73-101.
Rich, G.J. (2001). Positive Psychology: An introduction. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 41, 8-12.
Rogers, R. C. (1980). A way of being. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rogers, R.C. (1942). Counseling and psychotherapy: Newer concepts in practice.
Boston, M.A.: Houghton Mifflin.
Rowan, J. (1983). The real self and mystical experiences. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 22, 56-73.
Rowan, J. (1989). Two humanistic psychologies or one? Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 29, 224-229.
Rowan, J. (1999). Ascent and descent in Maslow’s theory. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 39, 125-133.
Ryback, D. (2001). Mutual affect therapy and the emergence of transformational empathy.
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 75-94.
Sartre, J.P. (1956). Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology.
Translated by H.E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library.
81
Sartre, J.P. (1964). Existentialism. In M. Friedman (Ed.), The worlds of existentialism: A
critical reader. New York: Random House.
Schneider, K.J. (1996). Jim Bugental’s vision: The next step. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 36, 67-70.
Schuster, R. (1979). Empathy and mindfulness. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 19,
71-77.
Segal, A.M. (1999). Architectural metaphor in psychotherapy: A phenomenological study.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University.
Sheldon, K.M. & Kasser, T. (2001). Goals, congruence, and positive well-being: New
empirical support for humanistic theories. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 30-50.
Smith, M.B. (1990). Humanistic Psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 30,
6-21.
Strümpfer, D.J.W. (2001). A model of interpersonal resilient functioning in adults.
Retrieved March 20, 2002 from World Wide Web: http//general.rau.ac.za/psych.
Taylor, E. (1999). An intellectual renaissance of humanistic psychology? Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 39, 7-25.
Tyler, K. (1992a). The ecosystemic approach to personality. Educational Psychology,
14, 45-58.
Tyler, K. (1992b). The development of the ecosytemic approach as a humanistic
educational psychology. Educational Psychology, 12, 15-23.
Thorne, B. (1992). Carl Rogers. London: Sage.
82
Valle, R.S., King, M. & Halling, S. (1989). An introduction to existential
phenomenological thought in psychology, In R.S. Valle & S. Halling (Eds.), Existential
phenomenological perspective in psychology: exploring the breath of human
experience. New York: Plenum Press.
Van Deurzen, E. (1998). Paradox and passion in psychotherapy: An existential approach to
therapy and counselling. West Sussex: Wiley.
Wilber, K. (1989a). God is so damn boring: A response to Kirk Schneider. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 29, 457-469.
Wilber, K. (1989b). Two humanistic psychologies or one? A response. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 29, 230-243.
Wertz, F.J. (1998). The role of humanistic movement in the history of psychology. Journal
of Humanistic Psychology, 38, 42-72.
Worrell, M. (1997). An existential-phenomenological perspective on the concept of
‘resistance’ in counselling and psychotherapy. Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 10,
5-15.
Yontef, G.M. & Simkin, J.S. (1989). Gestalt therapy. In R.J. Corsini & D. Wedding (Eds.),
Current psychotherapies. Itasa IL: Peackock.
Young-Bruehl, E. (1981). Freedom and Karl Jasper’s philosophy. New Haven: Yale
University Press.