chapter 1_electronic civil disobedience_simulation_and the public sphere

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Electronic Civil Disobedience,Simulation, and the Public Sphere

This article was originally published as a catalogue essay for the NextFive Minutes 3, 1999.

What counts in the long run is the “use” one makesof a theory…. We must start from existing practicesin order to retrace the fundamental flaws.

– Felix Guattari, Why Marxism and Freudianism

No Longer Disturb Anyone

In 1994, when Critical Art Ensemble first introducedthe idea and a possible model of electronic civildisobedience (ECD) as another option for digitalresistance, the collective had no way of knowingwhat elements would be the most practical, nor didit know what elements would require additionalexplanation. After nearly five years of field testing

of ECD by various groups and individuals, its infor-mation gaps have become a little more obvious andcan finally be addressed. Of particular concern inthis essay is the recent turn of events that has pro-



14 Electronic Civil Disobedience, Simulation, and the Public Sphere

duced an ECD model that opts for public spectacle

over clandestine policy subversion, and that em-phasizes simulated action over direct action. CAEcontends that these are unfortunate currents in thegeneral research on ECD. CAE still believes thatECD is an underground activity that should be keptout of the public/popular sphere (as in the hackertradition) and the eye of the media, and that

simulationist tactics as they are currently being usedby resistant forces are only modestly effective if notcounterproductive.

Civil Disobedience in the Public Sphere

Those familiar with CAE’s modeling of ECD* know

that it was an inversion of the model of civil dis-obedience (CD). Rather than attempting to createa mass movement of public objectors, CAE sug-gested a decentralized flow of particularized micro-organizations (cells) that would produce multiplecurrents and trajectories to slow the velocity of capi-talist political economy. This suggestion never satwell with more traditional activists, and recentlyeven Mark Dery (in both Mute and World Art) criti-cized the model because there would be conflict-ing goals and activities among the cells. To the con-trary, CAE still holds that conflicts arising from thediversity of the cells would function as a strengthrather than as a weakness; this diversity would pro-duce a dialogue between a variety of becomings that

would resist bureaucratic structure as well as pro-

*For more information: All CAE books, includingElectronic Civil Dis-

obedience, are available from Autonomedia (NYC) or they can bedownloaded free of charge at <http://www.critical-art.net>. German(Passagen Verlag), French (l’Éclat), and Italian (Castelvecchi) trans-lations are also available; unfortunately they are not available on-line,so contact CAE for more information.



Electronic Civil Disobedience, Simulation, and the Public Sphere 15

vide a space for happy accidents and breakthrough

invention. If resistant culture has learned anythingover the past 150 years, it’s that “the people united”is a falsehood; this concept only constructs new ex-clusionist platforms by creating bureaucratic mono-liths and semiotic regimes that cannot represent oract on behalf of the diverse desires and needs of individuals within complex and hybridizing social

segments.

The second key inversion of the model of CD wasto aim directly for policy shift, rather than tryingto accomplish this task indirectly through mediamanipulation. CAE’s position is still that the di-rect approach is the most effective. The indirect

approach of media manipulation using a spectacleof disobedience designed to muster public sympa-thy and support is a losing proposition. The 1960sare over, and there is no corporate or governmentagency that is not fully prepared to do battle in themedia. This is simply a practical matter of capitalexpenditure. Since mass media allegiance is skewedtoward the status quo, since the airwaves and pressare owned by corporate entities, and since capital-ist structures have huge budgets allotted for publicrelations, there is no way that activist groups canoutdo them. A sound bite here and there simplycannot subvert any policy-making process or swaypublic opinion when all the rest of the mass mediais sending the opposite message. Any subversive

opinion is lost in the media barrage, if not turnedto its opposition’s advantage through spin.

There was a time when CD and media manipula-tion combined were successful in disrupting andshifting authoritarian semiotic regimes. The civilrights movement is an excellent example. The




movement’s participants understood that the Civil

War was still being fought on an ideological level,and hence one social/political/geographic regioncould be turned against another. The northern andwestern regions of the U.S. had advanced not onlyin terms of industry, but also in their methods of public (and particularly minority) control. TheCivil War had eliminated the retrograde political

economy of the south, but had failed to shift itsideological structure (a far more difficult elementto change), and hence had not altered its symbolicmechanisms of control. All the civil rights move-ment needed to do was to call attention to this fail-ure, and the fully modern northern regions wouldforce the south to comply with an ideological posi-

tion that would be more compatible with the so-cioeconomic needs of advanced capital. The im-ages produced through acts of civil disobediencesuceeded in provoking outrage at the retro-ideol-ogy of the south and rekindled the state of war be-tween the regions. Student volunteers, communityorganizers, and eventually federal police agenciesand the military (mobilized by the executive of-fice) became allies and fought for the movement.

At the same time, the civil rights leaders were notnaive about this matter. They knew that the onlyracist policies that would change were those notheld by the north and that racism was not going todisappear; it would only be transformed into a more

subtle form of endocolonization, as opposed to itsthen current status as an explicit set of segregation-ist norms. Indeed, the general understanding of African Americans—that there was a hard bound-ary beyond which policy would shift no further—was key in the rapid decline of the civil rights move-ment and in the high-octane fueling of the black




power movement. Unfortunately, the latter fared

no better with its media campaign, because it lackedthe infrastructure to support its own material needs.

As a means of media manipulation, CD workedin the case of the civil rights movement becausethe historical dynamic of capitalism acted as thefoundation for its success. History was still het-

erogeneous and the normative manifestation of capitalist ideology was still a striated space at boththe national and international levels. But whatdo we do now, having reached the point wherevisible, diversified ideologies in the West no longerexist, and history is nothing more than a homo-geneous construct that continuously replays capi-

talist victories? From where will public outrageoriginate? What army, government, corporation,or any other power base will support thedisempowered when exploitive endocolonial re-lationships are precisely what allow these agen-cies to flourish? This is why CAE has argued fordirect confrontation, by using financial leverageobtained through blocking privatized information(since this form of information is the gold of latecapital). Appropriating media gains nothing in un-dermining an authoritarian semiotic regime be-cause no power base benefits from listening to analternative message; however, appropriating profitthrough blocking information sends a clear mes-sage to any chosen capitalist institutions—for

them, it may be cheaper to change policy than todefend militarily a semiotic regime under pressure.Accomplishing this task is possible in the virtualrealm, and it takes only the most modest of in-vestments to act (compared to forming an army);however, for such resistance to endure requiresclandestine activity.




Currently, the one weak exception to rejecting

(E)CD as a means to manipulate mass media is incases where history and ideology have not beenhomogenized. These tend to be situations in whicha resistance movement is in conflict with a domi-nant power that is still viewed by pancapitalism asbeing in some form different from itself. For in-stance, the democracy movement in China used

CD and media manipulation with a degree of suc-cess. Outrage was generated; however, rigid na-tional boundaries kept it from manifesting in anyway useful for the movement other than the grant-ing of asylum by western countries for those whohad to flee the Chinese authorities, and in gener-ating a modest amount of diplomatic pressure on

China. Even in this best-case scenario (and in away very similar to what occurred during the civilrights movement), while the ideological order of pancapitalism was offended, the western economicorder perceived China to have more similaritiesthan differences, and hence little was done by the“outraged” west to support the democracy move-ment or to materially undermine the Chinese in-frastructure.

ECD and Simulation**

Very early on in the development of electronic media,Orson Welles demonstrated (perhaps accidentally)that simulation has material effects. The simula-

tion of a news broadcast reporting that aliens hadinvaded earth had the effect of causing a minorpanic among those caught in the hall of mirrorsthat emerged out of the implosion of fiction and

**CAE would like to thank Heath Bunting for his valuable contribu-tion to CAE’s development of a simulationist model of subversion.




nonfiction created by the broadcast. Only varying

degrees of plausibility existed as to the truth of the story. Simultaneously, all information was trueand all information was false in that historic mo-ment of an erupting hyperreal. We have seen areplay of this narrative in the 1990s with regardto resistant electronic culture, but with some pe-culiar differences.

In an addendum written in 1995 for ECD and OtherUnpopular Ideas, CAE noted that there was grow-ing paranoia among U.S. security agencies aboutcontrolling the electronic resistance. Oddlyenough, these agencies scared themselves with theirown constructions of electronic criminality. It was

much like Welles being scared of his own broad-cast. In that comic moment, CAE ironically sug-gested that ECD was successful without ever hav-ing been tried, and that merely announcing thatsome form of digital resistance could occur couldhave the effect of creating a panic in security agen-cies to such a degree that their primary focus wouldbecome locked in the hyperreality of criminal con-structions and virtual catastrophe. This is a com-ment that CAE wishes it had never made, as someactivists have come to take it seriously and are try-ing to act on it, primarily by using the Web to pro-duce hyperreal activist threats to fan the flames of corporate-state paranoia. Again, this is a mediabattle that will be lost. State panic and paranoia

will be transformed through mass media into pub-lic paranoia, which in turn will only reinforce statepower. In the U.S., the voting public consistentlysupports harsher sentencing for “criminals,” morejails, and more police, and it is this hyperreal para-noia that gets law-and-order politicians the votesneeded to turn these directives into legislation.




How many times must we see this happen? From

McCarthyism to Reagan’s fear of the Evil Empireto the War on Drugs, the result in each case hasbeen more funds for military, security, and disci-plinary agencies (fully mandated by an already fear-ful and paranoid voting public), and this in turntightens the endocolonial belt. Considering thatthe U.S. is currently involved in the rapid creation

and expansion of security agencies devoted to po-licing electronic criminality (and since these agen-cies make no distinction between politically moti-vated action and criminality for profit), it seemsmisguided to give power vectors increased meansfor raising public support for this military growth,as well as a basis for increased national and inter-

national legislation regarding political managementof new electronic media.

Whether simulationist tactics could be used in amore compelling way is difficult to say. Since theCIA and the FBI have been using these tactics fordecades, it is easy to locate examples that could beinverted. One of the classics is the CIA’s topplingof the Arbenz government in Guatemala in orderto support United Fruit, protect oil interests, andundermine a democracy with such leftist leaningsthat it legitimized the communist party within theU.S. sphere of influence! To be sure, the CIA builtits operational infrastructure well by using eco-nomic sabotage to create unrest, but the final act

was one of electronic subversion. The CIA simu-lated field radio broadcasts of antigovernment troopmovements around the capital. Upon interceptingthese broadcasts, the Guatemalan government be-came convinced that a large rebel army had beenmustered and was preparing for an attack. To thecontrary, the public was overwhelmingly support-




ive of the government, and only a modest rebel fac-

tion existed. Unfortunately, government officialspanicked and the government fell in disarray.

The FBI used a similar means of subversion by em-ploying hyperreal communications in its attack onthe Black Panthers. Much like the CIA’s interven-tion in Guatemala, the FBI’s infowar had a strong

infrastructure. The Bureau had infiltrated the BlackPanther Party (BPP) and was close to the high com-mand, so it knew the nature of (and the players in)the party’s internal struggles. It had also success-fully used local law enforcement to harass chaptersacross the U.S. The party’s treasury was perpetu-ally depleted due to the persistent arrests of mem-

bers by police, who intentionally abused their powerin order to drain party funds by forcing the mem-bership to continually post bail for those detained.Given these conditions, paranoia was the order of the day for the Black Panthers, and when the schismbetween the San Francisco and the New York chap-ters erupted, the FBI saw a perfect opportunity toimplode the party. As a result of a simple letter-writing campaign that fanned the flames of mis-trust between east and west leadership, the partycollapsed amid its own internal fighting. (The FBI’scampaign consisted of the creation and delivery of documents that criticized specific leaders and theirparty policies; these documents were made to lookas if they originated from internal party opposition.)

This method could be inverted and turned againstauthoritarian agencies. The infighting that alreadyoccurs within and between government and cor-porate institutions makes them self-subsidizing tar-gets. The military and economic infrastructure thatwas necessary for the operations in the examples




given here is not necessary for ECD operations,

since the internal warfare is already occurring(given capital’s tendency toward predation, fear andparanoia are a part of everyday life experience forthose deep within power vectors, and hence noexpenditure is necessary to create them, as was nec-essary with the BPP). Certainly, carefully writtenand directed letter(s)/e-mail messages could have

an implosive effect (although it’s doubtful that afull collapse would ensue); however, the lessonslearned from these classic cases of simulationist tac-tics have to be understood and applied. First andmost obvious, this form of resistance would be co-vert. Second, reliable insider intelligence wouldneed to be acquired. This is the most problematic

area in this kind of tactical maneuvering, althoughit is not impossible to find solutions. Forsimulationist tactics of resistance to be successfullyemployed, methods and means of research, intelli-gence gathering, and informant recruitment haveto be developed. (CAE is willing to bet that thenext breakthrough paper on resistance will addressthis very problem of amateur intelligence genera-tion.) Until that occurs, subjective-subversive ac-tion will be pretty ineffectual. At present, thosenot involved in a fully developed covert approachcan only act tactically in regard to the strategic prin-ciples of an institution rather than to specific situ-ations and relationships. Obviously enough, a tac-tical response to a strategic initiative makes no

sense. In all probability such action will not havethe desired effect, and will only alert the agencybeing hit to prepare for potential external pressures.

We must also remember that simulationist infowaris only a destructive tactic—it is a way to causeinstitutional implosion, and has very little produc-




tive value in terms of policy reconstruction. To con-

tinue with the example of racism, agencies thathave institutionalized racist policies (and that in-cludes pretty much every institution in thepancapitalist regime) will not be changed by aninfowar of institutional attrition. The semiotic re-gime of racist policies will continue untouched inother institutions that are interrelated through the

shared privilege acquired by maintaining such poli-cies. CAE still insists that productively challeng-ing institutions will not occur through nihilistic ges-tures, but instead through forcing changes in thesemiotic regime on an institutional basis while leav-ing the material infrastructure intact forreinscription.

The Problem of Containment

Marshalling the materially destructive tendencies of hyperreality has other problematic consequenceswhen these destruction codes are released into thespectacle. Most notable is the problem of contain-ment. If an authoritarian agency believes itself tobe under attack, or under the threat of attack (de-ferred virtual catastrophe), and it is in the publiclimelight because of this, it will lash out in a lessthan predictable way. It may act in a manner thatis injurious to itself, but it is just as likely that itwill act in a way that could endanger unsuspectingelements of the public sphere. Introducing the pub-

lic into the formula forces the threatened agencyto face one major consequence: In order to keep upwith the speed of the infosphere, it must act quickly.Hesitation, even to allow time for reasonable analy-sis and reflection, is not an option. In the currentmarketplace of public relations, success and failurehave imploded, and all actions, when represented




well, reside in the sphere of hyperreal success and

victory. The only useful distinction to be made isbetween action and inaction. Inaction is the signof weakness and ineptitude. Caught in this high-velocity vector, a threatened agency will take ac-tion that will be explosive (not implosive). Scape-goats will be designated, and action detrimental tothese individuals or populations will follow (the

perfect macrocosm of this sequence of events is U.S.foreign policy and the actions taken on its behalf).In other words, once this sequence of destructionwas initiated by threat (whether virtual or actual),the often uncontrolled forces that would be releasedcould not be contained or redirected by the resis-tant force. This inability to contain the explosion

links this model (in effect only) to terrorism. Notthat the activists are initiating terrorist practice,since no one dies in hyperreality, but the effect of this practice can have the same consequence asterrorism, in that state and corporate power vec-tors will haphazardly return fire with weapons thathave destructive material (and even mortal) con-sequences.

What is odd is that such action would not be takenout of a concern for infrastructure, but for thesemiotic regime and the entity’s public image inhyperreality. However, when the public is takenout of this formula, the sequence changes dramati-cally. The agency under pressure would not have

to act quickly. It could have time to investigateand therefore be able to deliver a more surgicalstrike, because the sign of weakness (the publicperception of inaction) would not be damagingits intended public representation. In this worst-case scenario for the activists, the response wouldbe far more directed, and hence the consequences




would tend to fall on those who actually took the

risk of initiating the action. If the agency wereunaware that it was under subversion and an im-plosion occurred, the public would not be noti-fied or feel the direct consequences (although in-direct ones such as unemployment are probable).In either case, there would be no violent explo-sive spinoff of shrapnel that could land anywhere

in the landscape of resistance. In other words, con-tainment would be actualized. What is of addi-tional interest is that the agency under pressurewould subsidize containment activity. No agencywants to publicize that it is in financial trouble,that its security has been breached, etc., and henceit would contain itself. However, if the public is

introduced into the formula, then the likelihoodof containment evaporates and the consequencesbecome less than civil. For this reason CAE con-tinues to believe that all useful models of ECD(or for that matter, nearly all political as opposedto consciousness raising and pedagogical ac-tions***) within the current political conditionshave in common covert action and an abhorrenceof mass media as a theater of action.

***A pedagogical situation/action gives participants the oppor-tunity to escape some form of taken-for-granted authority. In thismoment of liberation, they can think about alternative possibili-ties in relation to the specific or general issue addressed. Thiskind of work is the domain of politicized cultural action. How-

ever, such action is only pedagogical, not political. It preparesthe consciousness of individuals for new possibilities, and in thebest cases, moves them to political action. Activity inspired bypedagogical situations, however, is political action. By politicalaction, CAE means the temporary or permanent redistributionor reconfiguration of power relationships (material or semiotic).We would also like to note that the distinction between thesecategories should not be assumed to be totalizing, but rather rep-resents a general tendency in the typology of activist action.




Writing the Discourse on ECD

Given the desire to keep the mass media out of thediscourse on ECD, CAE thought it wise to closewith a few suggestions on how to speak semipubliclyabout what should only be discussed among trustedcompanions. This is an old problem, so fortunatelythere are some precedents—most notably the

Frankfurt School. Its strategy was to write in themost dense, arcane style imaginable so that onlyinitiates into the fold could decipher it; in thisway the discourse stayed out of the public spherewhere it did not become a resource for marketcooptation. Happily, we do not have to go to suchlengths. The writing can be clear and accessible,but it should be made to resist the eye of the me-dia. Fortunately this is easy to do. All that is nec-essary is to make it “bad copy.” This is why CAEspeaks in terms of general models andhypotheticals (and never about specific actions). Not only would we not want to make specificspublic for obvious reasons, but generalities (mod-els) are not very interesting to the grand majority

of the popular media audience. Models are book-ish and slow, and in the fast-paced image barrageof popular spectacle, they are simply boring.

CAE also suggests looking to historical analoguesfor examples of tactical actions, particularly onesthat were activated by authoritarian power vectors.

None of the popular media is particularly interestedin more talk about “olden times,” nor are they in-terested in past atrocities (except for those perpe-trated by Nazis). Discussion of such topics leavesthe media with nothing interesting to bring to thepublic. This strategy goes back to issues of constel-lations, detournement, appropriation, etc. Use what




is already available, give the media vultures noth-

ing, and the only option for cooptation left is can-nibalism (hence the proliferation of retro). Nowclearly, it’s too late to stop media cooptation of ECD. It has already been sold for fifteen minutes of fame, and is fueling a new round of cyberhype, bute-activists can bring a halt to this current mediaevent by supplying nothing more. We can also be

thankful that ECD and other forms of electronicresistance that have now been dematerialized intothe hyperreal buzz of “hacktivism” are just morecyberfads that will rapidly fade on thetechnohorizon, leaving the committed to continuewith business as usual.

chapter 1_electronic civil disobedience_simulation_and the public sphere

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