62

Chapter 3

Agrarian Relations in Kerala

Agrarian relations refer to a pattern of relationship in which people are

related to the land as a productive resource by ownership or tenancy or by

any other form of relationship. It also refers to the historical nature of

land ownership system with its subsequent changes in its interaction and

reaction to the circumstances of ecology- natural and human – related to

creation of traditions of conflicting interests in land.

Many studies have focused on the agrarian problems like peasant revolts,

peasant movements, agrarian tensions, agrarian conflicts, and changes in

the agrarian structure. Many studies have analyzed peasantry in its

relationship with economic power structures and superstructures of the

village society. To the Marxist investigators agrarian relations are the

relationship between different classes of people engaged in the process of

production. But the Marxists failed to identify the differentiation within

peasantry as they delineated and analyzed the experiences of the agrarian

struggles (Vijayan, 1998).

Land reforms are back on the policy agenda of international development

institutions as well as of many nation states, although it never really

63

disappeared from the political agenda of rural social movements. Poverty

has remained largely a rural phenomenon globally, with three-fourths of

the world’s poor constituted by the rural poor despite efforts by national

governments, international institutions and civil society. Effective control

over productive resources, especially land and water, by the rural poor is

crucial to their autonomy and capacity to construct a rural livelihood and

to overcome poverty. This is largely because today in many countries a

significant portion of the income of the rural poor comes from farming,

despite far-reaching livelihood diversification processes occurring in

different places over the years. As a result, lack of control over land and

water resources is directly related to poverty and inequality(Nair and

Dhas,1989).

Moreover, land has a multidimensional character: it is important not only

for economic livelihoods, but also as a socio-political resource for poor

people to exercise their citizenship rights, and as a cultural factor crucial

for the preservation of people’s collective identity and dignity (Barros and

Schwartzman,2003). States have been driven by a variety of motives in

carrying out land reforms up to the 1980s. These can be broadly

differentiated between economic and socio-political ones.

64

The economic basis for land reform remains founded on the assumption

that large farms under-utilize land, while small farms are wasteful of

labor, resulting in low levels of land and labor productivity and

consequently leading to poverty. At the same time, most agrarian

societies are marked by un(der)employment of labor and scarcity of land.

From an economic consideration, it is deemed more logical to raise land

productivity than to try to increase labor productivity, at least as a first

radical step toward restructuring existing social and production relations

(Bernstein, 2002). There has thus been a broad consensus among scholars

and policymakers coming from diverse ideological perspectives on the

relevance of land reforms for economic development and rural poverty

eradication. Yet opinion is divided over the longer-term perspective - that

is, in what overall type of development paradigm does land reform figure,

or toward what developmental end should the rural surplus be directed.

This more fundamental issue has been linked to debates about what type

of organization of production should be adopted, i.e., individual or

collective farms, after the restructuring of landed property rights have

occurred. The neo-classical perspective of optimization of the farm

management through structuring of the land ownership or tenure system

and entitlement as a stimulus to the farm management set forth the

theoretical framework for the optimization models in countries like Japan.

Meanwhile, socio-political logic has been equally powerful in shaping the

65

rise (and fall) of land reforms in different countries over the years

(Borras, 2003).

First, the decolonization processes that were unleashed immediately after

World War II continued in some places until the 1980s, and have become

important contexts for land redistribution campaigns in many countries.

Second, geo-political and ideological imperatives in the context of the

Cold War provided another set of factors behind the rise of land reforms

in international and national policy agendas. Third, land reforms also held

a key place in alternative national projects heralded by victorious peasant-

based revolutions. Fourth, in reaction to external and internal political

pressures, land reforms were used by central states to ‘manage’

significant episodes of peasant unrest, whether communist-instigated or

otherwise. What later emerged as scattered patches of successful land

redistribution outcomes within these countries revealed the capacity of

central states to respond, albeit selectively and partially, to rural unrest.

Fifth, land reform was also often used to legitimize and/or consolidate the

claim to state power by one faction of the elite against another. Finally,

and perhaps more commonly, central authorities (capitalist or socialist)

almost always have used land reforms to further state-building agendas

(Borras, (2005). The administrative requirements of implementation of

the land reforms are multifarious. They have fed the desire of central state

66

authorities to extend their administrative, political and military-police

presence and authority into ‘untamed’ parts of state claimed territory and

to expand the central state’s tax base.

Thus fueled by different economic and socio-political reasoning, land

reforms were legislated and implemented in a wide variety of (sub)

national settings and with a variety of results (Borras et.al.,2005). In all

the postwar land redistribution campaigns, however, the outcome in terms

of redistributing all lands to all the poor households who needed them

ended up falling short or remained marked by only partial success.

Meanwhile, the changed global economic and socio-political context

emerging especially in the 1990’s resulted in a different context for land

reform. While there are many old economic and socio-political issues

around land reforms that have remained important up to the present, some

are clearly no longer relevant (such as the Cold War). Instead, new issues

emerged that have not really been part of the land reform discourse until

more recently, such as gender, the environment, human rights, ethnic

violence, and indigenous land rights (Carter and Mesbah ,1993).

Despite the series of agrarian reforms and rural development

interventions in the past, today, landlessness and rural poverty remain a

67

very significant problem in developing and transition-countries. The FAO

has forecasted, by 2006, three-fourths of the world’s poor, or about 900

million people would be living in rural areas and depending on access to

land and other natural resources for their livelihoods. For most of them,

insecure access to land is closely linked to poverty. The extent to which

the conditions of landed property rights and agrarian structure – in

convergence with other factors such as macroeconomic and socio-

political conditions – (re)shape the lives and livelihoods of the rural poor

vary significantly between and within regions. In Asia, amid rapid

economic development in China and India, national and sub-national

enclaves of agrarian problems have persisted, generally gravitating

around the issues concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights (e.g. India

and the Philippines), forestry lands (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand), land

degradation, greater control of the farming family over the terms of land

use (e.g. China and Vietnam), among others (de Janvry et.al,2001).

In Latin America, amid modest macroeconomic growth across the region

and uneven degrees of industrialization and urbanization, pockets of rural

poverty alongside a major cross-national poverty enclave – the Andes,

have persisted. This rural poverty is closely linked to land-related

problems, particularly the highly skewed distribution of landed property

rights in most countries.

68

In sub-Saharan Africa, the less vibrant macroeconomic development

processes in general have continued alongside low rural economic

productivity gains. Key problems remain connected to productivity issues

that in turn involve rural poor people’s control over water, capital, and

technology, while conflicts over the nature, pace and direction of property

rights reforms in settler-controlled farms and communal lands have

remain significant (Lorenzo et.al.2006).

Meanwhile, in the Near East and Northern Africa, the question of land is

always associated with the question of water and rural poverty is closely

linked to the poor people’s access to and control over available land and

water resources. Finally in the transitional economies of the former

USSR, Central Asia, and some parts of Eastern Europe, productivity

issues have remained central to the capacity of the rural poor and the

livelihoods after the land redistribution in the post-Cold War era. In short,

between and within regions today, the poverty of most rural households

have remained linked to the question of access to and control over land

and water resources.

Shaped partly by the diversity of socio-economic, political and cultural

conditions between and within countries, and partly by the varied

69

responses of different actors to the changing context, one can thus discern

four broadly distinct perspectives on achieving pro-poor land policies and

sustainable livelihoods. These are the market-led, state-led, poor people-

led and state- society driven perspectives, each of which is discussed

below.

From the state-led perspective, the reasons given for land reforms always

entail a convergence of many economic and socio-political considerations

and calculations. This view not only treats land mainly as an economic

factor of production, but also as a socio political and cultural resource and

sometimes even as a ‘territory’. It holds that strong political will by the

central state is necessary in order to defeat any opposition to reform, and

to employ expropriation methods for land redistribution. The state-led

view considers strong and independent peasant movements as critical to

the success of any land redistribution program in theory, even though

there is a strong tendency of states in practice to treat peasant

organizations as, or try to transform them into, subordinate administrative

adjuncts in carrying out land reforms.

In contrast to the state-led view, from the market-led perspective in land

reforms, the main consideration is economic efficiency and productivity

gains. Land is considered primarily as a commodity, a scarce resource

70

that is an important economic factor of production. Skewed distribution

of land resulting in lack of access to most rural households, is the key

cause of rural poverty. Thus there exists the need to secure access to land

for the rural poor. But because state intervention distorts (land) markets,

land distribution must be carried out via a combination of market-based

and market –oriented mechanisms: the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ land

transfer scheme, the promotion of land rental markets, the privatization

and formalization of land titles, and the decentralization of land records

and management. This view banks on the existence of strong,

independent local peasant organizations that could directly negotiate with

landlords for land sales, as well as on the involvement of NGOs to assist

local peasant organizations in farm development requirements, such as

preparing farm plans acceptable to commercial banks (Deere and

Medeiros, 2005).

Meanwhile, many of the poor people-led perspectives’ most basic

assumptions are similar to those of the state-led. However, it is important

to note that the poor people-led view differs from the state-led

perspective in one crucial respect: it tends to assume that the state,

ultimately, is too captive to anti-reform elite interests in society to be able

to carry out significant redistributive reforms. In the end, the state is an

unreliable partner in this regard. The poor people—led perspective also

71

views market forces as basically dominated by elite interests, and hence

unable to bring about truly pro-poor reform gains. Thus, for adherents of

this perspective, the only way to ensure the achievement of pro-poor

agrarian reforms is for peasants and their organizations to take and retain

the initiative in implementing them, even if they must stand alone in

doing so(Deininger,1999).

Finally, in a state-society perspective, it is the interactions between state

and societal actors that actually push for land reforms. This view aims to

take the best arguments of the state-led and poor people-led views and

bring them together, with a nod as well, with a few issues usually raised

by market-led perspectives. The main assumptions here are notably

nuanced. On the one hand, peasant movements are viewed as a crucial

factor in successful land reforms, but they (peasants/beneficiaries and

their organizations) are not assumed to be omnipotent. On the other hand,

the state is deemed a critical actor in any successful land reform, but it

does not necessarily assume a commanding role. Meanwhile, for their

part, markets are indeed an important context within which peasants who

receive lands must be able to construct, maintain and sustain their

livelihoods, but markets are not the only factor in economic productivity-

enhancement issues. Although the state/society-driven perspective

recognizes the relevance of each, it analyzes state, peasant movements,

72

and market forces not as separate entities, but as interdependent ones,

inherently linked to one another by their association to the politics and

economics of land resources. Consequently, this view has three key

dimensions: ‘poor people-initiated’, ‘livelihood enhancing/ creating’, and

‘state-supported’.

Land tenure systems in India

Agrarian systems in modern India are marked by tremendous diversity.

Although the particular configuration of institutions that helps to make

progressive policy reforms possible in one state may not be present in

others, it is important to be aware of broad variations in the factors that

influence patterns of agrarian change (Binswanger and Deininger 1997;

Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1995). Various types of institutions are

of relevance in understanding how contemporary agrarian systems have

evolved in India, including personal laws and customs regarding

inheritance, the significance of patron-client relations, collective action to

overcome ecological risk and missing markets, and other institutions in

village society (Sahu 1997).

Three broad types of land revenue system were introduced in India under

British rule (Baden-Powell 1892, Sharma 1992). The differences among

73

these systems account for the significant variations in the subsequent

evolution of land tenure systems throughout rural India. This is not to

suggest that these systems swept away pre-existing land relations. A

defining characteristic of each system was the attempt to incorporate

elements of the preceding agrarian structure, and the interaction of

colonial policy and existing systems produced widely different local

results and hybrid forms. Different areas came under British land

settlements at different times. Tribal areas, in particular, were not covered

by any of these systems, and some tribal areas remain to be ‘settled’ even

today.

Under the zamindari or ‘permanent settlement’ system, introduced

around 1793, feudal lords (zamindars, jagirdars etc) were declared

proprietors of the land on condition of fixed revenue payments to the

British regime. Peasants were transformed into tenant farmers, and rents

were collected by serried ranks of intermediaries below the level of

zamindars. This system prevailed over most of North India, including

present-day Uttar Pradesh (except Avadh and Agra), Bihar, West Bengal,

most of Orissa, and Rajasthan (except Jaipur and Jodhpur), and covered

around 57 per cent of the total cultivated area.

74

The other major system was the ryotwari system, introduced in Madras in

1792 and in Bombay in 1817-18. In this case, individual cultivators (ryots

or raiyats) were recognized as proprietors of their land with rights to sub-

let, mortgage, and transfer their land by gift or sale. Their tenure of land

was secure so long as revenue payments were made directly to the

collectors of the colonial administration. The ryotwari system held sway

over most of South India and most of Madhya Pradesh and Assam. The

princely states of Jaipur and Jodhpur in Rajasthan also fell under ryotwari

systems. Pockets of zamindari-type tenure existed within these ryotwari

areas, particularly where they were administered by local rajas or nawabs.

Ryotwari systems accounted for around 38 per cent of the total cultivated

area.

The third type of system was the mahalwari system, in which revenue

settlement was made with entire villages as collective units. Peasant

farmers contributed shares of the total revenue demand for the village

(mahal) in proportion to their respective holdings. The state was initially

entitled to as much as 83 per cent of gross produce in revenue, although

this was later lowered to 66 per cent. The mahalwari system was

introduced between 1820 and 1840 in Punjab (including both present-day

Punjabs in Pakistan and India, and the state of Haryana); parts of what are

now Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, and the princely states of Avadh and

75

Agra in Uttar Pradesh. This type of tenure system was much less

extensive, and accounted for some 5 per cent of the cultivated area.

A typology of the tenure system existent in the various states is presented

in Table 3.1

Table 3.1

Typology of tenure system in India

Sl. No. Tenure system State

1 Zamindari system (57% of

cultivated area)

Uttar Pradesh( except Avadh

& Agra)

Bihar

Orissa

West Bengal

Rajasthan

Andhra Pradesh (

Telengana)

2 Ryotwari system ( 38% of the

cultivated area)

Karnataka

Gujarat

Tamil Nadu

Kerala

Maharashtra

Madhya Pradesh (60% area)

Andhra Pradesh (except

Telengana)

Assam

Rajasthan (Jaipur &

Jodhpur)

3 Mahalwari (5% cultivated area)

Punlab

Haryana

Madhya Pradesh(40% area)

Orissa(9% area)

Uttarpradesh ( Avadh &

Agra)

Source: Sharma (1992)

76

Rural India was the theatre of a variety of struggles involving various

categories of rural population during the entire period of British

Domination. The agrarian movements that emerged in different parts of

the country pressed for various agrarian reforms. In Kerala effective

implementation of the regulation of agrarian relationship was possible

due to the strength of the Leftist movement.

Land reforms in Kerala

Kerala is a highly globalized regional economy. Kerala has been

integrated to the world economy so much so that all the convulsions and

vicissitudes of the major economic centers of the world have had their

repercussions and resonance in the state (Kunhaman, 2002).

Logically any land reform is part of a broad agrarian policy to entitle the

tiller of the land to organize agrarian production efficiently and

appropriate its surplus without the interference of the landlord or

moneylender or any other exploitative participant in production. It meant

to resolve the class conflicts in the appropriation of surplus in agricultural

production.

77

At the time of formation of the Kerala State, there existed bewilderingly

complex tenurial systems. In Travancore tenancy was abolished in 1865

by a Royal Proclamation. The Jenmikudian Proclamation of 1867 is

acclaimed as the Magna Carta of the feudal landlords of Kerala. But no

such reforms were enacted in the Malabar area. At the time of re-

organization of the state these disparities led to widespread discontent

among the peasants of Northern Kerala.

Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 implemented from 1

January 1970 was the most dramatic of any land reform legislation passed

by any state legislature. In India only Jammu and Kashmir, other than

Kerala thought of enacting such agrarian legislation. The term ‘tenant’

was defined broadly to include crop sharers, fugitive cultivators or any

other new types of tenancy. It enabled the tenants to become titleholders

of their leased holdings subject to government ceiling provisions and

payment of a purchase price. The Bill granted fixity of tenure to the

landless, occupants of homesteads known as ‘Kudikidappukar’. By this

legislation, fair rents were stipulated for all types of land and were made

uniform. The Bill also provided for help to small holders who were

defined as persons holding or owning below five acres of double crop

wetland or equivalent. Land Boards and Tribunals were entrusted with

the responsibility of implementing provisions of the Bill.

78

The dismissal of the Communist Ministry and subsequent invalidation of

the Bill by Kerala High Court in 1963 necessitated a diluted form of the

Bill to be passed as The Kerala Land Reform Act, 1963. The Act fixed

ceiling limit to be 12 standard acres but exempted certain types of land

from its coverage. This Act came into effect from 1st April, 1964.

As per the survey of Land Reforms in Kerala 1966-67, about 94 percent

of the leased land under all types of lands got fixity of tenure either

through sanction of Tribunal or mutual agreement between the landlord

and the tenant. The Table shows the total area of land under different

tenures and those which were granted fixity of tenure. Over 19.2 lakh

acres of land has been granted fixity of tenure and 17.49 lakh acres were

transferred through mutual agreement. The survey also revealed that very

few farmers could purchase landlord’s rights and only one percent of the

leased land was bought by the tenants.

79

Table 3.2

Type of tenure fixity of tenure and area involved

Types of

tenure

Total Throu

gh

Land

Tribun

al

Fixity of tenure & area involved (acres)

Fixity obtained Fixity not

obtained

Other

Throug

h

agreem

ent

Total Under

disput

es

Tot

al

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Kanam 496183 - 467523 467523 28660

Kuzhikanam 282568 1426 280701 282127 354 -

Kanamkuzhik

anam

100322 - 100222 100222 87

Verumpattam 849231 47219 731946 779165 20208 346

8

100

Mulgeni 49 - 49 49 46390

Chalgeni 9177 - 9177 9177

Vaidaeni - -

Kudiyiruppu 85829 6759 75396 82155 3414 103 157

Deemed

tenancy

54308 739 51245 51984 354 196

3

16

Others 43820 3718 33630 37348 6201 28 243

All 192148

7

59761 174988

9

1809750 59182 556

3

46993

Source: Survey of land Reforms, 1966-1967, Kerala

80

Prior to the abolition of tenancy, the lowest caste tenants did not have

security of tenancy and they could be evicted at any time at the will of the

landlord. To guard themselves against this malady the tenants had to pay

exorbitant rents. In 1940 it was recorded that the cultivator paid as much

as 50 per cent of the gross income as rent.

There existed tenancy in garden lands also. Here, the rent paid was not

directly accessible as they were paid in kind. Also, the returns from the

garden crops and hence the payments of rent were continuous, making its

monitoring difficult. So abolition of tenancy in these lands affected direct

wealth transfer to a lesser extent compared to the wetlands. But it had

implied political and economic importance for hutment dwellers. Its

importance in the cultivation aspects was that the tiller had greater stake

in the land improvement activities (Thomas ,1998).

However, with the introduction of the Agrarian Relations Bill, the

landlords commenced a hectic activity of bogus land transfers.

Consequently the target of acquiring and redistributing surplus lands

could not be achieved.

81

Effects of the land reforms

The three main objectives of Land Reforms were: (1) abolition of

intermediaries (b) tenancy reforms, and (3) imposition of ceilings on

holdings and redistribution of surplus land.

Prior to the 1969 Act, the land holding pattern was highly skewed in

Kerala. Roughly 8 per cent of the land owner households controlled 44.4

per cent of all rented lands and 61.8 per cent of the irrigated rented lands.

This showed the concentration of wealth and consequently power in the

landowner brahminical households. With the abolition of tenancy, most

of them utilizing their higher access to education, shifted professions and

became school teachers, administrators etc. Some continued as middle

farmers.

The abolition of feudal landlords did not automatically lead to capitalistic

mode of production in Kerala, as the land was not passed on to a class of

sturdy self-cultivating peasantry. Kerala has a good number of absentee

farmers whose main occupation is far from their cultivable lands. Also a

large number of the landlords circumvented the ceiling provisions, taking

advantage of the time lag between the deliberations, enactment and

enforcement of the Act. Thus the very essence of the land reforms got

vitiated (Krishnaji).

82

Despite the gain of title ownership, many of the former tenants did not

have the necessary capital or management skills to adapt themselves to

the changing price situations. Nearly 67 per cent of the tenant turned

owners held less than 0.5 Ha. and 88.5 per cent below 1Ha. Nearly 1

million had no other holding other than the leased in. So we cannot

categorically affirm that the land reforms brought forth a class of sturdy

peasant proprietors (Oommen, 1994)

Meanwhile, some of the relatively richer tenant peasants who had

substantial area of leased-in land got ownership rights of the whole land

operated by them and consequently emerged as a new class of capitalist

farmers. The distribution of surplus land did not make much difference to

the situation of the agricultural laborers either. Various agricultural

development programs also catered to the stronger large farmers and not

the small and marginal farmers.

Many of the new landowners had other significant income opportunities,

as well. Consequently they relied on hired labor. As their educational and

social status improved, they avoided making further investments in labor-

intensive agriculture. As the result, there occurred a shift towards

perennial crops that required less labor. The price- advantage catalyzed

83

this shift. Others opted to leave their land idle or leased it out illegally to

poor peasant cultivators (Easwaran, 1990). This phenomenon has now

reached alarming proportions warranting a re-look and re-examination of

the question of land reforms in Kerala.

The analysis of data on land holdings from 1960-61 to 1986-87 showed a

tendency towards marginal holdings. The average size of marginal

holdings declined from 0.29Ha in 1970-71 to 0.18Ha in 1986-87, the

lowest among different states of India. The average Keralite with a

mixture of contradictory sentiments of attachment towards ancestral

property and aversion towards laborious tasks of farming found real

estate a lucrative investment offer especially with investible earnings

from other sources. Thus, the market forces are asserting their might in

the land market contributing to social differentiation (Oommen, 1994)

When Agrarian Relations Bill was introduced in1959, it was estimated

that 72000Ha land would be available for re-distribution. But, only 39000

Ha was distributed to the beneficiaries by the end of 1978. The loopholes

in the Act added to the insensitivity and indifference of the bureaucracy

made the re-distribution system ineffective and the vulnerable sections of

the society did not benefit much from it (Thorner, 1978).

84

Many of these difficulties could be tackled with additional agrarian

reforms, on promotion of joint farming or group farming, irrigation,

development of new products, marketing and so on. All of them call for

popular initiatives at local level, comprehensive policy packages and

efficient public administration (Tonrquist and Tharakan, 1995). It is in the

absence of such supportive institutional arrangements, that the land

reforms in Kerala contributed to agricultural stagnation.

.The small farmers find it difficult to cultivate their holdings profitably.

This has led to a situation where people are leasing out the land

informally. This situation is leading us to a new set of problems of

uncontrolled exploitation of soil fertility.

Tenancy had declined in all the states in the seventies. The actual form of

tenancy also has undergone change. In a few states commercial tenancy

grew in prominence. At the All India level the break up of the holdings

based on the type of ownership revealed that 37 per cent of the operated

area was leased out by households self-employed in agriculture; about 19

percent by agricultural laborers while other households dominated with

46 per cent of operated area. Except Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,

Maharashtra and Karnataka, in all other states self employed households

in agriculture and others dominated substantial area. A marked exception

85

to this pattern is Kerala where 30 per cent of the area was leased in by

others.

Table 3.3

State-wise distribution of leased in area and type of operations

State Percentage of area leased out by Percentage of area leased in by

Self-

employed

in

agriculture

Agricultural

labor

Others Total Self-

employed

in

agriculture

Agricultural

labor

Others Total

Andhra

Pradesh

17.81 38.63 43.56 100.00 83.41 13.52 3.07 100.00

Assam 47.46 10.17 42.37 100.00 95.49 2.62 1.89 100.00

Bihar 39.27 10.12 50.61 100.00 75.62 2.62 14.59 100.00

Gujarat 42.42 47.88 9.70 100.00 96.00 9.79 2.00 100.00

Haryana 39.70 4.05 56.26 100.00 90.43 2.00 8.09 100.00

Himachal

Pradesh

70.14 0.00 29.86 100.00 99.32 1.48 0.68 100.00

Jammu&

Kashmir

49.47 0.00 50.53 100.00 85.03 0.00 14.70 100.00

Karnataka 9.62 41.48 48.90 100.00 91.24 4.83 3.93 100.00

Kerala 29.27 12.20 58.54 100.00 56.14 13.60 30.26 100.00

State Percentage of area leased out by Percentage of area leased in by

Self-

employed

in

agriculture

Agricultural

labor

Others Total Self-

employed

in

agriculture

Agricultural

labor

Others Total

Madhya

Pradesh

26.30 11.93 61.77 100.00 92.89 8.16 8.95 100.00

86

Maharashtra 14.87 48.33 36.80 100.00 82.23 12.93 4.85 100.00

Orissa 26.65 16.73 56.62 100.00 83.58 12.44 3.98 100.00

Punjab 65.43 0.09 34.48 100.00 96.36 1.16 2.48 100.00

Rajasthan 64.10 2.24 33.65 100.00 83.64 0.92 15.44 100.00

Tamil Nadu 43.27 12.27 44.46 100.00 78.09 11.82 10.10 100.00

Uttar

Pradesh

33.12 11.53 55.35 100.00 91.88 3.88 4.24 100.00

West

Bengal

60.16 0.41 39.43 100.00 80.23 13.51 6.27 100.00

All India 34.35 19.39 46.26 100.00 85.25 7.51 7.24 100.00

Source; Government of India (1989): Some Aspects of Household

Ownership Holding, 37th Round, January to December 1982, No.330,

Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning

88

There have been reports of the land lease market working in reverse. To

realize economies of scale in the use of new technology, the medium and

large holdings are increasingly entering the lease market (Gill, 1989). In

the regions of faster agriculture growth the employment opportunities in

other sectors also have increased. In such a situation, it was more

profitable for small holders to lease out their holding and move on to

other employment opportunities elsewhere. Thus the allocation of land

through the land-lease market has altered the size distribution of

operational holdings.

Table 3.4

Percentage operational holdings reporting leased-in area for broad class

of operational holdings

Size Class % of operational

holdings reporting

leased in area

%

distribution

in both

seasons

Area leased in

Any part of the year

Major part of the year

Both

season

Any

season

0002-0.20 4.4 7 94 42 39

0.21-0.50 4.9 6 94 67 67

0.51-1.00 1.9 4 99 41 41

1.01-2.00 5.7 10 87 128 115

2.01-4.00 4.4 7 99 51 51

4.01-10.00 14.1 17 81 41 41

10.01 &

above

0.0 60 89 24 24

All sizes 4.3 7 91 394 379

Source: Sarvekshna, January- March 1997.

89

According to the data given in Table 3.4 in the broad size class of above

10 hectares leased in area was as high as 60.34 percent. When both

seasons are considered, the percentage proportion amounted to 89.10

percent. In smaller size classes the proportion of leased in area was

comparatively lesser.

Present scenario

At present, the government is not zealously following up the activities

related to land reforms. Only the recovery and re-distribution of surplus

land is being continued. The reviews of the efficacy of the land reforms

process in Kerala stressed the fact that the land reforms in Kerala did not

yield the expected results. But it led to the transfer of ownership to a

series of intermediaries who did not have any direct involvement in

agriculture. The expectation that an environment conducive for

productivity improvement in agriculture will be nurtured by the land

reforms was misplaced. Meanwhile there was commendable productivity

improvement in plantation crops where restrictive ceiling provisions were

not laid. However, the effect of land reforms on the productivity of

crops, especially plantation crops is not conclusively proved.

The land reforms helped the socially and economically weaker sections of

the population to become owners of their own homes. This was socially

90

significant but not economically. In the wake of the social change, the

state inherited an agrarian sector dominated by small and marginal

holdings, which are vulnerable as far as the scope of commercial farming

is considered

It altered the self sustaining and regenerating common property resource

management system that has been prevalent in the villages of Kerala

irreversibly. Before the implementation of the land reforms, the grazing

lands, ponds and other types of water bodies were common pool

resources of the village managed by private persons or religious

institutions. But when the land was distributed as surplus land, there was

nobody responsible to maintain these common assets. They were

abandoned or converted to other uses.

The small size of the holding is a deterrent in sustaining the agricultural

ambitions of majority of the farmers in the state. However, at present, the

system of informal leasing of land is practised. This new practice alters

the ecological interrelations in farming. The lessee with no long term

interest in the fertility of the soil taps the fertility intensively with over-

use of the agricultural chemicals.

91

The data as per the 59th Round of National Sample Survey showed that

out of the estimated 2.1 million farmer households in the state, 6.6 per

cent leased- in land during the first crop season ( Kharif ) and 5.35 per

cent in the second crop season( Rabi ). Though there is no conclusive data

on the extent of land leased in as a proportion of the operated area, the

data on the type of activity indicate that the land is put to intensive

cultivation.

The state-level data on tenancy are considerably underestimated because

of several problems. Since tenancy has been declared to be illegal under

the sections 72 L, 73 and 74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, most of the

tenancies are oral and both lessors and lessees may not report the terms of

agreement. Besides the location-specific characteristics of the lease

agreement may not be captured by a state-level survey.

The distribution of number of tenant holdings by the length of tenure and

average size of owned and leased-in area in a sample study is described in

Table3.5.The data indicate that immediately after the implementation of

the 1970 Act there was significant reduction in the number of tenant

holdings but after 1990, there is a reversal in the situation with around 62

per cent of sample under study entering into leased land cultivation.

Further, those who took up lease cultivation owned small plots of land

92

only. The average size of owned holdings was higher for those who

entered tenancy prior to 1970.

Table 3.5

Distribution of number of tenant holdings by Length of tenure with

average size of owned and leased- in area

Year of origin No. of Tenant

Holdings

Average Size of

Owned Area

(cents)

Average Size

Leased-in Area

(cents)

Up to 1970 18(14.4) 52.3 19.7

1971-1980 8(6.4) 15.6 17.1

1981-1990 22(17.6) 15.3 14.5

1991-2000 77(61.6) 17.0 11.0

Total 125 21.68 13.25

Source: Omana Cheriyan (2003)

Lease Land Farming

When paddy cultivation became a non-lucrative affair, farmers of the

state deserted paddy fields. Kudumbashree found this as an opportunity.

Neighbourhood Groups of the mission were given encouragement to start

paddy cultivation. Many groups have identified the immense potential of

lease land farming. Lease land farming is beneficial both to the landless

poor women of Kudumbashree Neighbourhood Groups and the land lords

who are not cultivating the land on their own. Kudumbashree gives prime

importance for the economic empowerment of the indigent masses,

especially the poor women of Kerala. Began in April1, 1999, this 10 year

project includes three components micro credit, entrepreneurship and

empowerment. In 2004, leased land farming was done in 3466.65

93

hectares of paddy fields. 33501 families, hailing from 3703 NHGs got

benefited.

Data on informal leasing as practised in Kerala is furnished below in

Table 3.6. More than 16,000 Hectares of land has been brought under

cultivation of paddy, under various districts till 2005.

Table 3.6

Lease and Farming as on 31.03.2005

Sl.No Districts No.of NHGs

No.of

families Area in Hectares

1 Thiruvananthapuram 1506 18709 508.53

2 Kollam 1940 13886 380.58

3 Pathanamthitta 727 16300 2055.35

4 Alappuzha 3373 45811 1951.1

5 Kottayam 1074 11720 540.9

6 Idukki 6565 68331 2794.95

7 Ernakulam 3139 29368 2541

8 Thrissur 794 12383 599.19

9 Palakkad 1315 12065 801.57

10 Malappuram 337 3120 552.12

11 Kozhikode 1146 12291 520.89

12 Wayanad 1073 15662 1445.97

13 Kannur 2860 24835 1012

14 Kasaragod 1743 13432 429.51

State 27592 297913 16133.66

Source: Planning Board, 2005.

Estimates of income from tenant cultivation of different crops were made

by various researchers ( Cheriyan,2003; John, 2004; Veron,1999).