chapter 3 of civil procedure

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Chapter 3 Parties RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS Who may be parties? As a rule, there are only three kinds of persons who may be parties. They are: a. Natural Persons; b. Juridical Persons; and c. Entities authorized by law Galindo v. Heirs of Marciano A. Roxas, 448 SCRA 497 Facts: In a dispute regarding ownership of the land between heirs of persons who entered into a transaction a long time ago, Reginald Roxas alleges that he is the representative of the legitimate heirs of Marciano A. Roxas. The Galindo contended that the complaint did not allege that the heirs have authorized Reginald to file against her in their behalf. In the RTC, only one Galindo is the defendant. Now, in their petition before the SC, they are now joined by other Galindos. The respondent, Roxas, contended that they are not proper parties as they were not there during the action in the RTC and the petition in the CA. Issue: Are the other Galindos proper parties, considering that they were not there during the case in the RTC and the petition in the CA? Ruling: Yes, they are proper parties. In fact, they should have been impleaded from the very start. While we agree with the respondents’ premise that the petitioners herein, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties-defendants in the RTC and parties-petitioners in the CA, and, as a general rule, are not proper parties as petitioners in this case, the Court finds and so holds that they are 32

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Page 1: Chapter 3 of Civil Procedure

Chapter 3

Parties

RULE 3

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

Who may be parties?

As a rule, there are only three kinds of persons who may be parties. They are:

a. Natural Persons;

b. Juridical Persons; and

c. Entities authorized by law

Galindo v. Heirs of Marciano A. Roxas, 448 SCRA 497

Facts: In a dispute regarding ownership of the land between heirs of persons

who entered into a transaction a long time ago, Reginald Roxas alleges that he is

the representative of the legitimate heirs of Marciano A. Roxas. The Galindo

contended that the complaint did not allege that the heirs have authorized

Reginald to file against her in their behalf. In the RTC, only one Galindo is the

defendant. Now, in their petition before the SC, they are now joined by other

Galindos. The respondent, Roxas, contended that they are not proper parties as

they were not there during the action in the RTC and the petition in the CA.

Issue: Are the other Galindos proper parties, considering that they were not

there during the case in the RTC and the petition in the CA?

Ruling: Yes, they are proper parties. In fact, they should have been impleaded

from the very start. While we agree with the respondents’ premise that the

petitioners herein, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties-

defendants in the RTC and parties-petitioners in the CA, and, as a general rule, are

not proper parties as petitioners in this case, the Court finds and so holds that they

are indispensable parties and should be impleaded as parties-petitioners in this

case.

The general rule is that only those parties in a case and their privies and

successors-in-interest are bound by the order or decision of the trial court.

Persons or entities who are not parties to the case are not and should not be bound

or adversely affected by the said order or decision; otherwise, they will be

deprived of their right to due process. Since the petitioners, except petitioner

Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties in the RTC and in the CA, they are not

bound by the assailed orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA against

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petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; hence, they are not the proper parties to appeal

from and assail the said orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA.

It bears stressing, however, that the respondents, the plaintiffs in the RTC,

sought the nullification of the “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the

Deceased Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with Waiver of

Rights” executed by all the petitioners in which they adjudicated unto themselves

as co-owners thereof the rights and interests which they claimed the deceased

Urbano Galindo had over Lot 1048 covered by TCT No. 335593(M) which was

issued to and under the name of petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera on the basis of

the said deed, and the retention of TCT No. T-2145 under the names of the heirs of

Gregorio Galindo. Thus, all the petitioners, who executed the said deed, are

indispensable parties as parties-defendants in the RTC and as parties-petitioners in

the CA under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and should have been

impleaded by the respondents in their complaint. Without the presence of the said

petitioners as defendants, the trial court could not validly render judgment and

grant relief to the respondents. The failure of the respondents to implead all the

petitioners as parties-defendants constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and

the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said cases and rendered

any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity. The absence of an

indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for

want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those

present. The RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Real party in interest

There are three kinds of real party in interest. They are:

1. Those who stand to be benefited by the judgment of the suit;

2. Those who stand to be injured by the judgment of the suit; and

3. Those who are entitled to the avails of the suit.

*an exception of which is in a contract of agency. The agent, although not

benefited, injured or entitled to the suit, may file in behalf of his principal.

Class suits

Request of the heirs of passengers of Dona Paz, GR 88-1-646-0, 3/3/88

Facts: In an incident regarding the Dona Paz ship where a number of deaths

occurred, the heirs of the deceased and injured are now before the court

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requesting for a class suit as they have common or the same interest and it is so

impractical as to accommodate them.

Issue: Can they file a class suit?

Ruling: No they cannot. One other requirement of a class suit is that there must

be one cause of action. In this case, although there is only one incident, still the

injury caused are separate. An action for damages cannot be collective as each

party has different type of damages to be claimed. They must file this action

separately.

Sufficiency of Representation

Representation must be sufficient as to warrant the binding effect of the suit

to those who cannot come before the court. See: Banda v. Ermita, GR 166620,

4/20/10

Spouses

The inclusion of a spouse is a formal requirement. A husband and wife must

sue and be sued jointly.

Exceptions:

Abandonment or failure to comply with the obligation of the spouse

(Art. 101 and 128, Family Code);

If it concerns an exclusive property of a spouse of age (Art. 111,

Family Code);

If they are under the regime of separation of property. (Art. 145,

Family Code)

See: Navarro v. Escobido, GR 153788, Nov. 27, 2009

Minors and Incompetents

A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with the

assistance of his:

father,

mother,

guardian, or if he has none,

a guardian ad litem.

Joinder of Parties (notice that this is not Joinder of Cause of Action)

There are two kinds of joinder of parties. We have permissive and we have

compulsory.

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Permissive Joinder

Permissive joinder of parties requires that:

(a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of

transactions;

(b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or

defendants; and

(c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on

jurisdiction and venue. (Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, GR 140746,

3/16/05)

Compulsory Joinder

This rule applies to indispensable parties. Indispensable parties are those

whom no final determination of the case can be had without. Hence, they must be

joined

Case Law

Imson v. CA, 239 SCRA 58 (1994)

Facts: There was a vehicular accident involving a Toyota Corolla and a Hino

Diesel Truck. The owner of the Corolla filed a complaint for damages against the

truck driver, the beneficial owners thereof, and the insurer of the same. While the

driver and the beneficial owners failed to file an answer, the insurer and the

plaintiff were able to enter into a compromise agreement. Due to the compromise

agreement, the case was dismissed insofar as the insurer is concerned. Hence,

other defendants seek dismissal of the case too as they are all indispensable

parties.

Issue: Are they all indispensable parties?

Ruling: No, the insurer is not an indispensable party. Defendants are not all

indispensable parties. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected

by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of

the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the

relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal

presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence

there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is

effective, complete, or equitable.

Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit of his interest in the

controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other

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parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete

justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely

permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will

simply avoid multiple litigations.

It is true that all of petitioner's claims are premised on the wrong committed

by defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party

to the suit. The other defendants, however, cannot be categorized as indispensable

parties. They are merely proper parties to the case. Proper parties have been

described as parties whose presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole

controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final degree can be

made in their absence without affecting them. It is easy to see that if any of them

had been impleaded as defendant, the case would still proceed without prejudicing

the party not impleaded. Thus, if petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty

Corporation, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the

other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its

competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit. The insurer, clearly,

is not an indispensable party.

Garcia v. Reyes, 17 Phil. 127

Facts: Garcia filed a case for recovery of property against various parties.

These various parties were the persons whom the property in question has been

passed upon by purchases and donation. This action is to annul the transfers.

Issue: What are the parties in this case? Are they indispensable?

Ruling: Yes, they are indispensable parties. If such a declaration of annulment

can directly affect the persons who made and who were concerned in the said

transfers, nothing could be more proper and just than to hear them in the

litigation, as parties interested in maintaining the validity of those transactions,

and therefore, whatever be the nature of the judgment rendered, Francisco Reyes,

Dolores Carvajal, Alfredo Chicote, Vicente Miranda, and Rafael Sierra, besides the

said minors, must be included in the case as defendants. It is admitted that it

would be impossible to decide the allegations made in the complaint without a

previous hearing of all the parties interested who may be affected by the final

decision of the present litigation.

Co-owners

Adlawan v. Adlawan, GR 161916, 1/20/06, 479 SCRA 275

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Facts: The only and acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador Adlawan,

Arnelito previously let his Aunt and Uncle occupy the land which he inherited

intestate from Dominador. Then, he is seeking for their ejectment. The process of

succession being intestate rendered the plaintiff and Dominador’s wife’s relatives

are co-owners of the disputed lot.

Issue: Is it indispensable for Arnelito to include as parties the relatives of his

father’s wife?

Ruling: Yes, it is indispensable. A co-owner may bring such an action, without

the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is

deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the

plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-

ownership, the action will not prosper.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for

unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the

heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the

disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the

instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that

necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,

Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal

personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of

respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However,

petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the

property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the

lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the

heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged

benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of

the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State

will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession

and enjoyment of the property.

Arcelona v. CA, 280 SCRA 20 (1997)

Facts: The six Arcelonas co-owns a fishpond. They leased it with Tandoc, who

in turn appointed Farnacio as the caretaker. Upon expiration of the lease, Farnacio

surrendered the fishpond to the co-owners. Three days thereafter, however,

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Farnacio filed an action to be maintained as a caretaker but he failed to implead

other co-owners. Nevertheless, his action was favored by the trial court.

Issue: Are all the co-owners pro-indiviso of a real property indispensable

parties? Does the non-inclusion of some of such co-owners in a suit involving

tenancy over said property constitute sufficient ground to nullify the final decision

rendered in such case?

Ruling: Yes, they are all pro-indiviso. Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond.

Private respondent does not deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make

any contrary finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which

specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion

belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion the

tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil

Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as

indispensable parties.

It is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must

implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final

determination of the action. In other words, a tenant who fails to implead all the

co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.

Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and cannot

adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion belonging to

Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still pro-indiviso. Obviously, the

failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final

adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,

a judgment therein cannot attain finality.

Ergo, res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicarium faciunt. Thus, the

Court, through former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, held that a person who

was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered

therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a

stranger.

See: Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, 508 SCRA 469 (2006) - The same rule

applies to personal properties.

Dismissal of a complaint as against one indispensable party

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Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425

Facts: A widow of business partner filed a case against his deceased

husband’s partner and his wife. Subsequently, in the amended complaint, their

sons, being partners, were also impleaded as defendants. The action is for delivery

of the share due to her deceased husband. Afterwards, however, without any

reason, the widow filed a motion to drop the complaint insofar as the sons are

concerned. This was admitted by the court.

Issue: Since the dropped defendants were indispensable parties, what

happens to the action?

Ruling: The court was wrong in dismissing or dropping them. Whenever it

appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has

not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and to order the

inclusion of such party. The absence of an indispensable party renders all

subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not

only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In short, what

respondent court did here was exactly the reverse of what the law ordains — it

eliminated those who by law should precisely be joined.

Necessary Party

A necessary party is not indispensable but is required to be joined as a party if the

plaintiff wishes a complete relief, or for a complete determination or settlement

of the claim subject of the action.

Co-owners of a promissory note

Lichauco v. Limjuco et al. 19 Phil. (1912)

Facts: Limjuco and Gonzalo jointly executed a promissory note in favor of

Laochanco. As the alleged heirs of Laochanco, the Lichauco appointed a

representative to file an action to collect. Hence, only the representative is named

in the action.

Issue: Is it required for them to appoint a representative?

Ruling: It is not actually required because each heir is a necessary party in

the case. Each of them may file a separate action for collection. Its decision would

be futile and ineffective. Any one of the heirs might, the day following the decision

of this court, institute an action against the defendants upon the same promissory

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note and prosecute his action to final judgment, both on trial and on appeal. If in

that final judgment he were denied a right to recover, another one of the heirs

might, the next day, institute another action for exactly the same purposes; and so

on until the defendants had been brought into court upon the same cause of action

as many times as there were heirs who had an interest in the subject matter of the

litigation. It is the uniform policy of the law to reduce litigation as far as possible.

To this end it requires that every person who has an interest in the subject matter

in litigation shall be made a party to the action, that al rights may be adjudicated

at the same time. Hence, they all must be impleaded and not by representative.

Solidary Obligations

Cerezo v. Tuazon, GR 141538, 3/23/04

Facts: A passenger bus collided with a tricycle. The tricycle driver filed a

case against the bus owner, the husband of the bus owner, and the driver of the

bus. Summons was served to the spouses but not to the driver. The spouses

contended that jurisdiction has not been acquired over the persons of the

defendants because the bus driver is an indispensable party.

Issue: Is the bus driver an indispensable party?

Ruling: No, he is not an indispensable party. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s

assertion, Foronda, the bus driver is not an indispensable party to the case. An

indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the

litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However,

Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only

solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to

the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is

solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case,

each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay

for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but

only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either

of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because

complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not

even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Quieting of title

See: San Pedro v. Ong, GR 177598, 10/17/08

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Non-joinder of a necessary party

First, the plaintiff must name that necessary party. Next, he must state why

he is omitted. If the court finds the reason unmeritorious, the court shall order his

inclusion if jurisdiction over him can be obtained. (Sec. 9)

Unwilling Co-Plaintiff

A co-plaintiff who is unwilling to be a plaintiff may be impleaded as

defendant and the complaint shall state such reason.

Effect of Misjoinder and Non-joinder of Parties

Misjoinder or even non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal of the action.

Parties may be dropped or added by the order of the court on:

motion of any party; or

the court’s own initiative.

It may take place at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. A

misjoined party may be severed or proceeded with separately.

Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321 (1910)

Facts: This is a case when the priest filed an action for recovery against a

municipal board.

Issue: What name should be impleaded, the priest or the church?

Ruling: We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel

for the defendants on this appeal. We find none of them well founded. The only one

which deserves especial attention at our hands is the one wherein the defendants

assert that the court below erred in permitting the action to be brought and

continued in the name of the plaintiff instead of in the name of the bishop of the

diocese within which the church was located, or in the name of the Roman Catholic

Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest.

It is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic

Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally had no

interest in the cause of action. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires

that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The

plaintiff is not such party.

Uncertainty

When it is uncertain who should be sued- The plaintiff may implead may

implead several persons as alternative defendants. This may mean that a liability of

any or some may or may not be accorded with the others.

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When it is the identity or name of the defendant is uncertain- The plaintiff

may sue him as someone unknown or by such designation as the case may require.

However, when the identity has been discovered, the pleading must be amended

accordingly.

Entity without Juridical Personality

An entity without any juridical personality cannot sue under its own name.

However, it may be sued using its name. Its name may be that is commonly or

generally known or the members, individually. If it is sued under the name, the

names of the members shall be also included including their respective addresses.

Changes on the Parties

Death of a Party Defendant

Counsel’s duty- It is the duty of the counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)

days after such death or the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his

legal representative or representatives.

*failure of the counsel to comply with this shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

Actions that do not survive- Actions which are purely personal shall be

extinguished as the death of the party defendant. The only requirement here is

notice of death.

Actions that survive

The requirements here are notice of the death, and the names and addresses

of the legal representatives.

Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Kalaw, L-18805, 8/14/67

Facts: National Coconut Corporation, a chartered non-profit corporation filed

an action for damages against Kalaw for being negligent during the typhoon and

was unable to meet his obligations. Kalaw, however, died. Hence, his heirs

contended that the claim for damages, since it is directed to Kalaw, has been

extinguished.

Issue: Did the claim survived Kalaw’s death?

Ruling: Yes, it did. The rules enumerate the actions that survive against a

decedent's executors or administrators, and they are:

(1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate;

(2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and

(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The

present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that

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'injury to property' is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends

to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished.

Purely contractual claims (4 Death Situations)

Before filing of the action – the claim is extinguished.

After filing but before entry of judgment – the claim shall be allowed to

continue until entry of the judgment.

After entry of the judgment – the claim may be enforced against the… I don’t

know yet.

After levy on the property by way of attachment – the action will become a

real action from being a personal one.

Continued/commenced against the administrator/executor or heirs

Legal heirs may be substituted even with the presence of a court-appointed

administrator.

Gochan v. Young, GR 131889, 3/12/2001

Facts: When an incorporator of a corporation known as Gochan Realty died,

the shares were inherited by her daughter. When this daughter also died, the

shares were inherited intestate by the husband and children of this daughter. The

husband then files an action related to this shares of stocks. Other incorporators

opposed this as the rules provides for an administrator and not an heir to

represent the deceased.

Issue: Is a husband, as an heir, authorized to bring an action relative to the

property of the deceased?

Ruling: Yes, he is authorized to do so. I maintain the affirmative because, the

rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits

on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the

deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has

already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which

special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted,

yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be

expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see

if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights

and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights

and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

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The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective

of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and

proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put

undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent,

this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives

of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the

court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the

more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased.

Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased,

and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution

of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the

heirs of John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the

SEC.

Substitution of Legal Representatives

*If the substitution is done with sufficient notice, but there is no actual

substitution, the same shall be void.

Ferreria v. Vda de Gonzales, 104 Phil. 145 (1958)

Facts: During the pendency of an Agrarian Reform case, the landlady died.

She was substituted by her heir but there was no order for the substitute to

appear. The substitute never appeared also during the proceedings. The

complainant also failed to procure an appointment of a legal representative. The

Substitute opposed the resolution of the case as jurisdiction over her person was

not properly acquired by the Court of Agrarian Reform.

Issue: What is the effect of the above-mentioned omissions of the

complainant?

Ruling: The substitution is void. Inasmuch as Manolita Gonzales was never

validly served a copy of the order granting the substitution and that, furthermore,

a valid substitution was never effected, consequently, the court never acquired

jurisdiction over Manolita Gonzales for the purpose of making her a party to the

case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as legal

representative of the estate of her mother Manuela.

*However, even if there was no notice and no knowledge of the court, such

flaws would not affect the validity of subsequent proceedings

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Florendo v. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304 (1984)

Facts: The plaintiff died during the appeal filed by her from an ejectment

case. There was no substitution of party hence, Salindon, the deceased, continued

to be the plaintiff. The case was remanded to the trial court for retaking of

testimony. Meanwhile, after Salindon’s death, her heirs settled their estate and

there was a net TCT issued to them. CA dismissed the appeal because of

abandonment. The trial court issued a writ of execution. The National Housing

Authority also manifested its readiness to enforce the resolution. The defendants of

the ejectment case filed a motion to issue the order and also, cancelling the TCTs.

It was contended by the heirs that the motion for cancellation should be denied as

jurisdiction has not been acquired over the persons of the heirs.

Issue: Was the substitution valid, considering that no notice was issued to

the heirs?

Ruling: Yes, the substitution was valid. In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel

after her death failed to inform the court of Salindon's death. The appellate

court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Salindon

without the proper manifestation from Salindon's counsel. In such a case and

considering that the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil

personality; the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did

with the case. There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the

case were tainted with irregularities.

It appears that the petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was

because of this relationship that the petitioners were able to transfer the title of

Adela Salindon over the subject lot to their names. After Salindon's death, the

disputed lot was included as part of her estate. Salindon's counsel, whose acts bind

his client, failed to comply with his duty to the court and his deceased client.

Considering all this, the appellate decision is binding and enforceable against the

petitioners as successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of

the action. Furthermore, judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only

against defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their

relatives, or privies who derived their right of possession from the defendants.

Under the circumstances of this case, the same rule should apply to the

successors-in-interest if the decision should go against the original plaintiff.

Specific Cases

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Romualdez v. Tiglao, GR 51121, 7/24/81

Facts: In an action to collect rent, the Romualdez, filed against Tiglao and

his sureties. The plaintiff won in the trial court. However, despite the issuance of

the writ of execution, the debt is still unsatisfied. Thus, Romualdez again filed a

civil case against Tiglao and his sureties to revive the judgment. After the filing of

the revival, one of the sureties, died. Accordingly, the estate of the deceased surety

was that which made a defendant. The administratrix opposed this on the ground

that the rules prohibit estates being made defendant in money claim cases. Note:

this was in 1981 the rules here might not exist in the new rules.

Issue: Was the estate a proper defendant?

Ruling: Yes it is. This is precisely why the appellees have instituted the second

suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money

adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the

sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate.

To clarify, the purpose of making the estate of the defendant is not to make

it liable for payment but merely to keep the case alive.

Concurred by Justice Aquino, the case was merely for the forestallment of

the extinction of the claim. The judgment is merely for the confirmation of a claim.

(This ruling doesn’t feel right.)

Saligumba v. Palanog, GR 143365, 12/04/08

Death of Separation of a Party – Public Officer

*this applies to a public officer who is a party in an action in his capacity and

during the pendency of the case. In case he:

Dies;

Resigns; or

Otherwise ceases to hold office

The action may be continued and maintained by or against

his successor.

Condition: Within thirty (30) days after the succession or such time as may be

granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that:

There is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it; and

The successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the

action of his predecessor.

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Before substitution, there must be reasonable notice to the party of officer to be

affected and opportunity to be heard. (except if there is expressed assention)

Incompetence or Incapacity

If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the same may be allowed

to continue as such with the assistance of a legal guardian or a guardian ad litem.

Transfer of Interest

Even there is a transfer of interest, the case will continue as such (by or

against the original party) unless the court directs a substitution or joinder.

Po Lam v. CA, GR 116220, 12/6/00

This case manifested the effects of notice lis pendens to the party who is

substituted by reason of a sale.

Indigent Party

This is only available to a natural party litigant. It, obviously does not apply

to juridical entities. (In re: Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., AM 09-6-9-SC,

8/19/09)

Judging from the title, it looks like a charitable foundation seeks to apply as

indigent party litigant. Obviously this will be denied because there can be no

indigent juridical person.

Indigent party – he is a party who has no money or property sufficient and

available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Effect of the grant – the authority or grant shall include an exemption for payment

of docket fees and other lawful fees, as well as, the transcription of stenographic

notes. The amount of exemption shall be the lien on the judgment in case the

indigent wins, unless the court otherwise provides.

Contest Against claims of indigence – this shall be made at any time before the

judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court finds otherwise, it shall enforce

the payment. If payment is still not made, the execution shall issue without

prejudice to other sanctions.

Notice to the Solicitor General

The presence of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative duly

designated by him may be required by the court in the following cases involving

the validity of any:

Treaty;

Law;

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Ordinance;

Executive order;

Presidential decree; or

Rules or regulations.

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