chapter 35
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Chapter 35. Asymmetric Information. Common knowledge and private information . The latter leads to Asymmetric information , or Asymmetry of information. Akerlof model: the market for lemons. Density. Quality. Adverse selection as a hidden information problem. Moral hazard - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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ChapterChapter 35 35
Asymmetric Information
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Common knowledge and
private information.
The latter leads to
Asymmetric information, or
Asymmetry of information.
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Quality
Density
Akerlof model: the market for lemons.
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Adverse selection as a hidden information problem.
Moral hazard as a hidden action problem.
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Signaling
Two roles of education:To raise and to distinguish
Productivities
Spence model
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$ C(Y) for L
wage system
C(Y) for H
Y* Y
Best Choice of L, and of H
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Graph to show separating equilibria
and pooling equilibria.