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Chapter 4

PRACTICAL FIELD TEST AT SAN DIEGO TROLLEYComparing Security Perceptions and Storefront Patrol at

Santee and El Cajon Stations

The San Diego Trolley is in many ways representative of the renaissance of rail transitin the United States. This light rail system was one of the first built during the moveback to rail transit as an important mode of urban transportation. San Diego is aregional hub city along the California-Mexico border, occupying an important niche inboth the cross-border and Pacific Rim economies.

Its light rail system—the San Diego Trolley—is operated by the San Diego Trolley, Inc.,a wholly owned subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transit Development Board (MTDB), apublic agency responsible for stimulating transit system growth and usage in theMetropolitan San Diego area. The Trolley, as it is generally referred to by residents,serves a diverse, multi-ethnic community. It moves people from the suburbs to SanDiego's Central Business District, and from the CBD to the busy Mexican bordercrossing at San Ysidro. Its riders include commuters, students on their way to school,tourists, and shoppers.

BACKGROUND

The East Line brings commuters from San Diego's eastern suburbs into the centralcore. Opened in 1986, the East Line was extended to El Cajon in 1988. A 3.6-mileextension to Santee, costing $109 million, was opened in August 1995.

After a March 18, 1995 murder approximately three blocks from the Trolley's EastLine's Lemon Grove Station, MTDB commissioned a security survey of Trolleypatrons.1 The 2,220 patrons, who were polled at 16 East and South line parking lotsspecifically about Trolley security, gave the system a mixed review. One-third of the

1 Jo Moreland, "East County line seen as riskiest," Daily Californian, May 31, 1995.

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respondents cited the East Line as the place where most security problems occurred.

But the survey also noted that while feelings of safety declined at public placesthroughout the region, Trolley patrons felt safer on-board trains and at stations thanthey did while using ATM machines or while in downtown San Diego. Nevertheless,the patrons surveyed viewed Trolley security funding as their number one issue.

Longtime Trolley riders favored funding for security enhancements over systemimprovements.

Storefront security or police offices were explored as a security option in light of the

public reaction to the March murder. Two stations on the East Line, El Cajon andSantee, provide an interesting contrast in the interaction between security and thecommunity on a public transit system. Both stations currently employ storefrontoffices.

For this Practical Field Test, a storefront office is defined as a location where police orsecurity personnel are stationed to facilitate interaction with the public through highvisibility and accessibility. A storefront is distinguished from a sub-station, which

generally has a higher level of support facilities and a supervisory or command andcontrol element which can dispatch officers to respond to calls for service, process andtemporarily house prisoners, and accept complaints of officer misconduct, among otherduties.

The Santee storefront is staffed by community sheriff's deputies, while the El Cajonstorefront utilizes "MTS Security" officers. The Santee storefront was the first to open,with the opening of the station itself on August 26, 1995. In the wake of positive publicreaction to the Santee effort, the El Cajon storefront was instituted to combat an

ongoing security problem at that station.

This study contrasts the experiences at each site.

TROLLEY SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

The MTDB has periodically gauged security perceptions regarding the San DiegoTrolley. Drawing upon the experience of the San Diego Association of Governments

(SANDAG), periodic surveys measuring security perceptions of Trolley riders and SanDiego residents are conducted.

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In a December 1992 report recounting a survey of transit patrons conducted inNovember 1992, SANDAG reported that 89 percent of riders rated safety on-board theTrolley as good or average. Security at Trolley stations was rated as good or averageby 79 percent of the respondents, while 77 percent rated security at station parking lotsas good or average. When asked to rate their feelings of safety on the system, 80percent of those riders said they felt safe on-board the Trolley, and 63 percent said theyfelt safe at Trolley stations. Almost one-quarter noted a need for improved security atstations and parking lots and advocated additional funding for security personnel.2

In its November 1993 survey report, SANDAG recounted a September 1993 survey ofSan Diego residents that combined both transit users and non-users. The 1993 surveyshowed that 60 percent of the respondents felt safe on-board, while only 47 percent feltsafe at stations. Concerning the East Line, 53.8 percent of respondents felt it was safe;37 percent felt it was unsafe.3

In the 1993 survey, SANDAG observed that public transit users generally found theTrolley and its stations to be safer than did non-users. Of the respondents who foundthe system unsafe, 47.4 percent based their perception on news reports, 37 percentbased their perception on personal experience, and 25.5 percent based their perceptionon the experience of acquaintances. SANDAG believed this indicated that newscoverage of crimes or negative events on public transit plays an important role informing negative impressions of safety on-board the Trolley and at Trolley stations.

SANDAG analysts also observed that transit users were more likely to base transitsecurity perceptions on personal experience, while non-users tended to base theirs onnews reports. Rumors and the perception of safety in the areas proximate to Trolleylines were also cited as factors in respondents' perceptions.

The impact of crime in areas adjacent to the Trolley may influence both patron andnon-patron perceptions of security, particularly at stations. An October 1992 analysisof crime trends in the San Diego region by SANDAG found that "for most types ofcrimes, including violent crimes and malicious mischief, the largest increases haveoccurred within 1/8 mile of Trolley stations." Accordingly, SANDAG observed that this

2 SANDAG, December 1992.

3 SANDAG, November 1993.

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preliminary data supports an enhanced focus on enforcement and security within a 1/8

mile radius of Trolley stations.4

TROLLEY SECURITY EFFORTS

The San Diego Trolley has a unique approach to transit security. While the system hasauthority to establish its own police force, or retain a dedicated contract lawenforcement provider, it has not opted to exercise either alternative. Rather, the Trolleysecurity package includes armed contract security officers, unarmed public code

enforcement officers, and contracts with off-duty peace officers to patrol the system. Inaddition, the system's security administration works to stimulate a variety of system-centered efforts by jurisdictional police agencies.

Security Officers

The system contracts with a private security vendor to provide armed, uniformed patrolof the system and its property. These security officers wear distinctive uniforms with an

"MTS" (Metropolitan Transit Service) emblem and their supervisors drive marked "MTSSecurity" vehicles. There are sixty-five security officers authorized in addition to the 27Code Compliance Inspectors described in the next section.

Trained to the state standard for security officers, including familiarization with the lawsof arrest required by California Penal Code Section 832, these officers can make privatepersons arrests for crimes which occur in their presence. In California, security officershave no authority to issue citations. They are regulated by the California Department ofConsumer Affairs, which requires familiarization with the laws of arrest, firearms and

weapons (baton) training, as well as first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)training. These officers currently receive no transit or Trolley specific training.

The security officers' primary function is patrolling to serve as a visible deterrent to

crime and disorder. Both supervisors and officers have system surveillance duties.

4 See SANDAG, October 1992; this analysis evaluated changes in FBI, Uniform Crime Report Index Crimesreported to San Diego's Automated Criminal Justice Information System (ARJIS) by nine municipal policedepartments and the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. The incidence of crime at specific distances fromTrolley stations was assessed from 1987 through 1991.

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Supervisors, who are also responsible for monitoring security officers and maintainingliaison with local law enforcement, patrol in marked vehicles.

Security officers patrol on foot. These foot patrols are primarily train patrol and fixed sitepatrols of passenger station and park-n-ride areas. The objective at fixed posts isincreased quality-of-life enforcement.

If a quality-of-life violation is observed, the violator may be warned, ejected from thesystem, or held while the security officer calls a law enforcement officer or CodeCompliance Officer to the scene to issue a citation. During train patrol, the officers alsoperform fare compliance duties. In either case, since the security officers have nocitation authority, they must either eject the violator or call upon the system's CodeCompliance Officers, local police, or Sheriff's deputies5 to issue citations (formallyknown as a Notice to Appear under California law).

In addition to these functions, two security officers are permanently assigned to revenueprotection duties, that is, safeguarding cash collections from the system's ticket vendingmachines (TVMs). The system security administration encourages a high degree ofinteraction between the contract MTS Security officers and the Code ComplianceOfficers.

Code Compliance Officers

The system's Code Compliance Officers (CCOs) are public officers (thus able underCalifornia law to issue citations for infractions—including both fare and quality-of-lifeviolations). They form the system's primary transit enforcement arm. Currently, twenty-four Code Compliance Officers are allocated to the system. The CCOs are equippedwith hand-held radios, Mace for personal protection, and handcuffs. They carry noweapons, but receive instruction in officer safety techniques.

Code Compliance Officers perform fare inspection (the system utilizes a barrier-free,proof-of-payment fare framework), quality-of-life enforcement, and parking enforcementat the system's park-n-rides.

5 In California the Sheriff is the county law enforcement officer, while police are municipal entities. Both Sheriff'sdeputies and municipal police officers are peace officers under California law, deriving their authority throughSection 830.1 of the California Penal Code.

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When a fare or quality-of-life violation is observed, the violator may be verbally warned

or issued a written warning notice, ejected from the system, or issued a citation. Nospecific provisions are in place for addressing repeat violators. When a person fails toappear (known as an FTA) in court for Trolley infractions, the no-shows are referred to acollection agency for collection and a civil penalty for the FTA. This approach was

developed to replace the criminal warrant process, which became unworkable due tojail overcrowding.

Training provided to CCOs currently consists of an in-house orientation which includes

instruction in the MTDB's manual of policy and procedures, the MTDB administrativecode (including MTDB ordinances), familiarization with citation and report writing, andfamiliarization with court procedures and testifying. CCOs also receive training in firstaid and CPR, a two-hour class in the use of Mace, an eight-hour defensive tactics and

handcuffing course, and a forty-hour powers of arrest (832 P.C.) course from externalproviders.

New officers are assigned to work with a senior officer for a flexible time period after

pre-service training to hone their skills. Pre-shift briefings provide an opportunity toreview procedures and reinforce officer safety information. Officers are reminded tooffer assistance to all Trolley patrons, including the large number of occasional usersattracted to the San Diego area.

The transit security administration is currently working with the California Commissionon Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) toward the development of a POST-certified transit enforcement and security curriculum for Code Compliance Officers andcontract security officers assigned to the Trolley.

An informal collaboration between these two "security" entities has existed for manyyears. Recently, the system security administration has formalized these efforts,arranging formal joint efforts. Currently, the contract security officers frequently team up

with Code Compliance Officers for system patrols and fare enforcement efforts.Supervisory security officers and Code Compliance Officers meet once a month tofurther such interaction and coordinate efforts. The two sets of patrolling officers havealso been encouraged to work together more closely as a way to address patrons'

concerns about safety on-board the Trolley and in stations.

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Off-Duty Officers

In addition to the above efforts—which form the foundation of the Trolley's securityprogram—the system utilizes the services of off-duty peace officers to supplementsecurity and code compliance efforts. These officers are obtained through a vendor

and are generally off-duty San Diego area police officers or Sheriff's deputies.Currently, two officers are deployed on the Trolley and two are deployed on SanDiego Bus.

These officers work in plainclothes, providing directed patrol in response to specificproblems (such as juveniles pulling emergency stop cords). While they receive nospecific transit training, these officers are provided pre-shift briefings by Trolley transitsecurity administration staff. The purpose of these briefings is to set targeted patrol

objectives.

Typical duties include station surveillance at high profile "gang" stations (such asstations with a high visibility street gang presence) and train patrol at known trouble

spots during school travel hours. These officers are encouraged to take positive actionup to and including arrests, with an emphasis on transit incidents, especially vandalism.When required to attend court for Trolley-related arrests, the officers are paid by thevendor which in turn recoups the expense from the MTDB.

In response to transit security concerns within the city of San Diego, the San DiegoPolice Department began providing uniformed saturation patrols on city segments ofthe Trolley in the spring of 1996. The goal is to provide high visibility patrols whenpossible on Thursday and Friday evenings. The San Diego Police attempt to place

between four and six uniformed officers on each of two shifts (11:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.and 6:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.). These officers work closely with Trolley Code ComplianceOfficers.

MEASURING TROLLEY CRIME AND DISORDER

The MTDB currently tracks its own enforcement activity. This includes citations issuedby CCOs for fare and quality-of-life violations, as well as crimes or incidents reported to

CCOs or system security officers.

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A mechanism for capturing all crime occurring on the system or in its facilities doesnot exist. Local law enforcement agencies, which have police jurisdiction on thesystem, handle incidents, make arrests, or process reports of crime on the system. Nouniversal, formal mechanism for cross-reporting of transit crime data exists. Eachagency makes its own report, but separate tracking categories for transit crime are notin place. Trolley stations and lines fall within broader reporting districts within eachjurisdiction, but their specific location is not distinctly identified. Once crime data areentered into automated data bases (generally designed to meet state and federalUniform Crime Report guidelines, neither of which separately track transit events),they are difficult to recover. As a result, the full extent of transit crime or disorder is notknown.

Of course, this is not unique to the Trolley. Much the same situation exists throughoutthe United States. Transit security and police seek to overcome these structuralobstacles to precision analysis in a variety of ways. For example, MTDB tracks its ownactivity or incidents where CCOs or security officers are present and periodicallyresearches statistics at individual stations when problems6 become known.

Trolley CCOs also have the ability to query the regional Automated Criminal JusticeInformation System (ARJIS) for information about offenders and specific incidents.Moreover, CCOs and security officers encourage patrons who are victimized to reportthe incident to the local law enforcement agency; in turn, local police encourage victimsto advise MTDB. Of course, not all victims do so, resulting in a potential leakage ofsome transit crime data.

MTDB currently tracks its activity by hand, and is exploring development of anautomated system for tracking in-house activity by Code Compliance Officers, securitypersonnel, and off-duty officers assigned to the Trolley. In addition, ARJIS is currentlybeing updated to provide enhanced tracking and analytical capabilities. Theseenhancements will include provisions for capturing and tracking crimes at Trolleystations, on-board trains, and on the Trolley right-of-way. As a result, more precisedata will be available in the future, with implementation of these features slated for1997.

6 Problems are defined as a cluster of individual criminal or non-criminal incidents that impact patron security orthe quality-of-life within the system.

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EXPERIENCES AT THE SANTEE AND EL CAJON STATIONS

The security experience at these two stations provides an interesting case study fortransit police and security planners.

The El Cajon Station is perhaps the system's most blighted. A storefront securityoffice was added as a remedial effort. The Santee Station, conversely, is one of itsnewest, incorporating sound Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design(CPTED) concepts and an on-site storefront Sheriff's community office from itsinception.

The actual trolley platforms at both stations are designated "fare paid zones." As part ofa systemwide effort to maintain order, signs are posted restricting access to platformareas to persons in possession of proper proof-of-fare payment.

El Cajon Station

The El Cajon Station (formally the El Cajon Transit Center) is one of the system's mostproblematic stations. The center is located within the city of El Cajon, which has its ownpolice department. El Cajon Police occasionally patrol on-board Trolley vehicles andhave jurisdiction for response to incidents at the station.

The Transit Center consists of a two-platform trolley stop, a park-n-ride lot, and awaiting room/station building. Formerly open twenty-four hours per day, the building isnow open for only twelve hours (5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) each day. Security officers areposted at the facility twenty-four hours per day, but the center's waiting room is onlyopen during the twelve-hour period. The station/transit center building houses aGreyhound bus ticket office (open from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) and a waiting area.

A recent addition is a storefront-type "Transit Enforcement Office" staffed by a contractMTS Security officer. The center's restrooms are permanently closed due to severevandalism. Portable toilets outside in the parking lot have taken their place. Graffiti,etched windows, and dim lighting complete the interior ambience.

Etched windows, such as those found at the El Cajon Station, have become especiallycommon throughout southern California and are spreading to transit propertiesthroughout the country. They result when graffiti vandals carve their graffito into a

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Figure 4.1: The elevated El Cajon Station is not inviting to commuters.Figure 4.2: The Station's dark interior is marred by heavily etched windows.

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glass or plexiglass window, leaving a permanent, hard to remove symbol. These etchesare seen both on-board transit vehicles and at station facilities.7

Not only are etching devices easier to obtain than spray paint, an added benefit to thevandal is the increased difficulty in removing his or her mark. Paint or pen-basedmarkings can and frequently are removed daily—the Trolley even employs rovingcleaners to remove graffiti while the trains are in service. Etchings are harder toremove. Often the window must be removed and replaced. New plastic window liners(known as "sacrificial film") are now available to limit damage to train and bus windows.The liner can be changed, while the window remains unmarred.

While only a small number of serious crimes are known to have occurred at the center,the center itself visually reinforces perceptions of fear. Table 4.1 summarizes crimesknown to MTDB officials which have occurred at the station. (All data have beenprovided by the MTDB security administration.)

Table 4.1: Crimes Known to MTDB;June 1990 - February 1996

Against Persons Against Vehicles

Robbery 4 Theft 22

Assault 4 Theft (attempt) 6

Battery 7 Burglary 31

Stripping 30

Of course, this represents only the crimes known to the transit system. Additionalcrimes may be known to the local police; and it is expected a larger number are knownto their victims and assailants alone. While much of the actual crime picture potentiallyremains hidden, the visual signals of disorder—graffiti, vandalized fixtures, etchedwindows, litter, urine, and excreta—serve as a disincentive to potential transit patrons.As such, these subtle clues can act as precursors to serious crime.

7 Their rise is believed to correspond with laws banning the sale of spray paint to minors (persons under 18) andbanning the possession of spray paint by minors. Carving implements became easier to obtain, and possessingthem was not proscribed by law. This was remedied by Section 594.2 of the California Penal Code which nowprohibits minors from possessing such devices with the intent to inscribe graffiti.

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As part of the MTDB security administration's emphasis on combating disorder and anti-social behavior which compromises the quality of a patron's transit experience, thestorefront approach was exported from Santee to the El Cajon Station.

Despite the visible blight, it is clear that the transit enforcement office has improved thesituation, alleviating both the endemic disorder and confrontations that werecommonplace prior to the assignment of a routine security presence. Nevertheless,staffing constraints limit around-the-clock staffing, and total closure of the entire facilityis a potential remedy.

The actual—distinct from the psychological—costs of patron perception is real, so realthat the MTDB is considering demolishing the 80 x 25 foot building. The buildingoriginally cost $355,000 to construct and open; demolition costs are estimated at about$200,000.

Santee Station

The Santee Station opened on August 26, 1995. It has clear sightlines and a generallayout that obviously reflects the incorporation of CPTED concepts into its site plan. A"Sheriff's Trolley Storefront Sub-Station," actually a storefront office despite its name, islocated in a double-wide trailer in the park-n-ride. It has been there since the stationopened.

Santee has the lowest crime rate in San Diego County. Prior to opening the station,SANDAG surveyed residents and businesses about the perceived impact of the stationon community crime. Residents overwhelmingly felt the station would have a negativeimpact, with 30 percent feeling their community would be much less safe and 49percent feeling it would be less safe. Business owners had similar concerns, with 25percent feeling the station would make the community much less safe and 45 percentfeeling it would make the community less safe.8

Citing concerns by residents that the Trolley would carry vandals, gang members, andvagrants to their quiet community, the Santee City Council decided to embrace aproactive approach to security at the station. In addition to the storefront office, staffed

8 SANDAG, July 1995. Respondents to the SANDAG survey included 453 households and 53 businesses in Santee.

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Figure 4.3: The Santee Station police trailer presents a positive image to patrons.Figure 4.4: A Sheriff's deputy meets each arriving Trolley.

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by a deputy paid for by 1994 federal crime law funds, the Council adopted ordinances to

prohibit aggressive panhandling, loitering, and sleeping in public places.

The storefront office is funded by the city of Santee (which contracts with the San DiegoSheriff's Department for police services). It is open between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and

9:30 p.m. on weekdays and 10:00 a.m. through 10:00 p.m. on weekends. It contains apublic information desk and a work area for sheriff's deputies. It is staffed by a deputyand a community service officer (a CSO is a civilian who handles non-confrontationalfunctions such as report taking, public information, parking citations, and the like). The

deputy will respond to calls for service in the surrounding area, but the facility is alwaysstaffed by the CSO.

Detectives in the proximate area are encouraged to utilize the storefront as a base of

operations. Many frequently do so since office supplies, computer terminals, facsimiletransmission machines, and telephones are available for their use.

The goal of the Santee storefront is to place high emphasis on quality-of-life issues and

order-maintenance, thus bolstering feelings of security, reducing fear, and limitingserious crime.

While detailed crime statistics and post-opening survey results are not yet available,

preliminary activity reports are encouraging. No serious crimes or incidents have beenreported at the site.9 Table 4.2 provides an overview of arrest activity at the SanteeStation.

9 Events and activity at the Santee Station are tracked in the handwritten activity log at the storefront. Nosignificant criminal incidents are noted.

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Table 4.2: Arrests at Santee Station;August 26, 1995 - March 26, 1996

Assault 1 Drunk in Public 4

Burglary 9 Truancy 4

Theft (attempt) 1 Evade Railroad Fare 5

Vandalism 3 Receive Stolen Property 1

Narcotic Offenses 22 Possess Burglary Tools 5

Weapons Offenses 4 Misc. Misdemeanors 14

This enforcement pattern is clearly consistent with an order-maintenance approach. Theexperience at the Santee Sheriff's Trolley Storefront shows that the early positivepresence and attention to quality-of-life concerns through vigorous order-maintenance

activities are successful. The Santee Station lacks the visual clues that signal legitimatetransit users that "disorder prevails."

Santee appears to confirm the value of initiating an order-maintenance effort as early aspossible in a transit system's development.

CONCLUSIONS

Why does the same approach have a different impact at each site? If visible and

accessible storefront offices are a valuable security tool, to what can one attribute thedifferential success at each of these two sites?

In both cases, a storefront office was implemented. At Santee, the storefront is staffed

by a combination of sworn and non-sworn general service law enforcement personnel(that is, Sheriff's deputies and community service officers), while at El Cajon staffing isprovided by non-sworn yet armed, contract security officers. Although it is beyond thescope of this overview to measure the relative benefits of these distinct staffing

approaches, this may be an area deserving future research.

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Perhaps the greatest difference between the two storefront experiences is the timing of

their implementation. The Santee storefront was a fixture of the Santee Station from thevery beginning. A clear commitment to site security was thus readily visible to allusers—patrons and potential assailants alike. The Santee storefront is also linked to on-going community crime control efforts, providing a unified, seamless approach. The El

Cajon storefront, conversely, was implemented late in the station's life, only afterdisorder and vandalism became rampant.

In both cases, the transit security administration is seeking to bolster the linkages

between these station-specific efforts and systemwide security endeavors. It will beinteresting to see how this focus progresses. Nevertheless it appears that initiation andintegration of security efforts at an early stage yield the greatest benefit to controllingdisorder at transit facilities.

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SOURCES

This study was constructed after site visits to the San Diego Trolley. Site visits to boththe Santee and El Cajon stations were conducted as were rides on both the East andSouth Lines. Discussions with transit security and operations personnel were combined

with researcher observations to frame extensive interviews conducted with key systemsecurity administration staff. In addition, various reports on security issues werereviewed, as were pertinent articles in area newspapers. Detailed sources are listedbelow.

Interviews

Chuck Lacy, Transit Security Administrator, Metropolitan Transit Development BoardJeff Martin, Senior Transit Planner, San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG)Dan Portuguez, Code Compliance Supervisor, Metropolitan Transit Development

Board

Reports

San Diego Association of Governments, "Survey of Santee residents and businessesregarding security perceptions and issues, final report," July 14, 1995.

San Diego Association of Governments, "MTDB area public opinion report," (Volume1—Report Summary), November 1993.

San Diego Association of Governments, "1992 trolley passenger opinion survey,"December 1992.

San Diego Association of Governments, "Analysis of crime trends for MTDB and SDTI,"October 1992.

Articles

Arner, Mark, "Security on trolley criticized," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 4, 1995.________. "Panel urges trolley to create a police force," San Diego Union-Tribune, July

9, 1995.________. "Trolley security firm attempting to derail a competitor's tryout," San Diego

Union-Tribune, August 11, 1995.________. "Rock-tossing vandals take their toll on trolleys as violent attacks climb," San

Diego Union-Tribune, November 28, 1995.

________. "Vandalized transit site a concern in El Cajon," San Diego Union-Tribune,December 8, 1995.

Harpster, David, "Cops have new stop for trolley covered: Santee station's safetyaggressively maintained," San Diego Union-Tribune, September 21, 1995.

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Magee, Patti, "Law enforcement stepped up aboard trolley," Daily Californian,November 14, 1995.

Moreland, Jo, "Trolley crime down, violent crime up," Daily Californian, December 11,1994.

________."Trolley safety explored: Riders say storefront police offices may solvesecurity problem," Daily Californian, March 21, 1995.________. "East County line seen as riskiest," Daily Californian, May 31, 1995.________. "Trolley crime cut in half," Daily Californian, August 2, 1995.________. "Santee trolley station vows passenger safety," Daily Californian, August 25,

1995.________. "Santee has high hopes for trolley extension," Daily Californian, December

12, 1994."Off-duty officers hired by MTDB," San Diego Business Journal, August 29, 1994.Sosa, Ninette, "Rigida seguridad en el trolley de Santee," San Diego Hoy, August 29,

1995.Sturak, Craig, "Transit center's future in question," Daily Californian, December 8,

1995.

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Chapter 5

PRACTICAL FIELD TEST AT NYPDUniformed Officers Board Buses in Two Boroughs

New York City Transit (NYCT), one of five affiliates and subsidiaries of New York'sMetropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), is the largest transit system in the UnitedStates and one of the largest in the world. Rail and bus operations are divided into twoseparate departments—rapid and surface; policing arrangements have also differed.

Personnel of the Rapid Transit Operations (RTO) department operate and maintain 469subway stations and more than 6,000 subway cars in four New York City boroughs(Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx) serving a daily ridership of 3.5 million.The city's fifth borough has a rapid transit system of its own, Staten Island Railroad(SIR), a separate division of the MTA. A quasi-state agency, the MTA has responsibilityfor a significant number of metropolitan area bus routes, rail lines, and bridgesconnecting the five boroughs.

Personnel of NYCT's Surface Transit Operations (STO) operate and maintain the 233bus routes and 3,500 buses in all five boroughs, which operate daily on a twenty-fourhour basis. Bus ridership has been dropping annually; figures for 1995 show 460 millionriders, or, approximately 1.25 million daily compared to previous years' figures whichshow almost 1.5 million riders.

Although subway ridership increased in 1995 to a 21-year high, bus ridership continuedto decline. Transit officials credit the growth in subway ridership to increasingperceptions of safety—even during discretionary, non-rush hours.1 Ironically, some ofthe new subway riders seem to be coming from the buses, traditionally the preferredmode of transit for those fearful of riding the subway.

1 Gary Pierre-Pierre, "With fare up, subway use drops sharply: Ridership had reached a 21-year peak in '95,"New York Times, February 17, 1996, p. 25:5.

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While clogged streets, unlicensed and uninspected vans competing with city buses, thediscretionary nature of many bus trips, the rising fare, and the age and physicalconditions of the buses have contributed to ridership loses, many believe that customerperceptions of safety have also diminished. Reversing a two-decade-long trend, manytransit patrons now find the subway a safer, more hassle-free ride than the bus.

FEW OFFICERS RIDE THE BUSES

Anticipating this change in customer comfort levels and responding to an unusualsummer of violent bus crime, in late 1993 Michael F. O'Connor, then Chief of the NewYork City Transit Police Department (NYTPD), applied for a federal grant to fund 53uniformed officers to ride New York City Transit buses.

The Transit Authority maintained a separate Transit Police Department until April 2,1995, when the more than 4,500 members of that department were merged into theNew York City Police Department (NYPD). Even before the merger, though, policing ofthe city's buses and bus routes had been the duty of the NYPD. The Transit Police,except for a small Surface Crime Unit, were responsible only for policing the subwaysystem and other New York City Transit properties; a mission made clear by virtually allTransit Police literature, but often misunderstood by the riding public.

New Yorkers over the age of 40 may remember seeing uniformed police officers onbuses, but these sightings were of officers riding to or from their post assignments.Today these officers either walk to or are dropped off at their posts by marked policevehicles. Some officers also rode buses within their patrol areas to get to banks to cashtheir checks, a task now performed at virtually any corner with an ATM machine. Otherthan these and recent trips of convenience, NYPD officers were not assigned touniformed patrol on buses or along bus routes.

Although NYPD responded to calls for service originating on buses, the only scheduledpolicing of buses was conducted by the Transit Police Department's Surface CrimeUnit. This 60-officer group provided plainclothes, anti-crime patrols on buses,concentrating on routes that reported high levels of violent crimes, pickpocketing, orcertain sexual offenses that could easily occur undetected in crowded buses. In recentyears, Surface Crime officers were also responsible for stopping and summonsing theincreasing number of uninsured and unlicensed private vans operating along busroutes. No officers were assigned to uniform patrol of buses until January 1995, when

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28 officers, whose salaries were paid out of a $2.1 million grant to the Transit Policefrom the 1994 federal crime law, were added to the Surface Crime Unit.

THE GRANT-FUNDED OFFICERS

Initial indications were that these 28 officers would be involved in patrolling buses thatwere on school routes, somewhat similar to a successful Safe Passage subwayprogram.2 The Safe Passage initiative involves assigning an officer on each of 100trains serving 85 key schools at dismissal time, from 1:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. A uniformedofficer rides in one of the last three cars, providing a measure of safety not only to riderswho find the noisy youths threatening, but also to school-age riders themselves, whoare often fearful of the intimidating and harassing behavior of students from their own orother schools.

Although the Transit Police grant request for these officers highlighted plans toeventually assign 200 uniformed officers to patrol buses, the April 1995 merger of theTransit Police Department into the New York City Police Department altered theseplans. In addition, only 28 of the requested 53 officers were funded for the first year ofwhat was viewed as a three-year project to reach a total of 200 officers assigned to ridebuses. At the time of this Practical Field Test, the 28 officers were funded for a total ofthree years, but no additional officers had been added or were anticipated.

THE SUMMER OF 1993

The original grant to fund uniformed officers to patrol the city's buses had beenmotivated by a series of unusual bus crimes in 1993 that seemed to bring to life tales ofthe old West and stagecoach and train robberies. Events included three teenagersboarding a bus in Queens and firing a number of shots as they robbed 22 passengersand escaped with cash and jewelry. Even the Transit Authority's media spokesmancould not help referring to the event as "a 1993 version of the great stagecoachrobbery."3 Although the teens were arrested within days of the heist, the TransitAuthority stated publicly that there were only 50 transit officers assigned to buses to

2 Ralph Gardner Jr., "Parent & child: Protecting children going to school," New York Times, December 15, 1994,

p. C1:1-2.

3 Mike Koleniak and Jim Nolan, "Teen bandits open fire in bus heist," New York Post, July 31, 1993, p. 5:1-4.

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"assist the NYPD" since the TA "didn't have the manpower to patrol" the buses.4

Moreover, it was not assigned this task.

While this robbery did not result directly in copycat crimes, the summer of 1993 did littleto enhance patron perceptions of safety on the buses. Other crimes that were cited inChief O'Connor's request for federal funding included: a bus hijack in upper Manhattanduring which the bus travelled approximately 30 blocks before the hijacker fled; therobbery of a woman boarding a bus in Queens; another robbery during which a femalepassenger was assaulted; and a robbery in Brooklyn during which three young menboarded a bus and removed gold chains from a female patron. A series of crimesagainst drivers were also recorded, although, amazingly, there were no serious injuriesto either drivers or passengers in any of the incidents during which weapons weredisplayed.

These spectacular events tended to overshadow the daily quality-of-life violations thathad become commonplace on buses. In addition to graffiti and vandalism, loud musicand marijuana and/or regular smoking provided symptoms of a lack of control on thesystem. Passengers were also exposed to intoxicated, often noisy passengers and tothose who appeared disoriented or emotionally disturbed, often haranguing drivers orspecific passengers for no apparent reason.

To minimize these problems, the New York City Police Department assigned the 28funded officers to enforcement efforts on buses.

THE PRACTICAL FIELD TEST

This Practical Field Test compared reported incidents for a three-month period on twobus lines that received enforcement attention from the funded officers with reportedincidents on the same lines during the same three months for the prior two years.

The officers who participated in this test are assigned to the 58-officer Bus Unit, asection of the Surface Transportation Enforcement District, one of seven units thatcomprise the Traffic Control Division of the New York City Police Department. TheBus Unit, therefore, is not a part of the Transit Bureau, which has inherited most of thework and personnel of the former Transit Police Department. The majority of the

4 "Bus bandits still sought," New York Newsday, August 1, 1993, p. 38:1.

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officers assigned to the Bus Unit, including the lieutenant in charge during the PFT,were former Transit Police officers. This is becoming less so, as officers replacing thosewho retire or transfer may come from either the city police or the former Housing PoliceDepartment, the third party in the merger agreement. While the staffing of the Bus Unitwas not the subject of this study, it is interesting that it is one of the first since themerger that is becoming truly integrated at the officer rank.

The 28 funded officers, all of whom worked in uniform, were augmented by others fromthe unit, who may have been assigned in either uniform or plainclothes to either markedor unmarked police vehicles and who may have been concentrating on trafficenforcement in and around bus stops rather than on actual enforcement on the buses.For this reason, the activities of the entire unit were not considered a part of the PFT.

Because of the large number of police officers involved in this test as well as the largenumber of buses on the selected routes on a daily basis, the test involved two distincttypes of "bus boardings."

Bus Rides

A "bus ride" was defined as a police officer riding a bus from one point to another,getting on at one stop and riding at least until the next official bus stop. Officers werenot required to fill out any trip sheets, so the only way to determine the number andlength of rides would have been a daily review of their memo books. Such a reviewwould have been unwieldy, since memo books contain far more than recordings of anofficer's police activities (meal and personal requests, for example). Thus, the actualnumber and duration of rides were not tallied.

Bus Checks

A "bus check" was defined as an officer getting on a bus at a bus stop and getting offbefore the bus departed from that stop. This technique is common in areas where largenumbers of children board buses after school hours. Officers checking a bus aremandated to complete a "Public Bus Inspection Report," which requires them to record,for each check, the route and bus number, time of check, the operator's name and IDnumber, the location at which they checked the bus, and any remarks. Officers are notrequired to complete a specific number of checks (a policy instituted in San Francisco in1996) but are encouraged to check buses regularly as time permits.

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Figure 5.2: Bus riding is a new tactic in NYPD's quality-of-life enforcement.Figure 5.3: An NYPD officer assists a bus patron.

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SELECTING THE ROUTES

Because of the size of New York City's bus system, it was decided to limit thisPractical Field Test to two matched bus routes, neither of which operated in theborough of Manhattan. Among the criteria considered were that the matched lineswould:

• Travel within two different boroughs

• Travel through identifiable communities representing a number of socio-economic levels

• Travel past a number of New York City public high schools and have high levelsof student ridership

• Travel past at least one private high school

• Travel past at least one public or private college or university

• Have as a terminal or interim destination at least one well-known shoppingdistrict within the borough

A number of considerations played a role in the decision to exclude Manhattan, all ofwhich were based on the view that few of its routes met the criteria of the experiment.Many travel primarily through business areas, do not travel through solely residentialareas, or do not adjoin schools, which meant that the common nationwide mix of busriders (primarily teenagers and older riders on discretionary trips) would be missing.

Of the 133 routes within the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens, two were selected due theirclose match on each of the listed criteria.

The Bx12, which operates mainly within Bronx County, commences in the Inwoodsection of upper Manhattan (207th Street and Broadway) and travels through middle-class, family-oriented neighborhoods, and through a number of lower-income, primarilyminority (often Hispanic) areas, ending at Barstow and Edson Avenues near Co-op Cityand the Bay Plaza Shopping Center in the Bronx. The route is extended in the summermonths to provide service to Orchard Beach in the Bronx. Riders include students fromfour public high schools, three Roman Catholic high schools, one college and oneuniversity. In addition, the Bx12 travels for much of its route along Fordham Road, amajor shopping area for Bronx residents. The Bx12 travels through five New York Citypolice precincts, with a wide range of reported crime within them. Precincts include the45, 47, 49, 50, and 52.

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The B41 route travels from Kings Plaza in Brooklyn to the borough's downtownbusiness district. In addition, the B41 travels for much of its route along FlatbushAvenue and stops at Kings Plaza, a major shopping mall that attracts patrons arrivingand departing by bus as well as by private auto patrons. Riders include students fromfour public high schools, two public lower schhols, one Roman Catholic prep school,and one college. The B41 travels through six New York City precincts, with a widerange of reported crime within them. Precincts include the 63, 67, 70, 71, 78, and 84.

Table 5.1 explains the demographic information used to match the two routes.

Table 5.1: Comparison of the Two Selected Bus Routes;Bx12 and B41

CHARACTERISTICS Bx12 B41

Length of route (miles) 8.20 7.25

Number of daily trips 476 680

Daily ridership 35,000 35,000

Number of buses daily 35 57

Hours of operation 24 24

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF POLICE VISIBILITY

To determine reported incidents on or along the routes of these lines, Bus Briefs forFebruary, March, and April of 1994, 1995, and 1996 were tallied. Bus Briefs are therecords of all incidents reported into the Transit Authority dispatch center by drivers.They differ considerably from police incident reports, in that they include a large numberof situations that do not involve police response and for which the police are nevercalled.

Types of incidents might include an object thrown at a bus from the street in which thedriver cannot identify from where the item was thrown, vandalism to a bus where thedriver is unable to identify the vandal(s), mechanical problems with the bus (flat tire,overheating, and the like), or an aided or injury case in which the passenger declinesmedical attention and leaves the bus unassisted or continues on his or her trip.

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Police and Transit Authority officials estimate that about 200 daily Bus Briefs

(approximately 9 percent of the daily total) are criminal incidents, ranging from those towhich police are not called to those in which arrests are made. At the initiation of thePFT, consideration was given to comparing the Bus Briefs with crime reports filed in theprecincts through which the buses travelled. Because of the large number of precincts

involved, as well as the inability of the basic police incident report to fully capturewhether or not an incident was related to a bus ride, this portion of the experiment wasdiscontinued.

New York City, along with most cities, lacks the capability to fully record transit-relatedcrime because its basic incident report asks an officer merely to indicate whether thelocation is or is not visible from the street. On May 1994, a Transit Police OperationsOrder informed members of the department that the New York City Police Department

would begin altering its incident report to better track bus-related crime. Even with thischange, though, there is no specific mechanism to prompt an officer to inquire whetherthe victim may have been waiting for a bus or had ridden a bus anytime prior to thecrime being reported. This would be particularly useful, for example, in missing property

reports than might in fact be pickpocketing crimes or in assaults that might haveoccurred in or around a bus shelter, particularly if the victim was waiting for or had justexited a bus.

Figure 5.3 is a completed Bus Brief reporting an object having been thrown at andstriking the right side windshield of a bus on the B41 line on April 28, 1996 at 6:15 p.m.(shown on the Brief in military time of 18:15).

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Figure 5.3Sample Bus Brief

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Table 5.2 and 5.3 present the figures on selected incidents on Bx12, the Bronx route,

and the B41, the Brooklyn route, respectively. The data are derived from Bus Briefs forFebruary, March, and April of 1994, 1995, and the 1996 test period.

Table 5.2: Comparison of Selected Bus Briefs, BX12February - April 1994, 1995, and 1996

5 Because the crime category for an object thrown at a bus may differ depending on a number of circumstancessurrounding the crime, and because the source and intent of the missile is often unknown, items thrown at or striking abus are labeled "missile." In those instances when an arrest is made, the appropriate criminal charge is determined.

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Table 5.3: Comparison of Selected Bus Briefs, B41February - April 1994, 1995, and 1996

CONCLUSIONS

The nature of police work is such that the reliance on raw numerical data can often leadto false conclusions. In this case, though, numbers have been augmented by interviews

with some of the officers assigned to the test, permitting a richer analysis of the data.These conversations were supplemented by monthly meetings with the lieutenant incharge, who frequently patrolled with the grant-funded officers.

On both test bus lines, the number of incidents reported on Bus Briefs by driversdeclined considerably. Total incidents on the Bx12 fell from 63 in 1994 to 42 in 1995,

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to 19 during the 1996 test period, a total decline of 70 percent. Total incidents reportedon the B41 route increased from 84 in 1994 to 114 in 1995, and then decreased to 54during the test period. The two-year decline represents a 35.7 percent decrease; theone-year decline is an impressive 52.7 percent.

Criminal mischief, defined generally by the New York State Penal Law as intentionallydamaging property without the right or reasonable ground to do so, declined from 22incidents to 2 in the Bronx and from 14 to 6 incidents in Brooklyn. Officers reported thatdrivers attributed this decline to the presence of the officers during the high-trafficschool hour periods, when boisterous students are responsible for the majority ofcriminal mischief incidents.

What is striking about the figures, particularly in light of the 1993 concerns, is how littlemajor crime occurs on either of these routes, reinforcing the view that rider perceptionsof crime are often far in excess of actual criminal activity.

Moreover, this test reinforced the oft-described blase qualities of New York's bus riders.Surprisingly, none of the officers reported having patrons ask them why they wereboarding or riding the buses; nor did the change in policy receive any press coverage incitywide or neighborhood newspapers.

The lack of citywide coverage had been anticipated by the Police Department due to asmall, semi-official test that had assigned officers earlier in the year to ride or board abusy Manhattan bus line during its travels through midtown. Although this short testreceived high marks from drivers, there was no response—positively or negatively—from riders and no recognition by the press of the change, probably indicating that noone had contacted them asking why officers were riding buses.

This PFT provides a number of areas for further study, many of which would be moreeasily controlled on a smaller system. The ability to coordinate reports to the transitsystem with local police agency reports would provide a transit agency with amechanism to learn whether it is accurately capturing incidents occurring on itsproperty. Selecting one bus route that travels through a single police jurisdiction ormultiple jurisdictions that have a relatively low incidence of reported crime wouldfacilitate capturing this comparison data far more easily. In fact, such a test wouldprovide the opportunity for a meaningful partnership project between a transit agency'spolice or security department and local police department(s).

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This Practical Field Test also raised interesting questions pertaining to police orsecurity partnerships with drivers and their unions, many of which are demandingincreased uniformed presence for the safety of employees. Lastly, and, again,probably more feasible in a system smaller than New York's, customer perceptionsurveys might gauge whether patrons were aware of officers riding the bus (see theHouston PFT in this study for a markedly different perception result). It is also morelikely that local media in a smaller market would provide coverage of this type ofchange in policy, although this did not occur in Houston. It would be important totransit police and security managers, as well as operations managers, to knowwhether the knowledge that police or security officers were riding buses madepassengers feel more secure, or, on the other hand, whether it frightened them intobelieving that a serious crime problem was the reason for the change in policy. If thelatter proved true, managers would be faced with the contradiction that providing moresecurity results in patrons feeling less safe.

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SOURCES

This Practical Field Test was constructed after visits to the Traffic Control Division andto the Bus Unit, as well as site visits to the two target bus lines. Statistics are based onNew York City Transit Authority and New York City Police Department records. Inaddition, a project researcher was assigned to the Bus Unit to review and tally incidentson the two matched lines for the period of the three months of study and for the samemonths for the preceding two years.

Interviews

Deputy Inspector Vincent Kennedy, Traffic Control Division; Commanding Officer of theSurface Transportation Enforcement District, to which the Bus Unit reports

Lt. Richard Baggs, Commanding Officer, Bus Unit

Reports

Memorandum of Understanding Among the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, theNew York City Transit Authority and the City of New York on Merger of the NewYork City Transit Authority Police Department and the New York City PoliceDepartment, original document dated March 31, 1995.

New York City Transit Police Department, Police Hiring Supplement Program,December 1, 1994. (This is the grant proposal submitted to and funded by the U.S.

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, for 58 uniformed officers topatrol New York City's buses.)

Underground Under Control: The Transit Police Take Control of the Subway. 1994booklet (New York: NYCT, 1994.

Articles

"Bus bandits still sought," New York Newsday, August 1, 1993, p. 38:3.Gardner Jr., Ralph, "Parent & child: Protecting children going to school," New York

Times, December 15, 1994, p. C1:1-2.Koleniak, Mike and Jim Nolan, "Teen bandits open fire in bus heist," New York Post,

July 31, 1993, p. 5:1-4.Pierre-Pierre, Gary, "With fare up, subway use drops sharply: Ridership had reached a

21-year peak in '95," New York Times, February 17, 1996, p. 25:5.Singleton, Don, "Hijack of city bus thwarted by crowd," New York Daily News, August 5,

1993, p. 46:1-2.

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Chapter 6

PRACTICAL FIELD TEST AT HOUSTON METRO

Riding the Bus: Community Policing in the Transit Environment

The Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County in Houston, Texas, known asMETRO, was voted into existence in 1978 and began operation on January 1, 1979,providing bus service to metropolitan Houston and its surrounding area. Thedevelopment of METRO was tied to the "boomtown" development of Houston in the late1970s, when traffic jams were threatening to thwart additional growth and the bussystem was viewed as too old and untrustworthy to compete with private car travel.

Like so much of Texas and other southwestern states, METRO reflects the reality ofwide open spaces and a growth pattern based on building out rather than building up.Although downtown Houston boasts the Astrodome and a large number of high-riseoffice buildings, the dominant development pattern in Harris County has resulted inMETRO covering a vast area of numerous overlapping governmental jurisdictions.

In 1973 the Texas State Legislature authorized creation of local transit authorities andpermitted voters to dedicate a special sales tax to subsidize public transit and providefor long-range mobility improvements. Five years later, the Houston area createdMETRO, whose service area includes all of the city of Houston, 14 additionalcommunities, and major portions of unincorporated Harris County.

In 1979, METRO began service with the aging fleet it inherited and 100 new buses.Today METRO, reflecting the geographic spread of its system, maintains a bus fleet of1,391 (including METRO-owned buses operated by private companies under contract),1,154 passenger shelters, more than 10,000 bus stops, 125 bus routes, 23 park-and-ride routes each with an accompanying park-and-ride lot (total parking spaces are26,089), and 14 transit centers that are transfer points for riders who must use morethan one bus to get from their originating point to their final destination.1

1 All figures are as of November 30, 1994 and taken from METRO Facts, except for the number of bus stops,which comes from Discover METRO: A Guide to Using METRO.

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The system covers 3,000 route miles, crisscrossing a 1,279-square-mile area extendingfrom downtown Houston to a number of suburban areas. Bus ridership has increasedfrom 33 million annual passenger trips (not boardings) in 1979 to more than 58 million in1995.

In an attempt to further accommodate the relatively large distances passengers mustoften travel on the system, METRO has devised three distinct types of routes. Local busservice, serving mostly city streets, stops at every other corner along the route. Thebasic, one-way adult fare is $1.00, although METRO provides a large number of fareoptions and discounts in all its fare categories. Express buses stop less often than dolocal buses and frequently make use of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes to offerfaster service to downtown. The basic, one-way fare is $1.50. Lastly, speciallydesignated park-and-ride buses provide nonstop service between the park-and-ride lotsand downtown Houston, the Texas Medical Center, and two major shopping malls.Fares vary depending on distance.

METRO also encourages travel pools through its RideShare and METROVanprograms, a Subscription Bus program, and "Guaranteed RideHome" which allows busor van users who require home emergency transportation three trips a year whencertain emergencies must be tended to and regularly scheduled transportation isunavailable.

In recognition of the fact that even this large variety of public transit patterns will notmeet the needs of all commuters, METRO also maintains approximately 70 miles ofHOV lanes (barrier-protected and usually in the median of a freeway). The lanes arereserved for buses, vanpools, and carpools in an attempt to speed vehicular trafficthrough the interstate highway network that winds through METRO's service area.Reversible to accommodate commuter traffic during peak periods, the lanes are usedeach workday by more than 80,000 people.2

THE METRO BUS SYSTEM AND ITS POLICE FORCE

METRO's approach to policing is somewhat unique. It is one of the few bus-onlysystems that maintains its own police department and is the sole transit agency whose

2 METRO Facts; METRO: A Promise to the Community. Additional HOV lanes are expected to be in operationby the year 2000.

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police officers are also responsible for enforcement of all laws and regulationspertaining to the High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes that assist in traffic flowthroughout the city of Houston.

The Police Department was formed in 1982; three years after creation of METRO itself.It was the first such department in the state of Texas. Starting with a small force ofsecurity guards who initially lacked police powers, the department has grown rapidly,particularly in recent years. In 1992, the department had 85 officers; by 1996, thenumber has increased to close to 200 officers, all of whom are armed. All officers arecommissioned, with full police officer powers under the authority of Article 1118X,Vernon's Civil Statutes for the purpose of providing law enforcement and police servicesfor METRO's property, personnel, and patrons. Officers have the same powers of arrestas city police officers operating within their jurisdiction and are responsible forinvestigating all crimes occurring on METRO property, buses, and rights-of-way. ThePolice Department also has on its staff a small number of security officers who areassigned to corporate facilities. It also contracts with a private firm for security officersassigned to transit centers and park-and-ride lots. The annual police budget is justunder $14 million. Tom Lambert has been the chief since the department's inception; inanother unusual configuration, Chief Lambert is also the Assistant General Manager forMETRO.

Established specifically to address crime affecting both employees and patrons, thedepartment began with a philosophy of traditional reactive patrol. By 1987, it had shiftedto a more proactive, crime prevention focus. As early as 1988 (well in advance of themajority of transit police agencies), the department began contacting neighborhoodgroups to institute a Transit-on-Watch program. A multifaceted attempt to involve thepublic and civic groups in assisting METRO in reducing vandalism on the system,Transit-on-Watch includes adopt a shelter and adopt a transit center programs, a safehaven program, and a specific anti-vandalism program that involves rewards of up to$200 for those providing information that leads to the arrest and conviction of anyonewho has vandalized METRO property. Officers assigned to the Community ServicesUnit publicize these programs and also participate in a school outreach program whichteaches safety to students and makes them aware of the METRO code of conduct.Students are permitted to participate in the reward program.

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Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is also an integral part ofthe policing philosophy. A number of bus transfer points have been renovated based onCPTED principles and a number of other renovations are planned.

In 1993, the METRO Board of Directors took the unusual step of expanding the PoliceDepartment's responsibilities to include developing, implementing, and policing atraffic management program for area freeways and major thoroughfares.Approximately 40 METRO police patrol and enforce HOV routes and regulations,including all traffic laws; remove stalled or abandoned vehicles; assist strandedmotorists; investigate accidents; and develop traffic safety programs for the 200 milesof freeways, including approximately 70 miles of HOV routes (which account for80,000 passenger trips daily).

THE PRACTICAL FIELD TEST: DIRECTED BUS RIDING

Since its inception, the METRO Police Department has provided both plainclothes anduniformed foot patrol of downtown bus stops and directed vehicle patrol of parking lotsand transfer points. A number of parking lots and transfer points are also staffed byprivate guards who report to the police department.

Ridership surveys indicate that for many regular patrons, using the bus system is adiscretionary decision that can be highly influenced by both actual crime as well as theperception of an unsafe environment. For this reason, METRO Police have, for anumber of years, maintained a policy of periodically assigning plainclothes officers toride buses on routes with higher than average security risks to patrons.

Although patrons had previously suggested that uniformed officers, preferably policerather than security guards, ride the buses in uniform, the costs of such a programmitigated against its adoption. Because the idea remained under active considerationby Chief Lambert and his staff, the opportunity to test the benefits of and reaction toassigning a uniformed police officer to ride the bus formed the basis of this PracticalField Test.

Over a period of more than five months—from February 5 to July 19, 1996—auniformed police officer rode two selected buses for three hours (3:00 p.m. to 6:00p.m.), Monday through Friday, to examine this deployment tactic.

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To test actual changes in crime reports, patrons' and operators' perception of crime,and the general community relations value of an officer riding a particular bus line atspecified times, test conditions included:

• A uniformed officer assigned to directed bus riding beginning and ending at theSoutheast Transit Center for the hours of 3:00 to 6:00 p.m., Monday throughFriday. An unmarked van driven by a plainclothes officer trailed the officer in theevent he required assistance or transport due to observing an offense resultingin arrest. If the officer made an arrest during the course of the three-hour ridingperiod, rides were to be discontinued for that day

• The officer boarded bus line 52 (which travel primarily along Scott Boulevard),riding for any number of stops up to and including Holman Street, at which pointthe officer exited the bus, crossed the street, and awaited a bus returning to thetransit center

• The same officer boarded bus line 5 (which travels primarily along Griggs Road)riding for any number of stops up to and including Mykawa Street, at which timethe bus crosses a set of railroad tracks. The same procedure as outlined for line52 was followed by the officer

• The officer continued with these rides for the full three-hour period, recordingdistance ridden (by name of stop at which the officer exited and made thereturn ride), number of buses ridden, and time spent at Southeast betweenrides

The test called for the officer to use his discretion as to the number of stops to ridewithin the targeted area. This permitted the officer to become more involved in theproject. It also precluded concerns that the officer would ride an empty bus in amindless routine with little or no opportunity to interact with the riding public.

In addition to recording all police actions taken, the officer was required to record anycommunity-oriented, patron interactions, including: questions answered, crimeprevention information distributed, other information provided, community contactsmade, assistance rendered, and interventions which might not normally be recorded aspolice activity (such as patrons quieted, minor disputes adjusted, and the like). A form

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was devised by METRO to capture this information. (It is reproduced at the end of thePFT as Figure 6.1.)

No press announcement accompanied this PFT as a means of testing whether thepublic would indicate awareness of the change either by letters or telephone calls toMETRO or to the local media, or if the local media would discover the officer riding thebus and treat it as a local news story. Reactions from operators on the bus lines werealso obtained to gauge their perceived level of safety and whether they believe the busrides resulted in any changes in patron behavior.

The last experimental condition was the officer selected, who would be the only officerassigned to bus riding during the test period. The reason for this was the belief,ultimately substantiated, that potential benefits to bus riding were at least in partdependent on the personality of the officer assigned.

While at least theoretically all officers within a department are subject to identicalassignment, the recognition that this project contained elements of community policingled to selection of an officer who would support the program and who was willing tointeract regularly with riders (including school age-children, teenagers, and the elderly)and to establish a rapport with bus operators. Thus, the officer was not randomlychosen but was selected specifically by his commanding officer for his personality andhis past record of police and community activity.

The officer selected for the experiment held the rank of sergeant. To preclude anyunintended messages that his rank might have conveyed, Sgt. Carl Clark consentedto "become a police officer for the experiment," trading in his sergeant's badge andshirt with stripes for a police officer's badge and shirt. Those aware of the culture ofpolicing know that a sergeant riding a bus would send a message of supervision orinvestigation of wrongdoing either on the part of police officers or bus operators andwould also seem inappropriate to patrons familiar with military rank structures.Houston's size, as well as the size of the METRO Police Department, assured thatfew riders or operators would have interacted directly with Sgt. Clark and, therefore,would view his presence in a police officer's uniform as having negative implicationsabout him personally.

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Figure 6.2: Sgt. Carl Clark improved quality-of-life on the buses he regularly rode.Figure 6.3: Conditions at the Southeast Transit Center improved during the PFT.

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SELECTING THE ROUTES

Since this was to be a demonstration project, the routes and the times the officer wouldride the bus were selected to achieve maximum visibility.

Routes with the highest number of patron complaints were reviewed. Reinforcing priorresearch that only a few incidents are required to create a climate of fear for transitpatrons, none of the lines had reported any serious, violent offenses over the prior twoyears. Their designation as "crime prone" was more an indication of the small amount ofcriminal activity on the other lines than an indication of any serious crime on these lines.

The test centered on two bus lines operating from the same transit center. A majorreason for selecting two lines using the same transit center was to assure the presenceof the uniformed officer at that location before, between, and after directed busboardings and rides. It also provided a reporting place for the officer.

The Southeast Transit Center, which had the highest number of recorded incidents ofall transit centers for the period January through November 1995, was selected as thestarting point for the test. Two bus lines operating from it were paired for rides based onthe following similarities or contrasts:

• The 52 line had the seventh highest number of recorded incidents for the periodJanuary through December 1994 (the last full year of data at the time the testwas devised); travelled through a mixed-use, residential area, passed by onehigh school and two colleges, and carried a large number of high school andcollege students

• The 5 line, not listed among those with a high number of incidents, travelledthrough a commercial area and carried mostly adult riders

• The two lines do not intersect at any point, but the 5 line intersected at MartinLuther King Boulevard with the 77 line (which had the highest number ofreported incidents in 1994)

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MEASURING POLICE ACTIVITY

As anticipated by METRO management, traditional measures of police activityprovided only a small picture of the experiment's results. Although the numbersthemselves are quite small, they were viewed satisfactorily within the context of aproactive agency that is very conscious of servicing its patrons and of raising itsprofile within the community.

Table 6.1 provides a summary of the actual time spent by the uniformed officer eitherriding the bus or patrolling the transit center or stops along his designated route. It alsoreviews his activities based on the traditional police measurements of arrests,summons, and warnings issued.

Table 6.1: Summary of Activities; February - July 1996

Number of buses ridden 839

Time spent riding buses 106 hours, 13 minutes

Time spent at route locations3 208 hours, 14 minutes

Number of patrons on buses 21,625 (officer's count)

Arrests 13

Class C citations4 issued 2

Warnings for Class C violations 304

None of the thirteen arrests were for violent crimes or crimes against patrons oroperators. The most serious offenses were six arrests for possession of marijuana; allother arrests were for such quality-of-life offenses as public intoxication and urinating inpublic. Reinforcing the view that active quality-of-life enforcement results in feweroccurrences of these offenses over time, six of the thirteen arrests made during the PFToccurred during the first month of patrol. The final two marijuana possession and

3 Route location is defined as either the transit center or a bus stop along either of the two bus lines.

4 Class C citations are issued primarily for such violations of such city ordinances as drinking, littering, orobscene or abusive language in a public place. The most serious violations for which Class C citations may bewritten are simple assault (pushing or shoving) and petty theft of items valued at under $20.

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one crack cocaine possession arrests were made within 30 days of the start of thestudy. After that date, all subsequent arrests were for public intoxication.

The two Class C citations (one is a juvenile using abusive language, another to an adultfor the same infraction) were both issued within the first 30 days of the field test.

Warnings by the officer were either written or oral. An oral warning is, quite obviously,less serious than a written one. Yet, because the same officer rode the same buses, hisoral warning carried weight with those warned when they soon learned that he wouldreturn and that he remembered having spoken to them previously. Because of this, theoral warning, particularly for teenagers, came to be viewed as just as serious as awritten warning.

The number of warnings issued followed the identical pattern of the few arrests andcitations. The largest number of warnings were issued during the first month, when 111people were advised that their behavior was either illegal or a violation of codes ofconduct. By the second and third months, the number of people warned decreased toapproximately 70 each month. Thereafter the numbers continued to decline; by Julywarnings averaged slightly fewer than 1 per day.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN A TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT

The major findings of this experiment must be viewed within the context of communitypolicing. As shown above, the numbers of arrests, citations, and warnings were small incomparison to the number of patrons who observed the officer riding the bus. Onepolice officer riding two bus lines for only a short period of time was observed by morethan 21,600 patrons. He had at least minimal conversation with the operators of the 839buses he rode, as well as with other operators at the Southeast Transit Center. Inaddition, Sgt. Clark spoke with a large number of METRO supervisors and withadministrators of schools along the bus routes. He was also seen by numerousHoustonians picking up or dropping off riders at the transit center.

The discussion that follows, based on observations of the experiment monitors, theofficer who rode the buses, and his commanding officer, provides a deeper analysis ofthe test than the traditional activity measures of reactive policing.

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Sgt. Clark reported that his presence was initially viewed as a sign of trouble. Patrons,who were not accustomed to seeing a uniformed officer on board a bus unless therewas a problem, questioned him as to whether a violent crime had recently occurred.Operators were also cool, suggesting concern that they were being watched for farecollection or driving techniques.

Although previous customer surveys had indicated that a large percentage of riderswere aware of METRO's separate police department, Sgt. Clark was asked manyquestions similar to those answered by transit agency police around the nation. Patronswanted to know the officer's duties and powers; could he arrest people like the Houstonpolice; could he arrest people who were not on the bus or at bus stops? Patrons werealso unaware of a code of conduct that forbade eating, drinking, playing loud music,using abusive language, or littering on buses or at bus transfer points.

By midway through the test, attitudes toward the program became more positive. Someoperators began to solicit the officer to ride their bus, voicing disappointment when hedid not. Operators also reported noticing a change in patrons' conduct, especiallyamong young people riding the bus. Operators also reported, and patron commentssubstantiated, that fewer young people were loitering about the transit center. Womenparticularly commented on this since the groups of teenaged boys had often called tothem or generally made them feel uncomfortable.

The absence of the teenagers was not achieved by Sgt. Clark's presence alone. Heapproached the groups repeatedly, concentrating his efforts on learning what schoolsthey attended and why they were not in school. He met formally and informally withteachers and administrators in schools along his route, often changing buses at theschool stops both as a way of interacting with adults at the schools and also providingan unofficial "safe passage" program for adults as well as teens who may have beenintimidated by the unruly behavior of some of the school children.

The absence of loiterers was not the only environmental change at the SoutheastTransit Center and stops along the routes. Less debris was observed at stops andshelters, particularly after a more personal relationship between the officer and patrons,including the teenagers, began to develop.

Adult patrons told the officer they were more comfortable waiting for buses when hewas there. Patrons began to look for and expect the presence of the officer on a daily

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basis. They asked why more officers did not ride buses, and they suggested times androutes to which officers should be assigned.

Bus operators, initially suspicious of the officer's presence, came to view the officer asan ally. Many encouraged him to ride their particular bus or brought information to himof problems occurring along their routes, some of which he handled and many of whichhe referred either to other METRO officers, to the Houston Police Department, or toschool officials.

An unanticipated series of contacts occurred with shopkeepers along the two busroutes. Many of these individuals were unaware of METRO Police's existence until Sgt.Clark stopped in and encouraged them to report to him any problems that may havebeen caused by teenagers waiting for buses outside their stores. On at least oneoccasion, a store manager who observed the officer waiting at a bus stop asked him tocome into the store to discourage a group of youths the manager perceived to bepotential shoplifters. Sgt, Clark recognized the youths as regular bus patrons on theirway home from school and urged them to take the next bus with him, which they agreedto do.

Sgt. Clark also established positive relationships with a number of the young peoplewho had been perceived by bus operators as the major cause of the on-board rowdybehavior. Within two months of bus riding, Sgt. Clark began to chat regularly with manyof the male students. Some began to confide in him their fears of other students, usuallyfrom other schools, and to inform him in advance of any threats or potential problemsamong different groups of youths.

The types of relationships that Sgt. Clark established make up part of the classicdefinition by Robert Trojanowicz and David Carter of community policing, namely: "... aproactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crimes, disorder, and byextension, fear of crime, by intensely involving the same officer in the same communityon a long-term basis, so that residents will develop trust to cooperate with police byproviding information and assistance to achieve those three crucial goals."5

5 Robert Trojanowicz and David Carter, The Philosophy and Role of Community Policing, Community PolicingSeries No. 13 (East Lansing, Ml: National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, School of Criminal Justice,Michigan State University, 1988).

Figure 6.1: METRO Police Department PFT Daily Activity Log

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Figure 6.1: METRO Police Department PFT Daily Activity Log (continued)

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CONCLUSIONS

This Practical Field Test was deemed a success by METRO Police officials. Capt.Milton O'Gilvie, commanding officer of the Transit Services Bureau, described theexperiment as having created an "avoidance zone" for those who were unwilling toconform to METRO's rules or to use the system in a positive manner. This is similar tothe zero-tolerance policy that a number of rail agencies, particularly the WashingtonMetro Area Transit Agency (WMATA) and Atlanta's Metropolitan Regional TransitAgency (MARTA), have worked to enforce since their systems began operation. Thelarge number of buses operated by METRO makes a zero-tolerance policy impossibleto enforce, but temporary "avoidance zones," based on directed patrol in response toclusters of complaints, seem to have brought about the same results.

Chief Lambert also viewed the figures positively. Due to the high percentage ofdiscretionary riders on METRO buses, a nuisance-free environment has an effect quitesimilar to a crime-free one, since many passengers report that quality-of-life offensesare what keep them from riding buses regularly. Chief Lambert also termed theenforcement as cost effective for the Police Department's budget. Crimes and violationsthat do not occur represent a real dollar savings of the time off patrol for report writingand arrest processing that are often neglected in calculating the costs of traditionalpolice response to incidents and crimes.

Sgt. Clark raised the same issues. Listing the number and types of people with whomhe had contact and the different services he provided to each of these populations, hedescribed himself as a "mobile police storefront."

While the vast majority of transit agencies lack the staff to assign officers to multiple busor train rides and, therefore, have tended to use this assignment in a reactive way,usually only after receiving numerous complaints of specific crimes, this PFT suggeststhat agencies might assign one officer to one route for a specified period of time toprovide more proactive police services. The benefits of the officer's presence, onceoperators, patrons, and potential troublemakers were assured he would return regularly,became apparent within no more than two months. Using a three- or four-month, ratherthan six-month time period, even agencies whose staffing is thin, might considerassigning officers to particular problem routes as a way of preventing crime anddisorder and raising their own profile within the community.

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SOURCES

This study recounts a Practical Field Test (PFT) conducted by the METRO Police toassess the effectiveness of having a uniformed police officer ride two selected busroutes. The case study was constructed after site visits to the METRO system, includingsite assessments of the Southeast Transit Center, assessment of METRO policeincident reports and crime statistics, and interview with key police personnel.

Interviews

Tom C. Lambert, Assistant General Manager and Chief of Police, Houston MetropolitanTransit Authority METRO Transit Police

Captain Tim Kelly, Support Operations Commanding Officer, METRO Transit PoliceCaptain Milton O'Gilvie, Transit Services Commanding Officer, METRO Transit PoliceSgt. Carl Clark, METRO Transit Police

Reports

METRO Reports and MaterialsBus Operator Survey. Houston: METRO, 1995.Community Services Programs. Houston: METRO Police, 1995.Discover Metro: A Guide to Using Metro. Houston: METRO, 1996.METRO: A Promise to the Community: Houston: METRO, 1996.METRO Facts. Houston: METRO, 1996.METRO Police Freeway Management. Houston: METRO, 1996.Passenger Personal Security Report. Houston: METRO, 1992.

Article

"Houston METRO toots CPTED's horn," ENR: Engineering News-Record, February 19,1996.