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CHAPTER 5

THE MIZORAM ACCORD

5.1. INTRODUCTION

The origin of the Mizos, like those of many other tribes in North Eastern

India is shrouded in mystery. It is generally accepted that they appeared as a part

of the great Mongoloid wave of migration from China and later moved out to

India to their present habitat. It is possible that the Mizos came from Shinlung or

Chhinlungsan located on the banks of the river Yalung in China. They first settled

in the Shan State and moved on to Kabaw Valley to Khampat and then to the

Chin Hills in the middle of the 16th century.

The earliest Mizos who migrated to India were known as Kukis, the second

batch of immigrants were called New Kukis. The Lushais were the last of the

Mizo tribes migrate to India. The Mizo history in the 18th and 19th Century is

marked by many instances of tribal raids and retaliatory expeditions of security.

Mizo Hills were formally declared as part of the British-India by a proclamation

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in 1895. North and south hills were united into Lushai Hills district in 1898 with

Aizawl as its headquarters.

But folklore has an interesting tale to offer. The Mizos, goes the legend,

emerged from under a large covering rock known as Chhinlung. Two people of

the Ralte clan, known for their loquaciousness, started talking noisily while

coming out of the region. They made such an uproar that the leg god called

‘Pathian’ threw his hands in the air in disgust, and said “Enough is enough!” He

felt thattoo many people had already been allowed to step out and closed the door

with the rock.

History often varies from legends. But the story of the Mizos getting out

into open from the nether world through a rock opening is now part of the Mizo

fable. Chhinlung however, is taken by some as the Chinese city of Sinlung or

Chinlingsang situated close on the sino-Burmese border. The Mizos have songs

and stories about the glory of the ancient Chhinlung civilization handed down

from one generation to another powerful people. It is hard to tell how far the story

is true. It is nevertheless possible that the Mizos came from Sinlung or

Chinlungsan located on the banks of the river Yalung in China. According to

K.S.Latourette, there were political upheavals in China in 210 B.C. when the

dynastic rule was abolished and the whole empire was brought under one

administrative system. Rebellions broke out and chaos reigned throughout the

Chinese State. That the Mizos left China as part of one of those waves of

migration. Whatever the case may have been, it seems probable that the Mizos

moved from China to Burma and then to India under certain circumstances. They

first settled in the Shan State after having overcome the resistance put up by the

indigenous people. Then they changed settlements several times, moving from

the Shan State to Kabaw Valley to Khampat to Chin Hills in Burma. They finally

began to move across the river Tiau to India in the Middle of the 16th Century.

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The Shans had already been firmly settled in their State when Mizos came

there from Chhinlung around 5th Century. The Shans did not welcome the new

arrivals, but failed to throw the Mizos out. The Mizos had lived happily in the

Shan state for about 300 years before they moved on the Kabaw Valley around

the 8th Century. It was in the Kabaw Valley that Mizos got the opportunity to

have an unhindered interaction with the local Burmese. The two cultures met and

the two tribes influenced each other in the spheres of clothing, customs, music

and sports. According to some, the Mizos learnt the art of cultivation from the

Burmese at Kabaw. Many of their agricultural implements bore the prefix Kawl

which was the name given by the Mizos to the Burmese.

Khampat (now in Myanmar) is known to have been the next Mizo

settlement. The area claimed by the Mizos as their earliest town, was encircled

by an earthen rampart and divided into several parts. The residence of the ruler

stood at the central block called Nan Yar (Palace Site). The construction of the

town indicates that the Mizos had already acquired considerable architecture

skills. They are said to have planted a banyan tree at Nan Yar before they left

Khampat as a sign that the town was made by them.

The Mizos, in the early 14th century, came to settle at Chin Hills on the

Indo-Burmese border. They built villages and called them by their clan names

such as Seipui, Saihmun and Bochung. The hill and difficult terrain of Chin Hills

stood in the way of the building of another central township like Khampat. The

villages were scattered so unsystematically that it was not always possible for the

various Mizo clans to keep in touch with one another. The present Indian state of

Mizoram was called the Lushai Hills and was a district of Assam, before it

became a Union Territory and afterwards a full-fledged state. The Lusei people

were the first Mizo people to have an external exposure and hence the ethnicity

was initially known as the Lushai people. The demand for a distinct political

territory for the people of Lushai Hills resulted in the creation of a separate Union

Territory and afterwards the State of Mizoram (Adhikari 2013).

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5.2. CONCEPT OF MIZO STATEHOOD

The process of the consolidation of the British administration in tribal

dominated area in Assam started in 1919 when Lushai Hills along with some

other hill districts was declared a Backward Tract under government of India Act.

The tribal districts of Assam including Lushai Hills were declared Excluded Area

in 1935. This concept is discussed in greater detail later.

It was during the British regime that a political awakening among the

Mizos in Lushai Hills started taking shape. The first political party, the Mizo

Common People's Union was formed on 9th April 1946. The Party was later

renamed as Mizo Union. As the day of Independence drew nearer, the Constituent

Assembly of India set up an Advisory Committee to deal with matters relating to

the minorities and the tribals. A sub-Committee, under the chairmanship of

Gopinath Bordoloi was formed to advise the Constituent Assembly on the tribal

affairs in the North East. The Mizo Union submitted a resolution of this Sub-

committee demanding inclusion of all Mizo inhabited areas adjacent to Lushai

Hills. However, a new party called the United Mizo Freedom (UMFO) came up

to demand that Lushai Hills join Burma after Independence.

Following the Bordoloi Sub-Committee's suggestion, a certain amount of

autonomy was accepted by the Government and enshrined in the Six Schedule of

the constitution. The Lushai Hills Autonomous District Council came into being

in 1952 which led to the abolition of chieftainship in the Mizo society. The

autonomy however met the aspirations of the Mizos only partially.

Representatives of the District Council and the Mizo Union pleaded with the

States Reorganization Commission (SRC) in 1954 for integrating the Mizo-

dominated areas of Tripura and Manipur with their District Council in Assam.

The tribal leaders in the Northeast were laboriously unhappy with the SRC

Recommendations. They met in Aizawl in 1955 and formed a new political party,

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Eastern India Union (EITU) and raised demand for a separate state comprising of

all the hill districts of Assam. The Mizo Union split and the breakaway faction

joined the EITU. By this time, the UMFO also joined the EITU and the demand

for a separate Hill state by EITU was kept in abeyance.

In Mizoram, hilly topography and shifting cultivation technology

prevented the development of settled societies and concomitant state formation

of the kind seen in Manipur’s valley region. But like Manipur’s hill areas, villages

in Mizoram were autonomous, isolated and constantly at war with one another.

However there did exist, among the ruling Sailo clan, a sense of hierarchy of

chiefs, even if they were independent of each other (Reid, 1942). This, combined

with inter-clan feuds and flows of goods leading to the concentration of wealth in

the Sailo clan of the Lushai sub-tribe, enabled the development of some sort of

supra-local authority (Lehman, 1963). McCall (1949) found that even though

each village remained an autonomous unit and chiefs frequently clashed over

dominance, it was the Sailo chiefs who by the early nineteenth century had gained

control of the area.

The Lushai polity was composed of Hanmchawm, the ‘commoners’,

governed by a chief of the Sailo clan who was aided by his officials. Commoners

could rise to important positions in the chief’s administration, but could never

become chiefs themselves (McCall, 1949). Sailo chiefs were despotic and were

supported totally by tribute from commoners. They owned all land in the village.

Commoners, who were made up of a large number of subsidiary clans and

families, did not have much by way of individual rights. The burden on them was

heavy. Chiefs could order capital punishment; seize food stores and properties of

their villagers; order villagers to provide free labour; and demand payments.

There were, however, limits to their powers over their subjects. The latter could

migrate to another village if the rule of the chief becam difficult to bear. Chiefs

depended on the Zawlbuak, the young men’s barracks, to provide security to the

village from external threats and to enforce rules of discipline within. They also

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promoted Tlawmnghaina, the code of community obligation, which implied a

sense of public service. Chiefs also supported the development of their duhlian

dialect among their subjects (McCall1949, pp.96-98).

The Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90 led to the conquest and

incorporation of the Lushai Hills into British India. This was followed by

administrative changes required by the state to maintain peace and to extract

revenue. By 1898, the whole of the Lushai Hills had been consolidated into a

single Lushai Hill District with its borders clearly marked out. Chiefs were

forbidden from raiding each other. As in other areas, the state sought to ride

piggyback on pre-existing authority structures to penetrate society and acquire

the legitimacy it needed to rule. The strong presence of Sailo chiefs in the hills

provided the colonial state with that opportunity (Reid 1942, p. 27). In doing so

the state upheld the authority of the chiefs (McCall 1949, p. 202). Chiefs were

made responsible for tax collection and for maintaining peace within their

jurisdiction. The guiding principles of the state remained clear: not to interfere in

the internal matters of the people and their chiefs; to uphold the authority of the

chiefs; and to rule through them, while holding them responsible for to provide

effective administration. The attempt was to impose as few (legal) enactments as

possible, and to rely on customary codes and practices (Reid, 1942, p. 56).

However, it is significant that the colonial state in the Lushai Hills worked in a

manner that, while bringing the chiefs on board and upholding their authority,

helped consolidate its own position at the cost of the chiefs’. In this sense the state

behaved in ways very different from how it was behaving around the same time

in Manipur.

First, the state consolidated its hold territorially. While the region was

divided into two districts immediately after conquest, they were later brought

together into a single Lushai Hills district, with a Superintendent based in Aizawl

as the centre of political and administrative authority. Lushai chiefs were an

integral part of the administration, being given the responsibility for governing

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their villages. In 1901 the system was strengthened with the introduction of the

‘circle system’. The district was divided into sixteen circles, each with an

interpreter to act as a liaison between the chiefs and the superintendent. In 1906

the first rules for the administration of the Lushai Hills were introduced

(Government of Assam, 1906). These rules significantly constrained the authority

that chiefs had traditionally enjoyed, removing many powers they had previously

enjoyed, such as ordering capital punishment, confiscating property of their

subjects and taxing traders (Chin Hills Regulation, 1896). Chiefs were brought

under the supervision of the Superintendent of the district, who could regulate

and even punish them. The chiefs’ judicial authority was also curtailed. While

they still sat in judgment over petty cases, appeals against which now rested with

the Superintendent, criminal cases, especially heinous crimes, were removed

from the purview of chiefs altogether. Henceforth chiefs would act only as the

eyes and ears of the Superintendent in matters relating to more serious crimes.

Further, in 1927, all customary laws prevalent in the district were compiled

(Parray, 1927). This provided uniformity in the administration of justice and thus

made the task of the Superintendent’s supervision over the motley tribes easier.

It also consolidated the incorporation of village chiefs into the administrative set

up headed by the Superintendent.

Perhaps the strongest measure of the colonial state that undercut the

authority of the chiefs was the taking away of proprietary rights that chiefs had

traditionally enjoyed over land. Under the 1901 ‘land settlement’ system

introduced in the district, each chief was issued a lease over his domain for life.

Within the assigned territory, chiefs could move about, as they liked, as long as

they paid revenue and observed government orders. While ‘settlement’ stabilize

village boundaries, it implicitly meant that all land belonged to the state. The

independence that the Lushai chiefs had enjoyed so far was abolished and they

were made instruments of the colonial state administration. It also meant that

chiefs could be removed and also be created. The state soon began to issue rights

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over tracts of land to men it considered useful for its purpose (McCall 1948, p.

245).

Independence saw the Lushai Hills being retained as a part of Assam state,

but with special features. Constitution makers created a special administrative

arrangement for the northeast region, particularly its tribal areas, as a measure for

tribal self-rule. These Autonomous District Councils (ADC) were elected bodies

and were empowered with substantive legislative, executive and judicial

authority. First elections to the Lushai Hills District Council (LHDC) were held

in 1948. The Mizo Union, a political party with anti-chief sentiments, won a

majority of votes. One of the first measures that the MU-dominated Lushai ADC

took was to pass the Lushai Hills (Abolition of Chief-ship) Regulation, in 1952,

claiming that the “institution of chief-ship with its unlimited autocratic

possibilities is a misfit with democracy and as standing in the way of the well-

being of the district” (LHDC, 1953). In 1954, the Government of Assam under

pressure from the LHDC acquired the rights of Lushai chiefs (Government of

Assam, 1954). This act was to have a profound effect on the authority structure

in the state. It changed fundamentally the basis of land and power relations.

If there was any doubt at all who the owner of land was in the Lushai Hills

during colonial times, the 1954 acquisition of rights of chief-ship removed it all

in one quick stroke. While the British had asserted the state’s primacy, Lushai

chiefs continued to enjoy rights over land in perpetuity. This they could sublet to

tenants, and by virtue of state protection the chiefs had upheld their special

privileges and arbitrary rights that came at the expense of the commoners.

Abolition of chief-ship in 1952 meant that land became the property of the state

and chiefs’ privileges no longer existed. Notably, and unlike other land reform

regulations in the country, chief-ship abolition in Mizoram did not mean that

ownership automatically passed on to tenants under the former chiefs. All

allotments given by the chiefs were also cancelled. Tenants had to seek fresh

allotments from the LADC (Das, 1986). The act also led to the burden of village

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administration shifting from chiefs and their councillors to elected Village

Councils (VC) (Government of Mizoram, 1953). VCs are today responsible for

day-to-day village administration. They collect land revenue and taxes, distribute

jhum (swidden) land and ensure that government regulations are complied with.

Chief-ship abolition also led to changes in the legal framework of the state.

There are two functioning legal systems. One exists under the Autonomous

District Council (ADC) and the other under the Deputy Commissioner, the

executive head of the district. The former is a three-tier system of courts, at the

village, intermediate and ADC level, with jurisdiction over minor cases. These

courts, which use Mizo Hnam Dam (customary code) besides the Indian Penal

Code (IPC), are open, fast and cheap. A measure of their legitimacy is that not

too many appeals against their judgement have been made (Thanhranga, 1994).

Courts under the Deputy Commissioner try cases outside the powers of the ADC

courts established under the Lushai Hills District Council (Administration of

Justice) Rules 1953. Despite the dual legal system in practice in the state, and

the use of customary codes, what is noteworthy here is that both legal systems

exist within the formal legal framework of the state. They have the state’ sanction

and are integrated within it. Significantly it is the Guwahati High Court that has

revisionary jurisdiction over both systems, thus incorporating them fully within a

unified institutional framework of the state.

The impact of these consolidating moves has been significant. Abolition

of chief-ship, consolidation of the administrative and legal framework under the

state, and bringing tenants directly in contact with it, has helped consolidate the

state’s authority. This has enhanced the state’s social control while weakening

drastically any challenges to its authority from social forces. The state’s enhanced

autonomy enabled Mizoram to be the only hill state in Northeast India to have

attempted successful reforms in land ownership and distribution. This has led,

among other things, to written laws, definition of tenant rights and propriety

protection by issue of land certificates.

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5.3. THE ‘MAUTAM’ FAMINE AND INSURGENCY

In 1959, Mizo Hills was devastated by a great famine known in Mizo

history as ‘Mautam Famine’. The cause of the famine was attributed to flowering

of bamboos which consequently resulted in rat population boom in large

numbers. After eating up bamboo seeds, the rats turned towards crops, infested

the huts and houses and became a plague to the villages. The havoc created by

the rats was terrible and very little of the grain was harvested. For sustenance,

many Mizos had to collect roots and leaves from the jungles. Others moved out

to faraway places while a considerable number died of starvation (Chatterjee,

1994).

In his hour of darkness, many welfare organizations tried their best to help

starving villagers to facilitate supplies to the remote villages. With no organised

porters, animal transport was used to carry the air-drop food supplies. Earlier in

1955, Mizo Cultural Society was formed in 1955 and Laldenga was its Secretary.

In March 1960, the name of the Mizo Cultural Society was changed to 'Mautam

Front' During the famine of 1959-1960, this society took lead in demanding relief

and managed to attract the attention of all sections of the people. In September

1960, the Society adopted the name of Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF). The

MNFF gained considerable popularity as a large number of Mizo Youth assisted

in transporting rice and other essential commodities to interior villages

(Nunthara, 2002).

The Mizo National Famine Front dropped the word 'Famine' and a new

political organization, the Mizo National Front (MNF) was born on 22nd October

1961 under the leadership of Laldenga with the specified goal of achieving

sovereign independence of Greater Mizoram. Large scale disturbances broke out

on 28th February, 1966 in government installations at Aizawl, Lunglei,

Chawngte, Chhimluang and other places simultaneously. The uprising is

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discussed in details in the following section. However, it is worthwhile to note

that while the MNF took to violence to secure its goal of establishing a sovereign

land, other political forces in the hills of Assam were striving for a separate state.

The search for a political solution to the problems facing the hill regions in Assam

continued (Chatterjee, 1994).

The Mizo National Front was outlawed in 1967. The demand for statehood

was gained fresh momentum. A Mizo District Council delegation, which met

Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in May 1971, demanded a full-fledged state

for the Mizos. The union government in its own offered the proposal of turning

Mizo Hills into a Union Territory (UT) in July 1971. The Mizo leaders were ready

to accept the offer on the condition that the status of Union Territory would be

upgraded to statehood sooner rather than later. The Union Territory of Mizoram

came into being on 21st January, 1972. Mizoram got two seats in Parliament, one

each in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (Joshi, 2005).

Rajiv Gandhi's assumption of power following his mother's death

signalled the beginning of a new era in Indian politics. Laldenga met the Prime

Minister on 15th February, 1985. Some contentious issues, which could not be

resolved during previous talks, were referred to him for his advice. All trends

indicated that neither the Centre nor the MNF would waste the opportunity that

has now presented itself. New Delhi felt that the Mizo problem had been dragging

on for the long a time, while the MNF was convinced that bidding farewell to

arms to live as respectable Indian Citizens was the only way of achieving peace

and development. Statehood was a prerequisite to the implementation of the

accord signed between the MNF and the Union Government on 30 June 1986

(See Appendix D). The document was signed by Laldenga, on the behalf of

MNF, the Union Home Secretary R D Pradhan on behalf of the Government, and

Lalkhama Chief Secretary of Mizoram.

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However, lesser known is the “confidential” agreement signed by the

Congress party with the Mizo National Front which led to the signing of the Mizo

Accord. This agreement, signed on June 25, 1986, five days prior to the signing

of the Mizo Accord, took care of Laldenga’s demand of installing him as Chief

Minister of Mizoram. The agreement was signed by Laldenga of MNF and Sri

Arjun Singh, the Vice President of INC (See Appendix C). The incumbent Chief

Minister Lal Thanhawla became the Deputy Chief Minister under the new

coalition government headed by Laldenga as Chief Minster (Lalrintluanga 2009).

The MNF volunteers came out of their hiding and surrendered arms to

makeshift bamboo huts for the purpose at Parva and Marpara. A total of 614

activists gave themselves up in less than two weeks in July. Large quantities of

small and big firearms including LMGs and rifles were received from them.

While the MNF kept its part of the bargain, the Centre initiated efforts to raise

the status of Mizoram to a full-fledged State. A constitution Amendment Bill to

confer statehood on Mizoram was passed in the Lok Sabha on 5 August 1986.

The formalization of Mizoram State took place on 20th February, 1987. Chief

Secretary Lalkhama read out the proclamation of statehood at a public meeting

organised at Aizawl's Parade Ground. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi flew in to

Aizawl to inaugurate the new state. Sri Hiteshwar Saikia was appointed as the

first Governor of Mizoram. Since then Mizoram has witnessed vast

constitutional, political and administrative changes in recent years. The

traditional chieftainship was abolished and the District and Regional Councils

(created under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India) gave a substantial

measure of local control. Today the Lais, Maras, and the Chakmas have separate

Autonomous District Councils. The Village Councils are the grassroots of

democracy in Mizoram.

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5.4. THE MIZO NATIONAL FRONT UPRISING (1966)

The March 1966 Mizo National Front uprising was a revolt against the

Government of India, aimed at establishing a sovereign state for the Mizos. On 1

March 1966, the Mizo National Front (MNF) made a declaration of

independence, after launching coordinated attacks on the Government offices and

security forces posted in different parts of the Mizo district in Assam. The

Government suppressed the uprising and recaptured all the places seized by the

MNF by 25 March 1966. Counter-insurgency operations continued over the next

few years, although the intensity of the rebellion diminished over time

progressively till its complete resolution in the 1986 peace talks. During the

Government operations to suppress the rebellion, the Indian Air Force carried out

airstrikes in Aizawl; this remains the only instance of India carrying out an

airstrike in its own civilian territory (Kumar, 2010 and Miglani, 2010).

Before the formation of the Mizoram state in 1987, the Mizo-dominated

areas in India were a part of the Mizo district of the Assam state. The Mizo

organizations, including the Mizo Union, had long complained of step-motherly

treatment at the hands of the Assam Government, and demanded a separate state

for the Mizos. Every 48 years, a cyclic ecological phenomenon called Mautam

leads to widespread famine in this region. When such a famine started in 1959,

the Mizos were left disappointed by the Assam Government's handling of the

situation. The introduction of Assamese as the official language of the state in

1960, without any consideration for the Mizo language, led to further discontent

and protests.

The growing discontent with the Government ultimately resulted in a

secessionist movement led by Mizo National Front (MNF), an organization that

had evolved out of a famine relief team. While the Mizo Union's demand was

limited to a separate state for the Mizos within India, the MNF aimed at

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establishing a sovereign Christian nation for the Mizos. The extremist section

within MNF advocated the use of violence to seek independence from India. A

special armed wing called the Mizo National Army (MNA) was created for the

purpose. The MNA consisted of eight infantry "battalions" organised on the

pattern of the Indian army. One of the battalions was named after Joshua, while

the rest were named after the legendary Mizo heroes: Chawngbawia,

Khuangchera, Lalvunga, Saizahawla, Taitesena, Vanapa and Zampui Manga. The

Lion Brigade (Chawngbawla, Khuangchera, Saizahawla and Taitesena

battalions) operated in the northern half of the district, while the Dagger Brigade

(Joshua, Lalvunga, Vanapa and Zampui Manga) operated in its southern half.

MNA consisted of around 2000 men, supported by another group called the Mizo

National Volunteers (MNV), which comprised an equal number of irregulars.

In the early 1960s, the MNF leaders including Pu Laldenga visited East

Pakistan (now Bangladesh), where the Government of Pakistan offered them

supply of military hardware and training (Patnaik, 2008). Laldenga and his

lieutenant Pu Lalnunmawia were arrested by the Government of Assam on the

charge of conspiring against the nation, but were released in February 1964 after

an undertaking of good conduct by Laldenga. However, shortly after their release,

MNF intensified its secessionist activities. The MNF members forcibly collected

donations from the Mizo people, recruited volunteers and trained them with arms

supplied by Pakistan.[4] By the end of 1965, the MNF weapon cache consisted

of the plastic explosives stolen from the Border Roads Organisation, rifles and

ammunition obtained from the 1st Assam Rifles (AR) headquartered at Aizawl,

crude bombs and Sten-guns.

The Indian armed forces, fresh from the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, were focused on the Indo-Pak and Indo-China

borders. The extremist MNF leaders wanted to take advantage of this situation by

starting an armed rebellion to establish an independent Mizo nation. The

rehabilitation of the pro-Government Chakma refugees from East Pakistan in the

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Mizo district further instigated them (Bareh 2001). Accordingly, a plan

(codenamed "Operation Jericho") was created to systematically capture the power

in the Mizo district. The MNF aimed at taking over the treasuries and the petrol

pumps, neutralising the police force and capturing all the important non-Mizo

("Vai") officials. The MNF flag was to be hoisted at Aizawl on 1 March 1966,

followed by a victory parade on 2 March 1966. The MNF arsenal would be

supplemented by capturing the armories of the 1st Assam Rifles, the Border

Security Force (BSF) and the local police. The MNF leaders had hoped that they

would have a large number of sympathizers among the local police, the

Government officials and the AR, which would make the takeover peaceful. They

also hoped that if they could keep their flag flying in Aizawl for 48 hours, other

countries such as Pakistan would recognize the Mizo territory as a sovereign

nation and take up their case in the United Nations (Bareh, 2001). The volunteers

and the sympathizers of MNF were promised a prosperous future in the proposed

sovereign state. The plan was kept in strict secrecy. As a cover, the MNF leaders

indulged in public propaganda advocating use of "non-violent means" to achieve

independence for Mizos. The MNF commander Lt. Col. Laimana, who was

suspected of being a government informant, was assassinated on 1 January 1966

(Bareh 2001). On 27 February 1966, Pu Laldenga and some other MNF leaders

decided that the armed insurrection would start on 1 March. The instructions were

sent to launch simultaneous attacks on the posts of the 1st Assam Rifles and the

BSF. In case the attack failed, an alternate plan of concentrating near the Indo-

Pak border was also made.

The Government authorities did get some indications of the upcoming

armed action, but failed to anticipate its intensity. On the night of 27 February,

Rokima, the brother of the MNF lieutenant Pu Lalnunmawia was killed in an

apparently accidental blast, which was noticed by the Assam Rifles personnel.

All Assam Rifles posts were alerted to keep a watch on the movements of MNF

members.The security forces stationed in the Mizo Hills district included the 1st

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Assam Rifles (AR) headquartered at Aizawl, the 5th Border Security Force (BSF)

and the local police. On the night of 28 February/1 March 1966, the MNF

launched a series of simultaneous attacks on the 1st AR garrisons at Aizawl,

Lunglei and Champhai and the 5th BSF posts at Chawngte, Demagiri, Hnahlan,

Marpara, Tipaimukh, Tuipang, Tuipuibari, Vaphai and Vaseitlang.

The first attack by MNF began at about 10:30 pm IST on 28 February

1966, at the sub-treasury at Lunglei. A group 500–1000 strong attacked the camp

of the security forces and the AR post (Nag 2002). The attack was repulsed,

leaving two AR personnel dead and three more wounded. On 5 March, the

insurgents kidnapped R.V. Pillai, the Sub-divisional Officer. By 7 March, they

had captured the AR post as well as the Border Roads Task Force camp at

Lunglei. The MNF insurgents entered Aizawl on the night of 28 February 1966.

The same day, the Mizo district administration came across the copies of the two-

page declaration of independence distributed among the MNF leaders. Since the

insurgents had cut all the telephone lines, the local authorities could not seek

immediate help from Shillong or Silchar. Later, the commanding officer of the

Border Roads Organisation managed to send a wireless message to Silchar (Bareh

2001).

At 02:00 IST, on 1 March 1966, the insurgents attacked the telephone

exchange at Aizawl. An hour later, around 150 insurgents led by Pu Lalnundawta,

attacked the Aizawl District Treasury and looted money, arms and .303

ammunition. Within a few hours, the insurgents took control of all the important

centres of the Mizo district, paralysing the civil administration. They also seized

all the vehicles in the town. The law and order situation went beyond the control

of the local Police and the small units of AR posted in the district (Patnaik 2008).

T S Gill, the Deputy Commissioner of the Mizo district, took shelter in the AR

headquarters. The insurgents attacked the 1st AR battalion headquarters in

Aizawl unsuccessfully. They also attacked the AR post at Chhimluang on the

Aizawl-Silchar road, but were repulsed by the Riflemen. To stop any

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reinforcements from Silchar, they created several roadblocks and damaged the

only bridge on the road.

Around this time, several MNF leaders had gathered in Aizawl on the

pretext of a General Assembly. A few of the MNF leaders strongly opposed the

violence, and asked Laldenga to withdraw his orders for an armed action.

However, it was too late to discontinue the operation, as the rebels had already

attacked multiple places including Lunglei, Champhai and Demagiri. On 1

March, Laldenga made a declaration of independence, and exhorted all the Mizos

to join the revolt against the "illegal Indian occupation" of the Mizo territory

(Bareh 2001). On 2 March, the insurgents ambushed a patrol of the 1st AR, and

inflicted heavy casualties on them. After the 1st AR Battalion at Aizawl refused

to surrender, the MNF suicide squad launched an attack on them at 0900 hours

on 4 March. They lost 13 men in a counter-attack by the Assam Rifles soldiers.

Two helicopters with reserves, ammunition and water sent by the Government to

help the Riflemen could not land due to constant firing by the insurgents. Some

of the air drops meant for the Riflemen fell into the hands of MNF members. The

same day, the insurgents released all the prisoners from the Aizawl jail, who

looted the shops of the non-Mizos ("Vai"s), and also burned several huts in the

Aizawl bazaar (Bareh, 2001). Due to the AR's refusal to surrender, the victory

parade proposed to be held on 2 March was postponed to 10 March.

On 5 March, the insurgents led by Pu Hruaia plundered the Public Works

Department office in Aizawl, looting items for the "Mizoram Sawrkar"

("Mizoram Government") Office. On 11 March, the insurgents burned the houses

of the senior officials of the Mizo Union. At about 01:30 IST on 1 March 1966,

around 150 insurgents armed with lathis surrounded the sub-divisional officer of

the Public Works Department at Vairengte and asked him to get out of the district.

They also took over the departmental stores and the jeep. Similar incidents were

reported from Coinluang and Chawngte (Nag 2002). On the same day, the

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insurgents easily captured the AR post at Champhai, with help from their

sympathisers in the security forces.

At Kolasib, the insurgents took around 250 civil officials, the policemen,

the intelligence personnel and the road builders as captives, and kept them

without food and water. The women and children were also taken as captives and

kept separately in a small building (Bareh, 2001). None of the civilian officials

and government servants were hurt, as MNF expected their support in running

the administration of the proposed sovereign state.

5.5. THE CONFLICT: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

According to a statement made by the Chief Minister of Assam Bimala

Prasad Chaliha, on 1 March, the insurgents who attacked the Aizawl treasury and

Lunglei numbered around 10,000. The Indian Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda,

in the Indian parliament on 3 March, stated the total number of rebels in Aizawl,

Lunglei, Vairengte, Chawngte and Chhimluang as 800–1300 (Nag 2008). On 2

March 1966, the Government of Assam invoked the Assam Disturbed Areas Act,

1955 and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, proclaiming the entire

Mizo district as "disturbed". Bimala Prasad Chaliha condemned Laldenga for his

"betrayal", while the Gulzari Lal Nanda promised "stern action" with "all the

force" at the Government's command (Bareh 2001). A 24-hour curfew was

imposed in Aizawl on 3 March, and reinforcements were sent for the 1st AR by

helicopters. The IAF was asked to carry the troops in Mi-4 helicopters into the

besieged AR camp, accompanied with fighter escorts, but failed due to heavy and

accurate fire by the insurgents. The Toofani fighters of 29 Squadron operating

from Kumbhirgram and Hunter fighters of 17 Squadron operating from Jorhat

undertook independent missions to escort the troop reinforcements and to

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suppress the insurgents (Kumar, 2010). Later, when the Eastern Army

Commander Lt Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, MC flew over parts of Mizoram in 1968,

his helicopter was fired at by the insurgents (Sood 2006).

On the afternoon of 4 March 1966, the IAF jet fighters strafed the MNF

targets in Aizawl using machine guns, allegedly causing few civilian casualties

(Bareh 2001, TOI 2011). The next day, a more extensive airstrike was carried out

for about five hours. According to some Mizos, the planes used incendiary

bombs, resulting in fires that destroyed several houses in the Dawrpui and

Chhinga Veng areas. According to some other accounts, the houses were

destroyed in the fires started by the prisoners released from the Aizawl jail by the

insurgents. Apart from Aizawl, the neighbouring villages of Tualbung and

Hnahlan were also allegedly bombarded. No human casualties were officially

reported in these airstrikes, but most of the civilian population fled Aizawl, and

took refuge in the remote villages in the adjacent hills (Bareh 2001).

In the history of independent India, this remains the only instance of the

Government of India resorting to air strikes in its own territory (Kumar, 2010).

Locals claim that Rajesh Pilot and Suresh Kalmadi were among the IAF pilots

who dropped the bombs (Mazumdar 2011). Pu Zoramthanga, who went on to

become the Chief Minister of Mizoram in 1998, once said that the main reason

he joined the MNF and became a rebel was the "relentless bombing of Aizawl in

1966" (Assam Tribune, 2008). The operations were overseen by HQ Eastern

Command of the Indian Army, under Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw. The local

responsibility for the army operations was given to 101 Communication Zone

whose General Officer Commanding (GOC) was Major General Sagat Singh. 311

(Independent) Infantry Brigade Group was located at that point of time in Silchar.

An additional formation, 61 Mountain Brigade was moved from Agartala to

Aizawl. Subsequently, a regular division, HQ 57 Mountain Division was raised

at Masimpur, near Silchar which oversaw counter-insurgency operations in

Mizoram in the later stages. The leading battalion of 61 Mountain Brigade, the

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8th Battalion, Sikh Regiment (8 SIKH) advanced from Silchar into the disturbed

area on 3 March. The forces could reach Aizawl only on 6 March, due to the

roadblocks caused by the militants (Sood, 2006; Singh, 2002; Chatterjee, 1994).

On 7 March, they relieved the besieged AR garrison at Aizawl. On 8 March, the

2nd Battalion 11 Gorkha Rifles (2/11 GR) moved towards Champhai and the 3rd

Battalion Bihar Regiment (3 BIHAR) towards Lunglei. By 15 March, the entire

61 Brigade with its four battalions and supporting arms and services had moved

into Mizoram and by the end of the month had regained control of Mizoram

(Sinha, 2008).

5.6. WITHDRAWAL OF MNF

The insurgents had managed to capture all the posts of the 1st Assam

Rifles (AR) except the AR headquarters at Aizawl. Their chances of capturing

the AR headquarters were low after the IAF airstrikes. When the MNF leaders

heard about the likely arrival of the Indian Army in Aizawl on 7 March, they

decided to retreat to Lunglei, which was under the MNF control. The security

forces threatened to bomb Lunglei, but two Christian clergymen – H. S. Luaia

and Pastor C.L. Hminga – requested them to avoid it in order to prevent loss of

civilian lives. The two also persuaded the MNF not to attack the army (Patnaik

2008). After some resistance, the MNF rebels withdrew from Lunglei on 13

March, taking away some arms, ammunition and vehicles with them. The Indian

Army secured Lunglei on 14 March, and Champhai on 15 March. The 5th

Battalion, Parachute Regiment (5 PARA), was flown in by helicopters to Lunglei

on 14–15 March, set out for Demagiri and secured it on 17 March. By the 25th,

all the important towns and the posts had been freed from the MNF control.

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By the end of March 1966, the Indian security forces had captured 467

muzzle loading guns, 332 shotguns, 175 rifles, 57 pistols/revolvers and about

70,000 rounds of ammunition from MNF. However, MNF had also managed to

obtain a large amount of ammunition from the captured security forces posts. Its

weapon cache consisted of: around 1500 shotguns, 600 rifles (mostly .303 bore),

75 sten-guns, 30 revolvers/pistols, 25 carbines and 20 light machine guns. The

MNA headquarters, originally located in Aizawl was moved multiple times

during the conflict: first to South Hlimen (on 3 March), then to Reiek (on 18

March) and finally to the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan.

The Mizo Union leaders blamed the MNF for the loss of civilian life, and

condemned the armed insurrection. The MNF accused the Indian Government of

"indiscriminate bombing on civilian population" during the airstrikes in Aizawl

(Biswas and Thomas, 2006). Two MLAs of the Assam state, Stanley DD Nichols

Roy and Hoover H Hynniewta, visited the Mizo district to take a stock of the

situation. Later in April, Roy moved a motion in the Assam Legislative Assembly

on the Aizawl air attack, calling the use of air force "excessive" (Hluna and

Tochhawng 2012).The MNF insurgents dispersed in smaller units, merged with

the local population and continued to carry out armed attacks against the security

forces in the district. The villagers suffered from both sides as the insurgents

would kill those resisting their entry into the villages while the villages suffered

reprisals from the security forces in case ambushes had taken place in their

vicinity (Sinha, 2008). The Mizo National Front was outlawed in 1967. The same

year, the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School was set up at Vairengte

to train the soldiers in fighting with the rebels in the North-East India.

As the insurgents found security and refuge in the large number of tiny

hamlets from which they would launch attacks on the patrols of the security forces

and later merge into the civilian population, the military felt the need to deny

them access to the common people. To solve the problem, the Government of

India resorted to a "grouping" policy in the Mizo district, starting in January 1967.

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Under the grouping policy, nearly 80 per cent of the rural population was shifted

from their villages and resettled along the highways. The old villages were burnt,

and the new settlements were kept under the control of the security forces until

1970. The Indian Army got greater freedom of action and succeeded in isolating

the insurgents from the people and cutting the insurgents' supply chain. This

grouping of villages resulted in a great deal of suffering for the indigenous

populace as their farms and houses were burnt and they could not have enough

farmland while being interred into these camps. Farming output went down a cliff

and people had to face near-famine conditions (Nunthara 1981). This grouping

has also been said to be the beginning of social evils in Mizoram. The villagers

were forced to move to these camps and agreement papers were often signed at

gunpoint. While insurgency continued at lower levels, the space for political

negotiations was created and led to Mizoram becoming a Union Territory and the

entry of the MNF into mainstream politics (Sinha, 2008). In August 1968, the

Government of India offered amnesty to the insurgents, which resulted in the

surrender of 1524 MNF members. This was followed by more amnesty offers

during 1969–70.

5.7. REGROUPING OF VILLAGES

During the bombing of Aizawl by the Indian Army locals left their homes

and fled into the hills in panic. The MNA withered away into surrounding gorges,

forests and hills, to camps in Burma and the then East Pakistan. The air force

strafed Aizawl and other areas till March 13, 1966. This was the first— and only

— time that the air force has been used to attack Indians in India. It cleared

Aizawl and other cities of the MNA, but did not finish off the insurgency, which

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would last for another 20 years. Till the 1980s, the Indian military stoutly denied

the use of air attacks in Mizoram in 1966.

By 1967, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was in force in

the area that is now Mizoram. That year, the eastern military brass, led by the

then Lt General Maneckshaw, and government decided to implement the plan

that was called 'regrouping of villages.' At that time, there was one road coming

south from Silchar in Assam, that travelled all the way down to where the state's

limits ended. To the east and west of this road were vast tracts of forests, hills and

ravines, dotted with hundreds of villages. The military plan was to gather

villagers from all over, and cluster them along the side of this road stretching over

a length of 400 kilometres (Government Order, 1967). A population of fifty

thousand from 106 villages were shifted to these Protected and Progressive

Villages (PPVs) and the grouping of villages were completed in three phases. The

movement was supposed to be voluntary — people in some far off hamlet were

supposed to jump with joy when told to give up their land, crops and homes to

trek hundreds of miles and live behind barbed wire. Actually, the military told

villagers to take what they could carry on their backs, and burn everything else

down. Elders signed 'consent' papers at gunpoint (Barman, 2013).

In every case, villagers refused to move. When they were coerced to

march, they would refuse to burn down their properties. Then, the military officer

and his men would torch the whole place down. They would march in a column

guarded by the military, to their designated PPV. Life here was tough: each

resident was numbered and tagged, going and coming was strictly regulated and

rations were meagre. In the PPVs' confines, tribal conventions broke down. In the

scramble for scarce resources, theft, murder and alcoholism became widespread.

There was a general feeling that “they were treated as aliens and worse than

enemies (Government of Mizoram 1983).” The regrouping destroyed the Mizos'

practice of jhum, or shifting cultivation. There was little land inside the PPVs and

their original jhum areas had been left far behind in the interiors. Farm output fell

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off a cliff. Mizoram suffered from near-famine conditions, supplemented by what

little the military could provide, for the next three years.

Why were the villagers herded into the PPVs? The military reckoned that

keeping villagers under their eyes would keep them from sheltering insurgents or

joining the MNA. The original villages, crops and granaries were destroyed to

deny shelter and food to wandering insurgents. These ideas were picked up by

our officers from the colonial British playbook. The British had regrouped

villages during the Boer war in the early 20th century, in Malaya, where they

interned Chinese in special camps and in Kenya where villages were uprooted to

crush the Mau Mau uprising.

The scale of the Mizoram regrouping was huge. Out of 764 villages, 516

were evacuated and squeezed into 110 PPVs. Only 138 villages were left

untouched. In the Aizawl area, about 95 per cent of the rural population was

herded into PPVs. No Russian gulag or German concentration camp had hosted

such a large chunk of the local population. The first PPVs were dismantled in

1971, but the last ones continued for another eight years. Grouping of villages in

which people had to part with their ancestral homes has been considered by many

as the ''saddest chapter'' during the insurgency period in Mizoram from 1966 to

1986 (Barman 2013).

Though many said that the regrouping of villages in Mizoram ‘succeeded’,

Nandini Sundar (2011) argued that the concept of "success" and "failure" used by

studies of grouping is flawed, betraying a bureaucratic calculus. Whatever the

overt reasons given for grouping, what underlies it is the assumption that all

people in a given area, whether civilian or combatant, are potentially hostile.

Grouping is thus an act of war rather than effective counter-insurgency. She

further argued that from the perspective of basic principles like democracy,

citizenship, or the rule of law regrouping is always a failure, rather, “it is

profoundly destabilizing, since the government divides its own population into

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enemies and collaborators, in ways that begin to weaken the fundamental edifice

of citizenship”.

Based on interviews with civilians who endured grouping in the Indian

states of Nagaland and Mizoram in the 1960s and 1960s, this research shows how

for them, there was no ‘success’, only hardship. What they remember is not the

agricultural extension agents, the pharmacists or the administrative officers who

ostensibly manned the regrouped villages/ camps as part of a supposed ‘hearts

and mind approach’, but the army search operations, the starvation, the regime of

curfews and the reduction of identity to a roll call and a piece of paper. Separation

from their fields, their homes, and their forests filled them with a yearning which

no amount of ‘improved poultry and piggery’ could compensate for. Villagers

described themselves as objects: In Mizoram, the grouping was called khokhom,

which literally means driving villagers here and there; a term that sums up a world

of terror, like the Palestinian Nakbah or catastrophe to refer to the forcible

evacuations of 1948. People in Nagaland also mark time with reference to

grouping and the extended sojourns in the forest which preceded it: ‘the year we

came back from the jungles.’ (Sundar 2011)

5.8. THE POST MIZORAM ACCORD SCENARIO

Among ethnic and secessionist conflicts, the resolution of the Mizoram

issue was a notable success. Armed insurrection had persisted in Mizoram for

more than two decades. The movement by the Mizo National Front had racial and

religious overtones, and its declared aim was secession of Mizoram from the

Indian Union. There was an armed uprising in 1966 and violent conflict continued

well into the 1980s. The Mizoram Accord of June 1986 succeeded in bringing to

a satisfactory conclusion, the violent conflict of the past decades. One of the

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major fact that is said to have contributed to this historic conflict resolution is the

moderating influence and pressure of the Mizo civil society, especially the

women who had been the most aggrieved and affected during the periods of

violence (Government of India 2008)

After signing the memorable Peace Accord between the Government of

India and the MNF on June 20th 1986, Mizoram became a State in 1987. The

insurgency that broke out in Mizoram in 1966, lasted for twenty long years,

checking all development activities in the region. But the signing of this important

Peace Accord brought a new dawn to Mizoram, which is often called the land of

enchanting hills. The signing of the Peace Accord is, indeed, a turning point in

the development history of Mizoram. The era of peace and progress has now

come. As the reward for peace, development initiatives have been taken on

various fronts and the people of the State are the real beneficiaries of the fruits of

development. Till 1990s, Mizoram had three districts with three autonomous

District Councils. But now, the State has eight districts with three autonomous

District Councils. At present, Mizoram has twenty two towns with 22 rural

development blocks in the State. If one is really keen to analyse the socio-

economic development scenario of the eight North Eastern States, one could

easily find out that Mizoram is ahead of other northeastern states in many

respects.

According to the Eleventh Finance Commission’s Index of Economic and

Social Infrastructure, Mizoram ranks first among the North Eastern States getting

82 per cent points followed by Assam which gets 77.7 per cent. Weightage given

in this index includes infrastructures available in agriculture, banking, electricity,

transport, communications, education, health and civil administration. Literacy is

another area in which Mizoram has done exceedingly well. At present, Mizoram

has the highest literacy rate among the Northeastern States. According to 2001

Census, the literacy percentage of the State was 88.8 per cent, second highest in

the country, next only to Kerala. This is amazing considering that Mizoram had

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its first ever High School only in 1944 and its first Under-Graduate College in

1958. Women’s literacy in Mizoram, at 86.13 per cent, is again highest in the

whole of North East. Moreover, according to the figure provided by the Economic

Survey of India 2002-03, gender differences in work participation in Mizoram,

that is, gender gap is one of the lowest in India. The national figure for the gender

gap is 26 while in Mizoram it is only 9. This is something that deserves

recognition of the authority.

The MHIP (Women Association of Mizoram) received the prestigious

National Award in 2002 for its good works. Moreover, the Educational

Development Index (EDI) prepared at the National level indicates that in the year

1995 Mizoram got the first rank, which means, highest in the nation. The four

broad parameters used for the EDI are investment in education, literacy

achievement, universalization of elementary education and availability of

educational facilities. This indeed is a significant achievement for the State of

Mizoram. The steady rate of increase in literacy and general education after

Independence, particularly after 1981, is no doubt the result of an all-round

improvement in educational infrastructure both at the elementary and secondary

educational levels.

Another remarkable progress made in Mizoram is in the field of

eradication of poverty. As one knows, poverty is one of the socio-economic

indicators for development. Below Poverty Level family estimates (BPL

estimates) prepared by the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies of the Union

Government, indicates that in 1993-94 and in 1999-2000, Mizoram had the least

number of families living below poverty line in the whole Northeastern States.

The percentage of families living below poverty level in the State of Mizoram

was 25.66 in 1993-94 and 19.47 in 1999-2000. The corresponding figure for the

nation is 35.97 and 26.10 respectively. Had there been no peace in the state, it

would not have been possible on the part of Mizoram to achieve this

commendable position. One of the indicators of development is per capita

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income. According to the figure provided by the Economic Survey of India,

released each year before the Union Budget is presented, Mizoram has had the

highest per capita income among the seven States in the North East, for two

consecutive years. In 1998-99, the per capita income of Mizoram at current prices

was Rs. 13,479 and in 2011-12 it was estimated at Rs 54,689.10 This, no doubt, is

a big achievement for Mizoram which is very much land-locked and inaccessible

as compared to most of the other States in the North East.

The Human Development Index, 1991, published in the Economic Survey

2002-03, put Mizoram at the 7th position in the Nation, which again is highest in

the whole North-East. The positions of other states in the Northeast in this respect

are - Manipur 9th, Nagaland 11th, Tripura 22nd, Meghalaya 24th, Assam 26th

and Arunachal Pradesh 29th. In respect of rice and food grain production,

Mizoram’s productivity rate is above the Northeast States’ average. In rice

production, the Northeastern States’ average was 1,427 kg. per hectare in 1997-

98 as against Mizoram’s average at 1,624 kg. In the same year, the total food

grain production average in the Northeastern States was 1,400 kg. per hectare. In

Mizoram, it was 1,600 kg.

The productivity rate of Mizoram, as compared to other states in the

Northeast in respect of rice and total food grain production is third, in both cases.

To promote export, the Government of Mizoram submitted a project report,

requesting the Central Government to declare Mizoram an Agriculture Export

Zone (AEZ) for passion fruit. One of the most tangible outcomes of peace in the

State of Mizoram is the commissioning of Lengpui Airport in 1998-99. Lengpui

Airport is one of the best airports in the whole of North East. Commissioning of

this airport is a landmark in the history of Mizoram, as it greatly eased the

communication problem of the state. Till recently, air service linking Mizoram

with other parts of India had been only three days a week. But now it is 7 days a

10 Economic Survey of Mizoram (2012-13). Planning & Programme Implementation

Department, Government of Mizoram. Retrieved from www.mizoram.gov.in

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week. As we all know, road and communication happen to be one of the most

important infrastructures for development of a region or a state. By the end of

March 1989, the total road length in Mizoram was 4,850 km, against the total

road length of 2,662 km in 1983. This means that, the total road length in

Mizoram increased by 2,188 km, which translates into an increase of about 45

percent during a short period of six years. During the same period, the total length

of surfaced road also increased from 1,168 km to 1,760 km, an increase of 592

km surfaced road length. The road per 100 sq. km also increased from 12.62 km

in 1983 to 22.99 km in 1989. Road density in the State in 2005 was 27.5 km per

100 sq. km. Another remarkable development, as a fulfilment of Memorandum

of Settlement / Peace Accord 1986 was establishment of a High Court Bench in

Mizoram. Besides, a Central University called Mizoram University was

established in Mizoram on 2nd July, 2001.

Another step actively taken to fulfill one of the items of the Peace Accord

is in respect of Border Trade. To facilitate border trade (Indo-Myanmar trade in

particular) steps were taken actively by construction of roads, land customs

station and trade centre. Emphasis has also been given to border trade with

Bangladesh. Health services in general, and public health services in particular,

is another sector in which Mizoram has done a commendable job. Health services

both in terms of infrastructure and other facilities have been expanding steadily

in the state since the last two decades. In fact, the number of population served

by a hospital bed in Mizoram is the best in the whole of North East. As regards

to power and energy development, planned power development in Mizoram could

be said to have started since 1975-76, when Assam State Electricity Board ceased

to function in Mizoram. In those days, only two towns and three villages were

electrified. One notable achievement was that the State of Mizoram came on the

Grid Map of India in 1997 with the construction of about 140 km of 66 KV line

from Dulabcherra to Aizawl.