chapter five responsibility accounting and transfer pricing

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CHAPTER FIVE Responsibility Accounting and Transfer Pricing

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McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2003 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. 5-3 Responsibility Accounting Characteristics of responsibility centers are:  Knowledge of the centers’ managers is difficult to acquire, maintain, or analyze at higher levels  Decision rights are specified for each center  Performance measurement is obtained from internal accounting system (Recall organizational architecture concepts in Chapter 4.) Types of responsibility centers: cost, profit, investment. See Table 5-1.

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Page 1: CHAPTER FIVE Responsibility Accounting and Transfer Pricing

CHAPTER FIVEResponsibility Accounting

and Transfer Pricing

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McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2003 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

Outline of Chapter 5Responsibility Accounting and

Transfer Pricing Responsibility Accounting Transfer Pricing

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McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2003 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

Responsibility Accounting Characteristics of responsibility centers are: Knowledge of the centers’ managers is difficult to acquire,

maintain, or analyze at higher levels Decision rights are specified for each center Performance measurement is obtained from internal

accounting system(Recall organizational architecture concepts in Chapter 4.)

Types of responsibility centers: cost, profit, investment.See Table 5-1.

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Cost Center - DesignKnowledge: Central manager knows optimal production quantity and

budget Cost center manager knows how to optimally mix inputs

Decision rights: Cost center manager chooses quantity and quality of inputs

used in cost center (labor, material, supplies)

Measurement: Minimize total cost for a fixed output Maximize output for a fixed budget

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Cost Center - Problems Minimizing average costs does not necessarily

maximize profits. Cost centers have an incentive to produce more units to spread fixed costs over a large number of units.

Quality of products produced by cost center must be monitored.

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Profit Center - DesignKnowledge: Profit center managers’ knowledge of product mix, demand,

and pricing is difficult to transfer to central management

Decision rights: Can chose input mix, product mix, and selling prices Given fixed capital budget

Measurement: Actual profits Actual profits compared to budget

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Profit Center - Problems Setting appropriate transfer prices on goods and

services transferred within the firm

How to allocate corporate overhead costs to responsibility centers

Profit centers that focus only on their own profits often ignore how their actions affect other responsibility centers

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Investment CentersKnowledge: Investment center manager has knowledge of investment

opportunities and operating decisions

Decision rights: Ratify and monitor decisions of cost and profit centers Decide amount of capital invested or disposed

Measurement: Return on Investment (ROI) Residual Income (RI) Economic Value Added (EVA)

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Return on InvestmentReturn on Investment (ROI) =

Accounting net income for an investment center Total assets invested in that investment center

DuPont formula separates ROI into two components:ROI = Sales turnover Return on salesROI = (Sales Total Investment) (Net Income Sales)

ROI increases with smaller investments and larger profit margins.Focusing on ROI can cause underinvestment.

See Self Study Problem 1, part a.

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Residual IncomeResidual income (RI) =

Accounting net income of investment center (Required rate of return Capital invested in that center)

RI is determined with financial accounting measurements of net income and capital

Each investment center could be assigned a different required rate of return depending on its risk

RI can be increased by increasing income or decreasing investment

See Self Study Problem 1, part b.

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Economic Value AddedEVA is a refinement of residual income that uses economic measures of

income and capital rather than financial accounting measures.

Economic value added (EVA) =Adjusted accounting net income of investment center

(Weighted average cost of capital Capital invested in that center)

Examples of EVA adjustments to accounting: Research and development (R&D) is amortized over 5 years for EVA,

but expensed immediately for financial accounting. Unamortized R&D is included in capital for EVA, but treated is treated

as an expired cost (zero value) for financial accounting.

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Economic Value Added EVA can be increased by three basic

methods:– Increase the efficiency of existing operations, and thus the

spread between the investment return and the firm’s weighted average cost of capital

– Increase the amount of capital invested in projects with positive spreads between investment return and the firm’s weighted average cost of capital

– Withdraw capital from operations where the investment return is less than the firm’s weighted average cost of capital

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Investment Center - Problems Disputes over how to measure income and capital.

Difficult to compare investment centers of different sizes.

Firm’s central management must monitor product quality and market niches of investment centers to reduce possibility for self-interested investment center to damage firm’s reputation.

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Controllability PrincipleControllability Principle: Hold center managers responsible for only those

costs and decisions for which they have authority

Drawbacks of controllability principle: If managers suffer no consequences from events

outside their direct control, they have no incentive to take actions that can affect the consequences of uncontrollable events (such as storms, corporate income taxes, etc.)

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Transfer Pricing - DefinedTransfer Price defined:

the internal price (or cost allocation) charged by one segment of a firm for a product or service supplied to another segment of the same firm

Examples of transfer prices: Internal charge paid by final assembly division for

components produced by other divisions Service fees to operating departments for

telecommunications, maintenance, and services by support services departments

Cost allocations for central administrative services (general overhead allocation)

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Transfer Pricing and Firm ValueTransfer prices have multiple effects on firm value:

Performance measurement: Reallocate total company profits among business segments Influence decision making by purchasing, production, marketing, and

investment managers

Rewards and punishments: Compensation for divisional managers

Partitioning decision rights: Disputes over determining transfer prices

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Ideal Transfer PricingIdeal transfer price would be Opportunity cost, or the value forgone by not

using the transferred product in its next best alternative use

Opportunity cost is the greater of variable production cost or revenue available if the product is sold outside of the firm

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Transfer Pricing Methods External market price

– If external markets are comparable Variable cost of production

– Exclude fixed costs which are unavoidable Full-cost of production

– Average fixed and variable cost Negotiated prices

– Depends on bargaining power of divisions

See Self-Study Problem 2.

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Transfer Pricing Implementation

Disputes over transfer pricing occur frequently because transfer prices influence performance evaluation of managers

Internal accounting data are often used to set transfer prices, even when external market prices are available

Classifying costs as fixed or variable can influence transfer prices

determined by internal accounting data

To reduce transfer pricing disputes, firms may reorganize by combining interdependent segments or spinning off some segments as separate firms

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Transfer Pricing for International Taxation

When products or services of a multinational firm are transferred between segments located in countries with different tax rates, the firm attempts to set a transfer price that minimizes total income tax liability.

Segment in higher tax country:Reduce taxable income in that country by charging high prices on imports and low prices on exports.

Segment in lower tax country:Increase taxable income in that country by charging low prices on imports and high prices on exports.

Government tax regulators try to reduce transfer pricing manipulation.