chapter four domestic politics and war. unitary state assumption: the treatment of states as...
TRANSCRIPT
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Chapter Four
Domestic Politics and War
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Domestic Politics and War
Unitary state assumption: the treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interests that belong to the state.
This assumption can be a useful starting place for analysis.• However, states are legal and political constructs,
not beings capable of taking actions
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Domestic Politics and War
War is costly. But the costs of war are distributed unevenly.
Do wars serve the national interest?• To answer such questions, we must consider
domestic actors’ different interests
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Domestic Politics and War
Which domestic interests drive foreign policy choices depends on:• The strategic interactions between actors• The institutions within the state
War is the outcome of interaction between or among multiple states.
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Core of the Analysis
There are actors within the state who may benefit from war:• These actors may have institutional and
organizational advantages• Their main effect is to increase the aggressiveness
of the state’s foreign policy• Democratic political institutions can reduce their
influence
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National Vs. Particularistic Interests
General (national) interest:• Something that most actors within the country
share.
Narrow or particularistic interests:• Interests held by a relatively small number of
actors within the country
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National Vs. Particularistic Interests
An example: The US has had a consistent interest in oil and the Middle East.• Nationally, oil is vital to the US’s military power
and economy• Particularly, oil companies benefit from selling oil
War may sometimes arise because it furthers the narrow interests of particular actors.
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Interactions, Institutions, and Influence
Without the unitary actor assumption, individuals and groups with different interests come into play.• Institutions determine which actors and interests
have influence
Some actors may have strategic advantages.• Due to the collective action problem, small groups
may have more effective influence
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Interactions, Institutions, and Influence
The extent of a group’s political influence depends on its members ability to cooperate.
Three kinds of actors:• Leaders who make foreign policy decisions• Organized groups within the country (bureaucratic
actors and interests groups)• The general public
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Interactions, Institutions, and Influence
The bureaucracy: different organizations that make up a state’s structure.• Includes the military, diplomatic corps and
intelligence agencies
Interest groups: groups of individuals with common interests that have organized in order to push for policies that benefit their members.
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Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home?
In 1982, Argentina sparked war with Britain when it invaded the Falkland Islands.• The territory was not especially valuable and
Britain had a far superior naval force
Both governments had domestic problems:• Both economies were in severe recessions
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What Do Leaders Want?
Leaders of states have many interests of their own:• Ideological beliefs, personal motivation, the desire
to stay in power, etc.
Strategic politicians can use their control of policy to share their political restraints.• May use war to enhance their hold on power
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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive Rally effect: people’s tendency to become
more supportive of their own government during a crisis.
Approval ratings for a leader often jump at the onset of a war.• After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2008,
President George W. Bush’s approval rating jumped 35 percent
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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive
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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive
People “rally around the flag” because international conflicts can: • Cause an increase in patriotism• Ease criticism of the government• Create a diversion from other problems • Give leaders an opportunity to scapegoat or
blame the country’s problems on foreigners
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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive
At times, political leaders may face a diversionary incentive:• A temptation to spark an international crisis in
order to rally public support at home
Gambling for resurrection:• Taking a risky action, such as starting a war, when
the alternative is certain to be very bad
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Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
The 1997 movie Wag the Dog depicted a leader hiring a movie director to produce a fake war in order to boost his ratings.
But there is little evidence that leaders systematically resort to force when they are in trouble domestically.• International conflict is more often initiated by
leaders who are politically secure
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Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
Why do we not see stronger evidence of diversionary incentives?• Perhaps most leaders are not as cynical as
assumed and are not simply “office seeking”• Or, the political benefits of war relative to peace
have to be large in order to eliminate the possibility of peaceful bargaining
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Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
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Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”?
The size of the bargaining range is determined by the sum of war costs to both sides, a + b.• If State A expects war benefits to equal r, the total
cost of war to State A is a – r
Yet, even if the benefit r is greater than a, a bargaining range could still exist that is shown by: a + b – r
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The Political Costs of War
War can also impose domestic political costs.
Public support for war changes as the costs increase.• The only US wars that remained popular
throughout were WWII, the Persian Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan
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The Political Costs of War
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The Political Costs of War
Leaders who fight losing or costly wars are more likely to be removed from office than those who win wars.
Leaders should see war as a gamble not only for the state, but for their political interests.
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Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups?
Though imperialism did not benefit Britain as a whole, it was very profitable for wealthy people who could invest overseas.
A British economist, J. A. Hobson, argued that wars are fought to benefit military and business interests.
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Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups?
Military-industrial complex: • An alliance of military leaders and arms
manufacturers who presumably have a vested interest in an aggressive foreign policy
While hawkish domestic interests do not lead directly to the breakdown of bargaining, they do create more opportunities for such failures.
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Bureaucratic Politics and the Military
Decisions about war and peace are not only shaped by state leaders, but also by the interests of bureaucratic organizations.
These organizations generally seek:• Bigger budgets, more input into policy-making,
and opportunities for personal promotion
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Bureaucratic Politics and the Military The military is usually the most influential
bureaucratic actor in matters of war.
Does military influence over foreign policy decision-making affect a state’s belligerence?• The military sees benefits to war that other actors
may not• Yet, it is important not to equate the military with
militarism
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Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies Interest groups organize around economic and
ethnic motives.
Economic motives: when an actor’s income depends on events in other countries
Ethnic motives: when groups are motivated by ethnic attachment or ideological interests to support or oppose a particular country
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Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies Economic actors do not always prefer
belligerent policies.• May depend on peaceful relations with other
countries
Depending on where and how they do business:• Economic actors can have an interest in peaceful
relations with some countries and/or hostile relations with others
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How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On Policy?
The answer lies in the nature of the interactions between these different actors and the institutions that regulate their relations.
An example: The military’s influence derives from the fact that it controls a vast portion of a state’s coercive resources.
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How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On Policy?
Political leaders rely on the information and expertise of bureaucratic actors.
When making decisions about war, the military could shape the outcome by manipulating the information that the leader uses to calculated the expected value of war and its alternatives.
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How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On Policy?
How can interest groups “hijack” a state’s foreign policy for their own narrow interests?• Because taxpayers are more numerous, the costs of
intervention to any individual are quite low
Organized interest groups can provide political leaders with:• Things they need and want in exchange for favored
policies
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How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On Policy?
In a democracy, interest groups can also promise the support of motivated voters.• Examples: the Cuban-American and pro-Israel lobbies
However, just because a policy benefits a particular group does not mean the policy must have been enacted in order to benefit that group.
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How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On Policy?
For every foreign policy decision that might be made to serve a narrow interest, there are alternative arguments based on national interests.
For example: Some argue that imperialism was a product of military-strategic competition among the principal powers.
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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining?
By influencing the costs and benefits of conflict:• Domestic interests help determine the extent of
the state’s ambition in an international conflict
However, these interests are generally not sufficient to cause war in any given situation.
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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining?
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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining? What would happen if State A’s interests
changed in response to the influence of hawkish actors?
An example: the good is territory with oil in it and the government’s core supporters are environmentalists.• The costs of war would be considered high, at “aD” –
war is considered unattractive
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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining?
If the dovish leader is replaced by a leader who draws support from oil companies:• More value is placed on the land, so “aH” is the new
expected cost of war• The value of war now shifts to the right, but a bargaining
range still exists
The shift creates a danger of war that did not exist before.
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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining?
If war depends on features of the bargaining interaction, such as:• How information is distributed• Whether states can credibly commit to a deal
It is hard to argue that interest groups alone can explain why crises sometimes become wars.
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Why Don’t Democracies Fight One Another?
Democratic peace: a well-established observation that there are few, if any, clear cases of war between mature democratic states.
The strength of the claim depends on how one defines democracy – and what events one considers war.
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Why Don’t Democracies Fight One Another?
Democracies are not, overall, less war-prone than other kinds of states.• They are frequently at war with nondemocratic
states
Is the absence of war among democracies worldwide a coincidence?
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What Is Democracy?
Democracy: a political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections in which a sizeable portion of the adult population can vote.
This includes two major aspects of democracy:• Contestation and participation
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What Is Democracy?
Contestation:• Is the ability of different individuals and groups to
compete for political office
Participation:• Is the ability of a large portion of the country to be
involved in the selection process through voting
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What Is Democracy?
Liberal is another term that often accompanies democracy:• A philosophy that emphasizes the value of individual
liberty
Most liberal democracies, in addition to allowing competition and voting have:• Numerous protections of individual civil and political
rights, such as rights to free speech, religion, political association and a free press
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What Is Democracy?
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What Is Democracy?
How could democracies be different when it comes to war and peace?
Two broad ways in which domestic institutions can affect the likelihood of war:• By influencing the interests of states and their
leaders• By influencing the bargaining interaction between
and among countries
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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in War and Peace
The costs of war are paid by society at large.• A leader rarely has direct exposure to costs of war
The interests of the ruler and ruled are not always aligned.
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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in War and Peace
One solution to this problem is to establish a democratic government:• The ruler would be accountable to the people• This would align the interests of the ruler and ruled
Representative institutions could slow or stop the decision to go to war.
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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in War and Peace
Accountability: the ability to punish or reward leaders for their decisions.• Elections provide a simple mechanism for people
to impose these punishments
Democratic leaders face higher costs from war than do nondemocratic leaders.
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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in War and Peace
Nondemocratic leaders also find that life after losing office is not pleasant.• Their removal from office usually occurs through violent
means
Logic of accountability suggests that democratic leaders should be more selective about starting wars.• Nondemocratic leaders may be willing to gamble
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Democracy and Bargaining
Democratic institutions make it easier to overcome informational problems:• Political systems are much more transparent• Are more able to send credible signals in crises
Transparency can reduce the risk of preemptive war between democracies.• Commitment to refrain from attacking is made
credible because neither can mobilize forces in secret
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Democracy and Bargaining
Mechanisms of accountability mean that public disapproval is more likely to result in some sort of punishment for the democratic leader.
Institutions of accountability:• Make it easier for democratic leaders to credibly
communicate their resolve because backing down creates public disapproval
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Domestic Institutions or Strategic Interests?
Could common interests account for the democratic peace?
The verdict Is mixed:• War is a rare phenomenon and there were few
democracies in the nineteenth century• Democratic states did experience a high number of
militarized disputes short of war
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Domestic Institutions or Strategic Interests?
It is possible that democracy is not responsible for democratic peace.• Perhaps economic development accounts for the
democratic peace• But there is less evidence that wealth promotes peace
between countries
Democratic states may also have had relatively similar interests.
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Conclusion: What If All the World Were Democratic?
Political leaders may care about what is best for their country, but also care about staying in office.
When groups with hawkish interests have superior organization and resources, they can push the state toward greater international ambition.
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Conclusion: What If All the World Were Democratic?
When interactions and institutions empower those who bear the costs of war:• They can exert a pacifying effect at the international
level
The relative openness and transparency of democratic political process can:• Reduce informational and commitment problems that
cause bargaining to fail
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Conclusion: What If All the World Were Democratic?
Two reasons to be cautious:• Although the number of democracies has
increased over time, the spread of democracy has also experienced reversals
• Not all democratic countries are liberal; some are built on ethnic or religious identities that can foster conflicts
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Conclusion: What If All the World Were Democratic?
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Conclusion: What If All the World Were Democratic?
What if the public is motivated by nationalist, ethnocentric, or even genocidal ideas?
The international effects of democracy’s spread may depend not only on the institutions, but also on the interests of those they empower.
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What Do We Know? War and the Fate of Political Leaders
What happens to leaders who take their countries into war? Three outcomes:• Victories, small losses and big losses
About 85 percent of leaders who lost costly wars also lost office within a year of the war’s end.• Nondemocratic leaders face a much greater risk of
additional punishment
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What Shaped Our World? The Kargil War and the Limits of Democratic Peace In 1999, India mobilized its troops to repel a
Pakistani military force from the disputed Kashmir region.• At least 1000 soldiers died
India and Pakistan had already fought three wars since their independence in 1948.• But, at the time of war, both countries had democratically
elected governments
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What Shaped Our World? The Kargil War and the Limits of Democratic Peace Why did two democracies go to war?
• The role of religious differences• The influence of the military in Pakistan• Little civilian oversight of the diplomatic ramifications
of the operation
For democracy to act as a brake on international conflicts, elected leaders must have actual knowledge of and control over the state’s military actions.
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Controversy: Should We Assassinate Leaders Rather Than Fight Their Armies? Two arguments:
• Punish the “guilty” rather than the innocent• The common interests of warring states could
produce a bargaining outcome that minimizes the suffering and death of their populations
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Controversy: Should We Assassinate Leaders Rather Than Fight Their Armies? However, even if particular assassinations
save lives:• The general policy might be destabilizing for
international politics as a whole
The norm against assassination:• We should promote everyone’s interest in a stable
and predictable international order
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Additional Art for Chapter 4
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