chapter-iii nuclear establishments in...
TRANSCRIPT
CHAPTER-III
NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
Nuclear Establishments in Ka-zakhstan
At the hei.gb.t of the cold war era, the dominant thought was
that the two nuclear superpowers were invulnerable to pressure from
witbin and without as they were powered by nuclear warheads. All
this, however, changed with the radical redrawing of the political
map of the Central Asia followed by the implosions of the Soviet
. Union. New countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine
emerged as the nuclear states. Its strategic nuclear forces were
located in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan while tactical
nuclear weapons were scattered 1n about _ten republ1cs.1
Approximately 3,000 strategic and 6,500 tactical nuclear
weapons were located outside the Russian Federation. By M837 1992,
!!ill tactical weapons were transferred to Russia but strategic weapons
remained in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Kazakhstan's
nuclear stockpile consist.s of 1,410 warheads, 370 of them on heavy
bombers and 1,040 on 104 SS 185, the USSR;s largest ICMBs.2
2
S. Greenhouse, "US to double aid to Ukraine and Kazakhstan as · reward for Nuclear Accord", International Herald Times, 6 May : 1994.
Ibid.
76
The Semiplatinsk test site was established in 1949 and after
many nuclear explosions, was closed on 29 August 1992, in response
to a mass movement against nuclear testing led by a famous poet of
Kazakhstan. Unlike, Belarus and Ukraine, Kazakhstan is not a party
to the Partial Teat Ban Treaty (PTBT of 1963).
Kazakhstan has a sophisticated nuclear establishment with a
milltary potential. It has several nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The
republic has a nuclear power plant as well as a beryllium production ·
facility. Its liquid metal fast breeder reactor, BN -350 at Aktau
(formerly Shevab.enko) began commercial operation in 1973 and has
a license to operate until the year 2000. There is a phase of arraor
radar at Sari-Shagan and the famous Baikonur Cosmodrame.3
Kazakhstan was reported to be producing 50 percent of the
Soviet Union's uranium. There are plans to build a second fast
breeder reactor (350 MW). All these facilities, being part of the
nuclear weapon complex, have functioned without any international
inspection. Planning a maJor development of ita nuclear
infrastructure, Kazakhstan has recently established two- new
organizations.
3 President N ararbaev was immediately rewarded by US President Bill Clinton's decision to double $85 million of safe and secure nuclear disarmament aid pledged by Washington to that date, Strategic Digest, Nuclear Briefings, Maor 1994,
77
The Kazakh State Atomic Power & Engineering Industry
Corporation is given the responsibility for uranium production,
project management and facility construction and the Kazakh Atomic
Energy Agency w1ll manage the development of export controls and
safety regulations. All this would require financial, technological and
human resources.
In reality, it is Lisbon Protocol, 23M~ 1998, rather than the
START I Force Treaty that has ushered 1n denuclear1sat1on J>rDCess 1n
Central Asia and erstwhile Soviet states. The US Senate was
particularly concerned with denuclearisatlOI). and viewed any attempt
on the opposite as tantamount to breach of treaty: To tbis effect
Russia has made the implementation of the START I dependent on the
republics rat:ifying the treaty.4 Belarus and Kazakhstan have- ratified
ST.ART-1; but none of them has acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear
weapon state.
Ukraine and Kazakhstan have been most reluctant to part with
their nuclear weapons. They have made claims which amount to
'proliferation by inheritance'. President Nursultan Nzarbaorev has
pointed out that his country is sandWiched between two nuclear
weapon powers, Russia and China, both of them have made territorial
claims against it. He has, therefore, sought security guarantees from
4 Ibid.
78
the US. In February 1992, he linked denuclearization of his country
With the elimination of American, Russian and Chinese nuclear
arms.6
On another occasion he even maintained that because nuclear
test explosions continued to be conducted at the Semiplatinsk test site
when the NPT was being defeated Kazakhstan was entitled to be a
member of the exclusive "nuclear club". Under American pressure
Kazakhstan became a sign.atory to the Lisbon Protocol thereby
committing itself to a non-nuclear weapon .status.
The posture, however, is coupled with insiStence that instead of
transferring nuclear weapons to Russia they should be dismantled on
its own territory under international supervision. 6 Kazakhstan, like
Ukraine, objects to· the predilection of the western powers to regard
Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear stockpile.7
Because of its 'nuclear neighbourhood', there iS considerable
reluctance to allow Russia to have a monopoly of these weapons.
Oumirserik Kasenov and Kariat Abusetov of the Centre for Strategic
Studies in Alma Ata maintain that their country cannot exclude the
6
6
7
End of CIS Command heralds new Russian Defense Polley, RFE/Research Report, Vol.2, No.27, July 1993.
Strategic Digest, Nuclear Proliferation in Central Asia, Maor 1995.
R.S. Norris, 'The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago', Arms Control Today, Vol.22, No.1, Jan. 1992.
79
possibility of the emergence of a resurgent and expansionist Russia,
Kasenov says that Kazakhstan will not become a 'nuclear-free zone'
soon for two reasons.
The START-1 force limits do not include the destruction of all
nuclear weapons located in Kazakhstan; and secondly, any
negotiations on the remaining strategic nuclear weapons must
include Kazakhsstan as a full member of the negotiating process to
eliminate these weapons.
The ground realities are that both Ukraine and Kazakhstan
have come to realise the value of their nuclear capability, therefore,
are intent to dr:i.ve a ·hard bargain wbile affecting the process of
denuclearisation. The traditional Russophobia the historical fact has
also compounded this problem. In addition, six mill1on Russian.B
livtng in Kazakhstan also figure as a factor to be considered.
Central Asian Security and Kazakhstan's Nuclear Stockpiles
The problems raised by Kazakhstan's acquisition of nuclear
weapons dominated Western and Asian strategic reactions to the
Central Asian republics immediately after their independence.
Kazakhstan had 104-SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) with a total of 1,400 warheads as its soil. Each ICBM could
travel up to 11,200 kilometers and carried them independently
targeted warheads, each of which was equivalent to half a million
80
tons of TNT. The two main missile bases were in the north, in areas
dominated by Russian settlers. Overnight, Kazakhstan had become
· the fourth-largest nuclear power m the world. It was an awesome
responsibility for President Nursultan Nazarbayev and immensely
disturbing for a world that barely knew him or his policies.8
After the failed August 1991 coup, US Secretary of State J~s
Baker rushed to Alma Ata, where Nazarbaorev told him that so long as
Russian ~aintained its nuclear capability, Kazalthstan would retam.
its nuclear weapons~ 'I am absolutely against having any single
republic control all nuclear weapons by itself, 1rrespecttve of how
large that republic might. 9 I saor that 1n the Soviet Union, defense
should be unitary and all nuclear weapons should be under the
control of the central government', Nazarbaorev told Baker .10 In
December as the Soviet Union was on the verge of breakup,
Nazarbayev told Baker 1n another meet1ng that the joint control of aJ1
nuclear weapons should be shmoed by the nuelear inheritors of the
SOViet state. Russia, Ukraiiie, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
8
9
10
!TAR-TABS, Six CIS States join Forces to Enforce Export Control, 9 Feb. 1993.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Central Eurasia, FBIS-Sov, 10 Feb. 1993.
Peter Rudolf, 'Non-Proliferation and International Export Control', Aussenpolitik, Summer 1993.
81
At the meeting in Alma Ata on 21 December at which the
formation of the CIS was formally announced, all four nuclear states
agreed to keep the Soviet strategic arsenal under collective central
command, to accept US expertise in mOVing nuclear weapons from
outlying republics to Russia by 1994 and in carrying out plans for the
destruction of nuclear weapoJ+S. The only part of this agpeement that
was ever fulfilled was that by July 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons
had been moved to Ruasia. The US Congress sanctioned payment of
$400 million to the four nuclear states for the destructiOn of their
surplus nuclear weapons. '
.AI3 expected Ukraine and Kazakhstan_ linked d.enuclea.rjsati.on
With financial aid and at times appeared to show belligerent stands,
givtng room for a lot of_ speculations. It would be pertinent to recall ·
Nazabeyev's statement. On 28 January 1992,11 he declared that he
would not transfer bis weapons to Russia. 'It is not our fault that we
have become a nuclear power', he told the French Foreign Minifi.ter
Ronald Dumas.12 Rumours abounded in the western press that
Kazakhstan had sold 44 SS-18 to Iran and that it was about to
provide Teheran With uranium. None of these reports was ever
11
12
Ibid.
K.M. Cambell, et. al., "Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union", CSIA Studies in International Security, No.1.
82
proved but they kept western intel.l.i.gence agencies on their toes for
much of the year.
President Nazarbayev travelled to Washington in Maor 1992,
where he met President George Bush and signed a protocol in which
Kazakhstan agreed to sign the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START!) which would eventually allow the eUminatiOn of one-third
of Soviet and US nuclear weapons. Ukraine and Belarus had also'
signed such a protocol with the USA, so that all three states had
guaranteed with they would either destroy their missiles or move
them to Russia within seven years. All three states also pledged to
Sign the. Nuclear Non-Prnliferation Treaty (NPT) m the shortest
possible time. Russia was offi.cial.1y designated as the successor
nuclear state to the former Soviet Union.
Nazarbayev once again hardened stand, pointing to nuclear
status to China, Pakistan and India and called for unified, rather
particular denuclearisation programme. 13
In June 1992, the US and Russia agreed to START!, which
would eliminate all land-based multiple warhead missiles, leading to
an eventual ceiling of each side fielding 3,000 to 3,500 warheads by
the year 2000. The first missiles to be eliminated would be the SS-
18s, the very missiles on Kazakh soil. Ukraine, with 1,650 nuclear
13 Ibid.
83
warheads on the soil, refused to fall in and began a lengthy process of
threats, blackmail and ultimatums to Washington and Moscow in a
bid to obtain security guarantees from the USA and more than $175
million earmarked by Washington for the elimination of the missiles.
In January 1993, after three days of talks in Washington, Ukra.inia.n
leaders agreed to accept US security guarantees after Russia had
agreed to compensate Ukraine for giving up its nuclear weapons.
Kazakhstan is the only Asian country, other than China, India
and Pakistan to have declared nuclear weapons on its territory. It
has a total of 1,340 strategic nuclear weapons and was said to have
had 650 tactical nuclear weapons till these were Withdrawn into
Russia in mid-1992. Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Procotol on 22
Maor 1992 and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclea:r weapon state. It
has also declared a 'no first use' policy. There was considerable
speculation as to what will happen to these weapons once the overall
responsibility of the SOViet Union ceases. Initially President
Nazarbaorev had stated that it would help its nuclear weapons for
another 15 years. 14 But the Kazakh parliament has now decided to
withdraw all strategic nuclear weapons from operation by 1995. Till
then these will be under 'four power' control with control of 'nuclear
button' with the Russian President and the Kazakh President only to
14 John Muller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World", International Security, Falll998.
84
be kept informed. The actual elimination Will not be achieved soon.
In accordance With STARI, in the course of the next 7 years, i.e. by
2000 Kazakhstan Will be cutting its nuclear armaments in the same
proportion applicable to the Soviet . Union. At the same time
Kazakhstan and Russia, bound by their defense treaty, will decide for
themselves where to station these nuclear weapons in future.
The other question is on the safety and matntenance of the
nuclear weapons With Kazakhstan. There were considerable doubts
about this, but apparently an agreement has been reached with
Russia for ensuri.ng their safety. The disposal of the nuclear sites a;re
posing some problems, wliicll will be resolved within the Kazakhstan
Defense Ministry. The SenupaJ.atinBk nuclear testing site has been
converted into a national nuclear research centre, meant for non
m111tary research and develop;ment.
Nucleartsa.tion of Tibetan Plateau
Ch1na entered the nuclear age at a breakneck speed faster than
any other nuclear power. It took only 32 months during the early
1960s, a decade of chaos, fa.tlure and famine in China. This
extraordinary achievement required the summ.on:ing of enormous
intellectual and material resources at a time when intellectuals were
being purged and materials scarce. It also required concentrating
these people and supplies iil an elite, secluded setting. The location
85
was a closely guarded state secret and the security was absolutely top-
notch. The place was the Tibetan plateau, in Haibei Tibetan
Autonomous prefecture, 100 k.llometer west of X1ning.16
The selection of the Tibetan plateau for China's primary nuclear
weapons research and development base was the first in a series of
decisions that put China's nuclear .illfrastructure including test sites,
nuclear processing facilities and nuclear weapons production and
assembly in regions populated by non-Chinese peoples. There 1s now
little doubt that China's nuclear programme has had an inordinate
impact on Tibetans,. Uygurs and Mongolians. From land
appropriation to nuclear fallout, to toxic and radioactive pollution in
rivers, lakes and pastures, the story ·about the ugly side-effects of
China's nuclear programme is just beginning to emerge.16
China's nuclear programme is only a fraction Of the size of
those in the United States and the ex -Soviet Union in terms of its
nuclear arsenal, number of test explosions and the volume of nuclear
waste generated. But in the areas of nuclear proliferation, lack of
worker safety and irresponsible waste disposal, China's reco:r;d is as
poor or even worse than those of other nuclear powers. The
implications of this situation, from what we know of the effects in
16
16
John Ackerly, Nuclear Installations on the Tibetan Plateau, 1993, p.3-5.
Ibid.
86
other conntries, for the Tibetans, the Uygurs and the Mongolians is
trulyfr1eghten1.ng. 17
Before explaining the effects of the Chinese nuclear
establishments in Tibet, it is important to bring full details of the
Chinese nuclear setup and its policies. Only the minute descriptions
will tell the true story of the Chinese nuclear hazards for the Tibetan
people.
Nuclear weapons which can destroy all life forms and turn our
beautiful green planet into a barren dust-bowl are the antithesis of·
Buddhist philosopby. They can kill indiscriminately and continue
killing over thousands of years. So it is especial1y disturbing .for '
Tibetans to report that their motherland, dedicated to the peaceful
development of the human spirit, under China's occupation has
become the storehouse of Chinese nuclear weapons, and a place for
radioactive waste dumping. On top of this, China, for financial gain
has reportedly been encouraging foreign countries to ship their toxic
waste to Tibet.
The second part · of this chapter will try to focus on the
following major questions:
(a) . Document the development of nuclear weapons on the Tibetan
plateau.
17 Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 13 Aprill995.
87
(b) Bring to light China's destructive military activities on the
Tibetan plateau and their impact on the global environment.
(c) Create global consciousness about the effects of the
nuclearisation of the Tibetan plateau.
Historical Development
In 1949 People's Liberation .Army (PLA) soldiers entered
Eastern Tibet. In the Spring of 1950, Chi:i:la's "18th .A.rr:DY' entered
Tibet through Dartsedo in the east, and through Am.do in the north-
east. The "14th Division" entered through Dechen 1n south-east 'l'l"bet.
After occupying Kham and Amdo, the advance party of 'the "18th
.Army'' entered Lhasa on 9 September 1951, followed by the unit's
main force on 26 October 1951.18 This was only the beginning of the
vast Chinese military buildup in Tibet which continues to this <hey".
The first known nuclear weapon was brought onto the Tibetan
plateau in 1971 and installed in the Tsaidam basin in northern
Am.do. China currently has approximately 300-400 nuclear
warheads, 19 of which at least several dozen are believed to be on the
Tibetan plateau in Qinghai Province.
18
19
Brahma Chellany, "Regional Proliferation: Issues and Challenges" in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control, Stephen Cohen, ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, pp.323-25.
Ibid.
88
Establishment of the Ninth Academy
The Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design
Academy, known as the "Ninth Academy" or "Factory 211",20 was
built by the Ninth Bureau of Chinese Nuclear Production
Establishment in the early 1960s to produce China's early nuclear
bomb designs. It is China's top secret nuclear city located 1n Haibei
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 100 k:m west of S1li.ng.
-The construction of the Ninth Academy was approved by the
late Chinese leader, Den.g Xiaop:lng, who was then the general
secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party.
The Ninth Academy is situated at 36.57N, 101.55E with an elevation
of 10,000 feet above sea level, 10 miles east of Lake Kokonar, and lies
in a watershed which drains into the Tsang Chu R1ver.21 This
becomes the Yellow River. In the late 1970s, the Ninth Academy
further established a Chemical Industry Institute to conduct
experiments on reprocessing highly enriched uranium :fields.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Ninth Academy operated
under emergency conditions, to build China's nuclear weapon
capacity. An unknown quantity of radioactive waste in the form of
20
21
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, 1988.
Ibid.
89
liquid slurry, as well as solid and gaseous waste was dumped by the
academy. The disposal of waste was haphazard and their record
keeping dismal. Initially radioactive waste was dumped in shallow
and unlined landfills.22
All of the functions of the Ninth Academy are still not exactly
known. But it is clear that the Ninth Academy was responsible for
designing all of China's nuclear bombs through the mid-1970s. For
this purpose the facility designed and carried out non-nuclear
explosions. It also served as a research centre for detonation
development, radiochemi.stry and many other nuclear weapons
related activities. Although the primary function of the Ninth
Academy was on research and design, it also assembled components
of nuclear weapons.
The huge nuclear facility is one of China's most secret and is
rarely mentioned in Chinese or western publications. Activities in
large nuclear facilities in Xingiang and Gansu are now relatively wen
known, but little has ever been written about the "Ninth Academy" .23
Parts of the facility are located underground to deter detection and
possible destruction in the event of an attack.
22
23
Tibetan Review, March 1981, p.13.
There are a few books which discuss nuclear facilities in Gansu and Xinliang, William Ryan and Sam Summerlin, China Cloud, Little Brown & Co., 1967, Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy.
90
One of the only references to the plant which publicly appeared
in English prior to the late 1980s was in the book In Exile from. the
Land of Snows which said that a gaseous diffusion plant, a warhead
assembly plant and research labs had been moved to an undisclosed
area in Tibet in 1968. The other reference, which went largely
unnoticed far decades, was a 1966 Central Intelligence Agency report
that referred to the facility as the "Kokonor Nuclear Weapons Center"
but gave no further infoflll.ation.24
There are reportedly other nuclear-related facilities near the
Ninth A~ademy. The town of Hwmgyuan has related factli~es which
are all connected_ by underground tunnels. At least one Torpedo
factory was located nearby, on the shores of Lake Kokonor, and has
been converted to a guest house.28 Known as "Factory 151", it iS
likely to have been associated with the nuclem." specialities developed
by Ninth Academy scientists. Other milita:ry installations have been
located on the south shore of Lake Kokonor, where abandoned
building and a pier for launching era;tts are now assembling. On the
north side at Gangca, there is a military airport and more facilities.
24
26
Ibid.
Li Jue, JPRS, p.2. Prior to the opening of the Ninth Academy, nuclear weapon design was conducted at the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute. After the Ninth Academy was: opened the top scientists and the principal work were relocated from Beijing to the Tibetan plateau.
91
Construction began under what were described as extremely
difficult conditions. Due to the isolation of the site, the altitude,. a
sh9rt annul frost-free period, and many other obstacles, the in1tial
force of construction workers waa inadequate. Authorities reinforced
the construction brigade with workers from thirteen departments,
which probably included prison labourers. The facility was partiaJly
opened in 1963 and fully operational by 1967, at the height of the
cultural revolut1on.26
In 1964, the Ninth Academy conducted the first 1:1 modeLblast
experiment at a site near the facility; It is unknown how many test
explosions have been conducted there, and how much radioactive1
material was involved. All documented nuclear tests have been
conducted at Lop Nor, in Xingia;ng Prov1nce.27 China's top nuclear
scientists continued to gather at the Ninth Academy to refine, update
and develop all of China's nuclear weapons technology through the
late 1960s and early 1970s.
During the 1960s China faced mounting hostilities with its
neighbours. Taiwan was becoming increasingly bel.l.igerent and the
US was considering deploying nuclear missiles on Taiwan - a move
26 Ibid.
27 John Avedon, In Exile from the Lands of Snows, New York: Vintage Books, 1986. ·
92
that led to a Chinese "Cuban Missile Crisis" .28 The Soviet Union and
China broke off relations inl960, and in 1962 the border was with
India completed the hostile encirclement of China in a new nuclear
age. China's tactical response was to create the "Third Front". From
1965 to the early 1970s China conducted massive and Secret
Industrial Investments centered in Sichuan which they thought
safest from invasion and bombing. The Third Front also involved
duplicating or relocating many strategic factories, research
establishments and military installations to protect them from
nuclear or oonventio:p.al attack. 29
Facilities_located m the_north of China were vulnerable due not
only to their proximity to the enemy Soviet state, but also because the
Soviets had helped design and build m.tmy of Cb:ina's nuclear and
military facilities. Thus, the SOViets knew the exact locations,
functions and capabilities of China's military. By 1969, relations
between the Soviet Un1on and China had deteriorated to the extent
that the Moscow was preparing plans for nuclear strikes aga1.nst
China's nuclear facilities. It was decided that the Ninth Academy was
one of the facilities to be moved. 30
28
29
30
Ibid.
John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bombs, Stansford University Press, 1988, p.53.
L. Hong,_ "Nuclear Weapon Breakthrough", China Daily, 9 Sept. 1984.
93
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Ninth Academy operated
under emergency conditions to bufid China's nuclear weapon
capability. An unknown quantity of radioactive waste in the form of
liquid slurry, as well as solid and gaseous waste was dumped by the
academy. The disposal of waste was haphazard and their record
keeping dismal. Initially radioactive waste was dumped in shallow
and unlined landfalls.31
A direct raUwaor line connects the academy with Lake Kokonor,
the largest lake on the Tibetan plateau. Nuclear waste_ experts believe
that radioactive waste was also dumped into, the lake. A reliable
report from a Chinese man whose father was a nuclear scientist in
Lanzhou, states that in 1974 there was an accident involving nuclear
pollution of the Lake (ICT, 1993). The Ninth Academy is loc~ted on
marshy land, allowing polluted water and radioactive particles to
easily seep into the groundwater which flows into Lake Kokonor.
According to the official China News Agency, Xinhua, dated 20
July 1995,32 the Ninth Academy was decommissioned in1987, and
the base was moved to sites in Sichuan prOVince in Eastern Tibet.
However, Tibetans living near the Ninth Academy informed the
Tibetan Government in Exile in 1996 that Chinese security personnel
31
32
Tibetan Review, Jan,-Feb. 1976,"p.26.
M.G. Chitkara, Toxic Tibet under Nuclear China, APH Publishing Coporation,New Delhi, 1996, p.l63.
94
secretly guarded the Ninth Academy round the clock, putting in.to
question the Chinese claim that this nuclear production centre has
been closed.
Anti-Frigate Missile Centre at Drotsa.ng
A new m.1Bsile production centre is located at Drotsa.ng, 63
kilometer in east of S11.1ng. The secret code number of this c-entre is
430. It was originally setup in 1986 and was massively expanded in ./
1995.33 It is a surrogate of the Ninth Academy and has been
producing anti-frigate miBsiles which are being tested in Lake
Kokonor.
Land-Based Nuclear Warheads
When Major General Zhang Shaosong, the Political
Commissioner of the PLA in Tibet, was asked pointblank whether
there were nuclear weapons in Tibet by the BEG's Mack Braine in
1988, he replied, "whether there are nuclear weapons in Tibet or not,
it is up to the authorities to decide." And he smiled.34
Nuclear Missile Launch Sites at Tsaida.m. in Am.do
The Ninth Academy was ready to produce nuclear weapons by
1991.
33
34
Tashi Chutter, Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese : Occupational Forces in Tibet, 1998.
Va;nya Kewley, Tibet: Behind the Ice Curtain, London, 1990.
95
The first batch of nuclear weapons manufactured at the Ninth
Academy was reportedly brought to Tsaidam Basin stationed at Small
Tsaidam and Large Tsaidam.36
According to various reports, a launch site for Dong Fen.g Four
(DF-4) missiles which are equivalent to Russia's CSS-2 was built in
Tsaidam. These missiles, located at Large Tsaidam and Small Tsaid.am
are reported to have a range of over 4,000 kin, placing the whole
Indian subcontinent within stri.ki.ng d1stance.36
The DF-4 is China's first intercontinental bailistic missile.
During the 1970s the range was extended from 4,000 km to 7,000
km allowing the moclified version now deployed on the Tibetan
plateau to reach Moscow and the rest of the former Soviet Union.37
The Small Tsaidam site 1n northern Tibet, is presumably
organized 1n a similar Wf3¥ to the large Tsaidam deployment and
launch site. The missiles were moved to these sites 1n the Tibetan
plateau in- 1971. According to diplomatic sources of International
Campaign for Tibet (ICT) 1n Wasb..i.n.gton DC, nuclear missiles are
36
36
37
DIIR, Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts, Department of Information & International Relations, CentraJ. Tibetan Administration, India, 1996.
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford Press, 1988.
Ibid ..
96
stationed in Small Tsaidam and are onJy moved to large Tsaidam in ·
times of emergency.
Another nuclear missile launch site is located at Terlin.gkha,
217 km southeast of Tsaidam. It houses DF-4 and Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Terlingbha is the missile regiment
headquarter for Am.do which consists of four -associated launch
sites.38
A New Missile Division in Amdo
A new nuclear missile division has alSo been established on the
Tibetan plateau on the border between Qinghai and Sichuan
prov1nces, in the Tibetan province of Amdo. Four CSS-4 missiles are
deployed here, which have a range of 8,000 m1les39 capable of striking
the United States, Europe and anywhere in Asia. Amdo province of
Tibet has in total four nuclear missile launch sites, two at Tsa.idam,
one at Terlingbha and one at the border between Amdo and Sichuan
prov1nce.
Missile bases at Risur in N a.gchuka
In 1979s numerous reports surfaced regarding the stockpiling
of nuclear weapons. These reports also confirmed that missile base
38 JohnAckerly, ICT, 1998.
39 The Tribune, 5 July 1997, 'China's Nuclear Power in Tibet'.
97
construction work had started about 10 miles north of-Nagchuka in
the 'Tibet Autonomous Region' in 1970 and that there was a
considerable buildup of Chinese military personnel in the area. 40
On 14 October 1987, an article in the Australian newspaper
The Australian reported the presence of nuclear missile at Nagchuka.
Subsequently, the Austrian Nuclear Disarmament party, in a press
release dated 28 October 1987, expressed their grave concern and
stated that 20 Intermediate Range Ballistic M1Bs1les (IRBM)41 and 70
medium range ones (MRBM) were stationed in Nagchuka.
Mr. Tasbi Chutter's newly published book (1998) Confidential
Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Forces in Tibet
confirms that there are nuclear missiles permanently stationed at
Nagchuka. The missiles are housed 1n underground complexes under
.Risur mountain, 25 km southeast of Nagchuka. The Risur site has
reportedly been developed by the Chinese government for two nuclear
reasons; to provide an alternative to the Lop Nor nuclear test site in
Eastern Turkistan (Xinl1a.ng), and to store as well as test China's
upgraded air defense missi.l,es and nuclear weapons. Nag Cb.uka is
reported to have the largest airforce unit stationed at any scheduled
40
41
Ibid.
Ibid.
98
site.42
Like . the Risur site, another missile base is located at Tagb.o
mountain in the remote valley of Pelok which lies to the East of
Nyima Dzon.g under Nagchuka administrative division of 'Tibet
Autonomous Region'. Missiles of either nuclear or non-nuclear are
reportedly stored in the underground rocky tunnels of Ta.gb.o
mountain. Tl:).e entire region is described as a desolate desert, where
only military vehicles are allowed to enteT. ~
Underground Missile Storage Site in Lhasa
Dhoti Phu is located at 3.5 km to the northwest of Drapchi
Prison and one km to the west of Sera Monastery. It came into.
existence between the late 1960s and 1970s. It was observed that
occasionally 20 to 25 trucks, loaded with long shaped objects
wrapped in canvas cloth were seen entering the storage site. The
movement of such vehicles takes place only at night. The
sophisticated underground storage complex of. Dhoti Phu reportedly
contains missiles known as di dui tron.g (ground-to-air) and di dui di
(surface-to--surface). 44 In Lhasa during Chinese Army Daur ( 1
42
43
44
Tashi, Chutter, Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Forces in Tibet, 1998.
Ibid.
Tibetan Review, Jan. 1981.
99
August), a number of missiles of these types were displayed to the
public on missile vehicles.
Missiles in Kon.gpo
A large underground missile storage centre is located at Payi
Town in Kongpo N;Yingb.i, 'TAR'. Its secret code number is 809. It is,
controlled by the Chengdu Military Logistic Division. Supplies are
brought in by the 17th, 18th and 20th Transport Reg:tmentEI from
Chengdu and some supplies are also brought in from Lhasa. A few
low ceiling barracks were noticed near the foothill of ~ mountaln 1n
Paon where there is an' entrance leading to an underground storage
complex. Long convoys of military trucks belonging to the transport
reg:tments have been .observed entering the storage facility when fresh
supplies arrive at the facility, storage complex drives replace the
regular drivers inside the complex. 46
It is reported_ that ground-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles
are stored at this site. During mock military exercises a large
number of such missiles are taken out of this complex. At one time,
about 80 missiles were observed. They were mounted on 20 trucks,
each truck carryin.g four missiles. Each missile measured about one
and half times the length of the trucks. During these exercises,
46 Ibid.
100
missiles were launched vertically and horizontally to hit pre-arranged
, targets.46
Airbases with Nuclear Weapons
There are three types of aircraft in China currently available for
nuclear bombing missions: the Hong-6 bomber, the Hong-5 bomber,
and the Qian-5 attack jet. The Hong-6 has a combat radius of over
3,000 km and can reach areas in the former Soviet Union and India.
The Hong-5 has a combat radius of 1,200 km.. 47
:During the 1960s and 1970s the three maJn military airbases
in Tibet were the Lhasa A:irfi.eld, Chabcha .Airfteld, and Golmud
Airfi.ed. During the 1960s Chabdra and Golmud airfields were used
as refuell:lng stations for Chinese on their way to Tibet and the Indian
border.
The Gongkar a1rfl.eld, located 97 km. southwest of Lhasa has
been· the main military air:field and the main supply centre for the
Chinese forces in the border area. At Shigatse military airport, four
or five IL-28 bombers were deployed with some jetfighter aircraft.
Military transport aircraft such as the AN -32 and the Russian made
IL-18 were noticed in frequent operations at the airport. Every
46
47
Richard Fieldhouse, 'Chinese Nuclear Weapons: A Current and Historical Overview", Natural Resource Defence Council, USA, March 1991.
Ibid.
101
autumn, these bombers carried out bombing exercises at a place
known at Logma Then.g, west of the airport at a distance of 50 km.
During the rest of the year the all>craft practice flight manoeuvring
exercises. 48
A classified Pentagon report quoted by the Washington Times
states that missile launch complexes in Ji.all.Shui, near the China-Viet
border and at Daton.g in Am.do are equipped with CSS-2 and CSS-5
launchers that can bit targets which cover "most of India" other
targets include Russian, Japan and Taiwan, quoting a. classified study
prepared by the National Air Intelligence Centre (NAIC). 49
China has been party to the violation of the 1963 treaty many a
times having exploded underground nuclear device on 17 August
1995 followed by two more explosions on 8 June 1996 and 29 Jwy
1996, ta.k;ng the whole taJly to forty-five.6° China's 45th nuclear
explosion of 29 July 1996 came just a few hours before delegates sat
down to negotiate the final stage of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty" (CTBT) at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva.
48
49
60
Tashi Chutter, Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Forces in Tibet, 1998.
Ibid.
United News of India (UNI), 28 Sept. 1997, 'China Tests more Nuclear Bombs'.
102
CNN World News on 7 Aprill998, announced that France and
the United Kingdom ratified the CTBT to prevent international
nuclear proliferation for a nuclear free world. China is one of the five
nuclear states in the world, along with the US and Russia who are yet
to ratify the CTBT. China signed the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty
in 1998.61
With trade matters and real politi.k. com.1n.g to the forefront of
the world diplomacy. China's nuclear tests are no longer vociferously
contested for it will entail huge trade losses to the advanced
countries. These nations are just ma.king occasional murmur
showing shift from the 1960s when the Tibetan cause was
voc?-ferously felt.
Radioactive Waste on the Tibetan Plateau
Radioactive wastes are chemical wastes which contain their
own unique blend of hundreds of distinctly unstable atomic
structures called radioisotopes. Each radioisotope has its own life
span and potency for giving off alpha, beta and gamma r837B. These
rays can cause cancer and other diseases in human beings and
animals; most frightening of all, radiation emitted by radioactive
wastes can cause genetic mutation resulting in birth defects in babies
etc. Scientists have not discovered any foolproof wa;y to permanently
61 Tibetan Review, 25 Jan. 1996, 'China's Nuclear Power'.
103
contain radioactive wastes. One spoonful of plutonium powder is
enough to destroy the population of a large city.
The Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on H11rnan
Rights, 1993, articulated that, 'Illicit dumping of toxic and dangerous
substances potentially constitutes a serious threat to human rights,
life and the health of everyone. "62
'
The Basel Convention,63 signed in 1992 by various countries to
which China is a signatory, and the subsequent Basel Ban, adopted as
an amendment to the convention in September 1995, prohibit trade
in hazardous wastes from industrialized to non-industrialized
countries. AT the fourth conference of parties held in Kuching,
Malavrsia between 23-27 February 1998, China half-heartedly
supported no changes to the Basel Ban to stop certain developing
countries from benefiting from trade in recyclable hazardous waste.
Although this is a step in the right direction, China's own record of
waste disposal on the Tl'betan plateau 1B dismal, to savr the least. 54.
On 18 February 1984, the Washington Post reported that China
had tentatively agreed to stare up to 4,000 tons of radioactive waste
62
63
64
The Tribune, 5 July 1998, 'Nuclear Hazards and China's Contributions'.
Ibid.
Tibetan Review, 'How Tibet is turning to be a nuclear waste bowl'. This news aJ.so explains the effects of nuclear wastes on the people of Tibet.
104
from European nuclear reactors in the remote Gobi Desert in
exchange for US $6 billion. Since then this was to take place over the
next 16 years. 5 5
In the fall of 1988, news began circulating among Tibetans as
to the potential use of Tibet as a nuclear dumping ground for Western
Europe. According to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, spiritu~ and
temporal leader of the Tibetan people, a signed document offers
evidence that the Chinese government is planning to dump foreign
nuclear waste in Tibet. 66
In 1991, Greenpeace reported that the city officials in-
Baltimore, Maryland, USA, had sec'ured a tentative agreement with
China to ship 20,000 tons of the city's toxic sewage waste to Tibet in
exchange for payment of US $1.44 million. The brokers for the
shipment were California Enterprises, and Hatnan Sunlight Group, a
Chinese government agency. The latter said that such shipments did
not require government approval according to China's import rules
and guaranteed that the sludge would not be shipped back to the
USA. Greenpeace noted that the import document describeP- the
BB
66
Michael Werskopf, 'China Reportedly agrees to store Western Nuclear Wastes', The Washington Post, 18 Feb. 1984, p.21.
Ibid.
105
shipment as "heni", which means "river silt"67 in Chinese.
Greenpeace protested, "Urban sewage iB not river silt". In the United
States, sludge from urban sewage treatment plants are ~hronicaJly
laced with toxic pollutants.
His Holiness tlie Dalai Lama, while participati.n.g in a "Meet the
Press" programme organized by the Karnatak.a Union of Working
Journalists in Bangalore in India said having authentic information
that China had set up a nuclear weapon factory in 'IJ.bet. He said that
China had stationed a half-a-million strong military force in. Tibet,
which indicated that the situation in the occupied territory was
potentially explosive. 68
China responded to international allegations levelling them as
baseless. But at the same time it conformed the exiStence of 80 sq.
meter dump for radioactive pollutants in Habey in Tibetan
autonomous prefecture near the source of lake Loparov. Another
aspect of the report was the consistent clean chit given to the Ninth
Academy pressing its excellent track record, but it conveniently heed
the facts of nuclear dangers like the· effec;t of radiation on the
villagers, livestock, natural pollution, pollution of rivers and trans-
national impact of nucleariBation. Thus, it becomes all the more
67
68
John Ackerly, A Poisonous Atmosphere: Nuclear Installations on the Tibetan Plateau, China Human Rights Forum, Spring 1993, pp.4-8.
The Statesman, 21 January 1992.
106
necessary to examine the cases of tbis genre while focussing on each
of the mentioned areas. We shall therefore examine all these aspects
with concrete examples and lists them under the respective headings
as follows below. 69
The report did not give details as to how the nuclear waste
initially contained or how it is being managed. It did s937 however in
the words of Mr. You Delrang, spokesman for the China National
Nuclear Corporation, that spent a large amount of money ft>om 1989
to 1993 to "strictly supervise the environmental conditions of the
retired nuclear weapon base" .60
A 1993· report "Nuclear Tibet", published by the International
Campaign for Tibet, documented reports by a local Jibetan -d.octor,
Tasbi Dolma, of abnormally b.1gh rate of diseases in the nearby towns
of Reshui and Ga.nzihe. The doctor also treated cbildren of nomads
who grazed their animals adjacent to the nuclear base called "Ninth
Academy" or "Factory 211", seven of whom died of cancer witb1n five
years.
Shallow Ian?- burial techniques, considered obsolete in the west,
were deemed "sufficiently safe" for implementation in China. On the
69
60
Xinhua, 19 July 1995. Its explanation is contradictory. It claims that there has not been a single case of nuclear contamination to any Tibetan.
Tibetan Review, 18 August 1994.
107
proposed site for High Level waste, Chinese officials said that China
had a very wide distribution area it would be easy to find a site.81
Since Tibet is sparsely populated by 'minority nationalities' and is far
removed from Beijing to the Chinese wa;y of thinking, it is a perfect
site to dump nuclear wastes.
According to a Reuter report dated 10 November 1993, China
was building its radioactive waste disposal centre in the aid western
province of Gansu and had planned three more in Bouthern, south-
western and eastern China under its ambitious schemes to boast
nuclear power to make up for a protected annual shortage of some
150 million tons of coal by 2000 and 1.2 billion tons by 2050.
Taiwan's nuclear experts went to Peking to attend a symposium
billed as an "ice-breaker for atom splitter". China offered a dump site
for Taiwan's stockpile of radioactive waste.82 According to AFP on 28
May 1997 Taiwan snubbed the offer by China to take their 60,000
barrels of nuclear waste.
Local Impacts
Dumping of nuclear wastes on the Tibetan plateau will directly
affect the lives of people and the health of the environment in both
61
62
United News of India (UNI), 25 Sept. 1993, 'Nuclear Dumping Sites in Tibet'.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1993.
108
the short-term and over millions of years.
For example, the half life of uranium is 4,500 million years.
Therefore, harmful radiation emitted is a health hazard for millions
of years to come and will lead to a number of deadly diseases
includi.ng cancer and leukaemia. Radioactivity also affects the DNA
in livin.g calls causing genetic d18orders and deformities that can be
passed from generation to generation in human, animals and plants.
People, Animals and Plants contaminated
Mr. Gonpo Thondup, who escaped from Tibet to Dharamsala in
India in March 1987, visited two nuclear weapons production
departments code numbered 405 in Kyangtsa and 792 in Thewo,
Amdo region of Tibet. His statement was presented by Mr. Tsewang
Norbu at the World Uranium Hearing in Salzburg, Germany, on 14
September 199~.63
(
It reads, "The effects of experiments and waste from 792 and
405 have been devastating. Before 1960, in this region of Am.do,
harvests were plentiful and domestic animals healthy. Now the crop-
field has shrunk, and people and animals are dying mysteriously, and
in increasing numbers. Since 1987 there has been a sharp rise in the
number of deaths of domestic animals and fish are all but vanished.
63 Detail explanation by Mr. Gonpo was published in Tibetan Review, 18 May 1992.
109
In the years of 1984 and 1990, 50 people died in the region, all
frommysterious causes. Twelve women gave birth in the Summer of
1990 and every child was dead before or died during birth. One
Tibetan woman, Tsering Dolma (aged 30), has given birth seven times
and not a single child has survived."
Mr. Gonpo added, "The people living near dpeartments 405 and
792 have experienced strange diseases. They have never seen before
many local people's skin turned yellowish and their eye-sight has
been affected seriously. Local populace reported strange memory
losses ~d many babies are born deformed. The people of the area are
desperate, and can only turn to religion and local doctors, who have
no knowledge of the uranium mines or of the nuclear plants nearby."
There is consistent evident that China's nefarious nuclear
programme has caused the regular loss of human lives. According to
the Tibet Information Network (TIN), London 1n a News Update of 11
September 1992, at least 35 Tibetans living near uranium mines died
within a few hours after developing a high fever and distinctive
diarrhoea 1n Ngaba Prefecture in Sichuan Province. 5 4
In 1984 villagers from ReshuLand Ganzihe villages, located
close to the Ninth Academy in Am.do, reported strange diseases to the
64 These reports were documented by ICT in 1990s. Reports a.re based on the interviews of the people have run awa;y from Tibet.
110
Tibetan doctor, Tashi Dolma and her medical team. However, the
China authorities would not allow the medical team to follow up these
reports. Dr. Tashi worked at Chabcha hospital 1n Hainam Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture directly south of the nuclear ·city known as
Ninth Academy, where they treated the children of nomads whose
cattle grazed near the Academy.66 These children developed cancer
which caused their white blood cell count to rise uncontrollably.
Seven of these children died . during the years that Dr. Tashi was
working at the hospital. An American doctor conducting research at
the hospital reported that these symptoms were similar to concerns
caused by radiation after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombings
in 1945. In addition there have been numerous reports of
unexpected deaths and illness amongst this nomad population.
In September 1992, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) ·
fact-finding team found that meant from the area had been banned
from stores by the Chinese authorities. However, poor Tibetan often
ate the contaminated meat either out of ignorance or economic
constraint. 66
66 Ibid.
66 FEER, 15 August 1995.
111
Uranium Mining
Uranium mines are located in several regions of Tibet,
including Damshung, north of Lhasa, Tsaidam began north of Golm.o,
Yamdrok Tso and Thewo in southernAmdo, 254 km from Tsoe under
Khaulho. The uranium deposits at Thewo in Gannan Tibetan
Autonomous prefecture are known to be the largest in Tibet. 67 At the
uranium mines at Thewo poisonous waste waster is allegedly
collected and stored in a stone structure 40 meters high before being
released into the local river, which the people use for drinking.
Tibetan refugees escaping to India report the following results from
the mining.
(a) More than-50 Tibetan residents ofThewo died between 1987-91
from mysterious illness.
(b) Domestic animals die mysteriously and the cause of illness i~
unidentif1able.
(c) Trees and ·grasses wither.
(d) The Jampakok river is polluted; the water is black and it
67
68
stinks. It merges with Dukchu Kurpo.68
M.G. Chitkara, Toxic Tibet under Nuclear China, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, p.l63.
Ibid.
112
A list of 24 Tb.ewo residents who myseriously died was part of
Thewo residents who mysteriously died was part of the information
provided to our desk. Witnesses said that before they died, aJl
experienced a high fever, then shivering cold. After death, their skin
had a blUish hue. Animals also turned blue or black after death and
their organs appeared burnt.69
Vanyakewley, a BBC reported who visited the Chinese missile
base at Nagc~uka in 1988 interviewed several people liVing 1n the
area. In her book Tibet: Behind the Ice Curt~ a Tibetan man caJled
Kelsang said, "Many people have seen and heard movements and
noises. Most people here have seen missiles coming from China and
mapy travellers have seen movements of missiles of different
places. "70
He further said, "As a result of the situation here, a.nirnals are
getting strange diseases and dying. Some people are dying and
children are being born deformed. In many places water 1s
contaminated and undrinkable. The moment you drink it, you get ill
or get diseases that we never had before. People get ill and go to
69
70
Ibid.
Green Tibet Annual Newsletter, 1995-96. China snubs the world with Nuclear Tests, DIIR, Central Tibetan Administration, India. This newsletter explains ill details about the nuclear effects on the lives of Tibetan people.
113
different hospitals. They don't get better and the doctors don't tell us
what it is and then we have to keep quiet about it. "71
The Use of Prisoners at Nuclear Establishments
Though, the human right organisation have regularly spoken of
the existence of labour camps behind the bamboo curtain just like the
SOViet Gulags noboy link them with the ongoing nuclear programme.
While mapping out the nuclear establishments in Tibet it became
increasingly evident that they were all located near large prison
labour camp adding fuel to the argument that the Chinese nuclear
programme used prison labourers. A classic example is the Delingha
Farm near Terlingbka Silos, home to one of three largest labour
camps 1n China with prison population put at one lakh.72 The picture
repeats itself the other missile sites spread over Central Am.do, large
tseaidom, Lanzhou in Ganso province and at other places in Am.do.
This scenario was confirmed by Harrywou, a former Chinese political
prisoner. The international campa:ign for Tibet, USA, took up tbis
issue with reference to the nuclear instalments at Lopnor and
Lanchou.73
71
72
73
Ibid.
Vanya Kewley, Tibet: Behind the Ice Curtain, London: Cra:ftion Books, 1990.
Green Tibet Annual Newsletter, 1995-96. China snubs the world with Nuclear Tests, DIIR.
114
Trans-National Impacts
Most toxic disposals sites on the Tibetan plateau have minimLal
safety standards. The effects of harmful radioactive pollutants
dumped anywhere on the plateau will be felt war beyond its borders,
particularly because it is the source of 10 great river systems of Asia
and commands - massive interdependent ecological zones which
share weather and climatic anomalies.
Atmospheric Pollution
The nuclear waste pollution of the Tibetan plateau, besides
haVing local effects, also has trans-national implications. The b.1gh
altitude winds (jet streams) that blow over the Tibetan plateau may
carry nuclear pollutants from Tibet across the globe to affect other
countries, since no boundary can be built to control air pollution.
The Tibetan plateau is seismologicaJJy an active region. Consequently,
serious accidents at nuclear power and weapons production plants
can endanger the lives of people and the health of the environment.
When the accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
the former Soviet Union in 1986, the radioactive dust from the plant
travelled 950 miles (1,529)74 in all directions resulting in irreparable
damage to people, people and the environment.
74 Sunda.ry Morning Post (SMP), 6 August 1989, 'Mainland Stores Nuclear Waste Amid Claims of Ignorance'.
115
Groundwater and Soil Contamination
Mr. Pan Ziqiang, Director of the Safety Department of the state
run National Nuclear Industry Corporation, is quoted ass~ that
so far aJ.l of China's nuclear wastes have been put in concrete
basement facilities which are safe for only about 10 years.75 Mr. Luo
Guerhen of the State Environmental Protection Bureau 883'8 that
1,200 people have been injured by radioactivity between 1980 and
1985 and about 20 have died.
Due to weatherin.g, radioactive and other military wastes
· concrete containers buried in the ground will seep out. the
contaminate ground water sources, which are normally used tor
drinking and agricultural purposes. Groundwater makes up a
s1gni.:ficant share of China's water resources.
Reports from Tibet confirm that underground water supplies in
Amdo have been djminishin.g at a rapid rate. Underground acquifers,
which are one of the maJor source of drinking water supplies, once
contaminated are impossible to clean. Therefore, any pollution at all,
especially radioactive contamination of groundwater is of great
concern.76
76 Ibid.
76 M.G. Chitkara, n.
116
River Pollution and Flooding
Radioactive waste .randomly disposed of near water bodies will
pollute rivers, lakes and springs. Since Tibet is the primary source of
water for most of south and south-east Asia, the impact of head water
pollution, especially by nuclear or industrial toxic waste on the social
and economic fabric of millions of people in downstream countries
would be disastrous. Countries including China, Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Burma, Thatlan.d, Cambodia, Laos, Bhutan, and Vietnam
will be drastically affected and forced to alter their livelihood. This
will certainly cause terrible suffering to everyone dependent on these
rivers for their livelihood. 77
Massive deforestation of the Tl."betan. plateau largely contributes
to the situation of the downstream rivers and the increas:ingly
destructive flooding that occurs each year. Rivers such as the
Bramhaputra, Yangtse, Yellow river, Salween,. Sutlel, Indus,
Mekongand others may also carry nuclear-Telated _ waste from
uranium mines in Tibet. These rivers finally flow into the Arabian
Sea, Bay of B~ngal and the South China Sea. The global scale of such
an environmental catastrophe is truly frightening.
Between 1985 and 1994, 36,000 hectares of Chinese farmland
annually suffered from top-soil loss, especially along the Yangtse and
77 Tibetan Review, 25 Maor 1991, 'Tibet and its Nei.ghoburs'.
117
Yellow rivers, both of which originate from Tibet. Erosion has caused
river beds to rise several meters higher than the surround.i.ng
farml~;LD.d, thereby increasing the incidence of floods.
In an extensive survey of China's major river basins, carried
out in 1994 only 32 percent of the river water was found to meet the
national standards for drinking water sources. Large. segments of the
Chinese population still haVe to rely on polluted sources for drinking
water, though estimates differ considerably. 78
78 UNDP, 1997, People's Republic of China: Development Co-operation Report, 1995.
118